SAN FRANCISCO AFTER THE FIRE.
The great San Francisco fire was brought under control Friday, April 20,
1906. The Sunday following, the first step was taken toward getting the
scattered Board of Supervisors together. George B. Keane, clerk of the
board, is authority for the statement that the meeting place was in a
room back of Supervisor McGushin's saloon.[48] The ashes of the burned
city were still hot; the average citizen was thinking only of the next
meal and shelter for the night for himself and dependents. But the
public-service corporations were even then active in furthering plans
which had been temporarily dropped while San Francisco was burning.
At the McGushin-saloon meeting, Keane found with the Supervisors Mr.
Frick of the law firm of Thomas, Gerstle & Frick. Mr. Frick was on hand
to represent the petitioners for the Home Telephone franchise, which, at
the time of the disaster was pending before the board.
For months previous to the fire, no subject affecting a San Francisco
public-service corporation had, with the single exception of the United
Railroads' scheme for substituting electric for cable service, created
more discussion than the Home Telephone application for franchise.
There had been allegations that the progress which, previous to the
fire, the Home Company had made toward securing its franchise, had been
paid for,[49] but for weeks after the fire few citizens had time to
think about it. The people forgot for the time the issues which had
before the disaster divided the city. But the agents for the
public-service corporations did not forget. We find a representative of
the Home Telephone Company picking his way over the hot ashes of the
burned city to McGushin's saloon to meet the Supervisors that the
interests of his company might be preserved. The developments of the
graft prosecution indicate that even as the Home Company was seeking out
the Supervisors, the United Railroads was getting into touch with
Ruef.[50]
But if the corporations were quick to avail themselves of the situation
to secure privileges denied them before the fire, they were also active
in the work of rehabilitation--so far as such activity served their
plans and purposes.
This was well illustrated by the course of the United Railroads. Within
a fortnight after the fire, that corporation had established efficient
service over a number of its electric lines. For a time, passengers were
carried without charge. On April 29 and 30, however, fares were
collected from men, but not from women and children. With the beginning
of May, fares were collected from all persons. For a time, in a glare of
much publicity, the United Railroads contributed these collections to
the fund for the relief of the stricken city.
The Home Telephone Company had no plant to restore nor authority to
establish one; but on Ruef's suggestion it, too, contributed to the fund
for the relief of the stricken city--$75,000.[51]
The United Railroads' activity in restoring its electric roads, was in
curious contrast to its failure to take advantage of the possibilities
offered by its cable systems. As some excuse for this inactivity, the
corporation's representatives alleged that the cable slots had been
closed by the earthquake, making restoration of the cable roads
impractical.
The alleged closing of the slots was even used as argument against the
conduit electric system.[52] But as a matter of fact, there were many
to testify that the damage done the cable slots was not from the
earthquake, although the slots in the burned district had been warped
more or less by the heat of the fire. But this damage was easily
remedied. On the Geary-street road, for example, cars were run for an
hour or more after the earthquake. The fire warped the Geary-street
cable slot, but this was easily and cheaply remedied by a force of men
with cold chisels and hammers.[53]
Statements from officials of the United Railroads, now of record,
indicate that the company's cable lines suffered no greater damage than
did other cable systems. An affidavit of Frank E. Sharon, for example,
who before the fire was superintendent of cables and stables belonging
to the United Railroads, made in the adjustment of fire losses sustained
by that corporation, sets forth that the company's principal cable power
house and repair shops situate on Valencia street were damaged but
little by the earthquake.[54] Although the buildings were damaged by
the fire, the damage to the contents, including the machinery by which
the cable cars were operated, was, according to statements made by the
United Railroads in fire-loss adjustment, comparatively small. The
company placed the sound value upon this machinery and contents, after
the earthquake, but preceding the fire, at $70,308.80. The salvage was
placed at $60,933.80, leaving a total fire loss of $9,375.[55]
The cable cars, with few exceptions, were saved. The most serious loss
of cars was on the Powell-street system, where sixty-four were
destroyed. Only one Valencia-street car was burned. After both
earthquake and fire, the United Railroads had available at least 150
cable cars for its Market and Powell-street systems. This does not
include the cable cars available on the Hayes and McAllister roads. The
power-houses of these two last-named systems were not destroyed by fire.
The allegation has been made that the McAllister-street cable was kept
running for several hours after the earthquake.
But whatever the possibilities for the restoration of the United
Railroads' cable properties, no steps were taken toward that end.
Instead, trolley wires were strung over the tracks of cable systems.
Street-car service was one of the greatest needs of the first few weeks
following the fire. Statements that cable properties could not be
restored were generally believed; the trolley service was accepted as a
matter of expediency; few thought, however, that it was to be
permanent.[56]
Within two weeks after the fire, the United Railroads had trolley wires
strung over the cable tracks on Market street. The little objection made
to this course went unheeded. The Market-street trolley cars, two weeks
after the fire, were as welcome to The People of San Francisco as were
the temporary shacks which were being erected upon the sites of the old
city's finest buildings. Market-street trolley cars gave as
sorely-needed transportation as the shacks gave needed shelter.
The opening of the Market-street trolley line was made subject for
rejoicing throughout the city. In the midst of this good feeling toward
his company, President Calhoun gave out that if allowed to place
overhead wires on Sutter and Larkin streets, he would place 2,000 men at
work and have both these lines in operation within thirty days.[57]
But the era of good feeling was not of long duration. On May 14, less
than a month after the fire, the Supervisors received a communication
signed by President Calhoun as President of the United Railroads,
setting forth that if the board would permit the use on the cable lines
of the standard electric system in use on the company's other lines, the
United Railroads would be glad to put all of their lines in commission
as rapidly as could be accomplished by the most liberal expenditure of
money and the largest possible employment of men.[58]
That very day, the Supervisors took the initial step toward granting to
the United Railroads a blanket permit, authorizing that corporation to
substitute the trolley system for all its cable lines.
