Among the thousand towns which paid tribute to Athens,—taking this

numerical statement of Aristophanês, not in its exact meaning, but

simply as a great number,—if a small town, or one of its citizens,

had cause of complaint against a larger, there was no channel except

the synod of Delos, or the Athenian tribunal, through which it could

have any reasonable assurance of fair trial or justice. It is not

to be supposed that all the private complaints and suits between

citizen and citizen, in each respective subject town, were carried

up for trial to Athens: yet we do not know distinctly how the line

was drawn between matters carried up thither and matters tried at

home. The subject cities appear to have been interdicted from the

power of capital punishment, which could only be inflicted after

previous trial and condemnation at Athens:[78] so that the latter

reserved to herself the cognizance of most of the grave crimes,—or

what may be called “the higher justice” generally. And the political

accusations preferred by citizen against citizen, in any subject

city, for alleged treason, corruption, non-fulfilment of public duty,

etc., were doubtless carried to Athens for trial,—perhaps the most

important part of her jurisdiction.

[78] Antipho, De Cæde Herôdis, c. 7, p. 135. ὃ οὐδὲ πόλει

ἔξεστιν, ἄνευ Ἀθηναίων οὐδένα θανάτῳ ζημιῶσαι.

But the maintenance of this judicial supremacy was not intended by

Athens for the substantive object of amending the administration of

justice in each separate allied city: it went rather to regulate

the relations between city and city,—between citizens of different

cities,—between Athenian citizens or officers, and any of these

allied cities with which they had relations,—between each city

itself, as a dependent government with contending political parties,

and the imperial head, Athens. All these were problems which imperial

Athens was called on to solve, and the best way of solving them would

have been through some common synod emanating from all the allies:

putting this aside, we shall find that the solution provided by

Athens was perhaps the next best, and we shall be the more induced

to think so, when we compare it with the proceedings afterwards

adopted by Sparta, when she had put down the Athenian empire. Under

Sparta, the general rule was, to place each of the dependent cities

under the government of a dekadarchy or oligarchical council of

ten among its chief citizens, together with a Spartan harmost, or

governor, having a small garrison under his orders. It will be found,

when we come to describe the Spartan maritime empire, that these

arrangements exposed each dependent city to very great violence and

extortion, while, after all, they solved only a part of the problem:

they served only to maintain each separate city under the dominion

of Sparta, without contributing to regulate the dealings between the

citizens of one and those of another, or to bind together the empire

as a whole. Now the Athenians did not, as a system, place in their

dependent cities, governors analogous to the harmosts, though they

did so occasionally under special need; but their fleets and their

officers were in frequent relation with these cities; and as the

principal officers were noways indisposed to abuse their position, so

the facility of complaint, constantly open to the Athenian popular

dikastery, served both as redress and guarantee against misrule of

this description. It was a guarantee which the allies themselves

sensibly felt and valued, as we know from Thucydidês: the chief

source from whence they had to apprehend evil was the Athenian

officials and principal citizens, who could misemploy the power of

Athens for their own private purposes,—but they looked up to the

“Athenian Demos as a chastener of such evil-doers and as a harbor

of refuge to themselves.”[79] If the popular dikasteries at Athens

had not been thus open, the allied cities would have suffered much

more severely from the captains and officials of Athens in their

individual capacity. And the maintenance of political harmony,

between the imperial city and the subject ally, was insured by Athens

through the jurisdiction of her dikasteries with much less cost

of injustice and violence than by Sparta; for though oligarchical

partisans might sometimes be unjustly condemned at Athens, yet such

accidental wrong was immensely overpassed by the enormities of the

Spartan harmosts and dekadarchies, who put numbers to death without

any trial at all.

[79] Thucyd. viii, 48. Τούς τε καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ὀνομαζομένους

οὐκ ἐλάσσω αὐτοὺς (that is, the subject-allies) νομίζειν σφίσι

πράγματα παρέξειν τοῦ δήμου, ποριστὰς ὄντας καὶ ἐσηγητὰς τῶν

κακῶν τῷ δήμῳ, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πλείω αὐτοὺς ὠφελεῖσθαι· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπ᾽

ἐκείνοις εἶναι καὶ ἄκριτοι ἂν καὶ βιαιότερον ἀποθνήσκειν, τὸν δὲ

δῆμον σφῶν τε καταφυγὴν εἶναι καὶ ἐκείνων σωφρονιστήν. Καὶ ταῦτα

παρ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων ἐπισταμένας τὰς πόλεις σαφῶς αὐτὸς εἰδέναι,

ὅτι οὕτω νομίζουσιν. This is introduced as the deliberate

judgment of the Athenian commander Phrynichus, whom Thucydidês

greatly commends for his sagacity, and with whom he seems in this

case to have concurred.

Xenophon (Rep. Ath. i. 14, 15) affirms that the Athenian officers

on service passed many unjust sentences upon the oligarchical

party in the allied cities,—fines, sentences of banishment,

capital punishments; and that the Athenian people, though they

had a strong public interest in the prosperity of the allies, in

order that their tribute might be larger, nevertheless thought

it better that any individual citizen of Athens should pocket

what he could out of the plunder of the allies, and leave to the

latter nothing more than was absolutely necessary for them to

live and work, without any superfluity, such as might tempt them

to revolt.

That the Athenian officers on service may have succeeded too

often in unjust peculation at the cost of the allies, is probable

enough: but that the Athenian people were pleased to see their

own individual citizens so enriching themselves is certainly not

true. The large jurisdiction of the dikasteries was intended,

among other effects, to open to the allies a legal redress

against such misconduct on the part of the Athenian officers: and

the passage above cited from Thucydidês proves that it really

produced such an effect.

So again, it is to be recollected that Athenian private citizens, not

officially employed, were spread over the whole range of the empire

as kleruchs, proprietors, or traders; of course, therefore, disputes

would arise between them and the natives of the subject cities, as

well as among these latter themselves, in cases where both parties

did not belong to the same city. Now in such cases the Spartan

imperial authority was so exercised as to afford little or no remedy,

since the action of the harmost or the dekadarchy was confined to

one separate city; while the Athenian dikasteries, with universal

competence and public trial, afforded the only redress which the

contingency admitted. If a Thasian citizen believed himself aggrieved

by the historian Thucydidês, either as commander of the Athenian

fleet off the station, or as proprietor of gold mines in Thrace, he

had his remedy against the latter by accusation before the Athenian

dikasteries, to which the most powerful Athenian was amenable not

less than the meanest Thasian. To a citizen of any allied city, it

might be an occasional hardship to be sued before the courts at

Athens, but it was also often a valuable privilege to him to be

able to sue before those courts others whom else he could not have

reached. He had his share both of the benefit and of the hardship.

Athens, if she robbed her subject-allies of their independence, at

least gave them in exchange the advantage of a central and common

judiciary authority; thus enabling each of them to enforce claims

of justice against the rest, in a way which would not have been

practicable, to the weaker at least, even in a state of general

independence.

Now Sparta seems not even to have attempted anything of the kind with

regard to her subject-allies, being content to keep them under the

rule of a harmost, and a partisan oligarchy; and we read anecdotes

which show that no justice could be obtained at Sparta, even for the

grossest outrages committed by the harmost, or by private Spartans

out of Laconia. The two daughters of a Bœotian named Skedasus, of

Leuktra in Bœotia, had been first violated and then slain by two

Spartan citizens: the son of a citizen of Oreus, in Eubœa, had

been also outraged and killed by the harmost Aristodêmus:[80] in

both cases the fathers went to Sparta to lay the enormity before

the ephors and other authorities, and in both cases a deaf ear

was turned to their complaints. But such crimes, if committed by

Athenian citizens or officers, might have been brought to a formal

exposure before the public sitting of the dikastery, and there can

be no doubt that both would have been severely punished: we shall

see hereafter that an enormity of this description, committed by

the Athenian general Pachês, at Mitylênê, cost him his life before

the Athenian dikasts.[81] Xenophon, in the dark and one-sided

representation which he gives of the Athenian democracy, remarks,

that if the subject-allies had not been made amenable to justice, at

Athens, they would have cared little for the people of Athens, and

would have paid court only to those individual Athenians—generals,

trierarchs, or envoys—who visited the islands on service; but under

the existing system, the subjects were compelled to visit Athens

either as plaintiffs or defendants, and were thus under the necessity

of paying court to the bulk of the people also,—that is, to those

humbler citizens out of whom the dikasteries were formed; they

supplicated the dikasts in court for favor or lenient dealing.[82]

However true this may be, we must remark that it was a lighter lot

to be brought for trial before the dikastery, than to be condemned

without redress by the general on service, or to be forced to buy off

his condemnation by a bribe; and, moreover, that the dikastery was

open not merely to receive accusations against citizens of the allied

cities, but also to entertain the complaints which they preferred

against others.

[80] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 20; Plutarch, Amator. Narrat. c. 3,

p. 773.

[81] See _infra_, chap. 49.

[82] Xenophon, Rep. Athen, i, 18. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, εἰ μὲν μὴ

ἐπὶ δίκας ᾔεσαν οἱ σύμμαχοι, τοὺς ἐκπλέοντας Ἀθηναίων ἐτίμων ἂν

μόνους, τούς τε στρατηγοὺς καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους καὶ πρέσβεις· νῦν

δ᾽ ἠνάγκασται τὸν δῆμον κολακεύειν τῶν Ἀθηναίων εἷς ἕκαστος τῶν

συμμάχων, γιγνώσκων ὅτι δεῖ μὲν ἀφικόμενον Ἀθήναζε δίκην δοῦναι

καὶ λαβεῖν, οὐκ ἐν ἄλλοις τισὶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, ὅς ἐστι δὴ

νόμος Ἀθήνῃσι. Καὶ ἀντιβολῆσαι ἀναγκάζεται ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις,

καὶ εἰσιόντος του, ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι τῆς χειρός. Διὰ τοῦτο οὖν οἱ

σύμμαχοι δοῦλοι τοῦ δήμου τῶν Ἀθηναίων καθεστᾶσι μᾶλλον.

Assuming the dikasteries at Athens to be ever so defective as

tribunals for administering justice, we must recollect that they

were the same tribunals under which every Athenian citizen held his

own fortune or reputation, and that the native of any subject city

was admitted to the same chance of justice as the native of Athens.

