THE
INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER
UPON THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE
1793-1812
BY
CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN, U.S.N.
PRESIDENT UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
AUTHOR OF "THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783"
OF "THE GULF AND INLAND WATERS," AND OF A
"LIFE OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT"
IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL. I.
FOURTH EDITION.
LONDON
SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON, SEARLE, & RIVINGTON
(LIMITED)
UNIVERSITY PRESS: JOHN WILSON AND SON, CAMBRIDGE, U.S.A.
PREFACE.
The present work, like its predecessor, "The Influence of Sea Power
upon History, 1660-1783," is wholly a result of the author's connection
with the United States Naval War College as lecturer upon Naval History
and Naval Tactics.
When first asked to undertake that duty, the question naturally arose
how to impart to the subject of Naval History an aspect which, in
this very utilitarian age, should not be open to the ready reproach
of having merely archæological interest, and possessing no practical
value for men called upon to use the changed materials of modern naval
war. "You won't have much to say about history," was then the somewhat
discouraging comment of a senior officer of his own service.
In pondering this matter, it occurred to the author—whose acquaintance
with naval history was at that time wholly superficial—that the part
played by navies, and by maritime power generally, as a factor in the
results of history, and as shaping the destinies of nations and of the
world, had received little or no particular attention. If this were
so, an analysis of the course of events through a series of years,
directed to show the influence of Sea Power upon History, would at
least serve to imbue his hearers with an exalted sense of the mission
of their calling; and might also, by throwing light upon the political
bearings of naval force, contribute to give the service and the country
a more definite impression of the necessity to provide a fleet adequate
to great undertakings, lest, if an occasion should arise for what he
has ventured to call "statesmanship directing arms," we should be found
unprepared, through having no sufficient armed force to direct.
In avowing this as the original, and, for a time at least, almost the
sole motive of his work, the author practically confesses that he at
the beginning had no scientific appreciation or reasoned knowledge
of the naval history of the past. Upon giving this the attention
required by his new duties, and collating the various incidents with
the teachings of recognized authorities upon land warfare, he soon came
to recognize that the principles which they claimed to be of general
application in their own specialty received also ample and convincing
illustration in naval annals; although the development of the Art of
War at sea has been slower, and is now less advanced, than on shore.
This backward result has been due, partly, to uncertainties peculiar to
the sea, and partly to a contempt for the study of the past, and of
its experience, as "not practical," from which the naval profession has
not yet wholly rid itself.
Thus, in its course, the author's former work, without abandoning its
first simple motive, expanded into an attempt to analyze the strategic
conduct of the naval campaigns, as well as the tactical features of the
various battles—all too few—in which any clear tactical purpose was
shown by the commanders engaged. The cordial reception given to the
work by his professional brethren, in Great Britain as well as at home,
has been to him not only most gratifying, but wholly unexpected. Its
chief significance is, however, not personal. The somewhat surprised
satisfaction testified is virtually an admission that, in the race
for material and mechanical development, sea-officers as a class have
allowed their attention to be unduly diverted from the systematic study
of the Conduct of War, which is their peculiar and main concern. For,
if the commendation bestowed be at all deserved, it is to be ascribed
simply to the fact that the author has been led to give to the most
important part of the profession an attention which it is in the power
of any other officer to bestow, but which too few actually do.
That the author has done so is due, wholly and exclusively, to the
Naval War College, which was instituted to promote such studies.
If further success attend his present venture, it is his hope that
this avowal may help to assure the long uncertain fortunes of the
College, to which,—and to its founder, Rear-Admiral Stephen B. Luce,—he
gratefully acknowledges his indebtedness for guiding him into a path he
would not himself have found.
The term of this work is fixed at the year 1812; a date signalized by
Napoleon's invasion of Russia, which wrecked his empire,—or at least
gave the outward and visible token of the wreck,—and also by the
outbreak of war between Great Britain and the United States. To the
latter, as a subject of particular national interest, the author hopes
in the near future to devote a special study.
A. T. MAHAN.
OCTOBER, 1892.
CONTENTS OF VOL. I.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTORY
OUTLINE OF EVENTS IN EUROPE, 1783-1793.
PAGE
Prominence of the year 1793 1
Leading features and results of the war of 1778 2
Condition of the different belligerents at its termination 3
Success of the second Pitt as a peace minister 5
Advantage to Great Britain arising from his secure tenure of power 6
Desire of Western Europe for peace 7
Causes of disturbance 7
Accession of Joseph II. to crown of Austria 7
Commercial expansion of Austrian Netherlands during war of 1778 8
Question of the navigation of the Scheldt 9
Wide-spread interests therein involved 10
The Eastern Question, 1780-1790 11
Change of relations between Great Britain and Russia from
1770 to 1785 12
Interests of France and of Great Britain in the Levant and
Baltic 14
Importance of Antwerp as a naval station 15
Interests of European States in Holland and the Netherlands 16
Relations between Russia and France, 1780-1790 17
Preponderance of French influence in Dutch politics 17
Joseph II. drops the question of the Scheldt 18
Treaty of alliance between France and Holland, 1785 18
Armed interference of Prussia in Holland, 1787 19
British party regains ascendency in Holland, 1787 19
Meeting of the Notables in France, February, 1787 19
Turkey declares war against Russia, August, 1787 19
Austria declares war against Turkey, February, 1788 19
Great Britain and Holland proclaim a strict neutrality 20
Consequent effect upon Russia's maritime projects 20
Sweden attacks Russian Finland, June, 1788 21
Defensive alliance between Great Britain, Prussia, and Holland,
1788 21
Denmark attacks Sweden 21
Interposition of Great Britain and Prussia in the Baltic 21
Significance of this action 22
Dawn of the modern Eastern Question 22
Conflicting views of British statesmen about Russia, 1791 23
External influence of France paralyzed by home troubles 24
Progress of the war in southeastern Europe 24
Renewed interference of Great Britain and Prussia in the Baltic 25
Meeting of the States-General in France, 1789 25
Cessation of hostilities between Austria and Turkey, September,
1790 26
Storming of Ismail by Suwarrow, Christmas, 1790 26
Peace of Galatz between Russia and Turkey, August, 1791 27
General peace in eastern Europe, 1791 27
Progress of the Revolution in France, 1789-1791 28
Flight of the King, 1791 28
Declaration of Pilnitz, August, 1791 28
Significant coincidence of this date with Peace of Galatz 29
France declares war against Austria, April, 1792 29
Disorders in Paris, June-September, 1792 30
Suspension of the King, August, 1792 30
Battle of Valmy, September 20, 1792 30
Meeting of National Convention, September 22, 1792 31
Royalty abolished in France 31
Battle of Jemappes, November 6, 1792 31
The French occupy Austrian Netherlands and open the Scheldt 31
Decree of Fraternity, November 19, 1792 31
Decree extending the French system with their armies, December
15, 1792 32
Strained relations between Great Britain and France 32
Execution of Louis XVI., January 21, 1793 32
Dismissal of the French minister by the British court 34
France declares war against Great Britain and Holland, February
1, 1793 34
CHAPTER II.
THE CONDITION OF THE NAVIES IN 1793—AND ESPECIALLY THE
FRENCH NAVY.
Causes of the deterioration of the French navy after 1789 35
Ignorance of maritime conditions among French administrators 37
Value of the lessons derivable from this experience 38
Factors conditioning the effects of any form of military activity 38
The gun the one sea-weapon of the period in question 39
A ship is a mobile battery 39
It is handled by an organic body, whose members are mutually
dependent 39
Necessity of special training to such an organization 40
Blindness of the French Legislature to these facts 41
Rise and growth of insubordination in the navy 41
The disturbances in Toulon, 1789 42
Maltreatment of Commodore D'Albert de Rions 43
Weakness of the National (Constituent) Assembly 43
The Nootka Sound trouble between Spain and Great Britain, 1790 44
France prepares to support Spain 45
De Rions ordered to command the Brest fleet 45
Mutiny in the Brest fleet 45
De Rions leaves the navy 46
His services and distinguished professional reputation 46
Disorders in the navy abroad 47
Disastrous effects upon the French colonies 48
Emigration of French naval officers 49
Reorganization of the navy by the Constituent Assembly, 1791 50
Previous measures of the monarchical government, 1786 51
Reorganization decrees of the Assembly, April, 1791 52
Essential spirit of this legislation 53
The Second (Legislative) Assembly lowers the qualifications for
officers 54
Naval officers in the Reign of Terror 54
Further legislation by Third Assembly (National Convention), 1793 55
Results of the successive measures 56
Action of the Assemblies touching enlisted men 57
Singular arguments based on equality of rights 58
Extravagancies of the period 59
Direct results of these measures as shown in battle 60
Indirect effects of the laxness of the Assemblies upon discipline 60
Mutiny in the Brest fleet, 1793 62
Disorders in the Mediterranean fleet, 1792 63
Deterioration of the material of the navy 64
Misery of officers and seamen 64
Want of naval supplies and equipment 67
Effect of these disadvantages upon naval efficiency 68
Effect of naval inefficiency upon the general results of the war 68
Endurance and success of Great Britain due to her Sea Power 69
Condition of the British navy in 1793 69
Possesses a body of trained officers having a continuous
tradition 69
Embarrassment of Great Britain for seamen 70
Condition and health of the crews 71
Mutinies in the British navy. How characterized 72
Character of the material in the British navy 73
Comparative force of the French and British navies 75
Numbers and condition of the Spanish navy 75
Inefficiency of its officers and seamen 76
Navies of Holland, Naples, and Portugal 78
Of Turkey and the Baltic States 78
CHAPTER III.
THE GENERAL POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CONDITIONS, AND THE
EVENTS OF 1793.
