RUEF A FUGITIVE.
Three months[142] after his indictment in the "French Restaurant"
extortion cases--three months of continuous fighting to evade the
issue--Ruef found his last technical obstruction, as far as the State
courts were concerned, swept away, and was forced to enter his plea to
the charge contained in the indictment. He pleaded "not guilty." His
trial was set for March 5.
Up to the day before the date fixed for the trial to begin, nothing had
come up to indicate further delay. On March 4, however, Ruef's bondsmen
surrendered him into the custody of the Sheriff. Ruef then applied to
Superior Judge J. C. B. Hebbard for a writ of habeas corpus. The
application was based on the allegation dealt with in a previous
chapter, that Grand Juror Wise was ineligible, because he had been drawn
as a trial juror within a year before the impanelment of the Grand Jury
of which he was a member. On the ground that Wise was ineligible for
Grand Jury service, Ruef's attorneys contended, their client's restraint
was in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the Federal
Constitution, thereby raising a Federal issue and paving the way for
appeal to the Federal courts.
In opposing Ruef's new move, Hiram W. Johnson,[143] who had been
employed to assist the District Attorney in the "graft" prosecution,
pointed out that the cases named in the petition were pending in a
co-ordinate branch of the Superior Court; that they were set for trial
the following day; that the points, including the Federal points, had
been made subject of extensive arguments before Hebbard's colleague,
Judge Dunne, and in the course of those arguments every question
presented in the proceedings had been passed upon.
Ach, representing Ruef, denied that the Federal question had been
presented. Johnson insisted that it had. An unfortunate scene
followed.[144] Hebbard showed symptoms of intoxication. Johnson, Langdon
and Heney finally refused to participate further in the proceedings and
walked out of the courtroom.[145] The withdrawal of the District
Attorney and his assistants did not delay Judge Hebbard's decision. He
denied the writ Ruef prayed for, but he allowed an appeal from his order
to the Supreme Court of the United States, and admitted Ruef to bail
pending that appeal.
One of Ruef's attorneys filed the writ of error issued by Judge Hebbard
with the clerk of the Federal Circuit Court. May 2 was set as the date
for the appearance on the writ of error before the United States Supreme
Court at Washington.[146]
The Aetna Indemnity Company had furnished Ruef's bond. This company
surrendered Ruef to the Sheriff in the forenoon. In the afternoon it
furnished the bail that had been imposed by Judge Hebbard.
Ruef, in Hebbard's order granting him opportunity to take his case to
the Federal Courts, had basis for further struggle in the courts to
evade trial. But he undertook a new move. After leaving Hebbard's
courtroom on the afternoon of March 4, Ruef dropped out of sight as
completely as though the earth had opened and swallowed him.
For three days the regular peace officers of San Francisco searched San
Francisco for him but they did not find him. When Ruef's case was
called for trial in Judge Dunne's department on the morning following
the proceedings in Judge Hebbard's court, Ruef's attorney, Samuel M.
Shortridge, was present, but not the defendant.
Shortridge was in the position of an attorney in court without a
client.[147] After a wait of four hours, to give Ruef every opportunity
to make his appearance, Heney moved that the bonds of the absent
defendant be declared forfeited, specifying the bonds originally given
as well as those furnished in the proceedings before Hebbard.
Judge Dunne, in ruling upon Heney's motion, stated that he was
proceeding as though the proceedings before Judge Hebbard had not
occurred. Those proceedings, he announced, he felt were under a species
of fraud. He ordered Ruef's original bonds forfeited and took the
question of the forfeiture of the bonds in the proceedings before Judge
Hebbard under advisement. He considered it his duty, he said, to proceed
with the trial of the case until ordered to desist by the Supreme Court
or by the Court of Appeals.
Attorney Shortridge announced to Judge Dunne that in proceeding with the
hearing he might find himself in contempt of the Supreme Court of the
United States. Judge Dunne stated that that would not embarrass him, and
in any event, he would not proceed with the matter until the defendant
was in court.
The day passed without the defendant's whereabouts being discovered.
Sheriff O'Neil reported that he had been unable to find the fugitive,
but expressed his belief that he would be able to do so eventually. With
that understanding court adjourned for the day.
The day following, Ruef's attorneys appealed to the State Appellate
Court[148] for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Dunne and others
from further proceeding against Ruef in the extortion cases, and to show
cause why the writ should not be made permanent. Ruef being in hiding,
the application was not signed by the petitioner. The Appellate Court,
after twenty-four hours, denied the petition. Ruef's representatives
then went before the State Supreme Court with the same representations.
And here, again, eventually, Ruef lost.
In the meantime, Ruef had not been found. The day following his
disappearance, Judge Dunne disqualified the Sheriff and named the next
officer in authoritative sequence in such matters, the Coroner, W. J.
Walsh, as elisor, to arrest Ruef and bring him into court.
