federal diet (_Bundestag_), consisting of delegates of the several
states. By the terms of the Final Act this diet had very wide powers for
the development of the mutual relations of the governments in all
matters of common interest. It was empowered to arrange the fundamental
laws of the confederation; to fix the organic institutions relating to
its external, internal and military arrangements; to regulate the trade
relations between the various federated states. Moreover, by the famous
Article 13, which enacted that there were to be "assemblies of estates"
in all the countries of the _Bund_, the constitutional liberties of the
German people seemed to be placed under its aegis. But the constitution
of the diet from the first condemned its debates to sterility. In the
so-called narrower assembly (_Engere Versammlung_), for the transaction
of ordinary business, Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover,
Wurttemberg, Baden, Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Darmstadt, Holstein and
Luxemburg had one vote each; while the remaining twenty-eight states
were divided into six _curiae_, of which each had but a single vote. In
this assembly a vote of the majority decided. Questions of more than
usual importance were, however, to be settled in the general assembly
(_Plenum_) where a two-thirds majority was necessary to carry a
resolution. In this assembly the voting power was somewhat differently
distributed; but the attempt to make it bear some proportion to the
importance of the various states worked out so badly that Austria had
only four times the voting power of the tiny principality of
Liechtenstein. Finally it was laid down by Article 7 that a unanimous
vote was necessary for changing "fundamental laws, organic institutions,
individual rights, or in matters of religion," a formula wide enough to
embrace every question of importance with which the diet might be called
upon to deal. Austria, in virtue of her tradition, received the
perpetual presidency of the diet. It was clear that in such a governing
body neither Austria nor Prussia would be content with her
constitutional position, and that the internal politics of Germany would
resolve themselves into a diplomatic duel for ascendancy between the two
powers, for which the diet would merely serve as a convenient arena.
In this duel the victory of Austria was soon declared. The Prussian
government believed that the effective government of Germany could only
be secured by a separate understanding between the two great powers; and
the indiscretion of the Prussian plenipotentiary revealed to the diet a
plan for what meant practically the division of Germany into Prussian
and Austrian spheres of influence. This threw the lesser princes,
already alarmed at the growth of Prussian military power, into the arms
of Austria, which thus secured a permanent majority in the diet. To
avoid any possible modification of a situation so satisfactory, Count
Buol, the Austrian president of the diet, was instructed to announce
that the constitution as fixed by the Final Act, and guaranteed by
Europe, must be regarded as final; that it might be interpreted, but not
altered.
The conception of the diet as a sort of international board of control,
responsible in the last resort not to Germany but to Europe, exactly
suited Metternich's policy, in which the interests of Germany were
subordinate to the wider ambitions of the Habsburg monarchy. It was,
moreover, largely justified by the constituent elements of the diet
itself. Of the German states represented in it even Prussia, by the
acquisition of Posen, had become a non-German power; the Habsburg
monarchy was predominantly non-German; Hanover was attached to the crown
of Great Britain, Holstein to that of Denmark, Luxemburg to that of the
Netherlands. The diet, then, properly controlled, was capable of being
converted into an effective instrument for furthering the policy of
"stability" which Metternich sought to impose upon Europe. Its one
effort to make its authority effective as the guardian of the
constitution, in the matter of the repudiation of the Westphalian debt
and of the sale of the domains by the elector of Hesse, was crushed by
the indignant intervention of Austria. Henceforth its sole effective
function was to endorse and promulgate the decrees of the government of
Vienna.
The question of constitutions.
In this respect the diet fairly reflected the place of Germany in
Europe. The constitution was the work of the powers, which in all
matters arising out of it constituted the final court of appeal. The
result was not wholly one-sided. Until the congress of Troppau in 1820
"Jacobinism" was still enthroned in high places in the person of
Alexander I. of Russia, whose "divine mission," for the time, included a
not wholly disinterested advocacy of the due carrying out of Article 13
of the Final Act. It was not to Russia's interest to see Austrian
influence supreme in the confederation. The lesser German princes, too,
were quick to grasp at any means to strengthen their position against
the dominant powers, and to this end they appealed to the Liberal
sentiment of their peoples. Not that this sentiment was very deep or
widespread. The mass of the people, as Metternich rightly observed,
wished for rest, not constitutions; but the minority of thoughtful
men--professors, students, officials, many soldiers--resented the
dashing of the hopes of German unity aroused by the War of Liberation,
and had drunk deep of the revolutionary inspiration. This sentiment,
since it could not be turned to the uses of a united Germany, might be
made to serve the purposes of particularism. Prussia, in spite of the
promises of Frederick William in the hour of need, remained without a
central constitution; all the more reason why the states of second rank
should provide themselves with one. Charles Augustus, the enlightened
grand duke of Weimar, set the example, from the best of motives.
Bavaria, Baden, Wurttemberg and others followed, from motives less
disinterested. Much depended on the success of these experiments.
Metternich and the constitutions.
The Wartburg festival, 1818.
To Metternich they were wholly unwelcome. In spite of the ring-fence of
censors, and custom-house officers, there was danger of the Liberal
infection spreading to Austria, with disintegrating results; and the
pose of the tsar as protector of German liberties was a perpetual
menace. The zeal and inexperience of German Liberals played into his
hands. The patriotism and Pan-Germanism of the gymnastic societies
(_Turnvereine_) and students' associations (_Burschenschaften_)
expressed themselves with more noise than discretion; in the
South-German parliaments the platitudes and catchwords of the Revolution
were echoed. Soon, in Baden, in Wurttemberg, in Bavaria, the sovereigns
and the chambers were at odds, united only in a common opposition to the
central authority. To sovereigns whose nerves had been shattered by the
vicissitudes of the revolutionary epoch these symptoms were in the
highest degree alarming; and Metternich was at pains to exaggerate their
significance. The "Wartburg festival" of October 1818, which issued in
nothing worse than the solemn burning, in imitation of Dr Martin Luther,
of Kamptz's police law, a corporal's cane and an uhlan's stays, was
magnified into a rebellion; drew down upon the grand duke of Weimar a
collective protest of the powers; and set in motion the whole machinery
of reaction. The murder of the dramatist Kotzebue, as an agent of this
reaction, in the following year, by a fanatical student named Karl Sand,
clinched the matter; it became obvious to the governments that a policy
of rigorous repression was necessary if a fresh revolution were to be
avoided. In October, after a preliminary meeting between Metternich and
Hardenberg, in the course of which the latter signed a convention
pledging Prussia to Austria's system, a meeting of German ministers was
held at Carlsbad, the discussion of which issued in the famous Carlsbad
Decrees (October 17, 1819). These contained elaborate provisions for
supervising the universities and muzzling the press, laying down that no
constitution "inconsistent with the monarchical principle" should be
granted, and setting up a central commission at Mainz to inquire into
the machinations of the great revolutionary secret society which existed
only in the imagination of the authorities. The Carlsbad Decrees,
hurried through the diet under Austrian pressure, excited considerable
opposition among the lesser sovereigns, who resented the claim of the
diet to interfere in the internal concerns of their states, and whose
protests at Frankfort had been expunged from the records. The king of
Wurttemberg, ever the champion of German "particularism," gave
expression to his feelings by issuing a new constitution to his kingdom,
and appealed to his relative, the emperor Alexander, who had not yet
been won over by Metternich to the policy of war _a outrance_ against
reform, and took this occasion to issue a fresh manifesto of his Liberal
creed.
