CHAPTER VI

SIR JAMES CRAIG

[Sidenote: Changes in administration.]

As has been told in the last chapter, Milnes and Hunter,

Lieutenant-Governors of Lower and Upper Canada respectively,

took up their appointments in the summer of 1799 when the

Governor-General Prescott was recalled to England. General

Hunter was not only Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada but also

Commander of the Forces in both provinces. These two men held

their appointments for six years, until August, 1805. On the 5th

of that month Milnes, who was by this time a baronet, Sir Robert

Shore Milnes,[216] left for England on leave of absence, and on

the 21st of the month General Hunter died at Quebec. For the time

being, two civilians acted as Lieutenant-Governors, Thomas Dunn,

senior Executive Councillor at Quebec, acting in Lower Canada, and

Alexander Grant acting in Upper Canada. Milnes remained on leave of

absence in England and drew his salary for over three years. A new

Lieutenant-Governor of Lower Canada was then appointed, who in his

turn also remained in England for many years and received pay in

respect of an office the duties of which he did not perform.[217]

[Sidenote: Evils of absenteeism.]

Thus it resulted that, at a very critical time, two provinces of

the British Empire, whose conditions were specially critical, were

left without a Governor-General, without Lieutenant-Governors,

and without a regular Commander of the Forces, while two men, one

holding the office of Governor-General of the two Canadas and the

other holding the office of Lieutenant-Governor of Lower Canada,

were spending their time and drawing their pay in England. We have

learnt something in the last hundred years, in regard to colonial

administration, and it is now difficult to appreciate a state of

public morality which showed so much indifference to the interests

of the colonies, so much acquiescence in sinecures, and so much

readiness on the part of capable and honourable public officers

to take pay without doing the work to which the pay was nominally

attached. But the fact that such things took place, affords a very

simple explanation of the difficulties which had already arisen and

which subsequently arose in the history of European colonization

between a mother country and her colonies. Men could put two and

two together in those days as in ours. If colonists saw the rulers

of the ruling land treating high offices in the colony as a matter

of individual profit and public indifference, they could only come

to the conclusion that they had better take care of themselves;

and if the answer came that governors and lieutenant-governors

were paid not by the colony but by the mother country, then the

colonists must needs have concluded that they themselves would

prefer to find the money and to have the money’s worth. This may

well have been in the minds of the members of the elected Assembly

in Lower Canada when, at a little later date, in 1810, they passed

uninvited a resolution that the province shall pay the cost of

the civil government, a resolution of which more was heard in the

course of the long constitutional struggle.

[Sidenote: External dangers which threatened Canada at the

beginning of the nineteenth century.]

[Sidenote: Hostility of France to Great Britain.]

What made for keeping up the connexion with the mother country

was not so much what the mother country did for the colonies in

peace, as the need which the colonies had for the mother country

in case of war. An attempt has been made in the preceding chapters

of this book to show that good fortune has attended Canada in her

development into a nation. The conquest by Great Britain tended to

this end, so did the loss by Great Britain of the provinces which

now form the United States. At the beginning of the nineteenth

century the cloud of war hung over Canada, but still her good

fortune did not desert her. There was perpetual danger from two

quarters, from France and from the United States. With France

Canada, as being part of the British Empire, was nominally at open

war throughout the closing years of the eighteenth and the early

years of the nineteenth century, except for the very short interval

which followed the conclusion of the Peace of Amiens in 1802; but

it is noteworthy how the political complications inured to the

preservation of Canada as a British possession. France and the

United States had strong bonds of sympathy. To French intervention

the United States largely owed their independence. Having parted

with their monarchy, the French were more attractive than before

to the citizens of the American republic; and in the days of the

American revolutionary war Congress had pledged itself to defend

for ever the French possessions in America. The bulk of the

Canadians, French in race, tradition, language and religion, might

well be expected to be French in sympathies. How great then might

have seemed the probability that England in war with France would

lose Canada? It was no wonder that such incidents as a visit of

Jerome Bonaparte to the United States caused uneasiness, or again

that a report was spread that Moreau, the French republican general

then living in exile in America, was likely to lead an invasion of

Canada.

[Sidenote: French Canadians not in sympathy with the French

Revolution.]

But, as a matter of fact, neither were the Canadians inclined

to return to their French allegiance nor were the people of the

United States in the least likely to permit France to regain

Canada. The Canadians had known forty years of British rule, clean

and just in comparison with what had gone before, and the France

which would reclaim them was widely different from the France to

which they had once belonged. The King was gone; religion was at

a discount; Canadian sympathies, at any rate in the earlier years

of the revolutionary wars, were rather with Royalist _emigrés_

than with the national armies who went on from victory to victory.

Above all antipathy to the United States, without whose abetting

or connivance, no French projects for regaining Canada could

have effect, tended to keep the Canadians firm in their British

allegiance. Thus the news of the victory of Trafalgar was welcomed

in Canada.

[Sidenote: The United States not disposed to allow the French to

regain Canada.]

Nor again were the Americans, however well disposed to France, in

any way or at any time minded to enable her to regain her lost

possessions in North America. A Canadian who had left Canada for

France when Canada was annexed by Great Britain, wrote, before the

conclusion of the Peace of Amiens, expressing the hope that Canada

would be regained by France. He regarded Canada, from the French

point of view, ‘as a colony essential to trade and as an outlet for

merchandize and men’; and he wrote that, if restored to France,

it ‘would constantly furnish the means of speculation which would

improve the future of the citizens whom war and revolution have

reduced to wretchedness’.[218] The words read as those of a man who

had known and still sighed for the days of the old French régime

in Canada, when men grew rich by illicit traffic; but, apart from

the views of individuals, there is no doubt that, as the eighteenth

century closed, France and the French people, after the wars of

the Revolution, with their power consolidated at home, were in the

stage of development favourable to colonial expansion, and mindful

of possessions beyond the seas which had once been French but were

French no longer.

