THAT THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION IS CREDIBLE.
By the Christian Religion is meant the Three Creeds, its four great
doctrines.
(_A._) THE TRINITY.
(1.) Its meaning; Three Persons in One Nature.
(2.) Its credibility; this must be admitted.
(3.) Its probability more likely than simple Theism.
(_B._) THE INCARNATION.
(1.) Its difficulties; not insuperable.
(2.) Its motive; God, it is said, loves man, and wishes man
to love Him, not improbable for several reasons.
(3.) Its historical position.
(_C._) THE ATONEMENT.
The common objections do not apply because of the
_willingness_ of the Victim.
(1.) As to the Victim; it does away with the injustice.
(2.) As to the Judge; it appeals to His mercy not justice.
(3.) As to the sinner; it has no bad influence.
(_D._) THE RESURRECTION.
(1.) Christ's Resurrection; not incredible, for we have no
experience to judge by.
(2.) Man's resurrection; not incredible, for the same body
need not involve the same molecules.
(_E._) CONCLUSION.
Three considerations which show that the Christian
Religion, though improbable, is certainly not incredible.
We pass on now to the Christian Religion, by which we mean the facts
and doctrines contained in the _Three Creeds_, commonly, though
perhaps incorrectly, called the Apostles', the Nicene, and the
Athanasian. And, as these doctrines are of such vast importance, and
of so wonderful a character, we must first consider whether they are
_credible_. Is it conceivable that such doctrines should be true, no
matter what evidence they may have in their favour? In this chapter,
therefore, we shall deal chiefly with the difficulties of
Christianity. Now its four great and characteristic doctrines are
those of the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement, and the
Resurrection. We will examine each in turn, and then conclude with a
few general remarks.
(_A._) THE TRINITY.
To begin with, the Christian religion differs from all others in its
idea of the nature of God. According to Christianity, the Deity
exists in some mysterious manner as a _Trinity of Persons_ in a
_Unity of Nature_; so we will first consider the meaning of this
doctrine, then its credibility, and lastly its probability. It is
not, as some people suppose, a kind of intellectual puzzle, but a
statement which, whether true or false, is fairly intelligible,
provided, of course, due attention is given to the meaning of the
words employed.
(1.) _Its meaning._
In the first place, we must carefully distinguish between _Person_
and _Substance_; this is the key to the whole question. The former
has been already considered in Chapters III. and IV., though it must
be remembered that this term, like all others, when applied to God,
cannot mean exactly the same as it does when applied to man. All we
can say is that, on the whole, it seems the least inappropriate
word. The latter is a little misleading, since it is not the modern
English word _substance_, but a Latin translation of a Greek word,
which would be better rendered by _nature_ or _essence_.
But though difficult to explain, its meaning is tolerably clear.
Take, for instance, though the analogy must not be pressed too far,
the case of three men; each is a distinct human _person_, but they
all have a common human _nature_. This human nature, which may also
be called human substance (in its old sense), humanity, or manhood,
has of course no existence apart from the men whose nature it is; it
is merely _that_ which they each possess in common, and the
possession of which makes each of them a man. And hence, any
attribute belonging to human nature would belong to each of the
three men, so that each would be mortal, each subject to growth,
etc. Each would in fact possess the complete human nature, yet
together there would not be three human natures, but only one.
Bearing this in mind, let us now turn to the doctrine of the
Trinity. This is expressed in vv. 3-6 of the Athanasian Creed as
follows:--
3. 'The Catholic Faith is this, that we worship one
God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity.
4. 'Neither confounding the Persons, nor dividing
the Substance.
5. 'For there is one Person of the Father, another
of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghost.
6. 'But the Godhead of the Father, of the Son,
and of the Holy Ghost, is all one, the Glory equal, the
Majesty co-eternal.'
Here, it will be noticed, vv. 5 and 6 give the _reasons_ for v. 4,
so that the Godhead in v. 6 is, as we should have expected, the same
as the Divine _Substance_ or Nature in v. 4. Thus the meaning is as
follows:--
We must worship one God (as to Nature) in Trinity (of Persons) and
Trinity (of Persons) in Unity (of Nature); neither confusing the
Persons, for each is distinct; nor dividing the Nature, for it is
all one.
Thus far there is no intellectual difficulty in the statements of
the Creed. We do not mean that there is no difficulty in believing
them to be true, or in accurately defining the terms used; but that,
as statements, their meaning is quite intelligible.
We now pass on to the following verses which are deductions from
this, and show that as each of the three Persons possesses the
Divine Nature, all attributes of the Godhead (_i.e._, of this one
Divine Nature) are possessed by each of the three. Each is therefore
_eternal_, and yet there is only _one_ eternal Nature. But this is
expressed in a peculiarly short and abrupt manner. No one, of
course, supposes that God is Three _in the same sense_ in which He
is One, but the Creed does not sufficiently guard against this,
perhaps because it never occurred to its author that anyone would
think it meant such an obvious absurdity. Moreover, even
grammatically the verses are not very clear. For the various terms
_uncreate_, _incomprehensible_ (_i.e._, boundless, or omnipresent),
_eternal_, _almighty_, _God_, and _Lord_ are used as if they were
adjectives in the first part of each sentence, and nouns in the
latter part.