Immediately, San Francisco's opposition to the trolley system was
revived. All classes joined in condemning the action of the board. The
Sutter Street Improvement Club, representing large down-town interests
and property holders, adopted resolutions demanding that the Supervisors
refuse to grant the permit. The San Francisco Labor Council,
representing over 100 affiliated unions, with a membership of more than
30,000 wage earners, declared as strongly against such action. The press
charged the United Railroads with taking advantage of the city's
distress to force the trolley upon her.[59]
Then came explanations and defense. Mayor Schmitz in public interviews
set forth that the proposed permit was not a permanent measure, nor
under its provisions could the United Railroads indefinitely operate
trolley cars in Market street.[60] The Labor Council which had at first
adopted resolutions condemning the policy of granting the permit,
adopted resolutions of confidence in the "present city administration."
President Calhoun himself solicited citizens to attend the meeting of
the board at which a vote was to be taken on the proposed permit, to
urge action favorable to the United Railroads.[61]
Long before the board met to take final action it was recognized that in
spite of opposition the permit would be granted.[62] And it was
granted. On May 21, the Supervisors passed the ordinance which gave the
United Railroads authority to convert its cable systems, wherever grades
would permit, into trolley lines. For this privilege, no money
compensation, nor promise of compensation, was made the city.[63]
Demand that Mayor Schmitz veto the ordinance granting these
extraordinary privileges followed. Nevertheless, the Mayor affixed his
signature to the trolley permit-granting ordinance.
Fair expression of the feeling this action engendered will be found in
the San Francisco papers of the latter part of May, 1906. "Mayor Eugene
E. Schmitz," said the Examiner, for example, "has betrayed the trust
reposed in him by the people, violated his solemn pledge in favor of an
underground conduit system, and joined Abe Ruef and the United Railroads
in the shameless work of looting the city at the time of her greatest
need."
The Ruef-Schmitz administration protested at the criticism. The
eighteen Supervisors, seventeen of whom were within a year to confess
that they had accepted bribes and all of whom were to be involved in the
scandal, joined in a letter[64] to the Examiner, announcing that such
criticism was unwarranted, and injured the city. The letter contained
veiled threat that questioning of the Supervisors' motives would not be
tolerated. The threat, however, intimidated nobody. Criticism of Ruef
and the administration continued.
But in spite of the hostility toward him, Ruef controlled the San
Francisco delegates who were named that year to attend the Republican
State convention. The convention met at Santa Cruz. Ruef held the
balance of power. He was the most sought man there. He had the
nomination for Governor in his hands. He gave it to James N.
Gillett.[65]
While the convention was in session, a dinner was given the State
leaders of the Republican party at the home of Major Frank McLaughlin,
then Chairman of the Republican State Central Committee. Ruef was one of
the select few present. A flash-light picture of that banquet board
shows him seated in the place of honor at the center of the table, the
remaining guests with the exception of the host, McLaughlin, who is
seated at Ruef's side, standing.
At Ruef's back stands James N. Gillett, who had just received, with
Ruef's assistance, the party nomination for Governor, his hand resting
upon Ruef's shoulder. Others in this flash-light group are George
Hatton, political manipulator, whose connection with the 1905 mayoralty
campaign in San Francisco has already been noted; J. W. McKinley, head
of the Southern Pacific Law Department at Los Angeles, who was chairman
of the convention; Rudolph Herold, a politician prominent in the
counsels of the old "Southern Pacific machine"; Justice F. W. Henshaw of
the California Supreme Bench, who was nominated at the convention for
re-election;[66] Walter F. Parker, political agent for the Southern
Pacific Company; Warren R. Porter, who had just received the nomination
for Lieutenant-Governor; Congressman J. R. Knowland, prominent in the
counsels of the "machine" that at the time dominated the State, and
Judge F. H. Kerrigan of the Appellate Bench, whose decision in favor of
the Southern Pacific Company while on the Superior Bench, in the
so-called San Joaquin Valley railroad rate case, made him a conspicuous
figure in California public life.[67]
The group represented the most effective forces at the time in
California politics. Ruef, at the Santa Cruz convention, reached the
height of his power. He left Santa Cruz planning a State organization
that would make him as great a factor in State politics as he was at the
metropolis.
But on his return to San Francisco, Ruef found himself harassed by
criticism and beset by opposition. At every point in the municipal
administration, with the exception of the District Attorney's office,
was suggestion of graft and incompetency. The police department could
not, or would not, control the criminal element. Merchants, in the
middle of the day, were struck down at their places of business and
robbed. Several were fatally injured in such attacks, being found dying
and even dead behind their counters. Street robberies were of daily
occurrence.
In the acres of ash-strewn ruins, was junk worth hundreds of thousands
of dollars. The police seemed utterly powerless to protect this
property. It became the loot of unchecked bands of thieves.
A reign of terror prevailed. Citizens feared to appear on the streets at
night. Merchants charged that their business was seriously injured by
these conditions. On all sides, blame was placed upon the Schmitz
administration which Ruef was known to control.[68]
Then again, Ruef's toll from the tolerated gambling, saloon and social
evil interests was getting too heavy for his own safety.[69] The public
was given hint of this when the newspapers quoted George Renner, a
prominent businessman, as asserting that a liquor license could be
secured if the applicant "put the matter into Ruef's hands and paid a
fat little fee." Ruef, in his reply, stated that the liquor people were
nuisances anyhow. Ruef had long acted as attorney for the California
Liquor Dealers' Association. The Association, after Ruef's flippant
characterization of the liquor people, boldly dispensed with his
services and employed another attorney, Herbert Choynski, in his stead.