Coroner Walsh had no better success than had Sheriff O'Neil. Ruef had
disappeared on the night of Monday, March 4. On Friday, March 8, after
three days of unavailing search by O'Neil and Walsh,[149] Judge Dunne
disqualified Walsh and appointed William J. Biggy[150] as elisor to
arrest the fugitive.
Within two hours Biggy, accompanied by Detective William J. Burns, had
located Ruef at a road-house in the San Francisco suburbs and had placed
him under arrest.[151]
Having taken his man,[152] the elisor was at a loss to know what to do
with him. To put him in the city prison was to turn him over to the
police; to put him in the county jail was to turn him over to the
Sheriff. The Chief of Police was even then under indictment with Ruef, a
co-defendant; the Sheriff had been disqualified. The only alternative
was for Biggy himself to hold Ruef until the court could act. Biggy
accordingly secured suitable quarters at the Hotel St. Francis, and
there held Ruef a prisoner until the following Monday, when he was taken
before Judge Dunne.
Judge Dunne refused to admit Ruef to bail, remanded him to Elisor
Biggy's custody, and continued his trial until the following morning,
Tuesday, March 12.
Ruef immediately made application to the Supreme Court for a writ of
habeas corpus, asking to be released from the custody of Elisor Biggy
and placed in charge of the Sheriff. But here again Ruef was defeated.
Elisor Biggy continued his keeper for many months following.
Ruef, after his appeal to the Federal Supreme Court, had exhausted every
legal device known to himself and his attorneys to escape trial in the
extortion case pending before Judge Dunne.[153] His last recourse gone,
Ruef found himself brought face to face with trial before a jury. On
March 13 the selecting of jurors to try Ruef began in Judge Dunne's
court.
But events of far greater moment than petty extortion had the attention
of San Francisco. Even as Ruef was in hiding, Detective Burns and his
assistants had trapped three members of the Board of Supervisors in
bribery. This opened up the most fruitful field of the graft
prosecution, and immediately the extortion cases became of comparative
unimportance. The trapping of the three Supervisors led to confessions
from fourteen others, which involved not only Ruef in enormous bribery
transactions, but also prominent members of the bar, and leaders in the
social, financial and industrial life of California.
FOOTNOTES:
[142] Ruef and Schmitz were indicted November 15, 1906. The date of
Ruef's plea of "Not guilty" was February 18, 1907.
[143] Hiram W. Johnson is a native of California, having been born
at Sacramento. He was educated at the Sacramento public
schools and the University of California. At twenty-one he had
been admitted to practice at the California bar. He was active
for years against the corrupt political conditions in
California before he came into prominence as one of the
prosecutors at the graft trials. In 1910 he was selected to
lead the movement against the political machine which
dominated the State. As primary candidate for Republican
nomination for Governor, he visited practically every
community in California, making one pledge to be carried out
in the event of his election, "to kick the Southern Pacific
out of political control of the State." He was nominated and
elected. His election resulted in political revolution in
California. (See "Story of the California Legislature of 1911"
and "Story of the California Legislature of 1913.") He was one
of the founders of the Progressive party at Chicago in 1912,
and was that year candidate for Vice-President with Roosevelt
on the National Progressive ticket. In 1914 he was re-elected
Governor of California with overwhelming vote. Johnson is the
first Governor since 1853 to secure re-election in California.
[144] See Heney's affidavit in The People vs. Ruef, No. 823.
[145] "Again we protest," said Johnson when the final break came,
"in behalf of the District Attorney of this city and county,
and in the name of the people of California. We do not believe
in this; we will not participate in it; and we take our leave
of this court. We will not participate in any proceeding which
does not, according to our ideas, comport with the dignity of
justice, the dignity of this court, or our own dignity."
[146] On March 25, 1907, Ruef's appeal in the habeas corpus matter
was dismissed by the Supreme Court of the United States. Of
this move, Frank J. Murphy, one of Ruef's attorneys, is quoted
in a published interview: "We have instructed our
representative in Washington to withdraw the writ of error
filed by us. This decision was reached on account of the
decision of the State Supreme Court to the effect that the
participation of an incompetent juror does not affect the
validity of an indictment."
This action left the Prosecution free to proceed with Ruef's
trial without any possibility of the proceedings being
questioned later.
[147] Judge Dunne ruled that Ruef, being a fugitive from justice,
and his trial one for felony, at which the defendant must be
present at every stage of the proceedings, there was no trial
before the court. Shortridge was in the position of counsel
without a client. During the examination of Coroner Walsh,
after his failure to find Ruef, Shortridge insisted upon
interrupting the examination. Judge Dunne after repeated
warnings, found Shortridge guilty of contempt of court, and
sentenced him to serve twenty-four hours in jail. The
Chronicle of March 9, 1907, contains the following account of
the incident:
"Have you not said," Walsh was asked by Heney, "that you hoped
he (Ruef) would be acquitted and that you would do all you
could for him? Are you not in sympathy with him?"
Again the Coroner quibbled and Judge Dunne ordered: "Answer
the question. Do you sympathize with him or not?"
Still the witness hesitated, and again the Judge asked with
vigor: "Are you in sympathy with him?"