But we must remember these verses do not stand alone. If they did,
they might perhaps be thought unintelligible. But they do not. As
just said, they are deductions from the previous statement of the
doctrine of the Trinity; and, therefore, they must in all fairness
be interpreted so as to agree with that doctrine, not to contradict
it. And the previous verses (3-6) show clearly that where _three_
are spoken of, it refers to Persons; and where _one_ is spoken of,
it refers to Substance or Nature.
It must however be admitted that the _names_ of these Divine Persons
imply some closer union between them than that of merely possessing
in common one Divine Nature. For they are not independent names like
those of different men or of heathen gods, each of whom might exist
separately; but they are all _relative_ names, each implying the
others. Thus the Father implies the Son, for how can there be a
Father, unless there is a Son (or at least a child)? And of course
an Eternal Father implies an Eternal Son, so any idea that the
Father must have lived first, as in the case of a human father and
son, is out of the question. Similarly the Son implies the Father,
and the Spirit implies Him whose Spirit He is. And though these
names are no doubt very inadequate; they yet show that the three
Persons are of the same Nature, which is the important point.
We conclude then that the Doctrine of the Trinity means the
existence of three Divine Persons, each possessing in its
completeness the one Divine Nature; and closely united together;
though in a manner, which is to us unknown.
(2.) _Its credibility._
Having now discussed the meaning of the Christian doctrine, we have
next to consider whether it is credible. It must of course be
admitted that the doctrine is very mysterious, and though fairly
intelligible as a doctrine, is extremely hard to realise (indeed
some might say inconceivable) when we try to picture to ourselves
what the doctrine actually means. But we must remember that the
nature of God is anyhow almost inconceivable, even as simple Theism.
We cannot picture to ourselves a Being Who is omnipresent,--in this
room, for instance, as well as on distant stars. Nor can we imagine
a Being Who is grieved every time we commit sin, for if so,
considering the number of people in the world, He must be grieved
many thousands of times _every second_; as well as being glad
whenever anyone resists sin, also, let us hope, several thousand
times a second. All this may be true, just as the marvels of
science--the _ether_, for instance, which is also omnipresent, and
has millions of vibrations every second--may be true, but our minds
are quite unable to realise any of them.
Thus, as said in Chapter III., though we have ample means of knowing
what God is _in His relation to us_ as our Creator and Judge, yet as
to His real nature we know next to nothing. Nor is this surprising
when we remember that the only being who in any way resembles God
is _man_; and man's nature, notwithstanding all our opportunities of
studying it, still remains a mystery.
Now Christianity does attempt (in its doctrine of the Trinity) to
state what God is _in Himself_, and without any reference to
ourselves, or to nature; and that this should be to a great extent
inconceivable to our minds seems inevitable. For the nature of God
must be beyond human understanding, just as the nature of a man is
beyond the understanding of animals; though they may realise what he
is _to them_, in his power or his kindness. And for all we know,
Trinity in Unity, like omnipresence, may be one of the unique
attributes of God, which cannot be understood (because it cannot be
shared) by anyone else. Therefore the mysteriousness of the
Christian doctrine is no reason for thinking it incredible.
Nor is it inconsistent with Natural Religion, for though this shows
the _Unity_ of God, it is only a unity of _outward action_. It does
not, and cannot tell us what this one God is _in Himself_, whether,
for instance, He exists as one or more Persons. In the same way (if
we may without irreverence take a homely illustration) a number of
letters might be so extremely alike as to show that they were all
written by one man. But this would not tell us what the man was _in
himself_, whether, for instance, he had a free will, as well as a
body and mind; or how these were related to one another. Hence
Natural Religion can in no way conflict with Christianity.
(3.) _Its probability._
But we may go further than this, and say that the Christian doctrine
of _Three_ Divine Persons is (when carefully considered) _less_
difficult to believe than the Unitarian doctrine of only _One_. For
this latter leads to the conclusion, either that God must have been
a solitary God dwelling alone from all eternity, before the creation
of the world; or else that the world itself (or some part of it)
must have been eternal, and have formed a kind of companion. And
each of these theories has great difficulties. Take for instance the
attributes of _Power_ and _Wisdom_, both of which, as we have seen,
must of necessity belong to God. How could a solitary God dwelling
alone before the Creation of the world have been able to exercise
either His Power or His Wisdom? As far as we can judge, His Power
could have produced nothing, His Wisdom could have thought of
nothing. He would have been a _potential_ God only, with all His
capacities unrealised. And such a view seems quite incredible.
