SIR,

When I proposed to the House, the last time this subject was before them,

to fix this day for the further consideration of His Majesty’s Message, I

certainly indulged the hope that the result of a similar communication to

the Parliament of Ireland would have opened a more favourable Prospect,

than at present exists, of the speedy accomplishment of a measure which I

then stated, and which I still consider, to be of the greatest importance

to the power, the stability, and the general welfare of the Empire;

to the immediate interests of both Kingdoms; and more particularly

to the peace, the tranquillity, and the safety of Ireland: in this

hope, I am sorry to say, I have for the present been disappointed, by

the proceedings of the Irish House of Commons, of which we have been

informed since this subject was last under consideration.

I feel and know that the Parliament of Ireland possesses the power,

the intire competence, on the behalf of that country, alike to accept

or reject a proposition of this nature—a power which I am by no means

inclined to dispute. I see that at the present moment one House

of Parliament in Ireland has expressed a repugnance, even to the

consideration of this measure. Feeling, Sir, as I have already stated,

that it is important, not only as it tends to the general prosperity

of the Empire of Great Britain, but (what, under every situation, must

always be to me an object of the greatest moment) feeling that it was

designed and calculated to increase the prosperity and ensure the safety

of Ireland, I must have seen with the deepest regret that, at the very

first moment, and before the nature of the measure could be known, it was

so received.

But whatever may have been my feelings upon this subject, knowing that

it is the undoubted right of the Legislature of Ireland to reject or to

adopt such measures as may appear to them injurious or beneficial, far be

it from me to speak of its determination in any other terms but those of

respect. Let it not, therefore, be imagined that I am inclined to press

any sentiment, however calculated it may appear to me to benefit every

member of the Empire, in any manner which may lead to hostile discussion

between two Kingdoms, whose mutual happiness and safety depend upon their

being strictly and cordially united. But while I admit and respect the

rights of the Parliament of Ireland, I feel that, as a Member of the

Parliament of Great Britain, I also have a Right to exercise, and a Duty

to perform. That Duty is to express, as distinctly as I can, the general

nature and outline of the Plan, which, in my conscience, I think would

tend in the strongest manner to ensure the safety and the happiness of

both Kingdoms.

While I feel, therefore, that as long as the House of Commons of Ireland

view the subject in the light they do at present, there is no chance of

its adoption, I do not think that I ought on that account to abstain from

submitting it to the consideration of this Parliament; on the contrary, I

think it only the more necessary to explain distinctly the principles of

the Measure, and to state the grounds upon which it appears to me to be

entitled to the approbation of the Legislature.

If Parliament, when it is in possession of the basis upon which this Plan

is founded, and of its general outline, should be of opinion with me,

that it is founded upon fair, just, and equitable principles, calculated

to produce mutual advantages to the two Kingdoms—if Parliament, I say,

upon full explanation, and after mature deliberation, should be of that

opinion, I should propose that its determination should remain recorded

as that by which the Parliament of Great Britain is ready to abide,

leaving to the Legislature of Ireland to reject or to adopt it hereafter,

upon a full consideration of the subject.

There is no man who will deny that in a great question of this nature,

involving in it objects which, in the first instance, are more likely to

be decided upon by passion than by judgment; in a question in which an

honest but, I must be allowed to say, a mistaken sense of National Pride

is so likely to operate, that much misconstruction and misconception

must inevitably happen. It therefore becomes the more necessary that

the intentions of the Government which proposes the Measure, and the

principles of the Measure itself, should be distinctly understood.

But, Sir, in stating that intention and those principles, I look to

something more than a mere vindication of Government for having proposed

the Measure. I do entertain a confidence, even under the apparent

discouragement of the opinion expressed by the Irish House of Commons,

that this Measure is founded upon such clear, such demonstrable grounds

of utility, is so calculated to add to the strength and power of the

Empire, (in which the safety of Ireland is included, and from which

it never can be separated) and is attended with so many advantages to

Ireland in particular, that all that can be necessary for its ultimate

adoption is, that it should be stated distinctly, temperately, and fully,

and that it should be left to the unprejudiced, the dispassionate,

the sober judgment of the Parliament of Ireland. I wish that those

whose interests are involved in this measure should have time for its

consideration—I wish that time should be given to the Landed, to the

Mercantile, and Manufacturing Interest, that they should look at it

in all its bearings, and that they should coolly examine and sift the

popular arguments by which it has been opposed, and that then they should

give their deliberate and final judgment.

I am the more encouraged in this hope of the ultimate success of this

measure, when I see, notwithstanding all the prejudices which it has

excited, that barely more than one-half of the members that attended

the House of Commons were adverse to it; and that in the other House of

Parliament in Ireland, containing, as it does, so large a portion of the

property of that kingdom, it was approved of by a large majority.—When I

have reason to believe that the sentiments of a large part of the People

of that Country are favourable to it; and that much of the Manufacturing,

and of the Commercial Interest of Ireland are already sensible how much

it is calculated to promote their advantage, I think, when it is more

deliberately examined, and when it is seen in what temper it is here

proposed and discussed, that it will still terminate in that which can

alone be a fortunate result.

It would be vain indeed to hope that a proposition upon which prejudices

are so likely to operate, and which is so liable to misconception, should

be unanimously approved. But the approbation I hope for is, that of the

Parliament of Ireland, and of the intelligent part of the Public of

that Country. It is with a view to this object that I think it my duty

to bring this measure forward at present; not for the sake of urging

its immediate adoption, but that it may be known and recorded; that the

intention of the British Parliament may be known, in the hope that it

will produce similar sentiments among our Countrymen in Ireland. With

this view it is my intention not to go at present into any detailed

statement of the plan, because should it ultimately be adopted, the

minuter parts must necessarily become the objects of much distinct

discussion; but to give such a general statement of the nature of the

measure as will enable the House to form a correct judgment upon it.

I shall therefore, Sir, before I sit down, open to the House a string

of Resolutions, comprising the general heads of this plan. It will

be necessary for me, for the purpose of discussing those Resolutions

with regularity and convenience, to move that the House should resolve

itself into a Committee. And I have already stated, that it is not my

intention then to press the Committee to come to an immediate decision

upon the Resolutions; but if, upon full and deliberate examination, the

Resolutions which I shall have the honour to propose, and which contain

as much as is necessary for an outline of the plan, shall be approved, my

opinion is, that nothing can contribute more to obviate any doubts and

dissatisfaction which may exist, than that Parliament should adopt those

Resolutions, and that it should then humbly lay them at the foot of the

Throne, leaving it to HIS MAJESTY’S wisdom to communicate them to the

Parliament of Ireland, whenever circumstances should appear favourable

to such a Measure. I shall therefore, Sir, proceed as shortly as I can

to state to the House the nature, of the Resolutions, and of the Address

which I shall propose to accompany them, if it should be the pleasure of

the House to adopt them.

Having now, Sir, explained to the House the mode I mean to pursue, and my

reasons for persisting, under the present circumstances, in submitting

this Measure to the consideration of Parliament, I will endeavour to

state the general grounds on which it rests, the general arguments by

which it is recommended, and to give a short view of the outline of the

Plan.

As to the general principle upon which, the whole of this Measure is

founded, I am happy to observe, from what passed upon a former occasion,

that there is not a probability of any difference of opinion. The general

principle, to which both sides of the House perfectly acceded, is, that

a perpetual Connection between Great Britain and Ireland is essential

to the interests of both. The only Honourable Gentleman who, when this

subject was before the House on a former day, opposed the consideration

of the Plan altogether, stated, in terms as strong as I could wish,

the necessity of preserving the strictest Connection between the two

Countries. I most cordially agree with him in that opinion, but I then

stated, that I do not barely wish for the maintenance of that Connection

as tending to add to the general strength of the Empire, but I wish for

the maintenance of it with a peculiar regard to the local interests of

Ireland, with a regard to every thing that can give to Ireland its due

weight and importance, as a great member of the Empire. I wish for it

with a view of giving to that Country the means of improving all its

great natural Resources, and of giving it a full participation of all

those blessings which this Country so eminently enjoys.