France declares war against Spain, March 7, 1793 79
Character of the governments arrayed against France 79
Mutual jealousy of Austria and Prussia 80
Attitude of the smaller German States 80
Military and naval situation of Spain 81
Policy of Great Britain 82
Attitude of Russia 82
Second Partition of Poland 82
Course of Sweden and Denmark 83
Internal dissensions and external dangers of Holland 83
Dutch colonies 83
Relations between Portugal and Great Britain 84
Attitude of the Italian States 84
Extent and disorganization of the Turkish Empire 85
Strategic importance of the Mediterranean islands 85
Their political distribution 86
Value of Malta and of Port Mahon 87
Corsica in the beginning of the French Revolution 88
Internal commotions in France 89
Reverses in Belgium and treason of Dumouriez 89
Reorganization of the Committee of Public Safety 90
Revolt of Lyon against the Convention 90
Fall of the Girondists 90
Risings of their followers throughout France 90
Siege of Lyon by Conventional troops 91
Toulon delivered to the British and Spanish fleets 92
French reverses on the eastern and northeastern frontiers 93
Desperate state of France 93
Mistakes of the allies 94
Energy of the Convention and its commissioners 94
Effect upon the armies 94
Failure to attain similar results in the navy 95
Causes of this failure 96
Naval unpreparedness of Great Britain in 1793 96
Difficulty in manning the fleet 96
Distribution of the British naval forces 96
Military and naval problem before Great Britain 97
Military value of insurrections in an enemy's country 98
Measures to compel the French navy to leave port 99
Difficulty of blockading French ports 99
Maritime claims of Great Britain 100
Military character of Lord Howe 101
His views of naval policy 101
Proper strategic use of the British fleet 102
Effects of inactivity upon a naval force 102
Successes of the French armies toward the close of 1793 103
Disasters of the Vendean insurgents 104
Fall of Lyon 105
The allies abandon Toulon, Dec. 19, 1793 105
Disadvantages of Toulon for the allies 106
End of the maritime year 1793 106
CHAPTER IV.
THE WEST INDIES, 1793-1810.
Present importance of the West India islands 109
Their value at the end of the eighteenth century 109
Control of a maritime region dependent upon the navy 110
Interests of Great Britain in the Caribbean Sea 110
Condition of Haïti 111
Relation of Haïti to the routes of commerce 112
Mistaken policy of the British in Haïti 113
Military and commercial value of the Lesser Antilles 114
Their political distribution in 1793 114
Naval weakness of Great Britain in that region 115
Expedition of Jervis and Grey in 1794 115
Capture of the French islands 115
The French retake Guadaloupe 116
Disastrous results to British possessions and commerce 117
Expedition of Christian and Abercromby, 1796 117
Its successes 118
Criticism of British military policy in 1794 119
Injury to Great Britain of Spanish and Dutch alliance with France 120
Capture of Trinidad by the British 121
Subsequent events in the West Indies 121
CHAPTER V.
THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN OF MAY, 1795, AND BATTLE OF THE
FIRST OF JUNE.
Distress in France in 1793 and 1794 122
Food supplies ordered from the United States 123
Ships of war sent to convoy them to France 123
Squadrons of Nielly and Villaret sent to meet the convoy 124
Determination of British government to intercept it 125
Sailing of the Channel Fleet under Lord Howe 125
Howe meets the French fleet under Villaret Joyeuse, May 28 126
Partial engagement of May 28 127
Manœuvres of May 29 129
Partial engagement of May 29 130
Lord Howe breaks the French line 131
Villaret loses the advantage of the wind 131
Summary of the results of the two days' engagements 133
Merits of Howe's tactics 135
Strategic mistake by which Montagu's squadron was not on hand 135
Events of May 30 and 31 135
Preparations for battle, June 1 136
Character of Howe's attack 137
Opening of the battle 138
Howe's flag-ship again breaks the French line 139
General success of the first attack 140
The contest between the "Vengeur" and the "Brunswick" 140
Sinking of the "Vengeur" 143
Results of the encounter 144
Villaret's manœuvre to rescue his crippled ships 145
Howe's manœuvre to preserve his prizes 146
Incomplete results of the British victory 147
Physical prostration of Lord Howe 147
Tactical analysis of the action 149
Inferences deduced therefrom 152
Conduct of the French captains 153
Study of the strategic conduct of the two admirals 155
Howe's tactical success neutralized by strategic error 160
Termination of the campaign 161
Safe arrival of the convoy at Brest 161
CHAPTER VI.
THE YEAR 1794 IN THE ATLANTIC AND ON THE CONTINENT.
Inaction of the British Channel fleet 162
Capture of the "Alexander," 74 162
Disastrous winter cruise of the French Brest fleet 163
Continued inactivity of the British Channel fleet 164
Howe leaves the command afloat 165
Succeeded by Bridport 165
Change in the British Admiralty 165
Little change of system 165
Dangers incurred by faulty dispositions 166
Reign of Terror in France 167
Fall of Robespierre, July 27, 1794 167
French successes on north-east frontier 168
Divergent retreat of Austrians and Anglo-Dutch 169
Conquest of Holland by the French 170
Establishment of Batavian Republic 170
Effect of this event upon the coalition 170
War between Great Britain and Holland 170
Fall of Dutch colonies 171
French successes on the Rhine and in the Pyrenees 171
Peace made with France by Prussia, Holland, and Spain 172
Treaties of Great Britain with Austria and Russia 172
CHAPTER VII.
THE YEAR 1795 IN THE ATLANTIC AND ON THE CONTINENT.
The year 1795 one of reaction in France 173
Reactionary measures 174
Counter-revolutionary disorders 175
Constitution of 1795 175
Dissolution of the National Convention 176
Six French ships-of-the-line transferred from Brest to Toulon 176
Action between Villaret Joyeuse and Cornwallis 177
Bridport's action off Île Groix 178
French adopt policy of commerce-destroying and withdraw their
fleets from the ocean 179
Criticism of this decision 179
Military conclusions derivable from Napoleon's naval policy 180
Weakness of French military action in 1795 180
Serious reverses in Germany 181
Suspension of arms in Germany 182
Narrative shifts to the Mediterranean 183
Summary of results in 1795 183
CHAPTER VIII.
THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY.—FROM THE EVACUATION OF
TOULON IN 1793 TO THE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM THAT
SEA, IN 1796, AND BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT, IN FEBRUARY,
1797.—AUSTRIA FORCED TO MAKE PEACE.
Requirements of a base of operations 184
Policy and objects of Great Britain in the Mediterranean 185
Inadequacy of Gibraltar to these ends 185
Advantages of Corsica as a base 186
Expulsion of the French from Corsica 187
The crown of Corsica offered to the king of Great Britain 188
Strained relations between Paoli and the viceroy 188
French Toulon fleet puts to sea, in March, 1795 189
Action with the British Mediterranean fleet, March 14 190
Lethargy of Admiral Hotham 192
Losses in the two fleets 192
French re-enforced by a detachment from Brest 192
Disturbances in Toulon 193
Brush between the fleets off the Hyères Islands 194
Military events in Italy, 1795 195
Difficulty of suppressing coasting trade along the Riviera of
Genoa 196
Sluggish movements of the Austrian general Devins 197
Decisive defeat of the Austrians at the battle of Loano 198
They retire across the Apennines 198
Criticism of the management of the British navy 199
Importance of Nelson's services 200
Commerce-destroying by the French 201
Admiral Jervis assumes command in the Mediterranean, and
General Bonaparte in Italy 203
Professional Characteristics of Jervis 203
Disastrous results of Hotham's inactivity 207
Share of the French flotilla in maintaining Bonaparte's
communications 207
Bonaparte's Italian campaign of 1796 208
Sardinia forced to peace 209
Successive defeats of the Austrians 210
Bonaparte occupies the line of the Adige, and blockades Mantua 210
Political results of the campaign 211
Naples abandons the Coalition, and the French occupy Leghorn 211
Consequent effects upon the British fleet 212
Bonaparte's designs upon Corsica 213
The British seize Elba 213
Offensive and defensive alliance between Spain and France 214
Singular conduct of Rear-Admiral Mann 214
Critical position of the British Mediterranean fleet 215
Ordered to evacuate Corsica 215
Junction of French and Spanish fleets 215
Jervis withdraws his fleet to Gibraltar 216
Policy of thus evacuating the Mediterranean 217
Influence of Naples upon Bonaparte's plans 218
Succession of disasters to Jervis's fleet 219
He repairs with it to Lisbon, January, 1797 219
Nelson's detached expedition to evacuate Elba 219
Events leading to the battle of Cape St. Vincent 220
Battle of Cape St. Vincent 221
Nelson's brilliant action 226
Merit of Sir John Jervis 228
Results of the battle 229
Sir John Jervis created Earl St. Vincent 229
Public depression in Great Britain at this time 230
Influence upon public feeling of the news of the battle 231
St. Vincent establishes the blockade of Cadiz 232
Critical condition of discipline in the British navy 232
Bonaparte's position in Italy 233
Capitulation of Mantua 233
Bonaparte advances through Carinthia into Austria 234
Preliminaries of peace signed at Leoben, April, 1797 234
Conditions, both open and secret 235
Austria treats alone, apart from Great Britain 235
Advantage to Great Britain from her Sea Power 236
Note,—incident of the mutinies of 1797 occurring in the fleet
of Earl St. Vincent 236-239
CHAPTER IX.
THE MEDITERRANEAN IN 1797 AND 1798.
BONAPARTE'S EGYPTIAN EXPEDITION—THE RETURN OF THE
BRITISH TO THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE BATTLE OF THE
NILE.—GREAT BRITAIN RESUMES CONTROL OF THE MEDITERRANEAN
AND THE SECOND COALITION IS FORMED.
