appropriately called the "Hoche," and eight frigates, under the command
of Commodore Bompart, sailed from Brest, carrying a second division
of three thousand troops. Though they escaped the eyes of Bridport's
vessels, if there were any in the neighborhood, by running through the
Passage du Raz, they were seen on September 17, the day after sailing,
by three British frigates; one of which, after ascertaining that the
French were really going to sea, went to England with the news, while
the others continued to dog the enemy, sending word to Ireland of the
approaching danger as opportunity offered. On the 4th of October, in
a gale of wind, the enemies separated, and the French commodore then
made the best of his way towards his destination, in Lough Swilly, at
the north end of Ireland; but the news had reached Plymouth on the 23d
of September, and when he drew near his port he found the way blocked
by three British ships-of-the-line and five frigates, which had sailed
at once for the insurgent district. An engagement followed, fought on
the 12th of October, under circumstances even more disadvantageous than
that of mere numbers, for the "Hoche" shortly before the action had
lost some of her most important spars. Of the little squadron, she and
three frigates were compelled to surrender that day, and three more
were intercepted later by British vessels, so that only two of the
expedition regained a French port. The enthusiastic and unfortunate
Irishman, Wolfe Tone, was on board the "Hoche" and wounded in the
action. He shortly afterwards committed suicide in prison. A third
French division had sailed from Rochefort on the very day the "Hoche"
was captured. It succeeded in reaching Ireland; but learning the fate
of Bompart's squadron, returned without landing the troops. This was
the last of the expeditions against Ireland that sailed from French
ports. Other interests and other rulers combined with the pronounced
naval ascendency of Great Britain to give a different direction to the
efforts of the republic.
END OF VOL. I.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Martin, Histoire de France, vol. xix. p. 370.
[2] Nineteenth Century Review, June, 1887, p. 922.
[3] Lord John Russell's Life of Fox, vol. ii. p. 137.
[4] Annual Register, vol. 27, p. 10.
[5] See Annual Register, 1769, pp. 2-4; 1770, pp. 27-41, 67, 71, 75.
[6] Annual Register, 1788, p. 59.
[7] King's Message, March 29, 1781.
[8] Fox's Speeches (London, 1815), vol. iv. p. 178.
[9] Parl. Hist., vol. xxix. pp. 75-79.
[10] Annual Register, 1791, p. 102.
[11] Annual Register, 1793; State Papers, p. 118.
[12] Annual Register, 1793; State Papers, pp. 127, 128.
[13] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la République, p. 49.
[14] Nap. to Decrès, Aug. 29, 1805.
[15] Troude, Batailles Nav., vol. iii. p. 370.
[16] Moniteur, Jan. 19, 1790, p. 82.
[17] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la République, p. 11.
[18] Ibid., p. 12.
[19] Guérin, Histoire de la Marine, vol. iii. p. 156 (1st ed.).
[20] Troude, Batailles Nav. de la France, vol. ii. p. 201.
[21] Guérin, Hist. Mar., vol. iii. p. 195 (1st ed.).
[22] Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. 2, p. 320.
[23] Guérin, vol. iii. p. 213.
[24] Guérin, vol. iii. p. 153.
[25] See Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la République, pp. 20-23.
[26] The decree of April 22 is in the Moniteur of the 23d. That of
the 28th is not; but it will be found in the "Collection Générale des
Décrets rendus par l'Ass. Nat." for April, 1791.
[27] The word _entretenu_, here rendered "paid," is difficult to
translate. The dictionary of the French Academy explains it to mean
an officer kept on pay, without necessarily being employed. Littré
says that an officer "non entretenu" is one not having a commission.
The word carries the idea of permanence. By the decree of April 28,
"enseignes non entretenus" had no pay nor military authority, except
when on military service; nor could they wear the uniform, except when
so employed.
[28] Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. ii. p. 260.
[29] Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. ii. pp. 261, 262.
[30] Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. ii. p. 397.
[31] Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. ii. p. 396.
[32] Guérin, Hist. de la Mar., vol. iii. p. 411 (note). (Ed. 1848.)
[33] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la Rép., p. 126.
[34] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la Rép., p. 126.
[35] Jurien de la Gravière, Guerres Mar., vol. i. p. 138 (1st ed.).
[36] Ibid., vol. i. p. 139 (1st ed.).
[37] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la Rép., pp. 51, 52.
[38] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la Rép., pp. 97-101.
[39] Chevalier, p. 42.
[40] Chevalier, Rép. p. 219.
[41] Tronde, Bat. Nav., vol. ii. p. 423.
[42] Letter of the Ordonnateur de la Marine, Najac; Jurien de la
Gravière, Guerres Mar. (4th ed. App.).
[43] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous le Consulat, p. 47.
[44] Ibid., p. 49.
[45] Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. iii. p. 337.
[46] La Gravière, Guerres Mar., p. 51.
[47] Chevalier, Rép., p. 132.
[48] See Chapter VI.
[49] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous le Consulat, p. 43.
[50] Collingwood's Correspondence, p. 48. (First American from fourth
London edition.)
[51] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. vi. p. 480.
[52] Collingwood's Correspondence, pp. 265, 266.
[53] Collingwood's Correspondence, p. 208.
[54] Brenton's Naval History, vol. i. p. 415. (Ed. 1823.)
[55] Brenton's Naval History, vol. i. p. 455.
[56] James' Nav. Hist. vol. i. p. 53 (ed. 1878). This system had been
adopted in France a century before by Colbert (Revue Mar. et Coloniale,
September, 1887, p. 567).
[57] Brenton's Nav. Hist., vol. ii. p. 105.
[58] James' Nav. Hist., vol. i. pp. 57, 58.
[59] Guerres Mar., vol. i. p. 49 (1st ed.).
[60] James, vol. i. p. 55.
[61] Guerres Mar., vol. i. p. 164 (note).
[62] Nels. Disp. i. 309-311.
[63] Nels. Disp., i. p. 312.
[64] Ibid., ii. pp. 70, 77, 241.
[65] Life of Sir Jahleel Brenton.
[66] James' Nav. Hist., vol. i. p. 54. (Ed. 1878).
[67] For example, that any captain surrendering to a force less than
double his own should suffer death; and if of a ship-of-the-line, to
any number of enemies unless the vessel was actually sinking. The same
fate awaited him who, in a fleet action, allowed the line to be broken.
So also the decree not to give quarter. See Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous
la Rép., p. 128; Guérin, Hist. de la Mar., vol. iii. p. 395.
[68] The Peninsular War, so brilliant in many of its features and in
the end so triumphantly successful, has some analogies to the smaller
expeditions here criticised, and may be thought to refute the remarks
in the text. The analogy, however, fails in some very decisive points.