Yet the only alternative--that the world itself is eternal--though
it gets over this difficulty, is still inadequate. For as we have
seen God possesses _moral_ attributes as well, such as Goodness. And
all moral attributes--everything connected with right and wrong--can
only be thought of as existing between two _persons_. We cannot be
good to an atom of hydrogen, or unjust to a molecule of water. We
can it is true be kind to _animals_, but this is simply because they
resemble personal beings in having a capacity for pleasure and pain.
But moral attributes in their highest perfection can only exist
between two persons. Therefore as the eternal God possesses, and
must always have possessed, such attributes, it seems to require
some other eternal _Person_.
The argument is perhaps a difficult one to follow, but a single
example will make it plain. Take the attribute of _love_. This
requires at least two persons--one to love, the other to be loved.
Therefore if love has always been one of God's attributes, there
must always have been some _other_ person to be loved. And the idea
that God might have been eternally _creating_ persons, like men or
angels, as objects of His love, though perhaps attractive, is still
inadequate. For love in its perfection can only exist between two
beings _of the same nature_. A man cannot love his dog, in the same
way that he can love his son. In short, _personality_, involving as
it does moral attributes like love, implies _fellowship_, or the
existence of other and _similar_ persons.
Yet, when we think of the meaning of the term God, His omnipresence
and omnipotence, it seems impossible that there can be more than
one. We must then believe in at least two Eternal and Divine
Persons, yet in but one God; and the Christian doctrine of the
Trinity in Unity, with all its difficulties, still seems the _least_
difficult explanation.
But this is not all, for Natural Religion itself leads us to look
upon God in _three_ distinct ways, which correspond to the three
chief arguments for His existence. (Chaps. I., II., and V.) Thus we
may think of Him as the Eternal, Self-Existent One, altogether
independent of the world--the All-Powerful _First Cause_ required to
account for it. Or we may think of Him in His relation to the world,
as its Maker and Evolver, working everywhere, in everything and
through everything,--the All-Wise _Designer_ required by nature. Or
we may think of Him in His relation to ourselves as a Spirit holding
intercourse with our spirits, and telling us what is right--the
All-Good _Moral_ God required by conscience. And how well this
agrees with the Christian doctrine scarcely needs pointing out; the
Father the Source of all, the Son by Whom all things were made, and
the Spirit bearing witness with our spirits; and yet not three Gods,
but one God.
On the whole, then, we decide that the Doctrine of the Trinity is
certainly credible and perhaps even probable. For to put it shortly,
Nature forces us to believe in a personal God; yet, when we reflect
on the subject, the idea of a personal God, Who is only one Person,
seems scarcely tenable; since (as said above) personality implies
fellowship.
(_B._) THE INCARNATION.
We next come to the doctrine of the Incarnation; which however is so
clearly stated in the Athanasian Creed, that its meaning is quite
plain. God the Son, we are told, the second Person of the Trinity,
was pleased to become Man and to be born of the Virgin Mary, so that
He is now both _God_ and _Man_. He is God (from all eternity) of the
Substance or Nature of His Divine Father, and Man (since the
Incarnation) of the Substance or Nature of His human Mother. He is
thus complete God and complete Man; equal to the Father in regard to
His Godhead, for He is of the same Nature; and inferior to the
Father, in regard to His Manhood, for human nature must be inferior
to the Divine. Moreover, though He possesses these two Natures, they
are not changed one into the other, or confused together; but each
remains distinct, though both are united in His One Person. This is
in brief the doctrine of the Incarnation; and we will first consider
its difficulties, then its motive, and lastly its historical
position.
(1.) _Its difficulties._
The first of these is that the Incarnation would be a _change_ in
the existence of God, Who is the changeless One. He, it is urged, is
always the same, while an Incarnation would imply that at some
particular time and place a momentous change occurred, and for ever
afterwards God became different from what He had been for ever
before.
This is no doubt a serious difficulty, but it must not be
exaggerated. For an Incarnation would not, strictly speaking,
involve any change in the Divine Nature itself. God the Son remained
completely and entirely God all the time, He was not (as just said)
in any way changed into a man, only He united to Himself a human
nature as well. And perhaps if we knew more about the nature of God,
and also about that of man (who we must remember was made to some
extent in God's image, and this perhaps with a view to the
Incarnation), we should see that it was just as natural for God to
become Man, as it was for God to create man. We have really nothing
to argue from. An Incarnation seems improbable, and that is all we
can say.
But if it took place at all, there is nothing surprising in this
planet being the one chosen for it. Indeed, as far as we know, it is
the only one that could be chosen, since it is the only one which
contains personal beings in whom God could become incarnate. Of
course other planets _may_ contain such beings; but as said before
(Chapter V.) this is only a conjecture, and in the light of recent
investigations not a very probable one. While if they do contain
such beings, these may not have sinned, in which case our little
world, with its erring inhabitants, would be like the lost sheep in
the parable, the only one which the Ruler of the Universe had come
to save.
