That it shall be the duty of the Superintendent of Finance, to examine

into the state of the public debts, the public expenditures, and the

public revenue; to digest and report plans for improving and

regulating the finances, and for establishing order and economy in the

expenditure of the public money; to direct the execution of all plans,

which shall be adopted by Congress respecting revenue and expenditure;

to superintend and control the settlement of all public accounts; to

direct and control all persons employed in procuring supplies for the

public service, and in the expenditure of public money; to obtain

accounts of all the issues of the specific supplies furnished by the

several States; to compel the payment of all moneys due to the United

States, and in his official character, or in such manner as the laws

of the respective States shall direct, to prosecute in behalf of the

United States, for all delinquencies respecting the public revenue and

expenditures; to report to Congress the officers who shall be

necessary for assisting him in the various branches of his Department.

_In Congress, February 20th._ Congress proceeded to the election of a

Superintendent of Finance; and the ballots being taken, Robert Morris

was unanimously elected.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Philadelphia, March 13th, 1781.

Sir,

I had the honor to receive your Excellency's letter of the 21st of

last month, enclosing the Act of Congress of the 20th, whereby I am

appointed, by a unanimous election of that honorable body, to the

important office of SUPERINTENDENT OF FINANCE. Perfectly sensible of

the honor done me by this strong mark of confidence from the sovereign

authority of the United States, I feel myself bound to make the

acknowledgments due, by pursuing a conduct formed to answer the

expectations of Congress, and promote the public welfare. Were my

abilities equal to my desire of serving America, I should have given

an immediate determination after this appointment was made; but

conscious of my own deficiencies, time for consideration was

absolutely necessary. Little, however of that time, which has elapsed

have I been able to devote to this object, as the business before the

Legislature of Pennsylvania wherein I have the honor of a seat, has

demanded and continues to demand my constant attendance.

So far as the station of Superintendent of Finance, or indeed any

other public station or office, applies to myself I should without the

least hesitation have declined an acceptance; for after upwards of

twenty years assiduous application to business as a merchant, I find

myself at that period when my mind, body, and inclination combine to

seek for relaxation and ease. Providence had so far smiled on my

endeavors as to enable me to prepare for the indulgence of these

feelings, in such a manner as would be least injurious to the interest

of my family. If, therefore, I accept this appointment, a sacrifice of

that case, of much social and domestic enjoyment, and of every

material interest, must be the inevitable consequence; and as my

ambition was entirely gratified by my present situation and character

in life, no motive of that kind can stimulate me to the acceptance.

Putting myself out of the question, the sole motive is the public

good; and this motive I confess comes home to my feelings. The contest

we are engaged in appeared to me, in the first instance, just and

necessary; therefore, I took an active part in it. As it became

_dangerous_, I thought it the more _glorious_, and was stimulated to

the greatest exertions in my power, when the affairs of America were

at the worst. Sensible of the want of arrangement in our monied

affairs, the same considerations impel me to this undertaking, which I

would embark in without hesitation, could I believe myself equal

thereto; but fearing this may not be the case, it becomes

indispensably necessary to make such stipulations, as may give ease to

my feelings, aid my exertions, and tend to procure ample support to my

conduct in office, so long as it is founded in and guided by a regard

to the public prosperity.

In the first place then, I am to inform Congress, that the preparatory

steps I had taken to procure to myself relaxation from business, with

least injury to the interests of my family, were by engaging in

certain commercial establishments with persons, in whom I had perfect

confidence as to their integrity, honor, and abilities. These

establishments I am bound in honor and by contracts to support to the

extent agreed on. If, therefore, it be in the idea of Congress, that

the office of Superintendent of Finance is incompatible with

commercial concerns and connexions, the point is settled; for I cannot

on any consideration consent to violate engagements or depart from

those principles of honor, which it is my pride to be governed by. If,

on the contrary, Congress have elected me to this office under the

expectation, that my mercantile connexions and engagements were to

continue, an express declaration of their sentiments should appear on

the minutes, that no doubt may arise or reflections be cast on this

score hereafter.

I also think it indispensably necessary, that the appointment of all

persons who are to act in my office, under the same roof, or in

immediate connexion with, should be made by myself; Congress first

agreeing, that such secretaries, clerks, or officers, so to be

appointed are necessary, and fixing the salaries for each. I conceive,

that it will be impossible to execute the duties of this office with

effect, unless the absolute power of dismissing from office or

employment all persons whatever, that are concerned in the official

expenditure of public moneys, be committed to the Superintendent of

Finance. For unless this power can be exercised without control, I

have little hopes of efficacy in the business of reformation, which is

probably the most essential part of the duty.