The landing and base of operations at Lisbon were in the territory of
an ally of long standing; the projected advance was into a country in
general insurrection against foreign rule; above all, the position of
Lisbon and its distance from France imposed upon the French, in case
they advanced against it in great force as they did in 1810, a long and
very difficult line of communication, while the British had the sea
open. Toulon, in 1793, was disadvantageous to the British as compared
with Lisbon in 1809, because farther from England and in France. For
remarks on Peninsular War see note at end of this chapter.
[69] For the strategic discussion of the British naval dispositions on
the occasion of the Irish Expedition of 1796, see Chapter XI.
[70] Brenton's Life of St. Vincent, vol. i. p. 295.
[71] Of the thirty ships-of-the-line in Toulon when occupied by the
allies, three or four had been sent to Rochefort without guns, carrying
French prisoners whom it was inconvenient to keep.
[72] The author is keenly aware that this policy, of garrisoning
several somewhat separated ports, is seemingly inconsistent with
sound military principles as to concentration, as well as with what
he himself has elsewhere said about the proper dispositions for
maintaining military control of a maritime region. It is, therefore,
well to explain that those principles and dispositions apply where the
belligerent navies are so far equal as to create a real struggle. This
was not the case in the French Revolution. Great Britain had undisputed
naval supremacy in the West Indies, and the question before her was,
not to beat the enemy's fleet, but to secure her own commercial routes.
To this end it was necessary to disseminate, not concentrate her ships,
and to provide them with convenient centres of refuge and supply along
the routes. The case was analogous to the police arrangements of a
city. In ordinary quiet times the police are distributed to cope with
individual offenders; when a mob gathers and threatens the peace they
are concentrated in large bodies.
[73] Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. iv. p. 454.
[74] Ardouin, Études sur l'Hist. de Haïti, vol. iv. p. 45.
[75] Account of Jamaica, London, 1808, pp. 51, 52.
[76] Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. ii. p. 326.
[77] Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. ii. p. 327. James says May 6.
[78] See _ante_ p. 101.
[79] A ship is said to be hove-to when some of the sails are so
arranged as to move her ahead and others to force her astern,—the
result being that she remains nearly in the same spot, but drifts
slowly to leeward.
[80] Villaret had been joined on the 19th of May by a ship-of-the-line,
which had separated from Nielly's squadron; this raised his force from
twenty-five to twenty-six.
[81] A raking shot is one that passes from end to end, lengthwise, of a
ship, instead of across, from side to side. It not only ranges through
a greater space within, but attacks more vital parts, particularly
about the stern, where were the rudder and the more important officers
of a ship.
[82] Another advantage in engaging to leeward was that the lower-deck
batteries, which contained the heaviest guns, were so near the water
that a ship heeling over with a strong breeze could not always open
her lee ports. The lee ship of two opponents, using her weather guns,
would escape this inconvenience and have a proportionate advantage. On
the First of June the weather was too moderate to affect the use of the
lower-deck batteries; but on the 29th of May, the "Queen Charlotte,"
using her lee as well as her weather guns as she broke through the
French line, had the lower deck full of water. One of her officers,
Lieutenant (afterwards Admiral) Codrington, being knocked down by the
recoil of a gun and thrown to the lee side of the deck, could, when
leaning on his left arm, barely keep his head out of water. (Life of
Admiral Codrington.)
[83] A whimsical incident is told as occurring in this grim scene of
slaughter and destruction. "The 'Brunswick' had a large figurehead of
the Duke, with a laced hat on. The hat was struck off by a shot during
the battle. The crew of the ship sent a deputation to the quarter-deck
to request that Captain Harvey would be pleased to order his servant to
give them his laced cocked-hat to supply the loss. The captain, with
great good-humor, complied, and the carpenter nailed it on the Duke's
head, where it remained till the battle was finished." (Barrow's Life
of Howe.)
[84] Official narrative of the loss of the "Vengeur," by the survivors.
Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. ii. p. 355.
[85] The speech of Barrère in the National Convention was as follows:
"Imagine the 'Vengeur' ship-of-the-line pierced with cannon shot,
opening in all directions, and surrounded by English tigers and
leopards, a crew composed of wounded and dying men, battling against
the waves and the cannon. All at once the tumult of the action, the
fear of danger, the pain-stricken cries of the wounded cease; all mount
or are carried upon deck. Every flag, every pennant is hoisted. Cries
of 'Vive la République!' 'Vive la Liberté et la France!' are heard
on all sides; it is the touching and animated spectacle of a civic
festival, rather than the terrible moment of a shipwreck. For a moment
they must have thought upon their fate. But no, citizens, our brothers
thought no more upon that, they see only the English and their country.
They choose rather to be engulfed than to dishonor her by a surrender.
They hesitate not an instant. Their last prayers are for liberty and
for the Republic. They disappear."
[86] The French accounts state that he remained until eight P.M.,
during all which time he might have been attacked. The English on the
contrary say that the whole French fleet was out of sight by quarter
past six. The question is not material, for it is certain that Villaret
did remain for some time, and that he would not have been attacked had
he stayed longer.
[87] Life of Admiral (then Lieutenant) Codrington.
[88] Barrow's Life of Lord Howe, p 256. There are similar statements as
to the bearing of Howe and Curtis made by Admiral Codrington.
[89] At noon of June 1, by the "Queen Charlotte's" log-book, the island
of Ushant bore east one-half north, distant 429 miles.
[90] The carelessness with which naval affairs are too often described
by general historians may be illustrated by the account of this battle
given by one of the most distinguished. "Lord Howe gained so decisive
a success from the adoption of the same principles which gave victory
to Frederic at Leuthen, to Napoleon at Austerlitz, and to Wellington
at Salamanca, viz.: _to direct an overwhelming force against one half
of the enemy's force_, and making the attack obliquely, keeping the
weather gage of the enemy, to render it impossible for the ships to
leeward to work up to the assistance of those engaged. By this means
he reduced one half of the enemy's fleet to be the passive spectators
of the destruction of the other.... Had he succeeded _in penetrating
the line at all points_, or had his captains implicitly obeyed his
directions in that particular, and engaged the whole to leeward, he
would have brought twenty ships-of-the-line to Spithead." (Alison's
"History of Europe.") How an attack upon one half of the line is
consistent with penetrating the same line at all points does not
clearly appear; but the statement concerning Lord Howe's principle of
action on the 1st of June is absolutely contrary to all the facts,
although Alison had James's painstaking work before him and refers
to it frequently. His statement is that of Jomini's "Guerres de la
Révolution Française;" but the latter author writes only as a military
man, introduces naval matters merely incidentally, and was doubtless
misled in the scanty information attainable when he wrote.