The second difficulty is, that the Incarnation would lead to a
_compound Being_, who is both Divine and human at the same time, and
this is often thought to be incredible. But here the answer is
obvious, and is suggested by the Creed itself. Man himself is a
compound being; he is the union of a material body and an immaterial
spirit, in a single person. His spirit is in fact _incarnate_ in his
body. We cannot explain it, but so it is. And the Incarnation in
which Christians believe is the union of the Divine Nature and the
human nature in a single Person. Both appear equally improbable, and
equally inconceivable to our minds, if we try and think out all that
they involve; but as the one is actually true, the other is
certainly not incredible.
The third and last of these difficulties refers to the miraculous
_Virgin-birth_. But if we admit the possibility of an Incarnation,
no method of bringing it about can be pronounced incredible. The
event, if true, is necessarily unique, and cannot be supposed to
come under the ordinary laws of nature. For it was not the birth of
a _new_ being (as in the case of ordinary men), but an already
existing Being entering into new conditions. And we have no
experience of this whatever. Indeed, that a child born in the usual
way should be the Eternal God, is just as miraculous, and just as
far removed from our experience, as if He were born in any other
way. While considering that one object of the Incarnation was to
promote moral virtues in man, such as purity, the virgin-birth was
most suitable, and formed an appropriate beginning for a sinless
life.
(2.) _Its motive._
But we now come to a more important point, for the Incarnation, if
true, must have been the most momentous event in the world's
history; and can we even imagine a sufficient reason for it? God we
may be sure does not act without motives, and what adequate motive
can be suggested for the Incarnation? Now the alleged motive, indeed
the very foundation of Christianity, is that God _loves_ man; and as
a natural consequence wishes man to love Him. Is this then
incredible, or even improbable? Certainly not, for several reasons.
To begin with, as we have already shown, God is a Personal and Moral
Being, Who cares for the welfare of His creatures, more especially
for man. And this, allowing for the imperfection of human language,
may be described as God's _loving_ man, since disinterested love for
another cannot be thought an unworthy attribute to ascribe to God.
On the other hand, man is also a personal and moral being, able to
some extent to love God in return. And to this must be added the
fact that man, at least some men, do not seem altogether unworthy of
God's love, while we certainly do not know of any other being who is
more worthy of it.
Moreover, considering the admitted resemblance between God and man,
the analogy of human parents loving their children is not
inappropriate. Indeed it is specially suitable, since here also we
have a relationship between two personal and moral beings, one of
whom is the producer (though not in this case the creator) of the
other. And human parents often love their children intensely, and
will sometimes even die for them; while, as a rule, the better the
parents are the more they love their children, and this in spite of
the children having many faults. Is it, then, unlikely that the
Creator may love His children also, and that human love may be only
a reflection of this--another instance of how man was made in the
image of God? The evidence we have may be slight, but it all points
the same way.
Now, if it be admitted that God loves man, we have plainly no means
of estimating the _extent_ of this love. But by comparing the other
attributes of God, such as His wisdom and His power, with the
similar attributes of man, we should expect God's love to be
infinitely greater than any human love; so great indeed that He
would be willing to make any sacrifice in order to gain what is the
object in all love, that it should be returned. Might not then God's
love induce Him to become man, so that He might the more easily win
man's love?
And we must remember that man's love, like his will, is _free_.
Compulsory love is in the nature of things impossible. A man can
only love, what he can if he chooses hate. Therefore God cannot
force man to love Him, He can only induce him; and how can He do
this better than by an Incarnation? For it would show, as nothing
else could show, that God's love is a self-sacrificing love; and
this is the highest form of love. Indeed, if it were not so, in
other words, if God's love cost Him nothing, it would be _inferior_
in this respect to that of many men. But if, on the other hand,
God's love involved self-sacrifice;--if it led to Calvary--then it
is the highest possible form of love. And then we see that God's
attributes are all, so to speak, on the same scale; and His Goodness
is as far above any human goodness, as the Power which rules the
universe is above any human power; or the Wisdom which designed all
nature is above any human wisdom. Hence, if the Incarnation still
seems inconceivable, may it not be simply because the love of God,
like His other attributes, is so inconceivably greater than anything
we can imagine?
Moreover a self-sacrificing love is the form, which is most likely
to lead to its being returned. And experience proves that this has
actually been the case. The condescending love of Christ in His
life, and still more in His death, forms an overpowering motive
which, when once realised, has always been irresistible.
But more than this. Not only does the Incarnation afford the
strongest possible motive for man to love God, but it _enables_ him
to do so in a way which nothing else could. Man, it is true, often
longs for some means of intercourse, or communion with his Maker,
yet this seems impossible. The gulf which separates the Creator from
the creature is infinite, and can never be bridged over by man, or
even by an angel, or other intermediate being. For a bridge must of
necessity touch _both sides_; so if the gulf is to be bridged at
all, it can only be by One Who is at the same time both God and Man.
