CHAPTER I.

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THE CULT OF INCOMPETENCE

FIRST EDITION November, 1911.

SECOND EDITION July, 1912.

THE CULT OF INCOMPETENCE

By EMILE FAGUET

_Of the French Academy_

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH BY

BEATRICE BARSTOW

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

THOMAS MACKAY

NEW YORK:

E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY

1912

CONTENTS.

PAGE

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER

I. THE PRINCIPLES OF FORMS OF GOVERNMENT 12

II. CONFUSION OF FUNCTIONS 37

III. THE REFUGES OF EFFICIENCY 59

IV. THE COMPETENT LEGISLATOR 66

V. LAWS UNDER DEMOCRACY 82

VI. THE INCOMPETENCE OF GOVERNMENT 92

VII. JUDICIAL INCOMPETENCE 96

VIII. EXAMPLES OF INCOMPETENCE 123

IX. MANNERS 156

X. PROFESSIONAL CUSTOMS 162

XI. ATTEMPTED REMEDIES 172

XII. THE DREAM 216

INDEX 237

THE CULT OF INCOMPETENCE.

INTRODUCTION.

Though it may not have been possible in the following pages to reproduce

the elegant and incisive style of a master of French prose, not even the

inadequacies of a translation can obscure the force of his argument. The

only introduction, therefore, that seems possible must take the form of

a request to the reader to study M. Faguet's criticism of modern

democracy with the daily paper in his hand. He will then see, taking

chapter by chapter, how in some aspects the phenomena of English

democracy are identical with those described in the text, and how in

others our English worship of incompetence, moral and technical, differs

considerably from that which prevails in France. It might have been

possible, as a part of the scheme of this volume, to note on each page,

by way of illustration, instances from contemporary English practice,

but an adequate execution of this plan would have overloaded the text,

or even required an additional volume. Such a volume, impartially worked

out with instances drawn from the programme of all political parties,

would be an interesting commentary on current political controversy, and

it is to be hoped that M. Faguet's suggestive pages will inspire some

competent hand to undertake the task.

If M. Faguet had chosen to refer to England, he might, perhaps, have

cited the constitution of this country, as it existed some seventy years

ago, as an example of a "demophil aristocracy," raised to power by an

"aristocracy-respecting democracy." It is not perhaps wise in political

controversy to compromise our liberty of action in respect of the

problems of the present time, by too deferential a reference to a golden

age which probably, like Lycurgus in the text, p. 73, never existed at

all, but it has been often stated, and undoubtedly with a certain amount

of truth, that the years between 1832 and 1866 were the only period in

English history during which philosophical principles were allowed an

important, we cannot say a paramount, authority over English

legislation. The characteristic features of the period were a

determination to abolish the privileges of the few, which, however,

involved no desire to embark on the impossible and inequitable task of

creating privileges for the many; a deliberate attempt to extirpate the

servile dependence of the old poor law, and a definite abandonment of

the plan of distributing economic advantages by eleemosynary state

action. This policy was based on the conviction that personal liberty

and freedom of private enterprise were the adequate, constructive

influences of a progressive civilisation. Too much importance has

perhaps been attached to the relatively unimportant question of the

freedom of international trade, for this was only part of a general

policy of emancipation which had a much more far-reaching scope. Rightly

understood the political philosophy of that time, put forward by the

competent statesmen who were then trusted by the democracy, proclaimed

the principle of liberty and freedom of exchange as the true solvents of

the economic problems of the day. This policy remained in force during

the ministry of Sir R. Peel and lasted right down to the time of the

great budgets of Mr. Gladstone.

If we might venture, therefore, to add another to the definitions of

Montesquieu, we might say that the principle animating a liberal

constitutional government was liberty, and that this involved a definite

plan for enlarging the sphere of liberty as the organising principle of

civil society. To what then are we to impute the decadence from this

type into which parliamentary government seems now to have fallen? Can

we attribute this to neglect or to exaggeration of its animating

principle, as suggested in the formula of Montesquieu? It is a question

which the reader may find leisure to investigate; we confine ourselves

to marking what seem to be some of the stages of decay.