These being the only positive stipulations that occur to me at this

time, the determination of Congress thereon will enable me to

determine whether to accept or decline the appointment. I must,

however, observe that the act of Congress of the 7th of February,

describing the duties of the Superintendent of Finance, requires the

execution of many things, for which adequate powers are not provided,

and it cannot be expected, that your officer can in such case be

responsible. These however may be the subjects of future discussions.

With sentiments of the highest respect, for you and Congress, I have

the honor to subscribe myself, your Excellency's most obedient and

most humble servant.

ROBERT MORRIS.[30]

FOOTNOTES:

[30] During the whole period in which Mr Morris held the office of

Superintendent of Finance, he kept a _Diary_, in which he entered

daily the principal transactions of his department. The following is

an extract from the Diary.

"On the 21st of February I received a letter from the President of

Congress, enclosing the resolves of the 20th, whereby I was

unanimously elected the Superintendent of Finance of the United

States. This appointment was unsought, unsolicited, and dangerous to

accept, as it was evidently contrary to my private interest, and if

accepted must deprive me of those enjoyments, social and domestic,

which my time of life required, and to which my circumstances entitled

me; and a vigorous execution of the duties must inevitably expose me

to the resentment of disappointed and designing men, and to the

calumny and detraction of the envious and malicious. I was therefore

determined not to engage in so arduous an undertaking. But the

solicitations of my friends, acquaintance, and fellow citizens, a full

conviction of the necessity, that some person should commence the work

of reformation in our public affairs, by an attempt to introduce

system and economy, and the persuasion, that a refusal on my part,

would probably deter others from attempting this work, so absolutely

necessary to the safety of our country; these considerations, after

much reflection and consultation with friends, induced me to write a

letter to the President of Congress, dated the 13th of March, 1781."

* * * * *

PROCEEDINGS IN CONGRESS.

_March 20th._ A letter of the 13th instant from Robert Morris was

taken into consideration, and it was

_Resolved_, that the United States in Congress assembled do not

require him to dissolve the commercial connexions referred to in the

said letter.

_March 21st._ The consideration of the letter of the 13th instant,

from Robert Morris being resumed, a motion was made, and it was

_Resolved_, that the Superintendent of Finance be, and he is hereby

empowered to appoint and remove at his pleasure, his assistants in his

peculiar office or chamber of business in immediate connexion with

him; it being first determined by the United States in Congress

assembled, that such assistants so to be appointed are necessary, and

what the salary of each shall be.

_Ordered_, that the remainder of Mr Morris's letter be referred to a

committee of three. The members appointed were Messrs Houston, Burke,

and Wolcott.

* * * * *

TO THOMAS BURKE, WILLIAM HOUSTON, AND OLIVER WOLCOTT, COMMITTEE OF

CONGRESS.

Date Uncertain.

Gentlemen,

When I had the honor of a visit from you on the subject of my

interview with Congress, it was agreed that I should make out and

deliver you a list of the several officers concerned in the

expenditure of public money, over whom I judged it necessary for the

Superintendent of Finance to have the uncontrolled power of

dismission. But on reflection I found it was not in my power to render

such a list, because I do not know the several degrees of officers now

in employment, and even if I did, such a list would not answer the

end, because others may hereafter be created, who should also be

subjected to the power of the Financier, and it would be very

troublesome for Congress on every such appointment to pass a

resolution for the purpose. There will also be appointments made

occasionally by the Commander in Chief, the Heads of Department, and

by other officers, in which the expenditure of public moneys will be

involved, and of course such appointments must also be subject to the

same authority. For these reasons, it seems proper that the power of

the Minister of Finance, with respect to the control and dismission

from office of all persons concerned in the expenditure of public

property, should be defined in one Act of Congress, vesting him with

that authority.

To me it appears absolutely necessary, that this power should be

vested in the Financier to enable him to remedy and prevent public

abuses; and the _extent_ should be measured by the _necessity_ and the

_use_. As to myself, I am far from desiring power for the sake of

power. Indeed I think it is generally more dangerous to the possessor

than to the objects of it. Consequently I cannot have a wish to extend

it beyond the necessity and utility mentioned.

The whole business of finance may be described in two short but

comprehensive sentences, if I have proper notions on the subject. _It

is to raise the public revenues, by such modes as may be most easy and

most equal to the people; and to expend them in the most frugal, fair,

and honest manner._ In our case the first part must ever be the

business of Congress, and the Legislatures of the respective States;

because the powers of taxation cannot be delegated. The second I take

to be the most essential part of the duty of the Superintendent of

Finance. He must ever have it in view to reduce the expenditures as

nearly as possible to what in justice and in reason they ought to be;

and to do this, he must be vested with power to dismiss from

employment those officers he shall find unnecessary, unequal to their

stations, inattentive to their duty, or dishonest in the exercise of

it.