Accordingly, we find the Athenian envoy at Sparta, immediately before

the Peloponnesian war, taking peculiar credit to the imperial city

on this ground for equal dealing with her subject-allies. “If our

power (he says) were to pass into other hands, the comparison would

presently show how moderate we are in the use of it: but as regards

us, our very moderation is unfairly turned to our disparagement

rather than to our praise. For even though we put ourselves at

disadvantage in matters litigated with our allies, and though we have

appointed such matters to be judged among ourselves and under laws

equal to both parties, we are represented as animated by nothing

better than a love of litigation.”[83] “Our allies (he adds) would

complain less if we made open use of our superior force with regard

to them; but we discard such maxims, and deal with them upon an

equal footing: and they are so accustomed to this, that they think

themselves entitled to complain at every trifling disappointment

of their expectations.[84] They suffered worse hardships under

the Persians before our empire began, and they would suffer worse

under you (the Spartans), if you were to succeed in conquering us

and making our empire yours.” History bears out the boast of the

Athenian orator, both as to the time preceding and following the

empire of Athens.[85] And an Athenian citizen, indeed, might well

regard it, not as a hardship, but as a privilege, that subject-allies

should be allowed to sue him before the dikastery, and to defend

themselves before the same tribunal, either in case of wrong done

to him, or in case of alleged treason to the imperial authority of

Athens: they were thereby put upon a level with himself. Still more

would he find reason to eulogize the universal competence of these

dikasteries in providing a common legal authority for all disputes of

the numerous distinct communities of the empire, one with another,

and for the safe navigation and general commerce of the Ægean. That

complaints were raised against it among the subject-allies, is noway

surprising: for the empire of Athens generally was inconsistent

with that separate autonomy to which every town thought itself

entitled,—and this was one of its prominent and constantly operative

institutions, as well as a striking mark of dependence to the

subordinate communities. Yet we may safely affirm, that if empire

was to be maintained at all, no way of maintaining it could be found

at once less oppressive and more beneficial than the superintending

competence of the dikasteries,—a system not taking its rise in the

mere “love of litigation,” if, indeed, we are to reckon this a

real feature in the Athenian character, which I shall take another

opportunity of examining, much less in those petty collateral

interests indicated by Xenophon,[86] such as the increased customs

duty, rent of houses, and hire of slaves at Peiræus, and the larger

profits of the heralds, arising from the influx of suitors. It was

nothing but the power, originally inherent in the confederacy of

Delos, of arbitration between members and enforcement of duties

towards the whole,—a power inherited by Athens from that synod, and

enlarged to meet the political wants of her empire; to which end

it was essential, even in the view of Xenophon himself.[87] It may

be that the dikastery was not always impartial between Athenian

citizens privately, or the Athenian commonwealth collectively, and

the subject-allies,—and in so far the latter had good reason to

complain; but on the other hand, we have no ground for suspecting it

of deliberate or standing unfairness, or of any other defects than

such as were inseparable from its constitution and procedure, whoever

might be the parties under trial.

[83] Thucyd. i, 76, 77. Ἄλλους γ᾽ ἂν οὖν οἰόμεθα τὰ ἡμέτερα

λαβόντας δεῖξαι ἂν μάλιστα εἴ τι μετριάζομεν· ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ

ἐπιεικοῦς ἀδοξία τὸ πλέον ἢ ἔπαινος οὐκ εἰκότως περιέστη. Καὶ

ἐλασσούμενοι γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ξυμβολαίαις πρὸς τοὺς ξυμμάχους δίκαις,

καὶ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις νόμοις ποιήσαντες τὰς

κρίσεις, φιλοδικεῖν δοκοῦμεν, etc.

I construe ξυμβολαίαις δίκαις as connected in meaning with

ξυμβόλαια and not with ξύμβολα—following Duker and Bloomfield in

preference to Poppo and Göller: see the elaborate notes of the

two latter editors. Δίκαι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων indicated the arrangements

concluded by special convention between two different cities, by

consent of both, for the purpose of determining controversies

between their respective citizens: they were something

essentially apart from the ordinary judicial arrangements of

either state. Now what the Athenian orator here insists upon

is exactly the contrary of this idea: he says, that the allies

were admitted to the benefit of Athenian trial and Athenian

laws, in like manner with the citizens themselves. The judicial

arrangements by which the Athenian allies were brought before

the Athenian dikasteries cannot, with propriety, be said to be

δίκαι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων; unless the act of original incorporation into

the confederacy of Delos is to be regarded as a ξύμβολον, or

agreement,—which in a large sense it might be, though not in the

proper sense in which δίκαι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων are commonly mentioned.

Moreover. I think that the passage of Antipho (De Cæde Herôdis,

p. 745) proves that it was the citizens of places _not in

alliance with Athens_, who litigated with Athenians according to

δίκαι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων,—not the allies of Athens while they resided

in their own native cities; for I agree with the interpretation

which Boeckh puts upon this passage, in opposition to Platner

and Schömann (Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, book iii, ch. xvi,

p. 403, Eng. transl.; Schömann, Der Attisch. Prozess, p. 778;

Platner, Prozess und Klagen bei den Attikern, ch. iv, 2, pp.

110-112, where the latter discusses both the passages of Antipho

and Thucydidês).

The passages in Demosthenês Orat. de Halones. c. 3, pp. 98, 99;

and Andokidês cont. Alkibiad. c. 7, p. 121 (I quote this latter

oration, though it is undoubtedly spurious, because we may well

suppose the author of it to be conversant with the nature and

contents of ξύμβολα), give us a sufficient idea of these judicial

conventions, or ξύμβολα,—special and liable to differ in each

particular case. They seem to me essentially distinct from that

systematic scheme of proceeding whereby the dikasteries of Athens

were made cognizant of all, or most, important controversies

among or between the allied cities, as well as of political

accusations.

M. Boeckh draws a distinction between the _autonomous_

allies (Chios and Lesbos, at the time immediately before the

Peloponnesian war) and the _subject_-allies: “the former class

(he says) retained possession of unlimited jurisdiction, whereas

the latter were compelled to try all their disputes in the

courts of Athens.” Doubtless this distinction would prevail

to a certain degree, but how far it was pushed we can hardly

say. Suppose that a dispute took place between Chios and one

of the subject islands, or between an individual Chian and an

individual Thasian; would not the Chian plaintiff sue, or the

Chian defendant be sued, before the Athenian dikastery? Suppose

that an Athenian citizen or officer became involved in dispute

with a Chian, would not the Athenian dikastery be the competent

court, whichever of the two were plaintiff or defendant? Suppose

a Chian citizen or magistrate to be suspected of fomenting

revolt, would it not be competent to any accuser, either Chian or

Athenian, to indict him before the dikastery at Athens? Abuse of

power, or peculation, committed by Athenian officers at Chios,

must of course be brought before the Athenian dikasteries, just

as much as if the crime had been committed at Thasos or Naxos.

We have no evidence to help us in regard to these questions; but

I incline to believe that the difference in respect to judicial

arrangement, between the autonomous and the subject-allies, was

less in degree than M. Boeckh believes. We must recollect that

the arrangement was not all pure hardship to the allies,—the

liability to be prosecuted was accompanied with the privilege of

prosecuting for injuries received.

There is one remark, however, which appears to me of importance

for understanding the testimonies on this subject. The Athenian

empire, properly so called, which began by the confederacy of

Delos after the Persian invasion, was completely destroyed at

the close of the Peloponnesian war, when Athens was conquered

and taken. But after some years had elapsed, towards the year

377 B.C., Athens again began to make maritime conquests, to

acquire allies, to receive tribute, to assemble a synod, and to

resume her footing of something like an imperial city. But her

power over her allies, during this second period of empire, was

nothing like so great as it had been during the first, between

the Persian and Peloponnesian wars: nor can we be at all sure

that what is true of the second is also true of the first. Now

I think it probable, that those statements of the grammarians,

which represent the allies as carrying on δίκας ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων in

ordinary practice with the Athenians, may really be true about

the second empire or alliance. Bekker Anecdota, p. 436. Ἀθηναῖοι

ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων ἐδίκαζον τοῖς ὑπηκόοις· οὕτως Ἀριστοτέλης. Pollux,

viii. 63. Ἀπὸ συμβόλων δὲ δίκη ἦν, ὅτε οἱ σύμμαχοι ἐδικάζοντο.

Also Hesychius, i, 489. The statement here ascribed to Aristotle

may very probably be true about the second alliance, though it

cannot be held true for the first. In the second, the Athenians

may really have had σύμβολα, or special conventions for judicial

business, with many of their principal allies, instead of making

Athens the authoritative centre, and heir to the Delian synod, as

they did during the first. It is to be remarked, however, that

Harpokration, in the explanation which he gives of σύμβολα treats

them in a perfectly general way, as contentions for settlement

of judicial controversy between city and city, without any

particular allusion to Athens and her allies. Compare Heffter,

Athenäische Gerichtsverfassung, iii, 1, 3, p. 91.

[84] Thucyd. i. 77. Οἱ δὲ (the allies) ~εἰθισμένοι πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ

τοῦ ἴσου ὁμιλεῖν~, etc.

[85] Compare Isokratês, Or. iv, Panegyric. pp. 62-66, sects.

116-138; and Or. xii, Panathenaic. pp. 247-254, sects. 72-111;

Or. viii, De Pace, p. 178, sect. 119, _seqq._; Plutarch, Lysand.

c. 13; Cornel. Nepos, Lysand. c. 2, 3.

[86] Xenophon, Repub. Ath. i, 17.

[87] Xenophon, Repub. Ath. i, 16. He states it as one of the

advantageous consequences, which induced the Athenians to bring

the suits and complaints of the allies to Athens for trial—that

the prytaneia, or fees paid upon entering a cause for trial,

became sufficiently large to furnish all the pay for the dikasts

throughout the year.

But in another part of his treatise (iii, 2, 3), he represents

the Athenian dikasteries as overloaded with judicial business,

much more than they could possibly get through; insomuch that

there were long delays before causes could be brought on for

trial. It could hardly be any great object, therefore, to

multiply complaints artificially, in order to make fees for the

dikasts.