At the conference of ministers which met at Vienna, on the 20th of
November, for the purpose of "developing and completing the Federal Act
of the congress of Vienna," Metternich found himself face to face with a
more formidable opposition than at Carlsbad. The "middle" states, headed
by Wurttemberg, had drawn together, to form the nucleus of an inner
league of "pure German States" against Austria and Prussia, and of
"Liberal particularism" against the encroachments of the diet. With
Russia and, to a certain extent, Great Britain sympathetic, it was
impossible to ignore their opposition. Moreover, Prussia was hardly
prepared to endorse a policy of greatly strengthening the authority of
the diet, which might have been fatal to the Customs Union of which she
was laying the foundation. Metternich realized the situation, and
yielded so gracefully that he gave his temporary defeat the air of a
victory. The result was that the Vienna Final Act (May 15,1820), which
received the sanction of the diet on the 8th of June, was not
unsatisfactory to the lesser states while doing nothing to lessen
Austrian prestige. This instrument merely defined more clearly the
principles of the Federal Act of 1815. So far from enlarging the powers
of the diet, it reaffirmed the doctrine of non-intervention; and, above
all, it renewed the clause forbidding any fundamental modification of
the constitution without a unanimous vote. On the vexed question of the
interpretation of Article 13 Metternich recognized the inexpediency of
requiring the South German states to revise their constitutions in a
reactionary sense. By Articles 56 and 57, however, it was laid down that
constitutions could only be altered by constitutional means; that the
complete authority of the state must remain united in its head; and that
the sovereign could be bound to co-operate with the estates only in the
exercise of particular rights. These provisions, in fact, secured for
Metternich all that was necessary for the success of his policy: the
maintenance of the _status quo_. So long as the repressive machinery
instituted by the Carlsbad Decrees worked smoothly, Germany was not
likely to be troubled by revolutions.
Revolutions of 1830.
The period that followed was one, outwardly at least, of political
stagnation. The Mainz Commission, though hampered by the jealousy of the
governments (the king of Prussia refused to allow his subjects to be
haled before it), was none the less effective enough in preventing all
free expression of opinion; while at the universities the official
"curators" kept Liberal enthusiasts in order. The exuberance of the
epoch of Liberation gave place to a dull lethargy in things political,
relieved only by the Philhellenism which gave voice to the aspirations
of Germany under the disguise of enthusiasm for Greece. Even the July
revolution of 1830 in Paris reacted but partially and spasmodically on
Germany. In Hanover, Brunswick, Saxony and Hesse-Cassel popular
movements led to the granting of constitutions, and in the states
already constitutional Liberal concessions were made or promised. But
the governments of Prussia and Austria were unaffected; and when the
storm had died down Metternich was able, with the aid of the federal
diet, to resume his task of holding "the Revolution" in check. No
attempt was, indeed, made to restore the deposed duke of Brunswick, who
by universal consent had richly deserved his fate; but the elector of
Hesse could reckon on the sympathy of the diet in his struggle with the
chambers (see HESSE-CASSEL), and when, in 1837, King Ernest Augustus of
Hanover inaugurated his reign by restoring the old illiberal
constitution abolished in 1831, the diet refused to interfere. It was
left to the seven professors of Gottingen to protest; who, deprived of
their posts, became as famous in the constitutional history of Germany
as the seven bishops in that of England.
The Prussian system.
Yet this period was by no means sterile in developments destined to
produce momentous results. In Prussia especially the government
continued active in organizing and consolidating the heterogeneous
elements introduced into the monarchy by the settlement of 1815. The
task was no easy one. There was no sense of national unity between the
Catholics of the Rhine provinces, long submitted to the influence of
liberal France, and the Lutheran squires of the mark of Brandenburg, the
most stereotyped class in Europe; there was little in common between
either and the Polish population of the province of Posen. The Prussian
monarchy, the traditional champion of Protestant orthodoxy, found the
new Catholic elements difficult to assimilate; and premonitory symptoms
were not wanting of a revival of the secular contest between the
spiritual and temporal powers which was to culminate after the
promulgation of the dogma of papal infallibility (1870) in the
_Kulturkampf_. These conditions formed the excuse for the continual
postponement of the promised constitution. But the narrow piety of
Frederick William III. was less calculated to promote the success of a
benevolent despotism than the contemptuous scepticism of Frederick the
Great, and a central parliament would have proved a safety valve for
jarring passions which the mistaken efforts of the king to suppress, by
means of royal decrees and military coercion, only served to embitter.
Yet the conscientious tradition of Prussian officialism accomplished
much in the way of administrative reform.
The Prussian Zollverein.
Above all it evolved the Customs-Union (_Zollverein_), which gradually
attached the smaller states, by material interests if not by sympathy,
to the Prussian system. A reform of the tariff conditions in the new
Prussian monarchy had been from the first a matter of urgent necessity,
and this was undertaken under the auspices of Baron Heinrich von Bulow
(1792-1846), minister in the foreign department for commerce and
shipping, and Karl Georg Maassen (1769-1834), the minister of finance.
When they took office there were in Prussia sixty different tariffs,
with a total of nearly 2800 classes of taxable goods: in some parts
importation was free, or all but free; in others there was absolute
prohibition, or duties so heavy as to amount to practical prohibition.
Moreover, the long and broken line of the Prussian frontier, together
with the numerous enclaves, made the effective enforcement of a high
tariff impossible. In these circumstances it was decided to introduce a
system of comparative free trade; raw materials were admitted free; a
uniform import of 10% was levied on manufactured goods, and 20% on
"colonial wares," the tax being determined not by the estimated value,
but by the weight of the articles. It was soon realized, however, that
to make this system complete the neighbouring states must be drawn into
it; and a beginning was made with those which were enclaves in Prussian
territory, of which there were no less than thirteen. Under the new
tariff laws light transit dues were imposed on goods passing through
Prussia; and it was easy to bring pressure to bear on states completely
surrounded by Prussian territory by increasing these dues or, if need
were, by forbidding the transit altogether. The small states, though
jealous of their sovereign independence, found it impossible to hold
out. Schwarzburg-Sondershausen was the first to succumb (1819);
Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt (1822), Saxe-Weimar and Anhalt-Bernburg (1823),
Lippe-Detmold and Mecklenburg-Schwerin (1826) followed suit so far as
their "enclaved" territories were concerned; and in 1826 Anhalt-Dessau
and Anhalt-Cothen, after several years' resistance, joined the Prussian
Customs-Union. In 1828 Hesse-Cassel entered into a commercial treaty
with Prussia. Meanwhile, alarmed at this tendency, and hopeless of
obtaining any general system from the federal diet, the "middle" states
had drawn together; by a treaty signed on the 18th of January 1828
Wurttemberg and Bavaria formed a tariff union, which was joined in the
following year by the Hohenzollern principalities; and on the 24th of
September 1828 was formed the so-called "Middle German Commercial Union"
(_Handelsverein_) between Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, the Saxon duchies,
Brunswick, Nassau, the principalities of Reuss and Schwarzburg, and the
free cities of Frankfort and Bremen, the object of which was to prevent
the extension of the Prussian system and, above all, any union of the
northern Zollverein with that of Bavaria and Wurttemberg. It was soon,
however, found that these separate systems were unworkable; on the 27th
of May 1829 Prussia signed a commercial treaty with the southern union;
the _Handelsverein_ was broken up, and one by one the lesser states
joined the Prussian Customs-Union. Finally, on the 22nd of March 1833,
the northern and southern unions were amalgamated; Saxony and the
Thuringian states attached themselves to this union in the same year;
and on the 1st of January 1834 the German Customs- and Commercial-Union
(_Deutscher Zoll- und Handelsverein_) came into existence, which
included for tariff purposes within a single frontier the greater part
of Germany. Outside this, though not in hostility to it, Hanover,
Brunswick, Oldenburg and Schaumburg-Lippe formed a separate
customs-union (_Steuerverein_) by treaties signed on the 1st of May 1834
and the 7th of May 1836, and to this certain Prussian and Hessian
enclaves were attached. Subsequently other states, e.g. Baden and Nassau
(1836), Frankfort and Luxemburg (1842), joined the Prussian Zollverein,
to which certain of the members of the Steuerverein also transferred
themselves (Brunswick and Lippe, 1842). Finally, as a counter-move to
the Austrian efforts to break up the Zollverein, the latter came to
terms with the Steuerverein, which, on the 1st of January 1854, was
absorbed in the Prussian system. Hamburg was to remain outside until
1883; but practically the whole of what now is Germany was thus included
in a union in which Prussia had a predominating influence, and to which,
when too late, Austria in vain sought admission.[2]
Even in the earlier stages of its development the Zollverein had a
marked effect on the condition of the country. Its growth coincided with
the introduction of railways, and enabled the nation to derive from them
the full benefit; so that, in spite of the confusion of political
powers, material prosperity increased, together with the consciousness
of national unity and a tendency to look to Berlin rather than to Vienna
as the centre of this unity.
