GENERAL POLICY OF THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN
Many leaders of thought in England, whose convictions should certainly
carry weight, are of the opinion that the expedition to the Dardanelles
was in itself unsound, and should never have been undertaken. Now the
views of well-known practical common-sense men should not be lightly
thrust aside, but perhaps as one who has travelled and read much, and
knows the East and the questions bound up with it fairly well, I hope I
may not appear too presumptuous if I venture to disagree with those who
condemn the Dardanelles policy.
It must be remembered that although we declared war on Turkey she had
already committed several hostile acts on our Russian ally, and had
flouted us most outrageously by allowing the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ the
freedom and protection of her waters and the resources of her arsenals.
Of course the escape of these two ships is one of the most extraordinary
bungles of the war, which it is to be hoped will be carefully gone into
at some future time, and the responsible culprit brought to book, for on
his head probably rests the blood of the countless dead in Gallipoli.
I have reason to think that it is more than doubtful whether the
mischievous activity of Enver Pasha and his satellites would have been
sufficient to induce the Turkish nation to commit an act of war against
either ourselves or Russia, but for the presence at the gates of
Constantinople of these powerful German warships.
Our ally having been attacked and we ourselves flouted it became
necessary for us, if we meant to uphold our prestige in the East, to
declare war on Turkey.
A successful war against the Ottoman Empire had immense possibilities in
it; the way to Russia would be opened, guns and munitions would have
streamed in to her through the Bosphorus, while wheat for ourselves and
our allies would have streamed out--but there was a great deal more than
this at stake, as I shall point out.
It was well known to the Foreign Office that unless we showed a strong
hand in the Near East, some of the Balkan States, who were even then
trembling in the balance, would in all probability link their fortunes
with those of the enemy. These wavering States wished to join the
Allies if they saw a reasonable chance of the Allies' success. On the
other hand Austria, backed up by the might of Germany, was at their
gates, and with Belgium as an object lesson they feared for their
country. What therefore could have been more calculated to gain them to
our side than a smashing blow which would crumple up Turkey and give us
direct communication with Russia? Had we succeeded (and we ought to have
succeeded) it is certain that Greece and Rumania would now be fighting
on our side; the astute Ferdinand would have seen on which side his
bread was buttered, and have either kept Bulgaria neutral, or made
common cause with the Allies; and those unfortunate little States,
Serbia and Montenegro, would not have been betrayed and ground to dust.
The fall of Constantinople would once more have been a great
epoch-making event, which would have changed the course of the world's
history, for with its fall our victorious army, hand in hand with
Russia, would have made a triumphant march through the Balkans, where
every State would then have rallied to our side.
This allied flood would number between two and three millions of men,
and with this irresistible force we would have burst upon the plains of
Hungary and on to the heart of the Empire. Such an advance is not new to
history, as the Turks themselves, when in the zenith of their power,
overran Austria-Hungary and were only denied the domination of Europe
under the very walls of Vienna itself, where, as everybody knows, they
were defeated by John Sobiesky. No modern Sobiesky would have been found
strong enough to deprive us of our prey, and with the fall of Vienna
Austria would have been crushed, and the war would soon have come to a
victorious end.
Even if we did not penetrate quite so far, the very fact of such a large
army advancing from the south and east would have drawn an immense
number of the enemy's troops from the Eastern and Western fronts, which
would have given the Russians, the French and ourselves an opportunity
of smashing through on those fronts and between us crushing Germany.
Yes, undoubtedly the fall of Constantinople was of vital importance, and
for once our politicians were right.
In addition to our material gains in Europe, our prestige throughout the
East would have reached a pinnacle such as it has never yet attained,
and there would have been no such nuts for us to crack as the Egyptian,
Persian, or Mesopotamian questions.
Germany would be completely hemmed in and the strangling grip of our
fleet would have been irresistible when this last link with the outer
world had been severed.
Germany's wheat supply from Rumania, copper from Serbia, cottons, fats
and other vital products from Turkey would be cut off, and economic life
in the Central Empires would in a very short time have been made
intolerable.