We are now considering the Athenian empire as it stood before the

Peloponnesian war; before the increased exactions and the multiplied

revolts, to which that war gave rise,—before the cruelties which

accompanied the suppression of those revolts, and which so deeply

stained the character of Athens,—before that aggravated fierceness,

mistrust, contempt of obligation, and rapacious violence, which

Thucydidês so emphatically indicates as having been infused into the

Greek bosom by the fever of an all-pervading contest.[88] There had

been before this time many revolts of the Athenian dependencies,

from the earliest at Naxos down to the latest at Samos: all had

been successfully suppressed, but in no case had Athens displayed

the same unrelenting rigor as we shall find hereafter manifested

towards Mitylênê, Skiônê, and Mêlos. The policy of Periklês, now in

the plenitude of his power at Athens, was cautious and conservative,

averse to forced extension of empire as well as to those increased

burdens on the dependent allies which such schemes would have

entailed, and tending to maintain that assured commerce in the

Ægean by which all of them must have been gainers,—not without a

conviction that the contest must arise sooner or later between

Athens and Sparta, and that the resources as well as the temper of

the allies must be husbanded against that contingency. If we read

in Thucydidês the speech of the envoy from Mitylênê[89] at Olympia,

delivered to the Lacedæmonians and their allies in the fourth year

of the Peloponnesian war, on occasion of the revolt of the city

from Athens,—a speech imploring aid and setting forth the strongest

case against Athens which the facts could be made to furnish,—we

shall be surprised how weak the case is, and how much the speaker is

conscious of its weakness. He has nothing like practical grievances

and oppressions to urge against the imperial city,—he does not

dwell upon enormity of tribute, unpunished misconduct of Athenian

officers, hardship of bringing causes for trial to Athens, or other

sufferings of the subjects generally,—he has nothing to say except

that they were defenceless and degraded subjects, and that Athens

held authority over them without and against their own consent: and

in the case of Mitylênê, not so much as this could be said, since

she was on the footing of an equal, armed, and autonomous ally. Of

course, this state of forced dependence was one which the allies, or

such of them as could stand alone, would naturally and reasonably

shake off whenever they had an opportunity:[90] but the negative

evidence, derived from the speech of the Mitylenæan orator, goes far

to make out the point contended for by the Athenian speaker at Sparta

immediately before the war,—that, beyond the fact of such forced

dependence, the allies had little practically to complain of. A city

like Mitylênê, moreover, would be strong enough to protect itself

and its own commerce without the help of Athens: but to the weaker

allies, the breaking up of the Athenian empire would have greatly

lessened the security both of individuals and of commerce, in the

waters of the Ægean, and their freedom would thus have been purchased

at the cost of considerable positive disadvantages.[91]

[88] See his well-known comments on the seditions at Korkyra,

iii, 82, 83.

[89] Thucyd. iii, 11-14.

[90] So the Athenian orator Diodotus puts it in his speech

deprecating the extreme punishment about to be inflicted on

Mitylênê—ἤν τινα ἐλεύθερον καὶ βίᾳ ἀρχόμενον ~εἰκότως πρὸς

αὐτονομίαν ἀποστάντα χειρωσώμεθα~, etc. (Thucyd. iii, 46.)

[91] It is to be recollected that the Athenian empire was

essentially _a government of dependencies_; Athens, as

an imperial state, exercising authority over subordinate

governments. To maintain beneficial relations between two

governments, one supreme, the other subordinate, and to make

the system work to the satisfaction of the people in the one

as well as of the people in the other, has always been found a

problem of great difficulty. Whoever reads the instructive volume

of Mr. G. C. Lewis (Essay on the Government of Dependencies),

and the number of instances of practical misgovernment in this

matter which are set forth therein, will be inclined to think

that the empire of Athens over her allies makes comparatively a

creditable figure. It will, most certainly, stand full comparison

with the government of England, over dependencies, in the last

century; as illustrated by the history of Ireland, with the penal

laws against the Catholics; by the Declaration of Independence,

published in 1776, by the American colonies, setting forth the

grounds of their separation; and by the pleadings of Mr. Burke

against Warren Hastings.

A statement and legal trial alluded to by Mr. Lewis (p. 367),

elucidates, farther, two points not unimportant on the present

occasion: 1. The illiberal and humiliating vein of sentiment

which is apt to arise in citizens of the supreme government

towards those of the subordinate. 2. The protection which English

jury-trial, nevertheless, afforded to the citizens of the

dependency against oppression by English officers.

“An action was brought, in the court of Common Pleas, in 1773,

by Mr. Anthony Fabrigas, a native of Minorca, against General

Mostyn, the governor of the island. The facts proved at the trial

were, that Governor Mostyn had arrested the plaintiff, imprisoned

him, and transported him to Spain, without any form of trial, on

the ground that the plaintiff had presented to him a petition for

redress of grievances, in a manner which he deemed improper. Mr.

Justice Gould left it to the jury to say, whether the plaintiff’s

behavior was such as to afford a just conclusion that he was

about to stir up sedition and mutiny in the garrison, or whether

he meant no more than earnestly to press his suit and obtain a

redress of grievances. If they thought the latter, the plaintiff

was entitled to recover in the action. The jury gave a verdict

for the plaintiff _with_ £3,000 _damages_. In the following term,

an application was made for a new trial, which was refused by the

whole court.

“The following remarks of the counsel for Governor Mostyn,

on this trial, contain a plain and _naïve_ statement of the

doctrine, _that a dependency is to be governed, not for its

own interest, but for that of the dominant state_. ‘Gentlemen

of the jury,’ said the counsel, ‘it will be time for me now

to take notice of another circumstance, notorious to all the

gentlemen who have been settled in the island, that the natives

of Minorca are but ill-affected to the English, and to the

English government. It is not much to be wondered at. They are

the descendants of Spaniards; and they consider Spain as the

country to which they ought naturally to belong: it is not at all

to be wondered at that they are indisposed to the English, whom

they consider as their conquerors.—Of all the Minorquins in the

island, the plaintiff perhaps stands singularly and eminently

the most seditious, turbulent, and dissatisfied subject to the

crown of Great Britain that is to be found in Minorca. Gentlemen,

_he is, or chooses to be called, the patriot of Minorca_. Now

patriotism is a very pretty thing among ourselves, and we owe

much to it: we owe our liberties to it; but we should have but

little to value, and we should have but little of what we now

enjoy, were it not for our trade. _And for the sake of our

trade, it is not fit that we should encourage patriotism in

Minorca_; for it is there destructive of our trade, and there

is an end to our trade in the Mediterranean, if it goes there.

But _here it is very well_; for the body of the people in this

country will have it: they have demanded it,—and in consequence

of their demands, they have enjoyed liberties which they will

transmit to their posterity,—and it is not in the power of this

government to deprive them of it. But they will take care of all

our conquests abroad. If that spirit prevailed in Minorca, the

consequence would be the loss of that country, and of course of

our Mediterranean trade. We should be sorry to set all our slaves

free in our plantations.’”

The prodigious sum of damages awarded by the jury, shows the

strength of their sympathy with this Minorquin plaintiff against

the English officer. I doubt not that the feeling of the

dikastery at Athens was much of the same kind, and often quite as

strong; sincerely disposed to protect the subject-allies against

misconduct of Athenian trierarchs, or inspectors.

The feelings expressed in the speech above cited would also often

find utterance from Athenian orators in the assembly; and it

would not be difficult to produce parallel passages, in which

these orators imply discontent on the part of the allies to be

the natural state of things, such as Athens could not hope to

escape. The speech here given shows that such feelings arise,

almost inevitably, out of the uncomfortable relation of two

governments, one supreme and the other subordinate. They are not

the product of peculiar cruelty and oppression on the part of the

Athenian democracy, as Mr. Mitford and so many others have sought

to prove.

Nearly the whole of the Grecian world, putting aside Italian,

Sicilian, and African Greeks, was at this time included either in

the alliance of Lacedæmon or in that of Athens, so that the truce

of thirty years insured a suspension of hostilities everywhere.

Moreover, the Lacedæmonian confederates had determined by majority

of votes to refuse the request of Samos for aid in her revolt

against Athens: whereby it seemed established, as practical

international law, that neither of these two great aggregate bodies

should intermeddle with the other, and that each should restrain

or punish its own disobedient members.[92] Of this refusal, which

materially affected the course of events, the main advisers had

been the Corinthians, in spite of that fear and dislike of Athens

which prompted many of the allies to vote for war.[93] The position

of the Corinthians was peculiar; for while Sparta and her other

allies were chiefly land-powers, Corinth had been from early times

maritime, commercial, and colonizing,—she had been indeed once the

first naval power in Greece, along with Ægina; but either she had

not increased it at all during the last forty years, or, if she

had, her comparative naval importance had been entirely sunk by the

gigantic expansion of Athens. The Corinthians had both commerce and

colonies,—Leukas, Anaktorium, Ambrakia, Korkyra, etc., along or near

the coast of Epirus: they had also their colony Potidæa, situated

on the isthmus of Pallênê, in Thrace, and intimately connected with

them: and the interest of their commerce made them extremely averse

to any collision with the superior navy of the Athenians. It was this

consideration which had induced them to resist the impulse of the

Lacedæmonian allies towards war on behalf of Samos: for though their

feelings, both of jealousy and hatred against Athens were even now

strong,[94] arising greatly out of the struggle a few years before

for the acquisition of Megara to the Athenian alliance,—prudence

indicated that, in a war against the first naval power in Greece,

they were sure to be the greatest losers. So long as the policy

of Corinth pointed towards peace, there was every probability

that war would be avoided, or at least accepted only in a case of

grave necessity, by the Lacedæmonian alliance. But a contingency,

distant as well as unexpected, which occurred about five years

after the revolt of Samos, reversed all these chances, and not only

extinguished the dispositions of Corinth towards peace, but even

transformed her into the forward instigator of war.

[92] See the important passage already adverted to in a prior

note.

Thucyd. i, 40. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμεῖς Σαμίων ἀποστάντων ψῆφον προσεθέμεθα

ἐναντίαν ὑμῖν, τῶν ἄλλων Πελοποννησίων δίχα ἐψηφισμένων εἰ χρὴ

αὐτοῖς ἀμύνειν, ~φανερῶς δὲ ἀντείπομεν τοὺς προσήκοντας ξυμμάχους

αὐτόν τινα κολάζειν~.

[93] Thucyd. i. 33.

[94] Thucyd. i. 42.

