THE FINAL STAGES
FRENCH KING. _'Tis certain he hath passed the river Somme._
CONSTABLE OF FRANCE. _And if he be not fought withal, my lord,
Let us not live in France: let us quit all,
And give our vineyards to a barbarous people._
The fighting in the neighbourhood of Compiègne developed into something
of a general action, an action in which the British more than held
their own. There was some doubt whether the 4th Division would be able
to shake off the heavy attack which was being made upon them, so
another brigade was ordered to their help. The retirement was then
easily effected.
The 3rd Brigade was a little north of Crépy-en-Valois, and, without
waiting for the enemy, themselves made a spirited advance for a short
distance, and did excellent work with their R.F.A. against the German
infantry.
Soon after midnight on Wednesday, September 2nd, the Force continued
its retirement. There may have been some little grumbling, and it
became increasingly difficult to keep up the old fiction--now indeed a
fact--about a "strategical retirement"; but, somehow or other, a
genuine conviction was stealing through the ranks that at any moment
the real end would come. If our men were very, very weary, so also
were the enemy, and every day brought fresh evidence of the fact.
Then, too, news came to us that the French (the 7th Army) were really
tackling von Buelow's armies, and were doing well against them. That
had a very inspiriting effect.
Now the Force, or rather our left, was actually in sight of the
outlying forts of Paris, about a dozen miles off. Great was the
excitement, for, of course, everyone jumped to the conclusion that we
were making for the capital. G.H.Q. was at Lagny-sur-Marne, just 15
miles due east of Paris. They actually got as far south as Melun, on
the outskirts of the Forest of Fontainebleau, before the tide turned.
If you look at these places on the picture-map you will see that, after
Senlis was passed, the Force, instead of retiring straight on towards
Paris, as it had been doing, now swung round, with the right flank of
the First Corps as pivot, and marched in a south-easterly direction.
Possibly the enemy imagined from this that their chance had come, and
that they would now be able to slip in between our left and Paris. But
the new French army was coming up from behind Paris, upon our left, to
fill the gap and cover the approaches to the city.
That swinging round movement to cross the River Marne was rather a
risky business, for it meant marching for a certain distance across the
enemy's front. However, it was successfully accomplished, and by the
evening of September 3rd the Force was south of the river. That same
afternoon our aircraft reported that the Germans had also swung
eastwards, and were now apparently making for the large town of
Château-Thierry, the point of division between our extreme right and
the 5th French Army.
The position in which the Force found themselves that evening was
wellnigh hopeless from a defensive point of view. To make matters
worse, we were very badly off for entrenching tools, the men having
lost the greater part in the hurried retirement after the hard battle
at the Wednesday. This question of entrenching tools was further
complicated by the removal of our base to St. Nazaire, for that meant a
much more serious difficulty in getting up supplies.
I forgot to mention that when orders reached the Second Corps and 4th
Division on the Thursday night to keep on the move, instructions were
given by G.H.Q. to abandon everything, even the ammunition, which might
retard the transport, and so to leave the vehicles free for wounded or
the more exhausted of the men. Only one Division carried out the
order, and that only partially, before the G.O.C. Second Corps on the
spot realised it was unnecessary and countermanded it.
During and after the battle of Le Cateau, as I have said the fight of
the Wednesday has come to be spoken of, a rather curious adventure
befell one of the motor transport ammunition parks About ten of the
lorries, under an A.S.C. subaltern, had been doing some detached work
away from the main body. These had got out of rather a tight corner,
but the rest of the park (some sixty odd lorries) had become involved
in that mix-up at Estrées.
About 3 P M. the A.S.C. captain in charge received an order to go back
in the direction of Le Cateau. This was, apparently, straight into the
advancing enemy, who were only some three or four miles off. The C.O.
obeyed his orders and took his lorries back. From that moment those
sixty great lorries vanished into thin air, and not a soul knew what
had happened to them. At G.H.Q. the unit was officially reported as
"missing," and it so appeared, I believe, in the London Press.
The subaltern invented and spread abroad a delicious yarn. I omit his
version of his own adventures, for he got a "mention in dispatches" for
it, though this was subsequently quashed.
When the order to go back was received, he said, and annihilation of
the park seemed certain, the O.C. called his subalterns together and
told them the position. They unanimously decided to obey and charge
the advancing enemy with the lorries. The drivers (our old friends the
busmen) were instructed to go full speed ahead into the enemy column.
But the drivers were not having any. So the officers produced their
revolvers and threatened to shoot any man who refused to obey. That
decided them. "We will die by German bullets rather than British." So
away they went, the lorries bumping along the road straight into the
ranks of the astonished Germans. Nothing could stop them, and the
column got through (the narrator forgot to mention where to) with the
loss of about half the park.
The subaltern carried his arm in a sling for a fortnight afterwards. A
shrapnel splinter, he said, when they were rushing the enemy. It had
really been caused by the back-fire of a motor-bike. Possibly this is
the origin of that glorified picture which appeared in certain of the
London illustrated papers.
The park was, however, actually lost for nearly a week. They had
vanished as completely as though the earth had opened and swallowed
them. They were eventually heard of by the merest accident, when a
sergeant came in to one of the towns on the line of retreat to get
provisions. But even then they could not be found, for the sergeant
had gone again without leaving his address. So for days Staff officers
scoured the country in swift cars, and thus the park was eventually run
to earth. No one was more surprised than the C.O. to hear that he had
been lost. They had not seen a single German, and they had had such a
jolly time, thank you, seeing the pretty country.