Choynski made no effort to placate Ruef. On the contrary, he gave out
interviews to the press charging that Ruef had received $500,000 for the
trolley permit, and that each Supervisor had been given $4000 or $5000
for his vote.
This story was given some credit, although few realized the amount of
truth it contained.
The Supervisors were spending money freely. Men, who in private life had
earned less than $100 a month, and as Supervisors were receiving only
that amount, gave evidence of being generously supplied with funds.
Supervisor Coffey, a hack driver, took a trip to Chicago. Lonergan,
driver of a delivery wagon, announced plans for a tour of Ireland with
his wife and children. Wilson planned a trip through the Eastern States.
The official head of the administration, Mayor Schmitz, left on a trip
to Europe, leaving Supervisor Gallagher as acting Mayor.[70] Reports
printed in San Francisco papers of Schmitz, the orchestra player, as
guest of the most expensive European hotels, did not tend to lessen the
opposition to the administration.
The general dissatisfaction with the administration finally found
expression in a mass meeting intended to inaugurate a movement to rid
the community of Ruef's influence.[71] The meeting was called in the
name of various promotion associations and improvement clubs. It was to
have been held in the rooms of the California Promotion Association, a
temporary shack that had been erected in Union Square, a public park in
the business district. But the crowd which gathered was so great that
the meeting had to be held in the park itself.
When the committee in charge met to complete final preparations,
preliminary to calling the meeting to order, Ruef and Acting Mayor
Gallagher, with astonishing assurance, appeared before the committee and
offered their co-operation in the work in hand. Their presence does not
appear to have been welcome. Nevertheless, before the resolutions which
the committee had under consideration were read before the crowd, all
harsh references to Ruef and the municipal administration had been
expurgated. In effect, the expurgated resolutions called upon commercial
organizations, clubs, labor unions and similar bodies to form a
committee of 100 for public safety.
In the meeting which followed the expurgation of the resolutions, the
organizers of the movement lost control. Their counsel was for
moderation in a situation where all elements were at work.
The crowd was made up of Ruef claquers who shouted everybody down;
members of Labor Unions who had been led to believe that the purpose of
the gathering was to break down the unions; and of radicals who were for
proceeding immediately to clean up the town. Those responsible for the
gathering appeared appalled at its magnitude, and showed themselves
unable to cope with the situation.
William A. Doble presided. Samuel M. Shortridge, an attorney who was to
play a prominent part in the graft trials, stood at Doble's side and
acted as a sort of director of the proceedings. The expurgated
resolutions were read by the President of the Merchants' Association, E.
R. Lillienthal. The ayes were called for and the resolutions declared to
have been adopted. The next moment announcement was made that the
meeting stood adjourned.
An angry demonstration followed. The people had met to discuss
lawlessness. They refused to be put off. The adjourned meeting refused
to adjourn. There were cries of =Drive Ruef out of Town=. One speaker, A.
B. Truman, denounced Ruef as a grafter. For the moment an outbreak
seemed imminent. At this crisis, Acting Mayor Gallagher appeared.
"I would suggest," he announced,[72] "that you disperse to your
respective homes."
Citizens who did not care to participate in what threatened to become a
riot began leaving the park. But Ruef's henchmen did not leave.
Ruef, who had cowered in fright when the crowd was denouncing him, was
concealed in a room in the so-called Little St. Francis Hotel, which
after the fire had been erected in Union Square Park. From his hiding
place he could see the crowd without being seen. At the right time, he
appeared on the steps of the building which were used for the speaker's
stand. His followers, now in a majority, cheered him wildly. The next
moment, Ruef was in control of the meeting which had been called to
protest against the conditions in San Francisco, for which the
administration, of which he was the recognized head, was held to be
accountable.[73] The first serious attempt to oust Ruef from his
dictatorship had failed.
But while the protestants against prevailing conditions were hot with
the disappointments of this failure, District Attorney Langdon issued a
statement that he had determined to seize the opportunity presented by
the impanelment of a new Grand Jury to inaugurate a systematic and
thorough investigation into charges of official graft and malfeasance in
office. To assist in this work, he announced, Francis J. Heney had been
requested to become a regular deputy in the District Attorney's office,
and had accepted. That the investigation might not be handicapped by
lack of funds, Mr. Langdon stated Rudolph Spreckels had guaranteed that
he would personally undertake the collection from public-spirited
citizens of a fund to provide for the expenses necessary to make the
investigation thorough.[74] It became known that William J. Burns, who
had been associated with Heney in the Oregon land-fraud cases, had been
retained to direct the investigation, and that for several months his
agents had been quietly at work.
The effect of these announcements was immediate. All talk of "vigilante
committee" and "lynching" ceased. The case of The People of San
Francisco vs. the Schmitz-Ruef Administration was to be presented in an
orderly way in the courts.
And the united press of San Francisco, legitimate business interests,
and a great majority of the people welcomed the alternative.
FOOTNOTES:
[48] See Keane's testimony in The People vs. Ruef, No. 1437, Part 3,
vol. 1, page 455.
[49] See footnote 41, page 43.
[50] Supervisor Gallagher testified in the case of The People vs.
Ruef, No. 1437, that about a week before the fire "Mr. Ruef
stated that the United Railroads wanted to secure a permit to
use electricity upon their lines and asked me to speak to the
members of the Board of Supervisors about it and let him know
whether it could go through the Board, and about what amount of
money it would take. I told him that I would do so." (See
Transcript on Appeal, page 850.) Similar testimony, to show
that the United Railroads was dealing with Ruef during the
month preceding the fire, was brought out at trials of other
defendants in the "graft" cases. This would make the date of
Ruef's activity on behalf of the United Railroads about the
time of Mr. Calhoun's announcement that he would proceed to
present plans for the trolley system, to the "proper
representatives" of the People (the Supervisors), who were even
then, through Ruef, receiving bribe money from public-service
corporations.