[91] It is a curious coincidence, though not necessarily significant,
that the number of men hit in each of these ships was nearly the same.
The "Royal Sovereign" lost fifty-four, the "Queen" fifty-four, and the
"Glory" fifty-two.
[92] Brenton, in his naval history of Great Britain, tells an amusing
story of the captain of one of the ships a little to Howe's left, which
at once characterizes a type of officer and illustrates the above
remark. He was, Brenton says, so occupied with preserving his station
by the azimuth compass that he lost sight of his intended antagonist,
and in the smoke never found him.
[93] James, Nav. Hist., vol. i. p. 144. (Ed. 1878.)
[94] Troude says that he reached his station on the 21st of May. Bat.
Nav., vol. ii. p. 330.
[95] Many years later Admiral Villaret was governor of Martinique. When
that island was taken by the British in 1809, he went to England as
a passenger in a ship commanded by Capt. E. P. Brenton. This officer
in his naval history states that Villaret told him that Robespierre's
orders were to go to sea, and that, if the convoy fell into Howe's
hands, his head should answer for it. Therefore he avoided action
so long, and endeavored to draw Lord Howe out of the track of the
convoy. The loss of the ships taken was to him a matter of comparative
indifference. "While your admiral amused himself refitting them, I
saved my convoy, and I saved my head."
[96] Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. ii. p. 337. Chevalier, Hist. de la Mar.
Fran. sous la Rép., p. 144.
[97] Ross's Life of Saumarez, vol. i. p. 146.
[98] Page 140.
[99] Martin, Hist. de France depuis 1789, vol. ii. p 240.
[100] Nels. Disp., ii., p. 32.
[101] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la Rép. p. 216. Life of Adm.
Codrington, vol. i. pp. 36, 37.
[102] See _post_, Chap. VIII., Martin's actions with Hotham.
[103] Jomini, Guerres de la Rév., livre viii. p. 74.
[104] Jomini, Guerres de la Rév., livre ix. p. 341.
[105] L'horrible route de la Corniche sous le feu des cannonières
anglaises.—JOMINI, _Guerres de la Rév._, livre x. p. 62.
[106] Life of Lord Minto, vol. ii. p. 274.
[107] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la Rép., p. 174.
[108] Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p. 26.
[109] Mar. Fran. sous La Rép., p. 186.
[110] Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p. 50.
[111] See _ante_, p. 176.
[112] "We cannot get another mast this side of Gibraltar." (Nels Disp.,
May 4, 1795.)
[113] James, vol. i. p. 297. Nelson says six. (Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p
47.)
[114] Jomini, Guerres de la Rév., livre viii. p. 75.
[115] The effects were, however, very severely felt in France. (Corr.
de Nap., vol. i., pp. 65, 79, 95.)
[116] Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p. 84.
[117] The Austrian generals say, and true, they were brought on the
coast at the express desire of the English to co-operate with the
fleet, which fleet nor admiral they never saw.—_Nels. Disp._, vol. ii.
p. 213.
[118] Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p. 98a. See also p. 110.
[119] Nels. Disp., June 6, 1800.
[120] Ibid., vol. ii., p. 64.
[121] For Nelson's complaints about the force under his command, see
ibid., pp. 106-114.
[122] Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p. 118.
[123] Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p. 63.
[124] Commentaires de Nap., vol. i. p. 112.
[125] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la Rép. p. 251.
[126] Comment. de Nap., vol. i. p. 71.
[127] Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p. 128.
[128] Corr. de Nap., vol. i. p. 465.
[129] For O'Hara's characteristics, see life of Lord Minto, vol. ii.
pp. 190, 195.
[130] See Nelson's Disp., vol. ii. p. 258, note.
The letter of the Admiralty to Admiral Mann may possess some interest
as an example of the official correspondence of the day, as well as an
expression of disapprobation too profound for reproach:—
SIR,—I have received and communicated to my Lords Commissioners of the
Admiralty your letter to me of the 29th December, giving an account of
your proceedings and of the severe [several?] occurrences which have
taken place during your passage from Gibraltar, with the squadron under
your command; and I have their Lordships' commands to acquaint you that
they cannot but feel the greatest regret that you should have been
induced to return to England with the squadron under your orders, under
the circumstances in which you were placed.
I have their Lordships' further commands to acquaint you that orders
will be to sent to you, either by this or to-morrow's post, to strike
your flag and come on shore. I am, &c.,
EVAN NEPEAN,
_Secretary to the Admiralty_
Tucker's St. Vincent, vol. i. p. 216.
[131] Life of Lord Minto, vol. ii. p. 358.
[132] This was Jervis's opinion. (See Life of St. Vincent by Tucker,
vol. i. p. 240; also Nelson's Dispatches, vol. ii. p. 294.)
[133] Napoleon's Correspondence, vol. ii. p. 76. See also generally
pp. 73-80. The relief obtained by Bonaparte from the departure of the
British crops out on every page.
[134] Life of Lord Minto, vol. ii. p. 373.
[135] The project of forcing the entrance to the Tagus by a squadron
from Brest had been openly discussed in France. (Chevalier, Mar. Fran.
sous la République, p. 258.)
[136] An exciting incident occurred during this chase. In the height
of it a man fell overboard. A boat was lowered and picked him up; but
the enemy's ships were so close it became doubtful whether the British
frigate could afford to await her return. Nelson, always generous to
the verge of rashness, backed a topsail, saying "I won't let Hardy go,"
and succeeded in carrying him off. The anecdote gains in interest when
it is remembered that Hardy, who was taken in the prize of December
20, had just been released from Spain; and that, as captain of the
flag-ship at Trafalgar, he was witness of Nelson's fall and death-scene.
[137] The distinguishing flag which shows a commodore is on board the
ship.
[138] A favorite project with the Directory, as with Napoleon, was to
mass the French and Spanish navies in one great body; as had several
times been done under Louis XVI. during the American Revolution. Such
a combination was hoped for the Irish expedition of 1796; and, though
too late for that purpose, the movement from Cartagena to Cadiz was
regarded by the Directory as a step toward uniting the fleets. This was
one of the objects of Bruix's adventurous sortie from Brest in 1799,
when he actually brought back to that port in his train fifteen Spanish
ships,—nominal allies, actual hostages. The combination at Trafalgar is
well known. Later on the Emperor sought to build up a patch-work fleet
out of all the minor navies of the Continent, as he pieced together
out of all the nations the immense army which was swallowed up in his
Russian enterprise. But here, as usually, a homogeneous body, centrally
placed, triumphed over an incongruous coalition.
