Transcriber’s Note
Italic text displayed as: _italic_
Senator Fulbright’s
Secret Memorandum
JAMES D. BALES
Concerning the cold war, a well known
liberal, William E. Bohn, said: “Many of
us on the democratic side are poorly prepared
for this historic conflict. There are
editors, clergymen, educators, and politicians
in this country who hardly know what Communism
is.” (_The New Leader_, January
22, 1962, p. 15)
BALES BOOKSTORE
Searcy, Arkansas
Copyright 1962 By
JAMES D. BALES
PREFACE
Senator J. W. Fulbright’s memorandum concerning the military and
the cold war was likely the most controversial paper which appeared
in Washington in 1961. It is probable that the memorandum has been
discussed by a lot of people who have not read it, much less studied
it. Because it is an important document it ought to be studied by the
public as a whole, and not just by men in the armed forces or by those
in the political arena.
The importance of the memorandum is underscored not only by what
it says but also by the wide and varied reaction to it. As to be
expected, it has not been favorably received by those individuals and
organizations which it attacks as extremely radical rightwingers. In
addition, many individuals from various parts of the United States and
from both political parties have been critical of the memorandum.
On the other hand, support for the memorandum has come from many and
different sources. President Kennedy stated that Senator Fulbright
rendered a service by sending the memorandum to the White House. In
the Senator’s own state, the _Arkansas Gazette_ has more than once
indicated its editorial backing of the memorandum.
The leftists as a whole have backed the memorandum. This backing has
included that of the socialists and of the communists. Kingsley Martin,
a British socialist said: “The dangerous change came with the Korean
war, when America discovered that GIs, having no notion why they were
fighting, were easily influenced by Communist propaganda. As a result,
the Pentagon has poured out hundreds of booklets instructing officers
how to indoctrinate the army with hatred of Communism. Quotations
from these documents, presented at the initial hearing of the Walker
case, were, one would have thought sufficient evidence of the virulent
anti-Communist propaganda to which the troops are subjected. But the
Fulbright memorandum (which should be widely published and not hidden
in the Congressional Record) proved that politically-minded generals
had used the permitted task of indoctrination as a means of denigrating
such distinguished American personalities as Truman, Mrs. Roosevelt
and Dean Acheson. These were in effect treated as near-Communists, if
not traitors.”[1] So far as the present author understands the matter,
the memorandum does not mention but one General even remotely in such
a way. And even in his case it states that he said that some prominent
Americans were “tainted with Communist ideology.” This is not the same
as calling them near-Communists or traitors.
Kingsley Martin further praised Senator Fulbright as an
internationalist, and as one who “was making a reasoned attempt to
bring Arkansas into the world community.”[2] What kind of “world
community” did the socialist Martin have in mind?
Senator Fulbright and his position were backed in the Paris weekly,
L’EXPRESS on October 12, 1961. This paper is connected with Pierre
Mendes-France, a leader of the leftwing of the Socialist Party in
France.[3]
The Socialist Party-Social Democratic Federation has backed it
consistently. Norman Thomas said: “Our immediate purpose in preparing
this factual pamphlet was to present it to the administration in order
to back up Senator Fulbright’s excellent memorandum and continue the
work that the Defense Department has begun.”[4]
Irwin Suall, a prominent socialist, has written: “Flushing out and
exposing the activities of the ultras is a major current function of
the Socialist Party. From that standpoint, Thomas called the results of
his press conference ‘highly gratifying’.”[5]
The Communist Party in the United States thought so highly of the
memorandum that they reprinted without comment several columns of the
memorandum in _The Worker_ for August 27, 1961.
No attempt is made to identify Senator Fulbright with each of these
groups just because they back him in this matter. This would be neither
sensible nor fair. However, such questions as the following are raised:
Why are they backing him in this matter? How do they believe that this
would contribute to their long-range or short-range purposes? Would
it make a contribution to any of their purposes? We do know that the
socialists and the communists are backing the memorandum. This reveals
their evaluation of it and indicates whose causes they think that the
memorandum serves.