Thus the Incarnation brings God, if we may use the expression,
within man's reach, so that the latter has no mere abstract and
invisible Being to love, but a definite Person, Whose Character he
can appreciate, and Whose conduct he can to some extent follow. In
short, the Incarnation provides man with a worthy Being for his love
and devotion, yet with a Being Whom he can partly at least
understand and partly imitate. And he is thus able to become in a
still truer sense a _child of God_; or, as it is commonly expressed,
God became Man in order that man might become as far as possible,
like God.
And this brings us to another aspect of the Incarnation. Christ's
life was meant to be an _example_ to man, and it is clear that a
_perfect_ example could only be given by a Being Who is both God and
Man. For God alone is above human imitation, and even the best of
men have many faults; so that from the nature of the case, Christ,
and Christ alone, can provide us with a perfect example, for being
Man He is capable of imitation, and being God He is worthy of it.
Now what follows from this? If Christ's life was meant to be an
example to man, it was essential that it should be one of
_suffering_, or the example would have lost more than half its
value. Man does not want to be shown how to live in prosperity, but
how to live in adversity, and how to suffer patiently. The desertion
of friends, the malice of enemies, and a cruel death are the
occasional lot of mankind. They are perhaps the hardest things a man
has to bear in this world, and they have often had to be borne by
the followers of Christ. Is it incredible, then, that He should have
given them an example of the perfect way of doing so; gently
rebuking His friends, praying for His murderers, and acting
throughout as only a perfect man could act? No doubt such a life and
death seem at first sight degrading to the Deity. But strictly
speaking, suffering, if borne voluntarily and for the benefit of
others, is not degrading; especially if the benefit could not be
obtained in any other way.
When we consider all this, it is plain that many reasons can be
given for the Incarnation. Of course it may be replied that they are
not adequate; but we have no means of knowing whether God would
consider them adequate or not. His ideas are not like ours; for what
adequate motive can we suggest for His creating man at all? Yet He
has done so. And having created him and given him free will, and
man having misused his freedom, all of which is admitted, then that
God should endeavour to restore man cannot be thought incredible.
Indeed it seems almost due to Himself that He should try and prevent
His noblest work from being a failure. And if in addition to this
God loves man still, in spite of his sins, then some intervention on
his account seems almost probable.
(3.) _Its historical position._
It may still be objected that if the above reasons are really
sufficient to account for the Incarnation, it ought to have taken
place near the commencement of man's history. And no doubt when we
contemplate the great antiquity of man, this often seems a
difficulty. But we have very little to judge by, and that little
does not support the objection. For in nature God seems always to
work by the slow and tedious process of evolution, not attaining
what He wanted all at once, but by gradual development. Therefore,
if He revealed Himself to man, we should expect it to be by the same
method. At first it would be indistinctly, as in _Natural Religion_;
which dates back to pre-historic times, since the burial customs
show a belief in a future life. Then it would be more clearly, as in
the _Jewish Religion_; and finally it might be by becoming Man
Himself, as in the _Christian Religion_.
According to Christianity, the whole previous history of the world
was a preparation for the Incarnation. But only when the preparation
was complete, _when the fullness of the time came_, as St. Paul
expresses it,[177] did it take place. And it has certainly proved,
as we should have expected, an epoch-making event. In all
probability the history of the world will always be considered
relatively to it in years B.C. and A.D. And very possibly it has a
significance far beyond man or even this planet. For we must
remember, man is not merely a link in a series of created beings
indefinitely improving, but, as shown in Chapter V., he is the _end_
of the series, the last stage in evolution, the highest organised
being that will ever appear on this planet, or, as far as we know,
on any planet.
[Footnote 177: Gal. 4. 4.]
Therefore, man's rank in the universe is not affected by the
insignificance of this earth. Where else shall we find a personal
being with attributes superior to those of man? Where else indeed
shall we find a personal being at all? The only answer Science can
give is _nowhere_. But if so, man's position in the universe is one
of unique pre-eminence. And it is this inherent greatness of man, as
it has been called, which justifies the Incarnation. _He is worthy
that Thou should'st do this for him._
Moreover when we consider God the Son as the Divine Person who is
specially _immanent_ in nature, and who has been evolving the
universe through countless ages from its original matter into higher
and higher forms of life, there seems a special fitness in its
leading up to such a climax as the Incarnation. For then by becoming
Man, He united Himself with matter in its highest and most perfect
form. Thus the Incarnation, like the Nebula theory in astronomy, or
the process of Evolution, if once accepted, throws a new light on
the entire universe; and it has thus a grandeur and impressiveness
about it, which to some minds is very attractive. On the whole,
then, we decide that the doctrine is certainly not incredible,
though it no doubt seems improbable.
