THE EFFECT OF THE MEMORANDUM
Senator Fulbright, when he inserted the memorandum into the
_Congressional Record_, said it was based on the principle of military
subordination to civilian control, and that it was not the function of
the military to educate the public on political issues.[27] The Senator
further said: “The memorandum was directed solely at the impropriety
of officers of the armed services lending their prestige and official
status to meetings which tend to undermine policies of the civil
government of the United States, as set forth by the President and the
Congress.”[28]
“The sole objective of my recommendation was to insure that high
military personnel adhere to the obligation, which is inherent in their
duty as officers to refrain from public expressions of opposition to
the policies of the Government and of their Commander-in-Chief.”[29]
We are not impugning the motives of Senator Fulbright when we say that
a study of the memorandum reveals that its effect was to challenge
the National Security Council directive of 1958. This directive did
not deny the principle of civilian control; in fact, because of
its subordination to President Eisenhower the military obeyed the
directive. Furthermore, the directive did not call for the military
to educate the public on political issues in the sense of partisan
politics. In the memorandum Senator Fulbright himself said: “Under a
National Security Council directive in 1958, it remains the policy of
the U. S. Government to make use of military personnel and facilities
to arouse the public to the menace of the cold war.”[30]
“The purpose of this memorandum is to give some indication of the
dangers involved in education and propaganda activities by the
military, directed at the public, and to suggest steps for dealing with
the underlying problem.”[31]
“There is little in the education, training or experience of most
military officers to equip them with the balance of judgment necessary
to put their own ultimate solutions—those with which their education,
training and experience are concerned—into proper perspective in the
President’s total ‘strategy for the nuclear age’.”[32]
Under “Recommendations” we find:
“1. With reference to the National Security Council directive of 1958,
suggested revision is based upon its description in attachment 3 (New
York Times article of June 18, 1961), from which the following is
excerpted: ‘President Eisenhower and his top policy leaders decreed
that the cold war could not be fought as a series of separate and
often unrelated actions, as with foreign aid and propaganda’. Rather,
it must be fought with a concentration of all the resources of the
Government and with the full understanding and support of the civilian
population. It was decided, in particular, that the military should be
used to reinforce the cold-war effort.”
“This policy should be reconsidered from the standpoint of a basic
error, that military personnel have the necessarily broad background
which would enable them to relate the various aspects of the cold-war
effort, one to the other.”[33]
The memorandum indicates that it is convinced that the National
Security Council directive, and its implementation, could be attacked
from several grounds, including an assumed violation of the “basic
traditional and constitutional question of military efforts to
propagandize the public....” As it went on to say: “the violation of
these concepts alone should be sufficient basis for challenging the
National Security Council policy, and its implementation.”[34]
This also helps make it certain that the memorandum was not directed
simply against certain mistakes in the implementation of the policy,
but against the policy itself. In addition to saying that the military
is _not qualified_ to engage in the cold war, the Senator claims that
it is _forbidden on constitutional grounds_.
FOOTNOTES:
[27] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 2,m.
Civilian control is not controversial. In his May 12, 1962 speech
to the West Point Cadets, General Douglas MacArthur emphasized that
political problems were “not for your professional participation or
military solution.” _Congressional Record_, May 31, 1962, p. A4009,
col. 1,t.
Admiral Arleigh A. Burke testified: “No mature U.S. military officer
I know of has ever questioned it. Indeed, it is a sacred part of our
military tradition itself. If a military man cannot reconcile his
convictions with his civilian superior’s orders, he has only the
recourse of leaving the service.”
“But the principle of civilian control can be perverted. Civilian
control of the military is properly exerted by the President, the
Secretary of Defense, and the secretaries of the individual military
departments over the military services, within the guidelines laid down
by Congress. The senior civilians in the Government have the final
decision on all problems affecting the military posture of the United
States. This is proper and correct.”
“In my opinion, it is improper that civilian control should be
exercised in any other echelon but at the top. It should not be
extended to every subordinate military echelon. To be specific, orders
and directives to the military should come from the top civilian
elements to the senior military people. They should not come from
junior civilian elements to junior military people.” (Military Cold War
Education and Speech Review Policies, Part 1, pp. 21-22).
General MacArthur further said: “While for the purpose of
administration and command the Armed forces are within the executive
branch of the Government, they are accountable as well to the
Congress, charged with the policymaking responsibility, and to the
people, ultimate repository of all national power. Yet so inordinate
has been the application of the Executive power that members of the
armed services have been subjected to the most arbitrary and ruthless
treatment for daring to speak the truth in accordance with conviction
and conscience.” (as quoted by General Edward M. Almond, _Ibid._, Part
2, p. 714.)
[28] “Statement of Senator J. W. Fulbright Relating to a Memorandum
Submitted by Him to the Department of Defense,” p. 3.
[29] _Ibid._, page 4.
[30] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 3,b.
[31] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 1,t.
[32] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 1,b.
[33] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 3,t.
[34] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 2,b.