Considering the subject in this point of view, and assuming it as a

proposition not to be controverted, that it is the duty of those who wish

to promote the Interest and Prosperity of both Countries, to maintain

the strongest connection between them, let me ask, what is the situation

of Affairs that has called us to the discussion of this subject? This

very connection, the necessity of which has been admitted on all hands,

has been attacked by Foreign Enemies, and by Domestic Traitors. The

dissolution of this connection is the great object of the hostility of

the common Enemies of both Countries, it is almost the only remaining

hope with which they now continue the contest. Baffled and defeated as

they have hitherto been, they still retain the hope, they are still

meditating attempts, to dissolve that connection. In how many instances

already the defeat of their hostile designs has been turned to the

confirmation of our Strength and Security, I need not enumerate. God

grant that in this instance the same favour of Divine Providence, which

has in so many instances protected this Empire, may again interpose

in our favour, and that the attempts of the Enemy to separate the two

Countries, may tend ultimately to knit them more closely together, to

strengthen a Connection, the best pledge for the happiness of both, and

so add to that power which forms the chief barrier to the civilized

world, against the destructive principles, the dangerous projects, and

the unexampled usurpation of France. This Connection has been attacked

not only by the avowed Enemies of both Countries, but by internal

Treason, acting in concert with the designs of the Enemy. Internal

Treason, which ingrafted Jacobinism on those diseases which necessarily

grew out of the State and Condition of Ireland.

Thinking, then, as we all must think, that a close Connection with

Ireland is essential to the interests of both Countries, and seeing how

much this Connection is attacked, let it not be insinuated that it is

unnecessary, much less improper, at this arduous and important crisis,

to see whether some new arrangements, some fundamental regulations, are

not necessary, to guard against the threatened danger. The foreign and

domestic Enemies of these Kingdoms have shewn, that they think this the

vulnerable point in which We may be most successfully attacked; let us

derive advantage, if we can, from the hostility of our Enemies—let us

profit by the designs of those who, if their conduct displays no true

wisdom, at least possess in an eminent degree that species of wisdom

which is calculated for the promotion of mischief. They know upon what

footing that Connection rests at this moment between the two Countries,

and they feel the most ardent hope, that the two Parliaments will be

infatuated enough not to render their designs abortive, by fixing that

Connection upon a more solid basis.

These circumstances I am sure will not be denied. And if upon other

grounds we had any doubt, these circumstances alone ought to induce us,

deliberately and dispassionately, to review the situation of the two

Countries, and to endeavour to find out a proper remedy for an evil,

the existence of which is but too apparent. It requires but a moment’s

reflection, for any man who has marked the progress of events, to decide

upon the true state and character of this Connection. It is evidently one

which does not afford that security which, even in times less dangerous

and less critical than the present, would have been necessary, to enable

the empire to avail itself of its strength and its resources.

When I last addressed the House on this subject, I stated that the

settlement, which was made in 1782, so far from deserving the name of a

Final Adjustment, was one that left the Connection between Great Britain

and Ireland exposed to all the attacks of Party, and all the effects

of accident. That Settlement consisted in the demolition of the System

which before held the two Countries together. Let me not be understood as

expressing any regret at the termination of that System. I disapproved

of it, because I thought it was one unworthy the liberality of Great

Britain, and injurious to the interests of Ireland. But to call that a

System in itself—to call that a glorious fabric of human wisdom—which is

no more than the mere demolition of another System—is a perversion of

terms which, however prevalent of late, can only be the effect of gross

misconception, or of great hypocrisy. We boast that we have done every

thing, when we have merely destroyed all that before existed, without

substituting any thing in its place. Such was the _Final Adjustment_ of

1782; and I can prove it to be so, not only from the plainest reasoning,

but I can prove it by the opinion expressed by the British Parliament at

that very time. I can prove it by the opinion expressed by those very

Ministers by whom it was proposed and conducted. I refer, for what I

have said, to proofs which they will find it very difficult to answer;

I mean their own acts, which will plainly shew that they were of opinion

that a new System would be necessary. But, Sir, I will go farther—I

will also produce the authority of one of those whose influence, on the

present occasion, has been peculiarly exerted to prevent the discussion

of the question in Ireland—of one, of whom I do not wish to speak but

with respect, but for whom, nevertheless, I should convey an idea of

more respect, than I can now feel to be due to him, if I were merely to

describe him as the person who fills the same situation, in the House

of Commons of Ireland, which you, Sir, hold among us, and of which on

all occasions _you_ discharge the duties with a dignity and impartiality

which reflects so much credit on yourself, and so well supports the

character and authority of the House.

On a former night, I read an Extract from the Journals, to shew what

was the opinion even of those by whom the Final Adjustment was proposed

on that Measure. It would there appear, that the Message was sent to

the Parliament of Ireland, recommending to them the adoption of some

Plan for a Final Adjustment between the two Countries, and wishing to

know what were the grounds of the grievances of which they complained.

In answer to this Message, the Parliament of Ireland stated certain

grievances, the principal of which was, the power claimed by the

Parliament of Great Britain of making Laws to bind Ireland; but, with

respect to that part of the Message which related to the propriety of

adopting some Measures for a Final Adjustment between the two Countries,

they were wholly silent. This Address was laid before the Parliament of

Great Britain, to whom a similar Message had been previously sent, and on

that ground was moved the Repeal of what was called the Declaratory Act,

which Motion was assented to by the British Parliament. This satisfaction

was compleat to Ireland, as far as related to the grievance of which

her Parliament had complained, viz. the Power of the British Parliament

of making Laws for Ireland, because, by the Repeal of the Declaratory

Act, that power was given up. But so far was the Minister of that day

from considering that the Repeal of that Law finally terminated all

differences, and established the Connection between the two Countries

upon a solid basis, that he thought it necessary to move that a farther

Settlement was indispensable for the maintenance of that Connection.

[Mr. SHERIDAN across the Table, desired that that part of the

Journals to which Mr. PITT alluded, might be read.]

Mr. PITT continued. Sir, I have stated the substance of the Journals

correctly; they were read on a former night, and the Honourable Gentleman

may, if he chooses, have them read again.[1] If he does he will find that

they fully justify the statement I have made, but I beg that at present

I may not be interrupted. I do maintain, that upon a reference to the

Journals of the period to which I have alluded, it will appear that a

farther agreement between Great Britain and Ireland is there dated, in

the opinion of the Administration of the day, to be absolutely necessary.

[1] Vide Appendix.

I beg farther to state, that after the motion for the Bill of which so

much has been said, was passed, an Address to HIS MAJESTY was moved and

carried, praying him to take such further measures as to him seemed

proper, to strengthen the Connection between the two Countries. HIS

MAJESTY’S most Gracious Answer, stating, that in compliance with the

Address, he would immediately take such measures as might be necessary

for that purpose, was delivered to the House by an Honourable Gentleman

who then filled the office of Secretary of State, and whom we have not

lately seen in the House, though he still continues to be a Member of it.

I do assert, without the least fear of contradiction from any Gentleman

whatever, that it was in the contemplation of the Government of that

day, to adopt some measures of the nature alluded to in the Address;

since that period, however, no such measure has been taken. I do also

maintain, that that very system which by these very Ministers who brought

it forward was found to be imperfect, even for the purpose of maintaining

the Connection between the two Countries, remains at this moment in the

same imperfect state. It leaves the two Countries with separate and

independent Legislatures, connected only with this tie, that the Third

Estate in both Countries is the same—that the Executive Government is the

same—that the Crown exercises its power of assenting to Irish Acts of

Parliament under the Great Seal of Great Britain, and by the advice of

British Ministers.

This is the only principle of Connection which is left by the Final

Adjustment of 1782. Whether this is a sufficient tie to unite them in

time of Peace; whether in time of War it is sufficient to consolidate

their strength against a Common Enemy; whether it is sufficient to guard

against those local jealousies which must necessarily sometimes exist

between countries so connected; whether it is calculated to give to

Ireland all the important commercial and political advantages which she

would derive from a closer Connection with Great Britain; whether it can

give to both Nations that degree of strength and prosperity which must be

the result of such a Measure as the present, I believe needs only to be

stated to be decided.

But I have already said, that I have upon this point, the authority

of an opinion to which I before alluded—an opinion delivered upon a

very important Measure, very soon after the Final Adjustment of 1782.

