CHAPTER XV.

RUEF PLEADS GUILTY TO EXTORTION.[207]

While the Supervisors were making full confessions of their

participation in the bribery transactions, and the Grand Jury was

dragging from unwilling promoters, capitalists and corporation employees

information as to the source of the corruption funds, Ruef's days and

nights were devoted to consideration of plans for his own safety. Ruef,

after his arrest and confinement under Elisor Biggy, became one of the

scramblers of his broken organization to save himself.

But Ruef was more clever, more far-seeing than any of the Supervisors.

His course from the beginning indicates that, in considering confession,

he carefully weighed against the power of the regularly constituted

authorities of San Francisco to protect him if he testified for the

State, the ability of organized corruptionists to punish for betrayal.

Ruef realized that although the all-powerful State "machine," labeled

Republican, of which the San Francisco organization labeled Union Labor,

which he had built up, was but a part, had for the moment lost control

of the San Francisco District Attorney's office, but the "machine" still

dominated the other departments of the municipal government, as well as

of the State government[208]. Ruef realized that Langdon might die; that

the State Attorney General might set Langdon aside and himself conduct

the graft prosecution. And he realized that some day a district attorney

other than Langdon would be prosecutor in San Francisco. In any of these

events, what would be the lot of the man who had betrayed the

scarcely-known captains of the powerful machine?

On the other hand, the hour when the evidence which the District

Attorney had accumulated against him would be presented before a trial

jury, approached with deadly certainty.

Such considerations led to Ruef devoting his days to resistance of the

proceeding against him in the trial court, where a jury to try him on

one of the five extortion charges on which he had been indicted, was

being impaneled, while his nights were given to scheming to wring from

the District Attorney immunity from punishment for the extortions and

briberies which had been brought to his door.

The period was one of activity for both District Attorney and Ruef. On

the whole, however, the District Attorney had the liveliest time of it.

To be sure, Ruef had been brought before the trial judge; that is to

say, the impaneling of a trial jury had begun, but Ruef's technical

fight had not been abandoned for a moment.

The appearance of Ruef under arrest was signal for a fight to have him

admitted to bail. But release under bonds Judge Dunne denied him on the

ground of the immediate approach of his trial, and because he had

attempted to put himself beyond the process of the court. Ruef's

attorneys appealed to the United States District Court for a writ of

habeas corpus, but this was denied them. His attorneys filed affidavits

alleging bias and prejudice on the part of Judge Dunne against Ruef, and

demanding a change of venue. And with these various motions, all of

which the District Attorney was called upon to meet, was the appeal from

Judge Hebbard's order to the Federal Supreme Court, which was considered

in a previous chapter.

The actual work of drawing a jury to try Ruef began on March 13,[209]

eight days later than the date originally set for trial. The State was

represented by District Attorney Langdon, Francis J. Heney and Hiram W.

Johnson. At the defense end of the table with Schmitz and Ruef were

Attorneys Joseph C. Campbell, Samuel M. Shortridge, Henry Ach, Charles

A. Fairall and J. J. Barrett. But it developed that one of the four

citizens drawn for jury service was not in the courtroom. The defense

objected to proceeding during the absence of the venireman. The hearing

was accordingly postponed. Because of one technical obstruction and

another, the work of impaneling the trial jury was delayed until April

2. Even after that date there were interruptions, but the work of

securing the jury[210] went on until May 13, when the twelfth man to try

Ruef was accepted.

But while Ruef was making this brave fight in public to head off trial

on the extortion charge, behind the scenes he was imploring

representatives of the Prosecution to grant him immunity from punishment

in return for such confession as he might see fit to make.

As early as March 20, Ruef sent word to Heney through Burns[211] that he

was willing to make confession, provided he were given immunity from

punishment for all crimes which he had committed or in which he had

participated.

Heney refused absolutely to consider any arrangement which involved

complete immunity for Ruef. Negotiations on the basis of partial

immunity followed.[212]

Heney, on the ground that he did not trust any of Ruef's lawyers,

refused to discuss the matter with them, but stated that he would meet

any lawyer in whom he had confidence to negotiate terms of partial

immunity, provided that Ruef's representative were permitted:

(1) To give the names of Ruef's accomplices who would be involved by his

testimony.

(2) To give the general nature of the offenses in which the various

accomplices were involved.

(3) To be prepared to assure Heney that Ruef's evidence against his

accomplices could be corroborated, and was sufficient to sustain a

conviction.

Ruef at first appeared to be well satisfied with the plan. He sent for a

list of San Francisco attorneys, and set himself enthusiastically to the

work of selecting a list of the names of attorneys to be submitted to

Heney. But he failed to make a selection, urging all the time to Burns

that Heney accept Henry Ach. Ruef's insistence that he deal with Ach

convinced Heney that Ruef was not acting in good faith, and he refused

to yield to Burns's urging that he give way to Ruef in this particular

and accept Ach as Ruef's representative.[213]

Under Ruef's temporizing, negotiations dragged until April 2, the day

that, Ruef's technical obstructions in the main set aside, his trial was

to be resumed before Judge Dunne.