Negotiations for peace between Great Britain and France, 1796 240
The British envoy ordered to quit France 241
Difficulties between the United States and France 242
Death of Catharine II. of Russia and accession of Paul I. 243
Reactionary results of the French elections in 1797 243
Coup d'État of September 3-4, 1797 244
Reactionary members exiled from France 245
Renewed negotiations with Great Britain, 1797 245
The British envoy again dismissed 246
Bonaparte's Eastern projects 246
Insidious treatment of Venice 247
Nelson's expedition against Teneriffe 249
He is repulsed, loses his right arm, and returns to England 250
Peace of Campo Formio between France and Austria 250
Conditions of the peace 251
Venice ceases to exist, and France acquires the Ionian islands 251
Bonaparte leaves Italy and returns to Paris 252
Commands army intended to invade England 252
Difficulties of this enterprise 252
The expedition to Egypt determined in its stead 253
Absence of the British fleet from the Mediterranean in 1797 254
Nelson rejoins the fleet off Cadiz, April, 1798 256
Sent with three ships to watch the preparations in Toulon 256
Bonaparte sails with expedition for Egypt, May 19, 1798 256
Nelson joined by a re-enforcement of ten ships-of-the-line 257
Bonaparte seizes Malta, and sails again for Alexandria 257
Perplexity of Nelson as to the enemy's designs 258
Pursues to Alexandria, but fails to find the French 259
Cause of this disappointment 259
Retraces his steps to the westward 260
Bonaparte anchors off Alexandria, and at once disembarks troops 260
Nelson anchors at Syracuse, and again sails for Alexandria 261
Discovers the French fleet anchored in Aboukir Bay 261
Indecision and lethargy of the French admiral Brueys 262
Neglect of Bonaparte's orders 263
Description of Aboukir Bay 263
Brueys's inadequate preparations against attack 264
Comparison with those made by Hood in a like position 265
Battle of the Nile 266
Concentration upon the head of the French column 268
Grounding of the "Culloden" 269
Arrival of the British reserve and concentration on the French
centre 270
The French flag-ship blows up 271
Only two French ships-of-the-line escape 271
Discussion of Nelson's claims to the credit of this action 273
Successes of Bonaparte in Egypt 277
Effect upon French troops of the battle of the Nile 277
Effect of the battle upon foreign powers 277
Aggressive action of France upon the continent of Europe 278
Intervention in Switzerland and Rome 279
Dissatisfaction of Naples and Austria 280
Hostile attitude of Paul I. of Russia 281
Alliance between Russia and Austria 282
Effect of the tidings of the battle of the Nile 282
Influence of the battle in India 283
Nelson ordered to Naples 284
Blockade of Malta by the British 285
Disposition of the British Mediterranean fleet 286
Russo-Turkish attack upon the Ionian islands 286
Minorca captured by the British 287
Maritime results of the year 1798 287
CHAPTER X.
THE MEDITERRANEAN FROM 1799 TO 1801.
BONAPARTE'S SYRIAN EXPEDITION AND SIEGE OF ACRE.—THE
INCURSION OF THE FRENCH BREST FLEET UNDER ADMIRAL
BRUIX.—BONAPARTE'S RETURN TO FRANCE.—THE FRENCH
LOSE MALTA AND EGYPT.
Bonaparte's hopes from the Egyptian expedition 288
Weakness of Egyptian institutions 289
Conquest of Upper Egypt 289
The Pasha of Syria advances against Egypt 290
Isolation of the French in Egypt 290
Consequent embarrassment of Bonaparte 291
Bonaparte hears of the Turkish preparations against him 292
Resolves to invade Syria 292
The French capture El Arish and advance to Acre 293
Character of Sir Sidney Smith, commanding the British squadron
off Acre 294
His naval and diplomatic mission to the Levant 296
Annoyance thereby caused to Nelson and St. Vincent 297
Smith assumes command off Alexandria 298
Importance of Acre 299
Smith arrives at Acre from Alexandria 299
Captures a convoy with Bonaparte's siege train 300
Siege of Acre 300
Arrival of Turkish re-enforcements from Rhodes 301
Final assault by the French 302
They raise the siege and retreat to Egypt 302
Services of Sir Sidney Smith at Acre 303
The French fleet of twenty-five ships-of-the-line, under Admiral
Bruix, escapes from Brest 304
Conduct of Lord Bridport 305
Excitement in Great Britain 306
Bruix appears off Cadiz, and enters the Mediterranean 307
Exposed position of the British naval detachments 308
Anxieties of Earl St. Vincent 309
Measures taken by him 309
Action of Nelson 310
Activity and sagacity shown by St. Vincent 311
The Spanish fleet leaves Cadiz and reaches Cartagena 312
St. Vincent's health fails, and he gives up command to Keith 312
Bruix eludes Keith's pursuit and joins Spaniards in Cartagena 313
The allied fleets pass the Straits and reach Brest 316
Keith pursues to Brest and then goes to Torbay 316
Discussion of the French objects in this cruise 316
Conduct of the British admirals at the same time 318
The Turkish army lands in Aboukir Bay to attack the French 321
It is destroyed by Bonaparte 322
Bonaparte quits Egypt and returns to France 323
Criticism of the Egyptian expedition 324
Absolute control of the Mediterranean by the British navy 328
Surrender of Malta 330
Isolation of Egypt 330
Convention of El Arish for the evacuation of Egypt by the French 332
Ratification refused by British government, because unauthorized 333
Abercromby's expedition. Final loss of Egypt by the French 334
Assassination of Kleber 334
CHAPTER XI.
THE ATLANTIC, 1796-1801.—THE BREST BLOCKADES.—THE
FRENCH EXPEDITIONS AGAINST IRELAND.
The French resolution to depend upon commerce-destroying 335
Consequent effect upon naval war and upon the control of the sea 336
Resulting dispositions of French and British navies 337
Inefficient character of the blockade of Brest 338
Conditions of the maritime problem before Great Britain stated 339
Measures proper to be adopted 340
Mutual relations of the elements of a defensive system 341
Two aspects under which the military value of Brest should be
considered 342
Description of the port and its surroundings 342
Strategic importance of the winds 344
Anchorages available to the British fleets as bases of operations
against Brest 344
Theory of the Brest blockade 345
Fitness of the British bases relative to this theory 345
Policies of St. Vincent, Howe, and Bridport 346
Causes leading to the Irish expedition of 1796 347
Preparations for the expedition 348
Hoche appointed to command it 349
Villaret Joyeuse appointed to command the fleet 349
His distaste for the enterprise 349
He is superseded by Morard de Galles 350
Inefficiency of the French navy at this time 350
Departure of the expedition 351
Its dispersal on the night of starting 353
Reunion of the greater part of the ships 354
Absence of the two commanders-in-chief 354
The expedition reaches the coast of Ireland 355
Mishaps in Bantry Bay 356
The ships return to France 357
Shipwreck of the "Droits de l'Homme" 358
Misfortunes of the ship carrying Hoche and Morard 359
Inefficiency of the British dispositions against invasion 360
Analysis of these dispositions 361
Consequent impunity of the French 367
St. Vincent succeeds, in 1800, to the command of the Channel
fleet 368
His strategic management of the general operations 369
His tactical dispositions to maintain the watch of the port 371
Dependence of the admiralty upon the commander-in-chief 373
St. Vincent's provisions in case of the blockade being forced 374
Decisive effects of the system introduced by him 375
Paralysis of Brest under this watch 376
Napoleon in consequence adopts Antwerp as his chief dockyard 377
Purposed expedition against Ireland from the Texel 378
Naval battle of Camperdown 378
Death of Hoche 378
The expeditions of 1798 against Ireland 379
Cessation of the attempts upon Ireland 380
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
VOLUME I.
MAPS AND BATTLE PLANS.
PAGE
I. Manœuvres of May 29, 1794, Figures 1 and 2 129
II. Manœuvres of May 29, 1794, Fig. 3 131
III. Battle of June 1, 1794 137
IV. Map of Northern Italy 195
V. Battle of Cape St. Vincent 223
VI. Map of the Mediterranean 257
VII. Coast Map, Alexandria to the Nile 263
VIII. Battle of the Nile 266
IX. Map of English Channel and North Sea 335
X. Map of Brest and its Approaches 342
THE
INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER
UPON THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTORY.
OUTLINE OF EVENTS IN EUROPE, 1783-1793.
The ten years following the Peace of Versailles, September 3, 1783,
coming between the two great wars of American Independence and of the
French Revolution, seem like a time of stagnation. The muttering and
heaving which foretold the oncome of the later struggle were indeed to
be heard by those whose ears were open, long before 1793. The opening
events and violences which marked the political revolution were of
earlier date, and war with Austria and Prussia began even in 1792;
but the year 1793 stands out with a peculiar prominence, marked as it
is by the murder of the king and queen, the beginning of the Reign
of Terror, and the outbreak of hostilities with the great Sea Power,
whose stubborn, relentless purpose and mighty wealth were to exert the
decisive influence upon the result of the war. Untiring in sustaining
with her gold the poorer powers of the Continent against the common
enemy, dogged in bearing up alone the burden of the war, when one by
one her allies dropped away, the year in which Great Britain, with her
fleets, her commerce, and her money, rose against the French republic,
with its conquering armies, its ruined navy, and its bankrupt
treasury, may well be taken as the beginning of that tremendous strife
which ended at Waterloo.
To the citizen of the United States, the war whose results were summed
up and sealed in the Treaty of Versailles is a landmark of history
surpassing all others in interest and importance. His sympathies are
stirred by the sufferings of the many, his pride animated by the noble
constancy of the few whose names will be forever identified with the
birth-throes of his country. Yet in a less degree this feeling may
well be shared by a native of Western Europe, though he have not the
same vivid impression of the strife, which, in so distant a land and
on so small a scale, brought a new nation to life. This indeed was the
_great_ outcome of that war; but in its progress, Europe, India, and
the Sea had been the scenes of deeds of arms far more dazzling and at
times much nearer home than the obscure contest in America. In dramatic
effect nothing has exceeded the three-years siege of Gibraltar,
teeming as it did with exciting interest, fluctuating hopes and
fears, triumphant expectation and bitter disappointment. England from
her shores saw gathered in the Channel sixty-six French and Spanish
ships-of-the-line,—a force larger than had ever threatened her since
the days of the Great Armada, and before which her inferior numbers had
to fly, for the first time, to the shelter of her ports. Rodney and
Suffren had conducted sea campaigns, fought sea fights, and won sea
victories which stirred beyond the common the hearts of men in their
day, and which still stand conspicuous in the story of either navy. In
one respect above all, this war was distinguished; in the development,
on both sides, of naval power. Never since the days of De Ruyter and
Tourville had so close a balance of strength been seen upon the seas.