But to tell of half the curious or amusing incidents I should need a
volume many times the size of this one. Things happened every day any
one of which would provide a newspaper with a column of excellent
"copy." At the time one thought little about them, for everybody was
too busy looking after his job and himself. There was, for instance,
the Adventure of the Flat-Nosed Bullet, the Adventure of the Man with
the Crooked Ear, the Adventure of the Field Cashier and the Pay Chest,
the Adventure of the Blood-stained Putty Knife, the Adventure of the
Perishing Cat, and many another.
The great question on the morning of Friday, September 4th, was: "Are
we going right back to the Seine, with our left on Paris?" You picture
the Force, tired enough but in most excellent fettle, growing hourly
more impatient, longing with all their hearts to turn and have a go at
the enemy who had caused them all that trouble and discomfort.
"Give a guess," I asked two of my sergeants that day, "how long we have
been out here?"
They thought for a few minutes. "Six weeks," they said; "perhaps
seven."
And, you see, it was only a fortnight after all. But they would not
believe it until a calendar was produced. Unconsciously everyone
reckoned each night as another day, for nights and days were alike so
far as work was concerned. I think that remark was more telling than
pages of descriptive writing.
The days during those final stages were almost tropical in their heat,
which told very severely on men and horses. The nights were chill and
wet. So altogether one had one's work cut out in mothering the men.
Cases of bowel complaints were very common, and one has to be so
careful to prevent serious developments. The lads really need looking
after like children, bless them! Aromatic chalk-powder with opium
(5-grain tablets) I found an excellent remedy, and cured dozens of
cases. So there is a little tip for other officers. Calomel is
useful, too, and I saved much agony from bad wounds by doses of opium
(1-grain tablets), but this must not be given in cases of stomach
wounds--most to be dreaded of any. Aspirin, also, is, of course,
invaluable. Certainly no officer should be without a small
medicine-case, and it is the one thing they never seem to think of when
getting kit together. A trivial lapse, this, into egotism, I am
afraid. I hope it will be excused for the sake of the hints offered.
In the evening of September 4th orders came to continue the retirement
still farther. The Second Corps marched through most of the night
towards the River Seine, the First Corps conforming to the movement on
the east. The 6th French Army was coming up well on our left, and thus
the western end of the Franco-British line was gradually swinging round
and up between Paris and the right flank of the Germans, who were now
definitely moving east-south-east. You must remember, though, that
these facts were only apparent at the time to a handful of officers of
the Headquarters Staff; everyone else was still in the dark. But how
thrilling those hours must have been to an airman observing from above,
and who knew the facts.
On the 5th (Saturday), at noon, one battery found itself halted in a
field by the 12-kilometre stone from Paris, and the men were confident
that "la ville lumière" was their next stop. There was an undercurrent
of excitement, for another couple of thousand men had joined up to the
corps as reinforcements. It was a definite halt and a rest, the first
they had had since Mons, and they were making the most of it.
Just about 6 P.M. the major came into the lines with a paper in his
hand. There was something in his walk, something about him--the men
jumped up as he approached. "Paris?"--the major shook his head.
"Not--not--is it advance, sir?" The major nodded. "We are going to
advance," he said.
ADVANCE!
There was a cheer which must have startled the French Government in
Bordeaux, or whereever they had gone to.
The drivers rushed at their horses, the gunners rushed to the limbers
to help hook in. "Stand to your horses!" sang out the sergeant-major.
Then, in a very few minutes: "Battery all ready, sir!"
The major stood up in his stirrups with a splendid laugh in his eyes.
"Sub-sections right-about-wheel! Walk, march!"
Another rousing shout, which soon merged into the cheery strains of
"All aboard for Dixie," and the battery began a march, this time in the
right direction, which only stopped at 2 A.M. for the sake of the
horses. The men were ready to go on for a week.
The great Retreat had ended. The Advance had begun.
How and why the tide turned against the invaders at that, for them,
most critical moment we cannot exactly tell. It was, as I see it, a
combination of circumstances. There was the imminence of the Russian
invasion into Prussia, and it was said that the Germans withdrew two
army corps from the Western front to meet it. There was the sudden
production by the French Commander-in-Chief of an entirely new French
army from behind Paris to attack the German right.
But one thing, at least, is certain. Von Kluck made, perhaps, the
biggest mistake in his life in imagining that "the contemptible little
army" which he and his legions had been hunting for a fortnight was now
too dispirited and broken for further fighting; and, with that
conviction in his mind, he started to do the very thing which the most
elementary military textbooks tell you is absolutely wrong. He moved
his army across the unbroken front of a hostile force.
General Smith-Dorrien had been compelled to do the same thing with the
Second Corps only three days before. But he did it with the full
knowledge of the dangers, and he took every possible precaution to
obviate them. He succeeded.
Von Kluck, in his delusion, saw no danger. He failed.
"I should conceive it," says Sir John French, "to have been about noon
on September 6th ... that the enemy realised the powerful threat that
was being made against the flank of his columns moving south-east, and
began the great retreat which opened the battle of the Marne."
* * * * *
And there I draw the tableau curtains on the first act of the drama.
How inadequately the story has been told, or rather outlined, no one is
more conscious than the writer. For every omission the critics may
find, I will find two. But if I have so written that the great-hearted
public may realise a little more of what the Retreat from Mons meant to
the lads of ours who worked and fought so marvellously, to themselves
at home, to our brothers and sisters overseas, then indeed I am
satisfied.
Of necessity I have had to omit a great deal which may not be told
until the war has ended. To an officer on the active list freedom of
speech is rightly denied. But some day I shall hope to write in fuller
detail and to do more justice to the work of individuals. It is only
right that the public should learn the actual facts.
The glory of the achievement lay not merely in the hourly repulse, over
a period of fourteen days, of an overwhelming attack, and of a
continued retirement, which somehow never broke, before such an
inveterate pursuit. But there was also the big question of
temperament. The Germans knew exactly what they wanted, and they went
straight for it, backed by all the resources of their wonderful
organisation working to that particular end for a decade of years or
longer. The British, on the other hand, were thrust into the breach
literally at the last moment, a week late, and then had to fight for a
fortnight in total ignorance of the course of events.