On that day, a new actor appeared in the person of Dr. Jacob Nieto, a

Jewish Rabbi of some prominence in San Francisco.

Nieto, according to Burns's statement to Heney, asked the detective if

he had any objection to his (Nieto's) calling upon Ruef. Nieto stated

further that he believed that he could get Ruef to confess, and

volunteered the theory that the "higher-ups" were endeavoring to make

Ruef a scapegoat for all the boodling that had been committed.

Burns reported to Heney that he not only replied to Nieto that he had no

objection to Nieto's visiting Ruef, but would be glad to have the Rabbi

endeavor to get Ruef to tell the truth.

When Burns told Heney of this conversation, Heney did not show himself

so well pleased with the arrangements as Burns might have expected. The

prosecutor took occasion to warn Burns against Nieto. Heney had already

had unpleasant experience with Rabbi Nieto.[214] Nevertheless, Nieto

visited Ruef. Members of Ruef's family were called into consultation.

Conferences were held between Ach, Ruef and Burns. Heney states in his

affidavit that he did not attend these meetings. Finally Burns brought

Heney word that Ach and Ruef wanted citations to show that the District

Attorney had authority to grant immunity. Heney sent back word that he

was confident that the District Attorney had no such power, but with

the further statement that if the terms of the immunity agreement were

reasonable and in the interest of justice, that the Court, provided it

had confidence in the District Attorney, would unquestionably follow

such recommendation as that official might make.

Burns brought back word to Heney that Ruef and Ach continued to insist

upon complete immunity.

Heney sent back an ultimatum to the effect that Ruef must plead guilty

to the extortion case then on trial before Judge Dunne[215] and take his

chances with the sentence that would be given him; that if Ruef did

this, Heney was willing to arrange for complete immunity in all the

other cases, provided Ruef showed to Heney's satisfaction that his

testimony could be sufficiently corroborated and would sustain a

conviction of his accomplices other than Supervisors, in cases where

members of the Board of Supervisors had been bribed.

In the meantime, the work of selecting a jury to try Ruef on the

extortion charge was going on with the deadly certainty of the slide of

the knife of a guillotine. The second week of the examination of

prospective jurors brought Dr. Nieto to Heney's office. Burns

accompanied the Rabbi.

Nieto[216] described himself as no particular friend of Ruef. He

expressed the opinion that Ruef should be punished; that he should

restore his ill-gotten gains. Heney stated to Nieto his attitude toward

Ruef, as he had expressed it many times before. From that time on Dr.

Nieto was a frequent caller at Heney's office, always for the purpose of

discussing the question of Ruef's confession. During all these meetings

Heney did not depart a jot from his original position that the extortion

charge against Ruef should not be dismissed.

Later on, a second Rabbi, Dr. Bernard M. Kaplan, joined Nieto in these

visits to Heney's office. Kaplan continued active in the negotiations to

secure immunity for the fallen boss.[217] Finally Nieto, Kaplan and Ach

sent word to Heney and Langdon by Burns that they desired to meet the

District Attorney and his assistant at Heney's office to discuss the

immunity question. Heney and Langdon consented and the meeting was held

in the latter part of April.

Ach insisted upon complete immunity, but admitted that he had advised

Ruef to take the best he could get.[218] Neither Langdon[219] nor Heney

would consent to complete immunity, nor to material change in the stand

which Heney had taken. Ach wanted assurance that the Judges before whom

the bribery cases were pending would, on motion of the District

Attorney, dismiss them as to Ruef, and suggested to Heney that he go to

the judges and get them to consent to the proposed agreement. To this

Heney made emphatic refusal, stating that the utmost he would do would

be to go with Ach to Judges Dunne and Lawlor and ask each of them

whether he had confidence in him (Heney) and what the Judge's general

practice was in relation to matters of this kind, generally, when they

came before his court.

Other conferences[220] were held, at which Ach continued to urge

complete immunity for Ruef, which finally brought out emphatic

statement from Heney that he did not trust Ruef and would enter into no

agreement with him which did not leave it in the power of the District

Attorney to send him to the penitentiary if at any time the District

Attorney and himself concluded that during the progress of the matters

Ruef was acting in bad faith, or that the information which he might

give was not of sufficient importance to the people of the city and the

State equitably to entitle him to go without punishment.

Heney takes pains all through his affidavit to make it clear that he

treated with Nieto and Kaplan at all times upon the theory that they

were Ruef's special pleaders and special representatives, who believed

that Ruef was sure to be convicted upon as many of the felony bribery

charges as the District Attorney tried him on, and that he would go to

the penitentiary for a term of years equivalent to life.