[139] The stringent exactions of the close-hauled line-of-battle
imposed upon a fleet, in the presence of an enemy, the tactical
necessity of rectifying the order with any considerable change of
wind,—an evolution whose difficulty increased in direct proportion to
the number of the ships; and in a more than geometrical progression,
when they were badly drilled.
[140] Tucker's Life of St. Vincent, vol. i. p. 255.
[141] James's Nav. Hist., vol ii. p. 37.
[142] Nelson's Narrative. Dispatches, vol. ii. pp. 340, 343.
[143] James states that these ships first came to the wind on the
starboard tack, heading as did the British, "as if intending to weather
the whole British fleet." The superior speed and weatherliness of the
Spanish ships, if well handled, might have enabled them very seriously
to molest the British in their attack; but, from the whole conduct
of the Spaniards on this day, it is probable that the movement, if
made, was only one of the successive vacillations of men who had put
themselves in a false position. (Vol. ii. p. 39.)
[144] Notably in Keppel's action in 1778, in which he bore a
distinguished part. See Mahan's Influence of Sea Power upon History,
1660-1783, p. 351.
[145] "When the 'Prince George' tacked, the two three-deckers [of
the Spanish lee division] tacked after us, and which the rest of the
enemy's rear were about to do; but the commander-in-chief, with the
ships of [our] centre and rear, following close, _covered us from their
attack upon the rear of the ships with me_, and obliged them to re-tack
... and effectually divided the enemy's fleet." (Sir William Parker's
narrative of the conduct of the British van. Nelson's Dispatches, vol.
ii. p. 473.) The gallant admiral's style is confused, but his meaning
is clear enough after half a dozen readings. He must not be taken
for the very distinguished officer of the same name, but of the next
generation.
Both Parker and Nelson (Dispatches, vol. ii. pp. 340, 344) speak of
the main Spanish division as "the van." In truth, when the "Culloden"
interposed, the whole enemy's fleet were so nearly joined on the port
tack as to seem in line, though disorderly and not quite connected.
[146] Nelson's Narrative, Dispatches, vol. ii. pp. 341, 345.
[147] Annual Register, 1797, p. 148.
[148] Life of Lord Minto, vol. ii. p. 379.
[149] See Chapter X.
[150] For a striking incident of St. Vincent's energy in suppressing
mutiny, see note at end of this chapter.
[151] April 19, 1797. Napoleon's Correspondence, vol. ii. p. 655.
[152] Napoleon's Correspondence, vol. iii. p. 346.
[153] Martin, Hist. de France depuis 1789, vol. ii. p. 479.
[154] Corr. de Nap., vol. ii. p. 590.
[155] See page 235.
[156] Corr. de Nap., vol. ii. p. 622.
[157] Ibid., vol. iii. p. 21.
[158] Ibid., vol. iii. p. 73.
[159] Ibid., p. 89.
[160] Corr. de Nap., May 26, 1797, vol. ii. pp. 86, 87.
[161] Ibid., Sept. 13, 1797, vol. ii. p. 392.
[162] Ibid., Aug. 16, 1797, vol. ii. p. 311.
[163] Bonaparte to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Corr., vol. iii. p. 392.
[164] Corr. de Nap., vol. iii. p. 313.
[165] "Upon reaching Venice, Commodore, you will call, in company with
the commanding general and the Minister of France, on the provisional
government. You will tell them that the conformity of principles
existing between the French and Venetian republics, and the protection
granted by us to them, exact the prompt equipment of their navy, in
order to concert with us, to maintain the mastery of the Adriatic
and the islands; that for this purpose I have sent troops to Corfu,
to preserve it to the Venetian Republic; and that henceforth it is
necessary to work actively to put their navy in good condition.
"You will get possession of everything under this pretext; having
continually on your tongue the unity of the two republics, and using
always the name of the Venetian Navy.... It is my intention to seize
for the (French) Republic all the Venetian ships, and all the stores
possible for Toulon." To Commodore Perrée, June 13, 1797.—_Napoleon's
Correspondence_, vol. iii. p. 155. See also instructions to Admiral
Brueys, ibid., p. 291.
[166] Corr. de Nap., vol. iii. pp. 519, 520.
[167] Corr. de Nap., vol. iii. p. 597.
[168] Ibid., vol. iii. p. 609 (Dec. 14, 1797).
[169] Ibid., p. 644 (Feb. 23, 1798).
[170] Corr. de Nap., vol. iii. p. 643.
[171] Jurien de la Gravière, Guerres Maritimes (4th ed.), vol. i. p.
350.
[172] So moderate a man as Collingwood wrote (Jan. 26, 1798): "The
question is not merely who shall be conqueror, ... but whether we shall
be any longer a people,—whether Britain is still to be enrolled in the
list of European nations."—_Collingwood's Memoirs._
[173] See Correspondence of Brueys with Bonaparte; Jurien de la
Gravière, Guerres Maritimes (Appendix, 4th ed.).
[174] "There are fitting out at Brest but ten ships-of-the-line, which
have no crews, and are still far from being in condition to keep the
sea.... The expedition against England would appear not to be possible
before next year." (Corr. de Nap., vol. iii. p. 644, Feb. 23, 1798.)
The British Channel fleet at this time numbered forty-seven of the
line, exclusive of sixteen in the North Sea.
[175] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 35.
[176] Marmont attributes the approach to Candia to a wish to give the
shelter of the island to the numerous coasters in the convoy. (Mémoires
du Duc de Raguse, vol. i. p. 362.)
[177] Bonaparte in his preparations laid special stress on having
enough small vessels. "It is indispensable to have with the squadron
the greatest attainable number of corvettes and despatch vessels. Send
orders to all the ports for all such to join the fleet."—_Corr. de
Nap._, vol. iv. pp. 79, 80.
[178] This statement is based on the plate in the "Commentaires de
Napoléon," vol. ii. p. 190. There are evident inaccuracies in the
British positions there given (_e.g._, for June 22, and in the approach
to Alexandria); but that of the 25th seems probable. James states that
on the night of June 22 the tracks of the two fleets crossed, but at
a sufficient interval of time to prevent a meeting,—the more so as a
constant haze prevailed. (Nav. Hist., vol. ii. p. 177.)
[179] Narrative in Naval Chronicle, vol. i. p. 48.
[180] Corr. de Nap., vol. iv. pp. 275-277.
