of their conquests it would be beneficial both to France and Spain,
yet it has not entered into their system so far as it regards America,
and that his Majesty accordingly refused to accede to the plan of
negotiation proposed by the mediating powers, which held up that idea.
He exhorts the Minister to recommend to Congress the most vigorous
exertions, and to assure them, that the expulsion of the enemy from
this continent depends in a great measure on the exertion of the
United States; that France would be able to afford us very little
assistance; and that Britain, so far from discovering any inclination
to peace upon reasonable terms, absolutely refused the plan of
negotiation proposed by the mediating powers; so that arms alone could
compel her to it. He mentions, that the King being apprehensive, that
the capture of the Marquis de Lafayette might reduce us to some
difficulties, had ordered her cargo to be replaced immediately; and
that in consequence of applications from the States of Virginia and
Maryland, he had ordered a number of arms and military stores to be
shipped to them, subject however to the order of Congress. That this
and the cargo designed to replace that of the Marquis de Lafayette,
were to be paid for out of the loan negotiated in Holland, which he
had occasion to think would be completed. He expresses a desire, that
the plan for the appointment of Consuls should be digested and
adopted, as the Court of France wished to make it the basis of some
commercial arrangements between France and the United States.
The Secretary for Foreign Affairs further informed Congress, that the
Minister of France had communicated to him the following extract of a
letter from the Count de Vergennes, which he had transmitted to the
Superintendent of Finance.
Extract of a letter from the Count de Vergennes, September 7th, 1781.
"We think that since the arrival of Colonel Laurens, you have stopped
the bills of Mr Morris on Messrs Le Couteulx. If the Superintendent
has not followed your advice, he will cause us some embarrassment, as
we have not destinated any fund for that article. We have
peremptorily declared to Dr Franklin, that we will not in future
discharge any bills, that had not been drawn with your consent. As to
you, Sir, we cannot but repeat our former instructions on this
subject; and we direct you to authorise no draft even for a small
sum."
* * * * *
No. 1.
_The Answer of his Most Christian Majesty to the Articles proposed by
the two Mediating Courts._[2]
Translation.
The mediators are too well satisfied of the moderation of the King,
and his constant wish for the re-establishment of peace, not to be
previously assured, that his Majesty will receive with as much
gratitude as warmth the _Preliminary Articles_ they have communicated.
The King, the more fully to convince the two high mediators of his
frankness and of the purity of his intentions, as well as of the
unreserved confidence, that he places in the justice and impartiality
of their High Imperial Majesties, believes he ought to make some
confidential observations upon these Preliminary Articles. His Majesty
flatters himself, that this will be more acceptable to them as its
sole objects are to prevent discussions, which are equally
mischievous and complicated, and to facilitate the much wished for
success of their generous interposition.
"ARTICLE I. _There shall be a negotiation at Vienna, by the united
care of the two Imperial Courts, embracing all the objects for the
re-establishment of peace, which the belligerent parties, who
intrust them with the mediation, shall judge proper to be there
proposed. A negotiation shall in the meantime be entered into
between Great Britain and her Colonies for the re-establishment of
peace in America, but without the intervention of either of the
other belligerent parties, or even of the two Imperial Courts,
unless their mediation shall be formally demanded and accorded,
for this object._"
According to the verbal observations, the expressions in the first
part of this Article have been used merely to place the King of Spain
in a situation to propose the cession of Gibraltar, and this turn has
been judged necessary because the Court of London had previously
declared, that it ought to be made without reference to this cession,
while the Catholic King demands it as a preliminary; as this part of
the Article immediately affects the Court of Madrid, the King cannot
but refer himself to it for the answer that shall be made thereto. His
Majesty is content to observe, that having united himself in the same
cause with the King, his uncle, he neither can nor will separate his
interests from those of that Prince, and that he regards the
satisfaction he claims as a condition, without which he cannot
personally treat of those matters.
As to the second part of the Article, the two Imperial Courts cannot
flatter themselves with the hopes of bringing their mediation to a
happy issue, if they do not prevent the subterfuges, the subtelties
and false interpretations, which either of the belligerent powers may
avail themselves of to explain according to their views the
preliminary propositions, which will certainly happen if they do not
previously ascertain the sense of the expressions, which relate to
America.
The Court of London will elude as much and as long as she possibly
can, the direct or indirect acknowledgement of the independence of the
United States, and will avail herself of the terms, that are used in
speaking of them, to maintain, that she is not obliged to treat with
her ancient Colonies as with a free and independent nation. That she
is consequently not reduced to admit a Plenipotentiary on their part,
and that she is at liberty to view the American representative as a
deputy from a part of her subjects who demand a favor. From whence it
will follow, that when the mediation is in force, and they shall be
about to enter upon the negotiation, that they will dispute the
character, in which the American Plenipotentiary shall be received.