Amidst the various colonies planted from Corinth along the coast of

Epirus, the greater number acknowledged on her part an hegemony,

or supremacy.[95] What extent of real power and interference this

acknowledgment implied, in addition to the honorary dignity, we

are not in a condition to say; but the Corinthians were popular,

and had not carried their interference beyond the point which the

colonists themselves found acceptable. To these amicable relations,

however, the powerful Korkyra formed a glaring exception, having been

generally at variance, sometimes in the most aggravated hostility,

with its mother-city, and withholding from her even the accustomed

tributes of honorary and filial respect. It was amidst such relations

of habitual ill-will between Corinth and Korkyra, that a dispute

grew up respecting the city of Epidamnus, known afterwards, in the

Roman times, as Dyrrachium, hard by the modern Durazzo,—a colony

founded by the Korkyræans on the coast of Illyria, in the Ionic gulf,

considerably to the north of their own island. So strong was the

sanctity of Grecian custom in respect to the foundation of colonies,

that the Korkyræans, in spite of their enmity to Corinth, had been

obliged to select the œkist, or founder-in-chief of Epidamnus, from

that city,—a citizen of Herakleid descent, named Phalius,—along

with whom there had also come some Corinthian settlers: so that

Epidamnus, though a Korkyræan colony, was nevertheless a recognized

granddaughter, if the expression may be allowed, of Corinth, the

recollection of which was perpetuated by the solemnities periodically

celebrated in honor of the œkist.[96]

[95] Thucyd. i, 38. ἡγεμόνες τε εἶναι καὶ τὰ εἰκότα θαυμάζεσθαι.

[96] Thucyd. i, 24, 25.

Founded on the isthmus of an outlaying peninsula on the sea-coast of

the Illyrian Taulantii, Epidamnus was at first very prosperous, and

acquired a considerable territory as well as a numerous population.

But during the years immediately preceding the period which we have

now reached, it had been exposed to great reverses: internal sedition

between the oligarchy and the people, aggravated by attacks from

the neighboring Illyrians, had crippled its power: and a recent

revolution, in which the people put down the oligarchy, had reduced

it still farther,—since the oligarchical exiles, collecting a

force and allying themselves with the Illyrians, harassed the city

grievously both by sea and land. The Epidamnian democracy was in such

straits as to be forced to send to Korkyra for aid: their envoys sat

down as suppliants at the temple of Hêrê, cast themselves on the

mercy of the Korkyræans, and besought them to act both as mediators

with the exiled oligarchy and as auxiliaries against the Illyrians.

Though the Korkyræans themselves, democratically governed, might

have been expected to sympathize with these suppliants and their

prayers, yet their feeling was decidedly opposite: for it was the

Epidamnian oligarchy who were principally connected with Korkyra,

from whence their forefathers had emigrated, and where their family

burial-places as well as their kinsmen were still to be found:[97]

while the demos, or small proprietors and tradesmen of Epidamnus,

may perhaps have been of miscellaneous origin, and at any rate

had no visible memorials of ancient lineage in the mother-island.

Having been refused aid from Korkyra, and finding their distressed

condition insupportable, the Epidamnians next thought of applying

to Corinth: but as this was a step of questionable propriety, their

envoys were directed first to take the opinion of the Delphian god.

His oracle having given an unqualified sanction, they proceeded to

Corinth with their mission; describing their distress as well as

their unavailing application at Korkyra,—tendering Epidamnus to

the Corinthians as to its œkists and chiefs, with the most urgent

entreaties for immediate aid to preserve it from ruin,—and not

omitting to insist on the divine sanction just obtained. It was

found easy to persuade the Corinthians, who, looking upon Epidamnus

as a joint colony from Corinth and Korkyra, thought themselves not

only authorized, but bound, to undertake its defence, a resolution

much prompted by their ancient feud against Korkyra. They speedily

organized an expedition, consisting partly of intended new settlers,

partly of a protecting military force,—Corinthian, Leukadian, and

Ambrakiôtic: which combined body, in order to avoid opposition from

the powerful Korkyræan navy, was marched by land as far as Apollônia,

and transported from thence by sea to Epidamnus.[98]

[97] Thucyd. i, 26. ἦλθον γὰρ ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν οἱ τῶν Ἐπιδαμνίων

φυγάδες, τάφους τε ἀποδεικνύντες καὶ ξυγγένειαν ἣν προϊσχόμενοι

ἐδέοντο σφᾶς κατάγειν.

[98] Thucyd. i, 26.

The arrival of such a reinforcement rescued the city for the moment,

but drew upon it a formidable increase of peril from the Korkyræans,

who looked upon the interference of Corinth as an infringement of

their rights, and resented it in the strongest manner. Their feelings

were farther inflamed by the Epidamnian oligarchical exiles, who,

coming to the island with petition for succor, and appeals to the

tombs of their Korkyræan ancestors, found a ready sympathy. They

were placed on board a fleet of twenty-five triremes, afterwards

strengthened by a farther reinforcement, which was sent to Epidamnus

with the insulting requisition that they should be forthwith

restored, and the new-comers from Corinth dismissed. No attention

being paid to these demands, the Korkyræans commenced the blockade

of the city with forty ships, and with an auxiliary land-force of

Illyrians,—making proclamation that any person within, citizen or

not, might depart safely if he chose, but would be dealt with as an

enemy if he remained. How many persons profited by this permission

we do not know: but at least enough to convey to Corinth the news

that their troops in Epidamnus were closely besieged. The Corinthians

immediately hastened the equipment of a second expedition,—sufficient

not only for the rescue of the place, but to surmount that resistance

which the Korkyræans were sure to offer. In addition to thirty

triremes, and three thousand hoplites, of their own, they solicited

aid both in ships and money from many of their allies: eight ships

fully manned were furnished by Megara, four by Palês, in the island

of Kephallênia, five by Epidaurus, two by Trœzen, one by Hermionê,

ten by Leukas, and eight by Ambrakia,—together with pecuniary

contributions from Thebes, Phlius, and Elis. They farther proclaimed

a public invitation for new settlers to Epidamnus, promising equal

political rights to all; an option being allowed to anyone who wished

to become a settler without being ready to depart at once, to insure

future admission by depositing the sum of fifty Corinthian drachmas.

Though it might seem that the prospects of these new settlers were

full of doubt and danger, such was the confidence entertained in the

metropolitan protection of Corinth, that many were found as well to

join the fleet, as to pay down the deposit for the liberty of future

junction.

All these proceedings on the part of Corinth, though undertaken with

intentional hostility towards Korkyra, had not been preceded by any

formal proposition, such as was customary among Grecian states,—a

harshness of dealing arising not merely from her hatred towards

Korkyra, but also from the peculiar political position of that

island, which stood alone and isolated, not enrolled either in the

Athenian or in the Lacedæmonian alliance. The Korkyræans, well aware

of the serious preparation now going on at Corinth, and of the union

among so many cities against them, felt themselves hardly a match for

it alone, in spite of their wealth and their formidable naval force

of one hundred and twenty triremes, inferior only to that of Athens.

They made an effort to avert the storm by peaceable means, prevailing

upon some mediators from Sparta and Sikyon to accompany them to

Corinth; where, while they required that the forces and settlers

recently despatched to Epidamnus should be withdrawn, denying all

right on the part of Corinth to interfere in that colony,—they at

the same time offered, if the point were disputed, to refer it for

arbitration either to some impartial Peloponnesian city, or to the

Delphian oracle; such arbiter to determine to which of the two

cities Epidamnus as a colony really belonged, and the decision to be

obeyed by both. They solemnly deprecated recourse to arms, which,

if persisted in, would drive them as a matter of necessity to seek

new allies such as they would not willingly apply to. To this the

Corinthians answered, that they could entertain no proposition until

the Korkyræan besieging force was withdrawn from Epidamnus: whereupon

the Korkyræans rejoined that they would withdraw it at once, provided

the new settlers and the troops sent by Corinth were removed at the

same time. Either there ought to be this reciprocal retirement, or

the Korkyræans would acquiesce in this _statu quo_ on both sides,

until the arbiters should have decided.[99]

[99] Thucyd. i, 28.

Although the Korkyræans had been unwarrantably harsh in rejecting the

first supplication from Epidamnus, yet in their propositions made at

Corinth, right and equity were on their side. But the Corinthians

had gone too far, and assumed an attitude too decidedly aggressive,

to admit of listening to arbitration, and accordingly, so soon as

their armament was equipped, they set sail for Epidamnus, despatching

a herald to declare war formally against the Korkyræans. As soon

as the armament, consisting of seventy triremes, under Aristeus,

Kallikratês, and Timanor, with two thousand five hundred hoplites,

under Archetimus and Isarchidas, had reached Cape Aktium, at the

mouth of the Ambrakian gulf, it was met by a Korkyræan herald in

a little boat forbidding all farther advance,—a summons of course

unavailing, and quickly followed by the appearance of the Korkyræan

fleet. Out of the one hundred and twenty triremes which constituted

the naval establishment of the island, forty were engaged in the

siege of Epidamnus, but all the remaining eighty were now brought

into service; the older ships being specially repaired for the

occasion. In the action which ensued, they gained a complete victory,

destroying fifteen Corinthian ships, and taking a considerable

number of prisoners. And on the very day of the victory, Epidamnus

surrendered to their besieging fleet, under covenant that the

Corinthians within it should be held as prisoners, and that the other

new-comers should be sold as slaves. The Corinthians and their allies

did not long keep the sea after their defeat, but retired home, while

the Korkyræans remained undisputed masters of the neighboring sea.

Having erected a trophy on Leukimmê, the adjoining promontory of

their island, they proceeded, according to the melancholy practice of

Grecian warfare, to kill all their prisoners,—except the Corinthians,

who were carried home and detained as prizes of great value for

purposes of negotiation. They next began to take vengeance on those

allies of Corinth, who had lent assistance to the recent expedition:

they ravaged the territory of Leukas, burned Kyllênê, the seaport

of Elis, and inflicted so much damage that the Corinthians were

compelled towards the end of the summer to send a second armament to

Cape Aktium, for the defence of Leukas, Anaktorium, and Ambrakia.

The Korkyræan fleet was again assembled near Cape Leukimmê, but

no farther action took place, and at the approach of winter both

armaments were disbanded.[100]

[100] Thucyd. i, 29, 30.

Deeply were the Corinthians humiliated by their defeat at sea,

together with the dispersion of the settlers whom they had brought

together; and though their original project was frustrated by the

loss of Epidamnus, they were only the more bent on complete revenge

against their old enemy Korkyra. They employed themselves, for two

entire years after the battle, in building new ships and providing

an armament adequate to their purposes: and in particular, they sent

round not only to the Peloponnesian seaports, but also to the islands

under the empire of Athens, in order to take into their pay the

best class of seamen. By such prolonged efforts, ninety well-manned

Corinthian ships were ready to set sail in the third year after the

battle: and the entire fleet, when reinforced by the allies, amounted

to not less than one hundred and fifty sail: twenty-seven triremes

from Ambrakia, twelve from Megara, ten from Elis, as many from

Leukas, and one from Anaktorium. Each of these allied squadrons had

officers of its own, while the Corinthian Xenokleidês and four others

were commanders-in-chief.[101]

[101] Thucyd. i, 31-46.