When the forces of destructive radicalism had done their legitimate

work, it seemed a time for rest and patience, for administration rather

than for fresh legislation and for a pause during which the principles

of liberty and free exchange might have been left to organise the

equitable distribution of the inevitably increasing wealth of the

country. The patience and the conviction which were needed to allow of

such a development, rightly or wrongly, were not forthcoming, and

politicians and parties have not been wanting to give effect to

remedies hastily suggested to and adopted by the people. Political

leaders soon came to realise that recent enfranchisements had added a

new electorate for whom philosophical principles had no charm. At a

later date also, Mr. Gladstone, yielding to a powerful and not

over-scrupulous political agitation, suddenly determined to attempt a

great constitutional change in the relations between the United Kingdom

and Ireland. Whether the transference of the misgovernment of Ireland

from London to Dublin would have had results as disastrous or as

beneficial as disputants have asserted, may be matter for doubt, but the

manner in which the proposal was made certainly had one unfortunate

consequence. Mr. Gladstone's action struck a blow at the independence

and self-respect, or as M. Faguet terms it, the moral competence of our

parliamentary representation from which it has never recovered. Men were

called on to abandon, in the course of a few hours, opinions which they

had professed for a lifetime and this not as the result of conviction

but on the pressure of party discipline. Political feeling ran high.

The "Caucus" was called into more active operation. Political parties

began to invent programmes to capture the groundlings. The conservative

party, relinquishing its useful function of critic, revived the old

policy of eleemosynary doles, and, in an unlucky moment for its future,

has encumbered itself with an advocacy of the policy of protection. For

strangely enough the democracy, the bestower of power, though developing

symptoms of fiscal tyranny and a hatred of liberty in other directions

clings tenaciously to freedom of international trade--for the present at

least--and it would seem that the electioneering caucus has, in this

instance, failed to understand its own business. The doles of the new

State-charity were to be given to meet contributions from the

beneficiaries, but as the class which for one reason or another is ever

in a destitute condition, could not or would not contribute, the only

way in which the benevolent purpose of the agitation could be carried

out was by bestowing the dole gratuitously. The flood gates, therefore,

had to be opened wider, and we have been and still are exposed to a rush

of philanthropic legislation which is gradually transferring all the

responsibilities of life from the individual to the state. Free trade

for the moment remains, and it is supposed to be strongly entrenched in

the convictions of the liberal party. Its position, however, is

obviously very precarious in view of the demands made by the militant

trade unions. These, in their various spheres, claim a monopoly of

employment for their members, to the exclusion of those who do not

belong to their associations. Logic has something, perhaps not much, to

do with political action, and it is almost inconceivable that a party

can go on for long holding these two contradictory opinions. Which of

them will be abandoned, the future only can tell.

The result of all this is a growing disinclination on the part of the

people to limit their responsibilities to their means of discharging

them, the creation of a proletariate which in search of maintenance

drifts along the line of least resistance, dependence on the government

dole. In the end too it must bring about the impoverishment of the

state, which is ever being called on to undertake new burdens; for the

individual, thus released from obligation to discharge, is still left

free to create responsibilities, for which it is now the business of the

State to make provision. Under such a system the ability to pay as well

as the number of the solvent citizens must continuously decline.

The proper reply to this legislation which we describe as predatory in

the sense that we describe the benevolent habits of Robin Hood as

predatory, cannot be made by the official opposition which was itself

the first to step on the down grade, and which only waits the chances of

party warfare to take its turn in providing _panem et circenses_ at the

charge of the public exchequer. In this way, progress is brought to a

standstill by the chronic unwillingness of the rate- and tax-payers

to find the money. A truer policy, based on the voluntary action of

citizens and capable of indefinite and continuous expansion, finds no

support among politicians, for all political parties seem to be held in

the grip of the moral and technical incompetence which M. Faguet has so

wittily described. The only reply to a government bent on such courses

is that which above has been imputed--perhaps without sufficient

justification--to the governments of the period 1832-1866; and that

reply democracy, as at present advised, will allow no political party to

make.