[181] In a chart of the old port of Alexandria, made in 1802 by Major
Bryce of the Royal Engineers, attached to Abercromby's expedition, it
is said that not less than five fathoms will be found throughout the
middle passage. The directions add that heavy ships cannot get out
unless with good weather for warping. This was Brueys's great objection
to entering, and it was well taken; but the alternative of destruction
was worse.
[182] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 128.
[183] See Coast Map, Alexandria to Rosetta, and Plan of the Battle of
the Nile.
[184] Chevalier, Mar. Fran, sous la République, p. 365.
[185] A spring is a rope taken from the stern of a ship at anchor and
fastened either to the riding cable or to an anchor suitably placed, so
as to turn the broadside in the direction wished. Owing to the boats
being away to get water when Nelson appeared, to the failure of many
of them to return, and to the rapidity with which the attack was made,
these precautions were not carried out.
[186] Mahan's "Influence of Sea-Power upon History," pp. 469-478.
Plates XVIII. and XIX.
[187] Letter of DeGrasse to Kerguelen, Jan. 8, 1783. Hood "ranged his
vessels in very close order (_très-serrés_), and it was impossible
to pass between the land and them, as I wished."—_Kerguelen's Guerre
Maritime de 1778_, p. 259.
[188] Letter of Brueys to Bonaparte, July 13, 1798; La Gravière,
Guerres Maritimes, vol. i. p. 367. This is a somewhat singular example
of following a rule, the principle of which is not grasped. The rear of
a column of sailing ships under way was the weaker end, because less
easily helped by the van; but in a column of ships at anchor, head to
wind, the weather ships were incomparably more exposed, the lee having
a very hard pull to get up to them.
[189] Narrative of Sir Edward Berry. See Naval Chronicle, vol. i. p. 52.
[190] James, ii. p. 177. The Vanguard's Journal, quoted by Sir Harris
Nicolas, Nelson's Disp. vol. iii. p. 49, says 4 P. M.
[191] The ships-of-the-line needed nearly five fathoms in smooth water,
more if there was much sea.
[192] James's Naval History, vol. ii. p. 184 (ed. 1878). In the main,
the author has followed James in the details of this and other battles,
though not without careful comparison with other sources of information
accessible to him.
[193] Until after the middle of this century there were in the British
navy three flags of the same general design, but with red, white, and
blue grounds. Admirals were divided into three classes, of the Red,
the White, and the Blue; and, according to their classification, ships
under their immediate command showed the corresponding ensign. Nelson
being at this time a rear-admiral of the Blue, his ships would usually
carry the blue flag, almost invisible at night.
At the present day all British naval vessels wear the white flag, and
merchant ships the red.
[194] The first attack of the thirteen British ships (counting among
them the "Leander," fifty,) was confined to the eight head ships of
the French line, down to and including the "Tonnant." As these were
one by one crushed, the British dropped down and engaged those in the
rear,—but with a vigor necessarily diminished by the injuries they
had themselves received, not to speak of the physical fatigue induced
by the labor and excitement of the previous hours. Nevertheless the
"Mercure," when she hauled down her flag, had lost one hundred and
five killed and one hundred and forty-eight wounded, and had but six
guns that could be used. The loss of the "Heureux" is not stated, but
she had nine feet of water in her hold. (Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la
Rép., pp. 376, 377.)
[195] Jurien de la Gravière, Guerres Maritimes, vol. i. pp. 228-230;
Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la République, pp 386-388. A letter from
Villeneuve, justifying his inaction, is to be found in the former work,
p. 231, and in Troude, Batailles Navales, vol. iii. p. 121.
[196] Corr. de Nap., vol. iv. p. 520.
[197] The two that escaped were captured by Lord Nelson's squadron
before July, 1800, when he resigned the Mediterranean command.
[198] Chevalier, p. 381.
[199] Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 10.
[200] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 84.
[201] For this discussion see Nelson's Dispatches and Letters, vol.
iii. pp. 62-65; also App. p. 474.
[202] Ross's Life of Saumarez, vol. i. p. 228.
[203] Nelson's Disp., vol. iii.; Appendix, p. 474. Letter of Admiral
Browne.
[204] The American novelist and naval historian, Fenimore Cooper, in
the preface to the "Two Admirals," has attributed the whole tactical
combination to the captains, on the authority of Captain Ball of the
"Alexander," speaking to the late Commodore Morris of the United
States Navy, who in turn was Cooper's informant. This constitutes a
perfectly respectable oral tradition, coming through intelligent men of
unquestioned integrity; but when opposed to the contemporary written
statement of Captain Berry, Nelson's flag-captain, who had the fullest
opportunity of knowing the facts, it becomes impossible to doubt that
somewhere in the chain of witnesses there has been a misunderstanding.
That Captain Foley conceived on the moment the plan he executed is
perfectly credible; but that the whole body of captains were inspired
to carry out, as by mutual consent, a combination of which there
had been no previous mention, is a marvel of which Berry's account
of Nelson's constant discussions and explanations with his officers
effectually disposes. (See Narrative of an Officer of Rank, etc. Naval
Chronicle, vol. i. p. 52.)
[205] Marine Fran. sous la République, p. 381.
[206] Commentaires de Napoléon, vol. ii p. 350.
[207] "Good gunners would assuredly have modified the issue of these
sinister dramas, for they would have crushed the English fleet at the
first act." (Jurien de la Gravière, Guerres Mar., vol. ii. p. 225, 1st
ed.). "If Nelson had led in upon an American fleet, as he did upon the
French at the Nile, he would have seen reason to repent the boldness of
the experiment." (Cooper, preface to "The Two Admirals.")
[208] Annual Register, 1798; State Papers, pp. 267-272.
[209] Martin, Histoire de France depuis 1789, vol. iii. p. 6.
[210] Martin, Hist. de France depuis 1789, vol. iii. p. 9.
[211] Ibid., p. 11.
[212] Martin, Hist. de France depuis 1789, vol. iii. p. 16.
[213] Martin, Hist. de France depuis 1789, vol. iii. p. 24.
[214] See _post_, Chapter XVII.
[215] Annual Register, 1798; State Papers, p. 237.
[216] Ibid. Martin, Hist. de France, vol. iii. p. 23.
[217] Corr. de Nap., vol. iv. pp. 226, 233.
[218] Annual Register, 1798; State Papers, p. 276.
[219] Martin, Hist. de France, vol. iii. p. 27.
[220] Ibid. pp. 24, 25.
[221] Jurien de la Gravière, Guerres Maritimes, vol. i. p. 229 (1st
ed.).
[222] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 105.
[223] This division consisted of the "Vanguard," flag-ship, which had
not had proper lower masts since she was dismasted immediately after
entering the Mediterranean (p. 256); the "Culloden," that had beaten
heavily on Aboukir reef for seven hours during the battle; and the
"Alexander," both masts and hull in very bad order.