"If he is innocent I am in sympathy with him, if he is guilty
I am not."
"I suppose you wish it to appear that you are not in sympathy
with him so that you may take charge of the jury," suggested
Heney.
Samuel M. Shortridge, one of Ruef's lawyers, here said that he
objected on behalf of his client to the line of examination.
Heney proceeded without paying any attention to Shortridge's
interruption. Shortridge again entered an objection, and Judge
Dunne ordered him to take his seat.
"But I wish to be heard on behalf of my client," persisted
Shortridge.
"Take your seat, Mr. Shortridge, or I will order the Sheriff
to cause you to do so or remove you from the court room,"
declared Judge Dunne.
"Am I to understand that I am not to be heard in this court?"
demanded Shortridge with play of great indignation.
"Mr. Shortridge, your conduct is boisterous and offensive and
tends to interfere with the orderly conduct of the court. I
declare you guilty of contempt and sentence you to be confined
in the County Jail for twenty-four hours. Mr. Sheriff, take
him into custody."
[148] The two principal points on which the defense based their
applications for writs of habeas corpus and of prohibition
were:
(1) That Juror Wise, having sat on a petty jury within a year,
was disqualified to act as a Grand Juror, and hence the
indictments were fatally defective.
(2) That the matter was before the Supreme Court of the United
States on a writ of error.
[149] Heney, in his affidavit in contention that an Elisor should be
appointed to bring Ruef into court, indicated the conditions
which were handicapping the prosecution.
[150] Biggy afterwards became Chief of Police of San Francisco.
[151] Ruef was with one of his henchmen, Myrtile Cerf, when
arrested. Long after, when he had plead guilty to one of the
extortion charges, Ruef stated in an interview published in
the San Francisco Call, May 16, 1907, that it had been his
purpose "to wait until the Legislature had acted on the Change
of Venue Bill," which was considered in a previous chapter,
and which at the time of Ruef's flight was being engineered
through the Senate by George Keane in his capacity as Senator.
Ruef, in his interview, stated further: "We had expected that
this bill would go through. Naturally we were surprised when
we learned that Campbell, the Mayor's (Schmitz's) attorney,
was at Sacramento lobbying against the bill. What his object
was I do not know. He even went to George Keane, who had
charge of the bill, and tried to switch him to the other
side."
During the period of Ruef's disappearance, his attorneys had
insisted that they were unaware of his whereabouts. Myrtile
Cerf, his companion in flight, refused to say before the Grand
Jury with whom he had telephonic communication while at the
roadhouse, on the ground that such testimony might incriminate
him.
[152] Ruef's arrest threw the administration into the greatest
confusion. Supervisor Wilson testified at the trial of The
People vs. Ruef, No. 1437, Part 3, Vol. 7, p. 3175, that at 2
o'clock of the morning following Ruef's capture, he went down
to Henry Ach's apartment to ascertain if the rumor that Ruef
had been found were true.
[153] Of the procedure which made possible Ruef's long technical
fight to escape trial, the San Francisco Chronicle on November
10, 1906, said:
"The disgraceful condition of our criminal laws permits guilty
men to put off their doom almost without limit. Where money
makes unscrupulous talent available that course is invariably
taken by those caught in the toils of justice. There are many
objects to be gained by these delays. Witnesses may die or be
spirited away. Most important of all the public becomes
wearied and finally forgets or loses its zest for the
enforcement of the law. When that stage is reached the 'pull'
comes into play. By the connivance of the District Attorney,
and especially of the Judge, continuance after continuance can
be granted until proof becomes impossible and the case is
dismissed. The adoption of such a course by any accused person
of bad reputation is moral evidence of guilt which is
conclusive with the public. We have had in this city many
disgraceful criminal trials. We have had many obvious
miscarriages of justice. There have been wealthy men whom
everybody feels should be in the penitentiary who have hardly
ceased for a day to flaunt their faces in decent society. We
have never had a case in which the obstruction to the cause of
justice began so early as Ruef began it, or was conducted with
such brazen effrontery. It is not within our recollection that
any accused person of whose guilt there was reasonable doubt
had adopted such a course. Its adoption is the recognized sign
of guilt.
"But while our laws affecting court practice are very bad,
they do afford the means of ultimately bringing criminals to
trial and convicting them if the evidence is sufficient and
the jury unbiased and uncorrupted. It only requires that the
public maintains its interest and thereby sustains its
officials in their efforts to secure justice. In this case the
advantage is with the public. There is no possibility of a
'pull' with the District Attorney. His assistant, Mr. Heney,
is himself a master of the criminal law and in notable cases
elsewhere has triumphed over similar efforts for delay made in
behalf of criminals of far higher social and political
standing than Ruef. In fact Ruef has no standing of any kind
in the community in any way different from that possessed by
other political bosses supposed to be corrupt. The indignation
of this community is a righteous indignation and it will never
abate until under the due processes of law the truth in
respect to Ruef and his roustabouts is dragged out in open
court."