I recall a remark once made by General Joffre:
"The better he understands the importance of the movements of the
attack wherein he participates, the braver the French soldier fights,
and the more trust he puts in the measures taken by his leaders."
While the converse may not always be true, it will, I think, suggest
how very difficult is the execution of a delicate piece of strategy
when the officers and men are ignorant of the motives which prompt it.
The Retreat was carried to a successful conclusion because, by the
inherent qualities of race, it was a piece of work of a character in
which the British Army has always excelled; and also, in face of the
terrible engines of modern slaughter, because of the splendid
discipline of the men and their training as individual human beings.
Of the invariable cheerfulness of the men I have given several
examples; but I would again attempt to correct the popular impression
that such cheerfulness is no more than the cracking of jokes on all
occasions. No, it is something far deeper and finer than that. The
casual observer will watch a party of sappers mending a road, under
fire, with loads of flint stones. He will hear them grumbling about
the shocking waste of the ratepayers' money, and will then write home a
letter for publication narrating the incident as a funny remark under
fire. He omits to point out that it is only the cheery spirits of the
men (and, of course, discipline, etc.) which make possible the clean
finish of the work.
So it was in the Retreat. The men were far too exhausted to crack
jokes, but the unconquerable soul of them rose high above every
obstacle, and so the work was done.
Looking back over what I have written, I find that, quite
unconsciously, I have said little or nothing of the work of the
officers. Yet there is nothing else that I can say. It is not for me
to remark upon the work of our leaders and of my brother-officers. I
can only repeat the words of the Commander-in-Chief, and I venture to
do so because the general public bothers but little with official
dispatches.
"It is impossible," Sir John French remarked, "for me to speak too
highly of the skill evinced by the two General Officers Commanding Army
Corps; the self-sacrificing and devoted exertions of their Staffs; the
direction of the troops by Divisional, Brigade and Regimental leaders;
the command of the smaller units by their officers; and the magnificent
fighting spirit displayed by non-commissioned officers and men."
But in the Commander-in-Chief's dispatches there is one officer whose
name shines out like a beacon. You who have followed in spirit the
work of the Second Corps on August 26th will have realised the
imperishable debt which the nation owes to the General Officer
Commanding that corps. The verdict of posterity will but confirm that
of the present generation.
Again I can but quote the Commander-in-Chief:
"I cannot close the brief account of this glorious stand of the British
troops without putting on record my deep appreciation of the valuable
services rendered by General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien.
"I say without hesitation that the saving of the left wing of the Army
under my command on the morning of August 26th could never have been
accomplished unless a commander of rare and unusual coolness,
intrepidity and determination had been present to personally conduct
the operation."
At the head of my sketch of that day's work I have set Shakespeare's
immortal lines on St. Crispin's Day. May one who was privileged to
serve as a member of that "band of brothers" on that day venture to
offer his poor tribute to the leader of that band?
From Mons to the Marne, wherever the fight was hottest, wherever his
men were working against heaviest odds, there was the General at hand
to help and stiffen them. The outposts before Mons were heavily
engaged; the General was up with them, under shell-fire, to see how
things were going. Through the days that followed, wherever
opportunity served, their commander stepped from his car to say a few
words of cheery encouragement to the passing troops. Was there a field
hospital, a passing ambulance?--again, those few words of kindly
inquiry which made the poor sufferers forget everything save only the
desire to be well again to give their-chief, and Britain, all that was
in them. If the Commander-in-Chief owed so much to General
Smith-Dorrien, I can only say that the Second Corps would have stormed
the gates of Hell for their leader, and would have trusted implicitly
in him to bring them through.
I seem to have said practically nothing about the Flying Corps, and
very little about the Sappers. I am afraid that I saw very little of
our aeroplane work until the Aisne, and so I cannot speak from personal
observation. In fact, there are far too many omissions in this brief
chronicle.
But pardon, gentles all,
* * * * *
Oh, pardon! since a crooked figure may
Attest in little place a million;
And let us, ciphers to this great accompt,
On your imaginary forces work,
* * * * *
Piece out our imperfections with your thoughts.
Indeed, I find it quite impossible to speak of one branch of the Force
more than another. It was just one perfect whole. Thus I have, so far
as possible, refrained from designating particular regiments. If I
have written of the 9th Lancers or L Battery it is because the gallant
work of those units is already a household word throughout the Empire.
But, so far as that first fortnight was concerned, there was not a
single unit, officer or man, who did not achieve something equally as
gallant did the opportunity come his way. Indeed, had it not been so,
the Retreat could never have been accomplished as it was. Every man
played the game for his side, and, in consequence, that side won.
And if that were so, then there can be no question of "mentions in
dispatches," D.S.O.'s and D.C.M.'s. Every regiment in the firing-line
should be "mentioned." If, by great good fortune, a regiment achieves
some specially noble piece of work which comes to the notice of the
authorities, then, say I, let the Colour of that regiment be decorated.
To single out individuals, to give a Victoria Cross to the colonel, a
D.S.O. to the senior major, a Military Cross to the senior captain, and
so on, is to create jealousy, and is, also, unfair to others.
Humanity, the other noble trait in the character of our men, I have
barely mentioned, for it seems quite unnecessary to do so. It is a
characteristic of British sailors and soldiers which is always taken
for granted. One need only recall some of the many occasions in our
naval actions when British sailors have rescued Germans at the peril of
their lives, and have been fired at while doing so. And set in
contrast the murderous attack by German destroyers upon the crew of a
British submarine stranded on the Swedish coast.