Frederick William IV.
This tendency was increased by the accession to the throne of Prussia,
in 1840, of Frederick William IV., a prince whose conspicuous talents
and supposed "advanced" views raised the hopes of the German Liberals in
the same degree as they excited the alarm and contempt of Metternich. In
the end, however, the fears were more justified than the hopes. The
reign began well, it is true, notably in the reversal of the narrow
ecclesiastical policy of Frederick William III. But the new king was a
child of the romantic movement, with no real understanding of, and still
less sympathy with, the modern Liberal point of view. He cherished the
idea of German unity, but could conceive of it only in the form of the
restored Holy Empire under the house of Habsburg; and so little did he
understand the growing nationalist temper of his people that he
seriously negotiated for a union of the Lutheran and Anglican churches,
of which the sole premature offspring was the Protestant bishopric of
Jerusalem.
Meanwhile the Unionist and Liberal agitation was growing in strength,
partly owing to the very efforts made to restrain it. The emperor
Nicholas I. of Russia, kept informed by his agents of the tendencies of
opinion, thought it right to warn his kinsman of Prussia of the approach
of danger. But Frederick William, though the tsar's influence over him
was as great as over his father, refused to be convinced. He even
thought the time opportune for finishing "the building begun by Papa" by
summoning the central assembly of the diets, and wrote to the tsar to
this effect (December 31, 1845); and he persevered in this intention in
spite of the tsar's paternal remonstrances. On the 13th of February 1847
was issued a patent summoning the united diet of Prussia. But, as
Metternich had prophesied, this only provided an organ for giving voice
to larger constitutional aspirations. The result was a constitutional
dead-lock; for the diet refused to sanction loans until its
"representative" character was recognized; and the king refused to allow
"to come between Almighty God in heaven and this land a blotted
parchment, to rule us with paragraphs, and to replace the ancient,
sacred bond of loyalty." On the 26th of June the diet was dissolved,
nothing having been done but to reveal the widening gulf between the
principle of monarchy and the growing forces of German Liberalism.
The strength of these forces was revealed when the February revolution
of 1848 in Paris gave the signal for the outbreak of popular movements
throughout Europe. The effect of the revolution in Vienna, involving the
fall of Metternich (May 13) and followed by the nationalist movements in
Hungary and Bohemia, was stupendous in Germany. Accustomed to look to
Austria for guidance and material support, the princes everywhere found
themselves helpless in face of the popular clamour. The only power which
might have stemmed the tide was Prussia. But Frederick William's
emotional and kindly temperament little fitted him to use "the mailed
fist"; though the riot which broke out in Berlin on the 15th of March
was suppressed by the troops with but little bloodshed, the king shrank
with horror from the thought of fighting his "beloved Berliners," and
when on the night of the 18th the fighting was renewed, he entered into
negotiation with the insurgents, negotiations that resulted in the
withdrawal of the troops from Berlin. The next day, Frederick William,
with characteristic histrionic versatility, was heading a procession
round the streets of Berlin, wrapped in the German tricolour, and
extolling in a letter to the indignant tsar the consummation of "the
glorious German revolution."
German nationalism.
Frankfort parliament.
The collapse of the Prussian autocracy involved that of the lesser German
potentates. On the 30th of March the federal diet hoisted the German
tricolour and authorized the assembling of the German national parliament
at Frankfort. Arrangements for this had already been made without
official sanction. A number of deputies, belonging to different
legislative assemblies, taking it upon themselves to give voice to the
national demands, had met at Heidelberg, and a committee appointed by
them had invited all Germans who then were, or who had formerly been,
members of diets, as well as some other public men, to meet at Frankfort
for the purpose of considering the question of national reform. About 500
representatives accepted the invitation. They constituted themselves a
preliminary parliament (_Vorparlament_), and at once began to provide for
the election of a national assembly. It was decided that there should be
a representative for every group of 50,000 inhabitants, and that the
election should be by universal suffrage. A considerable party wished
that the preliminary parliament should continue to act until the assembly
should be formed, but this was overruled, the majority contenting
themselves with the appointment of a committee of 50, whose duty it
should be in the interval to guard the national interests. Some of those
who were discontented with this decision retired from the preliminary
parliament, and a few of them, of republican sympathies, called the
population of Upper Baden to arms. The rising was put down by the troops
of Baden, but it did considerable injury by awakening the fears of the
more moderate portion of the community. Great hindrances were put in the
way of the elections, but, as the Prussian and Austrian governments were
too much occupied with their immediate difficulties to resist to the
uttermost, the parliament was at last chosen, and met at Frankfort on the
18th May. The old diet, without being formally dissolved, (an omission
that was to have notable consequences) broke up, and the national
representatives had before them a clear field. Their task would in any
case have been one of extreme difficulty. The new-born sentiment of
national unity disguised a variety of conflicting ideals, as well as
deep-seated traditional local antagonisms; the problem of constructing a
new Germany out of states, several of which, and those the most powerful,
were largely composed of non-German elements, was sure to lead to
international complications; moreover, the military power of the
monarchies had only been temporarily paralysed, not destroyed. Yet, had
the parliament acted with promptitude and discretion it might have been
successful. Neither Austria nor Prussia was for some time in a position
to thwart it, and the sovereigns of the smaller states were too much
afraid of the revolutionary elements manifested on all sides to oppose
its will. But the Germans had had no experience of free political life.
Nearly every deputy had his own theory of the course which ought to be
pursued, and felt sure that the country would go to ruin if it were not
adopted. Learned professors and talkative journalists insisted on
delivering interminable speeches and on examining in the light of
ultimate philosophical principles every proposal laid before the
assembly. Thus precious time was lost, violent antagonisms were called
forth, the patience of the nation was exhausted, and the reactionary
forces were able to gather strength for once more asserting themselves.
The very first important question brought out the weaknesses of the
deputies. This related to the nature of the central provisional
executive. A committee appointed to discuss the matter suggested that
there should be a directory of three members, appointed by the German
governments, subject to the approval of the parliament, and ruling by
means of ministers responsible to the latter body. This elaborate scheme
found favour with a large number of members, but others insisted that
there should be a president or a central committee, appointed by the
parliament, while another party pleaded that the parliament itself should
exercise executive as well as legislative functions. At last, after a
vast amount of tedious and useless discussion, it was agreed that the
parliament should appoint an imperial vicar (_Reichsverweser_) who should
carry on the government by means of a ministry selected by himself; and
on the motion of Heinrich von Gagern the archduke John of Austria was
chosen by a large majority for the office. With as little delay as
possible he formed an imperial cabinet, and there were hopes that, as his
appointment was generally approved both by the sovereigns and the people,
more rapid progress would be made with the great and complicated work in
hand. Unfortunately, however, it was necessary to enter upon the
discussion of the fundamental laws, a subject presenting many
opportunities for the display of rhetoric and intellectual subtlety. It
was soon obvious that beneath all varieties of individual opinion there
were two bitterly hostile tendencies--republican and constitutionalist.