Gallagher testified further (see same transcript, page 853)
that within a week after the fire Ruef stated to him that the
United Railroads still wanted its electric permit, and directed
that Gallagher find out whether such a permit could be put
through the Board. Gallagher testified that he saw members, put
the question to them, and reported back to Ruef that in his
judgment the permit could be put through by paying each member
of the Board the amount which Ruef had specified, $4,000.
[51] Supervisor Gallagher testified at graft trials that Ruef had
told him the payment of this $75,000 to the Relief Fund was a
good thing, as it would tend to shut off adverse criticism. But
the Home Company people had asked that the money be not turned
over to the Relief Fund until such time as the ordinance
granting the franchise had been approved or the matter
definitely determined.
[52] As early as May 5, C. E. Loss, a railroad contractor, came out
with the proposition that the city should abandon all idea of
conduit systems, because the cable slots had been closed by the
earthquake. In this, Loss was disputed by City Engineer Thomas
P. Woodward. Woodward, in an interview printed in the Examiner
on May 5, 1906, said:
"I think Mr. Loss was mistaken when he said the earthquake
closed the cable slots. I have not made a careful examination
of the various roadbeds in San Francisco, but from what I have
seen as I have gone about the city, I am inclined to think that
no injury was done the cable slots by the earthquake.
"The lines on Sacramento, California, Geary, Sutter and Haight
streets appear to be all right outside the burned district.
Where the metal was subjected to the intense heat, the slots
are warped out of shape, and in some places closed."
Loss's allegations called forth the following editorial comment
in the Examiner of May 5th:
"Even an earthquake shock and a conflagration do not long
obscure the vision of certain wealthy gentlemen where there is
a chance to turn a calamity to their individual account.
"Before the catastrophe, San Francisco had indicated with great
emphasis to the United Railroads that it would not permit the
reconstruction of the cable system into an overhead trolley,
but would insist upon a modern up-to-date conduit electric
railroad, the safety, utility and efficiency of which had been
demonstrated in New York and other Eastern cities.
"The emergency created by the destruction of the traffic
systems in the city has compelled permission for a temporary
trolley line because it could be constructed more quickly than
any other.
"It is not intended, and the United Railroads must be made to
realize that it will not be permitted, that the unsightly poles
and dangerous wires will be allowed to cumber the new and more
beautiful San Francisco, any more than it will be permitted
that the rough shacks and sheds which temporarily shelter the
people in parks and streets and otherwise vacant lots shall
remain after the emergency which called them into being has
ceased."
[53] A. D. Shepard, vice-president and secretary of the Geary-street
Railroad Company, gave the following statement to the Examiner
as to the condition of the Geary-street roadbed:
"We can run cars as far as the road goes, but the power-house
is not ready for business. The smokestack at Geary and Buchanan
streets must be built up to comply with the ordinance of the
city before we can get a permit to build fires under the
boilers. The smokestack should be repaired by the end of this
week, and cars will probably be run over the road then. I
cannot say just what day we will begin to run cars. All depends
upon the smokestack and the Board of Public Works.
"Our line was not injured by the earthquake, and we ran cars
for some time after the shake. It was the fire that drove us
out of business. The heat warped the slot, making it narrow in
places and wide in other spots, but this is easily remedied."
(See Examiner, May 30, 1906.)
[54] Sharon's affidavit was introduced at the graft trials. It was
as follows:
"State of California, City and County of San Francisco--ss.
"Frank E. Sharon, being first duly sworn according to law,
deposes and says: That he was for many years prior to April 18,
1906, the superintendent of cables and stables belonging to the
United Railroads of San Francisco, and situate at the corner of
Market and Valencia streets; that on the property situate at
said Market and Valencia streets were located what is known as
the Market and Valencia Power House and Shops, consisting of
power-house, stables, machine shops, special machine shops,
mill, offices, store-rooms, sheds, etc.; that he was such
superintendent on April 18, 1906; that on the morning of April
18, 1906, immediately following the earthquake he proceeded to
the above described premises, arriving there at about 8 a. m.;
that none of the buildings above described were materially
damaged by the earthquake; that the walls of all the buildings
were standing and intact; that the roofs of all the buildings
were on and uninjured by the earthquake, with the exception of
the roof of a portion of what is known as the power-house,
which was damaged by reason of a small portion of the chimney
adjoining the power-house on the west falling thereon; that the
greater portion of said brick from the top of said chimney fell
toward the south or east into the driveway; that extending from
the base of said chimney to the crown thereof and on the east
and west side thereof are cracks which were in said chimney for
many years prior to the earthquake of April 18, 1906, which
cracks were opened somewhat by said earthquake; and the boilers
in said power-house were not injured to any extent and steam
was kept under said boilers for some time after the earthquake;
that in his judgment the building as a whole was intact and the
machinery not injured in any material part of the earthquake;
that the building caught fire from the adjoining buildings on
the east and southeast late in the afternoon of April 18, 1906;
said buildings were not dynamited nor backfired for any
purpose.
"F. E. SHARON.
"Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of August, A.
D. 1906.
"CHARLES R. HOLTON.
"Notary Public in and for the City and County of San Francisco,
State of California."
[55] The loss included $25 damage to two engines which cost new
$24,000; $2,000 damage to six boilers, new cost $30,000; $210
water-tank, cost new $350; $500 damage to pipes, valves and
fittings, which cost new $10,500; material in store-room worth
$2,000, a total loss; $4,800 loss of two tension carriages used
for taking up slack of the cable. These tension carriages could
very easily have been restored. This loss, $4,800, and the
$2,000 stock loss, deducted from the total of $9,375, leaves a
total loss of $2,575 to the machinery of a plant estimated to
have cost $115,842.