And so it has been with our soldiers. Our men invariably enter a fight
with the innate feeling that it is a sporting contest, where you shake
hands with your adversary before and after the fight. If he knocks out
his adversary, then the winner is the man to help him to his feet.
We have seen from the very beginning that "chivalry" and "fair play"
are words unknown to the Germans. To them nothing matters but to win,
preferably by foul means. So, on the very first day, British soldiers
were terribly undeceived. They saw German infantry advancing to the
attack behind a screen of Belgian women and children, driven on at the
bayonet point. From then onwards we lost hundreds of gallant men
simply through their feelings of humanity towards wounded enemies,
being shot at by other Germans, or being treacherously shot or stabbed
by the very man to whose lips they were holding a flask of water.
And yet, with such examples before them of their comrades' fate, the
sense of humanity and chivalry was never dulled. Despite the stringent
orders on the subject, the men, even now, hesitate to fire when the
enemy raises a white flag, and will always, whenever possible, succour
a wounded German lying before the trench. These are the men who have
only, as yet, learned of German treachery by hearsay evidence. But
there are others. There are companies and battalions who know from
ghastly experience. These men adopt other methods.
But nothing I can write will make people at home understand what this
war really is. Nothing, short of actual experience, can do that.
Stay, perhaps there is one thing: the genius of Louis Raemaekers. He,
at least, by his cartoons, is bringing home to millions the hideous
meaning of this war. And not only of this war, but of all modern war.
I would have a volume of his cartoons distributed gratis by the
Government to every household in the kingdom. I would have half a
dozen of the cartoons thrown upon the screen in every cinema-house at
every entertainment. The people would shudder with horror, but they
would see them and learn what Germany is and what war means.
Apart from this, I hold it to be the sacred duty of every man and woman
who can use a pen to advantage, or who can command the attention of an
audience, to make known this meaning. To cry from the housetops what
is this foul thing which Germany has thrust upon the world, and to show
the people why and how Civilisation must crush it out for ever.
There is no greater honour to-day that a man may wear--alas, there are
but few left to wear it!--than the honour of having served his King and
Country in France throughout August and September, 1914. Just that.
He needs no decoration, no "mention." He served through the "Retreat
from Mons." In days to come our children, our children's children,
will point with pride to that one little word on the regimental colour,
"Mons." For in that single word will be summed up the Liberation of
the World. It was the victory of the Marne which won for Civilisation
that freedom, but it was, under God's hand, the British Navy, the stand
of Belgium, and the "Retreat from Mons" which made that victory
possible.
APPENDIX I
MILITARY DESPATCHES FROM THE FIELD-MARSHAL
COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF, BRITISH FORCES IN THE FIELD,
DATED SEPTEMBER 7TH AND 17TH
7th September, 1914.
MY LORD,
I have the honour to report the proceedings of the Field Force under my
command up to the time of rendering this despatch.
1. The transport of the troops from England both by sea and by rail was
effected in the best order and without a check. Each unit arrived at
its destination in this country well within the scheduled time.
The concentration was practically complete on the evening of Friday,
the 21st ultimo, and I was able to make dispositions to move the Force
during Saturday, the 22nd, to positions I considered most favourable
from which to commence operations which the French Commander-in-Chief,
General Joffre, requested me to undertake in pursuance of his plans in
prosecution of the campaign.
Position at Mons
The line taken up extended along the line of the canal from Condé on
the west, through Mons and Binche on the east. This line was taken up
as follows:--
From Condé to Mons inclusive was assigned to the Second Corps, and to
the right of the Second Corps from Mons the First Corps was posted.
The 5th Cavalry Brigade was placed at Binche.
In the absence of my Third Army Corps I desired to keep the Cavalry
Division as much as possible as a reserve to act on my outer flank, or
move in support of any threatened part of the line. The forward
reconnaissance was entrusted to Brigadier-General Sir Philip Chetwode
with the 5th Cavalry Brigade, but I directed General Allenby to send
forward a few squadrons to assist in this work.
During the 22nd and 23rd these advanced squadrons did some excellent
work, some of them penetrating as far as Soignies, and several
encounters took place in which our troops showed to great advantage.
Sunday, August 23
2. At 6 a.m., on August 23rd, I assembled the Commanders of the First
and Second Corps and Cavalry Division at a point close to the position,
and explained the general situation of the Allies, and what I
understood to be General Joffre's plan. I discussed with them, at some
length the immediate situation in front of us.
From information I received from French Headquarters I understood that
little more than one, or at most two, of the enemy's Army Corps, with
perhaps one Cavalry Division, were in front of my position; and I was
aware of no attempted outflanking movement by the enemy. I was
confirmed in this opinion by the fact that my patrols encountered no
undue opposition in their reconnoitring operations. The observation of
my aeroplanes seemed also to bear out this estimate.
About 3 p.m. on Sunday, the 23rd, reports began coming in to the effect
that the enemy was commencing an attack on the Mons line, apparently in
some strength, but that the right of the position from Mons and Bray
was being particularly threatened.
The Commander of the First Corps had pushed his flank back to some high
ground south of Bray, and the 5th Cavalry Brigade evacuated Binche,
moving slightly south: the enemy thereupon occupied Binche.
The right of the 3rd Division, under General Hamilton, was at Mons,
which formed a somewhat dangerous salient; and I directed the Commander
of the Second Corps to be careful not to keep the troops on this
salient too long, but, if threatened seriously, to draw back the centre
behind Mons. This was done before dark. In the meantime, about 5
p.m., I received a most unexpected message from General Joffre by
telegraph, telling me that at least three German Corps, viz., a reserve
corps, the 4th Corps and the 9th Corps, were moving on my position in
front, and that the Second Corps was engaged in a turning movement from
the direction of Tournay. He also informed me that the two reserve
French Divisions and the 5th French Army on my right were retiring, the
Germans having on the previous day gained possession of the passages of
the Sambre between Charleroi and Namur.