[Sidenote: Napoleon’s views as to St. Domingo and Louisiana.]

[Sidenote: Abandonment of his American schemes.]

Napoleon, as writers have shown, in negotiating for and concluding

the Peace of Amiens which gave him respite from the sea power of

Great Britain, had in view the reconquest of St. Domingo where

Toussaint L’Ouverture had secured practical independence, and the

recovery of Louisiana. By secret bargain with Spain in 1800, he had

secured the retrocession of Louisiana; and, had the arrangement

been carried out and the French power been firmly planted again at

New Orleans and on the Mississippi, a new impetus and a new motive

would have been given for French designs on Canada. But the losses

in the St. Domingo campaigns were heavy, and in regard to Louisiana

Napoleon had to reckon with the American people. Realizing that his

policy, if persisted in, would draw the United States away from

France and towards Great Britain, he came, with some suddenness, to

the conclusion that the game was not worth the candle, and selling

in 1803 to the United States the great territory on the line of

the Mississippi which after all was not his to sell, he put an end

for ever to French aspirations for recovering their North American

dominions.

[Sidenote: Danger to Canada from the United States.]

Napoleon’s decision set Canada free from any possible danger of

French conquest; but, at the same time, it set him free also to

renew war with Great Britain, and cut short any tendency to more

cordial relations between Great Britain and the United States.

The danger for Canada now was that, either as the direct result

of friendship between France and the United States, or indirectly

through the incidents to which the maritime war between France

and Great Britain gave rise, war would take place between Great

Britain and the United States, involving American invasion and not

improbably American conquest of Canada. Eventually, in 1812, war

came to pass. Once more England was called upon to fight France

and the United States at the same time; but in this second war the

Canadians, heart-whole in defending their province against their

rivals of old time, themselves largely contributed to the saving of

Canada.

[Sidenote: The incident of the _Leopard_ and the _Chesapeake_.]

[Sidenote: Sir James Craig appointed Governor-General of Canada.]

[Sidenote: His previous career.]

The causes which led to the war of 1812 have been noted in another

book.[219] One of the incidents which preluded it was the action

of a British ship of war, the _Leopard_, in firing on the American

frigate _Chesapeake_ and carrying off four men, who were claimed

as deserters from the British navy. This high-handed proceeding

naturally caused the strongest resentment in the United States,

and raised the whole question of the right of search. There was

talk of invading Canada, which was answered by calling out the

Canadian militia; the Canadians answered readily to the call; and

shortly afterwards a new Governor-General arrived in Canada, a man

well tried in war, Sir James Craig. On the 10th of August, 1807,

General Prescott, still Governor-General of Canada, though he had

left in July, 1799, was delicately informed by Lord Castlereagh,

then Secretary of State, that it was necessary to appoint a

new Governor-General. The terms of the letter were that Lord

Castlereagh lamented that circumstances required an arrangement

to be made which might interfere with Prescott’s emoluments. Sir

James Craig accordingly received his commission on the last day of

August, 1807, and landed at Quebec on the 18th of October, too ill

to take the oaths of office until the 24th of that month, when he

took them in his bedroom. Craig, though in failing health, governed

Canada for four years. Like his predecessors he was a distinguished

soldier. He was a Scotchman but was born at Gibraltar, where his

father held the post of civil and military judge in the fortress.

He was born in 1748 and was only fifteen years old when he joined

the army in 1763, the year of the great Peace. He was wounded at

Bunker’s Hill; in 1776 he went to Canada and commanded the advanced

guard of the forces which under Carleton’s command drove the

Americans out of Canada. He took part in Burgoyne’s expedition, was

twice wounded, was present at Saratoga, and was chosen to carry

home dispatches.[220] Later in the war he served with distinction

under Lord Cornwallis in North Carolina. In 1794 he became a

major-general, and in 1795 he was sent to the Cape to take it over

from the Dutch. The Netherlands, recently over-run by a French army

under Pichegru, had been transformed into the Batavian republic,

and the Prince of Orange, then a refugee in England, sent orders by

the British fleet under Admiral Elphinstone, which carried Craig

and his troops, that the British force should be admitted as having

come to protect the colony from the French. The Dutch governor,

however, was not prepared to hand over his charge to British

keeping. Craig accordingly landed his troops at Simonstown, and

successfully attacked the Dutch at Muizenberg, but was not able to

occupy Capetown until the arrival of a force from India, which had

been ordered to co-operate, and which was under the command of a

senior officer, Sir Alured Clarke, the late Lieutenant-Governor of

Lower Canada. On Clarke’s arrival the Dutch capitulated, and Craig

became the first British Governor of the Cape, being succeeded in

1797 by a civilian, Lord Macartney. He served about five years in

India, being promoted to be Lieutenant-General in 1801; and, after

returning to England in 1802, was sent in 1805 to the Mediterranean

in charge of an abortive expedition to Naples, in which British and

Russian troops were to combine against the French. It ended in his

transferring his force to Sicily, where the Neapolitan court had

taken refuge. He then went home in ill health, and in 1807 went out

to Canada. His appointment was no doubt mainly due to his military

reputation, for war with the United States seemed close at hand;

but he was well qualified for it also by his wide experience of

the colonies, and by the fact that, like Prescott, he had already

had a short term of colonial administration. He left behind him at

the Cape a good record as governor, and but for the state of his

health seemed clearly the man for Canada.

