The final refusal of the Platæans was proclaimed to Archidamus, by

word of mouth from the walls, since it was not thought safe to send

out any messenger. As soon as the Spartan prince heard the answer,

he prepared for hostile operations,—apparently with very sincere

reluctance, attested in the following invocation, emphatically

pronounced:—

“Ye gods and heroes, who hold the Platæan territory, be ye my

witnesses, that we have not in the first instance wrongfully—not

until these Platæans have first renounced the oaths binding on all of

us—invaded this territory, in which our fathers defeated the Persians

after prayers to you, and which ye granted as propitious for Greeks

to fight in,—nor shall we commit wrong in what we may do farther, for

we have taken pains to tender reasonable terms, but without success.

Be ye now consenting parties: may those who are beginning the wrong

receive punishment for it,—may those who are aiming to inflict

penalty righteously, obtain their object.”

It was thus that Archidamus, in language delivered probably under

the walls, and within hearing of the citizens who manned them,

endeavored to conciliate the gods and heroes of that town which he

was about to ruin and depopulate. The whole of this preliminary

debate,[326] so strikingly and dramatically set forth by Thucydidês,

illustrates forcibly the respectful reluctance with which the

Lacedæmonians first brought themselves to assail this scene of the

glories of their fathers. What deserves remark is, that their direct

sentiment attaches itself, not at all to the Platæan people, but

only to the Platæan territory; it is purely local, though it becomes

partially transferred to the people, as tenants of this spot, by

secondary association. It was, however, nothing but the long-standing

antipathy[327] of the Thebans which induced Archidamus to undertake

the enterprise; for the conquest of Platæa was of no avail towards

the main objects of the war, though its exposed situation caused it

to be crushed between the two great contending forces in Greece.

[326] Thucyd. ii, 71-75.

[327] Thucyd. iii, 68.

Archidamus now commenced the siege forthwith, in full hopes that his

numerous army, the entire strength of the Peloponnesian confederacy,

would soon capture a place of no great size, and probably not very

well fortified; yet defended by a resolute garrison of four hundred

native citizens, with eighty Athenians: there was no one else in

the town except one hundred and ten female slaves for cooking. The

fruit-trees, cut down in laying waste the cultivated land, sufficed

to form a strong palisade all round the town, so as completely to

block up the inhabitants. Next, Archidamus, having abundance of

timber near at hand in the forests of Kithæron, began to erect a

mound up against a portion of the town wall, so as to be able to

march up by an inclined plane, and thus take the place by assault.

Wood, stones, and earth, were piled up in a vast heap,—cross palings

of wood being carried on each side of it, in parallel lines at right

angles to the town wall, for the purpose of keeping the loose mass of

materials between them together. For seventy days and as many nights

did the army labor at this work, without any intermission, taking

turns for food and repose: and through such unremitting assiduity,

the mound approached near to the height of the town wall. But as it

gradually mounted up, the Platæans were not idle on their side: they

constructed an additional wall of wood, which they planted on the

top of their own town wall, so as to heighten the part over against

the enemy’s mound: sustaining it by brickwork behind, for which

the neighboring houses furnished materials: hides, raw as well as

dressed, were suspended in front of it, in order to protect their

workmen against missiles, and the woodwork against fire-carrying

arrows.[328] And as the besiegers still continued heaping up

materials, to carry their mound up to the height even of this recent

addition, the Platæans met them by breaking a hole in the lower part

of their town wall, and pulling in the earth from the lower portion

of the mound; which thus gave way at the top and left a vacant space

near the wall, until the besiegers filled it up by letting down

quantities of stiff clay rolled up in wattled reeds, which could

not be pulled away in the same manner. Again, the Platæans dug a

subterranean passage from the interior of their town to the ground

immediately under the mound, and thus carried away unseen the lower

earth belonging to the latter; so that the besiegers saw their

mound continually sinking down, in spite of fresh additions at the

top,—yet without knowing the reason. Nevertheless, it was plain that

these stratagems would be in the end ineffectual, and the Platæans

accordingly built a new portion of town wall in the interior, in the

shape of a crescent, taking its start from the old town wall on each

side of the mound: the besiegers were thus deprived of all benefit

from the mound, assuming it to be successfully completed; since when

they had marched over it, there stood in front of them a new town

wall to be carried in like manner.

[328] Thucyd. ii, 75.

Nor was this the only method of attack employed. Archidamus farther

brought up battering engines, one of which greatly shook and

endangered the additional height of wall built by the Platæans over

against the mound; while others were brought to bear on different

portions of the circuit of the town wall. Against these new

assailants, various means of defence were used: the defenders on

the walls threw down ropes, got hold of the head of the approaching

engine, and pulled it by main force out of the right line, either

upwards or sideways: or they prepared heavy wooden beams on the

wall, each attached to both ends by long iron chains to two poles

projecting at right angles from the wall, by means of which poles

it was raised up and held aloft: so that at the proper moment, when

the battering machine approached the wall, the chain was suddenly

let go, and the beam fell down with great violence directly upon the

engine and broke off its projecting beak.[329] However rude these

defensive processes may seem, they were found effective against

the besiegers, who saw themselves, at the close of three months’

unavailing efforts, obliged to renounce the idea of taking the town

in any other way than by the process of blockade and famine,—a

process alike tedious and costly.[330]

[329] The various processes, such as those here described,

employed both for offence and defence in the ancient sieges, are

noticed and discussed in Æneas Poliorketic. c. 33, _seq._

[330] Thucyd. ii, 76.

Before they would incur so much inconvenience, however, they had

recourse to one farther stratagem,—that of trying to set the town

on fire. From the height of their mound, they threw down large

quantities of fagots, partly into the space between the mound and

the newly-built crescent piece of wall,—partly, as far as they could

reach, into other parts of the city: pitch and other combustibles

were next added, and the whole mass set on fire. The conflagration

was tremendous, such as had never been before seen: a large portion

of the town became unapproachable, and the whole of it narrowly

escaped destruction. Nothing could have preserved it, had the wind

been rather more favorable: there was indeed a farther story, of a

most opportune thunder-storm coming to extinguish the flames, which

Thucydidês does not seem to credit.[331] In spite of much partial

damage, the town remained still defensible, and the spirit of the

inhabitants unsubdued.

[331] Thucyd. ii, 77.

There now remained no other resource except to build a wall of

circumvallation round Platæa, and trust to the slow process of

famine. The task was distributed in suitable fractions among the

various confederate cities, and completed about the middle of

September, a little before the autumnal equinox.[332] Two distinct

walls were constructed, with sixteen feet of intermediate space all

covered in, so as to look like one very thick wall: there were,

moreover, two ditches, out of which the bricks for the wall had

been taken,—one on the inside towards Platæa, and the other on the

outside against any foreign relieving force. The interior covered

space between the walls was intended to serve as permanent quarters

for the troops left on guard, consisting half of Bœotians and half of

Peloponnesians.[333]

[332] Thucyd. ii, 78. καὶ ἐπειδὴ πᾶν ἐξείργαστο περὶ Ἀρκτούρου

ἐπιτολάς, etc. at the period of the year when the star Arcturus

rises immediately before sunrise,—that is, sometime between the

12th and 17th of September: see Göller’s note on the passage.

Thucydidês does not often give any fixed marks to discriminate

the various periods of the year, as we find it here done. The

Greek months were all lunar months, or nominally so: the names

of months, as well as the practice of intercalation to rectify

the calendar, varied from city to city; so that if Thucydidês

had specified the day of the Attic month Boêdromion (instead

of specifying the rising of Arcturus) on which this work

was finished, many of his readers would not have distinctly

understood him. Hippokratês also, in indications of time for

medical purposes, employs the appearance of Arcturus and other

stars.

[333] Thucyd. ii, 78; iii, 21. From this description of the

double wall and covered quarters provided for what was foreknown

as a long blockade, we may understand the sufferings of the

Athenian troops (who probably had no double wall), in the two

years’ blockade of Potidæa,—and their readiness to grant an easy

capitulation to the besieged: see a few pages above.

At the same time that Archidamus began the siege of Platæa, the

Athenians on their side despatched a force of two thousand hoplites

and two hundred horsemen, to the Chalkidic peninsula, under Xenophon

son of Euripidês (with two colleagues), the same who had granted so

recently the capitulation of Potidæa. It was necessary doubtless,

to convoy and establish the new colonists who were about to occupy

the deserted site of Potidæa: moreover, the general had acquired

some knowledge of the position and parties of the Chalkidic towns,

and hoped to be able to act against them with effect. They first

invaded the territory belonging to the Bottiæan town of Spartôlus,

not without hopes that the city itself would be betrayed to them

by intelligences within: but this was prevented by the arrival

of an additional force from Olynthus, partly hoplites, partly

peltasts. These peltasts, a species of troops between heavy-armed

and light-armed, furnished with a pelta (or light shield), and short

spear, or javelin, appear to have taken their rise among these

Chalkidic Greeks, being equipped in a manner half Greek and half

Thracian: we shall find them hereafter much improved and turned

to account by some of the ablest Grecian generals. The Chalkidic

hoplites are generally of inferior merit: on the other hand, their

cavalry and their peltasts are very good: in the action which now

took place under the walls of Spartôlus, the Athenian hoplites

defeated those of the enemy, but their cavalry and their light troops

were completely worsted by the Chalkidic. These latter, still farther

strengthened by the arrival of fresh peltasts from Olynthus, ventured

even to attack the Athenian hoplites, who thought it prudent to fall

back upon the two companies left in reserve to guard the baggage.

During this retreat they were harassed by the Chalkidic horse and

light-armed, who retired when the Athenians turned upon them, but

attacked them on all sides when on their march; and employed missiles

so effectively that the retreating hoplites could no longer maintain

a steady order, but took to flight, and sought refuge at Potidæa.

Four hundred and thirty hoplites, near one-fourth of the whole force,

together with all three generals, perished in this defeat, and the

expedition returned in dishonor to Athens.[334]

[334] Thucyd. ii, 79.