The Measure to which I refer, was that of the Commercial Propositions

which were brought forward in 1785. I am not now going to enter into

a discussion of the merits of that Measure. The best, perhaps, that

can be said of it is, that it went as far as circumstances would then

permit, to draw the two Countries to a closer Connection. But those who

think that the Adjustment of 1782 was final, and that it contained all

that was necessary for the establishment of the Connection between the

two Countries upon a firm basis, can hardly contend that the Commercial

Propositions of 1785 were necessary to prevent the danger of separation

between the two Countries, and to prevent the conflicting operation of

Independent Legislatures. Yet, if I am not mistaken, there will be found,

upon a reference to better Records than those in which Parliamentary

Debates are usually stated (I mean a statement of what passed in the

discussion upon those Propositions fourteen years ago, made, as I have

understood, by some of the principal parties themselves) that the

CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER of that day in Ireland, in a Debate upon

the Irish Propositions, held this language—“If this infatuated Country

gives up the present offer, she may look for it again in vain.” Here the

Right Honourable Gentleman was happily mistaken; Ireland has again had

the offer of the same advantages, but more compleat, and in all respects

better calculated to attain their object; and this offer the Right

Honourable Gentleman has exerted all his influence to reject. But he

goes on to say—“THINGS CANNOT REMAIN AS THEY ARE—Commercial jealousy is

roused—it will increase with _two independent Legislatures_—and without

an united interest in commerce, in a commercial Empire, political Union

will receive many shocks, and _separation of interest_ must threaten

_separation of Connection_, which every _honest Irishman_ must shudder to

look at, as a possible event.”

Gentlemen will have the goodness to observe, that I am not now quoting

these expressions as pledges given by that Right Honourable Gentleman

that he would support a proposal for a Union between the two Countries,

but I am adducing them to prove that the situation of the two Countries

after the Final Adjustment of 1782, was such, in his opinion, as led

to the danger of a separation between them. I am not now arguing that

a Legislative Union is the only measure which can possibly be adopted,

but I am contending that the Adjustment of 1782 was never considered as

final, by those who now state it to be so as an argument against the

consideration of the present measure. How the Honourable Gentleman on

the other side of the House will evade this authority I do not know;—an

authority too, which, I must observe, he seems much more inclined to

treat with respect than he was formerly.

But, Sir, it does not stop there. What is the evil to which he alludes?

Commercial jealousies between two Countries acting upon the laws of two

independent Legislatures, and the danger of those Legislatures acting

in opposition to each other.—How can this evil be remedied? By two

means only; either by some Compact entered into by the Legislatures

of the two Countries respecting the mode of forming their commercial

regulations, or else by blending the two Legislatures together; these

are the only two means. I defy the wit of man to point out a third. The

mode of compact was proposed in 1785, but unfortunately, in spite of

that Right Honourable Gentleman’s eloquence and authority, who then

stated the importance of guarding against the evil, it so happened that

doctrines, derived chiefly from this side of the water, succeeded in

convincing the Parliament of Ireland, that it would be inconsistent

with their independence, to enter into any compact whatever. We have

then the authority of that Right Honourable Gentleman to whom I have so

often alluded, that the unsettled state in which the matter was left,

would give “Political Union many shocks, and lead to a separation of

Connection.” The experiment of a mutual Compact has been tried without

success; the arrangement of that sort, which was proposed in 1785, in

order to obviate the inconveniences stated by the Right Honourable

Gentleman, was then attacked with the same success against his authority,

as another and more effectual remedy has recently experienced under his

auspices. The result then is—you must remain in the state which that

Right Honourable Gentleman has described, with the seeds of separation in

the system now established, and with the Connection, on which the mutual

prosperity of both countries depends in danger of being hourly dissolved,

or you must again recur to the proposal of a compact similar to that

rejected in 1785, or you must resort to the best and most effectual

remedy,—A LEGISLATIVE UNION.

I have dwelt longer, perhaps, upon this part of the subject than was

absolutely necessary, because I believe there is scarcely any man who

has ever asked himself, whether there is a solid, permanent system of

Connection between the two Countries, who could, upon reflection, answer

the question in the affirmative. But besides the authorities of the

persons who made the arrangement in 1782, and of those who have since

treated of it, to shew that it was not deemed to be final and complete;

I have further the test of experience to shew how imperfect it was,

and how inadequate in practice to the great object of cementing the

Connection, and placing it beyond the danger of being dissolved. In the

single instance, which has occurred, (and that a melancholy one which

all of us deplored,) in which we could feel the effects of two jarring

Legislatures, We did feel it. On that occasion, it might have produced

the most signal calamities, had we not been rescued from its danger by

an event, to which no man can now look back without feeling the utmost

joy and exultation; feelings, which subsequent circumstances have served

to heighten and confirm. Every Gentleman will know, that I must allude

to the Regency. With two independent Legislatures, acting upon different

principles, it was accident alone that preserved the identity of the

Executive Power, which is the bond and security of the Connection: And

even then the Executive authority, though vested in one person, would

have been held by two different tenures, by one tenure in England, by

another in Ireland, had not the interposition of Providence prevented a

circumstance pregnant with the most imminent perils, and which might have

operated to a separation of the two kingdoms.

After seeing the recorded opinion of Parliament, of those who made the

arrangement of 1782, and after the decided testimony of experience on

the subject, within the short period of sixteen years, perhaps, it is

hardly necessary to appeal to farther proofs of its inadequacy, or to

desire Gentlemen to look forward to possible cases, which I could easily

put, and which will naturally suggest themselves to the minds of all, who

chuse to turn their attention to the subject.

But when we consider the distinct powers possessed by the two

Legislatures on all the great questions of Peace and War, of alliances

and confederacies,—(for they each have in principle, a right to discuss

them and decide upon them, though one of them has hitherto been wisely

restrained by discretion, from the exercise of that right),—have we

not seen circumstances to induce us to think it possible, at least,

that on some of these important questions the opinions and decisions of

the two Parliaments might have been at variance? Are we talking of an

indissoluble Connection, when we see it thus perpetually liable to be

endangered? Can we really think that the interests of the Empire, or of

its different branches rest upon a safe and solid basis at present? I

am anxious to discuss this point closely with any man, either here, or

in Ireland. Will it be said, that the Parliament of the latter Country

is bound by our decision on the question of Peace or War? And if not so

bound, will any man, looking at human Nature as it is, contend, that

there is a sufficient certainty that the decision on that important

subject will always be the same in both countries? I should be glad to

receive a distinct answer to this question, from the Honourable Gentleman

who has declared himself to be as warm a friend to the Connection between

the two Countries as I am.

Suppose, for instance, that the present war, which the Parliament of

Great Britain considers to be just and necessary, had been voted by the

Irish Parliament, to be unjust, unnecessary, extravagant, and hostile to

the principles of humanity and freedom.—Would that Parliament have been

bound by this Country? If not;—what security have we, at a moment the

most important to our common interest and common salvation, that the two

Kingdoms should have but one friend and one foe? I repeat it; I am eager

to hear what can be said in justification of a basis so imperfect and

unsound, and liable to be shaken by so many accidents. I have already

observed, that in the peculiar circumstances of the present moment,

we may find stronger reasons to prove the necessity of correcting the

system of Connection between this Country and Ireland, of supplying its

imperfections, and strengthening its weakness, than are to be found at

any former period.

Having thus stated, Sir, and I think sufficiently proved, that the

Settlement of 1782, in every point of view in which it can be considered,

is imperfect, and inadequate to the object of maintaining the connection

between the two kingdoms, I proceed next to the circumstances which

peculiarly call upon us at the present moment to remedy that imperfection.

This Country is at this time engaged in the most important, and momentous

conflict, that ever occurred in the History of the World; a conflict in

which Great Britain is distinguished for having made the only manly and

successful stand against the common enemies of civilized society. We see

the point in which that Enemy think us the most assailable—Are we not

then bound in policy and prudence, to strengthen that vulnerable point,

involved as we are in a contest of Liberty against Despotism—of Property

against Plunder and Rapine—of Religion and Order against Impiety and

Anarchy? There was a time when this would have been termed declamation;

but, unfortunately, long and bitter experience has taught us to feel that

it is only the feeble and imperfect representation of those calamities

(the result of French Principles and French Arms), which are every day

attested by the wounds of a bleeding world.