On the night of April 21,[231] when the work of selecting a jury to try

Ruef was nearing completion, Ach, Kaplan and Nieto visited Heney's

office with assurance that Ruef had about concluded to accept Heney's

terms. But, they explained, a new difficulty had come up. Rabbi Nieto

was to leave San Francisco the next morning for a trip to Europe.

Neither he nor Dr. Kaplan was familiar with the practices of the courts,

and while the judges would no doubt consider favorably any

recommendation which was made by Mr. Langdon or by Mr. Heney,

nevertheless, the two Rabbis would like to hear from Judge Dunne and

Judge Lawlor statement as to what the practice of each of these judges

was in that respect before they urged Ruef any further to accept the

terms which had been offered him. As Dr. Nieto was to leave for Europe

early in the morning, they wanted to see the judges that night.

Heney assured his visitors that owing to the lateness of the hour, he

was afraid it would be impossible for them to see the judges before

morning. But they insisted. Burns was finally sent out to find the

judges if he could. He succeeded in locating Judge Lawlor at the

theater. Judge Lawlor at first refused to see Nieto and Heney that

night, stating that they could appear at his chambers the next morning.

But Burns explained that Nieto had to leave for Europe the next morning,

adding that he was sure that both Nieto and Heney would consider it a

great favor if the Judge would see them that night, as the matter was

very important. Lawlor finally consented to see them, but stated that he

would do so only at his chambers, if, as he understood it, Heney and

Nieto wanted to see him about his duties as judge. Burns took word back

to Heney's office that they could go to Judge Lawlor's chambers, where

the Judge would go as soon as the theater was over.

Heney, Kaplan and Nieto met Lawlor at his chambers. Heney went straight

at the purpose of the meeting.

"Judge," Heney sets forth in his affidavit he said in substance, "we

come up here tonight to ask you what the practice of your court is in

criminal cases in relation to recommendations which may be made by the

District Attorney?"

Judge Lawlor replied in effect that the District Attorney represents the

public in the prosecution of crime, and that under the law it was the

practice for that official to submit to the court recommendations

concerning persons who turn state's evidence; that the law vests the

authority in the Court to determine all such recommendations and that it

is proper for the District Attorney to make them; that such

recommendations should be carefully considered by the Court; and if they

are in the interests of justice they should be followed, otherwise not.

Judge Lawlor stated further that he would not consider or discuss any

cause or case of any individual except upon a full hearing in open

court, and that it would be determined alone upon what was so presented.

Final decision, he said, would in every case rest with the Court, and if

the application was in the interest of justice, it would be granted, but

if not it would be denied.

Immediately after having made this statement Judge Lawlor excused

himself and left the building.

Judge Dunne, when finally found by Burns, objected as strongly as had

Judge Lawlor to going to the courtroom that night, but finally yielded

to the same representations as had been made to Judge Lawlor.

All parties at the meeting with Judge Dunne at the courtroom were agreed

and the incident was quickly over.

Heney asked the Judge, in effect, to state for the benefit of Nieto and

Kaplan the practice of his court in criminal matters in relation to any

recommendations which may be made by the District Attorney's office in

the interest of justice when the defendant becomes a witness on behalf

of the State against his accomplices. Heney stated further that the two

Rabbis would also like to know whether or not Judge Dunne had confidence

in District Attorney Langdon and himself.

Judge Dunne replied in substance: "I have confidence in you, Mr. Heney,

and in the District Attorney, and while I have confidence in the

District Attorney, whenever a recommendation or suggestion is made by

him in a case pending in my department, it is my practice to entertain

and be guided by it, provided, of course, it is in the interest or

furtherance of justice."

Kaplan wanted to know what the course would be should a man plead guilty

and afterwards ask to change his plea.

"You have heard what I have said, gentlemen, as to my practice," replied

Judge Dunne. "Of course, in all cases of such recommendations, and which

I insist shall always be made in open court, whenever the District

Attorney fails to convince me that he is well advised, or that good and

sufficient grounds exist for his motions, it must be remembered that the

final determination must always rest with me. But, of course, I would

give great weight to any recommendation either you, Mr. Heney, or Mr.

Langdon might make."

From the courtroom Nieto, Kaplan and Burns went to Ruef, but Ruef still

insisted that he should not plead guilty to the extortion charge,

"backed and filled," as Burns expressed it.

Ruef sent word to Heney by Burns, asking an interview. But this Heney

refused to grant, bluntly stating that should he meet Ruef, Ruef would

misrepresent anything that he might say. Heney instructed Burns to tell

Ruef that he could accept the proposition that he had made to him or let

it alone as he pleased, that no more time would be wasted on him; that

trial of the extortion charge would be pressed to conclusion and

regardless of whether conviction were had or not, Ruef would be tried

immediately on one of the bribery charges.