In the western parts of Greece, the arms of Athens and her allies

were more successful. The repulse of the Ambrakiots from the

Amphilochian Argos, during the preceding year, had only exasperated

them and induced them to conceive still larger plans of aggression

against both the Akarnanians and Athenians. In concert with their

mother-city Corinth, where they obtained warm support, they prevailed

upon the Lacedæmonians to take part in a simultaneous attack of

Akarnania, by land as well as by sea, which would prevent the

Akarnanians from concentrating their forces in any one point, and put

each of their townships upon an isolated self-defence; so that all

of them might be overpowered in succession, and detached, together

with Kephallênia and Zakynthus, from the Athenian alliance. The

fleet of Phormio at Naupaktus, consisting only of twenty triremes,

was accounted incompetent to cope with a Peloponnesian fleet such as

might be fitted out at Corinth. There was even some hope that the

important station at Naupaktus might itself be taken, so as to expel

the Athenians completely from those parts.

The scheme of operations now projected was far more comprehensive

than anything which the war had yet afforded. The land-force of the

Ambrakiots, together with their neighbors and fellow-colonists the

Leukadians and Anaktorians, assembled near their own city, while

their maritime force was collected at Leukas, on the Akarnanian

coast. The force at Ambrakia was joined, not only by Knêmus, the

Lacedæmonian admiral, with one thousand Peloponnesian hoplites, who

found means to cross over from Peloponnesus, eluding the vigilance

of Phormio,—but also by a numerous body of Epirotic and Macedonian

auxiliaries, collected even from the distant and northernmost

tribes. A thousand Chaonians were present, under the command of

Photyus and Nikanor, two annual chiefs chosen from the regal gens.

Neither this tribe, nor the Thesprotians who came along with them,

acknowledged any hereditary king. The Molossians and Atintânes, who

also joined the force, were under Sabylinthus, regent on behalf of

the young prince Tharypas. There came, besides, the Paranæi, from

the banks of the river Aôus under their king Orœdus, together with

one thousand Orestæ, a tribe rather Macedonian than Epirot, sent by

their king Antiochus. Even king Perdikkas, though then nominally in

alliance with Athens, sent one thousand of his Macedonian subjects,

who, however, arrived too late to be of any use.[335] This large

and diverse body of Epirotic invaders, a new phenomenon in Grecian

history, and got together doubtless by the hopes of plunder, proves

the extensive relations of the tribes of the interior with the city

of Ambrakia,—a city destined to become in later days the capital of

the Epirotic king Pyrrhus.

[335] Thucyd. ii, 80.

It had been concerted that the Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth

should join that already assembled at Leukas, and act upon the coast

of Akarnania at the same time that the land-force marched into that

territory. But Knêmus finding the land-force united and ready, near

Ambrakia, deemed it unnecessary to await the fleet from Corinth, and

marched straight into Akarnania, through Limnæa, a frontier village

territory belonging to the Amphilochian Argos. He directed his march

upon Stratus,—an interior town, and the chief place in Akarnania,—the

capture of which would be likely to carry with it the surrender of

the rest; especially as the Akarnanians, distracted by the presence

of the ships at Leukas, and alarmed by the large body of invaders

on their frontier, did not dare to leave their own separate homes,

so that Stratus was left altogether to its own citizens. Nor was

Phormio, though they sent an urgent message to him, in any condition

to help them; since he could not leave Naupaktus unguarded, when the

large fleet from Corinth was known to be approaching. Under such

circumstances, Knêmus and his army indulged the most confident hopes

of overpowering Stratus without difficulty. They marched in three

divisions: the Epirots in the centre,—the Leukadians and Anaktorians

on the right,—the Peloponnesians and Ambrakiots, together with

Knêmus himself, on the left. So little expectation was entertained

of resistance, that these three divisions took no pains to keep near

or even in sight of each other. Both the Greek divisions, indeed,

maintained a good order of march, and kept proper scouts on the look

out; but the Epirots advanced without any care or order whatever;

especially the Chaonians, who formed the van. These men, accounted

the most warlike of all the Epirotic tribes, were so full of conceit

and rashness, that when they approached near to Stratus, they would

not halt to encamp and assail the place conjointly with the Greeks;

but marched along with the other Epirots right forward to the town,

intending to attack it single-handed, and confident that they should

carry it at the first assault, before the Greeks came up, so that

the entire glory would be theirs. The Stratians watched and profited

by this imprudence. Planting ambuscades in convenient places, and

suffering the Epirots to approach without suspicion near to the

gates, they then suddenly sallied out and attacked them, while the

troops in ambuscade rose up and assailed them at the same time. The

Chaonians who formed the van, thus completely surprised, were routed

with great slaughter; while the other Epirots fled, after but little

resistance. So much had they hurried forward in advance of their

Greek allies, that neither the right nor the left division were at

all aware of the battle, until the flying barbarians, hotly pursued

by the Akarnanians, made it known to them. The two divisions then

joined, protected the fugitives, and restrained farther pursuit,—the

Stratians declining to come to hand-combat with them until the other

Akarnanians should arrive. They seriously annoyed the forces of

Knêmus, however, by distant slinging, in which the Akarnanians were

preëminently skilful; nor did Knêmus choose to persist in his attack

under such discouraging circumstances. As soon as night arrived,

so that there was no longer any fear of slingers, he retreated to

the river Anapus, a distance of between nine and ten miles. Well

aware that the news of the victory would attract other Akarnanian

forces immediately to the aid of Stratus, he took advantage of the

arrival of his own Akarnanian allies from Œniadæ (the only town in

the country which was attached to the Lacedæmonian interest), and

sought shelter near their city. From thence his troops dispersed, and

returned to their respective homes.[336]

[336] Thucyd. ii, 82; Diodor. xii, 48.

Meanwhile, the Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth, which had been

destined to coöperate with Knêmus off the coast of Akarnania, had

found difficulties in its passage, alike unexpected and insuperable.

Mustering forty-seven triremes of Corinth, Sikyon, and other

places, with a body of soldiers on board, and with accompanying

store-vessels,—it departed from the harbor of Corinth, and made

its way along the northern coast of Achaia. Its commanders, not

intending to meddle with Phormio and his twenty ships at Naupaktus,

never for a moment imagined that he would venture to attack a

number so greatly superior: the triremes were, accordingly, fitted

out more as transports for numerous soldiers than with any view to

naval combat,—and with little attention to the choice of skilful

rowers.[337]

[337] Thucyd. ii, 83. οὐχ ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν, ἀλλὰ στρατιωτικώτερον

παρεσκευασμένοι: compare the speech of Knêmus, c. 87. The

unskilfulness of the rowers is noticed (c. 84).

Except in the combat near Korkyra, and there only partially, the

Peloponnesians had never yet made actual trial of Athenian maritime

efficiency, at the point of excellence which it had now reached:

themselves retaining the old unimproved mode of fighting and of

working ships at sea, they had no practical idea of the degree

to which it had been superseded by Athenian training. Among the

Athenians, on the contrary, not only the seamen generally had a

confirmed feeling of their own superiority,—but Phormio especially,

the ablest of all their captains, always familiarized his men with

the conviction, that no Peloponnesian fleet, be its number ever

so great, could possibly contend against them with success.[338]

Accordingly, the Corinthian admirals, Machaon and his two colleagues,

were surprised to observe that Phormio with his small Athenian

squadron, instead of keeping safe in Naupaktus, was moving in

parallel line with them and watching their progress until they

should get out of the Corinthian gulf into the more open sea. Having

advanced along the northern coast of Peloponnesus as far as Patræ in

Achaia, they then altered their course, and bore to the northwest

in order to cross over towards the Ætolian coast, in their way to

Akarnania. In doing this, however, they perceived that Phormio was

bearing down upon them from Chalkis and the mouth of the river

Euenus, and they now discovered for the first time that he was going

to attack them. Disconcerted by this incident, and not inclined for

a naval combat in the wide and open sea, they altered their plan

of passage, returned to the coast of Peloponnesus, and brought to

for the night at some point near to Rhium, the narrowest breadth of

the strait. Their bringing to was a mere feint intended to deceive

Phormio, and induce him to go back for the night to his own coast:

for, during the course of the night, they left their station, and

tried to get across the breadth of the gulf, where it was near the

strait, and comparatively narrow, before Phormio could come down

upon them: and if the Athenian captain had really gone back to take

night-station on his own coast, they would probably have got across

to the Ætolian or northern coast without any molestation in the

wide sea: but he watched their movements closely, kept the sea all

night, and was thus enabled to attack them in mid-channel, even

during the shorter passage near the strait, at the first dawn of

morning.[339] On seeing his approach, the Corinthian admirals ranged

their triremes in a circle with the prows outward, like the spokes

of a wheel; the circle was made as large as it could be without

leaving opportunity to the Athenian assailing ships to practise the

manœuvre of the diekplus,[340] and the interior space was sufficient,

not merely for the store-vessels, but also for five chosen triremes,

who were kept as a reserve, to dart out when required through the

intervals between the outer triremes.

[338] Thucyd. ii, 88. πρότερον μὲν γὰρ ~ἀεὶ αὐτοῖς ἔλεγε~

(Phormio) καὶ προπαρεσκεύαζε τὰς γνώμας, ὡς οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς πλῆθος

νεῶν τοσοῦτον, ἢν ἐπιπλέῃ, ὅ,τι οὐχ ὑπομενετέον αὐτοῖς ἐστί·

καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται ἐκ πολλοῦ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀξίωσιν ταύτην

εἰλήφεσαν, ~μηδένα ὄχλον Ἀθηναῖοι ὄντες Πελοποννησίων νεῶν

ὑποχωρεῖν~.

This passage is not only remarkable as it conveys the striking

persuasion entertained by the Athenians of their own naval

superiority, but also as it discloses the frank and intimate

communication between the Athenian captain and his seamen,—so

strongly pervading and determining the feelings of the latter.

Compare what is told respecting the Syracusan Hermokratês,

Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 30.