[Sidenote: The beginning of his administration.]

In his first speech to the Legislature of Lower Canada in January,

1808, Craig expressed his gratification at meeting the members of

the two Houses ‘in the exercise of the noblest office to which the

human mind can be directed, that of legislating for a free people’,

and he added that he looked forward to the most perfect harmony

and co-operation between them and himself. His anticipations were

not fulfilled, and during the years of his administration the

inevitable struggle for further power on the part of the elected

representatives of the community became accentuated. The session

of 1808 lasted from January to April. It was the last session of

an existing Parliament. No point of difference arose in this short

time between the Assembly and the Executive; but, the Assembly

having passed a Bill, undoubtedly right in principle though

directed against a particular individual, that judges should be

incapable of being elected to or sitting in the House, the Bill

was thrown out by the Legislative Council. This caused ill feeling

between the two branches of the Legislature, and at the same time

the Assembly came into collision with one of the constituencies,

that of Three Rivers, by passing a resolution which excluded from

the House a Jew who had been duly elected as member for Three

Rivers and was promptly re-elected. At the conclusion of the

session a General Election took place in May, but the Legislature

was not called together till April, 1809, and in the meantime

friction began between the governor and the popular representatives.

[Sidenote: Friction between the governor and the Assembly.]

In June, 1808, Craig dismissed certain gentlemen from their

appointments as officers in the town militia on account of their

connexion with the French opposition paper _Le Canadien_. One of

them, M. Panet, had been Speaker of the House of Assembly in the

late Parliament, and when the new House met he was again chosen to

be Speaker, the choice being confirmed by the governor. The House

sat for five weeks in 1809, wrangling over the same questions that

had been prominent in the preceding year, viz. the exclusion from

the House of judges and of members of the Jewish religion: it was

then peremptorily dissolved by the governor, who rated the members

as so many children for wasting time and abusing their functions at

a critical season of national affairs. The election took place in

the following October; and, when the Legislature met in January,

1810, the Assembly was composed of much the same representatives

as before, any change being rather against than in favour of the

governor. In his opening speech the governor intimated that the

Royal approval would be given to any proper Bill passed by both

Houses, rendering the judges ineligible for seats in the Assembly.

The House of Assembly on their side, having passed a resolution to

the effect that any attempt on the part of the Executive or the

other branch of the Legislature to dictate to them or censure their

proceedings was a breach of their privileges, went on to pass loyal

addresses appropriate to the fiftieth year of the King’s reign,

their loyalty being, perhaps, quickened by the strong reference

which had been made in the governor’s speech ‘to the high-sounded

resentment of America’, coupled with an assurance that in the event

of war Canada would receive ‘the necessary support of regular

troops in the confident expectation of a cheerful exertion of the

interior force of the country’. There followed an Address to the

King and the Imperial Parliament, to which reference has already

been made, and in which the Assembly, with many expressions of

gratitude, intimated that the prosperity of Lower Canada was now so

great that they could in that session pay all the expenses of the

civil government. This Address the governor promised to lay before

the King, though he pointed out that it was unconstitutional

in, among other points, ignoring the Legislative Council. A Bill

excluding the judges was then passed and sent up to the Legislative

Council, who amended it by adding a clause which postponed its

effect until the next Parliament, whereupon the Assembly passed a

resolution excluding by name a certain judge who had a seat in the

House, and the governor, rightly deeming their action in the matter

to be unconstitutional, on the 26th of February again dissolved

Parliament.

[Sidenote: Proceedings taken by the governor against _Le Canadien_.]

[Sidenote: Craig retires on ill health.]

[Sidenote: His death and character.]

[Sidenote: Prosperity of Canada under Sir James Craig.]

[Sidenote: Growth of the lumber trade.]

[Sidenote: The first steamer on the St. Lawrence.]

[Sidenote: Road to the Eastern Townships.]

The French newspaper, _Le Canadien_, abounded weekly in scurrilous

abuse of the authorities. On the 17th of March Craig took the

strong step of seizing the printing press and all the papers, and

committing to prison various persons connected with the paper,

three of whom had been members of the late House of Assembly. He

justified his action in a proclamation to the country at large. The

prisoners were released in the course of the summer on the score of

ill health or submission, with the exception of one French Canadian

named Bedard, who refused to come to terms with the Executive

and was still in prison when the new Assembly, to which he had

been elected, met on the 12th of December, 1810. The governor,

in his masterful proceedings, had acted under the authority of

a temporary law entitled ‘an Act for the better preservation of

His Majesty’s Government, as by law happily established in this

province’. This Act was now expiring, and in his opening address

he called attention to the necessity for renewing it. He carried

his point, the Act was renewed, and, in addition to resolutions

on the subject of Mr. Bedard’s imprisonment, the Assembly did

some useful legislative work before the Legislature was prorogued

on the 21st of March, 1811. Shortly after the prorogation Mr.

Bedard was released, and on the 19th of June, 1811, Sir James

Craig left Canada. He had long been in failing health, and in the

proclamation, in which he defended his seizure of _Le Canadien_ and

those responsible for it, he had referred pathetically to his life

as ‘ebbing not slowly to its period under the pressure of disease

acquired in the service of my country’. His resignation had been

for some months in the hands of the Government, and it was only in

order to suit their convenience that he put off his departure to

the date when it actually took place. He reached England alive, but

died in the following January in his sixty-second year. He was a

man of conspicuous honesty and of undoubted courage and firmness.