But the elaborate preparations going on at Corinth were no secret to

the Korkyræans, who well knew, besides, the numerous allies which

that city could command, and her extensive influence throughout

Greece. So formidable an attack was more than they could venture to

brave, alone and unaided. They had never yet enrolled themselves

among the allies either of Athens or of Lacedæmon: it had always

been their pride and policy to maintain a separate line of action,

which, by means of their wealth, their power, and their very peculiar

position, they had hitherto been enabled to do with safety. That they

had been able so to proceed with safety, however, was considered

both by friends and enemies as a peculiarity belonging to their

island; from whence we may draw an inference how little the islands

in the Ægean, now under the Athenian empire, would have been able to

maintain any real independence, if that empire had been broken up.

But though Korkyra had been secure in this policy of isolation up to

the present moment, such had been the increase and consolidation of

forces elsewhere throughout Greece, that even she could pursue it no

longer. To apply for admission into the Lacedæmonian confederacy,

wherein her immediate enemy exercised paramount influence, being

out of the question, she had no choice except to seek alliance with

Athens. That city had as yet no dependencies in the Ionic gulf; she

was not of kindred lineage, nor had she had any previous amicable

relations with the Dorian Korkyra. But if there was thus no previous

fact or feeling to lay the foundation of alliance, neither was there

anything to forbid it: for in the truce between Athens and Sparta, it

had been expressly stipulated, that any city, not actually enrolled

in the alliance of either, might join the one or the other at

pleasure.[102] While the proposition of alliance was thus formally

open either for acceptance or refusal, the time and circumstances

under which it was to be made rendered it full of grave contingencies

to all parties; and the Korkyræan envoys, who now for the first time

visited Athens, for the purpose of making it, came thither with

doubtful hopes of success, though to their island the question was

one of life or death.

[102] Thucyd. i, 35-40.

According to the modern theories of government, to declare war, to

make peace, and to contract alliances, are functions proper to be

intrusted to the executive government apart from the representative

assembly. According to ancient ideas, these were precisely the topics

most essential to submit for the decision of the full assembly of

the people: and in point of fact they were so submitted, even under

governments only partially democratical; much more, of course,

under the complete democracy of Athens. The Korkyræan envoys, on

reaching that city, would first open their business to the stratêgi,

or generals of the state, who would appoint a day for them to be

heard before the public assembly, with full notice beforehand

to the citizens. The mission was no secret, for the Korkyræans

had themselves intimated their intention at Corinth, at the time

when they proposed reference of the quarrel to arbitration: and

even without such notice, the political necessity of the step was

obvious enough to make the Corinthians anticipate it. Lastly, their

_proxeni_ at Athens, Athenian citizens who watched over Corinthian

interests, public and private, in confidential correspondence with

that government,—and who, sometimes by appointment, sometimes as

volunteers, discharged partly the functions of ambassadors in modern

times, would communicate to them the arrival of the Korkyræan envoys.

So that, on the day appointed for the latter to be heard before the

public assembly, Corinthian envoys were also present to answer them

and to oppose the granting of their prayer.

Thucydidês has given in his history the speeches of both; that is,

speeches of his own composition, but representing in all probability

the substance of what was actually said, and of what he perhaps

himself heard. Though pervaded throughout by the peculiar style and

harsh structure of the historian, these speeches are yet among the

plainest and most business-like in his whole work, bringing before

us thoroughly the existing situation; which was one of doubt and

difficulty, presenting reasons of considerable force on each of

the opposite sides. The Korkyræans, after lamenting their previous

improvidence, which had induced them to defer seeking alliance until

the hour of need arrived, presented themselves as claimants for the

friendship of Athens, on the strongest grounds of common interest

and reciprocal usefulness. Though their existing danger and want

of Athenian support was now urgent, it had not been brought upon

them in an unjust quarrel, or by disgraceful conduct: they had

proposed to Corinth a fair arbitration respecting Epidamnus, and

their application had been refused,—which showed where the right

of the case lay; moreover, they were now exposed single-handed,

not to Corinth alone, whom they had already vanquished, but to a

formidable confederacy, organized under her auspices, including

choice mariners hired even from the allies of Athens. In granting

their prayer, Athens would, in the first place, neutralize this

misemployment of her own mariners, and would, at the same time,

confer an indelible obligation, protect the cause of right, and

secure to herself a most important reinforcement. For, next to her

own, the Korkyræan naval force was the most powerful in Greece,

and this was now placed within her reach: if, by declining the

present offer, she permitted Korkyra to be overcome, that naval

force would pass to the side of her enemies: for such were Corinth

and the Peloponnesian alliance,—and such they would soon be openly

declared. In the existing state of Greece, a collision between that

alliance and Athens could not long be postponed: and it was with a

view to this contingency that the Corinthians were now seeking to

seize Korkyra along with her naval force.[103] The policy of Athens,

therefore, imperiously called upon her to frustrate such a design,

by now assisting the Korkyræans. She was permitted to do this by the

terms of the thirty years’ truce: and although some might contend

that, in the present critical conjuncture, acceptance of Korkyra was

tantamount to a declaration of war with Corinth, yet the fact would

falsify such predictions; for Athens would so strengthen herself

that her enemies would be more than ever unwilling to attack her.

She would not only render her naval force irresistibly powerful,

but would become mistress of the communication between Sicily and

Peloponnesus, and thus prevent the Sicilian Dorians from sending

reinforcements to the Peloponnesians.[104]

[103] Thucyd. i, 33. Τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους φόβῳ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ

πολεμησείοντας, καὶ τοὺς Κορινθίους δυναμένους παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς

καὶ ὑμῖν ἐχθροὺς ὄντας καὶ προκαταλαμβάνοντας ἡμᾶς νῦν ἐς τὴν

ὑμετέραν ἐπιχείρησιν, ἵνα μὴ τῷ κοινῷ ἔχθει κατ᾽ αὐτῶν μετ᾽

ἀλλήλων στῶμεν, etc.

[104] Thucyd. i, 32-36.

To these representations on the part of the Korkyræans, the

Corinthian speakers made reply. They denounced the selfish and

iniquitous policy pursued by Korkyra, not less in the matter of

Epidamnus, than in all former time,[105]—which was the real reason

why she had ever been ashamed of honest allies. Above all things,

she had always acted undutifully and wickedly towards Corinth,

her mother-city, to whom she was bound by those ties of colonial

allegiance which Grecian morality recognized, and which the other

Corinthian colonies cheerfully obeyed.[106] Epidamnus was not a

Korkyræan, but a Corinthian colony, and the Korkyræans, having

committed wrong in besieging it, had proposed arbitration without

being willing to withdraw their troops while arbitration was pending:

they now impudently came to ask Athens to become accessory after the

fact in such injustice. The provision of the thirty years’ truce

might seem indeed to allow Athens to receive them as allies: but

that provision was not intended to permit the reception of cities

already under the tie of colonial allegiance elsewhere,—still less

the reception of cities engaged in an active and pending quarrel,

where any countenance to one party in the quarrel was necessarily a

declaration of war against the opposite. If either party had a right

to invoke the aid of Athens on this occasion, Corinth had a better

right than Korkyra: for the latter had never had any transactions

with the Athenians, while Corinth was not only still under covenant

of amity with them, through the thirty years’ truce,—but had also

rendered material service to them by dissuading the Peloponnesian

allies from assisting the revolted Samos. By such dissuasion, the

Corinthians had upheld the principle of Grecian international

law, that each alliance was entitled to punish its own refractory

members: they now called upon Athens to respect this principle,

by not interfering between Corinth and her colonial allies,[107]

especially as the violation of it would recoil inconveniently upon

Athens herself, with her numerous dependencies. As for the fear of an

impending war between the Peloponnesian alliance and Athens, such a

contingency was as yet uncertain,—and might possibly never occur at

all, if Athens dealt justly, and consented to conciliate Corinth on

this critical occasion: but it would assuredly occur if she refused

such conciliation, and the dangers thus entailed upon Athens would

be far greater than the promised naval coöperation of Korkyra would

compensate.[108]

[105] The description given by Herodotus (vii, 168: compare

Diodor. xi. 15), of the duplicity of the Korkyræans when

solicited to aid the Grecian cause at the time of the invasion of

Xerxes, seems to imply that the unfavorable character of them,

given by the Corinthians, coincided with the general impression

throughout Greece.

Respecting the prosperity and insolence of the Korkyræans, see

Aristotle apud Zenob. Proverb. iv, 49.

[106] Thucyd. i, 38. ἄποικοι δὲ ὄντες ἀφεστᾶσί τε διὰ παντὸς

καὶ νῦν πολεμοῦσι, λέγοντες ὡς οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ κακῶς πάσχειν

ἐκπεμφθείησαν· ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐδ᾽ αὐτοί φαμεν ἐπὶ τῷ ὑπὸ τούτων

ὑβρίζεσθαι κατοικίσαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τῷ ἡγεμόνες τε εἶναι καὶ τὰ

εἰκότα θαυμάζεσθαι· αἱ γοῦν ἄλλαι ἀποικίαι τιμῶσιν ἡμᾶς, καὶ

μάλιστα ὑπὸ ἀποίκων στεργόμεθα.

This is a remarkable passage in illustration of the position of

the metropolis in regard to her colony. The relation was such as

to be comprised under the general word _hegemony_: superiority

and right to command on the one side, inferiority with duty of

reverence and obedience on the other,—limited in point of extent,

though we do not know where the limit was placed, and varying

probably in each individual case. The Corinthians sent annual

magistrates to Potidæa, called Epidemiurgi (Thucyd. i, 56).

[107] Thucyd. i, 40. φανερῶς δὲ ἀντείπομεν ~τοὺς προσήκοντας

ξυμμάχους αὐτόν τινα κολάζειν~.

[108] Thucyd. i, 37-43.

Such was the substance of the arguments urged by the contending

envoys before the Athenian public assembly, in this momentous debate.