The King of England will consider him as his subject, while Congress
will demand, that he shall be received as the representative of a free
people, by means whereof the mediation will be stopped at the first
outset.
To prevent this inconvenience it should seem, that previous to any
other measure, the _character of the American agent_ ought to be
determined in the most precise and positive manner, and Congress
should be invited to confide its interests to the mediation. This
invitation is so much the more interesting, as the negotiation
relative to America should go hand in hand with that of the Courts of
Madrid and Versailles, and by consequence, the negotiations although
separate should commence at the same time.
But who will invite the Congress to treat with England? The King
cannot, since the First Article excludes him from the negotiation.
This task then can only be executed by the mediators themselves; all
that the King can do, and that he will do with zeal and fidelity, is
to invite the Americans to the peace, and to facilitate it by every
means that they believe compatible with their essential interests. But
that the King may take this step with safety, and the hopes of
success, and with the certainty of not rendering himself suspected by
the Americans, it is necessary that he should first know the
determination of the mediators upon the observations now made to them,
and that this determination should be such as to secure to the
American States their political existence.
The two high mediators and their Ministers are too enlightened not to
perceive, that without this preliminary measure the Congress will send
no person to Vienna, and that the King can make no attempts to engage
them thereto, without incurring the danger of involving himself, by
means whereof, and for the reasons already urged, the mediation will
be stopped at its first outset. These reflections appear to merit the
most serious attention of the two mediating Courts.
"ARTICLE II. _This separate peace cannot, however, be signed,
except conjointly, and at the same time with that of the powers
whose interests shall be treated by the mediating Courts. Although
neither peace, notwithstanding they are treated separately, shall
be concluded without the other, yet care shall be taken to inform
the mediators constantly of the progress of that, which regards
Great Britain and the Colonies, to the end, that the mediation may
be able to regulate the measures intrusted to it according to the
state of the negotiation relating to the Colonies, and both of the
pacifications, which shall have been separately concluded at the
same time, shall be solemnly guarantied by the mediating Courts,
and by every other neutral power, whose guarantee the belligerent
powers may think proper to claim._"
When the United States shall have been duly called to the Congress at
Vienna, and shall have commenced their separate negotiation with
England, this Article will make no difficulty with his Majesty.
"ARTICLE III. _To render the negotiations of peace independent of
events of war, always uncertain, which may arrest, or at least
retard their progress, there shall be a general armistice between
the two parties, during the term of one year, reckoning from ----
of the month of ---- of the present year, or reckoning from the
month of ---- of the year 1782. Should it happen, that a general
peace should not be re-established during the first term, or
whilst the duration of either of these terms continues, everything
shall remain in the same state, in which it shall be found at the
signing of these preliminaries._"
This Article includes two objects equally important; an armistice and
a _statu quo_. The mediators have already acknowledged, that without
this preliminary basis, they cannot enter upon a serious negotiation
for a peace; and, for still stronger reason, these preliminaries
should be established before a truce can be spoken of.
The two mediating Courts are themselves of this opinion, since they do
not propose the armistice, but in consequence of the acceptation of
the first and second Preliminary Articles. The King thinks, that
before they can agree to an armistice, it is necessary that the
belligerent parties should have established preliminaries; and it
cannot be denied, that the basis, which the high mediators have
proposed, may lead to a delay of those preliminaries, which should
serve as the pledge and security for the re-establishment of peace,
when, in fact, they really afford none.
But when these preliminaries shall be invariably established, it may
be of consequence to determine what duration should be given to the
suspension of arms. The plan of the mediators proposes one year; but
this term appears too short not to be illusory. In fact, it should be
observed, that the fire of war being kindled in the four quarters of
the world, one part of the year will have revolved before the orders
can be received by the respective commanders; so that tranquillity
will be established in Europe, while hostilities continue in America
and in the Indies. Besides, all the powers remaining armed, the
slightest circumstance may occasion a violation of the truce.
In fine, it is in vain to flatter ourselves with the hope of
concluding a definitive peace in the short space of one year; as,
exclusive of the variety of subjects, that must necessarily be
discussed, the two mediating Courts are at a great distance from each
other; nor is there less between the belligerent powers; and we should
deceive ourselves, if we supposed, that all the propositions, which
will be made on the one part, and on the other, will not give room for
much debate and altercation; or, that they will not, consequently,
consume much time.
To these considerations we ought to add, that an armistice for one
year would be very burdensome, because the powers at war will be
obliged to remain in arms, to their manifest loss, as it will be
impracticable to disarm, as well from the dispersion of the troops, as
from the enormous expense, if, (which is highly probable) it should
become necessary to renew hostilities. If, then, the mediators wish
sincerely to establish the peace they propose, they should prefer a
truce of many years to a simple armistice for one year. This expedient
is better adapted to consolidate their work, than a suspension of arms
for a short time. But a truce will have the same inconveniences, and
be equally dangerous with an armistice, if the belligerent powers
remain under arms. Thus it seems necessary to agree at the same time
reciprocally to disarm.