Never since the Peace of Versailles to our own day has there been such
an approach to equality between the parties to a sea war.
The three maritime nations issued wearied from the strife, as did also
America; but the latter, though with many difficulties still to meet,
was vigorous in youth and unfettered by bad political traditions. The
colonists of yesterday were thoroughly fitted to retrieve their own
fortunes and those of their country; to use the boundless resources
which Divine Providence had made ready to their hands. It was quite
otherwise with France and Spain; while Great Britain, though untouched
with the seeds of decay that tainted her rivals, was weighed down with
a heavy feeling of overthrow, loss and humiliation, which for the
moment hid from her eyes the glory and wealth yet within her reach.
Colonial ambition was still at its loftiest height among the nations
of Europe, and she had lost her greatest, most powerful colony. Not
only the king and the lords, but the mass of the people had set their
hearts upon keeping America. Men of all classes had predicted ruin to
the Empire if it parted with such a possession; and now they had lost
it, wrung from them after a bitter struggle, in which their old enemies
had overborne them on the field they called their own, the Sea. The Sea
Power of Great Britain had been unequal to the task laid upon it, and
so America was gone. A less resolute people might have lost hope.
If the triumph of France and Spain was proportionate to their
rival's loss, this was no true measure of their gains, nor of the
relative positions of the three in the years after the war. American
Independence profited neither France nor Spain. The latter had indeed
won back the Floridas and Minorca; but she had utterly failed before
Gibraltar, and Jamaica had not even been attacked. Minorca, as Nelson
afterwards said, was always England's when she wanted it. It belonged
not to this power or that, but to the nation that controlled the
sea; so England retook it in 1798, when her fleets again entered the
Mediterranean. France had gained even less than Spain. Her trading
posts in India had been restored; but they, even more than Minorca,
were defenceless unless in free communication with and supported by the
sea power of the mother-country. In the West Indies she returned to
Great Britain more than the latter did to her. "France," says a French
historian, "had accomplished the duties of her providential mission"
(in freeing America); "her moral interests, the interests of her glory
and of her ideas were satisfied. The interests of her material power
had been badly defended by her government; the only solid advantage she
had obtained was depriving England of Minorca, that curb on Toulon, far
more dangerous to us when in their hands than is Gibraltar."[1]
Unfortunately at this moment France was far richer in ideas, moral
and political, and in renown, than in solid power. The increasing
embarrassment of the Treasury forced her to stay her hand, and to yield
to her rival terms of peace utterly beyond what the seeming strength
of either side justified. The French navy had reaped glory in the five
years of war; not so much, nearly, as French writers claim for it,
but still it had done well, and the long contest must have increased
the efficiency of its officers along with their growing experience. A
little more time only was wanted for France, allied to Spain, to gain
lasting results as well as passing fame. This time poverty refused her.
Spain, as for centuries back, still depended for her income almost
wholly upon her treasure ships from America. Always risked by war,
this supply became more than doubtful when the undisputed control of
the sea passed to an enemy. The policy of Spain, as to peace or war,
was therefore tied fast to that of France, without whose navy her
shipping lay at England's mercy; and, though the national pride clung
obstinately to its claim for Gibraltar, it was forced to give way.
Great Britain alone, after all her losses, rested on a solid foundation
of strength. The American contest by itself had cost her nearly
£100,000,000, and rather more than that amount had during the war
been added to the national debt; but two years later this had ceased
to increase, and soon the income of the State was greater than the
outgo. Before the end of 1783, the second William Pitt, then a young
man of twenty-four, became prime minister. With genius and aims
specially fitted to the restorative duties of a time of peace, the
first of British finance ministers in the opinion of Mr. Gladstone,[2]
he bent his great powers to fostering the commerce and wealth of the
British people. With firm but skilful hand he removed, as far as the
prejudices of the day would permit and in the face of much opposition,
the fetters, forged by a mistaken policy, that hampered the trade
of the Empire. Promoting the exchange of goods with other nations,
simplifying the collection of taxes and the revenue, he added at once
to the wealth of the people and to the income of the State. Although
very small in amount, as compared with the enormous figures of later
years, the exports and imports of Great Britain increased over fifty
per cent between the years 1784 and 1792. Even with the lately severed
colonies of North America the same rate of gain, as compared with the
trade before the war, held good; while with the old enemy of his father
and of England, with France, there was concluded in 1786 a treaty of
commerce which was exceedingly liberal for those days, and will, it
is said, bear a favorable comparison with any former or subsequent
treaty between the two countries. "In the course of little more than
three years from Mr. Pitt's acceptance of office as First Lord of the
Treasury," says the eulogist of his distinguished rival, Fox, "great
commercial and financial reforms had been effected.... The nation
overcoming its difficulties, and rising buoyant from depression, began
rapidly to increase its wealth, to revive its spirit, and renew its
strength."[3]
Such was the home condition of the British people; but fully to
appreciate the advantageous position to which it was rising, in
preparation for the great conflict still unforeseen, it must be
remembered that all things worked together to centre and retain the
political executive power in the hands of Pitt. The feelings of the
king, then a very real force in the nation; the confidence of the
people, given to his father's son and fixed by the wisdom of his
own conduct and the growth of the moneyed prosperity so dear to the
British heart; the personal character of his only rival in ability,—all
combined to commit the political guidance of the State to one man at
the great crisis when such unity of action was essential to strength.
Whether the great peace minister was equal to the wisest direction of
war has been questioned, and has been denied. Certainly it was not
the office he himself would have chosen; but it was a great gain for
England that she was at this time able to give herself wholly to a
single leader. He took office with a minority of one hundred in the
House of Commons, held it for two months constantly out-voted, and then
dissolving Parliament appealed to the country. The election gave him a
majority of over a hundred,—a foretaste of the unwavering support he
received from the representatives of the people during the early and
critical years of the French Revolution, when the yet fluid opinions
of the nation were gradually being cast and hardened into that set
conviction and determination characteristic of the race.
How different the state of France is well known. The hopeless
embarrassment of the finances, hopeless at least under the political
and social conditions, the rapid succession of ministers, each sinking
deeper in entanglements, the weak character of the king, the conflict
of opinions, the lack of sympathy between classes, all tending to the
assembling of the Notables in February, 1787, and the yet more pregnant
meeting of the States General, May 4, 1789, which was the beginning of
the end. France was moneyless and leaderless.
But while the Western countries of Europe were by these circumstances
disposed or constrained to wish for the continuance of peace,
restlessness showed itself in other quarters and in ways which, from
the close relations of the European States, disquieted the political
atmosphere. The Austrian Netherlands and Holland, Poland and Turkey,
the Black Sea and the Baltic, became the scene of diplomatic intrigues
and of conflicts, which, while they did not involve the great Western
Powers in actual war, caused them anxiety and necessitated action.
The Empress-Queen of Austria and Hungary, Maria Theresa, had died in
1780. Her son, the Emperor Joseph II., came to the throne in the prime
of life, and with his head full of schemes for changing and bettering
the condition of his dominions. In 1781, the weakness of Holland being
plainly shown by her conduct of the war with Great Britain, and the
other countries having their hands too full to interfere, he demanded
and received the surrender of the fortified towns in the Austrian
Netherlands; which, under the name of the "barrier towns," had been
held and garrisoned by Holland since the Peace of Utrecht in 1713, as a
bridle upon the ambition of France. At the same time the circumstances
of the great maritime contest, which during the American Revolution
covered all the seas of Europe, impelled every neutral nation having
a seaboard to compete for the carrying trade. Holland for a time had
shared this profit with the nations of the North; but when Great
Britain, rightly or wrongly, forced her into war, the trade which had
been carried on through Holland and her great rivers reaching into the
heart of Germany, being denied its natural channel, sought a new one
through the Austrian Netherlands by the port of Ostend. The growth
of the latter, like that of Nassau during the Civil War in the United
States, was forced and unhealthy,—due not to natural advantages but
to morbid conditions; but it fostered the already strong wish of the
emperor for a sea power which no other part of his dominions could give.
This movement of Belgian commerce was accelerated by the disappearance
of the British carrying trade. As in the days of Louis XIV., before he
had laid up his ships-of-the-line, so in the American War the cruisers
and privateers of the allies, supported by the action of the combined
fleets occupying the British navy, preyed ravenously on British
shipping. In the days of the elder Pitt it had been said that commerce
was made to live and thrive by war; but then the French great fleets
had left the sea, and British armed ships protected trade and oppressed
the enemy's cruisers. Between 1778 and 1783 Great Britain was fully
engaged on every sea, opposing the combined fleets and protecting as
far as she could her colonies. "This untoward state of things reduced
the English merchants to difficulties and distresses, with respect to
the means of carrying on their trade, which they had never experienced
in any other war. Foreign vessels were used for the conveyance of
their goods, and the protection of a foreign flag for the first time
sought by Englishmen."[4] The writer forgot the days of Jean Bart,
Duguay-Trouin, and Forbin; we may profitably note that like conditions
lead to like results.
Thus, while America was struggling for life, and the contests of
England, France, and Spain were heard in all quarters of the world,
Netherland ships showed abroad on every sea the flag of an inland
empire, and Ostend grew merrily; but if the petty port and narrow
limits thus throve, how should the emperor bear to see the great city
of Antwerp, with its noble river and its proud commercial record,
shut up from the sea as it had been since the Treaty of Westphalia?