Monday, August 24
3. In view of the possibility of my being driven from the Mons
position, I had previously ordered a position in rear to be
reconnoitred. This position rested on the fortress of Maubeuge on the
right and extended west to Jenlain, south-east of Valenciennes, on the
left. The position was reported difficult to hold, because standing
crops and buildings made the siting of trenches very difficult and
limited the field of fire in many important localities. It
nevertheless afforded a few good artillery positions.
When the news of the retirement of the French and the heavy German
threatening on my front reached me, I endeavoured to confirm it by
aeroplane reconnaissance; and as a result of this I determined to
effect a retirement to the Maubeuge position at daybreak on the 24th.
A certain amount of fighting continued along the whole line throughout
the night, and at daybreak on the 24th the 2nd Division from the
neighbourhood of Harmignies made a powerful demonstration as if to
retake Binche. This was supported by the artillery of both the 1st and
2nd Divisions, whilst the 1st Division took up a supporting position in
the neighbourhood of Peissant. Under cover of this demonstration the
Second Corps retired on the line Dour--Quarouble--Frameries. The 3rd
Division on the right of the Corps suffered considerable loss in this
operation from the enemy, who had retaken Mons.
The Second Corps halted on this line, where they partially entrenched
themselves, enabling Sir Douglas Haig with the First Corps gradually to
withdraw to the new position; and he effected this without much further
loss, reaching the line Bavai--Maubeuge about 7 p.m. Towards midday
the enemy appeared to be directing his principal effort against our
left.
Work of the Cavalry
I had previously ordered General Allenby with the Cavalry to act
vigorously in advance of my left front and endeavour to take the
pressure off.
About 7.30 a.m. General Allenby received a message from Sir Charles
Fergusson, commanding 5th Division, saying that he was very hard
pressed and in urgent need of support. On receipt of this message
General Allenby drew in the Cavalry and endeavoured to bring direct
support to the 5th Division.
During the course of this operation General De Lisle, of the 2nd
Cavalry Brigade, thought he saw a good opportunity to paralyse the
further advance of the enemy's infantry by making a mounted attack on
his flank. He formed up and advanced for this purpose, but was held up
by wire about 500 yards from his objective, and the 9th Lancers and
18th Hussars suffered severely in the retirement of the Brigade.
The 19th Infantry Brigade, which had been guarding the Line of
Communications, was brought up by rail to Valenciennes on the 22nd and
23rd. On the morning of the 24th they were moved out to a position
south of Quarouble to support the left flank of the Second Corps.
With the assistance of the Cavalry Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was enabled
to effect his retreat to a new position; although, having two corps of
the enemy on his front and one threatening his flank, he suffered great
losses in doing so.
At nightfall the position was occupied by the Second Corps to the west
of Bavai, the First Corps to the right. The right was protected by the
Fortress of Maubeuge, the left by the 19th Brigade in position between
Jenlain and Bry, and the Cavalry on the outer flank.
Tuesday, August 25
4. The French were still retiring, and I had no support except such as
was afforded by the Fortress of Maubeuge; and the determined attempts
of the enemy to get round my left flank assured me that it was his
intention to hem me against that place and surround me. I felt that
not a moment must be lost in retiring to another position.
I had every reason to believe that the enemy's forces were somewhat
exhausted, and I knew that they had suffered heavy losses. I hoped,
therefore, that his pursuit would not be too vigorous to prevent me
effecting my object.
The operation, however, was full of danger and difficulty, not only
owing to the very superior force in my front, but also to the
exhaustion of the troops.
The retirement was recommenced in the early morning of the 25th to a
position in the neighbourhood of Le Cateau, and rearguards were ordered
to be clear of the Maubeuge--Bavai--Eth road by 5.30 a.m.
Two Cavalry Brigades, with the Divisional Cavalry of the Second Corps,
covered the movement of the Second Corps. The remainder of the Cavalry
Division with the 19th Brigade, the whole under the command of General
Allenby, covered the west flank.
The 4th Division commenced its detrainment at Le Cateau on Sunday, the
23rd, and by the morning of the 25th eleven battalions and a Brigade of
Artillery with Divisional Staff were available for service.
I ordered General Snow to move out to take up a position with his right
south of Solesmes, his left resting on the Cambrai--Le Cateau road
south of La Chaprie. In this position the Division rendered great help
to the effective retirement of the Second and First Corps to the new
position.
Although the troops had been ordered to occupy the Cambrai--Le
Cateau--Landrecies position, and the ground had, during the 25th, been
partially prepared and entrenched, I had grave doubts--owing to the
information I received as to the accumulating strength of the enemy
against me--as to the wisdom of standing there to fight.
Having regard to the continued retirement of the French on my right, my
exposed left flank, the tendency of the enemy's western corps (II.) to
envelop me, and, more than all, the exhausted condition of the troops,
I determined to make a great effort to continue the retreat till I
could put some substantial obstacle, such as the Somme or the Oise,
between my troops and the enemy, and afford the former some opportunity
of rest and reorganisation. Orders were, therefore, sent to the Corps
Commanders to continue their retreat as soon as they possibly could
towards the general line Vermand--St. Quentin--Ribemont.
The Cavalry, under General Allenby, were ordered to cover the
retirement.
The Guards at Landrecies
Throughout the 25th and far into the evening, the First Corps continued
its march on Landrecies, following the road along the eastern border of
the Forêt de Mormal, and arrived at Landrecies about 10 o'clock. I had
intended that the Corps should come farther west so as to fill up the
gap between Le Cateau and Landrecies, but the men were exhausted and
could not get farther in without rest.