[56] As late as November 13, 1906, seven months after the fire, the
San Francisco Call published an editorial article on the
trolley permits which showed that even then their nature was
not fully understood. The Call said:
"The insolent disregard of public rights in the streets by the
United Railroads is inspired, of course, by ulterior purpose to
entrench the corporation in the possession of privileges,
permits or franchises granted at a time of stress and confusion
whose legality may and probably will be questioned later.
"The Call does not desire to assume an attitude of hindering or
hampering progress. We recognize fully that every new
street-car line adds materially to the value of property within
its tributary territory. In a word, the growth of a city or a
neighborhood is, to a considerable degree, dependent on
facilities for urban transit.
"But it does not follow from these considerations that
franchises should be granted for nothing to any and every
applicant who is able to construct a street railway. The right
to use the streets is the most valuable privilege possessed by
a municipality. It should be made to yield a corresponding
revenue.
"All this might seem so obvious as scarcely to require
statement, but in practice the principles here laid down have
been virtually disregarded in San Francisco. In no instance was
there more flagrant disregard of public rights than in the
wholesale grants of permits or franchises to construct overhead
trolley lines made after the fire.
"The United Railroads at the time professed to regard these
permits as merely temporary, but that profession was not very
long maintained. The company now declares that many, if not
all, of these permits amount to absolute franchises in view of
the capital invested in making the necessary changes. That is
the explanation of the outrageous disregard of public rights
shown in tearing up some five or six miles of streets at once
and in different parts of town. This process is obviously
wasteful as a financial proposition, and is calculated besides
to arouse general indignation. We find these weighty
considerations disregarded on the advice of the corporation's
lawyers, to bolster up an invalid claim to the possession of
franchises obtained by trick and device in an hour of public
confusion.
"What the extent of the corporation's claim under these permits
may be we are not advised, and there is no immediate means of
finding out as long as the administration which granted these
hole-and-corner permits remains in power. The same influences
that made the Mayor and Supervisors so complaisant to the will
of the United Railroads are still operative. It was only the
other day that another permit for a street-car line was
granted, and granted illegally. This administration stays
bought.
"Therefore, the streets are torn up in a dozen different parts
of town and left in that condition untouched for months with
the full consent of the administration. But this political
condition is not permanent. Some of these people will go to
jail. They will all be ousted at the next election. San
Francisco has had enough of them.
"The United Railroads is endeavoring to fortify one wrong by
committing another. These things will not be forgotten in a
hurry. We are convinced that the corporation is pursuing a
shortsighted policy. Costly litigation must ensue to test the
validity and extent of the overhead trolley permits. The people
will not consent to see their most valuable property traded
away by a lot of conscienceless boodlers, and if it should
prove that the United Railroads has been able to make two
wrongs constitute one right, it is very certain that a movement
of irresistible force will follow for a reduction of street-car
fares.
"We are convinced that it will pay the United Railroads to be
fair and decent with the people of San Francisco. The present
policy is neither fair nor decent. The service is bad, public
rights in the streets are outraged, and, worst of all, the
corporation is the most malign, corrupting influence in the
politics of our municipal government. There will come a
reckoning."
[57] See statement printed in San Francisco Examiner, May 4, 1906.
[58] Calhoun's letter to the Supervisors read:
"United Railroads of San Francisco.
"President's Office.
"San Francisco, May 14, 1906.
"To the Honorable Board of Supervisors of the City of San
Francisco--Gentlemen: The United Railroads of San Francisco
respectfully represents that, notwithstanding its urgent and
earnest efforts to provide adequate street railway
transportation on the lines being operated, constant pressure
is being applied and innumerable requests are being presented
to it to increase its transportation facilities.
"The company is anxious to please the people, and is willing to
do its part in the immediate upbuilding of the Greater San
Francisco, but owing to the unavailability of material and
machinery for operating its cable systems, as well as the great
length of time necessary to rebuild destroyed power-houses and
reconstruct its cable conduits, a long time would necessarily
elapse before the cable systems could be operated so as to give
the required relief to traffic congestion.
"If your Honorable Board will permit the use on the cable lines
of a standard electric system such as is now used on the
company's other lines, we will be glad to put all of our lines
in commission, and will agree to have them in complete
operation wherever grades will permit as rapidly as the most
liberal expenditure of money and the largest possible
employment of men will accomplish. The necessary expenditure
for labor and materials to do this work will run into the
millions, and will afford much-needed employment to several
thousand deserving men.
"We believe the prompt reconstruction of your lines of
transportation will inspire confidence in all investing capital
and greatly aid in the prompt rebuilding of your city.
"We submit these suggestions for your consideration at the
request of many of our citizens from every walk of life.
"Respectfully,
"PAT. CALHOUN, President."
[59] The trolley permit was passed to print on May 14. The Examiner,
in its issue of May 15, said:
"The United Railroads, with the rapacity for which it has ever
been noted, is seeking to capitalize the city's woe to its own
advantage.
"Before the disaster of April 18 it had been balked in its
purpose to make San Francisco a trolley town. The protests of
citizens who knew that the underground system is better than
the cheap, unsightly trolley system and had been proved safer,
had blocked the United Railroads project. And it seemed certain
that the scheme to cumber Market street and Sutter street with
poles and wires was definitely stopped.
"The emergency which demanded the swiftest possible
establishment of a transportation system, gave the United
Railroads its opportunity to revive the discreditable scheme.