He had a soldier’s view as to discipline and subordination, which

made him peremptory as a governor, and his addresses tended to be

long-winded and dictatorial. But his personal popularity was great,

he was dignified, hospitable, and open-handed, and he commanded

respect even from his political opponents and from those whom he

put into prison. He may well have been forgiven much not only for

his personal qualities, but also because his military reputation

was no small asset to Canada. His dealings with the United States

were fair and courteous, but behind them was the known fact of

his capacity and experience as a soldier. He might dispute with

those whom he governed in the sphere of civil action, but in the

event of war they had in him a leader upon whom they could rely.

The Canadians too had reason to be in the main satisfied with

his rule, in that the years during which Craig was governor were

years of much prosperity. It was at this time that, stimulated

by Napoleon’s attempts to cut off Great Britain from the Baltic

trade and by the Non Intercourse Acts of the United States, lumber

became an important industry of Canada. It was at this time too,

at the beginning of November, 1809, that a citizen of Montreal,

John Molson, put the first steamer on the St. Lawrence, her

passage from Montreal to Quebec taking sixty-six hours, during

thirty of which she was at anchor. Craig himself contributed to

improvement of communication in Lower Canada by constructing sixty

miles of road which bore his name, and which linked the Eastern

Townships, then being settled largely by immigrants from the United

States, to the southern bank of the St. Lawrence over against

Quebec. This road, which was carried out by the troops under the

Quartermaster-General, afterwards Sir James Kempt, Administrator

of Canada, was, as Craig wrote to his friend and secretary Ryland,

much wanted ‘not merely for the purpose of procuring us the

necessary supplies but for the purpose also of bringing the people

to our doors’:[221] and it resulted in the price of beef falling

in the Quebec market from 7½_d._ to 4½_d._ a lb.[222] It gave an

outlet to Quebec to a fine agricultural district, and it opened a

direct route to Boston from the capital of Canada.

[Sidenote: Ryland’s mission to England.]

When Craig wrote these letters to Ryland, the latter was in

England. He had been sent by the governor to lay the views of the

latter upon the political situation in Canada before the Home

Government; and, reaching England at the end of July, 1810, he was

active in interviewing ministers and supplying them verbally and

by written memoranda with first-hand information. Ryland had gone

out to America in 1781 as a paymaster in the army during the War

of Independence; and, returning with Carleton at the end of the

war, had been taken by him to Canada as confidential secretary. He

continued to hold that office to successive governors for twenty

years, until 1813, when Sir George Prevost, who followed Craig as

Governor-General and with whom Ryland was not in harmony, suggested

that other arrangements should be made for the secretaryship.

Ryland then resigned his office of governor’s secretary but

remained clerk to the Executive Council, living in the suburbs of

Quebec, until his death in 1838. He seems to have been an able,

honourable man, strongly opposed to the democratic party in Lower

Canada, to the French and Roman Catholic section of the community.

In England he was brought into relations chiefly with Lord

Liverpool, who was Secretary of State for War and the Colonies[223]

in the Percival ministry, having succeeded Lord Castlereagh in that

office, and with the Under-Secretary of State, Robert Peel. Peel

was then beginning his public life, and Ryland’s impression of him

on his first interview was that ‘though a very young man and but

a few days in office [he] appears to be very much _au fait_ in

matters of public business’. A week or two later he wrote of him

as ‘a very elegant young man of fine talents, as I am informed’,

and very pleasing manners.[224] With these two ministers and

with various other public men, including George Canning, Ryland

conferred or corresponded during his stay in England, which lasted

for the better part of two years. On one occasion, soon after his

arrival, he was present at a Cabinet Council, being seated, as

we learn from the full account which he wrote to Craig, between

Percival and Lord Liverpool. He was asked a large number of

questions, including a query as to the number of regular troops in

Canada, and, as the result, he appears to have formed a very poor

opinion of the knowledge and capacity of the ministry.

[Sidenote: Craig’s views on the political situation in Lower

Canada.]

He had brought with him to England a very long dispatch in which

Craig had set out his views. Craig estimated the population of

Lower Canada at the time when he wrote, May, 1810, at between

250,000 and 300,000 souls, out of whom he computed that no more

than 20,000 to 25,000 were English or Americans. The remainder,

the French Canadians, he represented as, in the main, wholly

alienated from the British section of the community, French in

religion, laws, language and manners, and becoming more attracted

to France and more alienated from Great Britain, in proportion as

the power of France in Europe became more consolidated. The large

mass of the people were, so he wrote, wholly uneducated, following

unscrupulous men, their leaders in the country and in the House of

Assembly. The Roman Catholic priests were anti-English on grounds

of race and religion; their attachment to France had been renewed

since Napoleon made his concordat with the Pope; and, being largely

drawn from the lower orders of society, and headed by a bishop who

exercised more authority than in the days of the old régime and

who arrogated complete independence of the civil government, they

were hardly even outwardly loyal to the British Crown. The growing

nationalist and democratic feeling was reflected and embodied in

the elected House of Assembly. When the constitution was first

granted, some few Canadian gentlemen had come forward and been

elected; but, at the time when the governor wrote, the Canadian

members of the Assembly, who formed an overwhelming majority,

according to his account consisted of avocats and notaries,

shopkeepers and habitants, some of the last named being unable

either to read or write. The organ of the party was the paper

_Le Canadien_, which vilified the Executive officers as ‘gens en

place’, and aimed at bringing the government into contempt.

[Sidenote: Constitutional changes recommended.]