The enemy, however, would not allow them this rest, and about 9.30 p.m.
a report was received that the 4th Guards Brigade in Landrecies was
heavily attacked by troops of the 9th German Army Corps who were coming
through the forest on the north of the town. This brigade fought most
gallantly and caused the enemy to suffer tremendous loss in issuing
from the forest into the narrow street of the town. The loss has been
estimated from reliable sources at from 700 to 1,000. At the same time
information reached me from Sir Douglas Haig that his 1st Division was
also heavily engaged south and east of Maroilles. I sent urgent
messages to the Commander of the two French Reserve Divisions on my
right to come up to the assistance of the First Corps, which they
eventually did. Partly owing to this assistance but mainly to the
skilful manner in which Sir Douglas Haig extricated his Corps from an
exceptionally difficult position in the darkness of the night, they
were able at dawn to resume their march south towards Wessigny on Guise.
By about 6 p.m. the Second Corps had got into position with their right
on Le Cateau, their left in the neighbourhood of Caudry, and the line
of defence was continued thence by the 4th Division towards
Seranvillers, the left being thrown back.
During the fighting on the 24th and 25th the Cavalry became a good deal
scattered, but by the early morning of the 26th General Allenby had
succeeded in concentrating two brigades to the south of Cambrai.
The 4th Division was placed under the orders of the General Officer
Commanding the Second Army Corps.
Wednesday, August 26
On the 24th the French Cavalry Corps, consisting of three divisions,
under General Sordêt, had been in billets north of Avesnes. On my way
back from Bavai, which was my "Poste de Commandement" during the
fighting of the 23rd and 24th, I visited General Sordêt, and earnestly
requested his co-operation and support. He promised to obtain sanction
from his Army Commander to act on my left flank, but said that his
horses were too tired to move before the next day. Although he
rendered me valuable assistance later on in the course of the
retirement, he was unable for the reasons given to afford me any
support on the most critical day of all, viz., the 26th.
At daybreak it became apparent that the enemy was throwing the bulk of
his strength against the left of the position occupied by the Second
Corps and the 4th Division.
At this time the guns of four German Army Corps were in position
against them, and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien reported to me that he
judged it impossible to continue his retirement at daybreak (as
ordered) in face of such an attack.
I sent him orders to use his utmost endeavours to break off the action
and retire at the earliest possible moment, as it was impossible for me
to send him any support, the First Corps being at the moment incapable
of movement.
The French Cavalry Corps, under General Sordêt, was coming up on our
left rear early in the morning, and I sent an urgent message to him to
do his utmost to come up and support the retirement of my left flank;
but, owing to the fatigue of his horses he found himself unable to
intervene in any way.
There had been no time to entrench the position properly, but the
troops showed a magnificent front to the terrible fire which confronted
them.
The Artillery, although outmatched by at least four to one, made a
splendid fight, and inflicted heavy losses on their opponents.
At length it became apparent that, if complete annihilation was to be
avoided, a retirement must be attempted; and the order was given to
commence it about 3.30 p.m. The movement was covered with the most
devoted intrepidity and determination by the Artillery, which had
itself suffered heavily, and the fine work done by the Cavalry in the
further retreat from the position assisted materially in the final
completion of this most difficult and dangerous operation.
Fortunately the enemy had himself suffered too heavily to engage in an
energetic pursuit.
I cannot close the brief account of this glorious stand of the British
troops without putting on record my deep appreciation of the valuable
services rendered by General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien.
I say without hesitation that the saving of the left wing of the Army
under my command on the morning of the 26th August could never have
been accomplished unless a commander of rare and unusual coolness,
intrepidity, and determination had been present to personally conduct
the operations.
The retreat was continued far into the night of the 26th and through
the 27th and 28th, on which date the troops halted on the line
Noyon--Chauny--La Fère, having then thrown off the weight of the
enemy's pursuit.
On the 27th and 28th I was much indebted to General Sordêt and the
French Cavalry Division which he commands for materially assisting my
retirement and successfully driving back some of the enemy on Cambrai.
General D'Amade also, with the 61st and 62nd French Reserve Divisions,
moved down from the neighbourhood of Arras on the enemy's right flank
and took much pressure off the rear of the British Forces.
This closes the period covering the heavy fighting which commenced at
Mons on Sunday afternoon, 23rd August, and which really constituted a
four days' battle.
At this point, therefore, I propose to close the present despatch.
I deeply deplore the very serious losses which the British Forces have
suffered in this great battle; but they were inevitable in view of the
fact that the British Army--only two days after a concentration by
rail--was called upon to withstand a vigorous attack of five German
Army Corps.
It is impossible for me to speak too highly of the skill evinced by the
two General Officers commanding Army Corps; the self-sacrificing and
devoted exertions of their Staffs; the direction of the troops by
Divisional, Brigade, and Regimental Leaders; the command of the smaller
units by their officers; and the magnificent fighting spirit displayed
by non-commissioned officers and men.
I wish particularly to bring to your Lordship's notice the admirable
work done by the Royal Flying Corps under Sir David Henderson. Their
skill, energy, and perseverance have been beyond all praise. They have
furnished me with the most complete and accurate information which has
been of incalculable value in the conduct of the operations. Fired at
constantly both by friend and foe, and not hesitating to fly in every
kind of weather, they have remained undaunted throughout.
Further, by actually fighting in the air, they have succeeded in
destroying five of the enemy's machines.
I wish to acknowledge with deep gratitude the incalculable assistance I
received from the General and Personal Staffs at Headquarters during
this trying period.
Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Murray, Chief of the General Staff;
Major-General Wilson, Sub-Chief of the General Staff; and all under
them have worked day and night unceasingly with the utmost skill,
self-sacrifice, and devotion; and the same acknowledgment is due by me
to Brigadier-General Hon. W. Lambton, my Military Secretary, and the
Personal Staff.