But supposing these two points settled, there remains another equally
important, that is the _statu quo_. Neither France nor Spain have any
reason to reject it, so far as they are individually concerned. This
is not the case with the Americans. To be satisfied of this, we need
only cast our eyes upon the _points_, that the British troops actually
occupy upon the continent of North America. The question, then, will
be to obtain the consent of the United States, and this consent can
only be demanded by the two Courts that offer their mediation, for the
reasons that have already been urged.
"ARTICLE IV. _This plan of negotiation being adopted by all the
parties, the belligerent powers shall request the mediators to
open the conferences of the Congress, and shall without delay give
their respective plenipotentiaries such full powers and
instructions, as they shall judge necessary for the success of the
negotiation._"
The King will conform himself, with as much pleasure as earnestness,
to this Article, as soon as the preliminary basis shall be irrevocably
established, agreeably to the observation above mentioned. And the
King will then authorise his plenipotentiaries to treat immediately of
the Preliminary Articles, which should lead to a cessation of
hostilities; and, as soon as these Articles shall have been agreed to,
to labor with zeal and assiduity for the early conclusion of a
definitive treaty. The high mediators may be assured, that his Majesty
will facilitate this double task by every means, which he shall deem
compatible with his dignity, with his interest, and with those of his
allies; and that as far as depends upon him, they will acquire the
glory of having established, upon a solid and unalterable basis, the
peace and tranquillity of every part of the world.
FOOTNOTES:
[2] Austria and Russia proposed to act as mediators for a general
peace about the beginning of the year 1781. Some particulars on this
subject will be found in _John Adams's Correspondence_, Vol VI. p.
98;--also in _Flassan's Diplomatic Française_, Vol. VII. p. 300.--The
papers here inserted are imperfect, but they are all that could be
found in the Department of State. They will serve to illustrate that
part of the preceding communication of M. de la Luzerne, which relates
to the proposed mediation.
* * * * *
No. 2.
_The Answer of the Court of London to the Preliminary Articles
proposed by the Mediating Courts._
I am authorised to return an answer to the paper, which, by order of
your Court, you delivered me, and of which I have given an account to
his Majesty.
The answers marked A and B,[3] which I have the honor to submit to
you, explain the unalterable sentiments of the King, upon points
essential to his dignity, and demonstrate the reasons, that obliged
his Majesty to decline the plan proposed, so far as it relates to his
rebellious subjects. The King knows the justice and the impartiality
of the mediating Courts, and he considers the plan with that spirit
of conciliation which they give birth to. But his Majesty cannot but
see it in a very different point of view, from that in which it
appeared to the august mediators when they supposed it admissible in
all points.
The King persuades himself, that after having considered it again,
they will not entertain the same judgment relative thereto as
heretofore; and that they will even cease to wish that it should be
admitted, since, from their intention, as well as from the principles,
which they have laid down with so much wisdom, and which the King
adopts altogether, it necessarily results, that everything
inconsistent with the dignity of his Majesty, the essential interests
of his nation, and the rights of his crown, is inadmissible. A just
and honorable peace with the belligerent powers, under the mediation
of the two Imperial Courts, is the first object of his Majesty's
wishes. The King knows, that the two august mediators will pursue the
great work, that they have undertaken, with the same sentiments, which
induced them to engage therein, the desire of being useful to the
belligerent powers; and his Majesty hopes, that their generous care
will be crowned with success, and that they will serve to reconcile
all the sovereigns at war, by a safe and honorable peace, which it
shall be the interest of all parties to accept, and which shall not
wound the dignity of either of them.
The sincere desire of peace, the gratitude due to the august
sovereigns, who have been willing to charge themselves with the
mediation of it, and the sentiments with which the King will always
receive whatever shall be proposed to him by them, would dispose his
Majesty to accept the proposed Articles, if that acceptation could be
reconciled to his dignity, the interests of the empire, and the rights
of his crown.
1st. On every occasion, in which there has been a question of
negotiation, since the commencement of the war with France, the King
has constantly declared, that he could never admit in any manner
whatsoever, nor under any form, that there should be any interference
between foreign powers and his rebellious subjects.
2dly. The resolution of his Majesty upon this important object is
founded upon what the King owes to his own dignity, upon the essential
interests of his people, and upon the incontestible right, which every
Sovereign has to determine at his pleasure, that which is clearly
within his jurisdiction. This resolution is as immutable, as the
foundation upon which it rests. From the application of this principle
to the different points of the first, second, and third articles,
results the melancholy, but indispensable necessity of declining all
that is proposed in these different articles relative to the
rebellious subjects of his Majesty.