These two parties attacked each other with constantly growing animosity,
and in a few weeks sensible men outside the parliament gave up all hope
of their dealing satisfactorily with the problem they had been appointed
to solve.
Schleswig-Holstein.
In the midst of these disputes the attention of the nation was occupied
by a question which had arisen before the outbreak of the revolutionary
movements--the so-called "Schleswig-Holstein question" (q.v.). In 1846
Christian VIII. of Denmark had officially proclaimed that Schleswig and
the greater part of Holstein were indissolubly connected with the Danish
monarchy. This excited vehement opposition among the Germans, on the
ground that Holstein, although subject to the king of Denmark, was a
member of the German confederation, and that in virtue of ancient
treaties it could not be severed from Schleswig. In 1848 the German
party in the duchies, headed by Prince Frederick of Augustenburg, rose
against the Danish government. Frederick VII., who had just succeeded
Christian VIII., put down the rebellion, but Prussia, acting in the name
of the confederation, despatched an army against the Danes, and drove
them from Schleswig. The Danes, who were supported by Russia, responded
by blockading the Baltic ports, which Germany, having no navy, was
unable effectually to defend. By the mediation of Great Britain an
armistice was concluded, and the Prussian troops evacuated the northern
districts of Schleswig. As the Danes soon afterwards took possession of
Schleswig again, the Prussians once more drove them back, but, in view
of the threatening attitude of the powers, Frederick William summoned up
courage to flout the opinion of the German parliament, and on the 26th
of August, without the central government being consulted, an armistice
of seven months was agreed upon at Malmoe.
Disputes in the Frankfort assembly.
The full significance of this event was not at once realized. To
indignant patriots it seemed no more than a piece of perfidy, for which
Prussia should be called to account by united Germany. The provisional
government of the duchies appealed from Prussia to the German regent;
and the Frankfort parliament hotly took up its cause. A large majority
voted an order countermanding the withdrawal of the Prussian troops, in
spite of the protest of the ministry, who saw that it would be
impossible to make it effective. The ministry resigned, but no other
could be found to take its place; and the majority began to realize the
situation. The central government depended ultimately on the armed
support of the two great powers; to quarrel with those would be to ruin
the constitution, or at best to play into the hands of the extreme
revolutionists. On the 14th of September the question of the convention
of Malmoe again came up for discussion, and was angrily debated. The
democrats called their adherents to arms against the traitors who were
preparing to sell the Schleswig-Holsteiners. The Moderates took alarm;
they had no stomach for an open war with the governments; and in the end
the convention was confirmed by a sufficient majority. The result was
civil war in the streets of Frankfort; two deputies were murdered; and
the parliament, which could think of no better way of meeting the crisis
than by continuing "with imposing calm" to discuss "fundamental rights,"
was only saved from the fury of the mob by Prussian troops. Its
existence was saved, but its prestige had vanished; and the destinies of
the German people were seen to be in the hands that held the sword.
The revolution in Austria.
While these events were in progress, it seemed not impossible that the
Austrian empire would fall to pieces. Bohemia and the Italian states
were in revolt, and the Hungarians strove with passionate earnestness
for independence. Towards the end of 1848 Vienna was completely in the
hands of the revolutionary party, and it was retaken only after
desperate fighting. A reactionary ministry, headed by Prince
Schwarzenberg, was then raised to power, and in order that a strong
policy might be the more vigorously pushed forward, the emperor
Ferdinand resigned, and was succeeded by his nephew, Francis Joseph.
Reform in Prussia.
The prospects of reform were not much more favourable in Prussia. The
assembly summoned amid the revolutionary excitement of March met on the
22nd of May. Demands for a constitutional system were urged with great
force, and they would probably have been granted but for the opposition
due to the violence of politicians out of doors. The aristocratic class
saw ruin before it if the smallest concession were made to popular
wishes, and it soon recovered from the terror into which it had been
plunged at the outbreak of the revolution. Extreme antagonism was
excited by such proposals as that the king should no longer be said to
wear his crown "by the grace of God"; and the animosity between the
liberal and the conservative sections was driven to the highest pitch by
the attack of the democratic majority of the diet on the army and the
attempt to remodel it in the direction of a national militia. Matters
came to a crisis at the end of October when the diet passed a resolution
calling on the king to intervene in favour of the Viennese
revolutionists. When, on the evening of the 30th, a mob surrounded the
palace, clamouring for the king to give effect to this resolution,
Frederick William lost patience, ordered General Wrangel to occupy
Berlin with troops, and on the 2nd of November placed Count Brandenburg,
a scion of the royal house and a Prussian of the old school, at the head
of a new ministry. On the pretext that fair deliberation was impossible
in the capital, the assembly was now ordered to meet in Brandenburg,
while troops were concentrated near Berlin and a state of siege was
proclaimed. In vain the assembly protested and continued its sittings,
going even so far as to forbid the payment of taxes while it was
subjected to illegal treatment. It was forced in the end to submit. But
the discussions in Brandenburg were no more successful than those in
Berlin; and at last, on the 5th of December, the king dissolved the
assembly, granted a constitution about which it had not been consulted,
and gave orders for the election of a representative chamber.
The question of the constitution.
About the time that the Prussian parliament was thus created, and that
the emperor Ferdinand resigned, the Frankfort parliament succeeded in
formulating the fundamental laws, which were duly proclaimed to be those
of Germany as it was now to be constituted. The principal clauses of the
constitution then began to be discussed. By far the most difficult
question was the relation in which Austria should stand to the Germany
of the future. There was a universal wish that the Austrian Germans
should be included in the German state; on the other hand, it was felt
that if all the various nationalities of Austria formed a united
monarchy, and if this monarchy as a whole were included in the
confederation, it would necessarily overshadow Germany, and expose her
to unnecessary external dangers. It was therefore resolved that,
although a German country might be under the same ruler as non-German
lands, it could not be so joined to them as to form with them a single
nation. Had the parliament adopted this resolution at once, instead of
exhausting itself by pedantic disquisitions on the abstract principles
of jurisprudence, it might have hoped to triumph; but Austria was not
likely to submit to so severe a blow at the very time when she was
strong enough to appoint a reactionary government, and had nearly
re-established her authority, not only in Vienna, but in Bohemia and in
Italy. Prince Schwarzenberg took the earliest opportunity to declare
that the empire could not assent to any weakening of its influence.
Bitter strife now broke out in the parliament between the Great German
(_Gross-Deutsch_) and Little German (_Klein-Deutsch_) parties. Two of
the ministers resigned, and one of those who took their place, Heinrich
von Gagern (q.v.), proposed that, since Austria was to be a united
state, she should not enter the confederation, but that her relations to
Germany should be regulated by a special act of union. This of course
meant that Prussia should be at the head of Germany, and recommended
itself to the majority of the constitutional party. It was resisted by
the Austrian members, who were supported by the ultramontanes and the
democrats, both of whom disliked Prussia, the former because of her
Protestantism, the latter because of her bureaucratic system. Gagern's
proposal was, however, adopted. Immediately afterwards the question as
to the character of the executive was raised. Some voted that a
directory of princes should be appointed, others that there should be a
president, eligible from the whole German nation; but the final decision
was that the headship of the state should be offered by the parliament
to some particular German prince, and that he should bear the title of
German emperor.
Proposed empire.
The whole subject was as eagerly discussed throughout the country as in
Frankfort. Austria firmly opposed the idea of a united German state,
insisting that the Austrian emperor could not consent to be subordinate
to any other prince. She was supported by Bavaria, but on the other side
were Prussia, Brunswick, Baden, Nassau, Mecklenburg and various other
countries, besides the Hanseatic towns. For some time Austria offered no
counter scheme, but she ultimately proposed that there should be a
directory of seven princes, the chief place being held alternately by a
Prussian and an Austrian imperial vicar. Nothing came of this
suggestion, and in due time the parliament proceeded to the second
reading of the constitution. It was revised in a democratic sense, but
the imperial title was maintained, and a narrow majority decided that it
should be hereditary. Frederick William IV. of Prussia was then chosen
emperor.