As an emergency service nobody could object to the overhead
trolleys. But it was understood that the service was absolutely
temporary in its character and should only obtain during the
pendency of present conditions.
"Yesterday, however, there appeared out of the void of
forbidden things an ordinance that was hastily passed to print,
granting a franchise to the United Railroads to trolleyize its
whole system.
"It was expected evidently that this iniquitous measure could
be sneaked through under cover of the present stress and
excitement without people realizing until it was too late what
had been done.
"When the scheme was flushed it was still attempted to make it
appear that this was a temporary measure, a representation
absolutely varying with the language of the ordinance.
"But the scheme has not succeeded yet.
"It was to be expected that, like the looters who have to be
kept from other people's property by soldiers and police, San
Francisco's misfortune would bring out a horde of corporate
ghouls eager to snatch privileges during the time of disorder.
But it was likewise to be expected that the city
administration, which has been so alert to protect private
property, would be equally alert to protect the precious
possessions of the city.
"The railroads can only do what the city permits, and a strong
official scrutiny of the ordinance which was yesterday passed
to print should result in its final defeat.
"No matter what other claims an administration may have to the
gratitude and respect of the citizens of San Francisco, it
cannot afford to be known as the administration that put
trolley poles on Market street."
[60] The day that the ordinance granting the trolley permit was
ordered printed, Mayor Schmitz stated in an interview as
published in the Examiner:
"The proposed franchise is merely a temporary measure. It does
not mean that the United Railroads can indefinitely operate
their cars by the overhead trolley in Market street, or in the
streets formerly occupied by cable roads. It is necessary now
to have transportation. The cable roads cannot be repaired, I
am told, for some time. Meanwhile, the franchise to string
overhead wires has been granted. It can be revoked."
[61] At the Calhoun trial, William H. Sanderson testified to having
been introduced to Calhoun by Ruef at a public meeting, a few
days before the trolley permit was granted. He was then asked:
"Q. What, if any, conversation then ensued between yourself,
Mr. Ruef and Mr. Calhoun? A. Well, I stated--Mr. Calhoun was at
that time sitting at a large table in the room, where the
committee had held its session, and he rose out of his seat,
and the three of us held a conversation following that
introduction. I stated to Mr. Calhoun--I asked him when the
people of North Beach were or might expect railroad facilities,
that the population was coming back to that portion of the
city, and that other portions of the city were provided with
facilities, and that we were compelled to walk through miles of
burned district in order to get anywhere; and Mr. Calhoun said
in reply, that if the people of San Francisco desired railroad
facilities, they should co-operate with the railroad company
that was here to provide them with the same; and I said to Mr.
Calhoun that I thought that we were ready to do anything that
the company desired us to do, and asked him what in particular
he wished us to do, and he said: 'There is that trolley
privilege matter before the Supervisors; that comes up next
Monday, and you people of San Francisco ought to come down
before that Board, that the people of San Francisco, or you,
are vitally interested in the matter of this trolley permit.'
Mr. Ruef then said: 'Come down before the Board next Monday,
Sanderson, and make a talk on behalf of your organization in
favor of the trolley permit. We will see that you get the
privilege of the floor. A number of citizens of San Francisco
will be there, and we propose to show the press that the people
of San Francisco are behind this permit.' I said to Mr.
Calhoun: 'The papers tell me that this is a very valuable
franchise and you ought to pay the city something for it.' And
Mr. Calhoun said in substance that he thought that the company
would be paying all that the privileges was worth if it built
the road. Then I suggested to him that perhaps that sentiment
which objected to the disfigurement of Market street and Sutter
street by the erection of poles and wires, ought to be placated
to some extent, and I asked him why he would not at least put
the feed-wires under ground; and he said that that would entail
an expense which the company at that time was not or did not
think it advisable to meet. And then I asked him why he would
not put the poles 200 feet apart instead of 100 as--or 200 feet
apart, as was done in European cities, and he said that the
100-foot system was the more advisable in his opinion. And then
Mr. Ruef said to me: 'The passage of this permit will mean
immediate work for 5,000 men. We will be able to take them out
of the camps and put them at work.' And I said to Mr. Ruef:
'That is all very well, Mr. Ruef, but it seems to me that there
is another side to this question--a political side. The people
of San Francisco are at last all behind your administration.
What they need in this crisis is leadership, and we will have
to take such leadership as you give us; and now that everybody
is with you, and even the Bulletin has quit, it is not good
policy on your part to stir up another newspaper war. The
Examiner has been your friend ever since Schmitz was first
elected, and it will not swallow the trolley proposition in its
present form, and it is charging your administration with
corruption. If it persists in its fight it will eventually
break your back. It seems to me that it would be a
comparatively easy matter to placate this opposition by
exacting some compensation for this permit, either in the way
of cash or by way of a percentage of the proceeds of the road,
or you might limit it as to time; give them a permit for five
or ten years. You have them at your mercy and they are bound to
accept whatever terms you prescribe.' Mr. Ruef then said: 'To
hell with the Examiner, no public man can afford to swallow
that paper. This thing will go through on Monday. It is all
settled.' And then I said: 'You don't need me then,' and Mr.
Calhoun said: 'I don't think we do, Mr. Sanderson.' That is all
the conversation, or that is substantially all the conversation
that took place in regard to that matter."
[62] Said the Examiner in its issue of May 16, 1906: "It looks very
much as if Patrick Calhoun, Thornwell Mullally and their pals
of the United Railroads had sneaked up behind San Francisco
just as she lay wounded from earthquake and conflagration. In
the guise of helping her, they were caught picking her pocket.
If the Supervisors aid and abet them, the people will be
warranted in setting up their effigies in lasting bronze, a
group of everlasting infamy, with the inscription: 'THESE MEN
LOOTED SAN FRANCISCO AT THE TIME OF THE GREAT FIRE OF 1906.'"