Nevertheless, the persistent Ruef got an interview with Heney. He

secured it in this way:

After Heney had retired on the night of May 1st, Burns called him up on

the telephone, to state that if Heney would give Ruef a moment's

interview that Burns was confident that Ruef would accept Heney's

proposition. Heney granted the hearing.

Ruef plead for complete immunity. He argued that for him to plead guilty

to the extortion charge would weaken his testimony in the bribery cases.

He urged that public opinion would approve his release. He charged Heney

with being prejudiced against him.

Heney listened to him patiently, but refused to consider any suggestion

that he alter the original proposition.

By this time ten jurors had been secured to try Ruef. Ruef begged for an

interview with Langdon. It was granted, with Heney and others present.

The same ground was gone over again; the same denials made. And then

Heney bluntly told Ruef in substance: "You must plead guilty in case No.

305 and take your chances on the sentence which will be imposed in that

case. This is our ultimatum and you must agree to this before the first

witness is sworn in case No. 305, or we will withdraw our proposition

and will never again renew it, or any other proposition looking to any

sort of leniency or immunity for you."[222]

The day following, Burns brought word to Heney that Ruef had concluded

to accept the Prosecution's proposition, and had begun his confession by

reciting the particulars of the United Railroad's bribery. Burns recited

what Ruef had told him. Burns's enthusiasm suffered a shock from Heney's

cool analysis of Ruef's statement.[223]

Heney pointed out that Ruef had made no revelation which the Prosecution

had not known before, and further that Ruef was certainly concealing

part at least of what had occurred between him and General Ford. Heney

was now convinced of Ruef's treachery.[224] Ruef's future course tended

to strengthen this conviction.

Having agreed to make full statement of his connection with the bribing

of the Supervisors, Ruef haggled over the form of immunity contract. He

endeavored to force upon the Prosecution a contract of his own drawing.

Failing in that he tried to persuade Heney and Langdon to enter into a

stipulation that he might withdraw his plea of guilty in the extortion

case.

In neither move was he successful. Heney refused to depart a jot from

his original proposition. Ruef finally accepted the immunity contract

which Heney had submitted.[225]

Even after the immunity contract had been signed, Ruef continued to urge

Burns that he be not required to plead guilty. The prosecution was not

sure what Ruef would do. The examination of jurors to try him went on.

The jury was completed on May 13,[226] and was sworn. But the actual

taking of testimony was delayed by Ruef demanding change of venue from

Judge Dunne's court. This motion after the filing of numerous affidavits

by both sides, was denied.

However, Ruef's last motion delayed the taking of testimony for two days

more.

Upon Judge Dunne's ruling the next move would have been the placing of

witnesses on the stand. But before this could be done, Ruef whispered to

his attorney, Ach. Ach arose and addressed the Court.

"I am requested by our client, your Honor," Ach said in substance, "that

it is his desire to have a conference with his counsel. I would like to

draw your Honor's attention to the fact that up to this time Mr. Ruef

has not had a single opportunity to confer with his counsel alone. If

the elisor, or the guards, were not in the same room they were quite

close by. I think, in view of this fact, that we might be granted an

adjournment until say two o'clock of this afternoon so that Mr. Ruef may

have this privilege of conferring with us."

Heney promptly denied Ach's statement. "What Mr. Ach has stated is not a

fact," said Heney. "Mr. Ruef has always been granted privacy in his

conference with counsel."

On Langdon's suggestion, a half hour's recess was granted to allow Ruef

to confer with counsel. With his attorneys, Henry Ach, Samuel M.

Shortridge, Frank J. Murphy and Judge Fairall, Ruef went into Judge

Dunne's chambers for conference.

On their return to the courtroom, Ach and Shortridge, with Ruef's

consent, withdrew from the case on the ground that they could not agree

with Ruef as to the manner in which the case should be conducted.

Fairall and Murphy remained by their client.

And then Ruef, the tears streaming down his face, addressed the Court.

He stated his intent to acknowledge whatever there may have been of

wrong or mistake in his record, and pledged himself, so far as it lay in

his power to make it right.[227]

"I desire," concluded Ruef, "to withdraw my plea of not guilty

heretofore entered, and to enter the contrary plea, and at the proper

time submit to the Court further suggestions for its consideration.[228]

"If the defendant wishes to change his plea of 'not guilty' to

'guilty,'" said Heney, "the prosecuting attorney will consent to the

discharge of the jury, as he requests, but we think the indictment

should first be re-read so that he may enter the plea as he wishes."

The indictment was read.

"What is your plea?" asked Judge Dunne of the prisoner.

And Ruef replied, "Guilty."[229]

FOOTNOTES:

[207] The statements contained in this chapter are based on

affidavits filed in the case of The People vs. Patrick Calhoun

et al., No. 823. Many of the statements are qualified, and in

many instances denied, in affidavits filed by Ruef, his

friends, associates and attorneys, in the same proceedings.