All Germany awaited with anxiety the reply of Frederick William. It was
thought not improbable that he would accept the honour offered him, for
in the early part of his reign he had spoken of German unity as
enthusiastically as of liberty, and, besides, the opportunity was
surprisingly favourable. The larger number of the North-German states
were at least not unwilling to submit to the arrangement; and Austria,
whose opposition in ordinary circumstances would have been fatal, was
paralysed by her struggle with Hungary. Frederick William, however,
whose instincts were far from democratic, refused "to pick up a crown
out of the gutter"; and the deputation which waited upon him was
dismissed with the answer that he could not assume the imperial title
without the full sanction of the princes and the free cities.
End of Frankfort parliament.
This answer was in reality a death-blow to the hopes of German patriots,
but the parliament affected to believe that its cause was not yet lost,
and appointed a committee to see that the provisions of the constitution
were carried out. A vigorous agitation began in the country for the
acceptance of the constitution by the governments. The king of
Wurttemberg was forced to accede to it; and in Saxony, Baden and Rhenish
Bavaria armed multitudes kept the sovereigns in terror. Prussia, which,
following the example of Austria, had recalled her representatives from
Frankfort, sent her troops to put down these risings, and on the 21st of
May 1849 the larger number of the deputies to the parliament voluntarily
resigned their seats. A few republican members held on by it, and
transferred the sittings to Stuttgart. Here they even elected an
imperial government, but they had no longer any real influence, and on
the 18th of June they were forcibly dispersed by order of the
Wurttemberg ministry.
The Prussian Union.
Policy of Austria.
Although Frederick William had refused to become emperor, he was
unwilling to miss altogether the opportunity afforded by the
difficulties of Austria. He invited the states to send representatives
to Berlin to discuss the condition of Germany; and he concluded a treaty
with the kings of Saxony and Hanover. Two days afterwards the three
allies agreed upon a constitution which was in many respects identical
with that drawn up by the Frankfort parliament. The functions of the
executive were, however, extended, the electoral law was made less
democratic, and it was decided that, instead of an emperor, there should
be merely a supreme chief aided by a college of princes. This
constitution was accepted by a number of states, which assumed the name
of "The Union," and on the 20th of March 1850 a parliament consisting
of two houses met in Erfurt. Both houses accepted the constitution; and,
immediately after they broke up, the members of the Union assembled in
Berlin, and a provisional college of princes was elected. By that time,
however, the whole situation of Germany had changed. In the autumn of
1849 Austria had succeeded, by the help of Russia, in quelling the
Hungarian insurrection, and she was then in no mood to let herself be
thrust aside by Prussia. Encouraged by her, Hanover and Saxony had
severed themselves from the Union, and Saxony, Wurttemberg and Bavaria
arrived at an understanding as to a wholly new constitution. Afterwards
all four states, with several others, accepted the invitation of Austria
to consider the propriety of re-establishing the Confederation. The
representatives of the states favourable to this proposal, i.e. Austria,
Luxemburg, Denmark and the four kingdoms, came together in Frankfort on
the 4th of September 1850, constituted themselves a _Plenum_ of the old
diet and refused to admit the other states except under the terms of the
act of 1815.
Disturbance in Hesse-Cassel.
Thus the issue to which the events of about a century had been pointing
was apparently raised; Germany was divided into two hostile parties, one
set of states grouping themselves around Austria, another around
Prussia. A difficulty which arose in Hesse-Cassel almost compelled the
powers to bring their differences to the test of war. In this small
state the liberal movement of 1848 had been followed by reaction, and
the elector ventured to replace Hassenpflug, the unpopular minister who
had been driven from power. Hassenpflug, being detested by the chamber,
dissolved it in June 1850; but the new one was not less hostile, and
refused to sanction the collection of the taxes until it had considered
the budget. For this offence it also was dissolved, and orders were
issued for the raising of the taxes without its consent. Many officials
refused to obey; the judges remained loyal to the constitution; and when
attempts were made to solve the difficulty by the army, the officers
instructed to act resigned in a body. Meanwhile, Hassenpflug had
appealed to the representatives in Frankfort who claimed to be the
restored diet, and under the influence of Austria they resolved to
support him. Prussia, on the other hand, announced its determination to
carry out the principles of the Union and to maintain the Hessian
constitution. Austrian and Bavarian troops having entered Hesse, a
Prussian army immediately occupied Cassel, and war appeared to be
imminent. Prussia, however, was wholly unprepared for war; and, when
this was realized, Radowitz, the foreign minister, who had so far
pursued a vigorous policy, retired, and was replaced by Manteuffel, who,
although the whole Prussian army was mobilized, began by making
concessions. The Union was dissolved; and after Austria had despatched
an ultimatum formulating her demands, Baron Manteuffel met Prince
Schwarzenberg at Olmutz, and, by a convention signed on the 29th of
November 1850, virtually yielded everything he insisted upon. The
difficulty in Hesse was to be left to the decision of the German
governments; and as soon as possible ministerial conferences were to be
held in Dresden, with a view to the settlement of the German
constitution.
Diet restored.
The Austrian government strove to secure the appointment of a stronger
executive than had hitherto existed; but its proposals met with steady
opposition from Prussia. Every Prussian scheme was in like manner
resisted by Austria. Thus, from the sheer inability of the assembled
ministers to devise a plan on which all could agree, Prussia and the
states that had joined her in the Union were compelled to recognize the
Frankfort diet. From the 12th of June 1851 its sittings went on as if
nothing had occurred since it was dispersed.
This wretched fiasco was hardly less satisfactory to the majority of
Germans than the manner in which the national claims in
Schleswig-Holstein were maintained. The armistice of Malmoe having
expired in March 1849, the war with Denmark was resumed. A considerable
army was despatched against the Danes by the Frankfort government, but
on the 10th of July an armistice was signed at Berlin for six months,
and a year afterwards Prussia concluded peace. The inhabitants of the
duchies, however, continued the war. During the interview at Olmutz
between Manteuffel and Schwarzenberg it was agreed that, like the
affairs of Hesse-Cassel, those of Schleswig-Holstein should be submitted
to the decision of all German states, but that, in the meantime, Prussia
and Austria should act together. By the intervention of Austrian troops
peace was restored; and when, early in 1852, the government of Denmark,
in providing a constitution for the whole monarchy, promised to appoint
separate ministers for Schleswig and Holstein, and to do equal justice
to the German and the Danish populations, the two powers declared
themselves satisfied and the Austrian forces were withdrawn. The diet
also, after some delay, professed to be content with this arrangement.
While it was discussing the subject, a conference of the European powers
met in London, and by the protocol of May 28, 1852, settled that
Frederick VII. of Denmark should be succeeded by Christian, duke of
Glucksburg, and that the duchies should be indissolubly united to the
Danish monarchy. Austria and Prussia accepted the protocol, but it was
not signed by the diet.
Austria and the Zollverein.
In all these later events the first place had been taken by Austria. The
temporary dissolution of the Zollverein in 1851 gave her an opportunity
of trying to extend her influence; she demanded that a union should be
formed of which she should be the leading member. A congress of all
German states, with the exception of Prussia and one or two states which
sympathized with her, was held in Vienna; and it was followed by several
other congresses favourable to Austrian pretensions. Prussia, however,
being here on strong ground, refused to give way; and not only was the
customs union restored in accordance with her wishes, but Austria
concluded with her in 1853 a treaty of commerce which embodied some
important concessions.
Political reaction.
Germany had now fairly entered a period which, although it did not last
very long, was, in some respects, as humiliating as any in her history.