His discontent was deep and instant; but it was the misfortune of
this prince that he took in hand more than his own capacity and the
extent of his estates would let him complete. His attention being for
the moment diverted to southeastern Europe, where Austria and Russia
were then acting in diplomatic concert against the Porte, the question
of Antwerp was dropped. Before it could be resumed, the Peace of
Versailles had left Great Britain, France, and Holland—all so vitally
interested in whatever concerned Belgium—free, though loath, to enter
into a new contention. Matters having been for the time arranged with
Turkey, the emperor again in 1784 renewed his demands, alleging, after
the manner of statesmen, several collateral grievances, but on the
main issue saying roundly that "the entire and free navigation of the
Scheldt from Antwerp to the sea was a _sine qua non_" to any agreement.
The arguments—commercial, political, or founded on treaty—which were
in this instance urged for or against the natural claim of a country
to use a river passing through its own territory, to the sea that
washes its shores, are not here in question; but it is important to
analyze the far-reaching interests at stake, to note the bearing of
this dispute upon them and so upon the general diplomacy of Europe,
and thereby trace its intimate connection with that Sea Power whose
influence upon the course of history at this period it is our aim
to weigh. Though modified in expression by passing events, and even
at times superficially reversed, like natural currents checked and
dammed by contrary winds, these underlying tendencies—being dependent
upon permanent causes—did not cease to exist during the storm of the
Revolution. Ever ready to resume their course when the momentary
opposition was removed, the appreciation of them serves to explain
apparent contradictions, produced by the conflicts between transient
necessity and enduring interests.
From that great centre of the world's commerce where the Scheldt,
the Meuse, the Rhine, and the Thames meet in the North Sea, near the
Straits of Dover, there then parted two principal lines of trade
passing through European waters,—through seas, that is, along whose
shores were planted many different powers, foreign and possibly hostile
to each other. Of these two lines, one ended in the Baltic; the other,
after skirting the coasts of France and the Spanish peninsula and
running the gantlet of the Barbary corsairs, ended in the Levant or
Turkish Seas. The great Empire of Russia, which only made itself felt
in the sphere of European politics after the Treaty of Utrecht, in
1713, had since then been moving forward not only its centre, which
bore upon the continent of Europe, but also both its wings; one of
which touched and overshadowed the Baltic on the North, while the
other, through a steady course of pressure and encroachment upon the
Turks, had now reached the Black Sea. This advance had been aided by
the fixedness with which France and England, through their ancient
rivalry and their colonial ambitions, had kept their eyes set upon each
other and beyond the Atlantic; but the Peace of Versailles forced the
combatants to pause, and gave them time to see other interests, which
had been overlooked through the long series of wars waged, between 1739
and 1783, over commerce and colonies. It was then realized that not
only had Russia, in the past half-century, advanced her lines by the
partition of Poland and by taking from Sweden several provinces on the
Baltic, but also that she had so added to her influence upon the Black
Sea and over the Turkish Empire by successive aggressions, wresting
bits of territory and establishing claims of interference in behalf of
Turkish subjects, as to make her practical supremacy in Eastern waters
a possibility of the future.
The Western Question, as it may fitly be called, had been settled by
the birth of a new nation, destined to greatness and preponderance in
the western hemisphere; the Eastern Question, phrase now so familiar,
soon loomed on the horizon. Was it to receive a like solution? Was
a great nation, already close to the spot, to win a position of
exceptional advantage for dominating in eastern waters as America must
do in western? for it must be remembered that, although the Levant was
then only the end of a European trade route, both the history of the
past and the well understood possibilities of the future pointed to
it as one of the greatest centres of commerce, and therefore of human
interest and political influence, in the world. The Levant and Egypt
had then, and still keep, the same interest that is now being felt in
the Isthmus of Panama and the Caribbean; and it is hard to imagine
a more threatening condition of naval power than the possession of
the Black Sea and its impregnable entrance, by a vigorous nation, so
close to the Eastern highway of the world. The position in 1783 was
the more dangerous from the close alliance and respective abilities
of the rulers of Austria and Russia; the cool-headed and experienced
Catharine, through her influence on her weaker colleague, directing the
resources of both empires in a path most favorable to Russia.
The tendency of Russian growth, and the historic events which marked
its progress, were, of course, well enough known in England long
before; but there is a difference between knowing facts and realizing
their full meaning. Circumstances alter cases; and men's minds, when
strongly bent one way, do not heed what is passing elsewhere. Hence,
in 1785, we find the attitude of Great Britain toward Russia very
different from that of fifteen years earlier, when the empress and
the Porte were at war. In 1770, British officers commanded Russian
fleets and ships, and a British admiral had leave to take a place
in the Russian Admiralty, with the promise of his home rank being
restored to him. The Czarina sent a fleet of twenty sail-of-the-line
from the Baltic to the Levant. They stopped and refitted in Spithead;
Russian soldiers were landed and camped ashore to refresh themselves;
English sergeants of marines were employed to drill them; a Russian
eighty-gun ship, flying the flag of an Anglo-Russian admiral, was
docked in Portsmouth and cut down to improve her sailing qualities.
Thus comforted and strengthened they sailed for the Mediterranean;
and, receiving further damage from the poor seamanship of their crews,
they were again fitted at Port Mahon,—then an English dockyard,—for
action in the Levant.[5] When, among the hard knocks of the two
following years, the Russians destroyed a Turkish fleet of fifteen
ships-of-the-line in a port of Asia Minor, British lieutenants
commanded the fire-ships, and a British commodore the covering squadron.
To us now, with our remembrance of Kars and Silistria, of the Crimea
and Hobart Pasha, of Cyprus and Besika Bay, these things seem like a
dream; and the more so, that the Mediterranean powers of the earlier
day viewed the Russian approach with ill-concealed mistrust, and laid
severe restrictions upon the use of their ports. But Turkey then,
though a good friend to Great Britain, was a yet better friend to
France; the Turkish alliance had been useful to the latter country by
making diversion in her wars with Austria, Great Britain's natural
ally; the French were the favored nation by Turkish commercial
treaties, and a naval war in eastern waters could not but be injurious
to their commerce. Difficulties about trade might even bring about a
collision between France and Russia, which at least could do no harm
to Great Britain at a time when her rival was known to be steadily
building up her navy with a view to revenge past defeats; just as now
she is thought to be looking for a day of reckoning with Germany.
The Baltic trade was also of immense value, and the friendship of
Russia was necessary thereto. Altogether, in 1770, the Russian nation,
notwithstanding the French leanings of the Czarina, was, upon the
whole, the friend of Great Britain's friends, and the opponent of
her enemies,—especially of the one traditional, or, as even generous
Englishmen used to say, the _natural_ enemy, France. Russia bore
especially against Sweden, Poland, and Turkey; and these it was the
consistent aim of the best school of French statesmen to court and
strengthen.
But in 1785 a great change had taken place. The war of 1770 had planted
Russia firmly on the Black Sea. The treaty of Kainardji in 1774
admitted her trade freely to the Mediterranean,—a privilege which other
trading nations, in the narrow spirit of the day, considered their own
loss. Russian frigates had entered the Dardanelles on their way to the
Black Sea; and though the Porte, terrified at the consequences of its
action, stopped them at Constantinople, the move was none the less
significant. Then there had come, in 1774, the partition of Poland,
universally condemned as unrighteous and dangerous to the balance of
power, though submitted to by the other States. If Great Britain,
though restless over this, saw still some compensation in the injury
done to France by the weakening of her allies, and hugged herself with
the belief that her insular position made the continental balance of
less moment, she had had a severe reminder of Russia's growing strength
and power to injure, in the Armed Neutrality of 1780. This unfriendly
blow, aimed by a State she had looked upon as almost a natural ally,
which she had so greatly helped but ten years before, and which had now
chosen the moment of her direst straits to attack what she considered
her maritime rights, probably completed the alienation, and opened
the eyes of British statesmen to the new danger with which they were
threatened by the position of Russia upon the Baltic and close to the
Mediterranean.
France, also, had little less interest than England in this condition
of things, and certainly felt no less. From the days of Henry IV. and
Colbert, and even before, she had looked upon the Levant as peculiarly
her own field, the home of a faithful ally, and the seat of a lucrative
trade which was almost monopolized by her. Although so far foiled in
India, she had not yet lost her hopes of overcoming and replacing the
British hold upon that land of fabled wealth, and she understood the
important bearing of the Levant and Egypt upon the security of tenure
there. It need not then surprise us, in the great maritime war which we
are approaching, to find Napoleon—for all his greatness, the child of
his generation—amid all the glory and bewildering rush of his famous
Italian campaign, planning conquest in Egypt and the East, and Nelson,
that personification of the British sea power of his day, fighting
his two most brilliant battles in the Levant and in the Baltic. Nor
will we be unprepared to see an importance equal to that of Gibraltar
and Mahon in former days, now attached to points like Malta, Corfu,
Taranto, Brindisi, as well as to Sicily and Egypt, by the statesmen,
generals, and admirals, whose counsels directed the military efforts of
the belligerents. Many of these points had heretofore lain out of the
field of action of the Western Powers, but the rising Eastern Question
was bringing them forward.
Nor was it in the Levant alone that questions vitally affecting the
rival States awaited solution. The trade interests of the Baltic, as
the outlet through which great rivers and the products of immense
regions found their way to the world beyond, made its control also
an object of importance to both the chief parties in the coming
struggle,—to Great Britain who strove to drive her enemy off the sea,
and to France who wished to shut out hers from the land. But, besides
its commercial importance, the secluded character of the sea, the
difficulty of the approach,—aggravated by the severe climate,—and the
immense preponderance in strength of Russia over Sweden and Denmark,
made always possible an armed combination such as that of 1780, which
was in fact renewed in 1800, seriously threatening the naval supremacy
of Great Britain. Such a coalition it was vital to the latter to
prevent, and most desirable to her enemy to effect. If formed, it
was a nucleus around which readily gathered all other malcontents,
dissatisfied with the harsh and overbearing manner in which the great
Sea Power enforced what she considered her rights over neutral ships.