[208] In this connection, in discussing the difficulties in the way

of bringing criminals to trial, the San Francisco Chronicle,

in its issue of March 14, 1907, said:

"The penal laws of California are admirable, and cover almost

every transaction deserving moral reprobation. The only reason

why all our people are not either virtuous or in jail is that

the same Legislatures which have so carefully defined crimes

and prescribed punishments have been still more careful to

enact codes of criminal procedure that nobody can be convicted

of any crime if he has the cash to pay for getting off. And

what the legislatures have failed to do in this direction the

courts have usually made good."

[209] Four years later to a day, March 13, 1911, Ruef was taken to

the penitentiary at San Quentin to begin service of his

fourteen-year term for bribing a Supervisor.

[210] As the impaneling of the Ruef jury proceeded, that Ruef's

nerve was breaking became apparent to all who saw him. The

Chronicle, in its issue of March 18, 1907, thus describes his

condition:

"Ruef's nerve is breaking down. He is a prey to doubts and

fears which never troubled him in those days when he could see

his political henchmen every day and bolster up their

confidence in his ability to fight off the prosecution.

Reports reach his ears of confessions of guilt on the part of

some of his official puppets, of the sinister activities of

Burns and his agents and treachery on the part of those whom

he considered his most devoted adherents, and fill him with

alarm.

"It was different when he could hold his Sunday evening caucus

with the members of the Board of Supervisors, and reassure them

that all would be well. He knows the men he used in his

political schemes and their weaknesses."

[211] Heney, in instructing Burns as to his policy regarding Ruef,

took occasion to state to the detective his attitude toward

the broken boss. In an affidavit filed in the case of The

People vs. Calhoun et al., No. 823, Heney sets forth that he

told Burns: "Ruef was not a mere accessory or tool in the

commission of these briberies. He is a man of extraordinary

brain power, keen intelligence, fine education, with the

choice of good environment, great power of persuasion over

men, dominating personality, great shrewdness and cunning,

coupled with a greedy and avaricious disposition. He has not

been led into the commission of these crimes through weakness,

but on the contrary has aided in the initiation of them and

has joined hands with the most vicious and depraved elements

in the city to secure unlawful protection for them in

conducting their resorts of vice, and has joined hands with

the special privilege seeking classes to place improper

burdens upon the people of this city by granting franchises to

public service corporations which ought never to have been

granted, and by fixing rates which may be charged by them in

excess of the amounts which such rates ought to be, and thus

indirectly robbing the poor people of this city of a large

part of their meagre earnings, and that to let Ruef go free of

all punishment under such circumstances would be a crime

against society."

[212] Running through the affidavits which resulted from the

differences between the forces of the prosecution and the

defense concerning these negotiations, is a thread of

suggestion that individual members of the prosecution differed

as to the policy that should be followed toward Ruef. Burns,

the detective, leaned toward granting him complete immunity.

Heney was unalterably opposed to this course. Langdon, on the

whole, sided with Heney.

[213] See Heney's affidavit in the matter of The People vs. Patrick

Calhoun et al., No. 823.

[214] Nieto, according to Heney, had endeavored to make it appear

that race prejudice entered into the prosecution of Ruef.

Heney, in an affidavit filed in the case of The People vs.

Calhoun et al., No. 823, tells of Nieto's interference even

when the Oliver Grand Jury was being impaneled. Heney says:

"During the latter part of October or the first week in

November, 1906, while said Grand Jury was being impaneled, Dr.

Jacob Nieto introduced himself to me in the court room of

Department No. 10, where I had noticed that he was a constant

attendant and close observer of the proceedings connected with

the impaneling of the Grand Jury.

"Some days after he had introduced himself to me he stepped up

to me, just as court had adjourned and after I had been

examining some of the grand jurors as to their qualifications,

and said in substance:

"'Mr. Heney, it seems to me that you discriminate somewhat

against the Jews in examining jurors, and I think that in your

position you ought to be more careful not to exhibit any

prejudice against a man on account of his religion.'

"I asked what in particular I had done to cause him to

criticise my conduct in that way, and he referred to some

question which I had asked a grand juror, but which I cannot

now recollect. I then said to him in substance:

"'Why, Doctor, you are supersensitive. Some of the best friends

I have in the world are Jews, and some of the best clients I

ever had in my life were Jews, and I have no prejudice against

any man merely on account of his religious belief. I am sorry

that you have so misapprehended the purpose and motives of my

questions to jurors.'