[339] Thucyd. ii, 83. Ἐπειδὴ μέντοι ἀντιπαραπλέοντάς τε ἑώρων

αὐτοὺς (that is, when the Corinthians saw the Athenian ships)

παρὰ γῆν σφῶν κομιζομένων, καὶ ἐκ Πατρῶν τῆς Ἀχαΐας πρὸς τὴν

ἀντιπέρας ἤπειρον διαβαλλόντων ἐπὶ Ἀκαρνανίας κατεῖδον τοὺς

Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῆς Χαλκίδος καὶ τοῦ Εὐήνου ποταμοῦ προσπλέοντας

σφίσι, ~καὶ οὐκ ἔλαθον νυκτὸς ὐφορμισάμενοι~, οὕτω δὴ

ἀναγκάζονται ναυμαχεῖν κατὰ μέσον τὸν πορθμόν.

There is considerable difficulty in clearly understanding what

was here done, especially what is meant by the words οὐκ ἔλαθον

νυκτὸς ὐφορμισάμενοι, which words the Scholiast construed as

if the nominative case to ἔλαθον were οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, whereas the

natural structure of the sentence, as well as the probabilities

of fact, lead the best commentators to consider οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι

as the nominative case to that verb. The remark of the Scholiast,

however, shows us, that the difficulty of understanding the

sentence dates from ancient times.

Dr. Arnold—whose explanation is adopted by Poppo and Göller—says:

“The two fleets were moving parallel to one another along the

opposite shores of the Corinthian gulf. But even when they had

sailed out of the strait at Rhium, the opposite shores were still

so near, that the Peloponnesians hoped to cross over without

opposition, if they could so far deceive the Athenians, as to

the spot where they brought to for the night, as to induce them

either to stop too soon, or to advance too far, that they might

not be exactly opposite to them to intercept the passage. If they

could lead the Athenians to think that they meant to advance in

the night beyond Patræ, the Athenian fleet was likely to continue

its own course along the northern shore, to be ready to intercept

them when they should endeavor to run across to Acarnania. But

the Athenians, aware that they had stopped at Patræ, stopped

themselves at Chalkis, instead of proceeding further to the

westward; and thus were so nearly opposite to them, that the

Peloponnesians had not time to get more than half-way across,

before they found themselves encountered by their watchful enemy.”

This explanation seems to me not satisfactory, nor does it take

account of all the facts of the case. The first belief of the

Peloponnesians was, that Phormio would not dare to attack them

at all: accordingly, having arrived at Patræ, they stretched

from thence across the gulf to the mouth of the Euenus,—the

natural way of proceeding according to ancient navigation,—going

in the direction of Akarnania (ἐπὶ Ἀκαρνανίας). As they were

thus stretching across, they perceived Phormio bearing down upon

them from the Euenus: this was a surprise to them, and as they

wished to avoid a battle in the mid-channel, they desisted from

proceeding farther that day, in hopes to be able to deceive

Phormio in respect of their night-station. They made a feint of

taking night-station on the shore between Patræ and Rhium, near

the narrow part of the strait; but, in reality, they “slipped

anchor and put to sea during the night,” as Mr. Bloomfield says,

in hopes of getting across the shorter passage under favor of

darkness, before Phormio could come upon them. That they must

have done this is proved by the fact, that the subsequent battle

was fought on the morrow in the mid-channel _very little after

daybreak_ (we learn this from what Thucydidês says about the

gulf-breeze, for which Phormio waited before he would commence

his attack—ὅπερ ἀναμένων τε περιέπλει, καὶ εἰώθει γίγνεσθαι ~ἐπι

τὴν ἕω~). If Phormio had returned to Chalkis, they would probably

have succeeded; but he must have kept the sea all night, which

would be the natural proceeding of a vigilant captain, determined

not to let the Peloponnesians get across without fighting: so

that he was upon them in the mid-channel immediately that day

broke.

Putting all the statements of Thucydidês together, we may be

convinced that this is the way in which the facts occurred. But

of the precise sense of ὐφορμισάμενοι, I confess I do not feel

certain: Haack says, it means “clam appellere ad littus,” but

here, I think, that sense will not do: for the Peloponnesians did

not wish, and could indeed hardly hope, to conceal from Phormio

the spot where they brought to for the night, and to make him

suppose that they brought to at some point of the shore west of

Patræ, when in reality they passed the night in Patræ,—which

is what Dr. Arnold supposes. The shore west of Patræ makes a

bend to the southwest,—forming the gulf of Patras,—so that the

distance from the northern, or Ætolian and Akarnanian, side of

the gulf becomes for a considerable time longer and longer, and

the Peloponnesians would thus impose upon themselves a longer

crossing, increasing the difficulty of getting over without a

battle. But ὐφορμισάμενοι may reasonably be supposed to mean,

especially in conjunction with οὐκ ἔλαθον, “taking up a simulated

or imperfect night-station,” in which they did not really intend

to stay all night, and which could be quitted at short notice and

with ease. The preposition ὑπὸ, in composition, would thus have

the sense, not of _secrecy_ (_clam_) but of _sham-performance_,

or of mere going through the forms of an act for the purpose of

making a false impression (like ὑποφέρειν, Xenoph. Hell. iv, 72).

Mr. Bloomfield proposes conjecturally ἀφορμισάμενοι, meaning,

“that the Peloponnesians slipped their anchors in the night:” I

place no faith in the conjecture, but I believe him to be quite

right in supposing, that the Peloponnesians _did actually_ slip

their anchors in the night.

Another point remains to be adverted to. The battle took

place κατὰ μέσον τὸν πορθμόν. Now we need not understand this

expression to allude to the narrowest part of the sea, or the

strait, strictly and precisely; that is, the line of seven stadia

between Rhium and Antirrhium. But I think we must understand it

to mean a portion of sea not far westward of the strait, where

the breadth, though greater than that of the strait itself,

is yet not so great as it becomes in the line drawn northward

from Patræ. We cannot understand πορθμὸς (as Mr. Bloomfield and

Poppo do,—see the note of the latter on the Scholia) to mean

_trajectus_ simply, that is to say, the passage across even

the widest portion of the gulf of Patras: nor does the passage

cited out of c. 86 require us so to understand it. Πορθμὸς, in

Thucydidês, means a strait, or narrow crossing of sea, and Poppo

himself admits that Thucydidês always uses it so: nor would it be

reasonable to believe that he would call the line of sea across

the gulf, from Patræ to the mouth of the Euenus, a πορθμός. See

the note of Göller, on this point.

[340] Thucyd. ii, 86. μὴ δíδοντες διέκπλουν. The great object of

the fast-sailing Athenian trireme was, to drive its beak against

some weak part of the adversary’s ship: the stern, the side, or

the oars,—not against the beak, which was strongly constructed as

well for defence as for offence. The Athenian, therefore, rowing

through the intervals of the adversary’s line, and thus getting

in their rear, turned rapidly, and got the opportunity, before

the ship of the adversary could change its position, of striking

it either in the stern or some weak part. Such a manœuvre was

called the _diekplus_. The success of it, of course, depended

upon the extreme rapidity and precision of the movements of the

Athenian vessel, so superior in this respect to its adversary,

not only in the better construction of the ship, but the

excellence of rowers and steersmen.

In this position they were found and attacked shortly after daybreak,

by Phormio, who bore down upon them with his ships in single file,

all admirable sailors, and his own ship leading; all being strictly

forbidden to attack until he should give the signal. He rowed swiftly

round the Peloponnesian circle, nearing the prows of their ships

as closely as he could, and making constant semblance of being

about to come to blows. Partly from the intimidating effect of this

manœuvre, altogether novel to the Peloponnesians,—partly from the

natural difficulty, well known to Phormio, of keeping every ship

in its exact stationary position,—the order of the circle, both

within and without, presently became disturbed. It was not long

before a new ally came to his aid, on which he fully calculated,

postponing his actual attack until this favorable incident occurred.

The strong land-breeze out of the gulf of Corinth, always wont to

begin shortly after daybreak, came down upon the Peloponnesian

fleet with its usual vehemence, at a moment when the steadiness

of their order was already somewhat giving way, and forced their

ships more than ever out of proper relation one to the other. The

triremes began to run foul of each other, or become entangled with

the store-vessels: so that in every ship the men aboard were obliged

to keep pushing off their neighbors on each side with poles,—not

without loud clamor and mutual reproaches, which prevented both the

orders of the captain, and the cheering sound or song whereby the

keleustês animated the rowers and kept them to time, from being

at all audible. Moreover, the fresh breeze had occasioned such a

swell, that these rowers, unskilful under all circumstances, could

not get their oars clear of the water, and the pilots thus lost all

command over their vessels.[341] The critical moment was now come,

and Phormio gave the signal for attack. He first drove against and

disabled one of the admiral’s ships,—his comrades next assailed

others with equal success,—so that the Peloponnesians, confounded and

terrified, attempted hardly any resistance, but broke their order

and sought safety in flight. They fled partly to Patræ, partly to

Dymê, in Achaia, pursued by the Athenians; who, with scarcely the

loss of a man, captured twelve triremes, took aboard and carried away

almost the entire crews, and sailed off with them to Molykreium, or

Antirrhium, the northern cape at the narrow mouth of the Corinthian

gulf, opposite to the corresponding cape called Rhium in Achaia.

Having erected at Antirrhium a trophy for the victory, dedicating

one of the captive triremes to Poseidon, they returned to Naupaktus;

while the Peloponnesian ships sailed along the shore from Patræ to

Kyllênê, the principal port in the territory of Elis. They were here

soon afterwards joined by Knêmus, who passed over with his squadron

from Leukas.[342]

[341] See Dr. Arnold’s note upon this passage of Thucydidês,

respecting the keleustês and his functions: to the passages

which he indicates as reference, I will add two more of Plautus,

Mercat. iv, 2, 5, and Asinaria, iii, 1, 15.