In such operations as I have described, the work of the
Quartermaster-General is of an extremely onerous nature. Major-General
Sir William Robertson has met what appeared to be almost insuperable
difficulties with his characteristic energy, skill, and determination;
and it is largely owing to his exertions that the hardships and
sufferings of the troops--inseparable from such operations--were not
much greater.
Major-General Sir Nevil Macready, the Adjutant-General, has also been
confronted with most onerous and difficult tasks in connection with
disciplinary arrangements and the preparation of casualty lists. He
has been indefatigable in his exertions to meet the difficult
situations which arose.
I have not yet been able to complete the list of officers whose names I
desire to bring to your Lordship's notice for services rendered during
the period under review; and, as I understand it is of importance that
this despatch should no longer be delayed, I propose to forward this
list, separately, as soon as I can.
I have the honour to be,
Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,
(Signed) J. D. P. FRENCH, Field-Marshal,
Commander-in-Chief, British Forces in the Field.
17th September, 1914.
MY LORD,
In continuation of my despatch of September 7th, I have the honour to
report the further progress of the operations of the Forces under my
command from August 28th.
On that evening the retirement of the Force was followed closely by two
of the enemy's cavalry columns, moving south-east from St. Quentin.
Saturday, August 29
The retreat in this part of the field was being covered by the 3rd and
5th Cavalry Brigades. South of the Somme General Gough, with the 3rd
Cavalry Brigade, threw back the Uhlans of the Guard with considerable
loss.
General Chetwode, with the 5th Cavalry Brigade, encountered the eastern
column near Cerizy, moving south. The Brigade attacked and routed the
column, the leading German regiment suffering very severe casualties
and being almost broken up.
The 7th French Army Corps was now in course of being railed up from the
south to the east of Amiens. On the 29th it nearly completed its
detrainment, and the French 6th Army got into position on my left, its
right resting on Roye.
The 5th French Army was behind the line of the Oise between La Fère and
Guise.
The pursuit of the enemy was very vigorous; some five or six German
corps were on the Somme facing the 5th Army on the Oise. At least two
corps were advancing towards my front, and were crossing the Somme east
and west of Ham. Three or four more German corps were opposing the 6th
French Army on my left.
This was the situation at 1 o'clock on the 29th, when I received a
visit from General Joffre at my headquarters.
I strongly represented my position to the French Commander-in-Chief,
who was most kind, cordial, and sympathetic, as he has always been. He
told me that he had directed the 5th French Army on the Oise to move
forward and attack the Germans on the Somme, with a view to checking
pursuit. He also told me of the formation of the Sixth French Army on
my left flank, composed of the 7th Army Corps, four Reserve Divisions,
and Sordêt's Corps of Cavalry.
I finally arranged with General Joffre to effect a further short
retirement towards the line Compiègne--Soissons, promising him,
however, to do my utmost to keep always within a day's march of him.
In pursuance of this arrangement the British Forces retired to a
position a few miles north of the line Compiègne--Soissons on the 29th.
Change of Base
The right flank of the German Army was now reaching a point which
appeared seriously to endanger my line of communications with Havre. I
had already evacuated Amiens, into which place a German reserve
division was reported to have moved.
Orders were given to change the base to St. Nazaire, and establish an
advance base at Le Mans. This operation was well carried out by the
Inspector-General of Communications.
In spite of a severe defeat inflicted upon the Guard 10th and Guard
Reserve Corps of the German Army by the 1st and 3rd French Corps on the
right of the 5th Army, it was not part of General Joffre's plan to
pursue this advantage, and a general retirement on to the line of the
Marne was ordered, to which the French forces in the more eastern
theatre were directed to conform.
A new Army (the 9th) had been formed from three corps in the south by
General Joffre, and moved into the space between the right of the 5th
and left of the 4th Armies.
Whilst closely adhering to his strategic conception to draw the enemy
on at all points until a favourable situation was created from which to
assume the offensive, General Joffre found it necessary to modify from
day to day the methods by which he sought to attain this object, owing
to the development of the enemy's plans and changes in the general
situation.
In conformity with the movements of the French Forces, my retirement
continued practically from day to day. Although we were not severely
pressed by the enemy, rearguard actions took place continually.
South of Compiègne
On the 1st September, when retiring from the thickly wooded country to
the south of Compiègne, the 1st Cavalry Brigade was overtaken by some
German cavalry. They momentarily lost a Horse Artillery battery, and
several officers and men were killed and wounded. With the help,
however, of some detachments from the 3rd Corps operating on their
left, they not only recovered their own guns, but succeeded in
capturing twelve of the enemy's.
Similarly, to the eastward, the 1st Corps, retiring south, also got
into some very difficult forest country, and a somewhat severe
rearguard action ensued at Villers-Cotterets, in which the 4th Guards
Brigade suffered considerably.
On September 3rd the British Forces were in position south of the Marne
between Lagny and Signy-Signets. Up to this time I had been requested
by General Joffre to defend the passages of the river as long as
possible, and to blow up the bridges in my front. After I had made the
necessary dispositions, and the destruction of the bridges had been
effected, I was asked by the French Commander-in-Chief to continue my
retirement to a point some 12 miles in rear of the position I then
occupied, with a view to taking up a second position behind the Seine.
This retirement was duly carried out. In the meantime the enemy had
thrown bridges and crossed the Marne in considerable force, and was
threatening the Allies all along the line of the British Forces and the
5th and 9th French Armies. Consequently several small outpost actions
took place.
Saturday, September 5
On Saturday, September 5th, I met the French Commander-in-Chief at his
request, and he informed me of his intention to take the offensive
forthwith, as he considered conditions were very favourable to success.