Is there a man who does not admit the importance of a measure which, at

such a crisis, may augment the strength of the Empire, and thereby ensure

its safety? Would not that benefit to Ireland be of itself so solid, so

inestimable, that, in comparison with it, all Commercial Interests, and

the preservation of local habits and manners, would be trifling, even

if they were endangered by the present measure;—which they undoubtedly

are not? The people of Ireland are proud, I believe, of being associated

with us in the great contest in which we are engaged, and must feel the

advantage of augmenting the general force of the Empire. That the present

measure is calculated to produce that effect, is a proposition which I

think cannot be disputed. There is not in any Court of Europe a Statesman

so ill informed as not to know, that the general power of the Empire

would be increased to a very great extent indeed, by such a consolidation

of the strength of the two Kingdoms. In the course of the Century every

writer of any information on the subject has held the same language, and

in the general strength of the Empire both Kingdoms are more concerned

than in any particular interests which may belong to either. If we were

to ask the Ministers of our Allies, what measure they thought the most

likely to augment the power of the British Empire, and consequently

increase that strength by which they were now protected—if we were to ask

the Agent of our Enemies, what measure would be the most likely to render

their designs abortive—the answer would be the same in both cases, viz.

the firm consolidation of every part of the Empire.

There is another consideration well worth attention. Recollect what are

the peculiar means by which we have been enabled to resist the unequalled

and eccentric efforts of France, without any diminution, nay, with an

increase, of our general prosperity—what, but the great Commercial

Resources which we possess? A Measure, then, which must communicate

to such a mighty Limb of the Empire as Ireland, all the Commercial

advantages which Great Britain possesses, which will open the markets of

the one Country to the other, which will give them both the common use of

their Capital, must, by diffusing a large portion of wealth into Ireland,

considerably increase the Resources, and consequently the strength, of

the whole Empire.

But it is not merely in this general view, that I think the Question

ought to be considered.—We ought to look to it with a view peculiarly to

the permanent interest and security of Ireland. When that Country was

threatened with the double danger of hostile attacks by Enemies without,

and of Treason within, from what quarter did she derive the means of her

deliverance?—from the Naval Force of Great Britain—from the voluntary

exertions of her Military of every description, not called for by Law—and

from her pecuniary resources, added to the loyalty and energy of the

Inhabitants of Ireland itself;—of which it is impossible to speak with

too much praise, and which shews how well they deserve to be called the

Brethren of Britons. Their own courage might, perhaps, have ultimately

succeeded, in repelling the dangers by which they were threatened, but

it would have been after a long contest, and after having waded through

seas of blood. Are we sure that the same ready and effectual assistance

which we have happily afforded, on the present occasion, will be always

equally within our power? Great Britain has always felt a common interest

in the safety of Ireland; but that common interest was never so obvious

and urgent as when the Common Enemy made her attack upon Great Britain,

through the medium of Ireland, and when their attack upon Ireland went

to deprive her of her Connection with Great Britain, and to substitute

in stead, the new Government of the French Republic. When that danger

threatened Ireland, the purse of Great Britain was open for the wants of

Ireland, as for the necessities of England.

I do not, Sir, state these circumstances, as upbraiding Ireland for the

benefits we have conferred; far from it; but I state them with pleasure,

as shewing the friendship and good will with which this Country has acted

towards her. But if struggles of this sort may and must return again,

if the worst dangers are those which are yet to come, dangers which may

be greater from being more disguised—if those situations may arise when

the same means of relief are not in our power, what is the remedy that

reason and policy point out? It is to identify them with us—it is to make

them part of the same Community, by giving them a full share of those

accumulated blessings which are diffused throughout Great Britain; it

is, in a word, by giving them a full participation of the Wealth, the

Power, and the Stability, of the British Empire. If then this Measure

comes recommended not only by the obvious defects of the system which now

exists, but that it has also the pre-eminent recommendation of increasing

the general power of the Empire, and of guarding against future danger

from the Common Enemy, we are next to consider it as to its effects upon

the internal condition of Ireland.

I know perfectly well, that as long as Ireland is separated from Great

Britain, any attempt on our part to provide measures which we might think

salutary, as respecting questions of contending sects or parties, of the

claimed rights of the Catholics, or of the precautions necessary for the

security of the Protestants—I know that all these, though they may have

been brought forward by the very persons who are the advocates of the

Final Adjustment in 1782, were, in fact, attacks upon the Independence

of the Irish Parliament, and attempts to usurp the Right of deciding

on points which can only be brought within our province by Compact.

Until the Kingdoms are united, any attempt to make regulations here

for the internal state of Ireland must certainly be a violation of her

Independence. But feeling as I do, for their interests and their welfare,

I cannot be inattentive to the events that are passing before me; I

must therefore repeat, that whoever looks at the circumstances to which

I have alluded—whoever considers that the Enemy have shewn by their

conduct, that they considered Ireland as the weakest and most vulnerable

part of the Empire; whoever reflects upon those dreadful and inexcusable

cruelties instigated by the Enemies of both Countries, and upon those

lamentable severities by which the exertions for the defense of Ireland

were unhappily, but unavoidably, attended, and the necessity of which

is itself one great aggravation of the Crimes and Treasons which led to

them, must feel that, as it now stands composed, in the hostile division

of its Sects, in the animosities existing between ancient Settlers and

original Inhabitants, in the ignorance and want of Civilization, which

marks that Country more than almost any other Country in Europe, in the

unfortunate prevalence of Jacobin Principles, arising from these causes,

and augmenting their malignity, and which have produced that distressed

state which we now deplore; every one, I say, who reflects upon all

these circumstances, must agree with me in thinking, that there is no

cure but in the formation of a General Imperial Legislature, free alike

from terror and from resentment, removed from the danger and agitation,

uninfluenced by the prejudices and uninflamed by the passions of that

distracted Country.

I know that it is impossible, if we wish to consider this subject

properly, to consider it in any other point of view than as it affects

the Empire in general. I know that the interests of the two Countries

must be taken together, and that a man cannot speak as a true Englishman,

unless he speaks as a true Irishman, nor as a true Irishman, unless he

speaks as a true Englishman: But if it was possible to separate them,

and I could consider myself as addressing you, not as interested for the

Empire at large, but for Ireland alone, I should say, that it would be

indispensably necessary, for the sake of that Country, to compose its

present distractions, by the adoption of another system:—I should say,

that the establishment of an Imperial Legislature was the only means of

healing its wounds and of restoring it to tranquillity. I must here take

the liberty of alluding to some topics which were touched upon during the

discussion of the former night.

Among the great and known defects of Ireland, one of the most prominent

features is, its want of industry and a capital; how are those wants to

be supplied, but by blending more closely with Ireland, the industry

and the capital of this Country. But, above all, in the great leading

distinctions between the People of Ireland, I mean their religious

distinctions, what is their situation?—The Protestant feels that the

claims of the Catholics threatens the existence of the Protestant

ascendancy; while, on the other hand, the great body of Catholics feel

the establishment of the National Church, and their exclusion from the

exercise of certain rights, and privileges, a grievance. Between the two,

it becomes a matter of difficulty in the minds of many persons, whether

it would be better to listen only to the fears of the former, or to grant

the claims of the latter.

I am well aware that the subject of religious distinction is a dangerous

and delicate topic, especially when applied to a country such as Ireland;

the situation of which is different in this respect from that of every

other. Where the established religion of the State is the same as the

general religion of the Empire, and where the property of the Country

is in the hands of a comparatively small number of persons professing

that established religion, while the religion of a great majority of

the people is different, it is not easy to say, on general principles,

what system of Church Establishment in such a Country would be free from

difficulty and inconvenience. By many I know it will be contended, that

the religion professed by a majority of the people, would at least be

entitled to an equality of Privileges. I have heard such an argument

urged in this House; but those who apply it without qualification to the

case of Ireland, forget surely the principles on which English Interest

and English Connection has been established in that Country, and on

which its present Legislature is formed. No man can say, that, in the

present State of things, and while Ireland remains a separate kingdom,

full concessions could be made to the Catholics, without endangering the

State, and shaking the Constitution of Ireland to its centre.