When we conceive the structure of an ancient trireme, we shall

at once see, first, how essential the keleustês was, to keep the

rowers in harmonious action,—next, how immense the difference

must have been between practised and unpractised rowers. The

trireme had, in all, one hundred and seventy rowers, distributed

into three tiers. The upper tier, called thranitæ, were sixty-two

in number, or thirty-one on each side: the middle tier, or

zygitæ, as well as the lowest tier, or thalamitæ, were each

fifty-four in number, or twenty-seven on each side. Besides

these, there were belonging to each trireme a certain number,

seemingly about thirty, of supplementary oars (κῶπαι περινέω),

to be used by the epibatæ, or soldiers, serving on board, in

case of rowers being killed, or oars broken. Each tier of

rowers was distributed along the whole length of the vessel,

from head to stern, or at least along the greater part of it;

but the seats of the higher tiers were not placed in the exact

perpendicular line above the lower. Of course, the oars of the

thranitæ, or uppermost tier, were the longest: those of the

thalamitæ, or lowest tier, the shortest: those of the zygitæ, of

a length between the two. Each oar was rowed only by one man. The

thranitæ, as having the longest oars, were most hardly worked and

most highly paid. What the length of the oars was, belonging to

either tier, we do not know, but some of the supplementary oars

appear to have been about fifteen feet in length.

What is here stated, appears to be pretty well ascertained,

chiefly from the inscriptions discovered at Athens a few years

ago, so full of information respecting the Athenian marine,—and

from the most instructive commentary appended to these

inscriptions by M. Boeckh, Seewesen der Athener, ch. ix, pp.

94, 104, 115. But there is a great deal still, respecting the

equipment of an ancient trireme, unascertained and disputed.

Now there was nothing but the voice of the keleustês to keep

these one hundred and seventy rowers all to good time with their

strokes. With oars of different length, and so many rowers, this

must have been no easy matter, and apparently quite impossible,

unless the rowers were trained to act together. The difference

between those who were so trained and those who were not, must

have been immense. We may imagine the difference between the

ships of Phormio and those of his enemies, and the difficulty of

the latter in contending with the swell of the sea,—when we read

this description of the ancient trireme.

About two hundred men, that is to say, one hundred and seventy

rowers and thirty supernumeraries, mostly epibatæ or hoplites

serving on board, besides the pilot, the man at the ship’s bow,

the keleustês, etc., probably some half dozen officers, formed

the crew of a trireme: compare Herodot. viii, 17; vii, 184, where

he calculates the thirty epibatæ over and above the two hundred.

Dr. Arnold thinks that, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian

war, the epibatæ on board an Athenian trireme were no more than

ten: but this seems not quite made out: see his note on Thucyd.

iii, 95.

The Venetian galleys in the thirteenth century were manned by

about the same number of men. “Les galères Vénitiens du convoi de

Flandre devaient être montées par deux cent hommes libres, dont

180 rameurs, et 12 archers. Les arcs ou balistes furent préscrits

en 1333 pour toutes les galères de commerce armées.” (Depping,

Histoire du Commerce entre le Levant et l’Europe, vol. i, p. 163.)

[342] Thucyd. ii, 84.

These two incidents, just recounted, with their details,—the

repulse of Knêmus and his army from Stratus, and the defeat of the

Peloponnesian fleet by Phormio,—afford ground for some interesting

remarks. The first of the two displays the great inferiority of the

Epirots to the Greeks,—and even to the less advanced portion of the

Greeks,—in the qualities of order, discipline, steadiness, and power

of coöperation for a joint purpose. Confidence of success with them

is exaggerated into childish rashness, so that they despise even the

commonest precautions either in march or attack; while the Greek

divisions on their right and on their left are never so elate as to

omit either. If, on land, we thus discover the inherent superiority

of Greeks over Epirots involuntarily breaking out,—so in the

sea-fight we are no less impressed with the astonishing superiority

of the Athenians over their opponents; a superiority, indeed, noway

inherent, such as that of Greeks over Epirots, but depending in

this case on previous toil, training, and inventive talent, on the

one side, compared with neglect and old-fashioned routine on the

other. Nowhere does the extraordinary value of that seamanship,

which the Athenians had been gaining by years of improved practice,

stand so clearly marked as in these first battles of Phormio. It

gradually becomes less conspicuous as we advance in the war, since

the Peloponnesians improve, learning seamanship as the Russians,

under Peter the Great, learned the art of war from the Swedes, under

Charles the Twelfth,—while the Athenian triremes and their crews

seem to become less choice and effective, even before the terrible

disaster at Syracuse, and are irreparably deteriorated after that

misfortune.

To none did the circumstances of this memorable sea-fight seem so

incomprehensible as to the Lacedæmonians. They had heard, indeed,

of the seamanship of Athens, but had never felt it, and could not

understand what it meant: so they imputed the defeat to nothing

but disgraceful cowardice, and sent indignant orders to Knêmus at

Kyllênê, to take the command, equip a larger and better fleet,

and repair the dishonor. Three Spartan commissioners—Brasidas,

Timokratês, and Lykophron—were sent down to assist him with their

advice and exertions in calling together naval contingents from

the different allied cities: and by this means, under the general

resentment occasioned by the recent defeat, a large fleet of

seventy-seven triremes was speedily mustered at Panormus,—a harbor

of Achaia near to the promontory of Rhium, and immediately within

the interior gulf. A land-force was also collected at the same place

ashore, to aid the operations of the fleet. Such preparations did

not escape the vigilance of Phormio, who transmitted to Athens news

of his victory, at the same time urgently soliciting reinforcements

to contend with the increasing strength of the enemy. The Athenians

immediately sent twenty fresh ships to join him: but they were

induced by the instances of a Kretan named Nikias, their proxenus

at Gortyn, to allow him to take the ships first to Krete, on the

faith of his promise to reduce the hostile town of Kydonia. He

had made this promise as a private favor to the inhabitants of

Polichna, border enemies of Kydonia; but when the fleet arrived he

was unable to fulfil it: nothing was effected except ravage of the

Kydonian lands, and the fleet was long prevented by adverse winds

and weather from getting away.[343] This ill-advised diversion of

the fleet from its straight course to join Phormio is a proof how

much the counsels of Athens were beginning to suffer from the loss

of Periklês, who was just now in his last illness and died shortly

afterwards. That liability to be seduced by novel enterprises and

projects of acquisition, against which he so emphatically warned his

countrymen,[344] was even now beginning to manifest its disastrous

consequences.

[343] Thucyd. ii, 85.

[344] Thucyd. i, 144. Πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἔχω ἐς ἐλπίδα τοῦ

περιέσεσθαι, ἢν ἐθέλητε ἀρχήν τε μὴ ἐπικτᾶσθαι ἅμα πολεμοῦντες,

καὶ κινδύνους αὐθαιρέτους μὴ προστίθεσθαι· μᾶλλον γὰρ πεφόβημαι

τὰς οἰκείας ἡμῶν ἁμαρτίας ἢ τὰς τῶν ἐναντίων διανοίας.

Through the loss of this precious interval, Phormio now found

himself, with no more than his original twenty triremes, opposed to

the vastly increased forces of the enemy,—seventy-seven triremes,

with a large force on land to back them: the latter, no mean help in

ancient warfare. He took up his station near the Cape Antirrhium,

or the Molykric Rhium, as it was called,—the opposite cape to the

Achaic Rhium: the line between them, seemingly about an English mile

in breadth, forms the entrance of the Corinthian gulf. The Messenian

force from Naupaktus attended him, and served on land. But he kept

on the outside of the gulf, anxious to fight in a large and open

breadth of sea, which was essential to Athenian manœuvring: while his

adversaries on their side remained on the inside of the Achaic cape,

from the corresponding reason,—feeling that to them the narrow sea

was advantageous, as making the naval battle like to a land battle,

effacing all superiority of nautical skill.[345] If we revert back

to the occasion of the battle of Salamis, we find that narrowness of

space was at that time accounted the best of all protections for a

smaller fleet against a larger. But such had been the complete change

of feeling, occasioned by the system of manœuvring introduced since

that period in the Athenian navy, that amplitude of sea room is now

not less coveted by Phormio than dreaded by his enemies. The improved

practice of Athens had introduced a revolution in naval warfare.

[345] Thucyd. ii, 86-89: compare vii, 36-49.

For six or seven days successively, the two fleets were drawn out

against each other,—Phormio trying to entice the Peloponnesians to

the outside of the gulf, while they on their side did what they could

to bring him within it.[346] To him, every day’s postponement was

gain, since it gave him a new chance of his reinforcements arriving:

for that very reason, the Peloponnesian commanders were eager to

accelerate an action, and at length resorted to a well-laid plan for

forcing it on. But in spite of immense numerical superiority, such

was the discouragement and reluctance, prevailing among their seamen,

many of whom had been actual sufferers in the recent defeat,—that

Knêmus and Brasidas had to employ emphatic exhortations; insisting

on the favorable prospect before them,—pointing out that the late

battle had been lost only by mismanagement and imprudence, which

would be for the future corrected,—and appealing to the inherent

bravery of the Peloponnesian warrior. They concluded by a hint, that

while those who behaved well in the coming battle would receive due

honor, the laggards would assuredly be punished:[347] a topic rarely

touched upon by ancient generals in their harangues on the eve of

battle, and demonstrating conspicuously the reluctance of many of

the Peloponnesian seamen, who had been brought to the fight again

chiefly by the ascendency and strenuous commands of Sparta. To this

reluctance Phormio pointedly alluded, in the encouraging exhortations

which he on his side addressed to his men: for they too, in spite of

their habitual confidence at sea, strengthened by the recent victory,

were dispirited by the smallness of their numbers. He reminded them

of their long practice and rational conviction of superiority at

sea, such as no augmentation of numbers, especially with an enemy

conscious of his own weakness, could overbalance: and he called upon

them to show their habitual discipline and quick apprehension of

orders, and above all to perform their regular movements in perfect

silence during the actual battle,[348]—useful in all matters of

war, and essential to the proper conduct of a sea-fight. The idea

of entire silence on board the Athenian ships while a sea-fight was

going on, is not only striking as a feature in the picture, but is

also one of the most powerful evidences of the force of self-control

and military habits among these citizen-seamen.

[346] Thucyd. ii, 86.