(_C._) THE ATONEMENT.
We pass on now to the doctrine of the Atonement, which is that
Christ's death was in some sense a sacrifice for sin, and thus
reconciled (or made 'at-one') God the Father and sinful man. And
though not actually stated in the Creeds, it is implied in the
words, _Was crucified also for us_, and _Who suffered for our
salvation_.
The chief difficulty is of course on moral grounds. The idea of
atonement, it is said, or of one man being made to suffer as a
substitute for another, and thus appeasing the Deity, was well-nigh
universal in early times, and is so still among savage nations. Such
a sacrifice, however, is a great injustice to the _victim_; it
ascribes an unworthy character to God, as a _Judge_, Who can be
satisfied with the punishment of an innocent man in place of the
guilty one; and it has a bad influence on the _sinner_, allowing him
to sin on with impunity, provided he can find another substitute
when needed.
The answer to this difficulty is, that it takes no account of the
most important part of the Christian doctrine, which is the
_willingness_ of the Victim. According to Christianity, Christ was a
willing Sacrifice, Who freely laid down His life;[178] while the
human sacrifices just alluded to were not willing sacrifices, since
the victims had no option in the matter. And, as we shall see, this
alters the case completely both in regard to the victim himself, the
judge, and the sinner.
[Footnote 178: _E.g._, John 10. 18.]
(1.) _As to the Victim._
It is plain that his willingness does away with the injustice
altogether. There is no injustice in accepting a volunteer for any
painful office, provided he thoroughly knows what he is doing, for
he need not undertake it unless he likes. If, on the other hand, we
deny the voluntary and sacrificial character of Christ's death, and
regard Him as merely a good man, then there certainly was
injustice--and very great injustice too, that such a noble life
should have ended in such a shameful death.
(2.) _As to the Judge._
Next as to the Judge. It will be seen that a willing sacrifice,
though it does not satisfy his _justice_, makes a strong appeal to
his _mercy_; at least it would do so in human cases. Suppose for
instance a judge had before him a criminal who well deserved to be
punished, but a good man, perhaps the judge's own son, came forward,
and not only interceded for the prisoner, but was so devotedly
attached to him as to offer to bear his punishment (pay his fine,
for instance), this would certainly influence the judge in his
favour. It would show that he was not so hopelessly bad after all.
Mercy and justice are thus both facts of human nature; and it is
also a fact of human nature, that the voluntary suffering, or
willingness to suffer, of a good man for a criminal whom he deeply
loves, does incline man to mercy rather than justice.
Now, have we any reason for thinking that God also combines, in
their highest forms, these two attributes of mercy and justice?
Certainly we have; for, as shown in Chapter V., the goodness of God
includes both _beneficence_ and _righteousness_; and these general
terms, when applied to the case of judging sinners, closely
correspond to mercy and justice. God, as we have seen, combines
both, and both are required by the Christian doctrine. Mercy alone
would have forgiven men without any atonement; justice alone would
not have forgiven them at all. But God is both merciful and just,
and therefore the idea that voluntary atonement might incline Him to
mercy rather than justice does not seem incredible.
And this is precisely the Christian doctrine. The mercy of God the
Father is obtained for sinful man by Christ's generous sacrifice of
Himself on man's behalf; so that, to put it shortly, _God forgives
sins for Christ's sake_. And it should be noticed, the idea of sins
being _forgiven_ which occurs all through the New Testament, and is
alluded to in the Apostles' Creed, shows that Christ's Atonement was
not that of a mere substitute, for then no forgiveness would have
been necessary. If, for example, I owe a man a sum of money, and a
friend pays it for me, I do not ask the man to forgive me the debt;
I have no need of any forgiveness. But if, instead of paying it, he
merely intercedes for me, then the man may forgive me the debt for
my friend's sake.
And in this way, though Christ did not, strictly speaking, bear
man's _punishment_ (which would have been eternal separation from
God), His sufferings and death may yet have procured man's _pardon_;
He suffered on our behalf, though not in our stead. And some
Atonement was certainly necessary to show God's _hatred for sin_,
and to prevent His Character from being misunderstood in this
respect. And it probably would have been so, if men had been
forgiven without any Atonement, when they might have thought that
sin was not such a very serious affair after all.
(3.) _As to the sinner._
Lastly, the willingness of the victim affects the sinner also. For
if the changed attitude of the judge is due, not to his justice
being satisfied, but to his mercy being appealed to, this is plainly
conditional on a _moral change_ in the sinner himself. A good man
suffering for a criminal would not alter our feelings towards him,
if he still chose to remain a criminal. And this exactly agrees with
the Christian doctrine, which is that sinners cannot expect to avail
themselves of Christ's Atonement if they wilfully continue in sin;
so that _repentance_ is a necessary condition of forgiveness.