The nearness of England to the Baltic made it unnecessary to have naval
stations on the way for the repair or shelter of her shipping, but
it was most undesirable that the ports and resources of Holland and
Belgium, lying close on the flank of the route, and doubly strong in
the formidable outworks of shoals and intricate navigation with which
nature had protected them, should be under the control of a great
hostile power. Jean Bart, and his fellow-privateersmen of a hundred
years before, had shown the danger to British shipping from even the
third-rate port of Dunkirk, so situated. Where Dunkirk sent squadrons
of frigates, Antwerp could send fleets of ships-of-the-line. The
appearance of Russia, therefore, and her predominance on the Baltic,
made weightier still the interest in the political condition of the
Low Countries which, for generations past, Great Britain had felt on
account of her commercial relations with them, and through them with
Germany; an interest hitherto aroused mainly by the ambition of France
to control their policy, if not actually to possess herself of a large
part of their territory. She had to fear that which was realized under
Napoleon,—the conversion of Antwerp into a great naval station, with
free access to the sea, and the control of its resources and those of
the United Provinces by a strong and able enemy.
Great Britain, therefore, had in 1781 seen with just apprehension the
aggressive attitude of Joseph II. toward the Dutch, and the fall of
the "barrier towns." It is true that these fortresses had ceased to
afford much protection to Holland, owing to her military decline, but
the event emphasized her exposure to France; while the power of Austria
to defend her own provinces, or the Dutch, was notoriously less than
that of France to attack, owing to the relative distance of the two
from the scene, and the danger to troops, on the march from Austria, of
being assailed in flank from the French frontier. Now, again, in 1784,
she was forced to look with anxiety—less on account of Austria than
of France—upon this raising of the question of the Scheldt. There was
little cause to fear Austria becoming a great sea power now, when she
had held the Netherlands three fourths of a century without becoming
such; but there was good reason to dread that the movements in progress
might result in increasing her rival's sea power and influence—perhaps
even her territory—in the Low Countries. All these things did come to
pass, though not under the dying monarchy.
It may be presumed that the wise Catharine of Russia, without in the
least foreseeing the approaching French convulsion which shook her
plans as well as those of other European rulers, realized the true
relations between her country and the Western powers, when she so
heartily supported the emperor in his claim for the free navigation
of the Scheldt. There was no likelihood then, as there is little
likelihood now, that Great Britain and France would act together in
the Eastern Question, then too new to outweigh former prejudices or to
unite old enemies. If the contention of Austria were successful, Russia
would secure a friendly port in a region naturally hostile to her
pretensions. If unsuccessful, as things then looked, the result would
probably be the extension of French influence in the Netherlands and in
the United Provinces; and French gain there meant gain of sea power,
with proportionate loss of the same to Great Britain. The empress
could still reckon on their mutual antagonism; while the British navy,
and the way in which it was used in war, were more serious dangers to
Russia than the French armies. Whatever her reasoning, there is no
doubt that at this time her policy was drawing closer to France. The
French ministers in the East mediated between her and the Sultan in the
unceasing disputes arising from the treaty of Kainardji. A commercial
treaty on most favorable terms was concluded with France, while that
with Great Britain was allowed to lapse, and its renewal was refused
during many years.
Such were the ambitions and the weighty solicitudes, well understood
on all hands, which, during the eight years succeeding the emperor's
demand for the opening of the Scheldt, underlay and guided the main
tendencies of European policy, and continued so to do during the
revolutionary wars. The separate events which group themselves round
these leading outlines, up to the outbreak of war in 1793, can only be
hastily sketched.
Notwithstanding the close family relationship between Louis XVI. and
the emperor, the French government looked coldly upon the latter's
action in the matter of the Scheldt. The long-standing struggle in the
United Provinces between partisans of Great Britain and France was
just now marked by the preponderance of the latter, and, consequently,
of French influence. As Austria seemed resolved to enforce her claims
by war, the king first offered his mediation, and, when that was
unavailing, told the emperor he would interpose by arms. His troops
were accordingly massed on the Belgian frontier. It was understood that
the king of Prussia, who was brother-in-law to the stadtholder, would
act with France. Russia, on the other hand, proclaimed her intention
to support Austria. Sweden, as the enemy of Russia, began to put ships
in commission and enlist soldiers; while from Constantinople came a
report that, if war began, the sultan also would improve so good an
opportunity of regaining what he had lately lost. While the quarrel
about the Scheldt was thus causing complications in all quarters, an
incident occurred upon the chief scene of trouble, which under such
conditions might well have precipitated a general war. An Austrian brig
was ordered to sail from Antwerp to the sea, to test the intentions of
Holland. Upon passing the boundary she was fired upon and brought to by
a Dutch armed ship. This happened on the 8th of October, 1784.
Yet after all war did not come, owing to Joseph's volatile attention
being again drawn from the matter immediately in hand. He proposed to
the elector of Bavaria to take the Netherlands in exchange for his
electorate. This transfer, which by concentrating the possessions of
Austria would greatly have increased her weight in the Empire, was
resisted by the whole Germanic body with Frederic the Great at its
head. It therefore came to naught; but the slackening of the emperor's
interest in his Scheldt scheme promoted, under French auspices, a
peaceful arrangement; which, while involving mutual concessions, left
the real question substantially untouched. Its solution was not reached
until the storm of the Revolution swept city and river into the arms
of the French republic. This compromise was shortly followed by a
treaty of the closest alliance between France and the United Provinces,
engaging them to mutual support in case of war, fixing the amount of
armed ships or men to be furnished, and promising the most intimate
co-operation in their dealings with other States. This agreement,
which, as far as compacts could, established French preponderance in
the councils of Holland, was ratified on Christmas Day, 1785.
This treaty gave rise to serious and regretful consideration in
Great Britain; but the growing financial embarrassment and internal
disturbance of France were rapidly neutralizing her external
exertions. The following years were marked by new combinations and
alliances among States. In 1786 Frederic the Great's death took away
an important element in European politics. The quarrel between the
two factions in Holland had reached the verge of civil war, when an
insult offered by the French party to the wife of the stadtholder,
sister to the new king of Prussia, led to an armed interference by
this sovereign. In October, 1787, Prussian troops occupied Amsterdam
and restored to the stadtholder privileges that had been taken from
him. Even France had strongly condemned the act of those who had
arrested the princess, and advised ample satisfaction to be given;
but, nevertheless, when the French party appealed for aid against the
Prussian intervention, she prepared to give it and notified her purpose
to Great Britain. The latter, glad again to assert her own influence,
replied that she could not remain a quiet spectator, issued immediate
orders for augmenting her forces by sea and land, and contracted
with Hesse for the supply of twelve thousand troops upon demand. The
rapid success of the Prussians prevented any collision; but Great
Britain had the gratification, and France the mortification, of seeing
re-established the party favorable to the former.
In February, 1787, the Assembly of Notables, which had not met since
1626, was opened by Louis XVI. at Versailles. But the most striking
event of this year was the declaration of war against Russia by Turkey,
which determined no longer to wait until its enemy was ready before
engaging in an inevitable conflict. The Turkish manifesto was sent
forth August 24; Russia replied on the 13th of September.
The emperor, as the ally of Russia, declared war against Turkey on the
10th of February, 1788. Operations were carried on by the Austrians
around Belgrade and on the Danube. The Russians, bent on extending
their power on the Black Sea, invested Oczakow at the mouth and on the
right bank of the Dnieper,—Kinburn on the left side having already been
ceded to them by the treaty of Kainardji. The czarina also decided
to renew in the Mediterranean the diversion of 1770, again sending
ships from the Baltic. When the distance and inconvenience of this
operation, combined with the entire lack of any naval station in the
Mediterranean, are considered in connection with the close proximity of
Russia to that sea in mere miles, there will be felt most forcibly her
tantalizing position with reference to commerce and sea power, to whose
importance she has been keenly alive and to which she has ever aspired
since the days of Peter the Great. It is difficult to understand how
Russia can be quiet until she has secured an access to the sea not
dependent upon the good-will of any other State.
Notwithstanding the many causes of displeasure she had given to Great
Britain, Catharine went on with her arrangements as though assured of
the good-will and help before received. Pilot boats were engaged to
meet the ships in British waters, and take them to British dockyards.
Under her orders, British merchants chartered eighteen large ships to
convey artillery and stores after the fleet. All these arrangements
were quietly frustrated by Pitt's ministry, which forbade seamen to
serve in any foreign ships; and, upon the ground that the nation was to
be strictly neutral, made the contractors renounce their engagements.
Catharine then turned to Holland, which also refused aid, pleading the
same purpose of neutrality. This concert of action between the two
maritime States forced Russia to abandon so distant an expedition and
illustrated the advantage she would have obtained from the emperor's
claim to the Scheldt. It was at this time that the celebrated Paul
Jones, who had distinguished himself by his desperate courage in the
American Revolutionary War, took service in the Russian Navy and was
given a high command; but his appointment so offended the British
officers already serving in the fleet, whom their government had
foreborne to recall, that they at once resigned. The Russians could
not afford to lose so many capable men, and Jones was transferred from
the Baltic to the Black Sea.
Soon a fourth State took part in the contest. On the 21st of June,
1788, Sweden advanced her troops into Russian Finland, and on the 30th
war against her was declared by Russia. It now proved fortunate for
the latter that she had not been able to get her fleet away from the
Baltic. The fighting on land was there mainly confined to the north
coast of the Gulf of Finland, while in the waters of the Gulf several
very severe actions took place. These battles were fought not only
between ships-of-the-line of the usual type, but by large flotillas of
gunboats and galleys, and were attended with a loss of life unusual in
naval actions.