[347] Thucyd. ii, 87. Τῶν δὲ πρότερον ἡγεμόνων οὐ χεῖρον τὴν

ἐπιχείρησιν ἡμεῖς παρασκευάσομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδώσομεν πρόφασιν

οὐδενὶ κακῷ γενέσθαι· ἢν δέ τις ἄρα καὶ βουληθῇ, κολασθήσεται τῇ

πρεπούσῃ ζημίᾳ, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ τιμήσονται τοῖς προσήκουσιν ἄθλοις

τῆς ἀρετῆς.

[348] Thucyd. ii, 89. Καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ~κόσμον καὶ σιγὴν~ περὶ

πλείστου ἡγεῖσθε, ὃ ἔς τε τὰ πολλὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν ξυμφέρει, καὶ

ναυμαχίᾳ οὐχ ἥκιστα, etc.

The habitual position of the Peloponnesian fleet off Panormus was

within the strait, but nearly fronting the breadth of it,—opposite to

Phormio, who lay on the outer side of the strait, as well as off the

opposite cape: in the Peloponnesian line, therefore, the right wing

occupied the north, or northeast side towards Naupaktus. Knêmus and

Brasidas now resolved to make a forward movement up the gulf, as if

against that town, which was the main Athenian station; for they knew

that Phormio would be under the necessity of coming to the defence

of the place, and they hoped to pin him up and force him to action

close under the land, where Athenian manœuvring would be unavailing.

Accordingly, they commenced this movement early in the morning,

sailing in line of four abreast towards the northern coast of the

inner gulf; the right squadron, under the Lacedæmonian Timokratês,

was in the van, according to its natural position,[349] and care had

been taken to place in it twenty of the best sailing ships, since

the success of the plan of action was known beforehand to depend

upon their celerity. As they had foreseen, Phormio the moment he

saw their movement, put his men on shipboard, and rowed into the

interior of the strait, though with the greatest reluctance; for the

Messenians were on land alongside of him, and he knew that Naupaktus,

with their wives and families, and a long circuit of wall,[350] was

utterly undefended. He ranged his ships in line of battle ahead,

probably his own the leading ship; and sailed close along the land

towards Naupaktus, while the Messenians marching ashore kept near to

him. Both fleets were thus moving in the same direction, and towards

the same point, the Athenian close along shore, the Peloponnesians

somewhat farther off.[351] The latter had now got Phormio into the

position which they wished, pinned up against the land, with no

room for tactics. On a sudden the signal was given, and the whole

Peloponnesian fleet facing to the left, changed from column into

line, and instead of continuing to sail along the coast, rowed

rapidly with their prows shore-ward to come to close quarters with

the Athenians. The right squadron of the Peloponnesians occupying

the side towards Naupaktus, was especially charged with the duty of

cutting off the Athenians from all possibility of escaping thither;

and the best ships had been placed on the right for that important

object. As far as the commanders were concerned, the plan of action

completely succeeded; the Athenians were caught in a situation where

resistance was impossible, and had no chance of escape except in

flight. But so superior were they in rapid movement even to the

best Peloponnesians, that eleven ships, the headmost out of the

twenty, just found means to run by,[352] before the right wing of the

enemy closed in upon the shore; and made the best of their way to

Naupaktus. The remaining nine ships were caught and driven ashore

with serious damage,—their crews being partly slain, partly escaping

by swimming. The Peloponnesians towed off one trireme with its entire

crew, and some others empty; but more than one of them was rescued by

the bravery of the Messenian hoplites, who, in spite of their heavy

panoply, rushed into the water and got aboard them, fighting from the

decks and driving off the enemy even after the rope had been actually

made fast, and the process of dragging off had begun.[353]

[349] Thucyd. ii, 90. ἐπὶ τεσσάρων ταξάμενοι τὰς ναῦς. Matthiæ

in his Grammar (sect. 584), states that ἐπὶ τεσσάρων means “four

deep,” and cites this passage of Thucydidês as an instance of it.

But the words certainly mean here _four abreast_; though it is to

be recollected that a column four abreast, when turned into line,

becomes four deep.

[350] Thucyd. iii, 102.

[351] Thucyd. ii, 90. Οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῖς οἱ

Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκ ἐπέπλεον ἐς τὸν κόλπον καὶ τὰ στενὰ, βουλόμενοι

ἄκοντας ἔσω προαγαγεῖν αὐτοὺς, ἀναγόμενοι ἅμα ἕῳ ἔπλεον, ἐπὶ

τεσσάρων ταξάμενοι τὰς ναῦς, ~ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν ἔσω~ ἐπὶ τοῦ

κόλπου, δεξιῷ κέρᾳ ἡγουμένῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ ὥρμουν· ἐπὶ δ᾽ αὐτῷ

εἴκοσι νῆας ἔταξαν τὰς ἄριστα πλεούσας, ὅπως, εἰ ἄρα νομίσας ἐπὶ

τὴν Ναύπακτον αὐτοὺς πλεῖν ὁ Φορμίων καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιβοηθῶν ταύτῃ

παραπλέοι, μὴ διαφύγοιεν πλέοντα τὸν ἐπίπλουν σφῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι

~ἔξω τοῦ ἑαυτῶν κέρως~, ἀλλ᾽ αὗται αἱ νῆες περικλῄσειαν.

It will be seen that I have represented in the text the

movement of the Peloponnesian fleet as directed ostensibly

and to all appearance against Naupaktus: and I translate the

words in the fourth line of the above passage—ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν

γῆν ἔσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου—as meaning “_against the station of the

Athenians up the gulf within_,” that is, against Naupaktus. Mr.

Bloomfield gives that meaning to the passage, though not to the

words; but the Scholiast, Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and Göller, all

construe it differently, and maintain that the words τὴν ἐαυτῶν

γῆν mean _the Peloponnesian shore_. To my view, this latter

interpretation renders the whole scheme of the battle confused

and unintelligible; while with the other meaning it is perfectly

clear, and all the circumstances fit in with each other.

Dr. Arnold does not seem even to admit that τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν can

mean anything else but the coast of Peloponnesus. He says: “The

Scholiast says that ἐπὶ is here used for παρά. It would be better

to say that it has a mixed signification of motion towards a

place and neighborhood to it: expressing that the Peloponnesians

sailed _towards_ their own land (_i. e._ towards Corinth, Sikyon,

and Pellênê, to which places the greater number of the ships

belonged), instead of standing over to the opposite coast, which

belonged to their enemies: and at the same time kept close _upon_

their own land, in the sense of ἐπὶ with a dative case.”

It appears to me that Dr. Arnold’s supposition of Corinth and

Sikyon as the meaning of τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν is altogether far-fetched

and improbable. As a matter of fact, it would only be true of

part of the confederate fleet; while it would be false with

regard to ships from Elis, Leukas, etc. And if it had been

true with regard to all, yet the distance of Corinth from the

Peloponnesian station was so very great, that Thucydidês would

hardly mark _direction_ by referring to a city so very far off.

Then again, both the Scholiast and Dr. Arnold do great violence

to the meaning of the preposition ἐπὶ with an accusative case,

and cite no examples to justify it. What the sense of ἐπὶ is with

an accusative case signifying locality, is shown by Thucydidês

in this very passage.—εἰ ἄρα νομίσας ~ἐπὶ τὴν Ναύπακτον~ αὐτοὺς

πλεῖν ὁ Φορμίων, etc. (again, c. 85. ἐπὶ Κυδωνίαν πλεῦσαι; and

i. 29, ἐπὶ Ἐπίδαμνον, etc.—ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτοῦ of Perdikkas, i,

57), that is, against, or to go thither with a hostile purpose.

So sensible does the Scholiast seem to be of this, that he

affirms ἐπὶ to be used instead of παρά. This is a most violent

supposition, for nothing can be more different than the two

phrases ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν and παρὰ τὴν γῆν. Dr. Arnold again assigns

to ἐπὶ with an accusative case another sense, which he himself

admits that it only has with a dative.

I make these remarks with a view to show that the sense which

Dr. Arnold and others put upon the words of Thucydidês,—ἔπλεον

ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν,—departs from the usual, and even from the

legitimate meaning of the words. But I have a stronger objection

still. If that sense be admitted, it will be found quite

inconsistent with the subsequent proceedings, as Thucydidês

describes; and any one who will look at the map in reading this

chapter, will see plainly that the fact is so. If, as Dr. Arnold

supposes, the Peloponnesian fleet kept close along the shore of

Peloponnesus, what was there in their movements to alarm Phormio

for the safety of Naupaktus, or to draw him so reluctantly into

the strait? Or if we even grant this, and suppose that Phormio

construed the movement along the coast of Achaia to indicate

designs against Naupaktus, and that he therefore came into the

gulf and sailed along his own shore to defend the town,—still the

Peloponnesians would be separated from him by the whole breadth

of the gulf at that point; and as soon as they altered their line

of direction for the purpose of crossing the gulf and attacking

him, he would have the whole breadth of the gulf in which to take

his measures for meeting them, so that instead of finding himself

jammed up against the land, he would have been able to go out

and fight them in the wide water, which he so much desired. The

whole description given by Thucydidês, of the sudden wheeling of

the Peloponnesian fleet, whereby Phormio’s ships were assailed,

and nine of them cut off, shows that the two fleets must have

been very close together when that movement was undertaken. If

they had not been close,—if the Peloponnesians had had to row

any considerable distance after wheeling,—all the Athenian ships

might have escaped along shore without any difficulty. In fact,

the words of Thucydidês imply that _both_ the two fleets, at the

time when the wheel of the Peloponnesians was made, _were sailing

in parallel directions along the northern coast in the direction

of Naupaktus_,—ὅπως εἰ ἄρα νομίσας ἐπὶ τὴν Ναύπακτον αὐτοὺς πλεῖν

ὁ Φορμίων ~καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιβοηθῶν~ ταύτῃ παραπλέοι,—“if he _also_,

with a view to defend the place, should sail along that coast,”

(that is, if he, _as well as they_:) which seems to be the

distinct meaning of the particle καὶ in this place.