To meet the evils which he deemed so great and emphasized so

strongly, Craig proposed that the existing constitution should be

either cancelled or suspended. His view, as expressed in a letter

to Ryland written in November, 1810,[225] was that it should

be suspended during the continuance of the war with France and

for five years afterwards, and that in this interval the former

government by means of a governor and a nominated Legislative

Council should be revived. He argued that representative

institutions had been prematurely granted, before French Canadians

were prepared for them; that they had been demanded by the English

section of the inhabitants, not the French; and that at the time

the best informed Canadians had been opposed to the change. In

the alternative, he discussed the reunion of the two provinces,

so as to leaven the Assembly with a larger number of British

members, though he did not advocate this course; and the re-casting

of the electoral divisions in Lower Canada, so as to give more

adequate representation to those parts of the province, such as

the Eastern Townships, where the English-speaking element could

hold its own. In any case he pointed out the necessity of enacting

a property qualification for the members of the Assembly, no such

qualification being required under the Act of 1791, although

that Act prescribed a qualification for the voters who elected

the members. Craig went on to urge, as Milnes had urged before

him, that the Royal supremacy should be exercised over the Roman

Catholic priesthood, additional salary being given to the bishop,

in consideration of holding his position under the Crown, and the

curés being given freehold in their livings under appointment from

the Crown. There was a further point. The Sulpician seminary at

Montreal was possessed of large estates, and Craig considered this

clerical body to be dangerous in view of the fact that it consisted

largely of French emigrant priests. He proposed therefore that the

Crown should resume the greater part of the lands.

[Sidenote: Craig’s views not accepted by the Imperial Government.]

Ryland soon found that the ministry were not prepared to face

Parliament with any proposals for a constitutional change in

Canada, and that they were more inclined to what he called ‘the

namby-pamby system of conciliation’.[226] They thought that it had

been a mistake in the first instance to divide Canada into two

provinces, but the only step which they now took was to procure

a somewhat superfluous opinion from the Attorney-General to the

effect that the Imperial Parliament could alter the constitution of

the provinces, or could reunite them with one Council and Assembly;

and a rather less self-evident opinion that the governor could not

redistribute the electoral divisions of Lower Canada without being

authorized to do so by an Act either of the Imperial or of the

Colonial Legislature.

[Sidenote: Critical condition of England at the time of Ryland’s

mission.]

To Ryland the affairs of Canada were all in all; to the ministry

whom he deemed so weak, they were overshadowed by events and

difficulties at home and abroad, compared with which the political

questions which troubled Lower Canada were insignificant,

noteworthy only as likely, if not carefully handled, to add to

the burden which was laid on the statesmen responsible for the

safe-keeping of the Empire. In 1809 Talavera had been fought and

hardly won, but it was the year also of the disastrous expedition

to Walcheren. In 1810, behind the lines of Torres Vedras,

Wellington was beginning to turn the tide of French invasion in the

Peninsula. The next year saw Massena’s retreat, but at home the

political situation was complicated by the insanity of the old King

and the consequent necessity of declaring a regency. In 1812, the

year of Salamanca, Percival the Prime Minister was assassinated,

his place being taken by Lord Liverpool, who, as long as Ryland was

in England, had been in charge of the colonies. In the same year,

war with the United States long threatened, came to pass. These

years were in England years of financial distress and of widespread

misery. William Cobbett giving voice to the hungry discontent of

the poor was fined and imprisoned, and Ryland hoped that his fate

would have some effect in Canada.[227]

[Sidenote: Legal opinion as to patronage to appointments in the

Roman Catholic Church in Canada, and as to the Sulpician estates.]

Lord Liverpool, however, was very loyal to Craig, though he

did not support any such drastic measures as the latter had

suggested. At the end of July, 1811, by which time Craig had left

Canada, he wrote a letter to him expressing the Prince Regent’s

high approbation of his general conduct in the administration

of the government of the North American provinces and the

Prince’s particular regret at the cause which had necessitated

his retirement. He wrote too to Craig’s successor, Sir George

Prevost, highly praising Ryland and expressing a hope that he

would be retained in his appointment. The law officers of the

Crown in England had been consulted as to the Roman Catholic

Church in Canada in view of the governor’s proposals, and advised

that so much of the patronage of Roman Catholic benefices as was

exercised by the Bishop of Quebec under the French Government had

of right devolved on the Crown. On the further question, whether

the Crown had the right of property in the estates of the Sulpician

seminary at Montreal, they advised that legally the Crown had the

right, inasmuch as the Sulpicians who remained in Canada after the

British conquest had no legal capacity to hold lands apart from the

parent body at Paris which had since been dissolved, and had not

obtained a licence from the Crown to hold the estates; but the law

officers, seeing the hardship which would be involved in wholesale

confiscation of the lands after so many years of undisturbed

tenure, suggested that the question was one for compromise or

amicable arrangement. In the end nothing was done in the matter in

the direction of Craig’s and Ryland’s views, and many years later,

in 1840,[228] by an ordinance of Lower Canada, the Sulpicians of

Montreal were incorporated under certain conditions and confirmed

in the possession of their estates.

[Sidenote: Sir James Craig’s administration.]

It is not easy to form an accurate estimate of Sir James Craig’s

administration. His views and his methods have been judged in the

light of later history rather than in that of the years which had

gone before. It is somewhat overlooked that at the beginning of

the nineteenth century the normal conditions of the world were

conditions of war not of peace, and that the governors of colonies

were as a rule soldiers whose first duty was the military charge

of possessions held by no very certain tenure. The account usually

given and received is that Craig was an honest but mistaken man,

tactless and overbearing, trying to uphold an impossible system

of bureaucratic despotism, instead of realizing the merits of

representative institutions and giving them full play. The apology

made for him has been that he was guided by and saw with the eyes

of a few rapacious officials, who had no interest in the general

welfare of the community. ‘The government, in fact,’ writes

Christie, ‘was a bureaucracy, the governor himself little better

than a hostage, and the people looked upon and treated as serfs and

vassals by their official lords.’[229]

[Sidenote: Uniacke.]

