COMMUNAL TENURE AND SMALL HOLDINGS.
Two economic features determined the further development of
Russia, after the abolition of serfdom. Personal dependence of the
serf was replaced, as above shown, by economic dependence of the
“peasant-proprietor” compelled to seek work for wages beyond the limits
of his own holding. Inequality of condition among the peasants, created
by legal discrimination and furthered by the fiscal system, furnished
the basis for the division of labor by which the peasants tried to fill
up the holes in their farming. What were these occupations, and how did
they react upon the village community?
In the times of serfdom the village community, as above mentioned,
enjoyed certain rights to the land which was used by the master
himself. Pasture, and water, and way in the landlord’s estate were
free to the community. The emancipation deprived the peasants of
these privileges and put them under the necessity of entering into
agreements, of one kind or another, with the landlord for the use of
these easements.
Where lack of water, or the necessity of a way through the landlord’s
estate, has been artificially created by the reform, it is obviously
the community as a whole that must contract the agreement.
In so far, however, as rented pasture is concerned, the usual
communistic rule is put on trial by the growing inequalities that have
arisen in the business of stock breeding within the village community.
About one fourth of the community is composed of the poorest families,
who own no horses, and oftentimes no cattle at all.[53] It is obvious
that whenever the use of a pasture is rented for horses or cows, a not
inconsiderable part of the community is practically excluded from the
agreement. The assessment of the obligation in proportion to the shares
held by the several householders in the communal land would be unjust
to the poorest part of the community.
Another basis for the distribution is found, in many instances, in
the number of heads of cattle belonging to each householder, _i. e._
outside of the province of agrarian communism; the poor are thus
released from the burden of payments. But, on the other hand, the
community becomes virtually the voluntary partnership of its wealthier
members. The economic tendency of the time is shown by the following
figures:[54]
+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+-------+
| | Rented pasture. | Total |
| +------------------------+------+ in |
| Party of the renter. | In consideration of | | class |
| +------+------+----------+ | and |
| |Labor.|Money.|Mixed.[55]|Total.|region.|
+-------------------------------+------+------+----------+------+-------+
| _Former State peasants._ | | | | | |
|1. Community | | 1 | | 1 | |
|2. Individuals | | | 1 | 1 | |
+-------------------------------+------+------+----------+------+ |
| All to former State peasants| | 1 | 1 | 2 | 91 |
| | | | | | |
| _Former serfs._ | | | | | |
|1. Community | 93 | 22 | 8 | 123 | |
|2. Community, obligation | | | | | |
| discharged _per_ | 12 | 14 | | 26 | |
| head of stock | | | | | |
|3. Community, beside individuals | | 3 | 3 | |
|4. Partnerships and individuals| | 1 | 1 | 2 | |
+-------------------------------+------+------+----------+------+ |
| All to former serfs | 105 | 37 | 12 | 154 | 562 |
+-------------------------------+------+------+----------+------+-------+
We find the province of communism extended in only two villages of
the former state peasants, who had nothing to do with the landlords’
pasture before the emancipation. On the other hand, the right of
pasture held by the _mir_ in the landlord’s fields in the times of
serfdom has disappeared in 408 out of the 562 free communities.
Yet wherever pasture is rented, the _mir_ prevails, and individual
agreements are the rarest exception. The latter form is, however,
likely to keep pace with the development of money economy in rural
relations. So long as the easement is granted in consideration of a
certain amount of farm work to be done, (and this is now the ordinary
rule), it is to the landlord’s advantage to secure the collective
labor of a whole community at once, instead of entering into a special
agreement with each peasant for a small service. The fulfilment of
the obligation is secured by the joint suretyship of the community,
while to sue each peasant for failure to perform two or three days’
work would be far too troublesome. It certainly matters little to the
landlord, how the labor is distributed among the several members of the
community, and it was but in 12 cases out of 105 that the agreement was
made for so much work to be done _per_ head. On the other hand payment
was stipulated for at so much _per_ head in 14 out of 37 cases, in
which the transaction was one of money. But as soon as the agreement
is made in this form, the householders can act individually as well as
through the _mir_, and this was in reality the case in 6 communities
out of the 156, the peasants managing to get their cattle counted as
part of the landlord’s flock.
We notice here how economic inequality weakens the tie of communism,
even where that communism has its roots set deep in the prevailing
methods of agriculture, the cattle grazing in one flock upon the common
pasture under the surveillance of the communal shepherd.