Now if we suppose the Peloponnesian fleet to have sailed from

its original station towards Naupaktus, all the events which

follow become thoroughly perspicuous and coherent. I apprehend

that no one would ever have entertained any other idea, except

from the words of Thucydidês,—ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ~ἑαυτῶν~ γῆν ἔσω

ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου. Since the subject or nominative case of the verb

ἔπλεον is οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, it has been supposed that the word

~ἑαυτῶν~ must necessarily refer to the Peloponnesians; and Mr.

Bloomfield, with whom I agree as to the signification of the

passage, proposes to alter ~ἑαυτῶν~ into ~αὐτῶν~. It appears

to me that this alteration is not necessary, and that ἑαυτῶν

may very well be construed so as to refer to the _Athenians_,

not to the Lacedæmonians. The reflective meaning of the pronoun

ἑαυτῶν is _not necessarily_ thrown back upon the subject of the

action _immediately_ preceding it, in a complicated sentence

where there is more than one subject and more than one action.

Thus, for instance, in this very passage of Thucydidês which I

have transcribed, we find the word ἑαυτῶν a second time used,

and used so that its meaning is thrown back, not upon the

subject immediately preceding, but upon a subject more distant

from it,—ἐπὶ δ᾽ αὐτῷ (τῷ κέρατι) εἴκοσι ναῦς ἔταξαν τὰς ἄριστα

πλεούσας, ὅπως, εἰ ἄρα..., μὴ διαφύγοιεν πλέοντα τὸν ἐπίπλουν

σφῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ~ἔξω τοῦ ἑαυτῶν κέρως~, ἀλλ᾽ αὗται αἱ νῆες

περικλῄσειαν. Now here the words τοῦ ἑαυτῶν κέρως, allude to

the Peloponnesian fleet, not to the Athenians, which latter is

the subject immediately preceding. Poppo and Göller both admit

such to be the true meaning; and if this be admissible, there

appears to me no greater difficulty in construing the words ἐπὶ

τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν to mean, “the land of the _Athenians_,” _not_

“the land of the _Peloponnesians_.” Ἑαυτῶν might have been more

unambiguously expressed by ἐκείνων αὑτῶν; for the reflective

signification embodied in αὑτῶν is here an important addition to

the meaning: “Since the Athenians did not sail into the interior

of the gulf and the narrow waters, the Peloponnesians, wishing to

bring them in even reluctantly, sailed _against the Athenians’

own land_ in the interior.”

Another passage may be produced from Thucydidês, in which the

two words ἑαυτοῦ and ἐκείνου are both used in the same sentence

and designate the same person, ii, 13. Περικλῆς, ὑποτοπήσας,

ὅτι Ἀρχίδαμος αὐτῷ ξένος ὢν ἐτύγχανε, μὴ πολλάκις ἢ αὐτὸς ἰδίᾳ

βουλόμενος χαρίζεσθαι τοὺς ἀγροὺς αὐτοῦ παραλίπῃ καὶ μὴ δῃώσῃ,

ἢ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων κελευσάντων ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ~ἑαυτοῦ~ γένηται

τοῦτο, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄγη ἐλαύνειν προεῖπον ἕνεκα ~ἐκείνου~·

προηγόρευε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ ὅτι Ἀρχίδαμος μὲν οἱ

ξένος εἴη, οὐ μέντοι ἐπὶ κακῷ γε τῆς πόλεως γένοιτο, τοὺς δ᾽

ἀγροὺς ~τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ~ καὶ οἰκίας ἢν ἄρα μὴ δῃώσωσιν οἱ πολέμιοι

ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀφίησιν αὐτὰ δημόσια εἶναι. Here ἑαυτοῦ

and ἐκείνου (compare an analogous passage, Xenophon, Hellen. i,

1, 27) both refer to Periklês; and ἑαυτοῦ is twice used, so that

it reflects back not upon the subject of the action immediately

preceding it, but upon another subject farther behind. Again, iv,

99. Οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ ἀπεκρίναντο, εἰ μὲν ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ εἰσίν (οἱ

Ἀθηναῖοι), ἀπιόντας ~ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν~ ἀποφέρεσθαι τὰ σφέτερα· εἰ δ᾽

ἐν τῇ ~ἐκείνων~, αὐτοὺς γιγνώσκειν τὸ ποιητέον. Here the use of

ἑαυτῶν and ἐκείνων is remarkable. Ἑαυτῶν refers to the Bœotians,

though the Athenians are the subject of the action immediately

preceding; while ἐκείνων refers to the Athenians, in another case

where they are the subject of the action immediately preceding.

We should almost have expected to find the position of the two

words reversed. Again, in iv, 57, we have—Καὶ τούτους μὲν οἱ

Ἀθηναῖοι ἐβουλεύσαντο καταθέσθαι ἐς τὰς νήσους, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους

Κυθηρίους ~οἰκοῦντας τὴν ἑαυτῶν~ φόρον τέσσαρα τάλαντα φέρειν.

Here ἑαυτῶν refers to the subject of the action immediately

preceding—that is, to Κυθηρίους, not to Ἀθηναῖοι: but when we

turn to another chapter, iii, 78: οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι φοβούμενοι τὸ

πλῆθος καὶ τὴν περικύκλωσιν, ἁθρόαις μέν οὐ προσέπιπτον οὐδὲ

κατὰ μέσον ~ταῖς ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς τεταγμέναις~ (ναυσὶ)—we find ἑαυτῶν

thrown back upon the subject, _not_ immediately preceding it.

The same, iv, 47—εἴ πού τίς τινα ἴδοι ἐχθρὸν ἑαυτοῦ; and ii, 95.

Ὁ γὰρ Περδίκκας αὐτῷ ὑποσχόμενος, εἰ Ἀθηναίοις τε διαλλάξειεν

~ἑαυτὸν~ (_i. e._ Perdikkas), κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς τῷ πολέμῳ πιεζόμενον,

etc.

Compare also Homer, Odyss. xvii, 387. Πτωχὸν δ᾽ οὐκ ἄν τις

καλέοι, τρύξοντα ἓ αὐτόν; and Xenophon, Memorab. iv, 2, 28; i, 6,

3; v, 2, 24; Anabas. vii. 2, 10; 6, 43; Hellen. v, 2, 39.

It appears to me, that when we study the use of the pronoun

ἑαυτὸς, we shall see reason to be convinced that in the passage

of Thucydidês now before us, the phrase οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἔπλεον

ἐς τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν, need not necessarily be referred to the

_Peloponnesian_ land, but may in perfect conformity with analogy

be understood to mean the _Athenian_ land. I am sure that, in so

construing it, we shall not put so much violence upon the meaning

as the Scholiast and Dr. Arnold have put upon the preposition

ἐπὶ, when the Scholiast states that ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν means the

same thing as παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν, and when Dr. Arnold admits

this opinion, only adding a new meaning which does not usually

belong to ἐπὶ with an accusative case.

An objection to the meaning which I propose may possibly be

grounded on the word νομίσας, applied to Phormio. If the

Peloponnesian fleet was sailing directly towards Naupaktus, it

may be urged, Phormio would not be said to _think_ that they

were going thither, but _to see_ or _become aware_ of it. But

in reply to this we may observe, that the Peloponnesians never

really intended to attack Naupaktus, though they directed their

course towards it; they wished in reality to draw Phormio within

the strait, and there to attack him. The historian, therefore,

says with propriety, that Phormio would _believe_, and not that

he would _perceive_, them to be going thither, since his belief

would really be erroneous.

[352] Thucyd. ii, 90. How narrow the escape was, is marked in

the words of the historian—τῶν δὲ ἕνδεκα μὲν αἵπερ ἡγοῦντο

~ὑπεκφεύγουσι~ τὸ κέρας τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ τὴν ἐπιστροφήν, ἐς

τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν.

The proceedings of the Syracusan fleet against that of the

Athenians in the harbor of Syracuse, and the reflections of the

historian upon them, illustrate this attack of the Peloponnesians

upon the fleet of Phormio (Thucyd. vii. 36).

[353] Compare the like bravery on the part of the Lacedæmonian

hoplites at Pylus (Thucyd. iv, 14).

The victory of the Peloponnesians seemed assured, and while their

left and centre were thus occupied, the twenty ships of their right

wing parted company with the rest, in order to pursue the eleven

fugitive Athenian ships which they had failed in cutting off. Ten of

these got clear away into the harbor of Naupaktus, and there posted

themselves in an attitude of defence near the temple of Apollo,

before any of the pursuers could come near; while the eleventh,

somewhat less swift, was neared by the Lacedæmonian admiral; who, on

board a Leukadian trireme, pushed greatly ahead of his comrades, in

hopes of overtaking at least this one prey. There happened to lie

moored a merchant vessel, at the entrance of the harbor of Naupaktus;

and the Athenian captain in his flight, observing that the Leukadian

pursuer was for the moment alone, seized the opportunity for a bold

and rapid manœuvre. He pulled swiftly round the merchant vessel,

directed his trireme so as to meet the advancing Leukadian, and drove

his beak against her midships with an impact so violent as to disable

her at once; her commander, the Lacedæmonian admiral, Timokratês, was

so stung with anguish at this unexpected catastrophe, that he slew

himself forthwith, and fell overboard into the harbor. The pursuing

vessels coming up behind, too, were so astounded and dismayed by it,

that the men, dropping their oars, held water, and ceased to advance;

while some even found themselves half aground, from ignorance of the

coast. On the other hand, the ten Athenian triremes in the harbor

were beyond measure elated by the incident, so that a single word

from Phormio sufficed to put them in active forward motion, and to

make them strenuously attack the embarrassed enemy: whose ships,

disordered by the heat of pursuit, and having been just suddenly

stopped, could not be speedily got again under way, and expected

nothing less than renewed attack. First, the Athenians broke the

twenty pursuing ships, on the right wing; next, they pursued their

advantage against the left and centre, who had probably neared to the

right; so that after a short resistance, the whole were completely

routed, and fled across the gulf to their original station at

Panormus.[354] Not only did the eleven Athenian ships thus break,

terrify, and drive away the entire fleet of the enemy, with the

capture of six of the nearest Peloponnesian triremes,—but they also

rescued those ships of their own which had been driven ashore and

taken in the early part of the action: moreover, the Peloponnesian

crews sustained a considerable loss, both in killed and in prisoners.