"On a subsequent day, during the time the Grand Jury was being

impaneled, Dr. Nieto again approached me after an adjournment

of the court and again reproached me for having again shown

prejudice or discrimination against some grand juror of the

Jewish faith by the questions which I asked him * * * and I

said to him in substance, in a very emphatic tone of voice:

'Dr. Nieto, I have heretofore told you that I have no prejudice

against any man whatever on account of his religion. All I am

trying to do in this matter is to get fair grand jurors, and I

am just as willing to trust honest Jews as honest Christians,

but I want to make sure that a man is honest, whether a Jew or

Christian, and it looks to me as if you are trying to find some

excuse to line up in opposition to this prosecution. I do not

see why you need to seek for excuses if that is what you want

to do. I am conscious of my own singleness of purpose and

purity of purpose in examining grand jurors, and it is wholly

immaterial to me, therefore, what you or anybody else may think

of my method of questioning them.'"

As a matter of fact Jews not only sat on the Oliver Grand Jury,

but were among the most earnest and effective in sifting the

graft scandal to the bottom. But that the false cry that Ruef

was persecuted because he was a Jew influenced many of his

fellow Jews in his favor is unquestionably true.

[215] This case was numbered from the indictment, 305. Schmitz was

indicted jointly with Ruef in this indictment, and later was

convicted under it and sentenced to five years in the

penitentiary. See Chapter XVI. The testimony at the Schmitz

trial showed that Ruef had taken the extortion money from the

French-Restaurant keepers, after Schmitz had acted with him to

imperil the French-Restaurant keepers' liquor licenses, and

had given part of the proceeds of the enterprise to Schmitz.

[216] In his affidavit, Heney quotes Rabbi Nieto as saying In

substance: "I do not care to get publicly mixed up in the Ruef

case, because among other things, I am not a particular friend

of Ruef's, and am not interested in the matter as an

individual but only in the welfare of this community. I think

that Ruef has grievously sinned against this community and

that he can do a great deal to undo the wrongs which he has

committed and to clear up the situation, and I have told him

that it is his duty to himself and to his family and to the

city of his birth to do so. I want you to understand, Mr.

Heney, that I have not come here to ask you to let Ruef go

free and without punishment. I think he ought to be punished,

and I think he ought to give a large part of the money which

he obtained from these corporations to the city to improve its

streets. He ought to give $300,000 for that purpose, but Ruef

thinks more of money than he does of his family, or even of

his liberty, and I think he would rather go to the

penitentiary than give up any very large amount of it."

[217] Heney, in his affidavit, makes the following statement of his

impression of Kaplan: "Dr. Kaplan appeared to be far more

interested in finding out just what would be done to Ruef,

provided he plead guilty in the French Restaurant case than he

was in the moral issue which was involved in the discussion,

or in the beneficial effect which the testimony of Ruef might

have upon the deplorable situation then existing in San

Francisco on account of its municipal corruption.

"This was evidenced more from his manner and form of

questioning than by anything which he said. I immediately

became convinced that he was influenced by no motive or

purpose other than that of getting Ruef off without any

punishment if possible; but I also formed the opinion that he

was honest and unsophisticated."

[218] Heney, in his affidavit, states: "During the conversation Ach

stated, in substance: 'You can't convict Ruef in this French

Restaurant case, but I realize that you are sure to convict

him in some of the bribery cases, and I think it is useless

for him to stand out and fight any longer, he had better take

the best he can get, and I have told him so. He insists,

however, that he ought not to be required to plead guilty in

the French Restaurant case, or to submit to any punishment.'"

[219] In the course of the interview, Langdon stated to Ach and the

two Rabbis that he had authorized Heney to conduct the

negotiations for him, but that he wanted it to be distinctly

understood by everybody that he had the final say in the

matter and would exercise it, and that no agreement could be

concluded without his personal sanction.

[220] Heney, In his affidavit describing these meetings, states that

Ach, Kaplan and Nieto habitually came In the back way so they

would not be seen by newspaper reporters who at the time

frequented the front halls of the private residence in which

Heney, after the fire, had his offices. Ach, Heney states, was

desirous of not being known as party to the negotiations.

Heney in his affidavit says: "In this same conversation (at

the first conference) Ach said in substance: 'I want everybody

here to agree that the fact that I participated in this

conference, or had anything to do with advising Ruef to turn

state's evidence, shall never be made known; it would

absolutely ruin my business if it became known. A lot of the

people whom Ruef will involve as accomplices are close friends

of clients of mine. Of course I do not know just whom he will

involve, but I do have a general idea. For instance, while he

has never told me so in so many words, I understand that he

will involve William F. Herrin. Now just to illustrate to you

how it would affect me in business if it was known that I

participated in urging Ruef to do this I will tell you that I

am attorney for one company, an oil company, that pays me ten

thousand dollars a year as a salary for attending to its

business, and Herrin is one of the directors of the company

and undoubtedly has sufficient influence with the other

directors to take this client away from me. This is only one

instance, and there are many others.'"