There does not appear, therefore, to be much difference between the

situation here and in France, and it is very interesting to notice how

in various details there is a very close parallelism between events in

this country and those which M. Faguet has described. The position of

our Lord Chancellor, who has been bitterly attacked by his own party, in

respect of his appointment of magistrates, is very similar to that of M.

Barthou, quoted on p. 118. Our judicial system has hitherto been

considered free from political partisanship, but very recently and for

the first time a minister in his place in parliament, has rightly or

wrongly seen fit to call in question the impartiality of our judicial

bench, and the suspicion, if, as appears to be the case, it is widely

entertained by persons heated in political strife, will probably lead to

appointments calculated to ensure reprisals. Astute politicians do not

commit themselves to an attack on a venerated institution, till they

think they know that that institution is becoming unpopular with the

followers who direct their policy. Criminal verdicts also, especially

on the eve of an election, are now made liable to revision by ministers

scouring the gaols of the country in search of picturesque malefactors

whom, with an accompaniment of much philanthropic speech, they proceed

to set at liberty. Even the first principles of equity, as ordinarily

understood, seem to have lost their authority, when weighed in the

balance against the vote of the majority. Very recently the members of

an honourable and useful profession represented to a minister that his

extension of a scheme of more or less gratuitous relief to a class which

hitherto had been able and willing to pay its way, was likely to deprive

them of their livelihood. His reply, _inter alia_, contained the

argument that the class in question was very numerous and had many

votes, and that he doubted whether any one would venture to propose its

exclusion except perhaps a member for a university; as a matter of fact

some such proposal had been made by one of the university members whose

constituents were affected by the proposal. The minister further

declared that he did not think that such an amendment could obtain a

seconder. The argument seems to impute to our national representatives a

cynical disregard of equity, and a blind worship of numbers, which if

true, is an instance of moral incompetence quite as remarkable as

anything contained in M. Faguet's narrative.

If readers of this volume will take the trouble to annotate their copies

with a record of the relevant incidents which meet them every day of

their lives, they cannot fail to acknowledge how terribly inevitable is

the rise of incompetence to political power. The tragedy is all the more

dreadful, when we recognise, as we all must, the high character and

ability of the statesmen and politicians who lie under the thrall of

this compelling necessity.

This systematic corruption of the best threatens to assume the

proportions of a national disaster. It is the system, not the actors in

it, which M. Faguet analyses and invites us to deplore.

T. MACKAY.

CHAPTER I.

THE PRINCIPLES OF FORMS OF GOVERNMENT.

The question has often been asked, what is the animating principle of

different forms of government, for each, it is assumed, has its own

principle. In other words, what is the general idea which inspires each

political system?

Montesquieu, for instance, proved that the _principle_ of monarchy is

_honour_, the principle of despotism _fear_, the principle of a republic

_virtue_ or patriotism, and he added with much justice that governments

decline and fall as often by carrying their principle to excess, as by

neglecting it altogether.

And this, though a paradox, is true. At first sight it may not be

obvious how a despotism can fall by inspiring too much fear, or a

constitutional monarchy by developing too highly the sentiment of

honour, or a republic by having too much virtue. It is nevertheless

true.

To make too common a use of fear is to destroy its efficacy. As Edgar

Quinet happily puts it: "If we want to make use of fear we must be

certain that we can use it always." We cannot have too much honour, but

when we can appeal to this sentiment only and when distinctions,

decorations, orders, ribbons--in a word _honours_--are multiplied,

inasmuch as we cannot increase such things indefinitely, those who have

none become as discontented as those who, having some, want more.

Finally we cannot, of course, have too much virtue, and naturally here

governments will fall not by exaggerating but by abandoning their

guiding principle. Yet is it not sometimes true that by demanding from

citizens too great a devotion to their country, we end by exhausting

human powers of endurance and sacrifice? This is what happened in the

case of Napoleon, who, perhaps unwittingly, required too much from

France, for the building up of a 'Greater France.'