[Sidenote: James Stuart.]

Constitutions and systems of government are good or bad according

to the kinds of people to which they are applied, the stage

of development which they have reached, and the particular

circumstances existing at a given time inside and outside the land.

It was only with much hesitation that representative institutions

had been given to Canada; and one governor and another, bearing in

mind the conditions which had preceded the War of Independence,

had laid stress on the necessity of having a strong Executive,

and on the growing danger of colonial democracy. They were not

ignorant or shortsighted men; they looked facts in the face and

argued from past experience in America. Again, if the officials

were incompetent placemen, out of sympathy with the people, it was

the governors who laid stress on the necessity of filling official

positions with first-rate men and who occasionally took a strong

line with the men whom they did not consider to be adequate.

Moreover some of the officials, notably the judicial and legal

officers, placed themselves in opposition to the local government

and posed as defenders of the people. Craig dispensed, for the time

at any rate, with the services of two law officers. One of them,

Uniacke, who had been in Nova Scotia, was made Attorney-General

of Lower Canada by Lord Liverpool, and, being considered by the

governor to be unfit for his duties, was sent on leave to England

in 1810 with a request that he should be removed from his office.

He subsequently returned to his work in Canada. The other, James

Stuart, became a notable figure in Canadian history. He was the son

of a United Empire Loyalist, the rector of Kingston in Ontario.

He had been appointed Solicitor-General of Lower Canada by Milnes

in 1801, but after Craig’s arrival ranged himself, as a member

of the Assembly, in opposition to the governor, and in 1809 was

obliged to resign his appointment. After some years of bitter

opposition to the government, he lived to become a leading advocate

of reunion of the two provinces, to be appointed Attorney-General,

to be impeached by the Assembly and again deprived of his office,

and finally to be appointed by Lord Durham Chief Justice of Lower

Canada and to be created a baronet for his public services.

[Sidenote: Thorpe and Willcocks.]

Meanwhile in Upper Canada, where a young Lieutenant-Governor,

Francis Gore, from 1807 to 1811 carried on the administration

firmly and well, various holders of offices opposed the government

and tried to play the part of popular leaders. Judge Thorpe has

already been mentioned, on the Bench and in the House of Assembly

a blatant and disloyal demagogue; another man of the same kind

was Wyatt the Surveyor-General, and another Willcocks, sheriff of

one of the districts, and owner or nominal owner of a libellous

newspaper, for the contents of which the House of Assembly

committed him to jail on the ground of breach of privilege. These

three men were suspended from their appointments, and eventually

disappeared from Canada to make their voices heard in England or

in the United States; and the end of Willcocks was to be killed

fighting against his country in the war of 1812. One thing is

certain that in their official positions they were disloyal to the

government, and that in their disloyalty they received no support

from the elected Assembly of Upper Canada. Gore had a difficulty

too with his Attorney-General, Firth, a man sent out from England.

Firth ended by returning to England without leave and joining in

misrepresentations against the Lieutenant-Governor.

[Sidenote: Craig’s opinion of the French Canadians.]

[Sidenote: Real attitude of the French Canadians.]

It may fairly be summed up that in the Canadas many men were found

in office who had been pitchforked into appointments for which

they were unsuited; but that they were by no means invariably

supporters of the Executive against the representatives of the

people, nor were the governors their tools. On the contrary there

were constant cases of such officials opposing the governors, while

the governors in their turn stood out conspicuously in opposition

to the practice of appointing men from outside to offices in

Canada which required special qualifications in addition to good

character and general capacity. But a distinction must be drawn

between Upper and Lower Canada. In Upper Canada the voters and

their nominees, however democratic, were, with the exception of

a few traitorous individuals, intensely loyal to the British

connexion. In Lower Canada, on the other hand, the all-important

race question complicated the situation, and here Craig saw in the

French Canadians, who were also the democratic party, the elements

of disloyalty to Great Britain and _rapprochement_ with France. In

August, 1808, he wrote that the Canadians were French at heart;

that, while they did not deny the advantages which they enjoyed

under British rule, there would not be fifty dissentient voices,

if the proposition was made of their re-annexation to France: and

that the general opinion among the English in Canada was that

they would even join the Americans if the latter were commanded

by a French officer. His views on this point were fully shared by

another man of clear head and sound judgement, Isaac Brock. For

reasons which have been given Craig seems to have exaggerated any

danger of the kind. Republican France, which attracted American

sympathies, repelled those of the French Canadians. France under

Napoleon, brought back to law and order and to at any rate the

outward conventionalities of religion, became more attractive

to the French Canadians, but at the same time, in view of the

Napoleonic despotism, it became less attractive to the United

States. But at no time probably was there any real intention on the

part of the French Canadians to take any active step to overthrow

British supremacy. Certainly at no time was there the slightest

possibility of their changing their status except by becoming

absorbed in the United States. They were as a whole an unthinking

people, to whom representative institutions and a free press were

a novelty; their leaders liked the words and phrases which they

had learnt from English-speaking demagogues or imported from

revolutionary France. Their priesthood was not loyal, because it

claimed to be independent of the civil government, especially when

it was the government of a Protestant Power. The general aim was to

see to what uses the new privileges could be applied and how much

latitude would be given. The elected representatives opposed the

second chamber, the Legislative Council, as much as they opposed

the governor; they played with edged tools, but it may be doubted

whether at this early stage of the proceedings they meant much more

than play.