[221] See affidavits of Francis J. Heney and Judge William P. Lawlor

on file in the case of The People vs. Patrick Calhoun et al.,

No. 823.

[222] See Heney's affidavit in the case of The People vs. Patrick

Calhoun et als., No. 823.

[223] Ruef in this confession to Burns stated that he had received

$200,000 from General Tirey L. Ford, head of the United

Railroads law department. Of this amount, he said $50,000 he

had given to Schmitz and retained $50,000 for himself. Ruef,

five years later, in his story "The Road I Traveled,"

published in the San Francisco Bulletin, again stated that he

had received $200,000 from Ford, of which he gave to Schmitz

$50,000, to Gallagher his share for the Supervisors, and

retained $50,000 for himself. Gallagher received $85,000. This

leaves a balance of $15,000 which Mr. Ruef does not account

for.

[224] It is significant to note in this connection that Heney did

not call Ruef as a witness before the Grand Jury in the United

Railroads cases until after the Grand Jury had found

indictments against the officials of that corporation. In the

opinion of the Grand Jurors, the testimony, exclusive of that

of Ruef, justified these indictments.

[225] The immunity contract signed by Ruef and the District Attorney

will be found in full in the appendix.

[226] At the completion of the Ruef Jury, the Chronicle, issue of

May 15, 1907, said:

"The Ruef jury is complete and we are now in a way to learn

all the truth about the particular crime for which Ruef is

this time on trial, but which, compared with most other crimes

for which he has been indicted, is a mere peccadillo. That

Ruef got the money is proved, for he has confessed. His

defense, of course, will be that the French-Restaurant

proprietors voluntarily presented him with it. The state will

have to prove, in order to secure a conviction, that they did

not give the money voluntarily, but yielded it up under

threats which they believed it to be in his power to execute.

If the state fails to prove that Ruef will stand before the

community merely as a moral leper, loathsome to be sure, and

despicable almost beyond human conception, but yet not proved

guilty of that for which the law prescribes punishment in

state's prison. If proper proof cannot be made he must, of

course, be acquitted of this crime and at once put on trial

for another. Nothing is gained by society by the conviction

even of the most unmitigated scoundrel on insufficient

testimony. But when the proof is sufficient the salvation of

society demands punishment, and more particularly of

punishment of the rich criminal."

[227] Ruef's statement was in full as follows:

"If your honor please, with the permission of the court, I

desire to make a statement. I do so after only a short

consultation with my attorneys, to whom I have only within the

last half hour disclosed my determination, and against their

express protest. I take this occasion to thank them for their

services, fidelity and friendship. Notwithstanding the Court's

finding yesterday that this trial might safely be carried on

without serious injury to my health, physical or mental, I

wish to assure you that my personal condition is such that I

am at the present time absolutely unable to bear for two or

three months daily the strain of an actual trial of this case,

the constant, continual, nightly preparations therefor, the

necessary consultation and conversation with my attorneys in

regard thereto, to say nothing of other cares and

responsibilities.

"Moreover, the strain of these proceedings upon those whom I

hold nearest and dearest of all on earth has been so grave and

severe that as a result of these prosecutions their health has

all been undermined, they are on the verge of immediate

collapse and their lives are indeed now actually in the

balance.

"I have occupied a somewhat prominent position in this city of

my birth, in which I have lived all my life, where are all my

ties and interests, whence, when the time shall come, I hope to

pass into the eternal sleep. I have borne an honored name. In

my private and in my professional life there has been no stain.

In my public affiliations, until after the municipal campaign

of 1905 and the election of the present Board of Supervisors,

the abhorrent charges of the press to the contrary

notwithstanding, no action of mine ever gave just ground for

adverse criticism or deserved censure; but the assaults of the

press and its failure to credit honesty of purpose, a desire to

hold together a political organization which had been built up

with much effort, the means of otherwise holding them, did

after the election of this Board of Supervisors in a measure

influence me and the high ideals for which I had heretofore

striven.

"During the past few weeks I have thought deeply and often of

this situation, its causes and conditions. To offer excuses now

would be folly. To make an effort at some reparation for the

public good is, however, more than possible; to assist in

making more difficult, if not impossible, the system which

dominates our public men and corrupts our politics will be a

welcome task.

"I have decided that whatever energy or abilities I possess for

the future shall be devoted even in the humblest capacity to

restoring the ideals which have been lowered; shall, as soon as

opportunity be accorded, be re-enlisted on the side of good

citizenship and integrity. May it be allotted to me at some

time hereafter to have at least some small part in

re-establishment on a clear, sane basis, a plane of high civic

morality, just reciprocal relations between the constantly

struggling constituent element of our governmental and

industrial life.

"In the meantime I begin by earnestness of purpose, a purpose

to make the greatest sacrifice which can befall a human being

of my disposition to make, to acknowledge whatever there may

have been of wrong or mistake and so far as may be within my

power to make it right.