[224] Corr. de Nap., vol. iv. p. 660.
[225] Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 160.
[226] Ibid., p. 204.
[227] Commentaires de Napoléon, vol. iii. pp. 19, 20.
[228] Of all obstacles that can cover the frontiers of an empire, a
desert like that of Suez is indisputably the greatest. It is easy to
understand that a fort at El Arish, which would prevent an enemy from
using the wells and encamping under the palm-trees, would be very
valuable.—_Commentaires de Napoléon_, vol. iii. p. 16.
[229] For a graphic account of the anxieties of the French officers in
Toulon, illustrated by letters, see Jurien de la Gravière's Guerres
Maritimes (4th edition), pp. 352-362. (Appendix.)
[230] Corr. de Nap., vol. v. p. 276.
[231] Ibid., vol. iv., Letter to Directory, Sept. 8, 1798 (postscript).
[232] Corr. de Nap., vol. v. pp. 385, 391, 392. It is interesting to
note that by this mail Bonaparte seems first to have heard the word
"conscript," applied to the system of which he later made such an
insatiable use (p. 387).
[233] Instructions pour le citoyen Beauchamp, Corr. de Nap., vol. v.
pp. 260-263.
[234] Commentaires de Napoléon, vol. iii. p. 24.
[235] The roadstead of Aboukir is not safe in winter. It can protect a
squadron during the summer. (Commentaires de Nap., vol. ii. p. 235.)
In Abercromby's expedition, 1801, "all the pilots accustomed to the
Egyptian coast declared that till after the equinox it would be madness
to attempt a landing." (Sir R. Wilson's History of British Expedition
to Egypt, 2d edition, p. 6.) The fleet then lay in Aboukir Bay from
March 2 to March 8, before landing could be made.
[236] Corr. de Nap., vol. v. p. 402, where the reasons for the Syrian
expedition are given categorically, and can probably be depended upon
as truthful.
[237] Barrow's Life of Sir Sidney Smith, vol. i. p. 244.
[238] The opinion of a French officer may be worth quoting. "Although
every one knows what he is, I will nevertheless say a word about
Sir Sidney Smith. He has something at once of the knight and of the
charlatan. A man of intelligence, yet bordering upon insanity, with
the ability of a leader, he has thought to honor his career by often
running absurd risks, without any useful end, but only to be talked
about. Every one ridicules him, and justly; for in the long run he is
wearisome, though very original." (Mémoires du Duc de Raguse (Marmont),
vol. ii. p. 30.)
[239] The melodramatic painting of Sir Sidney Smith in the breach at
Acre represents graphically the popular impression of his character.
See frontispiece to Barrow's Life of Sir Sidney Smith.
[240] Smith escaped from Paris on the 25th of April; Bonaparte left
Paris May 2; Nelson sailed from Cadiz on his great mission May 2,—a
very singular triple coincidence.
[241] Brenton's Life of Lord St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 6; Barrow's Life
of Sir Sidney Smith, vol. i. p. 236.
[242] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 216. The Admiralty, upon
remonstrance, emphatically denied any such purpose. (Ibid., p. 335.)
[243] For Nelson's attitude until he received orders (Feb. 1, 1799)
from St. Vincent to take Smith under his orders, see Dispatches, vol.
iii. pp. 223, 224.
[244] Nels. Disp., vol. iii. pp. 204, 205.
[245] Mémoires de Bourrienne, vol. ii. pp. 243-245.
[246] "The siege of Acre lasted sixty-two days. There were two periods.
The first from March 19 to April 25, thirty-six days, during which
the artillery of the besiegers consisted of two carronades, 32 and 24
pound, taken from British boats, and thirty-six field guns. The second
period was from April 25 to May 21, twenty-six days." (Commentaires de
Napoléon, vol. iii., p. 63.) "During the latter period the park was
increased by two 24-, and four 18-pounders." (Ibid, p. 82.)
[247] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 351.
[248] Corr. de Nap., June 26, 1799, vol. v. p. 617.
[249] Commentaires de Napoléon, vol. iii. pp. 81, 82. It is only fair
to say that an attempt was made by Perrée a few weeks later to land
ammunition back of Mt. Carmel, when he was discovered and chased off.
(Barrow's Life of Sir Sidney Smith, vol. i. p. 300.) Napoleon may have
confused the two circumstances. His own correspondence (vol. v., pp.
517, 518) contradicts the landing near Acre. The guns were put on shore
at Jaffa and thence dragged to Acre.
[250] Schomberg's Naval Chronology. Appendix No. 374.
[251] Ibid. Appendix No. 376.
[252] See map of Brest in next chapter.
[253] Naval Chronicle, vol. i. p. 537.
[254] Ibid., p. 539.
[255] Ibid., vol. ii. p. 81. Osler's Life of Lord Exmouth, p. 191.
[256] Brenton's Life of St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 17.
[257] "Admiral Bruix, being able to rely more on the devotion of his
captains than upon their exactitude and precision in manœuvring, took
pains before sailing to lay down the duties of a captain under all
circumstances; carefully refraining, however, from making a special
application of these lessons to any one individual, that their
self-love might not be wounded. This wise precaution did not prevent
new mistakes, whose consequences would have been much aggravated had
we been obliged, by meeting the enemy, to manœuvre either to avoid
or compel action." (Journal of Captain Moras, special aide-de-camp
to Admiral Bruix. La Gravière, Guerres Maritimes, vol. i. p. 373.
Appendix, 4th edition.)
The gunnery, apparently, was equally bad. "I will cite only one fact to
give an idea of the effects of our artillery. When Admiral Bruix was
bringing to Brest the French and Spanish fleets, at least nine hundred
guns were fired in very fine weather at an Algerian corsair without
doing any harm. I do not believe that ever, in a combat of that kind,
was so much useless firing done." (Article by "an officer of marine
artillery;" Moniteur, 3 Fructidor, An 8 [Aug. 20, 1800].)
[258] Two months later Lord Keith, having succeeded St. Vincent in the
command, wrote to Nelson: "If Minorca is left without ships it will
fall." (Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 415, note.)
[259] Bruix did not have over a thousand troops with him, the pressure
on the land frontiers by the Second Coalition demanding all the force
that could be raised to resist it; but the fleet carried twenty-four
thousand seamen or artillerists, a force capable by itself of
accomplishing much. The reputation of the admiral caused both officers
and men to flock to his flag.