For two days did the debate continue, the assembly being adjourned

over to the morrow: so considerable was the number of speakers, and

probably also the divergence of their views. Unluckily, Thucydidês

does not give us any of these Athenian discourses,—not even that

of Periklês, who determined the ultimate result. Epidamnus, with

its disputed question of metropolitan right, occupied little of the

attention of the Athenian assembly: but the Korkyræan naval force

was indeed an immense item, since the question was, whether it

should stand on their side or against them,—an item which nothing

could counterbalance except the dangers of a Peloponnesian war. “Let

us avoid this last calamity (was the opinion of many) even at the

sacrifice of seeing Korkyra conquered, and all her ships and seamen

in the service of the Peloponnesian league.” “You will not really

avoid it, even by that great sacrifice (was the reply of others): the

generating causes of war are at work,—and it will infallibly come,

whatever you may determine respecting Korkyra: avail yourselves of

the present opening, instead of being driven ultimately to undertake

the war at great comparative disadvantage.” Of these two views, the

former was at first decidedly preponderant in the assembly;[109] but

they gradually came round to the latter, which was conformable to the

steady conviction of Periklês. It was, however, resolved to take a

sort of middle course, so as to save Korkyra, and yet, if possible,

to escape violation of the existing truce and the consequent

Peloponnesian war. To comply with the request of the Korkyræans, by

adopting them unreservedly as allies, would have laid the Athenians

under the necessity of accompanying them in an attack of Corinth, if

required,—which would have been a manifest infringement of the truce.

Accordingly, nothing more was concluded than an alliance for purposes

strictly defensive, to preserve Korkyra and her possessions in case

they were attacked: nor was any greater force equipped to back this

resolve than a squadron of ten triremes, under Lacedæmonius, son of

Kimon. The smallness of this force would satisfy the Corinthians

that no aggression was contemplated against their city, while it

would save Korkyra from ruin, and would in fact feed the war so as

to weaken and cripple the naval force of both parties,[110]—which

was the best result that Athens could hope for. The instructions to

Lacedæmonius and his two colleagues were express; not to engage in

fight with the Corinthians unless they were actually approaching

Korkyra, or some Korkyræan possession, with a view to attack: but in

that case to do his best on the defensive.

[109] Thucyd. i, 44. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἀκούσαντες ἀμφοτέρων, γενομένης

καὶ δὶς ἐκκλησίας, τῇ μὲν προτέρᾳ οὐχ ἧσσον τῶν Κορινθίων

ἀπεδέξαντο τοὺς λόγους, ἐν δὲ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μετέγνωσαν, etc.

Οὐχ ἧσσον, in the language of Thucydidês, usually has the

positive meaning of _more_.

[110] Thucyd. i, 44. Plutarch (Periklês, c. 29) ascribes the

smallness of the squadron despatched under Lacedæmonius to a

petty spite of Periklês against that commander, as the son of his

old political antagonist, Kimon. From whomsoever he copied this

statement, the motive assigned seems quite unworthy of credit.

The great Corinthian armament of one hundred and fifty sail soon

took its departure from the gulf, and reached a harbor on the

coast of Epirus, at the cape called Cheimerium, nearly opposite to

the southern extremity of Korkyra: they there established a naval

station and camp, summoning to their aid a considerable force from

the friendly Epirotic tribes in the neighborhood. The Korkyræan

fleet of one hundred and ten sail, under Meikiadês and two others,

together with the ten Athenian ships, took station at one of the

adjoining islands called Sybota, while the land force and one

thousand Zakynthian hoplites were posted on the Korkyræan Cape

Leukimmê. Both sides prepared for battle: the Corinthians, taking on

board three days’ provisions, sailed by night from Cheimerium, and

encountered in the morning the Korkyræan fleet advancing towards

them, distributed into three squadrons, one under each of the three

generals, and having the ten Athenian ships at the extreme right.

Opposed to them were ranged the choice vessels of the Corinthians,

occupying the left of their aggregate fleet: next came the various

allies, with Megarians and Ambrakiots on the extreme right. Never

before had two such numerous fleets, both Grecian, engaged in battle;

but the tactics and manœuvring were not commensurate to the numbers.

The decks were crowded with hoplites and bowmen, while the rowers

below, on the Korkyræan side at least, were in great part slaves: the

ships, on both sides, being rowed forward so as to drive in direct

impact, prow against prow, were grappled together, and a fierce

hand-combat was then commenced between the troops on board of each,

as if they were on land,—or rather, like boarding-parties: all upon

the old-fashioned system of Grecian sea-fight, without any of those

improvements which had been introduced into the Athenian navy during

the last generation. In Athenian naval attack, the ship, the rowers,

and the steersman, were of much greater importance than the armed

troops on deck: by strength and exactness of rowing, by rapid and

sudden change of direction, by feints calculated to deceive, the

Athenian captain sought to drive the sharp beak of his vessel, not

against the prow, but against the weaker and more vulnerable parts of

his enemy,—side, oars, or stern. The ship thus became in the hands of

her crew the real weapon of attack, which was first to disable the

enemy and leave him unmanageable on the water; and not until this

was done did the armed troops on deck begin their operations.[111]

Lacedæmonius, with his ten armed ships, though forbidden by his

instructions to share in the battle, lent as much aid as he could by

taking station at the extremity of the line, and by making motions as

if about to attack; while his seamen had full leisure to contemplate

what they would despise as the lubberly handling of the ships on both

sides. All was confusion after the battle had been joined; the ships

on both sides became entangled, the oars broken and unmanageable,

orders could neither be heard nor obeyed, and the individual valor

of the hoplites and bowmen on deck was the decisive point on which

victory turned.

[111] Πεζομαχεῖν ἀπὸ νεῶν—to turn the naval battle into a

land-battle on shipboard, was a practice altogether repugnant

to Athenian feeling, as we see remarked also in Thucyd. iv, 14:

compare also vii, 61.

The Corinthian and Syracusan ships ultimately came to counteract

the Athenian manœuvring by constructing their prows with

increased solidity and strength, and forcing the Athenian vessel

to a direct shock, which its weaker prow was unable to bear

(Thucyd. vii, 36).

On the right wing of the Corinthians, the left of the Korkyræans

was victorious; their twenty ships drove back the Ambrakiot allies

of Corinth, and not only pursued them to the shore, but also landed

and plundered the tents. Their rashness in thus keeping so long out

of the battle proved incalculably mischievous, the rather as their

total number was inferior: for their right wing, opposed to the

best ships of Corinth, was after a hard struggle thoroughly beaten.

Many of the ships were disabled, and the rest obliged to retreat

as they could,—a retreat which the victorious ships on the other

wing might have protected, had there been any effective discipline

in the fleet, but which now was only imperfectly aided by the ten

Athenian ships under Lacedæmonius. These Athenians, though at first

they obeyed the instructions from home, in abstaining from actual

blows, yet,—when the battle became doubtful, and still more, when the

Corinthians were pressing their victory,—could no longer keep aloof,

but attacked the pursuers in good earnest, and did much to save the

defeated Korkyræans. As soon as the latter had been pursued as far as

their own island, the victorious Corinthians returned to the scene

of action, which was covered with disabled and water-logged ships,

their own and their enemies, as well as with seamen, soldiers, and

wounded men, either helpless aboard the wrecks, or keeping above

water as well as they could,—among them many of their own citizens

and allies, especially on their defeated right wing. Through these

disabled vessels they sailed, not attempting to tow them off, but

looking only to the crews aboard, and making some of them prisoners,

but putting the greater number to death: some even of their own

allies were thus slain, not being easily distinguishable. They

then picked up their own dead bodies as well as they could, and

transported them to Sybota, the nearest point of the coast of Epirus;

after which they again mustered their fleet, and returned to resume

the attack against the Korkyræans on their own coast. The latter got

together as many of their ships as were seaworthy, together with the

small reserve which had remained in harbor, in order to prevent at

any rate a landing on the coast: and the Athenian ships, now within

the strict letter of their instructions, prepared to coöperate with

full energy in the defence. It was already late in the afternoon:

but the Corinthian fleet, though their pæan had already been shouted

for attack, were suddenly seen to back water instead of advancing;

presently they headed round, and sailed directly away to the Epirotic

coast. Nor did the Korkyræans comprehend the cause of this sudden

retreat, until at length it was proclaimed that an unexpected relief

of twenty fresh Athenian ships was approaching, under Glaukon and

Andokidês, which the Corinthians had been the first to descry, and

had even believed to be the forerunners of a larger fleet. It was

already dark when these fresh ships reached Cape Leukimmê, having

traversed the waters covered with wrecks and dead bodies;[112] and at

first the Korkyræans even mistook them for enemies. The reinforcement

had been sent from Athens, probably after more accurate information

of the comparative force of Corinth and Korkyra, under the impression

that the original ten ships would prove inadequate for the purpose of

defence,—an impression more than verified by the reality.

[112] Thucyd. i, 51. διὰ τῶν νεκρῶν καὶ ναυαγίων προσκομισθεῖσαι

κατέπλεον ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον.

Though the twenty Athenian ships were not, as the Corinthians

had imagined, the precursors of a larger fleet, they were found

sufficient to change completely the face of affairs. In the preceding

action, the Korkyræans had had seventy ships sunk or disabled,—the

Corinthians only thirty,—so that the superiority of numbers was

still on the side of the latter, who were, however, encumbered

with the care of one thousand prisoners, eight hundred of them

slaves, captured, not easy either to lodge or to guard in the

narrow accommodations of an ancient trireme. Even apart from this

embarrassment, the Corinthians were in no temper to hazard a second

battle against thirty Athenian ships, in addition to the remaining

Korkyræan: and when their enemies sailed across to offer them battle

on the Epirotic coast, they not only refused it, but thought of

nothing but immediate retreat,—with serious alarm lest the Athenians

should now act aggressively, treating all amicable relations between

Athens and Corinth as practically extinguished by the events of the

day before. Having ranged their fleet in line, not far from shore,

they tested the dispositions of the Athenian commanders by sending

forward a little boat with a few men to address to them the following

remonstrance,—the men carried no herald’s staff (_we_ should say,

no flag of truce), and were therefore completely without protection

against an enemy. “Ye act wrongfully, Athenians (they exclaimed), in

beginning the war and violating the truce; for ye are using arms to

oppose us in punishing our enemies. If it be really your intention

to hinder us from sailing against Korkyra, or anywhere else that

we choose, in breach of the truce, take first of all us who now

address you, and deal with us as enemies.” It was not the fault of

the Korkyræans that this last idea was not instantly realized: for

such of them as were near enough to hear, instigated the Athenians

by violent shouts to kill the men in the boat. But the latter, far

from listening to such an appeal, dismissed them with the answer: “We

neither begin the war nor break the truce, Peloponnesians; we have

come simply to aid these Korkyræans, our allies. If ye wish to sail

anywhere else, we make no opposition: but if ye are about to sail

against Korkyra, or any of her possessions, we shall use our best

means to prevent you.” Both the answer, and the treatment of the men

in the boat, satisfied the Corinthians that their retreat would be

unopposed, and they accordingly commenced it as soon as they could

get ready, staying, however, to erect a trophy at Sybota, on the

Epirotic coast, in commemoration of their advantage on the preceding

day. In their voyage homeward, they surprised Anaktorium, at the

mouth of the Ambrakiôtic gulf, which they had hitherto possessed

jointly with the Korkyræans; planting in it a reinforcement of

Corinthian settlers as guarantee for future fidelity. On reaching

Corinth, the armament was disbanded, and the great majority of the

prisoners taken—eight hundred slaves—were sold; but the remainder,

two hundred and fifty in number, were detained and treated with

peculiar kindness. Many of them were of the first and richest

families of the island, and the Corinthians designed to gain them

over, so as to make them instruments for effecting a revolution in

the island. The calamitous incidents arising from their return will

appear in a future chapter.