But that, some one will object, was not a republic!

From the point of view of the sacrifices required from the citizen, it

was a republic, similar to the Roman Republic and to the French Republic

of 1792. All the talk was 'for the glory of our country,' 'heroism,

heroism, nothing but heroism'! If too much is required of it, civic

virtue can be exhausted.

It is, then, very true that governments perish just as much from an

excess as from a neglect of their appropriate principle. Montesquieu

without doubt borrowed his general idea from Aristotle, who remarks not

without humour, "Those, who think that they have discovered the basis of

good government, are apt to push the consequences of their new found

principle too far. They do not remember that disproportion in such

matters is fatal. They forget that a nose which varies slightly from the

ideal line of beauty appropriate for noses, tending slightly towards

becoming a hook or a snub, may still be of fair shape and not

disagreeable to the eye, but if the excess be very great, all symmetry

is lost, and the nose at last ceases to be a nose at all." This law of

proportion holds good with regard to every form of government.

* * * * *

Starting from these general ideas, I have often wondered what principle

democrats have adopted for the form of government which they favour,

and it has not required a great effort on my part to arrive at the

conclusion that the principle in question is the worship and

cultivation, or, briefly 'the cult' of incompetence or inefficiency.

Let us examine any well-managed and successful business firm or factory.

Every employee does the work he knows and does best, the skilled

workman, the accountant, the manager and the secretary, each in his

place. No one would dream of making the accountant change places with a

commercial traveller or a mechanic.

Look too at the animal world. The higher we go in the scale of organic

existence, the greater the division of labour, the more marked the

specialisation of physiological function. One organ thinks, another

acts, one digests, another breathes. Now is there such a thing as an

animal with only one organ, or rather is there any animal, consisting of

only one organ, which breathes and thinks and digests all at the same

time? Yes, there is. It is called the amoeba, and the amoeba is the

very lowest thing in the animal world, very inferior even to a

vegetable.

In the same way, without doubt, in a well constituted society, each

organ has its definite function, that is to say, administration is

carried on by those who have learnt how to administer, legislation and

the amendment of laws by those who have learnt how to legislate, justice

by those who have studied jurisprudence, and the functions of a country

postman are not given to a paralytic. Society should model itself on

nature, whose plan is specialisation. "For," as Aristotle says, "she is

not niggardly, like the Delphian smiths whose knives have to serve for

many purposes, she makes each thing for a single purpose, and the best

instrument is that which serves one and not many uses." Elsewhere he

says, "At Carthage it is thought an honour to hold many offices, but a

man only does one thing well. The legislator should see to this, and

prevent the same man from being set to make shoes and play the flute." A

well-constituted society, we may sum up, is one where every function is

not confided to every one, where the crowd itself, the whole body

social, is not told: "It is your business to govern, to administer, to

make the laws, &c." A society, where things are so arranged, is an

amoebic society.

That society, therefore, stands highest in the scale, where the division

of labour is greatest, where specialisation is most definite, and where

the distribution of functions according to efficiency is most thoroughly

carried out.

* * * * *

Now democracies, far from sharing this view, are inclined to take the

opposite view. At Athens there was a great tribunal composed of men

learned in, and competent to interpret, the law. The people could not

tolerate such an institution, so laboured to destroy it and to usurp its

functions. The crowd reasoned thus. "We can interpret and carry out

laws, because we make them." The conclusion was right, but the minor

premise was disputable. The retort can be made: "True, you can interpret

and carry out laws because you make them, but perhaps you have no

business to be making laws." Be that as it may, the Athenian people not

only interpreted and applied its own laws, but it insisted on being paid

for so doing. The result was that the poorest citizens sat judging all

day long, as all others were unwilling to sacrifice their whole time for

a payment of six drachmas. This plebeian tribunal continued for many

years. Its most celebrated feat was the judgment which condemned

Socrates to death. This was perhaps matter for regret, but the great

principle, the sovereignty of incompetence, was vindicated.

Modern democracies seem to have adopted the same principle, in form they

are essentially amoebic. A democracy, well-known to us all, has been

evolved in the following manner.