The popular movement, from which great things had been hoped, had on
some occasions almost touched its goal; and, as might have been
expected, a reaction set in, which the princes knew how to turn to the
fullest advantage. The Austrian government, after the subjection of
Hungary, withdrew every concession it had made under pressure, and
established a thorough despotism, trampling upon the rights of the
individual nationalities, and forcing all its subjects into a common
political mould. In Prussia the parliament, summoned by the king on the
5th of December 1848, met early in the following year. Although the
democrats had declined to vote, it was not conservative enough for the
court, and not till the 31st of January 1850 was an understanding
arrived at respecting the constitution. The system thus established was
repeatedly revised, and always with the same object--to reduce to a
minimum the power of the national representatives, and to exalt and
extend that of the government. At the same time the ministry persecuted
the press, and allowed hardly a whisper of discontent to pass
unpunished. The smaller states followed with alacrity in the steps of
the two leading powers. The Liberal ministries of 1848 were dismissed,
the constitutions were changed or abolished, and new chambers were
elected under a severely restricted suffrage. Had the battle been fairly
fought out between the governments and the people, the latter would
still have triumphed; but the former had now, in the Frankfort diet, a
mightier instrument than ever against freedom. What it could do was seen
too clearly from the case of Hesse-Cassel. After the settlement of
Olmutz, federal troops occupied that country, and federal execution was
carried out with shameful harshness. Martial law was everywhere
proclaimed; officers, and all classes of officials who had incurred the
displeasure of the government, were subjected to arbitrary penalties;
and such was the misery of the people that multitudes of them were
compelled to emigrate. The constitution having been destroyed by the
_Bund_, the elector proclaimed one of his own making; but even the
chamber elected under the provisions of this despotic scheme could not
tolerate his hateful tyranny, and there were incessant disputes between
it and the government. The _Bund_ interfered in a like spirit in
Hanover, although with less disastrous results, after the accession of
George V. in 1851. For the whole of Germany this was emphatically the
period of petty despotism; and not only from Hesse, but from all parts
of the country there was a vast stream of emigration, mainly to the New
World.
Crimean War.
The outbreak of the Crimean War profoundly moved the German nation. The
sympathies of Austria were necessarily with the Western powers, and in
Prussia the majority of the people took the same side; but the Prussian
government, which was at this time completely under the control of
Russia, gave its moral support to the tsar. It did, indeed, assent to a
treaty--afterwards signed on behalf of the confederation--by which
Prussia and Austria guaranteed each other, but it resolutely opposed the
mobilization of the confederate army. The Prussian people were keenly
irritated by the cordial relations between their court and the most
despotic power in Europe. They felt that they were thus most unjustly
separated from the main stream of Western progress.
During the Crimean War the political reaction continued with unabated
force. In Prussia the government appeared resolved to make up for its
temporary submission to the popular will by the utmost violence on which
it could venture. A general election took place in the autumn of 1855,
and so harshly was the expression of opinion restrained that a chamber
was returned with scarcely a single liberal element of serious
importance. The feudalists called for a still further revision of the
constitution, and urged that even the reforms effected by Stein should
be undone. In Bavaria a chamber elected about the same time as that of
Prussia was rather less docile; but the government shared to the full
the absolutist tendencies of the day, and energetically combated the
party which stood up for law and the constitution. The Hanoverian
government, backed by the Frankfort diet, was still more successful in
its warfare with the moderate reformers whom it was pleased to treat as
revolutionists; and in Austria the feudalists so completely gained the
upper hand that on the 18th of August 1855 the government signed a
concordat, by which the state virtually submitted itself to the control
of the church.
Prussia and Switzerland.
The German people seemed to have lost both the power and the will to
assert their rights; but in reality they were deeply dissatisfied. And
it was clear to impartial observers that, in the event of any great
strain upon the power of the governments, the absolutist system would
break down. The first symptom that the reaction had attained its utmost
development displayed itself in Prussia, whose attention was for a time
distracted from home politics by a quarrel with Switzerland. The Swiss
authorities had imprisoned some foolish royalists of Neuchatel, in which
the house of Hohenzollern had never resigned its rights. War was
threatened by Prussia, but when the prisoners were set free, the two
states entered upon negotiations, and in the summer of 1857 King
Frederick William withdrew all claims to the principality.
Regency of William of Prussia.
Soon after this, the mental condition of the king made it necessary that
his duties should be undertaken by a substitute, and his brother
William, the prince of Prussia, took his place for three months. In
October 1858 the prince became regent. The accession to power of the new
regent was universally recognized as involving a change of system. The
temper of William, in contradistinction to that of his brother, was
pre-eminently practical; and he had the reputation of a brave, piously
orthodox Prussian soldier. The nickname "cartridge-prince"
(_Kartatschenprinz_) bestowed upon him during the troubles of '48 was
undeserved; but he was notoriously opposed to Liberalism and, had he
followed his own instincts, he would have modified the constitution in a
reactionary sense. Fortunately, however, he was singularly open to
conviction, and Otto von Bismarck, though not yet in office, was
already in his confidence. Bismarck realized that, in the struggle with
Austria which he foresaw, Prussia could only be weakened were she to
take up an attitude of opposition to the prevailing Liberal sentiment,
and that to tamper with the constitution would not only be inexpedient,
but useless, since special measures could always be resorted to, to meet
special circumstances. The interests of Prussia, he urged, had been too
often sacrificed to abstract ideas. William listened and was convinced.
He not only left the constitution intact, but he dismissed Manteuffel's
"feudal" ministry and replaced it with moderate Liberals.
The change was more revolutionary in appearance than in reality.
Manteuffel and his policy were associated in the regent's mind with the
humiliation of Olmutz, and the dismissal of the ministry symbolized the
reversal of this policy. William believed with his whole soul in the
unification of Germany, and in Prussia as its instrument; and, if he
doubted, it was only as to the how and when. Of one thing he was
certain--that whoever aspired to rule over Germany must be prepared to
seize it (letter to von Natzmer, May 20, 1849). This attitude had little
in common with the Liberal appeal to the voice of the people. Such a
revolutionary foundation might be good enough for the ephemeral empires
of France; the appeal of Prussia should be to the God of battles alone.
Prussia and the Austro-Italian War.
The antagonism between these conflicting principles was not long in
revealing itself. In Germany the relations between Austria and Prussia
were becoming unpleasantly strained in the question of the admission of
the Habsburg monarchy to the Zollverein, in that of the elector of Hesse
and his parliament, in that of the relation of the Elbe duchies to the
crown of Denmark. But for the outbreak of the Italian war of 1859 the
struggle of 1866 might have been anticipated. The outcome of the war
increased the prestige of Prussia. She had armed, not with the idea of
going to the aid of a German power in difficulties, but in order, at the
right moment, to cast her sword into the scale wherein her own interests
might for the time lie. At the menace of her armaments, concentrated on
the Rhine, Napoleon had stopped dead in the full career of victory;
Austria, in the eyes of German men, had been placed under an obligation
to her rival; and Italy realized the emergence of a new military power,
whose interests in antagonism to Austria were identical with her own.
Military reforms and constitutional crisis in Prussia.
So striking an object lesson was not lost on the Prussian regent, and he
entered on a vigorous policy of reforming and strengthening the army,
General von Roon being appointed minister of war for this purpose. To
the Liberal ministers, however, and to the Liberal majority in the
Prussian diet, this was wholly objectionable. Schemes were under
discussion for reforming the constitution of the Confederation and
drawing the German states closer together on a Liberal basis; the moment
seemed singularly inopportune for Prussia, which had not shown herself
particularly zealous for the common interests, to menace the other
German governments by increasing her separate armaments. When,
therefore, on the 10th of February 1860, the bills necessary for
carrying out the reform of the army were introduced into the diet, they
met with so strenuous an opposition that they had to be withdrawn.