On the other hand, without anticipating the discussion, or the propriety

of agitating the question, or saying how soon or how late it may be fit

to discuss it; two propositions are indisputable: First, When the conduct

of the Catholics shall be such as to make it safe for the Government

to admit them to the participation of the privileges granted to those

of the Established Religion, and when the temper of the times shall be

favourable to such a measure;—When these events take place, it is obvious

that such a question may be agitated in an United, Imperial Parliament,

with much greater safety, than it could be in a separate Legislature. In

the second place, I think it certain that, even for whatever period it

may be thought necessary, after the Union, to withhold from the Catholics

the enjoyment of those advantages, many of the objections which at

present arise out of their situation would be removed, if the Protestant

Legislature were no longer separate and local, but general and Imperial;

and the Catholics themselves would at once feel a mitigation of the most

goading and irritating of their present causes of complaint.

How far, in addition to this great and leading consideration, it may

also be wise and practicable to accompany the measure by some mode of

relieving the lower orders from the pressure of Tithes, which in many

instances operate at present as a great practical evil, or to make,

under proper Regulations, and without breaking in on the security of the

present Protestant Establishment, an effectual and adequate provision for

the Catholic Clergy, it is not now necessary to discuss. It is sufficient

to say, that these, and all other subordinate points connected with

the same subject, are more likely to be permanently and satisfactorily

settled by an United Legislature, than by any local arrangements. On

these grounds I contend, that with a view to providing an effectual

remedy for the distractions which have unhappily prevailed in Ireland,

with a view of removing those causes which have endangered, and still

endanger its security, the measure which I am now proposing promises

to be more effectual than any other which can be devised, and on these

grounds alone, if there existed no other, I should feel it my duty to

submit it to the House.

But, Sir, though what I have thus stated relates most immediately to the

great object of healing the dissentions, and providing for the internal

tranquillity of Ireland; there are also other objects which, though

comparatively with this of inferior importance, are yet in themselves

highly material, and in a secondary view, well worthy of attention.

I have heard it asked, when I pressed the measure, what are the positive

advantages that Ireland is to derive from it? To this very question I

presume the considerations which I have already urged afford a sufficient

answer. But, in fact, the question itself is to be considered in another

view; and it will be found to bear some resemblance to a question which

has been repeatedly put, by some of the Gentlemen opposite to me, during

the last six years. What are the advantages which Great Britain has

gained by the present war with France?

To this, the brilliant successes of the British arms by sea and land, our

unexampled naval victories over all our enemies, the solid acquisition of

valuable territory, the general increase of our power, the progressive

extension of our commerce, and a series of events more glorious than any

that ever adorned the page of our history, afford at once an ample and a

satisfactory answer. But there is another general answer which we have

uniformly given, and which would alone be sufficient; it is, that we did

not enter into this war for any purpose of ambition; our object was not

to acquire, but to preserve; and in this sense, what we have gained by

the war is, in one word, all that we should have lost without it: it is,

the preservation of our Constitution, our Independence, our Honour, our

Existence as a Nation.

In the same manner I might answer the question with respect to Ireland;

I might enumerate the general advantages which Ireland would derive

from the effects of the Arrangement to which I have already referred:

The Protection which she will secure to herself in the hour of danger.

The most effectual means of increasing her Commerce and improving her

Agriculture, the command of English Capital, the infusion of English

Manners and English Industry, necessarily tending to ameliorate her

Condition, to accelerate the progress of internal civilization, and to

terminate those feuds and dissentions which now distract the Country, and

which she does not possess, within herself, the power either to controul

or to extinguish. She would see the avenue to Honours, to Distinctions,

and exalted Situations in the general seat of Empire, opened to all those

whose abilities and talents enable them to indulge an honourable and

laudable ambition.

But, independent of all these advantages, I might also answer, that the

question is not what Ireland is to gain, but what she is to preserve;

not merely how she may best improve her situation, but how she is to

avert a pressing and immediate danger. In this view, what she gains

is the preservation of all those blessings arising from the British

Constitution, and which are inseparable from her Connection with Great

Britain. Those Blessings of which it has long been the aim of France, in

conjunction with domestic traitors, to deprive her, and on their ruins

to establish (with all its attendant miseries and horrors) a Jacobin

Republic, founded on French Influence, and existing only in subserviency

to France.

Such, Sir, would be the answer, if we direct our attention only to the

question of general advantage. And here I should be inclined to stop;

but since it has also been more particularly asked, what are the

advantages which she is to gain, in point of Commerce and Manufactures,

I am desirous of applying my answer more immediately and distinctly to

that part of the subject: and, as I know that the statement will carry

more conviction with it, to those who make the inquiry, if given in the

words of the Right Honourable Gentleman, to whom, and to whose opinions,

I have had more than one occasion to advert in the course of this night,

I will read you an extract from his recorded sentiments on the subject,

in the year 1785, on this same memorable occasion of the Commercial

Propositions. Speaking of a solid and unalterable Compact between the

two Countries, speaking expressly of the peculiar importance of insuring

the continuance of those Commercial benefits, which she at that time

held only at the discretion of this country, he says—“The exportation of

Irish Products, to England, amounts to Two Millions and a Half annually;

and the exportation of British Products, to Ireland, amounts to but One

Million.”

He then proceeds to reason upon the advantage which Ireland would derive,

under such circumstances, from guarding against mutual prohibitions;

and he accompanies the statement, which I have just read, with this

observation—

“If, indeed, the Adjustment were to take away the Benefit from Ireland,

it would be a good cause for rejecting it; but, as it for ever confirms

all the Advantages we derived from our Linen Trade, and binds England

from making any law that can be injurious to it, surely Gentlemen

who regard that trade, and _whose fortunes and rents depend on its

prosperity, will not entertain a moment’s doubt about embracing the

offer_.”

Such was the reasoning of the Irish CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER; which

I consider to have been perfectly just. With reference to his late

opinions, I do not think I can more forcibly reply, to a person who signs

his name to Propositions which declare that the ruin of the Linen Trade

of Ireland is likely to be the consequence of an Union, than by opposing

to him his own opinion. I shall be able to strengthen the former opinion

of that Gentleman, by stating, that the progress that has been made in

Commercial advantages to Ireland, since 1785, has been such as to render

his argument still more applicable. What is the nature of that Commerce,

explained by the same person in so concise and forcible a manner, that

I am happy to use his own statement? He does not confine himself to the

gross amount, but gives the articles in detail:—

“Britain,” he says, “imports annually from us Two Million Five Hundred

Thousand Pounds of our products, all, or very nearly all, duty free,

and covenants never to lay a duty on them. We import about a Million of

her’s, and raise a Revenue on almost every article of it, and reserve

the power of continuing that Revenue. She exports to us Salt for our

Fisheries and Provisions; Hops, which we cannot grow; Coals, which we

cannot raise; Tin, which we have not; and Bark, which we cannot get

elsewhere: and all these without reserving any duty.”

I will not tire the patience of the House, by reading farther extracts;

but the Right Honourable Gentleman’s whole Speech, in like manner,

points out the advantages of the Commercial Propositions (at that time

under consideration) as a ground-work of a Compact between the two

Countries, in 1785, on Commercial subjects.—But how stands the case now?

The trade is at this time infinitely more advantageous to Ireland. It

will be proved, from the documents which I hold in my hand, as far as

relates to the mere interchange of manufactures, that the manufactures,

exported to Ireland from Great Britain, in 1797, very little exceeded a

Million sterling (the articles of produce amount to nearly the same sum)

while Great Britain, on the other hand, imported from Ireland to the

amount of near Three Millions in the manufactured articles of Linen and

Linen Yarn, and between Two and Three Millions in Provisions and Cattle,

besides Corn and other articles of produce.