It began with this idea; king and people, democratic royalty, royal

democracy. The people makes, the king carries out, the law; the people

legislates, the king governs, retaining, however, a certain control over

the law, for he can suspend the carrying out of a new law when he

considers that it tends to obstruct the function of government. Here

then was a sort of specialisation of functions. The same person, or

collective body of persons, did not both legislate and govern.

This did not last long. The king was suppressed. Democracy remained, but

a certain amount of respect for efficiency remained too. The people, the

masses, did not, every single man of them, claim the right to govern and

to legislate directly.

It did not even claim the right to nominate the legislature directly. It

adopted indirect election, _a deux degres_, that is, it nominated

electors who in turn nominated the legislature. It thus left two

aristocracies above itself, the first electors and the elected

legislature. This was still far removed from democracy on the Athenian

model which did everything itself.

This does not mean that much attention was paid to efficiency. The

electors were not chosen because they were particularly fitted to elect

a legislature, nor was the legislature itself elected with any reference

to its legislative capacity. Still there was a certain pretence of a

desire for efficiency, a double pseudo-efficiency. The crowd, or rather

the constitution, assumed that legislators elected by the delegates of

the crowd were more competent to make laws than the crowd itself.

This somewhat curious form of efficiency I have called _competence par

collation_, efficiency or competence conferred by this form of

selection. There is absolutely nothing to show that so-and-so has the

slightest legislative or juridical faculty, so I confer on him a

certificate of efficiency by the confidence I repose in him when

nominating him for the office, or rather I show my confidence in the

electors and they confer a certificate of efficiency on those whom they

nominate for the legislature.

This, of course, is devoid of all common sense, but appearances, and

even something more, are in its favour.

It is not common sense for it involves something being made out of

nothing, inefficiency producing efficiency and zero extracting 'one' out

of itself. This form of selection, though it does not appeal to me under

any circumstances, is legitimate enough when it is exercised by a

competent body. A university can confer a degree upon a distinguished

man because it can judge whether his degreeless condition is due to

accident or not. It would, however, be highly ridiculous and paradoxical

if the general public were to confer mathematical degrees. A degree of

efficiency conferred by an inefficient body is contrary to common sense.

There is, however, some plausibility and indeed a little more than

plausibility in favour of this plan. Degrees in literature and in

dramatic art are conferred, given by 'collation,' by incompetent people,

that is by the public. We can say to the public: "You know nothing of

literary and dramatic art." It will retort: "True, I know nothing, but

certain things move me and I confer the degree on those who evoke my

emotions." In this it is not altogether wrong. In the same way the

degree of doctor of political science is conferred by the people on

those who stir its emotions and who express most forcibly its own

passions. These doctors of political science are the empassioned

representatives of its own passions.

--In other words, the worst legislators!--

Yes, very nearly so, but not quite. It is very useful that we should

have an exponent of popular passion at the crest of the social wave, to

tell us not indeed what the crowd is thinking, for the crowd never

thinks, but what the crowd is feeling, in order that we may not cross it

too violently or obey it too obsequiously. An engineer would call it the

science of the strength of materials.

A medium assures me that he had a conversation with Louis XIV, who said

to him: "Universal suffrage is an excellent thing in a monarchy. It is a

source of information. When it recommends a certain course of action it

shows us that this is a thing which we must not do. If I could have

consulted it over the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, it would have

given me a clear mandate for that Revocation and I should have known

what to do, and that Edict would not have been revoked. I acted as I

did, because I was advised by ministers whom I considered experienced

statesmen. Had I been aware of the state of public opinion I should have

known that France was tired of wars and new palaces and extravagance.

But this was not an expression of passion and prejudice, but a cry of

suffering. As far as passion and prejudice are concerned we must go

right in the teeth of public opinion, and universal suffrage will tell

you what that is. On the other hand we must pay heed, serious heed to

every cry of pain, and here too universal suffrage will come to our aid.

Universal suffrage is necessary to a monarchy as a source of

information."