[354] Thucyd. ii, 92. It is sufficiently evident that

the Athenians defeated and drove off not only the twenty

Peloponnesian ships of the right or pursuing wing,—but also

the left and centre. Otherwise, they would not have been able

to recapture those Athenian ships which had been lost at the

beginning of the battle. Thucydidês, indeed, does not expressly

mention the Peloponnesian left and centre as following the

right in their pursuit towards Naupaktus. But we may presume

that they partially did so, probably careless of much order, as

being at first under the impression that the victory was gained.

They were probably, therefore, thrown into confusion without

much difficulty, when the twenty ships of the right were beaten

and driven back upon them,—even though the victorious Athenian

triremes were no more than eleven in number.

Thus, in spite not only of the prodigious disparity of numbers, but

also of the disastrous blow which the Athenians had sustained at

first, Phormio ended by gaining a complete victory; a victory, to

which even the Lacedæmonians were forced to bear testimony, since

they were obliged to ask a truce for burying and collecting their

dead, while the Athenians on their part picked up the bodies of their

own warriors. The defeated party, however, still thought themselves

entitled, in token of their success in the early part of the action,

to erect a trophy on the Rhium of Achaia, where they also dedicated

the single Athenian trireme which they had been able to carry off.

Yet they were so completely discomfited,—and farther, so much in

fear of the expected reinforcement from Athens,—that they took

advantage of the night to retire, and sail into the gulf to Corinth:

all except the Leukadians, who returned to their own home.

Nor was it long before the reinforcement actually arrived, after

that untoward detention which had wellnigh exposed Phormio and his

whole fleet to ruin. It confirmed his mastery of the entrance of

the gulf and of the coast of Akarnania, where the Peloponnesians

had now no naval force at all. To establish more fully the Athenian

influence in Akarnania, he undertook during the course of the autumn

an expedition, landing at Astakus, and marching into the Akarnanian

inland country with four hundred Athenian hoplites and four hundred

Messenians. Some of the leading men of Stratus and Koronta, who were

attached to the Peloponnesian interest, he caused to be sent into

exile, while the chief named Kynês, of Koronta, who seems to have

been hitherto in exile, was reëstablished in his native town. The

great object was, to besiege and take the powerful town of Œniadæ,

near the mouth of the Achelôus; a town at variance with the other

Akarnanians, and attached to the Peloponnesians. But the great spread

of the waters of the Achelôus rendered this siege impracticable

during the winter, and Phormio returned to the station at Naupaktus.

From hence he departed to Athens towards the end of the winter,

carrying home both his prize-ships and such of his prisoners as were

freemen. The latter were exchanged man for man against Athenian

prisoners in the hands of Sparta.[355]

[355] Thucyd. ii, 102, 103.

After abandoning the naval contest at Rhium, and retiring to

Corinth, Knêmus and Brasidas were prevailed upon by the Megarians,

before the fleet dispersed, to try the bold experiment of a sudden

inroad upon Peiræus. Such was the confessed superiority of the

Athenians at sea, that, while they guarded amply the coasts of

Attica against privateers, they never imagined the possibility of

an attack upon their own main harbor. Accordingly, Peiræus was not

only unprotected by any chain across the entrance, but destitute

even of any regular guard-ships manned and ready. The seamen of

the retiring Peloponnesian armament, on reaching Corinth, were

immediately disembarked and marched, first across the isthmus, next

to Megara,—each man carrying his sitting-cloth,[356] and his oar,

together with the loop whereby the oar was fastened to the oar-hole

in the side, and thus prevented from slipping. There lay forty

triremes in Nisæa, the harbor of Megara, which, though old and out

of condition, were sufficient for so short a trip; and the seamen

immediately on arriving, launched these and got aboard. But such was

the awe entertained of Athens and her power, that when the scheme

came really to be executed, the courage of the Peloponnesians failed,

though there was nothing to hinder them from actually reaching

Peiræus: but it was pretended that the wind was adverse, and they

contented themselves with passing across to the station of Budorum,

in the opposite Athenian island of Salamis, where they surprised and

seized the three guard-ships which habitually blockaded the harbor of

Megara, and then landed upon the island. They spread themselves over

a large part of Salamis, ravaged the properties, and seized men as

well as goods. Fire-signals immediately made known this unforeseen

aggression, both at Peiræus and at Athens, occasioning in both the

extreme of astonishment and alarm; for the citizens in Athens, not

conceiving distinctly the meaning of the signals, fancied that

Peiræus itself had fallen into the hands of the enemy. The whole

population rushed down to the Peiræus at break of day, and put to sea

with all the triremes that were ready against the Peloponnesians;

but these latter, aware of the danger which menaced them, made haste

to quit Salamis with their booty, and the three captured guard-ships.

The lesson was salutary to the Athenians: from henceforward Peiræus

was furnished with a chain across the mouth, and a regular guard,

down to the end of the war.[357] Forty years afterwards, however,

we shall find it just as negligently watched, and surprised with

much more boldness and dexterity, by the Lacedæmonian captain

Teleutias.[358]

[356] Thucyd. ii, 93. ἐδόκει δὲ λαβόντα τῶν ναυτῶν ἕκαστον τὴν

κώπην, καὶ τὸ ὑπηρέσιον, καὶ τὸν τροπωτῆρα, etc. On these words

there is an interesting letter of Dr. Bishop’s published in the

Appendix to Dr. Arnold’s Thucydidês, vol. i. His remarks upon

ὑπηρέσιον are more satisfactory than those upon τροπωτήρ. Whether

the fulcrum of the oar was formed by a thowell, or a notch, on

the gunwale, or by a perforation in the ship’s side, there must

in both cases have been required—since it seems to have had

nothing like what Dr. Bishop calls a _nut_—a thong to prevent it

from slipping down towards the water; especially with the oars of

the thranitæ, or upper tier of rowers, who pulled at so great an

elevation, comparatively speaking, above the water. Dr. Arnold’s

explanation of τροπωτὴρ is suited to the case of a boat, but not

to that of a trireme. Dr. Bishop shows that the explanation of

the purpose of the ὑπηρέσιον, given by the Scholiast, is not the

true one.

[357] Thucyd. ii, 94.

[358] Xenophon, Hellen. v. 1, 19.

As during the summer of this year, the Ambrakiots had brought down

a numerous host of Epirotic tribes to the invasion of Akarnania,

in conjunction with the Peloponnesians,—so during the autumn, the

Athenians obtained aid against the Chalkidians of Thrace from a

still more powerful barbaric prince, Sitalkês, king of the Odrysian

Thracians. Amidst the numerous tribes, between the Danube and the

Ægean sea,—who all bore the generic name of Thracians, though

each had a special name besides,—the Odrysians were at this time

the most warlike and powerful. The Odrysian king Têrês, father of

Sitalkês, had made use of this power to subdue[359] and render

tributary a great number of these different tribes, especially those

whose residence was in the plain rather than in the mountains. His

dominion, the largest existing between the Ionian sea and the Euxine,

extended from Abdêra, or the mouth of the Nestus, in the Ægean sea,

to the mouth of the Danube in the Euxine; though it seems that this

must be understood with deductions, since many intervening tribes,

especially mountain tribes, did not acknowledge his authority.

Sitalkês himself had invaded and conquered some of the Pæonian

tribes who joined the Thracians on the west, between the Axius and

the Strymon.[360] Dominion, in the sense of the Odrysian king, meant

tribute, presents, and military force when required; and with the two

former, at least, we may conclude that he was amply supplied, since

his nephew and successor Seuthes, under whom the revenue increased

and attained its maximum, received four hundred talents annually in

gold and silver as tribute, and the like sum in various presents,

over and above many other presents of manufactured articles and

ornaments. These latter came from the Grecian colonies on the coast,

which contributed moreover largely to the tribute, though in what

proportions we are not informed: even Grecian cities not in Thrace

sent presents to forward their trading objects, as purchasers for the

produce, the plunder, and the slaves, acquired by Thracian chiefs or

tribes.[361] The residence of the Odrysians properly so called, and

of the princes of that tribe now ruling over so many of the remaining

tribes, appears to have been about twelve days’ journey inland from

Byzantium,[362] in the upper regions of the Hebrus and Strymon, south

of Mount Hæmus, and northeast of Rhodopê. The Odrysian chiefs were

connected by relationship more or less distant with those of the

subordinate tribes, and by marriage even with the Scythian princes

north of the Danube: the Scythian prince Ariapeithês[363] had married

the daughter of the Odrysian Têrês, the first who extended the

dominion of his tribe over any considerable portion of Thrace.

[359] Thucyd. ii, 29, 95, 96.

[360] Thucyd. ii, 99.

[361] See Xenophon, Anabas. vii, 3, 16; 4, 2. Diodorus (xii, 50)

gives the revenue of Sitalkês as more than one thousand talents

annually. This sum is not materially different from that which

Thucydidês states to be the annual receipt of Seuthes, successor

of Sitalkês,—revenue, properly so called, and presents, both

taken together.

Traders from Parium, on the Asiatic coast of the Propontis, are

among those who come with presents to the Odrysian king, Mêdokus

(Xenophon _ut supra_).

[362] Xenoph. Anabas. _l. c._

[363] Herodot. iv, 80.