In addition to these Articles, there are other circumstances of advantage

to Ireland. Articles which are essential to her trade and to her

subsistence, or serve as raw materials for her manufactures, are sent

from hence free of duty. It is expressly stated on the same authority,

that all that we take back from Ireland was liable to a Duty in that

Country on their exports: The increasing produce of the chief article

of their manufacture, and four-fifths of her whole export trade, are

to be ascribed, not to that _Independent Legislature_, but, to the

liberality of the British Parliament. It is by the free admission of

Linens for our market, and the Bounties granted by the British Parliament

on its re-export, that the Linen-Trade has been brought to the height

at which we now see it. To the Parliament of this Country, then, it is

now owing, that a Market has been opened for her Linen to the amount of

three millions. By the Bounty we give to Ireland, we afford her a double

market for that article, and (what is still more striking and important)

we have prevented a competition against her, arising from the superior

cheapness of the Linen-Manufactures of the Continent, by subjecting their

importation to a Duty of thirty per cent. Nothing would more clearly

shew what would be the danger to Ireland from the Competition in all

its principal branches of the Linen-Trade, than the simple fact, that

we even now import foreign Linens, under this heavy duty, to an amount

equal to a seventh part of all that Ireland is able to send us, with

the preference that has been stated. By this arrangement alone, we must

therefore be considered, either as foregoing between seven and eight

hundred thousand pounds per annum in revenue, which we should collect if

we chose to levy the same duty on all Linens, Irish as well as Foreign,

or on the other hand, as sacrificing perhaps at least a million sterling

in the price paid for those articles, by the subjects of this Country,

which might be saved, if we allowed the importation of all Linen, Foreign

as well as Irish, equally free from Duty.

The present measure is, however, in its effects calculated not merely

for a confirmation of the advantages on which the person to whom I have

alluded has insisted. It is obvious that a fuller and more perfect

Connection of the two Countries, from whatever cause it may arise, must

produce a greater facility and freedom of commercial intercourse, and

ultimately tend to the advantage of both. The benefits to be derived to

either Country from such an arrangement must indeed, in a great measure,

be gradual; but they are not on that account the less certain, and they

cannot be stated in more forcible language than in that used in the

Speech to which I have referred.—

“Gentlemen undervalue the reduction of British Duties on our

Manufactures. I agree with them it may not operate soon, but we are to

look forward to a final settlement, and it is impossible but that in

time, with as good climate, equal natural powers, cheaper food, and fewer

taxes, we must be able to sell to them. When commercial jealousy shall

be banished by final settlement, and Trade take its natural and steady

course, the Kingdoms will cease to look to rivalship, each will make that

fabrick which it can do cheapest, and buy from the other what it cannot

make so advantageously. Labour will be then truly employed to profit, not

diverted by Bounties, Jealousies, or Legislative Interference, from its

natural and beneficial course. This system will attain its real object,

consolidating the strength of the remaining parts of the Empire, by

encouraging the communications of their market among themselves, with

preference to every part against all strangers!”

I am at least, therefore, secure from the design of appearing to

deliver any partial or chimerical opinion of my own, when I thus state,

on the authority of a person the best informed, and who then judged

dispassionately, both the infinite importance to Ireland of securing

permanently the great commercial advantages which she now holds at the

discretion of Great Britain, and the additional benefit which she would

derive from any settlement which opened to her gradually a still more

free and compleat commercial intercourse with this Country. And while

I state thus strongly the commercial advantages to the sister Kingdom,

I have no alarm left I should excite any sentiment of jealousy here. I

know that the inhabitants of Great Britain wish well to the prosperity

of Ireland;—that, if the Kingdoms are really and solidly united, they

feel that to increase the commercial wealth of one Country is not to

diminish that of the other, but to increase the strength and power of

both. But to justify that sentiment, we must be satisfied that the wealth

we are pouring into the lap of Ireland is not every day liable to be

snatched from us, and thrown into the scale of the enemy. If therefore

Ireland is to continue, as I trust it will for ever, an essential part

of the integral strength of the British Empire; if her strength is to be

permanently ours, and our strength to be hers, neither I, nor any English

minister, can ever be deterred by the fear of creating jealousy in the

hearts of Englishmen, from stating the advantages of a closer Connection,

or from giving any assistance to the Commercial Prosperity of that

Kingdom.

If ever indeed I should have the misfortune to witness the melancholy

moment when such principles must be abandoned, when all hope of seeing

Ireland permanently and securely connected with this country shall be at

an end, I shall at least have the consolation of knowing, that it will

not be the want of temper or forbearance, of conciliation, of kindness,

or of full explanation on our part, which will have produced an event

so fatal to Ireland, and so dangerous to Great Britain. If ever the

over-bearing power of prejudice and passion shall produce that fatal

consequence, it will too late be perceived and acknowledged, that all the

great commercial advantages which Ireland at present enjoys, and which

are continually increasing, are to be ascribed to the liberal conduct,

the fostering care, of the British Empire, extended to the Sister

Kingdom as to a part of ourselves, and not (as has been fallaciously and

vainly pretended) to any thing which has been done or can be done by the

independent power of her own separate Legislature.

I have thus, Sir, endeavoured to state to you the reasons, why I think

this Measure advisable; why I wish it to be proposed to the Parliament

of Ireland, with temper and fairness; and why it appears to me, entitled

at least to a calm and dispassionate discussion in that Kingdom. I am

aware, however, that objections have been urged against the Measure, some

of which are undoubtedly plausible, and have been but too successful in

their influence on the Irish Parliament. Of these objections I shall now

proceed, as concisely as possible, to take some notice.

The first is, what I heard alluded to by the Honourable Gentleman

opposite to me, when his Majesty’s Message was brought down; namely—That

the Parliament of Ireland is incompetent to entertain and discuss

the question, or rather, to act upon the Measure proposed, without

having previously obtained the consent of the People of Ireland, their

Constituents. But, Sir, I am led to suppose from what the Honourable

Gentleman afterwards stated, that he made this objection, rather by way

of deprecating the discussion of the question, than as entertaining the

smallest doubt upon it himself.—If, however, the Honourable Gentleman,

or any other Gentleman on the other side of the House, should seriously

entertain a doubt on the subject, I shall be ready to discuss it with

him distinctly, either this night or at any future opportunity. For

the present I will assume, that no man can deny the competency of the

Parliament of Ireland (representing as it does, in the language of

our Constitution, “_lawfully, fully, and freely, all the estates of

the people of the realm_”) to make Laws to bind that People, unless

he is disposed to distinguish that Parliament from the Parliament

of Great Britain; and, while he maintains the Independence of the

Irish Legislature, yet denies to it the lawful and essential powers

of Parliament.—No man, who maintains the Parliament of Ireland to be

co-equal with our own, can deny its competency on this question, unless

he means to go the length of denying, at the same moment, the whole of

the authority of the Parliament of Great Britain—to shake every principle

of legislation—and to maintain, that all the Acts passed, and every thing

done by Parliament, or sanctioned by its authority, however sacred,

however beneficial, is neither more nor less than an act of usurpation.

He must not only deny the validity of the Union between Scotland and

England, but he must deny the authority of every one of the proceedings

of the united Legislature since the Union; nay, Sir, he must go still

farther, and deny the authority under which we now sit and deliberate

here, as a House of Parliament. Of course, he must deny the validity

of the adjustment of 1782, and call in question every measure which

he has himself been the most forward to have enforced. This point,

Sir, is of so much importance, that I think I ought not to suffer the

opportunity to pass, without illustrating more fully what I mean. If

this principle of the incompetency of Parliament to the decision of

the Measure be admitted, or if it be contended, that Parliament has no

legitimate authority to discuss and decide upon it, you will be driven

to the necessity of recognizing a principle, the most dangerous that

ever was adopted in any civilized State. I mean the principle, that

Parliament cannot adopt any measure new in its nature, and of great

importance, without appealing to the constituent and delegating authority

for directions. If that doctrine be true, look to what an extent it will

carry you. If such an argument could be set up and maintained, you acted

without any legitimate authority when you created the representation

of the Principality of Wales, or of either of the Counties Palatine of

England. Every Law that Parliament ever made, without that appeal, either

as to its own Frame and Constitution, as to the qualification of the

electors or the elected, as to the great and fundamental point of the

succession to the Crown, was a breach of Treaty, and an Act of Usurpation.