This, I am told, is Louis XIV's present opinion on the subject.

As far as legislation therefore is concerned, the attempt to secure

competence by 'collation' is an absurdity. Yet it is an inverted sort

of competence useful for indicating the state of a nation's temper. From

this it follows that this system is as mischievous in a republic as it

would be wholesome in a monarchy. It is not therefore altogether bad.

The democracy which we have in view, after having been governed by the

representatives of its representatives for ten years, submitted for the

next fifteen years to the rule of one representative and took no

particular advantage therefrom.

Then for thirty years it adopted a scheme which aimed at a certain

measure of efficiency. It assumed that the electors of the legislature

ought not to be nominated, but marked out by their social position, that

is their fortune. Those who possessed so many drachmas were to be

electors.

What sort of a basis for efficiency is this? It is a basis but certainly

a somewhat narrow one.

It is a basis, first, because a man who owns a certain fortune has a

greater interest than others in a sound management of public business,

and self-interest opens and quickens the eye; and again a man who has

money and does not lose it cannot be altogether a fool.

On the other hand it is a narrow basis, because the possession of money

is of itself no guarantee of political ability, and the system leads to

the very questionable proposition that every rich man is a competent

social reformer. It is, however, a sort of competence, but a competence

very precariously established and on a very narrow basis.

This system disappeared and our democracy, after a short interregnum,

repeated its previous experiment and submitted for eighteen years to the

rule of one delegate with no great cause to congratulate itself on the

result.

It then adopted democracy in a form almost pure and simple. I say

almost, for the democratic system pure and simple involves the direct

government of the people without any intervening representatives, by

means of a continuous plebiscite. Our democracy then set up and still

maintains a democratic system almost pure and simple, that is to say, it

established government of the nation by delegates whom it itself elected

and by these delegates strictly and exclusively. This time we have

reached an apotheosis of incompetence that is well nigh absolute.

This, our present system, purports to be the rule of efficiency chosen

by the arbitrary form of selection which has been described. Just as the

bishop in the story, addressing a haunch of venison, exclaimed: "I

baptise thee carp," so the people says to its representatives: "I

baptise you masters of law, I baptise you statesmen, I baptise you

social reformers." We shall see later on that this baptism goes very

much further than this.

If the people were capable of judging of the legal and psychological

knowledge possessed by those who present themselves for election, this

form of selection need not be prohibitive of efficiency and might even

be satisfactory; but in the first place, the electors are not capable of

judging, and secondly, even if they were, nothing would be gained.

Nothing would be gained, because the people never places itself at this

point of view. Emphatically never! It looks at the qualifications of the

candidate not from a scientific but from a moral point of view.

--Well that surely is something, and, in a way, a guarantee of

efficiency. The legislators are not capable of making laws, it is true;

but at least they are honest men. This guarantee of moral efficiency,

some critic will say, gives me much satisfaction.

Please be careful, I reply, we should never think of giving the

management of a railway station to the most honest man, but to an honest

man who, besides, understood thoroughly railway administration. So we

must put into our laws not only honest intentions, but just principles

of law, politics, and society.

Secondly, if the candidates are considered from the point of view of

their moral worth it is in a peculiar fashion. High morality is imputed

to those who share the dominant passions of the people and who express

themselves thereon more violently than others. Ah! these are our honest

men, it cries, and I do not say that the men of its choice are

dishonest, I only say that by this criterion they are not infallibly

marked out even as honest.

--Still, some one replies, they are probably disinterested, for they

follow popular prejudices, and not their own particular, individual

wishes.

Yes, that is just what the masses believe, while they forget that there

is nothing easier than to simulate popular passion in order to win

popular confidence and become a political personage. If

disinterestedness is really so essential to the people, only those

should be elected who oppose the popular will and who show thereby that

they do not want to be elected. Or better still only those who do not

stand for election should be elected, since not to stand is the

undeniable sign of disinterestedness. But this is never done. That which

should always be done is never done.