The extent to which the censorship, which is recommended in memorandum
of Senator Fulbright, is being carried out already is indicated in
a directive issued to Reserve Officers in at least one area of the
United States. It reads: “Although Reserve personnel are not subject
to Army Regulations except when on active duty, such regulations are
distributed to Reserve units with the intention of providing guidance
where appropriate. Members of the Reserve are encouraged to conform
whenever possible to the spirit and intent of regulations even though
they are not bound by them. It is pointed out that information they
convey to the public becomes at least quasi-official when linked with
their Reserve Status.”
Since within a few months an attempt was being made to carry over the
censorship into the private lives of Reservists, in the above manner,
what will happen within a few years unless the trend is changed? Will
the Reserves be prohibited from the freedom of speech which is the
birthright of American citizens?
The memorandum is thus seen to raise questions which are tremendous in
their import.
Our examination of the memorandum does not imply that there are no
extremists. Obviously there are extremists of all varieties in America,
and it would be unreasonable to conclude that there were no extremists
in the military or amongst the anti-Communists. However, in the
author’s judgment it is highly doubtful that the number of extremists
in the military is anywhere near as high as the percentage of soldiers
in Korean prisoner of war camps who in one way or another collaborated
with the enemy, or defected, or failed to manifest the proper
discipline or failed to cooperate with their fellow soldiers.
Our defense of some of the individuals and positions which are attacked
in the memorandum does not imply an endorsement of every individual
and organization mentioned in the memorandum; nor does it imply an
endorsement of everything which may have been said at one time or
another by the individuals and organizations in whose defense we have
spoken.
In our discussion of the memorandum we have sometimes quoted Senator
Fulbright against Senator Fulbright. We have also quoted some liberals
against Senator Fulbright. This illustrates that one is not necessarily
a so-called ultra rightist just because he opposes certain positions
taken by the Senator.
There are some who have implied that Senator Fulbright is not
responsible for what is in the memorandum since he did not personally
write it. Of such we would ask: Is there anything in the memorandum’s
charges and recommendations with which the Senator disagrees? If so,
why has he not said so? As far as our knowledge goes, the Senator
himself has never suggested that he disagrees with any of its charges
and recommendations.
Although the Senator did not personally write the memorandum, he is
responsible for it; and as far as we know he has never suggested
otherwise. He submitted it “to the Secretary of Defense.”[6] He said:
“The memorandum was based on my strong belief in the principle of
military subordination to civilian control.”[7] “The memorandum was a
personal one.... It was transmitted to the Secretary of Defense as a
personal correspondence.” It was a part of his “private papers.”[8]
According to the President, Senator Fulbright’s memorandum presented
the Senator’s views. “Senator Fulbright sent a memorandum to the
Secretary of Defense at the request of the Secretary of Defense, and
expressed his views about a matter which is, of course, of concern to
the Department of Defense.”
“So, in my judgment, Senator Fulbright performed a service in sending
his viewpoint to the Department of Defense....”[9]
In order to assist the public in their evaluation of the memorandum,
the following discussion of the memorandum is placed before the public.
This discussion does not endeavor to present and to examine the basic
philosophy, strategy and tactics of the enemy—communism. This the
author has endeavored to do in two other books, _Communism: Its Faith
and Fallacies_ and _Understanding Communism_.
Appreciation is expressed to those who gave permission to quote from
copyrighted material.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] _New Statesman_, November 17, 1961, p. 732, col. 2,t. The
difficulty of speaking on some phases of the present world situation
without crossing Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt is illustrated by following
remarks which she made in a recent interview. _First_, the President
has urged the people to build shelters. Mrs. Roosevelt said: “I don’t
believe in private shelters, or school shelters.” It must be done,
she said, through “a comprehensive government program” if it is to be
done at all. _Second_, the President indicates that we shall fight
if necessary. Military men teach the same thing. She said: “War
is inadmissible anymore.... Today willingness to go to war means
willingness to face the loss of civilization.” (Hal Boyle, “Eleanor
Roosevelt Recalls Pearl Harbor,” _Arkansas Democrat_, Dec. 7, 1961, p.