[260] "Port Mahon is a very narrow harbor, from which you cannot get
out without great difficulty." (Collingwood's letters, August 18,
1799.) "Ships had better be under sail off Port Mahon than in the
harbor." (Nelson's Dispatches, May 12, 1799.)
[261] Brenton's St. Vincent, vol. i. p. 493.
[262] "I had the happiness to command a band of brothers." (Nelson's
Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 230) The best of his Nile captains were, for
the most part, still with him.
[263] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. pp. 366, 374.
[264] See ante, p. 306.
[265] Jurien de la Gravière, Guerres Maritimes, vol. i. p. 288 (4th
edition); also James, Naval History, vol. ii. p. 264 (edition 1847).
Other authorities say the 8th. The reconcilement seems to be that Bruix
did not take his fleet to Genoa, but only a detachment; the main body
anchoring in Vado Bay. He would thus leave Genoa the 6th, Vado the 8th.
[266] "We avoided the enemy by skirting very close, and under cover
of foggy weather, the coasts of Piedmont and Provence." (Journal of
Captain Moras, special aid to Bruix. La Gravière, Guerres Maritimes,
vol. i. p. 376. Appendix, 4th edition.)
[267] "In our passage before Toulon we learned the vexatious accidents
which had happened to the Spanish fleet, and went to rejoin them at
Cartagena." (Ibid. Also James, Nav. Hist., vol. ii. p. 264.)
[268] The British fleet was sighted off St. Tropez (Troude, vol. iii.
p. 158); and fired upon by coast batteries near Antibes on June 6th.
(James, Nav. Hist. vol. ii. p. 262).
[269] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 379, note. This east wind seems
to have been overlooked in the criticisms of Keith's conduct.
[270] Cape delle Melle bore, on the 8th, N. N. E., distant ninety
miles. James, Nav. Hist., vol. ii. p. 262.
[271] Lord Keith's biographer (Allardyce) says he determined "to take
Minorca on his way to Rosas" (p. 165); which was certainly a liberal
construction, though not beyond the discretion of an officer in Keith's
position. To take Minorca on his way to Rosas, from his position on
the 8th, was to go two hundred miles to the former and one hundred and
fifty more to Rosas, when the latter at the moment was not two hundred
distant. He was a few miles nearer Rosas than Minorca, when he took the
decision which finally wrecked the cruise.
[272] Brenton's Life of St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 24.
[273] It was during this time that Perrée's squadron was captured. See
ante, p. 301.
[274] Mutineers belonging to the "Impétueux," one of the division, were
tried by court martial in Port Mahon, June 19 and 20. (Osler's Life of
Lord Exmouth, p. 192. Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 415, note.)
[275] James, Nav. Hist., vol. ii. p. 265 (edition 1847). Nels. Disp.,
vol. iii p. 415 note.
[276] Brenton's Life of St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 25.
[277] Histoire de la Révolution, vol. x. p. 392, note.
[278] Nels. Disp., July 4, 1803, vol. v. p. 116.
[279] Mar. Fran, sous la Rép. p. 415.
[280] Ten or twelve British, four or five Portuguese; the former
exceptionally well-ordered ships. (Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 365.)
[281] Nels. Disp., vol. vii. p. 16.
[282] To this must be added that, from conditions of wind and weather,
Malta was very far from Toulon, much farther than Toulon from Malta.
Of this Nelson complained often and bitterly in the later war, when
commander-in-chief off Toulon. Malta was valuable, he said (Disp., vol.
v. p. 107), as a most important outwork to India and for influence in
the Levant; valueless against Toulon.
[283] This is plain from his letter of June 6 to Nelson. (Ante,
p. 313.) Keith's failure is usually attributed to St. Vincent's
dispatches, received June 8; whereas the letter shows that he had
decided to return to Minorca two days before receiving them.
[284] Nels. Disp., vol. iii. pp. 408 and 414, with notes.
[285] Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 380.
[286] Keith to Nelson, July 12, 1799; Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 419,
note.
[287] The larger number is the estimate in Napoleon's Commentaries,
which ordinarily exaggerate the enemy's forces. (Vol. iii. p. 107.)
[288] Corr. de Nap., vol. v. p. 710.
[289] Commentaires de Napoléon, vol. iii. p. 89.
[290] Corr. de Nap., vol. v. p. 56.
[291] Ibid., p. 403 (Feb. 10, 1799).
[292] See ante, p. 291.
[293] Mém. de Bourrienne, vol. ii. p. 238.
[294] Ibid., p. 305.
[295] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous le Consulat, etc., p. 16.
[296] Nels. Disp. vol iv. p. 219, note.
[297] Naval Chronicle, vol. iii. p. 149.
[298] Napoleon's Commentaries give Sept. 26, 1799, as the date of this
letter,—only a month after Bonaparte sailed. (Vol. iii. p. 183.)
[299] Nels. Disp. vol. iii. p. 296.
[300] June 28, 1799. Corr. de Nap. vol. v. p. 622.
[301] At the same time he made requisitions for clothing for double
the number of men actually in Egypt, notifying the officers concerned
that he did so to deceive Europe as to the strength of the army. Corr.
de Nap. vol. v. p. 721. This has a significant bearing on the charges,
made by him against Kleber, of exaggerating his weakness.
[302] Annual Register, 1800; State Papers, p. 225. It may be added the
commissioners first met on board Smith's ship.
[303] For the convention of El Arish, see Annual Register, 1800, State
Papers, p. 217.
[304] Allardyce's Life of Lord Keith, pp. 226, 227.
[305] "At the theatre last night I had a conversation with General
Kilmaine [commanding the division intended to send into Ireland]. He
told me ... the arsenals at Brest are empty; and what stores they
have in other ports they cannot convey thither, from the superiority
of the naval force of the enemy, which kept everything blocked up."
(Wolf Tone's Journal, June 16, 1798.) In 1801 "the port of Brest lacked
provisions. The difficulty of getting the convoys into it decided the
First Consul to break up the fleet there and send part to Rochefort....
The Spanish admiral (who had come there with Bruix in 1799) was invited
to escort the division. To equip the necessary ships, this officer had
to give them equipments taken from the others of his squadron, and
could obtain provisions only for seventeen days. Baffled by the winds
and by the constant presence of the enemy, the ships did not sail." A
combined expedition against the Cape of Good Hope failed for the same
reason. "The blockade of the Dutch ports was no less rigorous than
that of the coast of France." "At Brest, they lived from day to day.
Villaret Joyeuse was ordered to go out with ten French and ten Spanish
ships to support the entry of convoys. He did not go, and received
another mission." (Troude, Batailles Navales, vol. iii. p. 222.)
[306] Nelson's Disp., vol. v. pp 300, 306, 411, 498.