War being now in full swing throughout the East, Great Britain and
Prussia drew together in a defensive treaty, and were joined by Holland
also, under the new lease of power of the stadtholder and British
party. The quota of troops or ships to be furnished in case of need by
each State was stipulated. The allies soon had occasion to act in favor
of one of the belligerents. Denmark, the hereditary enemy of Sweden,
and now in alliance with Russia, took this opportunity to invade the
former country from Norway, then attached to the Danish crown. On
September 24, 1788, twelve thousand Danish troops crossed the frontier
and advanced upon Gottenburg, which was on the point of surrendering
when the sudden and unexpected arrival of the king, in person and
alone, prevented. There was not, however, force enough to save the
town, had not Great Britain and Prussia interfered. The British
minister at Copenhagen passed over hastily into Gottenburg, induced the
Swedish king to accept the mediation of the two governments, and then
notified the Danish commander that, if the invasion of Sweden was not
stopped, Denmark would be by them attacked. The peremptory tone held
by the minister swept away the flimsy pretext that the Danish corps
was only an auxiliary, furnished to Russia in accordance with existing
treaty, and therefore really a Russian force. There was nothing left
for Denmark but to recede; an armistice was signed at once and a month
later her troops were withdrawn.
The true significance of the alliance between the two Western Powers,
to which Holland was accessory, is markedly shown by this action,
which, while ostensibly friendly to Sweden, was really hostile to
Russia and a diversion in favor of the sultan. Great Britain and
Prussia, in consequence of the growing strength and influence of Russia
in the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Continent, and to check her
progress, followed what was then considered to be the natural policy
of France, induced by ties and traditions long antedating the existing
state of things in Europe. Sweden then, and Turkey later, traditional
allies of France, and in so far in the opposite scale of the balance
from Great Britain, were to be supported by the demonstration—and if
need were by the employment—of force. This was done, not because France
was as yet less dreaded, but because Russia had become so much more
formidable. It was again the coming Eastern Question in which, from
the very distance of the central scene of action from Western Europe,
and from the character of the interests and of the strategic points
involved, Sea Power, represented chiefly by the maritime strength and
colonial expansion of Great Britain, was to play the leading and most
decisive part. It was the dawning of the day, whose noon the nineteenth
century has not yet seen, during which Nelson and Napoleon, Mohammed
Ali and Ibrahim Pasha, the Sultan Mahmoud and the Czar Nicholas,
Napier, Stopford, and Lalande in 1840, the heroes of Kars, Silistria,
and the Crimea, and of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, were to play
their parts upon the scene.
But in the years after the Peace of Versailles this was a new
question, upon which opinions were unformed. It was true that, to quote
from a contemporary writer, "England had had full leisure to ruminate
upon, and sufficient cause to reprobate, that absurd and blind policy,
under the influence of which she had drawn an uncertain ally, and an
ever-to-be-suspected friend, from the bottom of the Bothnic Gulf to
establish a new naval empire in the Mediterranean and Archipelago."[6]
These meditations had not been fruitless, as was seen by the consistent
attitude of Pitt's ministry at this time; but on the other hand, when
it was proposed in 1791 to increase the naval force in commission,
in order "to add weight to the representations"[7] being made by the
allies to the belligerents,—in order, in other words, to support Turkey
by an armed demonstration,—Fox, the leader of the Whigs, said that "an
alliance with Russia appeared to him the most natural and advantageous
that we could possibly form;"[8] while Burke, than whom no man had a
juster reputation for political wisdom, observed that "the considering
the Turkish Empire as any part of the balance of power in Europe was
new. The principles of alliance and the doctrines drawn from thence
were entirely new. Russia was our natural ally and the most useful ally
we had in a commercial sense."[9] That these distinguished members
of the opposition represented the feelings of many supporters of the
ministry was shown by a diminished majority, 93, in the vote that
followed. The opposition, thus encouraged, then introduced a series
of resolutions, the gist of which lay in these words: "The interests
of Great Britain are not likely to be affected by the progress of the
Russian arms on the borders of the Black Sea."[10] In the vote on this,
the minister's majority again fell to eighty, despite the arguments
of those who asserted that "the possession of Oczakow by the empress
would facilitate not only the acquisition of Constantinople, but of all
lower Egypt and Alexandria; which would give to Russia the supremacy in
the Mediterranean, and render her a formidable rival to us both as a
maritime and commercial power." After making every allowance for party
spirit, it is evident that British feeling was only slowly turning into
the channels in which it has since run so strongly.
France, under the pressure of her inward troubles, was debarred from
taking part with her old allies in the East, and withdrew more and more
from all outward action. On the 8th of August, 1788, the king fixed the
1st of May, 1789, as the day for the meeting of the States General;
and in November the Notables met for the second time, to consider the
constitution and mode of procedure in that body, the representation in
it of the Third Estate, and the vote by orders. They were adjourned
after a month's session; and the court, contrary to the judgment of the
majority among them, proclaimed on the 27th of December, 1788, that the
representatives of the Third Estate should equal in number those of
the two others combined. No decision was given as to whether the votes
should be individual, or by orders.
Oczakow was taken by the Russians on the 17th of December, 1788,
and during the following year the Eastern war raged violently both
in the Baltic and in southeastern Europe. Turkey was everywhere
worsted. Belgrade was taken on the 8th of October by the Austrians,
who afterwards occupied Bucharest and advanced as far as Orsova. The
Russians reduced Galatz, Bender, and other places. Besides losing
territory, the Turks were defeated in several pitched battles. The
conduct of the war on their part was much affected by the death of the
reigning sultan.
The Swedish war was in its results unimportant, except as a diversion
in favor of Turkey. To keep it up as such, subsidies were sent from
Constantinople to Stockholm. Great Britain and Prussia were obliged
again to threaten Denmark, in 1789, to keep her from aiding Russia.
The British minister, speaking for both States, expressed their
fixed determination to maintain the balance of power in the North. A
defensive alliance was then formed between Russia and Austria on the
one hand, and France and Spain on the other. The Bourbon kingdoms
pledged themselves to a strict neutrality in the Eastern War as it then
existed; but if Russia or Austria were attacked by any other State,
they were to be helped,—Austria, by an army of sixty thousand men;
Russia, by a fleet of sixteen ships-of-the-line and twelve frigates.
The latter provision shows both the kind of attack feared by Russia and
the direction of her ambition.
On the 4th of May of this year, 1789, the States General met at
Versailles, and the French Revolution thenceforth went on apace. The
Bastille was stormed July 14th. In October the royal family were
brought forcibly from Versailles to Paris by the mob. The earlier
events of the Revolution will hereafter be summarily related by
themselves, before going on with the war to which they led. It will
here be enough to say that the voice of France was now silent outside
her own borders.
In 1790 the Eastern War was practically brought to an end. On the 31st
of January a very close treaty of alliance was made between Prussia
and the Porte,—the king binding himself to declare war at a set time
against both Russia and Austria. The emperor died in February, and
was succeeded by his brother Leopold, who was disposed to peace. A
convention was soon after held, at which sat ministers of Austria,
Prussia, Great Britain, and the United Provinces; the two latter acting
as mediators because Prussia had taken such a pronounced attitude of
hostility to Austria. A treaty was signed July 27, by which the emperor
renounced his alliance with Russia. On September 20, he agreed to an
armistice with Turkey; which, after long negotiation, was followed by
a definitive peace, concluded August 4, 1791.
The Russian conflict with Turkey languished during the summer of 1790.
Active operations began in October, and continued during a season whose
severities the Russian could bear better than the Turk. The final blow
of the campaign and of the war was the taking of Ismail by Suwarrow, a
deed of arms so tremendous and full of horrors that a brief account of
its circumstances is allowable even to our subject.
The town, which was looked on as the key of the lower Danube, was
surrounded by three lines of wall, each with its proper ditch, and
contained a garrison of thirteen thousand. Its population, besides
the troops, was about thirty thousand. Owing to the season, December,
Suwarrow determined not to attempt a regular siege, but to carry the
place by assault, at any cost of life. Batteries were consequently put
up in every available place, and as rapidly as possible, in order to
prepare for and cover the attack. At five o'clock Christmas morning
they all opened together, and, after a furious cannonade of two hours,
the Russians moved forward in eight columns. After a three hours
struggle the assailants were forced back; but Suwarrow, whose influence
over his soldiers was unbounded, ran to the front, and, planting a
Russian flag on one of the enemy's works, asked his men if they would
leave it behind them. Through his efforts and those of the officers,
the troops returned to the charge. The conflict, which must have
resolved itself into a multitude of hand-to-hand encounters, lasted
till midnight, when, after an eighteen hours fight, the third line of
defence was carried and resistance ceased, though bloodshed continued
through the night. It was computed at the time that thirty thousand
Turks, including women and children, and some twenty thousand Russian
soldiers died violent deaths during that Christmas day of 1790. Warlike
operations continued during the spring, but preliminaries of peace
between Russia and Turkey were signed at Galatz on the 11th of August,
1791.
This put an end to hostilities throughout the East, peace having been
made between Russia and Sweden a year before, on August 11, 1790. The
time of attack had been well chosen by the Swedish king, and had public
opinion in Great Britain approached unanimity, a powerful lever would
have been put in her hands to break down the Russian attack on Turkey
by supporting the diversion in the North. The Russian and Swedish
fleets were so evenly balanced that a small British division would have
turned the scale, controlled the Baltic, and kept open the Swedish
communications from Finland to their own coast. So far, however, was
the nation from being of one mind that, as we have seen, the minister's
majority steadily fell, and he probably knew that among those who voted
straight, many were far from hearty in his support. Prussia also did
not back Sweden as she should have done, after definitely embracing
that policy, though she was both disconcerted and angered at the peace
for which she had not looked. This irresolution on the part of the
allied States limited their action to interposing between Sweden and
Denmark, and prevented the results which might reasonably have been
expected in the north, and yet more in the east of Europe; but it
does not take from the significance of their attitude, nor hide the
revolution in British statesmanship which marks the ten years now being
treated.
The tendency thus indicated was suddenly, though only temporarily,
checked by the Revolution in France. The troubles that had been so long
fomenting in that country had, after a short and delusive period of
seeming repose, begun again at nearly the very moment that the Eastern
War was ending. This will be seen by bringing together the dates at
which were happening these weighty events in the East and West.