19.)
[2] _New Statesman_, p. 732, col. 1,m.
[3] “Politically, it speaks for the non-Communist left and is close to
ex-Premier Pierre Mendes-France.” _Newsweek_, Feb. 12, 1962, p. 82,
col. 3,b.
[4] _New America_, December 8, 1961, p. 2.
[5] _Ibid._, p. 6, col. 5,t. _Maclean’s_ magazine (September 9, 1961)
defended Senator Fulbright and implied that “fanatics, numbskulls and
mediocrities” were the core of the opposition to him in his home state
(p. 81. From an article by Ian Schlanders.)
[6] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 2,m.
[7] _Ibid._, p. 13436, col. 2,m.
[8] _Ibid._, p. 13436, col. 3,t.
[9] Press conference of August 10. _Congressional Record_, August 11,
1961, p. 14449, col. 1,t,m. See also p. 14559.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTERS Page
Preface
I The Background 1
II The Secret Memorandum Made Public 5
III The Effect of the Memorandum 6
IV Who Is Attacked in the Memorandum 9
V The Protracted Conflict Concept Criticized 29
VI The American People the Principle Problem? 50
VII Who Is the Defeatest? 70
VIII Senator Fulbright and World Opinion 70
IX Is Communism A Matter of Politics? 80
X The Memorandum and the Community Party Line 80
XI Conclusions 101
Chapter I
THE BACKGROUND
Too many Americans have understood neither the American system
of freedom, and how it works, nor the communist challenge to our
freedom, and how it operates. The well known liberal, William E. Bohn,
wrote: “Many of us on the democratic side are poorly prepared for
this historic conflict. There are editors, clergymen, educators and
politicians in this country who hardly know what Communism is.”[10]
This lack of understanding was illustrated in the case of those
prisoners of war in Korea who were brainwashed.[11]
Out of this lack of understanding of the nature of our country, and of
the nature of the enemy who has challenged us, has come an apathy which
threatens our very survival. Senator Fulbright himself has spoken of
our having become “snug and complacent.”[12] He lamented: “... If only
we would stop snoring with our eyes open.”[13] His fear was that even
if we are aroused out of our sleep we “again subside into dreamland.”
In fact, he said: “Mr. President, I have no idea what must be done to
awaken Americans to the unpleasant facts of life. As unwilling as I
am to face it, perhaps the answer is that we simply do not wish to be
disturbed.”[14]
In December, 1960, the Senator said: “The greatest crisis confronting
the West is not Berlin. It is the apathy of the free world and its
incomprehensible unwillingness to look facts in the face. Evolution and
the survival of the fittest are concepts we understand when applied to
plants and animals—but we seem not to realize that these concepts apply
to us.”[15]
The people, said the Senator, must be informed. “The American people
ought to be told the bleak truth about their world, the character of
the forces arrayed against them, and what they must do, at whatever
cost, to survive or even to bring about a state of high security. They
must be told that, however humane their society, whatever its ideals,
this alone will not save them from destruction by a society armed with
the prodigious mechanisms of our times and an implacable determination
to dominate all men.”[16]
Spurred on by the studies of the Korean prisoners of war, and deeply
concerned with the apathy and ignorance in America, efforts were made
to do a better job of equipping the American soldier for the war in
which we have become involved. On August 17, 1955, President Eisenhower
made an official proclamation that soldiers were expected to live up to
the newly formulated “Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces
of the United States.” Since the ignorance in the Armed Forces was but
a reflection of the ignorance of the general population, President
Eisenhower and the National Security Council issued in 1958 a directive
which more fully put the military in the cold war.
The National Security Council is our top policy and planning agency.
It is composed of the Cabinet members who have responsibilities in
the field of national security, and included in it by law are the
President, Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary
of State, the National Security Resources Board’s Chairman; and, as
statutory advisers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
CIA. It was this group which issued the directive of 1958 which placed
upon the military the duty of helping not only the military but also
the civilian population to gain an understanding of the issues involved
in the cold war. By name, its statutory members in 1958 were President
Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon, John Foster Dulles, Neil H. McElroy,
and Gordon Grey, the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization.
