GUNS AND STAFF
The losses which we suffered in every attack on the Turkish trenches
were very severe, and it was painful to see our men frittered away time
after time in these hopeless assaults on what had now become an
impregnable position--impregnable at all events to such forces as we
could launch to the attack. Our casualties at the original landing had
reduced the 29th Division to a mere skeleton. Many of the Battalions
were not a company strong and had scarcely any officers left, and it was
found necessary to join the remnants of two or three together to make
one rather weak Battalion. The Dublins and Munsters were thus linked up
together and were officially known as the "Dubsters."
Reinforcements only came in by driblets, and as they came they were
eaten up in futile attacks on the strong trenches which the Turks had
meanwhile, with great energy, dug right across the Peninsula.
We were never really strong enough to undertake a serious offensive, and
our guns never had ammunition enough to prepare the way properly by a
devastating bombardment. Half an hour or an hour was usually about all
we were able to do in the way of knocking the Turkish trenches about
with high explosive, whereas these same trenches needed a steady rain of
shells for several days to crumple them up and destroy the scores of
machine-guns which bristled everywhere. Trench warfare seemed to have
taken us completely by surprise; we were without trench mortars, but
luckily were able to borrow some from the French; neither had we any
bombs or hand grenades, except such as we could manufacture locally out
of jam tins!
No battery commander was allowed to fire a single round unless he had
first obtained permission from his Brigadier, and even when a couple of
battalions of Turkish troops well within range could be observed
marching in column, the Brigadier was compelled to limit the battery to
two rounds only, for to such dire straits were we reduced owing to lack
of ammunition!
Even with the slight support given by the guns I have seen our gallant
fellows time after time leap out of their trenches and, in an
irresistible onslaught with the bayonet, sweep over trench upon trench
full of Turkish soldiers. Nowhere could the enemy stand up to our men
in the open, as was proved over and over again in the early days of the
fight before they took to trench warfare. If only we had had enough
ammunition and one more Division, equal to the 29th, we would have
retrieved the initial mistake of landing at Helles, and have swept the
Turks over Achi Baba from their positions round the Narrows, and
Constantinople itself would have been in our grip within a month.
But, alas! we hadn't the ammunition and we hadn't the men; and when the
Turks took to mole tactics, and protected their front with those two
inventions of the Evil One--barbed wire and machine-guns--our case,
considering the means at our disposal, was a hopeless one.
During a fierce battle which took place in June, I was standing close to
one of our batteries in position, just south of the Pink Farm, and what
a contrast it was to see these guns in action after having repeatedly
watched the French .75s! Here was no smooth barrel-recoil, but a clumsy
spade stuck in the ground to prevent the piece from kicking. Whenever
the gun was fired it jumped back like a bucking bronco, necessitating
the relaying of the gun after each shot.
We have better guns than that now, of course, but with all our
mechanical superiority and mechanical resources we should years ago have
had a gun equal, or superior, to the French .75. Of course there is no
use in having a quick-firing gun if you cannot have mountains of
ammunition alongside of it, and this point should never be lost sight of
by the Staff, whose duty it is to look after such matters.
As we were very short of high explosive shells the battery was not doing
a great deal of firing, and in the lull a Staff Officer rode up and told
the Battery Commander to lay his guns on to some Turks whom he pointed
out, saying they were threatening our line.
Now I had been watching this part of the battlefield most carefully
through my glasses, and I had seen our own men advance and go into the
position which the Staff Officer said was held by the Turks. I overheard
his instructions to the gunner officer, so I called out: "Those are our
men, not Turks!" However, in spite of my warning, a couple of rounds
were loosed off, and they were only too well placed, for they exploded
among our unfortunate troops, doing, no doubt, a considerable amount of
damage, because, in a moment, a wrathful telephone message came to the
Battery Commander telling him to cease fire instantly, on which the
discreet Staff Officer made a hurried departure.
While we had some excellent Staff Officers, there were others not
exactly noted for their brilliancy, and no doubt the Turks saw that some
of our "regrettable incidents" were due to bad Staff work, and the
following story was vouched for by the Peninsula wag.
It had been noted with some surprise that, though the Turkish sniper
exacted his toll from all other ranks, the Staff appeared to be immune.
At last the mystery was solved when one of these sharpshooters was
captured, for on being asked how it was that the Staff always escaped,
he replied: "Oh, well, you see, I get five shillings for every private I
shoot, ten shillings for every sergeant, a pound for every officer, but
if I were to shoot a Staff Officer I would be shot myself!"
I need hardly say that these merry quips made at the expense of the
Staff by our frolicsome wits should be taken with a grain of salt. So
far as my own experience goes, the Staff Officers of the 29th Division,
and, later, of the 8th Army Corps, were all that could be desired, and
at them no such gibe could be levelled. All those with whom I came in
contact were very much all there at their respective jobs.
There is no doubt, however, that there is some reason for the general
lack of confidence in the Staff. Responsible positions are unfortunately
too often given to most unsuitable men, with regrettable results.
Glaring instances of jobbery and favouritism are so universally known
that it is unnecessary to quote examples. Puck must be having the time
of his life. If only our responsible administrators would for the future
abjure nepotism (vain wish!) and give proved talent a chance, we should,
I am convinced, have something better to show than "strategic retreats"
and "brilliant evacuations."
I am reminded of an incident that occurred when I was staying with
Colonel Roosevelt during the time he was President of the United States.
An influential and well-known Senator came into the room while I was
there, and urged on the President the claims of a _protégé_ of his to a
post as Mining Inspector. President Roosevelt's reply impressed me very
much: "Well, Senator, if your man is the best Mining Engineer that can
be found in the United States he shall get the job, but not otherwise;
he will have the lives of men in his hands."
Mark this, ye jobbites of England!