--But, some one will say, your public bodies which recruit their numbers

by co-optation, Academies and learned societies, do not elect their

members in this way.--

Quite so, and they are right. Such bodies do not want their members to

be disinterested but scientific. They have no reason to prefer an

unwilling member to one who is eager to be elected. Their point of view

is entirely different. The people, which pretends to set store by high

moral character, should exclude from power those who are ambitious of

power, or at least those who covet it with a keenness that suggests

other than disinterested motives.

These considerations show us what the crowd understands by the moral

worth of a man. The moral worth of a man consists, as far as the crowd

is concerned, in his entertaining or pretending to entertain the same

sentiments as itself, and it is just for this reason that the

representatives of the multitude are excellent as documents for

information, but detestable, or at least, useless, and therefore

detestable, as legislators.

Montesquieu, who is seldom wrong, errs in my opinion when he says, "The

people is well-fitted to choose its own magistrates." He, it is true,

did not live under a democracy. For consider, how could the people be

fitted to choose its own magistrates and legislators, when Montesquieu

himself, this time with ample justification, lays down as one of his

principles that morals should correct climate, and that law should

correct morals, and the people, as we know, only thinks of choosing as

its delegates men who share, in every particular, its own manner of

thinking? Climate can be partially resisted by the people; but if the

law should correct morals, legislators should be chosen who have taken

up an attitude of reaction against current morality. It would be very

curious if such a choice were ever made, and not only is it never made

but the contrary invariably happens.

To sum it all up, it is intellectual incompetence, nay moral

incompetence which is sought instinctively in the people's choice.

* * * * *

If possible, it is more than this. The people favours incompetence, not

only because it is no judge of intellectual competence and because it

looks on moral competence from a wrong point of view, but because it

desires before everything, as indeed is very natural, that its

representatives should resemble itself. This it does for two reasons.

First, as a matter of sentiment, the people desires, as we have seen,

that its representatives should share its feelings and prejudices. These

representatives can share its prejudices and yet not absolutely resemble

it in morals, habits, manners and appearance; but naturally the people

never feels so certain that a man shares its prejudices and is not

merely pretending to do so, as when the man resembles it feature by

feature. It is a sign and a guarantee. The people is instinctively

impelled therefore to elect men of the same habits, manners and even

education as itself, or shall we say of an education slightly superior,

the education of a man who can talk, but only superior in a very slight

degree.

In addition to this sentimental reason, there is another, which is

extremely important, for it goes to the very root of the democratic

idea. What is the people's one desire, when once it has been stung by

the democratic tarantula? It is that all men should be equal, and in

consequence that all inequalities natural as well as artificial should

disappear. It will not have artificial inequalities, nobility of birth,

royal favours, inherited wealth, and so it is ready to abolish nobility,

royalty, and inheritance. Nor does it like natural inequalities, that is

to say a man more intelligent, more active, more courageous, more

skilful than his neighbours. It cannot destroy these inequalities, for

they are natural, but it can neutralise them, strike them with impotence

by excluding them from the employments under its control. Democracy is

thus led quite naturally, irresistibly one may say, to exclude the

competent precisely because they are competent, or if the phrase

pleases better and as the popular advocate would put it, not because

they are competent but because they are unequal, or, as he would

probably go on to say, if he wished to excuse such action, not because

they are unequal, but because being unequal they are suspected of being

opponents of equality. So it all comes to the same thing. This it is

that made Aristotle say that where merit is despised, there is

democracy. He does not say so in so many words, but he wrote: "Where

merit is not esteemed before everything else, it is not possible to have

a firmly established aristocracy," and that amounts to saying that where

merit is not esteemed, we enter at once on a democratic regime and never

escape from it.

The chance, then, of efficiency coming to the front in this state of

affairs is indeed deplorable.

First and last, democracy--and it is natural enough--_wishes to do

everything itself_, it is the enemy of all specialisation of functions,

particularly it wishes to govern, without delegates or intermediaries.

Its ideal is direct government as it existed at Athens, its ideal is

"democracy," in the terminology of Rousseau, who applied the word to

direct government and to direct government only.