Thus relieved from all danger, the Korkyræans picked up the dead

bodies and the wrecks which had floated during the night on to their

island, and even found sufficient pretence to erect a trophy, chiefly

in consequence of their partial success on the left wing. In truth,

they had been only rescued from ruin by the unexpected coming of

the last Athenian ships: but the last result was as triumphant to

them as it was disastrous and humiliating to the Corinthians, who

had incurred an immense cost, and taxed all their willing allies,

only to leave their enemy stronger than she was before. From this

time forward they considered the thirty years’ truce as broken, and

conceived a hatred, alike deadly and undisguised, against Athens; so

that the latter gained nothing by the moderation of her admirals in

sparing the Corinthian fleet off the coast of Epirus. An opportunity

was not long wanting for the Corinthians to strike a blow at their

enemy, through one of her wide-spread dependencies.

On the isthmus of that lesser peninsula called Pellênê, which

forms the westernmost of the three prongs of the greater peninsula

called Chalkidikê, between the Thermaic and the Strymonic gulfs,

was situated the Dorian town of Potidæa, one of the tributary

allies of Athens, but originally colonized from Corinth, and still

maintaining a certain metropolitan allegiance towards the latter:

insomuch that every year certain Corinthians were sent thither as

magistrates, under the title of Epidemiurgi. On various points of the

neighboring coast, also, there were several small towns belonging to

the Chalkidians and Bottiæans, enrolled in like manner in the list

of Athenian tributaries. The neighboring inland territory, Mygdonia

and Chalkidikê,[113] was held by the Macedonian king Perdikkas, son

of that Alexander who had taken part, fifty years before, in the

expedition of Xerxes. These two princes appear gradually to have

extended their dominions, after the ruin of Persian power in Thrace

by the exertions of Athens, until at length they acquired all the

territory between the rivers Axius and Strymon. Now Perdikkas had

been for some time the friend and ally of Athens; but there were

other Macedonian princes, his brother Philip and Derdas, holding

independent principalities in the upper country,[114] apparently on

the higher course of the Axius near the Pæonian tribes, with whom

he was in a state of dispute. These princes having been accepted as

the allies of Athens, Perdikkas from that time became her active

enemy, and it was from his intrigues that all the difficulties of

Athens on that coast took their first origin. The Athenian empire

was much less complete and secure over the seaports on the mainland

than over the islands:[115] for the former were always more or less

dependent on any powerful land-neighbor, sometimes more dependent

on him than upon the mistress of the sea; and we shall find Athens

herself cultivating assiduously the favor of Sitalkês and other

strong Thracian potentates, as an aid to her dominion over the

seaports.[116] Perdikkas immediately began to incite and aid the

Chalkidians and Bottiæans to revolt from Athens, and the violent

enmity against the latter, kindled in the bosoms of the Corinthians

by the recent events at Korkyra, enabled him to extend the same

projects to Potidæa. Not only did he send envoys to Corinth in order

to concert measures for provoking the revolt of Potidæa, but also to

Sparta, instigating the Peloponnesian league to a general declaration

of war against Athens.[117] And he farther prevailed on many of

the Chalkidian inhabitants to abandon their separate small towns

on the sea-coast, for the purpose of joint residence at Olynthus,

which was several stadia from the sea. Thus that town, as well as

the Chalkidian interest, became much strengthened, while Perdikkas

farther assigned some territory near Lake Bolbê to contribute to the

temporary maintenance of the concentrated population.

[113] See the geographical Commentary of Gatterer upon Thrace,

embodied in Poppo, Prolegg. ad Thucyd. vol. ii, ch. 29.

The words τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης—τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης χωρία (Thucyd. ii, 29)

denote generally the towns in Chalkidikê,—places _in the

direction or in the skirts of_ Thrace, rather than parts of

Thrace itself.

[114] Thucyd. i, 57; ii, 100.

[115] See two remarkable passages illustrating this difference,

Thucyd. iv, 120-122.

[116] Thucyd. ii, 29-98. Isokratês has a remarkable passage on

this subject in the beginning of Or. v, ad Philippum, sects.

5-7. After pointing out the imprudence of founding a colony

on the skirts of the territory of a powerful potentate, and

the excellent site which had been chosen far Kyrênê, as being

near only to feeble tribes,—he goes so far as to say that

the possession of Amphipolis would be injurious rather than

beneficial to Athens, because it would render her dependent upon

Philip, from his power of annoying her colonists,—just as she

had been dependent before upon Mêdokus, the Thracian king, in

consequence of her colonists in the Chersonese,—ἀναγκασθησόμεθα

τὴν αὐτὴν εὔνοιαν ἔχειν τοῖς σοῖς πράγμασι διὰ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα (at

Amphipolis) κατοικοῦντας, οἵαν περ εἴχομεν Μηδόκῳ τῷ παλαιῷ διὰ

τοὺς ἐν Χεῤῥονήσῳ γεωργοῦντας.

[117] Thucyd. i, 56, 57.

The Athenians were not ignorant both of his hostile preparations and

of the dangers which awaited them from Corinth after the Korkyræan

sea-fight; immediately after which they sent to take precautions

against the revolt of Potidæa; requiring the inhabitants to take down

their wall on the side of Pellênê, so as to leave the town open on

the side of the peninsula, or on what may be called the sea-side,

and fortified only towards the mainland,—requiring them farther both

to deliver hostages and to dismiss the annual magistrates who came

to them from Corinth. An Athenian armament of thirty triremes and

one thousand hoplites, under Archestratus and ten others, despatched

to act against Perdikkas in the Thermaic gulf, was directed at the

same time to enforce these requisitions against Potidæa, and to

repress any dispositions to revolt among the neighboring Chalkidians.

Immediately on receiving these requisitions, the Potidæans sent

envoys both to Athens, for the purpose of evading and gaining

time,—and to Sparta, in conjunction with Corinth, in order to

determine a Lacedæmonian invasion of Attica, in the event of Potidæa

being attacked by Athens. From the Spartan authorities they obtained

a distinct affirmative promise, in spite of the thirty years’ truce

still subsisting: at Athens they had no success, and they accordingly

openly revolted (seemingly about midsummer, 432 B.C.), at the same

time that the armament under Archestratus sailed. The Chalkidians and

Bottiæans revolted at the same time, at the express instigation of

Corinth, accompanied by solemn oaths and promises of assistance.[118]

Archestratus with his fleet, on reaching the Thermaic gulf, found

them all in proclaimed enmity, but was obliged to confine himself

to the attack of Perdikkas in Macedonia, not having numbers enough

to admit of a division of his force. He accordingly laid siege to

Therma, in coöperation with the Macedonian troops from the upper

country, under Philip and the brothers of Derdas; after taking that

place, he next proceeded to besiege Pydna. But it would probably have

been wiser had he turned his whole force instantly to the blockade

of Potidæa; for during the period of more than six weeks that he

spent in the operations against Therma, the Corinthians conveyed to

Potidæa a reinforcement of sixteen hundred hoplites and four hundred

light-armed, partly their own citizens, partly Peloponnesians, hired

for the occasion,—under Aristeus, son of Adeimantus, a man of such

eminent popularity, both at Corinth and at Potidæa, that most of the

soldiers volunteered on his personal account. Potidæa was thus put

into a state of complete defence shortly after the news of its revolt

reached Athens, and long before any second armament could be sent to

attack it. A second armament, however, was speedily sent forth.—forty

triremes and two thousand Athenian hoplites, under Kallias, son of

Kalliades,[119] with four other commanders,—who, on reaching the

Thermaic gulf, joined the former body at the siege of Pydna. After

prosecuting the siege in vain for a short time, they found themselves

obliged to patch up an accommodation on the best terms they could

with Perdikkas, from the necessity of commencing immediate operations

against Aristeus and Potidæa. They then quitted Macedonia, first

crossing by sea from Pydna to the eastern coast of the Thermaic

gulf,—next attacking, though without effect, the town of Berœa,—and

then marching by land along the eastern coast of the gulf, in the

direction of Potidæa. On the third day of easy march, they reached

the seaport called Gigônus, near which they encamped.[120]

[118] Thucyd. v, 30.

[119] Kallias was a young Athenian of noble family, who had

paid the large sum of one hundred minæ to Zeno of Elea, the

philosopher, for rhetorical, philosophical, and sophistical

instruction (Plato, Alkibiadês, i, c. 31, p. 119).

[120] Thucyd. i, 61. The statement of Thucydidês presents some

geographical difficulties which the critics have not adequately

estimated. Are we to assume as certain, that the _Berœa_ here

mentioned must be the Macedonian town of that name, afterwards

so well known, distant from the sea westward one hundred and

sixty stadia, or nearly twenty English miles (see Tafel, Historia

Thessalonicæ, p. 58), on a river which flows into the Haliakmon,

and upon one of the lower ridges of Mount Bermius?

The words of Thucydidês here are—Ἔπειτα δὲ ξύμβασιν ποιησάμενοι

καὶ ξυμμαχίαν ἀναγκαίαν πρὸς τὸν Περδίκκαν, ὡς αὐτοὺς κατήπειγεν

ἡ Ποτίδαια καὶ ὁ Ἀριστεὺς παρεληλυθὼς, ~ἀπανίστανται ἐκ τῆς

Μακεδονίας~, καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Βέροιαν κἀκεῖθεν ἐπιστρέψαντες,

καὶ πειράσαντες πρῶτον τοῦ χωρίου καὶ οὐχ ἑλόντες, ἐπορεύοντο

κατὰ γῆν πρὸς τὴν Ποτίδαιαν—ἅμα δὲ νῆες παρέπλεον ἑβδομήκοντα.