It was on the 6th of October, 1789, that the king and royal family were
brought from Versailles to Paris, unwilling but constrained. After
this outbreak of popular feeling, comparative quiet continued through
the last months of 1789 and all of 1790, during which were fought in
the East the most important battles of the war, both in the Baltic
and on the Danube, including the bloody assault of Ismail. During
this time, however, Louis XVI. underwent many bitter mortifications,
either intended as such, or else unavoidably humiliating to his sense
of position. In June, 1791, he fled with his family from Paris to put
himself in the care of part of the army stationed in eastern France
under the Marquis de Bouillé and believed to be thoroughly trustworthy.
Before reaching his destination he was recognized, and brought back
to Paris a prisoner. The greeting of the royal family was significant
of the change that had passed over the people within a few years, and
which their unsuccessful flight had intensified. They were met by
perfect silence, while some distance ahead of them rode an officer
commanding the bystanders not to uncover. Despite the distrust it
felt, the Constituent Assembly went on with the work of framing a
constitution in which the king still had a recognized position, and
which he formally accepted on the 14th of September, 1791. During that
summer, peace was signed between Russia and Turkey, and a meeting was
had at Pilnitz between the emperor and the king of Prussia, after which
they put out their joint declaration that the situation in which the
king of France found himself was an object of common concern to all the
rulers of Europe; that "they hoped this common concern would lead them
to employ, in conjunction with the two declaring sovereigns, the most
efficacious means, relative to their forces, in order to enable the
king of France to consolidate in the most perfect liberty, the basis of
a monarchical government equally suitable to the rights of sovereigns
and the welfare of the French nation." The two princes ended by
stating their own readiness to join in such united action with the
force necessary to obtain the common end proposed, and that they would,
meanwhile, give orders to their troops to be ready to put themselves in
a state of activity.
The close coincidence in date of the Declaration of Pilnitz, August
27, 1791, with the Peace of Galatz, signed August 11, is curious
enough for passing remark; the one formally opening the new channel of
European interest and action, while the other marked the close of the
old. The Declaration, however, was in the same line of effort that the
new emperor had for some time been following. It met with a somewhat
hesitating response. Russia and Sweden agreed to raise an army, which
Spain was to subsidize; but Great Britain, under Pitt, declined to
meddle in the internal affairs of another state.
The first National or, as it is conveniently called, Constituent
Assembly, dissolved after framing a Constitution; and the following
day, October 1, 1791, the second Assembly, known as the Legislative,
came together. The Declaration of Pilnitz had strongly moved the
French people and increased, perhaps unjustly, their distrust of the
king. This change of temper was reflected in the Assembly. Strong
representations and arguments were exchanged between the ministers
of foreign affairs in Austria and France, through the ambassadors
at either court; but in truth there was no common ground of opinion
on which the new republic and the old empires could meet. The
movements on either side were viewed with studied suspicion, and war
was finally declared by France against Austria, April 20, 1792. The
first unimportant encounters were unfavorable to the French; but more
serious danger than that which threatened from without was arising
within France itself. The king and the Assembly came into collision
through the use by the former of his constitutional power of Veto. The
agitation spread to the streets. On the 20th of June a deputation from
the mob of Paris appeared before the Assembly, and asked permission
for the citizens outside to defile before it, as a demonstration of
their support. The extraordinary request was granted; and an immense
crowd pressed forward, of people of all ages, armed with weapons of
every kind, among which appeared a pike carrying the heart of a bull
labelled an "Aristocrat's heart." From the Assembly the crowd went to
the Louvre, and thence forced their way through the palace gates into
the king's presence. The unhappy Louis bore himself with calm courage,
to which perhaps he, at the moment, owed his life; but he submitted to
put on the symbolic red cap, and to drink to the nation from a bottle
handed him by a drunken rioter.
Little was left in life for a king thus humbled, and his final
humiliation was close at hand. Prussia had not long delayed to act
in concert with the emperor, after France declared war. On July 26,
a month after the strange scene in the Tuileries, was issued an
exposition of her reasons for taking arms; and at the same time the
Duke of Brunswick, commander-in-chief of the allied armies, put forth a
proclamation to the French framed in such violent terms as to stir to
the utmost the angry passions of a frantic and excitable race. On the
10th of August the Paris mob again stormed the Tuileries, the king and
royal family fled for safety to the hall of the Legislature, the Swiss
Guards were killed and the palace gutted. The Assembly then decreed the
suspension of the king; and on the 13th of August the royal family was
removed to the Temple, the last home on earth for several of them.
On the 2d of September occurred the butcheries known as the September
Massacres. To this date and this act is to be referred the great change
in British feeling toward the Revolution. On the 20th the battle of
Valmy, by some thought decisive of the fate of the Revolution, was won
by the French. Though being otherwise far from a battle of the first
importance, it led to the retreat of the allied forces and destroyed
for a time the hopes of the royalists. Two days after Valmy met the
third Assembly, the National Convention of terrible memory. Its first
act was to decree the abolition of royalty in France; but the power
that swayed the country was passing more and more to the mob of Paris,
expressing itself through the clubs of which the Jacobin is the best
known. The violence and fanaticism of the extreme republicans and of
the most brutal elements of the populace found ever louder voice. On
the 19th of November the Convention passed a decree declaring, "in
the name of the French nation, that they will grant fraternity and
assistance to all people who wish to recover their liberty; and they
charge the executive power to send the necessary orders to the generals
to give assistance to such people, and to defend those citizens who
have suffered, or may suffer, in the cause of liberty." It was denied
by the French diplomatists that there was any intention of favoring
insurrections or exciting disturbances in any friendly country; but
such intention is nevertheless fairly deducible from the words, and
when a motion was made to explain that they were not so meant, the
Convention refused to consider it. Mr. Fox, the ardent champion of
the Revolution in Parliament, spoke of this edict as an insult to the
British people.
Meantime the battle of Valmy had been followed by that of Jemappes,
fought November 6. On the 14th the French army entered Brussels, and
the Austrian Netherlands were rapidly occupied. This was instantly
succeeded by a decree, dated November 16, opening the Scheldt, upon the
express ground of natural right; the boisterous young republic cutting
at one blow the knot which had refused to be untied by the weak hands
of Joseph II. Decided action followed, a French squadron entering the
river from the sea and forcing its way up, despite the protests of
the Dutch officers, in order to take part in the siege of Antwerp.
This was a new offence to the British Sea Power, which was yet further
angered by a decree of December 15, extending the French system to all
countries occupied by their armies. The words of this proclamation were
so sweeping that they could scarcely but seem, to those untouched with
the fiery passion of the Revolution, to threaten the destruction of all
existing social order. The British ministry on the last day of the year
1792 declared that "this government will never see with indifference
that France shall make herself, directly or indirectly, sovereign of
the Low Countries, or general arbitress of the rights and liberties of
Europe."[11]
While the Revolution was thus justifying the fears and accusations of
those who foretold that it could not confine itself to the overturn
of domestic institutions, but would seek to thrust its beliefs and
principles forcibly upon other nations, the leaders were hurrying on
the destruction of the king. Arraigned on the 11th of December, 1792,
Louis XVI. was brought to trial on the 26th, sentenced to death January
16, and executed January 21, 1793. This deed brought to a decided
issue the relations between France and Great Britain, which, from
an uncertain and unsatisfactory condition, had become more and more
embittered by the course of events ever since the November decree of
fraternity. As far back as August 10, when the king was suspended, the
British government had recalled its ambassador, who was not replaced;
and had persisted in attributing to the French minister in London an
ambiguous character, recognizing him only as accredited by the king who
had actually ceased to reign—by a government which in fact no longer
existed. Points of form were raised with exasperating, yet civil,
insolence, as to the position which M. Chauvelin, the minister in
question, actually occupied; and his office was not made more pleasant
by the failure of his own government to send him new credentials.
Papers written by him were returned by Lord Grenville, the foreign
minister, because his claim to represent the French republic was not
recognized; or, if accepted, they were only received as unofficial.
The letters thus exchanged, under forms so unsatisfactory, were filled
with mutual accusations, and arguments marked by the brisk vivacity of
the one nation and the cool aggressiveness of the other; but starting
as they did from the differing bases of natural rights on the one hand,
and established institutions on the other, no agreement was approached.
The questions of the Scheldt, of the decree of fraternity, and of that
extending the French system to countries occupied by their armies, were
thus disputed back and forth; and to them were added the complaints
of France against an Alien Act, passed by Parliament, January 4,
1793, laying vexatious restrictions upon the movements of foreigners
arriving in Great Britain, or wishing to change their abode if already
resident. This act M. Chauvelin rightly believed to be specially aimed
at Frenchmen. It sprang from the growing apprehension and change of
feeling in England; a change emphasized by a break in the Parliamentary
Opposition, a large number of whom, in this same month of January,
1793, definitively took the step in which their great associate, Edmund
Burke, had preceded them, broke their party ties, and passed over to
the support of Pitt. The latter would seem to have become convinced
that war was inevitable; that the question was no longer whether a
nation should exercise a right of changing its institutions, but
whether a plague should be stamped out before it had passed its borders
and infected yet healthy peoples.
Things had come to this state when news reached London of the death
sentence of the French king. M. Chauvelin had just received and
presented credentials from the republican government. On January 20,
the minister informed him that the king, under present circumstances,
did not think fit to receive them, adding the irritating words: "As
minister of the Most Christian King, you would have enjoyed all the
exemptions which the law grants to public ministers, recognized as
such; but as a private person you cannot but return to the general mass
of foreigners resident in England."[12] On the 24th of January, the
execution of Louis XVI. being now known, Lord Grenville wrote to him:
"The King can no longer, after such an event, permit your residence
here. His Majesty has thought fit to order that you should retire from
the kingdom within the space of eight days, and I herewith transmit
to you a copy of the order which His Majesty has given me to that
effect."[12]
On the 1st of February, 1793, the French republic declared war against
Great Britain and Holland. It was already at war with Austria, Prussia
and Sardinia; while Russia and Sweden were avowedly unfriendly, and
Spain almost openly hostile.