General Joffre announced to me his intention of wheeling up the left
flank of the 6th Army, pivoting on the Marne and directing it to move
on the Ourcq; cross and attack the flank of the 1st German Army, which
was then moving in a south-easterly direction east of that river.
The Advance
He requested me to effect a change of front to my right--my left
resting on the Marne, and my right on the 5th Army--to fill the gap
between that army and the 6th. I was then to advance against the enemy
in my front and join in the general offensive movement.
These combined movements practically commenced on Sunday, September
6th, at sunrise; and on that day it may be said that a great battle
opened on a front extending from Ermenonville, which was just in front
of the left flank of the 6th French Army, through Lizy on the Marne,
Mauperthuis, which was about the British centre Courtecon, which was
the left of the 5th French Army; to Esternay and Charleville, the left
of the 9th Army under General Foch, and so along the front of the 9th,
4th and 3rd French Armies to a point north of the fortress of Verdun.
This battle, in so far as the 6th French Army, the British Army, the
5th French Army, and the 9th French Army were concerned, may be said to
have concluded on the evening of September 10th, by which time the
Germans had been driven back to the line Soissons--Reims, with a loss
of thousands of prisoners, many guns, and enormous masses of transport.
About the 3rd September the enemy appears to have changed his plans and
to have determined to stop his advance South direct upon Paris; for on
the 4th September air reconnaissances showed that his main columns were
moving in a south-easterly direction generally east of a line drawn
through Nanteuil and Lizy on the Ourcq. On the 5th September several
of these columns were observed to have crossed the Marne; whilst German
troops, which were observed moving south-east up the left bank of the
Ourcq on the 4th, were now reported to be halted and facing that river.
Heads of the enemy's columns were seen crossing at Changis, La Ferté,
Nogent, Château Thierry, and Mezy.
Considerable German columns of all arms were seen to be converging on
Montmirail, whilst before sunset large bivouacs of the enemy were
located in the neighbourhood of Coulommiers, south of Rebais, La
Ferté-Gauchér, and Dagny.
I should conceive it to have been about noon on the 6th September,
after the British Forces had changed their front to the right and
occupied the line Jouy-Le Chatel--Faremoutiers--Villeneuve La Comte,
and the advance of the 6th French Army north of the Marne towards the
Ourcq became apparent, that the enemy realised the powerful threat that
was being made against the flank of his columns moving south-east, and
began the great retreat which opened the battle above referred to.
_Here follows the account of the Battle of the Marne._
APPENDIX II
ORDER OF THE DAY
AUGUST 29TH, 1914.
_Issued to the Troops under his command by the General
Officer Commanding the Second Corps._
As it is improbable the troops of the 2nd Army Corps understand the
operations of the last few days, commencing on the 21st instant with
the advance to the line of the Mons Canal and ending with a retirement
to our present position on the River Oise about Noyon, the Commander of
the Corps desires to let troops know that the object was to delay the
advance of a far superior force of the enemy to enable our Allies to
conduct operations elsewhere. This object, owing to the skilful
handling of the Commanders of units and the magnificent fighting spirit
shown by all ranks against overwhelming odds, and in spite of very
heavy casualties, was achieved, and the French Army is now reported to
be advancing.
That the losses were not greater in the retirement from the
Hancourt--Caudry--Beaumont--Le Cateau position on the 26th instant is
due largely to the support given by French troops, chiefly General
Sordêt's Cavalry Corps, operating on the West flank of the British
troops, and we may well be thankful to our gallant comrades in arms.
General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, whilst regretting the terribly heavy
casualties and the weary forced marches, in which it has been
impossible to distribute the necessary amount of food, begs to thank
all ranks and to express his admiration of the grand fighting and
determined spirit shown by all ranks, and his pride in being allowed to
command such a splendid force.
He is sure that whenever it is thought necessary to again assume the
offensive the troops will be as pleased as he will himself.
The following messages have been received from the Commander-in-Chief,
Field-Marshal Sir John French, to publish to the troops of the 2nd Army
Corps--the first dated 25th August.
(1)
"_Special Army Order._
"I have received the following telegram from the Secretary of State for
War:
"'LONDON, 25-8-14.
"'Congratulate troops on their splendid work. We are all proud as
usual of them.'
"In making this message known to the troops under my command, I wish to
express to them my heartfelt thanks for, and my profound admiration of,
their magnificent bearing and conduct during the fighting of the last
two days.
"The most difficult operation which an army can be called upon to carry
out was rendered necessary by the general strategic situation of the
allied forces extending over an enormous front.
"I can only tell you that it was most brilliantly and successfully
performed. This happy result was entirely due to the splendid spirit,
efficient training, and magnificent discipline of regimental officers
and men, and the fine skill displayed by the higher commanders in the
direction of the troops."
(2)
"28TH AUGUST, 1914.
"A a 67. Following message from Lord Kitchener to C.-in-C. will be
communicated to all troops. Begins: 'The First Lord asks me to
transmit to you the following message from the Home Fleet:--"The
officers and men of the Grand Fleet wish to express to their comrades
of the Army admiration of the magnificent stand made against great
odds, and wish them the brilliant success which the Fleet feels sure
awaits their further efforts." Ends.
(3)
"No. 28 G. Following from Lord Kitchener to C.-in-C. Begins: 'Your F
37. Your troops have done marvellously well under their Commanders
during severe attacks which they have had to withstand practically
alone. Express to them all the thanks of the King and Government.'
Ends."
PRINTED BY CASSELL & COMPANY, LIMITED, LA BELLE SAUVAGE, LONDON, E.C.
F.40.816
[Illustration: MAP OF COUNTRY FROM MONS TO PARIS]
End of Project Gutenberg's The Retreat from Mons, by A. Corbett-Smith