[63] Of the failure to exact pay for the franchise, the Examiner of
May 17, 1906, said:
"Mayor Schmitz and the Board of Supervisors must know, and if
they do not know they are now informed, that the franchises
they propose to give away to the United Railroads are worth a
great deal of money to the city of San Francisco, and they
certainly do know that the city never was so greatly in need of
money as now. To give away so much of value at such a time is
so hideous a crime that it will leave a scar upon the
reputation of everybody concerned in it, no matter what that
reputation has been up to the time of the infamy."
[64] The Supervisors' letter to the Examiner was as follows:
"San Francisco, Cal., May 26, 1906.
"To 'The San Francisco Examiner,' City--Gentlemen: The Board of
Supervisors of the City and County of San Francisco, regretting
the hostile stand which your journal has in these distressing
times assumed toward the rebuilding of our destroyed city, by
indiscriminately attacking every vested interest and all
intending investments of capital in this city, respectfully
submits for your consideration the propriety of joining with
instead of assailing those who are in good faith and with their
energy and ability striving to restore and rebuild our beloved
city.
"Irrespective of any personal feeling caused by your wanton
attacks on his Honor the Mayor, and on this Board, we ask of
you, as citizens of San Francisco and as the legislative branch
of our government, to cease your thoughtless and dangerous
efforts to drive away from our city every interest which has
expressed its intention to assist in our rebuilding and which
has manifested a practical confidence in our future. Otherwise,
the day will certainly not be far distant when the people,
realizing the result of your course, will seek to protect the
city against its further continuance.
"In all good faith for the city's interests and without any
personal rancor, these suggestions are submitted to your
careful attention.
"Respectfully, James L. Gallagher, Max Mamlock, Chas. Boxton,
L. A. Rea, F. P. Nicholas, Andrew M. Wilson, Geo. F. Duffey, J.
J. Furey. M. W. Coffey, Daniel G. Coleman, C. J. Harrigan, J.
J. Phillips, P. M. McGushin, E. I. Walsh, Sam Davis, Jas. T.
Kelly, Thomas F. Lonergan, W. W. Sanderson."
[65] Ruef, in his story of his political career, "The Road I
Traveled," states that in an interview with William F. Herrin,
chief of the Southern Pacific law department, previous to the
primary campaign, the necessary expenses of the primary
campaign and of the primary election were discussed. Herrin,
according to Ruef's account, agreed not to oppose the Ruef
tickets. "As agreed prior to the primary," Ruef goes on to say
in his narrative: "Herrin paid me $14,000 for the purpose of
securing for his organization the certainty of the votes of the
San Francisco delegation." See San Francisco Bulletin, August
31, 1912.
[66] Henshaw was re-elected. After Ruef had been convicted and the
Appellate Court had refused to grant him a new trial, Henshaw,
before the briefs had been filed in the matter of the appeal
from the Appellate to the Supreme Court, signed an order
granting Ruef a new hearing. See Chapter XXIX.
[67] See decisions in Edson vs. The Southern Pacific Co., 133 Cal.
Reports and 144 Cal. Reports.
[68] Nor was this criticism confined to San Francisco; it was
general throughout the State. The Sacramento Bee, in describing
the conditions prevailing at San Francisco, said:
"In the hold-ups which are now terrorizing the people of San
Francisco the citizens are seeing the effects of a loose or
dishonest municipal administration. The form of lawlessness now
prevailing in San Francisco follows upon bad local government
as inevitably as night follows day."
[69] Definite figures, alleged to be the graft schedule enforced in
the San Francisco tenderloin after the fire, were published.
The Chronicle of April 24, 1907, said on this score:
"After the great disaster of last April, or so soon as the new
tenderloin began to build up and the Barbary Coast district
began to establish itself, a schedule of prices for protected
vice was formulated. This schedule has been rigidly adhered to.
In the case of houses of ill-fame, the proprietors were
required to pay the policemen on the beat the sum of $5, the
sergeants $15, the captains $25, and the chief of police $75 to
$100 every week for the privilege of conducting their nefarious
business. The gambling houses were assessed according to their
ability to pay, but the average price for police protection,
according to Heney, was about the same as the houses of
prostitution. The dives along Pacific street and in the Barbary
Coast district were required to pay $50 every week to the
police captain and the chief, those two functionaries
presumably dividing the money. The sporting saloons where women
of the night life congregate were taxed a similar amount."
[70] Ruef advised strongly against Schmitz leaving San Francisco. In
an interview printed in the San Francisco Call, May 16, 1907,
the day after he had plead guilty to a charge of extorting
money from French restaurant dives, Ruef said:
"The great mistake of this whole thing began with the Mayor's
trip to Europe. The Mayor had been proclaimed as the man of the
hour after the disaster of last April. He was suddenly seized
with the desire of making a trip to Europe, where he expected
to be received as one of the crowned heads. He thought his fame
would spread throughout the world and he hoped to be lionized
abroad and, incidentally, gain social prestige. The whole thing
was a mistake. I begged him not to go. I pointed out to him
that the city was in ruins and the place for the Mayor was at
home. He persisted, and all my pleadings were in vain."
[71] At a preliminary meeting of the organizers of this movement,
held in the office of the California Canners, October 10, 1906,
responsibility for the state of affairs in San Francisco was
charged to Ruef. It was stated at this meeting, and given out
to the press, that convincing evidence had been secured against
Ruef which warranted his prosecution.