If we turn to Ireland itself, what do Gentlemen think of the power of

that Parliament, which, without any fresh delegation from its Protestant

constituents, associates to itself all the Catholic electors, and thus

destroys a fundamental distinction on which it was formed? God forbid,

that I should object to or blame any of these Measures! I am only stating

the extent to which the principle (that Parliament has no authority to

decide upon the present Measure) will lead; and, if it be admitted in

one case, it must be admitted in all. Will any man say, that (although

a Protestant Parliament in Ireland, chosen exclusively by Protestant

Constituents, has by its own inherent power, and without consulting those

constituents, admitted and comprehended the Catholics who were till

then, in fact, a separate community) that Parliament cannot associate

itself with another Protestant community, represented by a Protestant

Parliament, having one interest with itself, and similar in its Laws, its

Constitution, and its Established Religion? What must be said by those

who have at any time been friends to any plan of Parliamentary Reform,

and particularly to such as have been most recently brought forward,

either in Great Britain or Ireland? Whatever may have been thought of

the propriety of the Measure, I never heard any doubt of the competency

of Parliament to consider and discuss it. Yet I defy any man to maintain

the principle of those plans, without contending that, as a Member of

Parliament, he possesses a right to concur in disfranchising those who

sent him to Parliament, and to select others, by whom he was not elected,

in their stead. I am sure that no sufficient distinction, in point of

principle, can be successfully maintained for a single moment; nor should

I deem it necessary to dwell on this point, in the manner I do, were

I not convinced that it is connected in part with all those false and

dangerous notions on the subject of Government which have lately become

too prevalent in the world. It may, in fact, be traced to that gross

perversion of the principles of all political society, which rests on

the supposition that there exists continually in every Government a

Sovereignty _in abeyance_ (as it were) on the part of the People, ready

to be called forth on every occasion, or rather, on every pretence, when

it may suit the purposes of the party or faction who are the advocates

of this doctrine to suppose an occasion for its exertion. It is in

these false principles that are contained the seeds of all the misery,

desolation, and ruin, which in the present day have spread themselves

over so large a portion of the habitable Globe.

These principles, Sir, are, at length, so well known and understood in

their practical effects, that they can no longer hope for one enlightened

or intelligent advocate, when they appear in their true colours. Yet,

with all the horror we all feel, in common with the rest of the World,

at the effect of them, with all the confirmed and increasing love and

veneration which we feel towards the Constitution of our Country, founded

as it is, both in Theory and Experience, on principles directly the

reverse; yet, there are too many among us, who, while they abhor and

reject such opinions, when presented to them in their naked deformity,

suffer them in a more disguised shape to be gradually infused into

their minds, and insensibly to influence and bias their sentiments and

arguments on the greatest and most important discussions. This concealed

poison is now more to be dreaded than any open attempt to support such

principles by argument or to enforce them by arms. No society, whatever

be its particular form, can long subsist, if this principle is once

admitted. In every Government, there must reside somewhere a supreme,

absolute, and unlimited authority. This is equally true of every lawful

Monarchy—of every Aristocracy—of every pure Democracy (if indeed such

a form of Government ever has existed, or ever can exist)—and of those

mixed Constitutions formed and compounded from the others, which we are

justly inclined to prefer to any of them. In all these Governments,

indeed alike, that power may by possibility be abused, but whether

the abuse is such as to justify and call for the interference of the

people collectively, or, more properly speaking, of any portion of it,

must always be an extreme case and a question of the greatest and most

perilous responsibility, not in Law only, but in Conscience and in Duty,

to all those who either act upon it themselves, or persuade others to

do so. But no provision for such a case ever has been or can be made

before-hand; it forms no chapter in any known code of laws, it can find

no place in any system of human jurisprudence. But, above all, if such a

principle can make no part of any established Constitution, not even of

those where the Government is so framed as to be most liable to the abuse

of its powers, it will be preposterous indeed to suppose that it can be

admitted in one where those powers are so distributed and balanced as to

furnish the best security against the probability of such an abuse. Shall

that principle be sanctioned as a necessary part of the best Government,

which cannot be admitted to exist as an established check even upon the

worst! Pregnant as it is with danger and confusion, shall it be received

and authorized in proportion as every reason which can ever make it

necessary to recur to it is not likely to exist? Yet, Sir, I know not how

it is, that, in proportion as we are less likely to have occasion for

so desperate a remedy, in proportion as a Government is so framed as to

provide within itself the best guard and control on the exercise of every

branch of authority, to furnish the means of preventing or correcting

every abuse of power, and to secure, by its own natural operation, a due

attention to the interest and feelings of every part of the community, in

that very proportion persons have been found perverse enough to imagine,

that such a Constitution admits and recognizes, as a part of it, that

which is inconsistent with the nature of any Government, and, above all,

inapplicable to our own.

I have said more, Sir, upon this subject than I should have thought

necessary, if I had not felt that this false and dangerous mockery of

the _Sovereignty of the People_ is in truth one of the chief elements of

Jacobinism, one of the favourite impostures to mislead the understanding,

and to flatter and inflame the passions of the mass of mankind, who have

not the opportunity of examining and exposing it, and that as such on

every occasion, and in every shape in which it appears, it ought to be

combated and resisted by every friend to civil order, and to the peace

and happiness of mankind.

Sir, the next and not the least prevalent objection, is one which is

contained in words which are an appeal to a natural and laudable, but

what I must call an erroneous and mistaken, sense of national pride.

It is an appeal to the generous and noble passions of a nation easily

inflamed under any supposed attack upon its honour. I mean the attempt to

represent the question of a Union by compact between the Parliaments of

the two Kingdoms as a question involving the Independance of Ireland.—It

has been said, that no compensation could be made to any country for

the surrender of its National Independance. Sir, on this, as well as on

every part of the question, I am desirous Gentlemen should come closely

to the point, that they should sift it to the bottom, and ascertain

upon what grounds and principles their opinion really rests. Do they

mean to maintain that in any humiliating, in any degrading sense of the

word which can be acted upon practically as a rule, and which can lead

to any useful conclusion, that at any time when the Government of any

two separate Countries unite in forming one more extensive empire, that

the individuals who composed either of the former narrow societies are

afterwards less members of an independant country, or to any valuable and

useful purpose less possessed of political freedom or civil happiness

than they were before? It must be obvious to every Gentleman who will

look at the subject, in tracing the history of all the countries, the

most proud of their present existing independance, of all the nations

in Europe, there is not one that could exist in the state in which it

now stands, if that principle had been acted upon by our forefathers;

and Europe must have remained to this hour in a state of ignorance and

barbarism, from the perpetual warfare of independent and petty states.

In the instance of our own Country, it would be a superfluous waste

of time to enumerate the steps by which all its parts were formed

into one Kingdom; but will any man in general assert, that in all the

different Unions which have formed the principal states of Europe, their

inhabitants have become less free, that they have had less of which to be

proud, less scope for their own exertions, than they had in their former

situation. If this doctrine is to be generally maintained, what becomes

of the situation at this hour of any one county of England, or of any one

county of Ireland, now united under the independant Parliament of that

Kingdom? If it be pushed to its full extent, it is obviously incompatible

with all civil society. As the former principle of the sovereignty of

the people strikes at the foundation of all governments, so this is

equally hostile to all political confederacy, and mankind must be driven

back to what is called the state of nature.

But while I combat this general and abstract principle, which would

operate as an objection to every union between separate states, on the

ground of the sacrifice of independance, do I mean to contend that

there is in no case just ground for such a sentiment? Far from it: it

may become, on many occasions, the first duty of a free and generous

people. If there exists a country which contains within itself the means

of military protection, the naval force necessary for its defence,

which furnishes objects of industry sufficient for the subsistence

of its inhabitants, and pecuniary resources adequate to maintaining,

with dignity, the rank which it has attained among the nations of the

world; if, above all, it enjoys the blessings of internal content and

tranquillity, and possesses a distinct constitution of its own, the

defects of which, if any, it is within itself capable of correcting, and

if that constitution be equal, if not superior, to that of any other in

the world, or (which is nearly the same thing) if those who live under

it believe it to be so, and fondly cherish that opinion, I can indeed

well understand that such a country must be jealous of any measure,

which, even by its own consent, under the authority of its own lawful

government, is to associate it as a part of a larger and more extensive

empire.

But, Sir, if, on the other hand, it should happen that there be a country

which, against the greatest of all dangers that threaten its peace and

security, has not adequate means of protecting itself without the aid

of another nation; if that other be a neighbouring and kindred nation,

speaking the same language, whose laws, whose customs, and habits are

the same in principle, but carried to a greater degree of perfection,

with a more extensive commerce, and more abundant means of acquiring

and diffusing national wealth; the stability of whose government—the

excellence of whose constitution—is more than ever the admiration and

envy of Europe, and of which the very Country of which we are speaking

can only boast an inadequate and imperfect resemblance;—under such

circumstances, I would ask, what conduct would be prescribed by every

rational principle of dignity, of honour, or of interest? I would

ask, whether this is not a faithful description of the circumstances

which ought to dispose Ireland to a Union? Whether Great Britain is

not precisely the nation with which, on these principles, a Country,

situated as Ireland is, would desire to unite? Does a Union, under such

circumstances, by free consent, and on just and equal terms, deserve to

be branded as a proposal for subjecting Ireland to a foreign yoke? Is it

not rather the free and voluntary association of two great Countries,

which join, for their common benefit, in one Empire, where each will

retain its proportional weight and importance, under the security of

equal laws, reciprocal affection, and inseparable interests, and which

want nothing but that indissoluble Connection to render both invincible.