Therefore instead of having a bad influence on the sinners
themselves; it has precisely the opposite effect.
And what we should thus expect theoretically has been amply
confirmed by experience. No one will deny that Christians in all
ages have been devotedly attached to the doctrine of the Atonement.
They have asserted that it is the cause of all their joy in this
world, and all their hope for the next. Yet, so far from having
had a bad influence, it has led them to the most noble and
self-sacrificing lives. It has saved them from _sin_, and not only
the penalties of sin, and this is exactly what was required. The
greatness of man's sin, and the misery it causes in the world, are
but too evident, apart from Christianity. Man is indeed both the
glory and the scandal of the universe--the _glory_ in what he was
evidently intended to be, and the _scandal_ in what, through sin, he
actually became. And the Atonement was a 'vast remedy for this vast
evil.' And if we admit the _end_, that man had to be redeemed from
sin, impressed with the guilt of sin, and helped to resist sin; we
cannot deny the appropriateness of the _means_, which, as a matter
of fact, has so often brought it about.
This completes a brief examination of the moral difficulties
connected with the Atonement; and it is clear that the _willingness_
of the Victim makes the whole difference, whether we regard them as
referring to the Victim himself, the Judge, or the sinner.
(_D._) THE RESURRECTION.
The last great Christian doctrine is that of the Resurrection.
According to Christianity, all men are to rise again, with their
bodies partly changed and rendered incorruptible; and the
Resurrection of Christ's Body was both a pledge of this, and also to
some extent an example of what a risen body would be like. He was
thus, as the Bible says, the _firstborn_ from the dead.[179] Now
this word _firstborn_ implies, to begin with, that none had been so
born before, the cases of Lazarus, etc., being those of
_resuscitation_ and not _resurrection_; they lived again to die
again, and their bodies were unchanged. And it implies, secondly,
that others would be so born afterwards, so that our risen bodies
will resemble His. The Resurrection of Christ is thus represented
not as something altogether exceptional and unique, but rather as
the first instance of what will one day be the universal rule. It
shows us the last stage in man's long development, what he is
intended to become when he is at length perfected. We will therefore
consider first Christ's Resurrection, and then man's resurrection.
[Footnote 179: Col. 1. 18; Rev. 1. 5; 1 Cor. 15. 20; Acts. 26. 23.]
(1.) _Christ's Resurrection._
Now according to the Gospels, Christ's Risen Body combined material
and immaterial properties in a remarkable manner. Thus He could be
touched and eat food, and yet apparently pass through closed doors
and vanish at pleasure; and this is often thought to be incredible.
But strictly speaking it is not _incredible_; since no material
substance (a door or anything else) is _solid_. There are always
spaces between the molecules; so that for one such body to pass
through another is no more difficult to imagine, than for one
regiment to march through another on parade. And if a regiment
contained anything like as many men, as there are molecules in a
door, it would probably look just as solid.
Moreover Christ's risen Body, though possessing some material
properties, is represented to have been _spiritual_ as well. And the
nearest approach to a spiritual substance of which we have any
scientific knowledge is the _ether_, and this also seems to combine
material and immaterial properties, being in some respects more like
a solid than a gas. Yet it can pass through all material substances;
and this certainly prevents us from saying that it is incredible
that Christ's spiritual Body should pass through closed doors.
Indeed for all we know, it may be one of the properties of spiritual
beings, that they can pass through material substances (just as the
X-rays can) and be generally invisible; yet be able, if they wish,
to assume some of the properties of matter, such as becoming visible
or audible. In fact, unless they were able to do this, it is hard to
see how they could manifest themselves at all. And a slight
alteration in the waves of light coming from a body would make it
visible or not to the human eye. And it is out of the question to
say that God--the Omnipotent One--could not produce such a change in
a spiritual body. While for such a body to become tangible, or to
take food, is not really more wonderful (though it seems so) than
for it to become visible or audible; since when once we pass the
boundary between the natural and the supernatural everything is
mysterious.
It may of course be replied that though all this is not perhaps
incredible, it is still most improbable; and no doubt it is. But
what then? We have no adequate means of judging, for the fact, if
true, is, up to the present, unique. It implies a _new_ mode of
existence which is neither spiritual nor material, though possessing
some of the properties of each, and of which we have no experience
whatever. So we are naturally unable to understand it. But assuming
the Resurrection of Christ to be otherwise credible, as it certainly
is if we admit His Incarnation and Death, we cannot call it
incredible, merely because the properties of His risen Body are said
to be different from those of ordinary human bodies, and in some
respects to resemble those of spirits. It is in fact only what we
should expect.
(2.) _Man's Resurrection._
Next as to man's resurrection. The Christian doctrine of the
resurrection of the _body_ must not be confused with that of the
immortality of the _spirit_, discussed in Chapter VI., which is
common to many religions, and is certainly not improbable. But two
objections may be made to the resurrection of the body.