Under the circumstances, perhaps a fair judgement upon Sir James

Craig’s administration would be that he took the Parliamentary

situation in Lower Canada too seriously, and did not give

sufficient rope to the local politicians. He reprimanded the

Assembly when they acted unconstitutionally, and dissolved them

when they did not do their work. The strong measures which he

adopted, and the repeated dissolutions, were a bad precedent for

the future: and the course which he recommended, viz. suspension

of the constitution, would, if carried into effect, have been

premature and unwise. But for the moment the steps which he took

were effective. By his summary action in regard to the newspaper

_Le Canadien_, he showed that he had the ultimate power and was

not afraid to use it; and the result was that the very law which

gave the Executive extraordinary powers was renewed by the Assembly

which objected to those powers. Meanwhile Canada thrived, the

governor was personally respected, and repeated elections did no

one any harm. It was a time of danger from without and unrest

within, but many countries with admirable constitutions have fared

much worse than did Lower Canada under the rule of a strong soldier

confronted by a recalcitrant Assembly.

He was succeeded by a man of wholly different type, Sir George

Prevost, who endeared himself greatly to the French Canadians;

but internal differences were soon to be overshadowed by foreign

invasion, for in one year to the day from the date when Sir James

Craig left Canada, Madison, President of the United States, issued

a proclamation which began the war of 1812.

FOOTNOTES:

[216] He belonged to the same family as the Earl of Crewe,

Secretary of State for the Colonies.

[217] The Lieutenant-Governor in question was Mr., afterwards Sir,

F. Burton. His commission was dated November 29, 1808, but he

did not go out to Canada till 1822. He left Canada in 1828, but

did not cease to be Lieutenant-Governor, as his commission was

renewed on October 25, 1830--the year of King William the Fourth’s

accession. An Act passed in 1782, 22 Geo. III, cap. 75, commonly

known as Burke’s Act, provided against the holding of Patent

offices in the Colonies and Plantations in America and the West

Indies by sinecurists living in England. The operation of this Act

was greatly extended, and the granting of leave restricted by a

subsequent Act of 1814, 54 Geo. III, cap. 61.

[218] See Brymner’s _Report on Canadian Archives_ for 1892,

Introduction, p. xlix.

[219] _The Canadian War of 1812._

[220] See the _Memoir of Sir James Craig_, quoted at length on

pp. 343-5 of vol. i of Christie’s _History of the Late Province

of Lower Canada_, 1848. The notice of Craig in the _Dictionary of

National Biography_ says that he was sent home with dispatches

after the taking of Ticonderoga, which seems to be incorrect.

[221] Letter of August 6, 1810, Christie’s _History of Lower

Canada_, vol. vi, p. 129.

[222] Letter of September 10, 1810, Christie’s _History of Lower

Canada_, vol. vi, p. 157.

[223] The departments of War and the Colonies were combined under

one Secretary of State in 1801. This lasted till 1854, when a

separate Secretary of State for War was appointed.

[224] Ryland to Craig, August 4, and September 1, 1810. Christie,

vol. vi, pp. 124, 149.

[225] Letter of November 9, 1810, Christie, vol. vi, p. 166. The

main dispatch is dated May 1, 1810.

[226] Letter to Craig, August 23, 1810, Christie, vol. vi, p. 146.

[227] Letter to Craig, November 9, 1810, Christie, vol. vi, p. 169.

[228] 3 and 4 Vic., cap. 30.

[229] _History of Lower Canada_, vol. i, p. 350.

[Illustration:

MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE BOUNDARY OF CANADA _to face page 322_

TREATIES

subsequent to the Treaty of 1783,

under which the boundary line was fixed either directly or by

Commission or Arbitration

+---+ _Treaty of Ghent 24 Dec 1814_

| 1 | _Article 4._

+---+

+---+ _Jay’s Treaty of 19 Nov 1794_

| 2 | _Article 5._

+---+

+---+ _Treaty of Washington 9 Aug 1842_

| 3 | _Article 1._

+---+

+---+ _Treaty of Ghent 24 Dec 1814_

| 4 | _Article 6._

+---+

+---+ { _Treaty of Ghent 24 Dec 1814_

| 5 | { _Article 7._

+---+ { _Treaty of Washington 9 Aug 1842_

{ _Article 2._

+---+ { _Convention of London 20 Oct 1818_

| 6 | { _Article 2._

+---+ { _Treaty of Washington 9 Aug 1842_

{ _Article 2._

+---+ _Treaty of Washington 15 June 1846_

| 7 | _Article 1._

+---+

+---+ _Treaty of Washington 8 May 1871_

| 8 | _Articles 34 etc._

+---+

B. V. Barbishire, Oxford, 1908.

]

APPENDIX I

TREATY OF PARIS, 1783

DEFINITIVE TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN HIS

BRITANNIC MAJESTY AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, SIGNED AT

PARIS, THE 3RD OF SEPTEMBER, 1783.