“The natural route from Pydna to Potidæa (observes Dr. Arnold in

his note) lay along the coast; and Berœa was _quite out of the

way_, at some _distance to the westward_, near the fort of the

Bermian mountains. But the hope of surprising Berœa induced the

Athenians to deviate from their direct line of march; then, after

the failure of this treacherous attempt, they returned again to

the sea-coast, and continued to follow it till they arrived at

Gigônus.”

I would remark upon this: 1. The words of Thucydidês imply that

Berœa was _not in_ Macedonia, but _out_ of it (see Poppo, Proleg.

ad Thucyd. vol. ii, pp. 408-418). 2. He uses no expression which

in the least implies that the attempt on Berœa on the part of the

Athenians was _treacherous_, that is, contrary to the convention

just concluded; though, had the fact been so, he would naturally

have been led to notice it, seeing that the deliberate breach of

the convention was the very first step which took place after

it was concluded. 3. What can have induced the Athenians to

leave their fleet and march near twenty miles inland to Mount

Bermius and Berœa, to attack a Macedonian town which they could

not possibly hold,—when they cannot even stay to continue the

attack on Pydna, a position maritime, useful, and tenable,—in

consequence of the pressing necessity of taking immediate

measures against Potidæa? 4. If they were compelled by this

latter necessity to patch up a peace on any terms with Perdikkas,

would they immediately endanger this peace by going out of their

way to attack one of his forts? Again, Thucydidês says, “that,

proceeding by slow land-marches, they reached Gigônus, and

encamped _on the third day_,”—κατ᾽ ὀλίγον δὲ προϊόντες τριταῖοι

ἀφίκοντο ἐς Γίγωνον καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο. The computation of

time must here be made either from Pydna or from Berœa; and

the reader who examines the map will see that neither from the

one nor the other—assuming the Berœa on Mount Bermius—would it

be possible for an army to arrive at Gigônus on the third day,

marching round the head of the gulf, with easy days’ marches; the

more so, as they would have to cross the rivers Lydias, Axius.

and Echeidôrus, all not far from their mouths,—or, if these

rivers could not be crossed, to get on board the fleet and reland

on the other side.

This clear mark of time laid down by Thucydidês,—even apart

from the objections which I have just urged in reference to

Berœa on Mount Bermius,—made me doubt whether Dr. Arnold and

the other commentators have correctly conceived the operations

of the Athenian troops between Pydna and Gigônus. The _Berœa_

which Thucydidês means cannot be more distant from Gigônus, at

any rate, than a third day’s easy march, and therefore cannot

be the Berœa on Mount Bermius. But there was another town named

Berœa, either in Thrace or in Emathia, though we do not know

its exact site (see Wassi ad Thucyd. i, 61; Steph. Byz. v,

Βέρης; Tafel, Thessalonica, Index). This other Berœa, situated

somewhere between Gigônus and Therma, and out of the limits of

that Macedonia which Perdikkas governed, may probably be the

place which Thucydidês here indicates. The Athenians, raising

the siege of Pydna, crossed the gulf _on shipboard_ to Berœa,

and after vainly trying to surprise that town, marched along _by

land_ to Gigônus. Whoever inspects the map will see that the

Athenians would naturally employ their large fleet to transport

the army by the short transit across the gulf from Pydna (see

Livy, xliv, 10), and thus avoid the fatiguing land-march round

the head of the gulf. Moreover, the language of Thucydidês

would seem to make the land-march _begin at Berœa_ and not at

Pydna,—~ἀπανίστανται~ ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας, καὶ ~ἀφικόμενοι ἐς

Βέροιαν~ κἀκεῖθεν ἐπιστρέψαντες, καὶ πειράσαντες πρῶτον τοῦ

χωρίου καὶ οὐχ ἑλόντες, ~ἐπορεύοντο κατὰ γῆν~ πρὸς Ποτίδαιαν—ἅμα

δὲ νῆες παρέπλεον ἑβδομήκοντα. Κατ᾽ ὀλίγον δὲ προϊόντες τριταῖοι

ἀφίκοντο ἐς Γίγωνον καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο. The change of tense

between ἀπανίστανται and ἐπορεύοντο,—and the connection of the

participle ἀφικόμενοι with the latter verb,—seems to divide the

whole proceeding into two distinct parts; first, departure from

Macedonia to Berœa, as it would seem, by sea,—next, a land-march

from Berœa to Gigônus, of three short days.

This is the best account, as it strikes me, of a passage, the

real difficulties of which are imperfectly noticed by the

commentators.

The site of Gigônus cannot be exactly determined, since all that

we know of the towns on the coast between Potidæa and Æneia, is

derived from their enumerated names in Herodotus (vii, 123); nor

can we be absolutely certain that he has enumerated them all in

the exact order in which they were placed. But I think that both

Col. Leake and Kiepert’s map place Gigônus too far from Potidæa;

for we see, from this passage of Thucydidês, that it formed the

camp from which the Athenian general went forth immediately to

give battle to an enemy posted between Olynthus and Potidæa; and

the Scholiast says of Gigônus,—οὐ πολὺ ἄπεχον Ποτιδαίας: and

Stephan. Byz. Γίγωνος, πόλις Θρᾴκης ~προσεχὴς τῇ Παλλήνῃ~.

See Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iii, ch.

xxxi, p. 452. That excellent observer calculates the march, from

Berœa on Mount Bermius to Potidæa, as being one of four days,

about twenty miles each day. Judging by the map, this seems lower

than the reality; but admitting it to be correct, Thucydidês

would never describe such a march as ~κατ᾽ ὀλίγον~ δὲ προϊόντες

τριταῖοι ἀφίκοντο ἐς Γίγωνον: it would be a march rather rapid

and fatiguing, especially as it would include the passage of the

rivers. Nor is it likely, from the description of this battle

in Thucydidês (i, 62), that Gigônus could be anything like a

full day’s march from Potidæa. According to his description,

the Athenian army advanced by three very easy marches; then

arriving at Gigônus, they encamp, being now near the enemy, who

on their side are already encamped, expecting them,—προσδεχόμενοι

τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ~ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο~ πρὸς Ὀλύνθου ἐν τῷ ἰσθμῷ: the

imperfect tense indicates that they were already there at the

time when the Athenians took camp at Gigônus; which would hardly

be the case if the Athenians had come by three successive marches

from Berœa on Mount Bermius.

I would add, that it is no more wonderful that there should be

one Berœa in Thrace and another in Macedonia, than that there

should be one Methônê in Thrace and another in Macedonia (Steph.

B. Μεθώνη).

In spite of the convention concluded at Pydna, Perdikkas, whose

character for faithlessness we shall have more than one occasion to

notice, was now again on the side of the Chalkidians, and sent two

hundred horse to join them, under the command of Iolaus. Aristeus

posted his Corinthians and Potidæans on the isthmus near Potidæa,

providing a market without the walls, in order that they might not

stray in quest of provisions: his position was on the side towards

Olynthus,—which was about seven miles off, but within sight, and in

a lofty and conspicuous situation. He here awaited the approach of

the Athenians, calculating that the Chalkidians from Olynthus would,

upon the hoisting of a given signal, assail them in the rear when

they attacked him. But Kallias was strong enough to place in reserve

his Macedonian cavalry and other allies as a check against Olynthus;

while with his Athenians and the main force he marched to the isthmus

and took position in front of Aristeus. In the battle which ensued,

Aristeus and the chosen band of Corinthians immediately about him

were completely successful, breaking the troops opposed to them, and

pursuing for a considerable distance: but the remaining Potidæans

and Peloponnesians were routed by the Athenians and driven within

the walls. On returning from pursuit, Aristeus found the victorious

Athenians between him and Potidæa, and was reduced to the alternative

either of cutting his way through them into the latter town, or of

making a retreating march to Olynthus. He chose the former as the

least of two hazards, and forced his way through the flank of the

Athenians, wading into the sea in order to turn the extremity of

the Potidæan wall, which reached entirely across the isthmus, with a

mole running out at each end into the water: he effected this daring

enterprise and saved his detachment, though not without considerable

difficulty and some loss. Meanwhile, the auxiliaries from Olynthus,

though they had begun their march on seeing the concerted signal, had

been kept in check by the Macedonian horse, so that the Potidæans

had been beaten and the signal again withdrawn, before they could

make any effective diversion: nor did the cavalry on either side

come into action. The defeated Potidæans and Corinthians, having the

town immediately in their rear, lost only three hundred men, while

the Athenians lost one hundred and fifty, together with the general

Kallias.[121]

[121] Thucyd. i, 62, 63.

The victory was, however, quite complete, and the Athenians, after

having erected their trophy, and given up the enemy’s dead for

burial, immediately built their blockading wall across the isthmus,

on the side of the mainland, so as to cut off Potidæa from all

communication with Olynthus and the Chalkidians. To make the blockade

complete, a second wall across the isthmus was necessary, on the

other side towards Pallênê: but they had not force enough to detach

a completely separate body for this purpose, until after some time

they were joined by Phormio with sixteen hundred fresh hoplites

from Athens. That general, landing at Aphytis, in the peninsula of

Pallênê, marched slowly up to Potidæa, ravaging the territory in

order to draw out the citizens to battle: but the challenge not

being accepted, he undertook, and finished without obstruction, the

blockading wall on the side of Pallênê, so that the town was now

completely inclosed, and the harbor watched by the Athenian fleet.

The wall once finished, a portion of the force sufficed to guard

it, leaving Phormio at liberty to undertake aggressive operations

against the Chalkidic and Bottiæan townships. The capture of Potidæa

was now only a question of more or less time, and Aristeus, in order

that the provisions might last longer, proposed to the citizens to

choose a favorable wind, get on shipboard, and break out suddenly

from the harbor, taking their chance of eluding the Athenian fleet,

and leaving only five hundred defenders behind: though he offered

himself to be among those left behind, he could not determine the

citizens to so bold an enterprise, and he therefore sallied forth

in the way proposed with a small detachment, in order to try and

procure relief from without,—especially some aid or diversion

from Peloponnesus. But he was able to accomplish nothing beyond

some partial warlike operations among the Chalkidians,[122] and a

successful ambuscade against the citizens of Sermylus, which did

nothing for the relief of the blockaded town: it had, however, been

so well-provisioned that it held out for two whole years,—a period

full of important events elsewhere.

[122] Thucyd. i, 65.

From these two contests between Athens and Corinth, first indirectly

at Korkyra, next distinctly and avowedly at Potidæa, sprung those

important movements in the Lacedæmonian alliance which will be

recounted in the next chapter.