The King invariably entertains the desire, which he has so often
manifested, of terminating the war in which he is engaged with the
belligerent powers, by a just and honorable peace, under the mediation
of the Imperial Courts, and for this purpose his Ministers shall be
furnished with instructions and full powers, necessary to treat of all
objects directly relative to the said powers. They shall be ordered to
pursue the negotiation conformably to the principles explained
therein, with all possible zeal, and to contribute on their part every
suitable means to conduct it to a happy end.
FOOTNOTES:
[3] These papers are missing.
* * * * *
No. 3.
_The verbal Answer of the King of Great Britain to the to the verbal
Observations made by the Count de Belgiojoso, Austrian Ambassador in
London._
Since the King finds himself under the necessity of declining a plan
proposed by the two mediating Courts, he should think himself wanting
in that respect, which is due to them on so many accounts, if he did
not give some details of the reasons, which have rendered it
indispensable for him to take this step. His Majesty is persuaded,
that when the two august mediators shall have considered them with
that spirit of justice and impartiality, which characterises them,
they will become sensible of their weight.
The King would derogate from his rights of sovereignty, should he
consent in any manner to the admission of any person whatever,
delegated to the Congress by his rebel subjects; this admission being
absolutely incompatible with their quality of subjects. For the same
reason, conciliatory measures employed to put an end to a rebellion,
ought not to be intermixed, either in their commencement or in their
conclusion, with a negotiation between sovereign States.
In consequence of the same principle, his Majesty can never enter into
any engagements, nor adopt any plan, which may limit or suspend the
incontestible right, which every Sovereign has, to employ all the
means in his power to terminate a rebellion kindled in his dominions,
either by the progress of his arms, or by conciliatory means employed
in the country itself. If, instead of taking advantage of the present
disposition of a great part of his rebellious subjects to return to
their allegiance, he was to stop the effect and progress of that
disposition by stipulating a suspension of arms, he would retard the
instant of that reconciliation, which he wishes so much to hasten, and
would furnish the leaders of the rebels with the means of fostering
and strengthening their rebellion, and oppressing the well-affected by
the weight of their usurped authority; he would put it in the power of
his enemies to prolong the troubles, if he made the return of peace in
America to depend on the success of a negotiation with a belligerent
power, a negotiation which it would always be in their power to render
fruitless.
The favorable intentions of the King towards his rebellious subjects,
and his desire to make them experience the effects of his clemency,
and restore to them the happiness, which they enjoyed before their
rebellion, are generally known, but whatever may be the arrangements,
which his Majesty will make to restore and ensure the quiet of his
Colonies, and link the happiness of his American subjects to that of
the metropolis, they will be in their nature as all things are, which
are merely national, arrangements of internal policy, and as such,
they cannot properly be the object of the mediation or guarantee of
any foreign power. When the King availed himself of the dispositions
of the two Imperial Courts and employed their mediation, his Majesty
gave it plainly to be understood, that he aimed at the restoration of
peace between the belligerent powers, to which alone it appeared to
him that a mediation could be applied. Persisting invariably in the
same sentiments, the King wishes that the mediation, at the same time
that it confines itself to this particular object, may comprehend it
in its full extent, and that the war between Great Britain and the
Republic of Holland may be included in it.
If the negotiation is opened, agreeably to these principles, and
directed solely to this salutary end, if the other belligerent powers
bring to it the same conciliatory spirit which his Majesty will show,
the generous care of the mediating powers will meet with a success the
most complete, and the most conformable to their views.
* * * * *
No. 4.
_Reply of the Mediators to the Belligerent Powers._
Translation.
The Courts of Versailles and Madrid having transmitted to the two
Imperial Courts their respective answers[4] to the Articles proposed
to serve as a basis to the negotiation, which had been communicated to
them, as the Court of London had done on the 15th of June last, the
two Imperial Courts think, that they must not delay to communicate
their reply reciprocally to the three respective Courts, as necessary
to their mutual direction, and they have directed in consequence their
Ambassadors and Ministers with the said Courts, to present copies of
them to their respective Ministers.
Their Imperial Majesties have seen with the greatest satisfaction, in
that which was transmitted to them by his Most Christian Majesty, the
assurance of the grateful sentiments and real pleasure, with which his
Majesty has received the said Articles, but they could not but be so
much the more affected by the exposition of the motives, which have
appeared to his Britannic Majesty sufficient to prevent his
acceptation of them. It appears convenient to them in the actual state
of things to refer to another time, and other circumstances the
observations, which they might produce, and which it would probably be
useless to expose in the present moment, but what cannot be so either
at present or in future, is that the belligerent powers may see in
their proper light the Articles, which have been proposed to them, and
may in consequence appreciate them properly.