Non ego nec Teucris Italos parere jubebo

Nec nova regna peto; paribus se legibus ambæ

Invictæ gentes æterna in fædera mittant.

Sir, I have nearly stated all that is necessary for me to trouble the

House with; there are, however, one or two other objections which I wish

not entirely to pass over: One of them is, a general notion that a Union

with Great Britain must necessarily increase one of the great evils of

Ireland, by producing depopulation in many parts of the Country, and by

increasing greatly the number of absentees. I do not mean to deny that

this effect would, to a limited extent, take place during a part of the

year; but I think it will not be difficult for me to prove, that this

circumstance will be more than counterbalanced by the operation of the

system in other respects.

If it be true that this measure has an inevitable tendency to admit

the introduction of that British Capital which is most likely to give

life to all the operations of Commerce, and to all the improvements of

Agriculture; if it be that which above all other considerations is most

likely to give security, quiet, and internal repose to Ireland; if it

is likely to remove the chief bar to the internal advancement of wealth

and of civilization, by a more intimate intercourse with England; if it

is more likely to communicate from hence those habits which distinguish

this Country, and which, by a continued gradation, unite the highest

and the lowest orders of the community without a chasm in any part of

the system; if it is not only likely to invite (as I have already said)

English Capital to set Commerce in motion, but to offer it the use of new

markets, to open fresh resources of wealth and industry; can wealth, can

industry, can civilization increase among the whole bulk of the people

without much more than counterbalancing the partial effect of the removal

of the few individuals who, for a small part of the year, would follow

the seat of Legislation? If, notwithstanding the absence of Parliament

from Dublin, it would still remain the centre of Education and of the

internal commerce of a country increasing in improvement; if it would

still remain the seat of legal discussion, which must always increase

with an increase of property and occupation, will it be supposed, with

a view even to the interests of those whose partial interests have been

most successfully appealed to; with a view either to the respectable

Body of the Bar, to the Merchant, or Shopkeeper, of Dublin (if it were

possible to suppose that a transaction of this sort ought to be referred

to that single criterion) that they would not find their proportionate

share of advantage in the general advantage of the State? Let it be

remembered, also, that if the transfer of the Seat of Legislature may

call from Ireland to England the Members of the United Parliament,

yet, after the Union, property, influence and consideration in Ireland

will lead, as much as in Great Britain, to all the objects of imperial

ambition; and there must, consequently, exist a new incitement to persons

to acquire property in that Country, and to those who possess it, to

reside there and to cultivate the good opinion of those with whom they

live, and to extend and improve their influence and connections.

But, Sir, I need not dwell longer on argument, however it may satisfy

my own mind, because we can on this question refer to experience. I see

every Gentleman anticipates that I allude to Scotland. What has been

the result of the Union there? A Union, give me leave to say, as much

opposed, and by much the same arguments, prejudices, and misconceptions,

as are urged, at this moment, creating too the same alarms, and provoking

the same outrages, as have lately taken place in Dublin. Look at the

metropolis of Scotland: the population of Edinburgh has been more

than doubled since the Union, and a new city added to the old. But we

may be told, that Edinburgh has engrossed all the commerce of that

country, and has those advantages which Dublin cannot expect. Yet while

Edinburgh, deprived of its Parliament, but retaining, as Dublin would

retain, its Courts of Justice; continuing, as Dublin would continue,

the resort of those whose circumstances would not permit them to visit

a distant metropolis; continuing, as Dublin would continue, the seat of

national education, while Edinburgh has baffled all the predictions of

that period, what has been the situation of Glasgow? The population of

Glasgow, since the Union, has increased in the proportion of between five

and six to one: look at its progress in manufactures; look at its general

advantages, and tell me what ground there is, judging by experience

in aid of theory, for those gloomy apprehensions which have been so

industriously excited.

There remains, Sir, another general line of argument, which I have

already anticipated, and I hope answered, that the commercial privileges

now enjoyed by Ireland, and to which it owes so much of its prosperity,

would be less secure than at present. I have given an answer to that

already, by stating that they are falsely imputed to the independence of

the Irish Parliament, for that they are in fact owing to the exercise of

the voluntary discretion of the British Parliament, unbound by compact,

prompted only by its natural disposition to consider the interests of

Ireland the same as its own; and if that has been done while Ireland is

only united to us in the imperfect and precarious manner in which it

is, while it has a separate Parliament, notwithstanding the commercial

jealousies of our own manufactures; if under these circumstances we have

done so, if we have done so with no other connection than that which

now subsists, and while Ireland has no share in our representation;

what fresh ground can there be for apprehension, when she will have her

proportionate weight in the Legislature, and will be united with us as

closely as Lancashire or Yorkshire, or any other county in Great Britain.

Sir, I have seen it under the same authority to which I am sorry so often

to advert, that the Linen Trade would be injured, and that there will

be no security for its retaining its present advantages. I have already

stated to you (and with that very authority in my favour) that those

advantages are at present precarious, and that their security can only

arise from Compact with Great Britain. Such a Compact, this Measure would

establish in the most solemn manner; but besides this, Sir, the natural

policy of this Country, not merely its experienced liberality, but the

identity of Interests after a Union, would offer a security worth a

thousand Compacts.

Sir, the only other general topic of objection is that upon which great

pains have been taken to raise an alarm in Ireland—the idea that the main

principle of the Measure was to subject Ireland to a load of Debt and

an increase of Taxes, and to expose her to the consequences of all our

alleged difficulties and supposed necessities.

Sir, I hope the zeal, the spirit, and the liberal and enlarged policy,

of this Country, has given ample proof that it is not from a pecuniary

motive that we seek an Union. If it is not desirable on the grounds I

have stated, it cannot be recommended for the mere purpose of Taxation;

but to quiet any jealousy on this subject, here again let us look to

Scotland: is there any instance where, with 45 Members on her part

and 513 on ours, that part of the United Kingdom has paid more than

its proportion to the general burdens?—Is it then, Sir, any ground of

apprehension, that we are likely to tax Ireland more heavily when she

becomes associated with ourselves?—To tax in its due proportion the whole

of the Empire, to the utter exclusion of the idea of the predominance of

one part of society over another, is the great characteristic of British

Finance, as Equality of Laws is of the British Constitution.

But, Sir, in addition to this, if we come to the details of this

proposition, it is in our power to fix, for any number of years which

shall be thought fit, the proportion by which the Contribution of

Ireland, to the expences of the State, shall be regulated; that these

proportions shall not be such as would make a contribution greater than

the necessary amount of its own present necessary expences as a separate

Kingdom; and, even after that limited period, the proportion of the

whole contribution, from time to time, might be made to depend on the

comparative produce, in each Kingdom, of such general taxes as might be

thought to afford the best criterion of their respective wealth. Or,

what I should hope would be found practicable, the system of internal

taxation in each country might gradually be so equalized and assimilated,

on the leading articles, as to make all rules of specific proportion

unnecessary, and to secure, that Ireland shall never be taxed but in

proportion as we tax ourselves.

The application of these principles, however, will form matter of

future discussion; I mention them only as strongly shewing, from the

misrepresentation which has taken place on this part of the subject, how

incumbent it is upon the House to receive these propositions, and to

adopt, after due deliberation, such resolutions as may record to Ireland

the terms upon which we are ready to meet her. And, in the mean time, let

us wait, not without impatience, but without dissatisfaction, for that

moment, when the effect of reason and discussion may reconcile the minds

of men, in that Kingdom, to a Measure which I am sure will be found as

necessary for their peace and happiness, as it will be conducive to the

general security and advantage of the British Empire.

Sir, it remains for me only to lay these Resolutions before the House,

wishing that the more detailed discussion of them may be reserved to a

future day.