The natural state of the Thracian tribes—in the judgment of

Herodotus, permanent and incorrigible—was that of disunion and

incapacity of political association; were such association possible,

he says, they would be strong enough to vanquish every other

nation,—though Thucydidês considers them as far inferior to the

Scythians. The Odrysian dominion had probably not reached, at the

period when Herodotus made his inquiries, the same development

which Thucydidês describes in the third year of the Peloponnesian

war, and which imparted to these tribes an union, partial indeed

and temporary, but such as they never reached either before or

afterwards. It has been already mentioned that the Odrysian prince

Sitalkês, had taken for his wife, or rather for one of his wives,

the sister of Nymphodôrus, a Greek, of Abdêra; by whose mediation

he had been made the ally, and his son Sadokus even a citizen, of

Athens,—and had been induced to promise that he would reconquer the

Chalkidians of Thrace for the benefit of the Athenians,[364]—his

ancient kinsmen, according to the mythe of Tereus as interpreted

by both parties. At the same time, Perdikkas, king of Macedonia,

had offended him by refusing to perform a promise made of giving

him his sister in marriage,—a promise made as consideration for

the interference of Sitalkês and Nymphodôrus in procuring for him

peace with Athens, at a moment when he was much embarrassed by civil

dissensions with his brother Philip. The latter prince, ruling

in his own name, and seemingly independent of Perdikkas, over a

portion of the Macedonians along the upper course of the Axius,

had been expelled by his more powerful brother, and taken refuge

with Sitalkês: he was now apparently dead, but his son Amyntas

received from the Odrysian prince the promise of restoration. The

Athenians had ambassadors resident with Sitalkês, and they sent

Agnon as special envoy to concert arrangements for his march against

the Chalkidians, with which an Athenian armament was destined to

coöperate. In treating with Sitalkês, it was necessary to be liberal

in presents, both to himself and to the subordinate chieftains who

held power dependent upon him: nothing could be accomplished among

the Thracians except by the aid of bribes,[365] and the Athenians

were more competent to supply this exigency than any other people

in Greece. The joint expedition against the Chalkidians was finally

resolved.

[364] Xenophon, Anabas. vii, 2, 31; Thucyd. ii, 29; Aristophan.

Aves, 366. Thucydidês goes out of his way to refute this current

belief,—a curious exemplification of ancient legend applied to

the convenience of present politics.

[365] Thucyd. ii, 97. Φόρος δὲ ἐκ πάσης τῆς βαρβάρου καὶ τῶν

Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων, ὅσον προσῆξαν ἐπὶ Σεύθου, ὃς ὕστερον Σιτάλκου

βασιλεύσας πλεῖστον δὴ ἐποίησε, τετρακοσίων ταλάντων μάλιστα

δύναμις, ἃ χρυσὸς καὶ ἄργυρος εἴη· καὶ δῶρα οὐκ ἐλάσσω τούτων

χρυσοῦ τε καὶ ἀργύρου προσεφέρετο, χωρὶς δὲ ὅσα ὑφαντά τε

καὶ λεῖα, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κατασκευὴ, καὶ οὐ μόνον αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ καὶ

τοῖς παραδυναστεύουσι καὶ γενναίοις Ὀδρυσῶν· κατεστήσαντο

γὰρ τοὐναντίον τῆς Περσῶν βασιλείας τὸν νόμον, ὄντα μὲν καὶ

τοῖς ἄλλοις Θρᾳξὶ, λαμβάνειν μᾶλλον ἢ διδόναι, καὶ αἴσχιον ἦν

αἰτηθέντα μὴ δοῦναι ἢ αἰτήσαντα μὴ τυχεῖν· ὅμως δὲ κατὰ τὸ

δύνασθαι ἐπὶ πλέον αὐτῷ ἐχρήσαντο· οὐ γὰρ ἦν πρᾶξαι οὐδὲν μὴ

διδόντα δῶρα· ὥστε ἐπὶ μέγα ἡ βασιλεία ἦλθεν ἰσχύος.

This universal necessity of presents and bribes may be seen

illustrated in the dealings of Xenophon and the Cyreian army with

the Thracian prince Seuthes, described in the Anabasis, vii,

chapters 1 and 2. It appears that even at that time, B.C. 401,

the Odrysian dominion, though it had passed through disturbances

and had been practically enfeebled, still extended down to the

neighborhood of Byzantium. In commenting upon the venality of the

Thracians, the Scholiast has a curious comparison with his own

time—καὶ οὐκ ἦν τι πρᾶξαι παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς τὸν μὴ διδόντα χρήματα·

~ὅπερ καὶ νῦν ἐν Ῥωμαίοις~. The Scholiast here tells us that the

venality in his time as to public affairs, in the Roman empire,

was not less universal: of what century of the Roman empire he

speaks, we do not know: perhaps about 500-600 A.D.

The contrast which Thucydidês here draws between the Thracians

and the Persians is also illustrated by what Xenophon says

respecting the habits of the younger Cyrus: (Anabas. i, 9, 22):

compare also the romance of the Cyropædia, viii, 14, 31, 32.

But the forces of Sitalkês, collected from many different portions

of Thrace, were tardy in coming together. He summoned all the tribes

under his dominion, between Hæmus, Rhodopê, and the two seas:

the Getæ, between Mount Hæmus and the Danube, equipped like the

Scythians, their neighbors on the other side of the river, with bow

and arrow on horseback, also joined him, as well as the Agrianes,

the Lææi, and the other Pæonian tribes subject to his dominion;

lastly, several of the Thracian tribes called Dii, distinguished by

their peculiar short swords, and maintaining a fierce independence

on the heights of Rhodopê, were tempted by the chance of plunder,

or the offer of pay, to flock to his standard. Altogether, his

army amounted, or was supposed to amount, to one hundred and fifty

thousand men, one third of it cavalry, who were for the most part

Getæ and Odrysians proper. The most formidable warriors in his camp

were the independent tribes of Rhodopê; but the whole host, alike

numerous, warlike, predatory, and cruel, spread terror amidst all

those who were within even the remote possibilities of its march.

Starting from the central Odrysian territory, and bringing with him

Agnon and the other Athenian envoys, he first crossed the uninhabited

mountain called Kerkinê, which divided the Pæonians on the west from

the Thracian tribes called Sinti and Mædi on the east, until he

reached the Pæonian town or district called Dobêrus;[366] it was

here that many troops and additional volunteers reached him, making

up his full total. From Dobêrus, probably marching down along one

of the tributary streams of the Axius, he entered into that portion

of Upper Macedonia, which lies along the higher Axius, and which

had constituted the separate principality of Philip: the presence

in his army of Amyntos son of Philip, induced some of the fortified

places, Gortynia, Atalantê, and others, to open their gates without

resistance, while Eidomenê was taken by storm, and Eurôpus in vain

attacked. From hence, he passed still farther southward into Lower

Macedonia, the kingdom of Perdikkas; ravaging the territory on both

sides of the Axius even to the neighborhood of the towns Pella and

Kyrrhus; and apparently down as far south as the mouth of the river

and the head of the Thermaic gulf. Farther south than this he did not

go, but spread his force over the districts between the left bank of

the Axius and the head of the Strymonic gulf,—Mygdonia, Krestônia,

and Anthemus,—while a portion of his army was detached to overrun the

territory of the Chalkidians and Bottiæans. The Macedonians under

Perdikkas, renouncing all idea of contending on foot against so

overwhelming a host, either fled or shut themselves up in the small

number of fortified places which the country presented. The cavalry

from Upper Macedonia, indeed, well armed and excellent, made some

orderly and successful charges against the Thracians, lightly armed

with javelins, short swords, and the pelta, or small shield,—but it

was presently shut in, harassed on all sides by superior numbers, and

compelled to think only of retreat and extrication.[367]

[366] See Gatterer (De Herodoti et Thucydidis Thraciâ), sects.

44-57; Poppo (Prolegom. ad Thucydidem), vol. ii, ch. 31, about

the geography of this region, which is very imperfectly known,

even in modern times. We can hardly pretend to assign a locality

to these ancient names.

Thucydidês, in his brief statements respecting this march of

Sitalkês, speaks like one who had good information about the

inland regions; as he was likely to have from his familiarity

with the coasts, and resident proprietorship in Thrace (Thucyd.

ii, 100; Herodot. v, 16).

[367] Thucyd. ii, 100; Xenophon, Memorab. iii, 9, 2.

Luckily for the enemies of the Odrysian king, his march was not made

until the beginning of winter, seemingly about November or December.

We may be sure that the Athenians, when they concerted with him the

joint attack upon the Chalkidians, intended that it should be in a

better time of the year: having probably waited to hear that his

army was in motion, and waited long in vain, they began to despair

of his coming at all, and thought it not worth while to despatch

any force of their own to the spot.[368] Some envoys and presents

only were sent as compliments, instead of the coöperating armament;

and this disappointment, coupled with the severity of the weather,

the nakedness of the country, and the privations of his army at

that season, induced Sitalkês soon to enter into negotiations with

Perdikkas; who, moreover, gained over Seuthes, nephew of the Odrysian

prince, by promising his sister Stratonikê in marriage, together

with a sum of money, on condition that the Thracian host should be

speedily withdrawn. This was accordingly done, after it had been

distributed for thirty days over Macedonia: during eight of those

days his detachment had ravaged the Chalkidic lands. But the interval

had been quite long enough to diffuse terror all around: such a

host of fierce barbarians had never before been brought together,

and no one knew in what direction they might be disposed to carry

their incursions. The independent Thracian tribes (Panæi, Odomantê,

Drôi, and Dersæi) in the plains on the northeast of the Strymon, and

near Mount Pangæus, not far from Amphipolis, were the first to feel

alarm lest Sitalkês should take the opportunity of trying to conquer

them; on the other side, the Thessalians, Magnêtes, and other Greeks

north of Thermopylæ, anticipated that he would carry his invasion

farther south, and began to organize means for resisting him: even

the general Peloponnesian confederacy heard with uneasiness of this

new ally whom Athens was bringing into the field, perhaps against

them. All such alarms were dissipated, when Sitalkês, after remaining

thirty days, returned by the way he came, and the formidable

avalanche was thus seen to melt away without falling on them. The

faithless Perdikkas, on this occasion, performed his promise to

Seuthes, having drawn upon himself much mischief by violating his

previous similar promise to Sitalkês.[369]

[368] Thucyd. ii, 101. ἐπειδὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ παρῆσαν ταῖς ναυσὶν,

ἀπιστοῦντες αὐτὸν μὴ ἥξειν, etc.

[369] Thucyd. ii, 101.