The first is that it is _impossible_, since the human body
decomposes after death, and its molecules may afterwards form a part
of other bodies; so, if all men were to rise again at the same time,
those molecules would have to be in two places at once. But the
fallacy here is obvious, for the molecules composing a man's body
are continually changing during life, and it is probable that every
one of them is changed in a few years; yet the identity of the body
is not destroyed. This identity depends not on the identity of the
molecules, but on their relative position and numbers so that a
man's body in this respect is like a whirlpool in a stream, the
water composing which is continually changing, though the whirlpool
itself remains. Therefore the resurrection need not be a
resurrection of _relics_, as it is sometimes called. No doubt in the
case of Christ it was so, and perhaps it will be so in the case of
some Christians, only it _need_ not be so; and this removes at once
the apparent impossibility of the doctrine.
Secondly, it may still be objected that the doctrine is extremely
_improbable_. And no doubt it seems so. But once more we have no
adequate means of judging. Apart from experience, how very unlikely
it would be that a seed when buried in the ground should develop
into a plant; or that plants and trees, after being apparently dead
all through the winter, should blossom again in the spring. Thus
everything connected with life is so mysterious that we can decide
nothing except by experience. And therefore we cannot say what may,
or may not happen in some future state, of which we have no
experience whatever. Indeed, if man's spirit is immortal, the fact
that it is associated with a body during its life on this earth
makes it not unlikely that it will be associated with a body of some
kind during its future life. And that this body should be partly
spiritual, and so resemble Christ's risen body, is again only what
we should expect. Thus, on the whole, the doctrine of the
Resurrection is certainly credible.
(_E._) CONCLUSION.
We have now examined the four great doctrines of Christianity, the
others either following directly from these, or not presenting any
difficulty. And though, as we have shown, not one of these doctrines
can be pronounced _incredible_, yet some of them, especially those
of the Incarnation and the Atonement, certainly seem _improbable_.
This must be fully and freely admitted. At the same time, it is only
fair to remember that this improbability is distinctly lessened by
the three following considerations.
First, in regard to all these doctrines we have no _adequate_ means
of deciding what is or is not probable. Reason cannot judge where it
has nothing to judge by; and apart from Christianity itself, we know
next to nothing as to what was God's object in creating man. If,
then, these doctrines are true, their truth depends not on reason,
but on revelation. All reason can do is to examine most carefully
the evidence in favour of the alleged revelation. Of this we should
expect it to be able to judge, but not of the doctrines themselves.
We are hence in a region where we cannot trust to our own sense of
the fitness of things; and therefore the Christian doctrines must
not be condemned merely because we think them contrary to our
reason. Moreover many thoughtful men (including Agnostics) do not
consider them so. Thus the late Professor Huxley once wrote, 'I have
not the slightest objection to offer _a priori_ to all the
propositions of the Three Creeds. The mysteries of the Church are
child's play compared with the mysteries of Nature.'[180]
[Footnote 180: Quoted with his permission in Bishop Gore's Bampton
Lectures, 1891, p. 247, 1898 edition.]
And this brings us to the next point, which is that many _other_
facts which are actually true appear equally improbable at first
sight; such, for instance, as the existence of the ether, or the
growth of plants. Apart from experience, what an overwhelming
argument could be made out against such facts as these. Yet they
concern subjects which are to a great extent within our
comprehension, while Christianity has to do with the nature and
character of a God Who is admittedly beyond our comprehension. May
not the difficulties in both cases, but especially in regard to the
latter, be due to our _ignorance_ only? The Christian doctrines, we
must remember, do not claim to have been revealed in all their
bearings, but only in so far as they concern ourselves.
Thirdly, it should be noticed that, though individually these
doctrines may seem improbable, yet, when considered as a whole, as
in all fairness they ought to be, there is a complete harmony
between them. Their improbability is not _cumulative_. On the
contrary, one often helps to explain the difficulties of another.
This has been recognised by most writers, including many who can
scarcely be called theologians. Thus the great Napoleon is reported
to have said, 'If once the Divine character of Christ is admitted,
Christian doctrine exhibits the precision and clearness of algebra;
so that we are struck with admiration at its scientific connection
and unity.'[181]
[Footnote 181: Beauterne, Sentiment de Napoleon 1^er sur le
Christianisme, new edition, Paris, 1864, p. 110.]
In conclusion, it must be again pointed out that we are only now
considering the _credibility_ of Christianity, and not trying to
make out that it appears a probable religion, at first sight, which
it plainly does not. Only its improbability is not so extremely
great as to make it useless to consider the evidence in its favour.
This is especially so when we remember that this improbability must
have seemed far greater when Christianity was first preached than it
does now, when we are so accustomed to the religion. Yet, as a
matter of fact, the evidence in its favour did outweigh every
difficulty, and finally convince the civilised world. What this
evidence is we proceed to inquire.