In a monarchy this power need not be officially vested in a Minister,

because he can have constant intercourse with the Sovereign, and by

that means he is in the daily exercise of it. Where the sovereignty is

vested in a public body of men, such an intercourse is impracticable;

and I am persuaded that a Minister who would venture to execute the

duties of his office with vigor, without possessing uncontrolled the

power of dismission, would in a few months put it out of his power to

proceed in his business, and Congress would have full employment to

hear and determine between him and suspended officers. On the

contrary, if a dismissed officer can have no appeal but to the laws of

the land, Congress will not be troubled, business may be conducted

with decision, and the very knowledge that such a power exists, will

have a tendency to prevent the frequent exercise of it, after the

first reforms are effected.

I have been told, that some gentlemen considered the expressions in my

letter to Congress on this subject so general as that they might be

construed to comprehend the Commander in Chief, Heads of Department,

&c. But this cannot be. The Commander in Chief is not concerned

himself, but employs others in the expenditure of public money, to

whom he grants warrants or drafts on the military chest; and the

persons so employed ought to be accountable, and subject to

dismission. I suppose officers of the army may frequently be so

employed, and in that case it cannot be supposed, that the power of

the Financier extends to the military commission, for it certainly

must be confined to the money matters. There is one exception with

respect to what I have said of the Commander in Chief, and that is the

expenditures for secret service, and in this respect I think he should

be responsible to the Sovereign only.

The Quarter Master General, having a military as well as a civil duty,

he cannot be under the control of the Financier, for the first,

although he certainly ought to be the last, which has great connexion

with heavy expense, and perhaps it would be best, that he should

execute all the business of expenditures by one or more deputies,

which would exonerate him from that power, which they must be

subjected to. The Commissary General, and every person employed under

him, are the immediate objects of this power. The Paymaster General,

may be considered as a channel of conveyance, through which money

passes from the treasury to the army, and as he is subjected to the

law military, the Minister of Finance needs no other authority over

him and his officers, than the power of putting under arrest and

suspending for mal-conduct in office.

All persons employed as Commissaries of military stores, of clothing,

or any other denomination, wherein the expenditure of public money or

property is connected, ought to be subjected to this authority. The

expenses in the medical department are said to have exceeded those of

the like kind in any other country. It is, therefore, evident that the

Purveyors, Commissaries, &c. in this department should be subject to

the same immediate control as others; and although the Financier

cannot judge of the medical skill of the Director General and his

officers, yet if any waste or misapplication of public property in

their department should come to his knowledge, he should have

authority to bring offenders to a Court Martial.

There is no possibility of introducing public economy without the

frequent adjustment of accounts; and the more various these may be,

the greater is the necessity of constant attention to liquidate them

speedily and well. The Financier ought, therefore, to have the power

of removing any of the officers, whose business it is to examine and

settle the public accounts, that so he may be enabled to obtain a

proper and early settlement, and prevent the dangerous effects of

inattention or corruption on one hand, or of delay, insolence, and

tyranny to individuals concerned in such accounts, on the other. And

on account of this power the Financier should have no accounts with

the public himself, but wherever expenditures are necessary in his

department, he should employ proper persons therein, subject to the

same powers and modes of accounting with every other person employed

in expending public property; or if of necessity he shall at any time

have accounts with the public, Congress can appoint a committee, or

special board, to examine and settle his accounts.

From what I have already said, I think it is evident, that the power I

have stipulated for is absolutely necessary; and although it is not

possible to enumerate every object of that power, yet the general

lines within which they may be comprehended can be drawn from the

observations I have made, although I have said our foreign

departments, as these may be brought into consideration hereafter when

it shall appear necessary.

Whoever contemplates the extent of the United States, and the vast

amount of their present expenses, while at the same time all our

operations languish, must certainly be convinced that some immediate

remedy ought to be applied. The office of Superintendent of Finance I

suppose is meant as one means of restoring economy and vigor; and

nothing will keep up in the minds of the public servants such a

constant sense of their duty, as a knowledge of the power to remove

them in the hands of a person of vigilant and decisive character.

Whether I shall have sufficient courage and perseverance to act up to

that character, and whether my small abilities, supported by

application and attention, will enable me to render essential service

in the execution of this office, is become an object of great

consideration, that fills my mind with much apprehension, and induces

me to wish I had declined this arduous undertaking in the first

instance.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT MORRIS.