[307] See ante, p. 212.
[308] There is between Ushant and the reefs a narrow passage,
practicable for ships-of-the-line, which was surveyed under Lord St.
Vincent; but it could only be used with pilots, and was rather a
convenience than an important feature.
[309] In the English Channel and the neighboring western coasts of
Europe, winds from S.W. to N.W. prevail during three fourths of the
days of the year, and are often exceedingly violent.
[310] See "Twelve letters to the Rt. Hon. Spencer Perceval," by Capt.
James Manderson, 1812; in which it is also said that Mr. Pitt was
towards the end of his life much impressed with the advantages of
Falmouth's position. To this opinion is probably due the following
statement in a magazine of the day, during Pitt's short second
administration: "It is now (Feb. 1805) determined that the Channel
fleet shall in future rendezvous at Falmouth, and moorings are
immediately to be laid down for fifteen sail-of-the-line." (Nav.
Chron., vol. xiii. p. 328.) Lord Exmouth seems to have shared this
opinion. (Life, p. 140.) While Falmouth was by position admirably
suited for a rendezvous, ships running for refuge to Torbay would have
the wind three points more free, an advantage seamen will appreciate.
[311] With the wind to the southward of south-east we know full well
that no ship-of-the-line can get out of Brest.—_Letter of St. Vincent_;
Tucker's Life, vol. ii. p. 119.
[312] Tucker's Life of Earl St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 14.
[313] See ante, p. 220.
[314] See ante, pp. 202, 214.
[315] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la Rép., p. 265.
[316] Rousselin's "Vie de Hoche," quoted by Troude, Bat. Nav., vol.
iii. p. 6.
[317] Before Rochefort.
[318] See map of Brest, p. 343.
[319] In performing this audacious service Pellew was somewhat favored
by the fact that his ship was a French prize, easily mistaken for one
of the expedition. He kept close, often within half gun-shot of the
leading ship.
[320] The greater part of the "Séduisant's" crew was saved.
[321] "Fog so thick we cannot see a ship's length. Has been foggy all
day." (Wolfe Tone's Journal, Dec. 18.) "The state of the weather was
such that it was impossible for Admiral Colpoys to keep his own fleet
under observation, and the air so hazy that fog guns had continually to
be fired." (Parliamentary Hist. xxxiii, p. 12. March 3, 1797.)
[322] Wolfe Tone's Journal, Dec. 21, 1796.
[323] James Nav. Hist. vol. ii. p. 7. Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la
Rép. p. 281.
[324] Bouvet was broken without trial by the Directory on the 15th of
February, 1797, and was not restored to the navy until 1801, under the
Consulate. Captain Chevalier's judgment is that "he despaired too soon
of the success of the expedition, ... and forgot that he should have
been inspired only by the great interests entrusted by accident to his
hands." (Mar. Fran. sous la Rép., pp. 309, 311.)
[325] Chevalier. James makes the number captured to be seven.
[326] See ante, p 306.
[327] See post, Chap. XVI.
[328] Parliamentary History, vol. xxxiii. pp. 113, 116. Wolfe Tone
states that there were on board the ships of the expedition 41,160
muskets. (Journal, Dec. 22, 1796.)
[329] Dundas's Speech, Mar. 3, 1797, Parl. Hist. vol. xxxiii. p. 12.
[330] Ibid., vol. xxxiii. 13.
[331] Ibid., vol. xxxiii. pp. 109, 111.
[332] Speech of Lord Albemarle, ibid., p. 109.
[333] Speech of Earl Spencer, First Lord of Admiralty, ibid., p. 111.
[334] Dundas, Parl. Hist. vol. xxxiii. p. 13.
[335] James's Nav. Hist., vol. ii. p. 21.
[336] Of fifteen ships four were of ninety-eight guns or over.
(Schomberg's Nav. Chronology, vol. iv. p. 525.)
[337] James, vol. ii. p. 20.
[338] James's Nav. Hist., vol. ii. pp. 20, 22.
[339] Earl Spencer's Speech, Parl. Hist., vol. xxxiii. p. 115.
[340] Tucker's Life of Earl St. Vincent, vol. ii. pp. 10 and 70; the
latter reference being to a letter from St. Vincent to the First Lord
of the Admiralty. The incident occurred on board Bridport's flag ship,
the "Royal George."
[341] Tucker's Life of Earl St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 58.
[342] Ibid., vol. ii. p. 13.
[343] Ibid., p. 114.
[344] Ibid., p. 24.
[345] Tucker's St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 114.
[346] Ibid., p. 80.
[347] Ibid., p. 78.
[348] See Nelson's letter to Earl St. Vincent, Feb. 1, 1800. (Nelson's
Dispatches.)
[349] Tucker, vol. ii. p. 121. Modern ships, so much more complex, are
much more liable to derangement than those of St. Vincent; and, unless
such pains as his are taken to make them self-sufficing, their officers
and the dockyards will make a heavier drain on the force of the fleet
than in his day. Perhaps in no point will provident administration more
affect the efficiency of the fleet than in this.
[350] Tucker's St. Vincent, vol. ii. pp. 13, 88.
[351] Tucker's St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 14.
[352] Ibid., p. 14.
[353] Ibid., p. 115.
[354] See Troude, Batailles Navales, 1800, 1801, vol. iii. pp. 190,
222, 223. "We had at Brest (in 1800) neither provisions nor material.
The Franco-Spanish fleet there was of consideration only from its
numbers." (Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous le Consulat, p. 10.)
[355] Tucker's St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 136.
[356] Naval Chronicle, vol. iv. p. 520.
[357] See _post_, Chap. XIII.
[358] Tucker's St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 105.
[359] Parliamentary History, vol. xxxiii. pp. 111-116.
[360] Batailles Navales, vol. iii. pp. 187-190, 222, 223.
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| |
| Transcriber's Note: |
| |
| Minor typographical errors have been corrected without note. |
| Other corrections are noted below. I
| |
| Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained. |
| |
| Word combinations that appeared with and without hyphens were |
| changed to the predominant form if it could be determined. |
| |
| Italicized words are surrounded by underline characters, _like |
| this_. |
| |
| Mid-paragraph illustrations have been moved between paragraphs |
| and some illustrations have been moved closer to the text that |
| references them. The paginations in the List of Illustrations |
| have been adjusted accordingly. |
| |
| Footnotes were moved to the end of the book and numbered in one |
| continuous sequence. |
| |
| Other corrections: |
| p. 278: "which did away the provincial independence" changed to |
| "which did away with the provincial independence." |
| |
| p. 365: "the impotent conclusion" changed to "the important |
| conclusion." |
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