"I reached this final determination last night after careful

reflection and deliberation. Where duty calls I intend to

follow, whither hereafter the path of my life may lead and

however unpleasant and painful may be the result. I make this

statement so that the Court and the whole world may know at

least the motives which have guided me in the step I am about

to take.

"As an earnest I have determined to make a beginning, I am not

guilty of the offense charged in this indictment. I ask now,

however, that this jury be dismissed from further consideration

of this case. I desire to withdraw my plea of not guilty

heretofore entered and to enter the contrary plea, and at the

proper time submit to the Court further suggestions for its

consideration."

[228] The Chronicle, to its issue of May 16, said of Ruef's

confessions:

"Abraham Ruef should have thought of his family before he

entered upon his career of crime. They are innocent and the

public need not, as indeed it cannot, withhold its sympathy

for them. The most terrible punishment which is inflicted on

such criminals is the distress which their crimes brings upon

the innocent persons who have been accustomed to respect and

honor them. But it is the inexorable doom which crime brings

upon itself.

"For Ruef himself the only sympathy possible is that which one

might feel for a wolf which, having devastated the sheep fold,

has been pursued, brought to bay and, after a long fight,

finally disposed of. It is not a case in which the safety of

society permits leniency to be shown. Ruef has corrupted every

branch of the city government which he could get hold of and

brought the city almost to the verge of ruin. Seldom has a man

occupying an unofficial station in life been able to achieve

so much evil. It will be many a year before San Francisco can

outlive the shame which the man Ruef has brought upon her.

"He has not been ingenuous even in his confession, for while

pleading guilty as charged, he professes to be not guilty of

this particular crime--meaning merely by that that he did not

extort the money by threats within the meaning of the law.

Witnesses, however, would have sworn that he did so. It is

unthinkable that such sums should have been paid him

voluntarily by the restaurant keepers. All that Ruef can mean

by his profession of 'innocence' while pleading guilty, is a

claim that he succeeded in terrifying the restaurant men into

submitting to blackmail without the use of words which the law

would construe as a threat. There is no moral difference

between what Ruef would claim that he did and the crime to

which he has pleaded guilty.

"Ruef also shows his disingenuousness by attributing his

situation to 'the assaults of the press.' Doubtless he has been

assaulted by the press. But the press has accused him of

nothing but what he has confessed and intimated. What fault has

he to find with that? Shall the press remain silent while

thieves plunder a distressed city and rob it of its good name?

Ruef fought the forces of decency until he could fight no

longer. No man is strong enough to stand up against the wrath

of an outraged community. His physical collapse was inevitable

and the only mantle which charity can throw over him is that

his physical weakness broke down his mental faculties and

caused the self-contradictions in what is a virtual confession

of all that he has been charged with."

[229] The position of the Prosecution was most difficult. Every

department of the municipal government, with the exception of

the District Attorney's office, was controlled by the corrupt

administration, of which Schmitz was the official head. The

necessity of dealing with Ruef, and the question of immunity

arose primarily and almost entirely, from the fact that there

was practically no evidence against Schmitz, except in the

French restaurant case, and that there was no evidence in that

case that Schmitz received any of the money which was

collected by Ruef. Consequently without Ruef's testimony no

conviction of Schmitz was possible at all except in the French

restaurant case, and in that case his conviction was not at

all certain. Union Labor party adherents were naturally

unwilling to believe Schmitz guilty until he had been so

proven. The big public service corporations and Herrin of the

Southern Pacific were all still in sympathy with him and ready

to back him for re-election. An election was approaching early

in November. The redemption of the city depended upon taking

its control away from Schmitz. The Police Commission and the

Board of Public Utilities were part of the corrupt and

discredited administration. During the rebuilding of San

Francisco it was of vital importance to have these two boards

honest. Hence the Prosecution felt justified in going to

unusual length to secure the additional testimony against

Schmitz, which ought to make his conviction certain in the

French restaurant case, and thus immediately depose him from

office and place the entire city government in the hands of

honest men. The new Mayor could appoint a new Board of

Supervisors, new Police Commission and new Board of Public

Works, as well as many other important officials; and such new

Mayor and Supervisors would be reasonably sure of re-election.

Agents of the Public Service corporations realized to the full

extent the importance of preventing the conviction of Schmitz,

and of forcing the prosecution to submit to the appointment of

a new Board of Supervisors before any conviction of Schmitz

could possibly be secure so that the new Board of Supervisors,

so selected through Schmitz by themselves, would have the

power of appointing the new Mayor in case Schmitz were

convicted. This new Mayor could appoint a new Police

Commission and it in turn a new Chief of Police, and the new

officials would be controlled by the same interests which

controlled the old ones.

"The System," As Uncovered by the San Francisco Graft Prosecution · 第 15 / 26 章