As a result of this directive of the National Security Council,
national strategy seminars were conducted throughout the country.
Originating in the War College, these seminars were making a valuable
contribution to the waging of the cold war, as Roscoe Drummond has
pointed out.[17] Civilian organizations who wanted speakers on the
subject of Communism and the cold war could contact the military and
secure the services of military officials who were versed in some phase
of the cold war. In some cases facilities on military bases were made
available.
During 1961, however, there was an increase in censorship of the
speeches of military men. In July, 1961, the Defense Department issued
a directive placing certain restraints on military speakers, and this
action, according to Cabell Phillips in the _New York Times_ of July
21, was the result of a memorandum of Senator J. W. Fulbright.[18]
Supposedly directed only toward the curbing of political utterances
by rightwing military speakers, the impact of the directive and the
controversy which has arisen have been much broader. As a result, as
Roscoe Drummond pointed out, the country is being deprived “of the
useful and needed service which the military can properly perform.”
“We have just about thrown away the public national-strategy seminars
which were doing so much to alert people” concerning communism and its
strategy in the cold war.[19]
As far as we know the Defense Department has now limited the military
to military subjects, which include the military threat of Russia; but
anything dealing with the _specific aims and political tactics of the
communists must be cleared by the Pentagon_.[20]
Fulbright’s memorandum, which has had an influence on the stand taken
by the Department of Defense, is thus seen to be an important one.
FOOTNOTES:
[10] _The New Leader_, Jan. 22, 1962, p. 15.
[11] William E. Mayer, “Communist Indoctrination—Its Significance to
Americans,” Searcy, Arkansas: National Education Program, 1957, pp.
14-15, _Congressional Record_, Jan. 21, 1960, p. 877, col. 1,m. Senator
Dodd has endeavored to give the percentage of collaborators in The
_Congressional Record_, July 23, 1962, p. 13569. On the same page he
said: “The overwhelming majority of these POW’s succumbed to Communist
pressures and became collaborators in one degree or another. So general
was the phenomena of defeatism and ‘give-up-itis,’ that we cannot
write them off to individual weakness. The fault lay not with the
individual, but with our society.” See also the statements of Admiral
Arleigh A. Burke in the Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the
Committee on Armed Services, _Military Cold War Education and Speech
Review Policies_, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962, Part 1,
p.19. Also Secretary McNamara, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed
Services, _Defense Secretary McNamara on S. Res. 191_, Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1961, p. 4.
[12] _Congressional Record_, May 11, 1959, p. A3890, col. 2,b.
[13] _Ibid._, p. A3890, col. 1,m.
[14] _Congressional Record_, Jan. 23, 1959, p. 1007, col. 1,b.
[15] _Congressional Record_, Feb. 16, 1961, p. A925, col. 2,b.
[16] _Congressional Record_, March 28, 1960, p. A2709, col. 2,t.
[17] “When the Generals Should Be Allowed To Speak,” _Arkansas
Democrat_, October 26, 1961. General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thought that qualified military personnel
should participate in such seminars. Special Preparedness Subcommittee
of the Committee on Armed Services, _Military Cold War Education and
Speech Review Policies_, Part 1, page 103.
[18] See the directive and Phillips’ articles reprinted by Senator
Strom Thurmond in the _Congressional Record_, July 26, 1961, pp.
12620-12621. Compare _U.S. News and World Report_, August 7, 1961, p.
9. See also pp. 12-15 of a reprint entitled “Excerpts From Speeches
by Senator Strom Thurmond on Efforts to Gag Military Anti-Communist
Speeches and Seminars.”
[19] “When the Generals Should Be Allowed To Speak,” _Arkansas
Democrat_, October 26, 1961.
[20] According to _U.S. News and World Report_, September 18, 1961, p.
8. Reporting on the September 6 testimony of Defense Secretary McNamara.