Quite naturally we find individualism to be the rule as soon as we come
to the tenure of arable land, which is cultivated by the householders
individually:
+-----------------------+------------+------------+---------+
| | Number of | Rented |Land, per|
|Party to the agreement.|communities.|dessiatines.| cent. |
+-----------------------+------------+------------+---------+
| _Ranenburg._ | | | |
|Community | 25 | 2195 | 12.0 |
|Partnerships | 2 | 143 | 0.8 |
|Individuals | 265[56] | 16009[56]| 87.2 |
| +------------+------------+---------+
| Total | 290 | 18347[57]| 100 |
| | | | |
| _Dankoff._ | | | |
|Community | 23 | 2240 | 16.2 |
|Partnerships | 3 | 42 | 0.3 |
|Individuals | 230[56] | 11561[56]| 83.5 |
| +------------+------------+---------+
| Total | 256 | 13843[57]| 100 |
+-----------------------+------------+------------+---------+
As appears from this table, in so far as peasant farming has survived
on the landlord’s estate, agrarian communism has been almost entirely
superseded by individual tenancy.
Should not, however, the few cases of communal tenure be considered,
on the contrary, as signs of a budding agrarian communism? Is it not a
fact that peasant tenancy has sprung into existence from nothing within
recent times, and that in 48 villages agrarian communism has acquired
a foothold even in that tenancy which was always considered as being
essentially an individualistic form of landholding?
Such was the argument of an optimistic school of peasantists, which
gained much credit in Russia in a few years ago.[58] In reality,
however, nothing like a growth of communism can be seen in the recent
rise of communal tenancy. As a matter of fact the latter is restricted
solely to communities of former serfs.[59] Consequently it is but
the title of possession that has changed, and that from tenure in
perpetuity into tenancy at will, for periods of from 3 to 12 years.
On the other hand, the land which had been before the emancipation
occupied by the village community of the serfs, is now held by the
individual tenant.
Let us compare the area of land held by the tenants in 1882 with the
tracts carved out of the peasants’ possession in 1861.[60]
_Carved out _Rented
in 1861._ in 1882._
Ranenburg 3710 3274
Dankoff 5179 4327
Really worth thinking over is the question; why could not communal
tenure stand the competition of individual peasant tenancy?
In the first place the lots leased by the community are considerably
larger than those rented by individual peasants.[61] Moreover by the
joint suretyship of all the members of the community a security is
offered lacking in small individual contracts. Quite naturally the
terms on which land is rented by the community are more favorable for
the peasants than those of individual contracts.[62]
The result of cheaper rent is the better condition of the communities
in question as compared with the average.[63]
Why then should not other communities imitate this praiseworthy
example? The answer seems to be found precisely in the higher economic
level of the communities concerned, which carries with it greater
uniformity of interests:
+-----------------------+------------------------------------------+
| | Percentage of householders. |
|Classes of communities.+-----------+------------+-----------------+
| |Engaging in|Indifferent.|Letting out their|
| | tenure. | | own lots.[64] |
+-----------------------+-----------+------------+-----------------+
| _Ranenburg._ | | | |
|Tenure by the community| 64 | 25 | 11 |
|Tenure by individuals | 26 | 57 | 17 |
| _Dankoff._ | | | |
|Tenure by the community| 58 | 25 | 17 |
|Tenure by individuals | 25 | 59 | 16 |
+-----------------------+-----------+------------+-----------------+
The language of the figures is unequivocal. Wherever land is leased by
the _mir_, the prevailing majority is made up of tenants, while under
ordinary circumstances they form but a small minority. On the contrary
above one-half of the village assembly consists at large of those
householders who are indifferent to the question, and would not put
themselves to the trouble of incurring responsibility.
Thus it is in the growing heterogeneity of the village that the cause
of the decline of communism in tenancy is to be sought.
On the other hand, the same reason accounts for the substitution of
the usual method of distribution of land and burdens by the community,
through subdivision of the rented land in proportion to the money
invested by each householder.
The question arises whether that can really be called tenure by the
community, where a part of its members keep out of the agreement, and
the land is held severally, and _pro rata_ to the capital invested? It
seems to be rather a joint partnership.
Yet partnership is by nature an individualistic contract, whether
the parties to such contract be the “elders” of the _mir_, or common
business men.[65] We consider therefore rental partnership only as a
stage of transition from communal to individual tenancy.
As above mentioned, in those very communities where communal tenure is
yet in existence, side by side with it individual tenancy has taken
root:
_Ranenburg._ _Dankoff._
_Dessiatines._ _Per cent._ _Dessiatines._ _Per cent._
Held by the _mir_ 2195 66 2240 81
Held by individuals 1138 34 534 19
---- --- ---- ---
Total rented 3333 100 2774 100
Thus communism in tenancy is passing away; small holdings for a
term of one summer have become to-day the dominant form of rental
agreements.[66]