* * * * *

PROCEEDINGS IN CONGRESS.

_April 21st._ On a report of the committee, to whom was referred Mr

Morris's letter of the 13th of March,

_Resolved_, That the Superintendent of Finance be, and he is hereby

authorised, to remove from office or employment, for incapacity,

negligence, dishonesty or other misbehavior, such persons, not

immediately appointed by the United States in Congress assembled, as

are or may be officially intrusted with, and immediately employed in

the expenditure of the public supplies, stores, and other property; in

stating, examining and passing the public accounts, or in the receipt

of the continental revenues of the United States, and such of the said

persons as are or may be in his judgment unnecessary, reporting to

such authority, board, minister, or office, to whom it may belong to

supply the vacancy, the respective names of the persons so removed.

That he be authorised to suspend from office or employment, for

similar causes, persons officially employed and intrusted as

aforesaid, immediately appointed by the United States in Congress

assembled, reporting forthwith their names and the reason of

suspension.

Provided, that in all cases where any of the persons aforesaid, are or

may be amenable to the law martial, the Superintendent be, and he is

hereby authorised and directed, if he shall deem it most expedient for

the public service, to put them in arrest by order in writing, and to

apply to the officer whose duty it may be, to order a court martial;

and such officer is hereby directed to order proceedings on the arrest

accordingly.

That in every case of suspension, all pay and emoluments cease from

the date thereof, unless the persons suspended be, upon trial,

acquitted and restored; and the Superintendent shall have power to

supply the place when it may be necessary, by a temporary appointment,

to continue until the person suspended be restored or dismissed.

That the aforesaid powers shall not be construed to interfere with the

rank, commission, or military duty of any officer in the line of the

army, or those who may be duly intrusted with money for secret

services by Congress, or the Commander in Chief of the army, or

commanding officer of a separate department.

That the powers aforesaid be exercised during the pleasure of

Congress, but not to extend beyond the duration of the war.

_April 27th._ On a further report of the committee on Mr Morris's

letter of the 13th ultimo,

_Resolved_, that in order that the Superintendent of Finance may be at

liberty to devote his time and attention to the more immediate duties

of his office, he be, and hereby is authorised, to appoint by letter

of attorney, or otherwise, such person or persons, as he may think

proper, to prosecute or defend for him, in his official capacity, or

in behalf of the United States, in all places where the same may be

necessary.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Philadelphia, May 14th, 1781.

Sir,

The honor conferred by Congress in appointing me Superintendent of

Finance, their several resolutions of the 20th of March, and the 21st

and 27th of April, which your Excellency has been pleased to transmit,

and a serious conviction of that duty, which every citizen owes to his

country, especially in times of public calamity, will no longer permit

me to hesitate about the acceptance of that office, although I must

again repeat, that I have the fullest sense of my own inability. I

shall, however, strive to find such assistance as will enable me, in

some measure, to answer the reasonable expectations of Congress, to

whom I can promise for myself nothing more than honest industry.

You will readily perceive, that much time must be consumed in

procuring proper officers; fixing on men for assistants, whose

abilities and integrity may be depended on; in laying plans for

obtaining money with the greatest ease to the people, and expending it

with the greatest advantage to the public; forming arrangements

necessary to carry these plans into execution; and obtaining

information as to the present state of things, in order that abuses

may be, if possible, speedily and effectually remedied.

Besides this, it will be necessary that I should confer with the

Commander in Chief, on the various expenditures of the war, and the

means of retrenching such as are unnecessary. Let me add, that the

accounts of my private business must be adjusted, so as that all my

affairs may be put into the hands of other persons, and subjected to

their management. My necessary commercial connexions, notwithstanding

the decided sense of Congress, expressed in their resolution of the

20th of March, might, if the business were transacted by myself, give

rise to illiberal reflections, equally painful to me and injurious to

the public. This reason alone would deserve great attention; but,

further, I expect that my whole time, study, and attention will be

necessarily devoted to the various business of my department.

Having thus stated some of the causes, which will prevent me from

immediately entering on the arduous task assigned me, I pray leave to

call the attention of Congress to the advanced season, and then I am

persuaded their own good sense will render it unnecessary for me to

observe, that very little can be expected from my exertions during the

present campaign; they will, therefore, easily perceive the propriety

of the request I am to make, that the business may go on according to

the present arrangements, or such other as Congress may devise, until

I can take it up, which I promise to do as speedily as possible. By

this means, I may be enabled so to dispose of the several members of

my department, as to form them into a regular system; whereas, by

throwing the whole immediately upon me, I shall be inevitably involved

in a labyrinth of confusion, from which no human efforts can ever

afterwards extricate me.

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