Supplies were, however, granted for fourteen months, and the regent took
this as justifying him in proceeding with his plans. On the 1st of
January 1861 the standards of the new regiments were solemnly blessed;
on the next day Frederick William IV. died, and the new king was face to
face with a constitutional crisis.
Austria, meanwhile, had been making the first tentative essays in
constitutional concession, which culminated, in May 1861, in the
establishment at Vienna of a _Reichsrat_ for the whole empire, including
Hungary. The popularity she thus gained among German Liberals and
Nationalists was helped by the course of events at Berlin. The Prussian
diet of 1862 was no whit more tractable than its predecessor, but fell
to attacking the professional army and advocating the extension of the
militia (_Landwehr_) system; on the 11th of March the king dissolved it
in disgust, whereupon the Liberal ministry resigned, and was succeeded
by the Conservative cabinet of Prince Hohenlohe. Public opinion was now
violently excited against the government; the new elections resulted
(May 6) in the return of a yet larger Liberal majority; on the 22nd of
August the army estimates were thrown out. Hohenlohe now declared
himself incapable of carrying on the government, and King William
entrusted it to Otto von Bismarck.
Bismarck.
In choosing this man of iron will as his instrument during the actual
crisis the king's instinct had not betrayed him. For nine years Prussian
delegate at the diet of Frankfort, Bismarck was intimately acquainted
with all the issues of the German problem; with his accustomed
calculated bluntness he had more than once openly asserted that this
problem could only be settled by Austria ceasing to influence the German
courts and transferring "her centre of gravity towards Budapest"; with
equal bluntness he told the committee on the budget, on the 30th of
September 1862, that the problem could not be solve "by parliamentary
decrees," but only "by blood and iron." For the supreme moment of this
solution he was determined that Prussia should be fully prepared; and
this meant that he must defy the majority within the diet and public
opinion without. Some sort of constitutional pretence was given to the
decision of the government to persevere with the military reforms by the
support of the Upper House, and of this Bismarck availed himself to
raise the necessary taxes without the consent of the popular assembly.
He regretted the necessity for flouting public opinion, which he would
have preferred to carry with him; in due course he would make his peace
with Liberal sentiment, when success should have justified his defiance
of it. His plans were singularly helped by international developments.
The Polish rising of 1863 came just in time to prevent a threatened
Franco-Russian alliance; the timid and double-faced attitude of both
France and Austria during the revolt left them isolated in Europe, while
Bismarck's ready assistance to Russia assured at least the benevolent
neutrality in the coming struggle with the Habsburg power.
Views as to Germany unity.
Meanwhile, among the German people the object lesson of the Italian war
had greatly stimulated the sentiment of national unity. As to the
principle, however, on which this unity was to be based, the antagonism
that had been fatal in 1849 still existed. The German National Union
(_Deutscher Nationalverein_), organized in the autumn of 1859, favoured
the exclusion of Austria and the establishment of a federation under the
hegemony of Prussia; it represented the views of the so-called
"Gothaer," the political heirs of the rump of the Frankfort parliament
which had reassembled at Gotha in June 1849, and supported the Prussian
Union and the Erfurt parliament. To counteract this, a conference of
five hundred "Great Germans" assembled at Frankfort and, on the 22nd of
October 1862, founded the German Reform Union (_Deutscher
Reformverein_), which, consisting mainly of South German elements,
supported the policy of Austria and the smaller states. The
constitutional crisis in Prussia, however, brought both societies into
line, and in 1863 the National Union united with the Reform Union in an
attempt to defeat Prussian policy in the Schleswig-Holstein question.
The "Furstentag" of Frankfort.
This anti-Prussian feeling Austria now tried to exploit for her own
advantage. On the 2nd of August the emperor Francis Joseph proposed to
King William, during a meeting at Gastein, to lay before an assembly of
the German princes a scheme for the reconstitution of the Bund. The king
neither accepted nor refused; but, without waiting for his assent,
invitations were sent out to the other princes, and on the 14th the
congress (_Furstentag_) opened at Frankfort. Of the German sovereign
states but four were unrepresented--Anhalt-Bernburg, Holstein, Lippe and
Prussia; but the absence of Prussia was felt to be fatal; the minor
princes existed by reason of the balance between the two great powers,
and objected as strongly to the exclusion of the one as of the other
from the Confederation; an invitation to King William was therefore
signed by all present and carried by the king of Saxony in person to
Berlin. Bismarck, however, threatened to resign if the king accepted;
and the congress had to do the best it could without Prussian
co-operation. On the 1st of September it passed, with some slight
modifications, the Austrian proposals for the reconstruction of the
_Bund_ under a supreme Directory, an assembly of delegates from the
various parliaments, a federal court of appeal and periodical
conferences of sovereigns. Everything now depended on the attitude of
Prussia, and on the 22nd her decision was received. "In any reform of
the _Bund_," it ran, "Prussia, equally with Austria, must have the right
of vetoing war; she must be admitted, in the matter of the presidency,
to absolute equality with Austria; and, finally, she will yield no
tittle of her rights save to a parliament representing the whole German
nation."
Prussia thus made a bid for the sympathy of the democracy at the same
time as she declared war against the dynasties; and her power was
revealed by the fact that her veto was sufficient to wreck a proposal
seconded by the all but unanimous vote of the German sovereigns. The
Austrian stroke had failed, and worse than failed, for Napoleon III.,
who had been filled with alarm at this attempt to create on his flank an
"empire of 70,000,000," saw in Prussia's attitude no more than a
determination to maintain for her own ends the division and weakness of
Germany; and this mistaken diagnosis of the situation determined his
attitude during the crisis that followed.
The Schleswig-Holstein question, 1863.
This crisis was due to the reopening of a fresh acute phase of the
Schleswig-Holstein question by the accession of the "protocol-king"
Christian IX. to the throne of Denmark (November 15, 1863), and his
adhesion to the new constitution, promulgated two days before, which
embodied the principle of the inalienable union of the Elbe duchies with
the Danish body politic. The news of this event caused vast excitement
in Germany; and the federal diet was supported by public opinion in its
decision to uphold the claims of Prince Frederick of Augustenburg to the
succession of the duchies. An agitation in his favour had already begun
in Holstein and, after the promulgation of the new Danish constitution,
this was extended to Schleswig. On the 24th of December Saxon and
Hanoverian troops occupied Holstein in the name of the German
Confederation, and supported by their presence and the favour of the
population the prince of Augustenburg, as Duke Frederick VIII., assumed
the government.
Austro-Prussian alliance.
From these proceedings Prussia and Austria held rigorously aloof. Both
had signed the protocol of 1852, and both realized that, if the European
powers were to be given no excuse to intervene, their attitude must be
scrupulously "correct"; and this involved the recognition of King
Christian's rights in the duchies. On the other hand, the constitution
of the 13th of November had been in flat contradiction to the protocol
of London, which recognized the separate rights of the duchies; and if
the two great German powers chose to make this violation of an agreement
to which they had been parties a _casus belli_, Europe would have no
right to interfere. Prussia had begun to mobilize in November; and
Austria also soon realized that action must speedily be taken if the
lesser German governments were not to be allowed to get out of hand.
Russia and Great Britain had already protested against the occupation of
Holstein and the support given to the Augustenburg claimant; and now
Beust, the Saxon minister, was proposing that the federal diet, which
had been no party to the protocol, should formally recognize his claim.
Bismarck, then, had no difficult task in persuading Austria that the
time for action had come. A last attempt of the two powers to carry the
diet with them in recognizing the protocol having failed, they formally
announced that they would act in the matter as independent European
powers. On the 16th of January 1864 the agreement between them was
signed, an article, drafted by Austria, intended to safeguard the
settlement of 1852, being replaced at the instance of Prussia by
another, which stated that the contracting powers would decide only in
concert upon the relations of the duchies, and that in no case would
they determine the succession save by mutual consent. A clause was also
inserted provisionally recognizing the principle of the integrity of
Denmark.