[72] Acting Mayor Gallagher was emphatic in declaring that no
vigilance committee should disgrace San Francisco. The interior
press, which was following the San Francisco situation closely
and from an independent standpoint, advised Mayor Gallagher
that the best way to prevent organization of such a committee
would be to enforce the laws. Said the Stockton Record:
"If Acting Mayor Gallagher and his associates wish to abate the
agitation in favor of a committee of safety for San Francisco,
they should do less talking and take more energetic action
against the thug element. The police department of the
afflicted city is now virtually on trial. It is even under
suspicion of offenses graver than that of inefficiency. One or
two more crimes of violence with well-known people as victims
will fire the public indignation of San Francisco to a point
where incapable officers will be forced aside and an authority
created to meet the grave emergency confronting respectable
citizenry."
The Stockton Independent went even further. Said that paper of
the San Francisco situation:
"Acting Mayor Gallagher of San Francisco declares there shall
be no vigilance committee and no lynching in San Francisco. If
he and the police are unable to prevent daily murders, or
attempted murders, by single criminals, how can he prevent good
citizens in hundreds of thousands from lynching those criminals
if they catch them? Perhaps some of the purblind members of the
police force may be among the first to be lynched."
[73] After Ruef's capture of the Union Square meeting, Rev. P. C.
Macfarlane, pastor of the First Christian Church at Alameda,
said in a sermon (October 21, 1906) of the San Francisco
situation:
"Let a few resolute, clean-handed business men of San Francisco
who are not cowards, who are not quitters or grafters, get
together and make a purse of twenty, fifty or a hundred
thousand dollars, then employ the ablest attorney to be had and
set quietly to work to find the graft and punish the grafters.
They could make chapel exercises on Sunday afternoon in San
Quentin look like a political rally in San Francisco inside of
two years.
"Thus Eugene E. Schmitz stands before the world as a man who
tried to reform and could not. He is a moral inebriate. He is a
welcher. He is a wanderer on the face of the globe, a man
without country, expatriated by his own cowardice. This is Dr.
Jekyll.
"But there are some who see in Schmitz Mr. Hyde. These do not
give the Mayor credit for even a spasm of virtue and say that
the great work of the morning of April 18 was done by General
Funston and prominent citizens of their own volition. These
people say that he has now gone from San Francisco, taking with
him vast sums of money gained through the granting of the
trolley franchise, plotted even while the embers smoldered, and
that he will never return.
"The United Railroads is universally believed to have acquired
its trolley franchises by corrupt means. It is said that
prominent merchants will crane and crook and bow and scrape to
get a nod of recognition from Abe Ruef. Ruef has used the
advantages given him by the state of affairs to corrupt the
greatest city in California. Ruef owns the Board of
Supervisors. The Police Commissioners belong to him. The
saloon-keeper who wants a license, a corporation that wants a
favor from the Board of Supervisors, has only to retain Ruef as
an attorney at a fee sufficiently large."
Dr. Macfarlane gave expression to what many thoughtful men were
thinking, but of which few with interests at San Francisco
dared to admit openly.
[74] Mr. Langdon's statement was published October 21, 1906. It was
in full as follows:
"In view of the present extraordinary conditions prevalent in
the City and County of San Francisco, the unusual increase in
crime, which threatens to grow worse as the winter sets in, and
in view of the numerous charges of official graft and
malfeasance in office, I have determined to seize the
opportunity presented, by the impanelment of a new grand jury,
which has been set down for next Wednesday by Hon. Thomas F.
Graham, the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court in the City
and County of San Francisco, to inaugurate a systematic and
thorough investigation into these conditions. It is my official
duty to do so, and in pursuance of that duty and in view of the
magnitude of the task, I have decided to seek the best
assistance obtainable. It is my purpose to set at rest these
charges of official graft by either proving them false or
convicting those who are guilty. If the charges be untrue,
their falsity should be demonstrated to the world, so as to
remove the impressions which have been circulated to the injury
of the credit and fair name of the city. If they be true we
should show to the country that there is enough strength,
virtue and civic pride in our people to enable the regularly
constituted machinery of justice to re-establish conditions on
a clean, righteous and just basis, without resort to any
extraordinary expedients outside the law. This is to be an
honest, fair, thorough and searching investigation. We shall
protect no man. We shall persecute no man, but we shall
prosecute every man who is guilty, regardless of position or
standing in the city. In order that we may have the benefit of
expert services in this work I have requested Mr. Francis J.
Heney, who has won national fame for his work in the
prosecution of the Oregon land fraud cases, to become a regular
deputy in my office. Mr. Heney has accepted. It is unfortunate
that this work should be commenced during a political campaign,
but the conditions in San Francisco to-day require that radical
action be taken at once, and though I may be charged with
instituting this investigation at this particular juncture for
political advantage, I must ask the public to judge me by the
results attained, which will be the best answer.
"I am not unmindful of the great difficulties involved in this
investigation. It will be both laborious and costly. The money
available under the appropriations made to the District
Attorney's office and the grand jury is, of course, utterly
inadequate. Often previous investigations by other grand juries
have been made abortive because of this lack of necessary funds
to meet expenses. In the present instance we shall not suffer
this severe handicap. I am authorized to announce that Mr.
Rudolph Spreckels has guaranteed that he will personally
undertake the collection from public-spirited citizens of a
fund to provide for the expenses necessary to make the
investigation thorough and so that good results may ensue. The
city is in deep affliction consequent upon the dreadful
calamities of last spring; it is in danger from certainly
increasing invasion of desperate criminals from all over the
world; some of the public departments are undoubtedly in bad
hands, and I appeal to my fellow-citizens to give this
investigation their moral support, so that the innocent may be
protected, so that the guilty may be punished, and so that San
Francisco may be helped to her feet and started again on the
high road of prosperity in her material conditions, and have
restored decency, efficiency, honesty and honor in her public
affairs.
"WILLIAM H. LANGDON, District Attorney."