Forced by historical events and perhaps by necessity to govern by

delegates, how could democracy still contrive to govern directly or

nearly so, although continuing to govern through delegates?

Its first alternative is, perhaps, to impose on its delegates an

imperative mandate. Delegates under this condition become mere agents of

the people. They attend the legislative assembly to register the will of

the people just as they receive it, and the people in reality governs

directly. This is what is meant by the imperative mandate.

Democracy has often considered it, but never with persistence. Herein it

shows good sense. It has a shrewd suspicion that the imperative mandate

is never more than a snare and a delusion. Representatives of the people

meet and discuss, the interests of party become defined. Henceforward

they are the prey of the goddess Opportunity, the Greek {Kairos}.

Then it happens one day that to vote according to their mandate would be

very unfavourable to the interest of their party. They are therefore

obliged to be faithless to their party by reason of their fidelity to

their mandate, or disobedient to their mandate by reason of their

obedience to their party; and in any case to have betrayed their mandate

with this very praiseworthy and excellent intention is a thing for which

they can take credit or at least obtain excuse with the electors--and on

such a matter it will be very difficult to refute them.

The imperative mandate is therefore a very clumsy instrument for work of

a very delicate character. The democracy, instinctively, knows this very

well, and sets no great store by the imperative mandate.

What other alternative is there for it? Something very much finer, the

substance instead of the shadow. It can elect men who resemble it

closely, who follow its sentiments closely, who are in fact so nearly

identical with itself that they may be trusted to do surely,

instinctively, almost mechanically that which it would itself do, if it

were itself an immense legislative assembly. They would vote, without

doubt, according to circumstances, but also as their electors would vote

if they were governing directly. In this way democracy preserves its

legislative power. It makes the law, and this is the only way it can

make it.

Democracy, therefore, has the greatest inducement to elect

representatives who are representative, who, in the first place,

resemble it as closely as possible, who, in the second place, have no

individuality of their own, who finally, having no fortune of their own,

have no sort of independence.

We deplore that democracy surrenders itself to politicians, but from its

own point of view, a point of view which it cannot avoid taking up, it

is absolutely right. What is a politician? He is a man who, in respect

of his personal opinions, is a nullity, in respect of education, a

mediocrity, he shares the general sentiments and passions of the crowd,

his sole occupation is politics, and if that career were closed to him,

he would die of starvation.

He is precisely the thing of which the democracy has need.

He will never be led away by his education to develop ideas of his own;

and having no ideas of his own, he will not allow them to enter into

conflict with his prejudices. His prejudices will be, at first by a

feeble sort of conviction, afterwards by reason of his own interest,

identical with those of the crowd; and lastly, his poverty and the

impossibility of his getting a living outside of politics make it

certain that he will never break out of the narrow circle where his

political employers have confined him; his imperative mandate is the

material necessity which obliges him to obey; his imperative mandate is

his inability to quarrel with his bread and butter.

Democracy obviously has need of politicians, has need of nothing else

but politicians, and has need indeed that there shall be in politics

nothing else but politicians.

Its enemy, or rather the man whom democracy dreads because he means to

govern and does not intend to allow the mob to govern through him, is

the man who succeeds in getting elected for some constituency or other,

either by the influence of his wealth or by the prestige of his talent

and notoriety. Such a man is not dependent on democracy. If a

legislative assembly were entirely or by a majority composed of rich

men, men of superior intelligence, men who had an interest in attending

to the trades or professions in which they had succeeded rather than in

playing at politics, they would vote according to their own ideas, and

then--what would happen? Why then democracy would be simply suppressed.

It would no longer legislate and govern; there would be, to speak

exactly, an aristocracy, not very permanently established perhaps, but

still an aristocracy which would eliminate the influence of the people

from public affairs.

Clearly it is almost impossible for the democracy, if it means to

survive, to encourage efficiency, nay it is almost impossible for it to

refrain from attempting to destroy efficiency.

Thus, we may sum up, only those are elected as the representatives of

the people, who are its exact counterparts and constant dependents.

The cult of incompetence · 第 1 / 12 章