Danish War of 1864.
Whatever Austria's ulterior views may have been, Bismarck certainly from
the first had but one aim before him. He saw clearly what the possession
of the duchies would mean to Germany, their vast importance for the
future of German sea-power; already he had a vision of the great
war-harbour of Kiel and the canal connecting the Baltic and the North
seas; and he was determined that these should be, if not wholly
Prussian, at least wholly under Prussian control. Annexation was the
goal which from the beginning he kept steadily before his eyes
(_Reminiscences_, ii. 10). As for treaties to the contrary, he was to
avow in his _Reminiscences_ that these have little force when no longer
reinforced by the interests of the contracting parties. His main fear
was that the Danes might refuse to fight and appeal instead to a
European congress; and, to prevent this, he led the Copenhagen
government to believe that Great Britain had threatened to intervene in
the event of Prussia going to war, "though, as a matter of fact, England
did nothing of the kind." This sufficed to provoke the defiance of the
Danes, and on the 1st of February 1864 the Austrian and Prussian troops
crossed the Eider. The issue of a war between powers so ill-matched was
a foregone conclusion; the famous rampart of the Dannewerk (q.v.), on
which the Danish defence chiefly relied, was turned, and after a short
campaign, in which the Danes fought with distinguished courage, peace
was concluded by the treaty of Vienna (August 1, 1864), by which
Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg were ceded to Austria and Prussia
jointly.
Austria, Prussia and the Zollverein.
The Austro-Prussian alliance had been only an interlude in the great
drama in which the two powers were playing rival parts. To the other
causes of friction between them had been added, just before the war, a
renewed quarrel as to Austria's relation to the Zollverein. In 1862, in
the name of the customs union, Prussia had concluded with France a
commercial treaty, based mainly on free trade principles. This treaty
most of the small states refused to sign, and they were supported in
their objections by Austria, which loudly complained that Prussia had
given to a foreign power what she had denied to a sister state of the
_Bund_. Prussia, however, remained firm, and declared that, were the
treaty rejected, she would break up the Zollverein. After the war
Bismarck in fact succeeded in obtaining the signature of the smaller
states to the treaty; and Austria, her protests having proved
unavailing, was fain to sign a commercial treaty with the Zollverein,
essentially the same as that of 1853. Treaties concluded with Great
Britain and Belgium, about the same time, also tended to enhance
Prussian prestige.
Convention of Gastein.
Austria now sought in the question of the Elbe duchies an occasion for
re-establishing her influence in Germany. The ambitions of Prussia were
notorious, and Austria had no wish to see her rival still further
strengthened by the annexation of the duchies. In this attitude she was
sure of the support of the German princes, and of German public opinion,
which was enthusiastically in favour of the Augustenburg claimant. She
therefore took up the cause of Duke Frederick, and under her influence a
small majority of the federal diet decided to request the two powers to
invest him with the sovereignty of Holstein. Bismarck's reply was to
deny the competency of the diet to interfere; and in the Prussian
parliament the minister of war moved for a special grant for the
creation of a war-harbour at Kiel. Against this Austria protested, as
having the same right as Prussia to Kiel; an angry correspondence
followed; but neither power was quite prepared for war, and on the 20th
of August 1865 the convention of Gastein, to use Bismarck's phrase,
"papered over the cracks." Pending a settlement, Schleswig was to be
occupied and administered by Prussia, Holstein by Austria; while
Lauenburg was made over absolutely to Prussia in return for a money
payment. This was so far a diplomatic victory for Prussia, as it ignored
entirely the claims of the duke of Augustenburg.
Hostile attitude of France.
Bismarck had consented to the convention of Gastein in order to gain
time to prepare the ground for the supreme struggle with Austria for the
hegemony of Germany. He had no intention of postponing the issue long;
for the circumstances of the two powers were wholly favourable to
Prussia. The Prussian army had attained an unprecedented excellence of
organization and discipline; the Prussian people, in spite of the
parliamentary deadlock, were loyal and united; while in Austria army and
state were alike disorganized by nationalist discontent and the
breakdown of the centralized system. But there were other factors to be
considered. The attitude of Napoleon was dubious; the active alliance of
Italy was necessary to the certainty of Prussian success; and the policy
of Italy depended ultimately upon that of France. Lastly, the conscience
of King William, though since the acquisition of Lauenburg he had
"developed a taste for conquest," shrank from provoking war with a
German power. The news of the convention of Gastein, which seemed to
re-cement the union of Germany, had been received in France with
clamorous indignation; and on the 29th of August, under pressure of
public opinion, the French government issued a circular note denouncing
it as an outrage on national liberty and European law, the protest being
backed by note of the 14th of September circulated by Lord John Russell
on behalf of the British government. But Napoleon was himself little
inclined to use the warlike tone of his people; and Bismarck found it
easy to win him over to his views by explaining the temporary nature of
the convention, and by dropping hints at the famous interview at
Biarritz (September 30, 1865) of possible "compensations" to France in
the event of a Prussian victory over Austria; the probability of a
prolonged struggle in Germany between two powers apparently evenly
matched, moreover, held out to the French emperor the prospect of his
being able to intervene at the proper moment with overwhelming effect.
End of the Austro-Prussian understanding.
Napoleon having been successfully hoodwinked, Bismarck turned to Italy.
His previous advances had been interrupted by the Gastein convention,
which seemed to the Italian government a betrayal of the Italian cause.
Italy attempted to negotiate with Austria for the purchase of Venetia;
but the offer was curtly refused by the emperor Francis Joseph, and the
counter-proposal of a commercial _rapprochement_ was forestalled by
Prussia, which with the aid of most of the lesser states, angered by the
betrayal of their interests by Austria at Gastein, arranged a commercial
treaty between Italy and the Zollverein, an act which involved the
recognition of the Italian kingdom. The counter-stroke of Austria was to
embarrass Prussia by allowing full play in Holstein to the agitation in
favour of the Augustenburg claimant. To the protests of Prussia, Austria
replied that she had a full right to do what she liked in the duchy, and
that she still adhered to the declaration of the princes, made on the
28th of May 1864, in favour of Duke Frederick. This "perfidy" removed
the last scruples of King William; and the Austro-Prussian alliance came
to an end with the declaration of Bismarck that Prussia "must win full
freedom for her own entire policy" and his refusal to continue the
correspondence.
Prusso-Italian alliance.
War, though still postponed, was now certain; and with this certainty
the desire of the Italians for the Prussian alliance, now recommended by
Napoleon, revived. By the 16th of March 1866 the Austrian war
preparations were so far advanced that Count Mensdorff thought it safe
to send an ultimatum to Prussia and, at the same time, a circular note
to the princes declaring that, in the event of an evasive reply, Austria
would move in the diet for the mobilization of the federal forces. On
the 24th Bismarck in his turn issued a circular note stating that, in
view of the Austrian war preparations, Prussia must take measures for
her defence; at the same time he laid before the princes the outline of
the Prussian scheme for the reform of the Confederation, a scheme which
included a national parliament to be elected by universal suffrage, "as
offering surer guarantees for conservative action than limitations that
seek to determine the majority beforehand." Clearly Prussia meant war,
and the Italian government thought it safe to sign, on the 8th of April
1866, a treaty of alliance. By this instrument it was agreed that in
the event of her proposals for the reform of the federal constitution
being rejected by the German princes, Prussia should declare war "in
order to give effect to her proposals," and that, in that case, Italy
would also declare war against Austria. As a result of the war Venetia
was to be added to Italy and an equivalent amount of territory in North
Germany to Prussia. The agreement, however, was only to hold good if war
broke out within three months.