In the Name of the Most Holy and Undivided Trinity. It having

pleased the Divine Providence to dispose the hearts of the Most

Serene and Most Potent Prince, George the Third, by the Grace of

God, King of Great Britain, France and Ireland, Defender of the

Faith, Duke of Brunswick and Lunenburg, Arch-Treasurer and Prince

Elector of the Holy Roman Empire, &c., and of the United States of

America, to forget all past misunderstandings and differences that

have unhappily interrupted the good correspondence and friendship

which they mutually wish to restore: and to establish such a

beneficial and satisfactory intercourse between the 2 Countries,

upon the ground of reciprocal advantages and mutual convenience,

as may promote and secure to both perpetual Peace and Harmony; and

having for this desirable end already laid the foundation of Peace

and Reconciliation by the Provisional Articles signed at Paris,

on the 30th of November, 1782, by the Commissioners empowered on

each part; which Articles were agreed to be inserted in, and to

constitute, the Treaty of Peace proposed to be concluded between

the Crown of Great Britain and the said United States, but which

Treaty was not to be concluded until terms of Peace should be

agreed upon between Great Britain and France, and His Britannic

Majesty should be ready to conclude such Treaty accordingly; and

the Treaty between Great Britain and France having since been

concluded, His Britannic Majesty and the United States of America,

in order to carry into full effect the Provisional Articles

above-mentioned, according to the tenor thereof, have constituted

and appointed, that is to say:

His Britannic Majesty, on his part, David Hartley, Esq.,

Member of the Parliament of Great Britain; and the said

United States, on their part, John Adams, Esq., late a

Commissioner of the United States of America at the Court

of Versailles, late Delegate in Congress from the State

of Massachusetts, and Chief Justice of the said State and

Minister Plenipotentiary of the said United States to

Their High Mightinesses the States General of the United

Netherlands; Benjamin Franklin, Esq., late Delegate in

Congress from the State of Pennsylvania, President of the

Convention of the said State, and Minister Plenipotentiary

from the United States of America at the Court of Versailles;

John Jay, Esq., late President of Congress and Chief Justice

of the State of New York, and Minister Plenipotentiary

from the said United States at the Court of Madrid; to be

the plenipotentiaries for the concluding and signing the

present Definitive Treaty: who, after having reciprocally

communicated their respective Full Powers, have agreed upon

and confirmed the following Articles:

Art. I. His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the said United

States, viz., New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island

and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New

Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North

Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, to be Free, Sovereign

and Independent States; that he treats with them as such;

and for himself, his Heirs and Successors, relinquishes all

claims to the government, propriety and territorial rights of

the same, and every part thereof.

II. And that all disputes which might arise in future on

the subject of the Boundaries of the said United States may

be prevented, it is hereby agreed and declared, that the

following are and shall be their Boundaries, viz., from the

North-West Angle of Nova Scotia, viz., that Angle which

is formed by a line drawn due North, from the source of

St. Croix River to the Highlands, along the said Highlands

which divide those Rivers that empty themselves into the

River St. Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlantic

Ocean, to the North-westernmost head of Connecticut River;

thence down along the middle of that River to the 45th

degree of North latitude; from thence by a line due West

on said latitude until it strikes the River Iroquois or

Cataraquy; thence along the middle of the said River into

Lake Ontario; through the middle of said Lake, until it

strikes the communication by water between that Lake and Lake

Erie; thence along the middle of said communication into

Lake Erie; through the middle of said Lake until it arrives

at the water-communication between that Lake and Lake Huron;

thence along the middle of said water-communication into the

Lake Huron; thence through the middle of said Lake to the

water-communication between that Lake and Lake Superior;

thence through Lake Superior, Northward of the Isles Royal

and Phelipeaux, to the Long Lake; thence through the middle

of said Long Lake, and the water-communication between it

and the Lake of the Woods, to the said Lake of the Woods;

thence through the said Lake to the most North-western point

thereof, and from thence on a due West course to the River

Mississippi; thence by a line to be drawn along the middle

of the said River Mississippi, until it shall intersect the

Northernmost part of the 31st degree of North latitude. South

by a line to be drawn due East from the determination of the

line last mentioned, in the latitude of 31 degrees North

of the Equator, to the middle of the River Apalachicola or

Catahouche; thence along the middle thereof to its junction

with the Flint River; thence straight to the head of St.

Mary’s River, and thence down along the middle of St. Mary’s

River to the Atlantic Ocean, East by a line to be drawn along

the middle of the River St. Croix, from its mouth in the Bay

of Fundy to its source; and from its source directly North to

the aforesaid Highlands, which divide the rivers that fall

into the Atlantic Ocean from those which fall into the River

St. Lawrence: comprehending all islands within 20 leagues

of any part of the shores of the United States, and lying

between lines to be drawn due East from the points where the

aforesaid boundaries between Nova Scotia on the one part, and

East Florida on the other, shall respectively touch the Bay

of Fundy, and the Atlantic Ocean; excepting such Islands as

now are, or heretofore have been, within the limits of the

said Province of Nova Scotia.

III. It is agreed that the People of the United States

shall continue to enjoy unmolested the right to take Fish

of every kind on the Grand Bank and on all the other Banks

of Newfoundland; also in the Gulph of St. Lawrence, and at

all other places in the Sea, where the Inhabitants of both

Countries used at any time heretofore to fish. And also that

the Inhabitants of the United States shall have liberty

to take fish of every kind on such part of the Coast of

Newfoundland as British Fishermen shall use, (but not to dry

or cure the same on that Island,) and also on the Coasts,

Bays, and Creeks of all other of His Britannic Majesty’s

Dominions in America; and that the American Fishermen shall

have liberty to dry and cure fish in any of the unsettled

Bays, Harbours, and Creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands

and Labrador, so long as the same shall remain unsettled; but

so soon as the same, or either of them, shall be settled, it

shall not be lawful for the said Fishermen to dry or cure

fish at such Settlement, without a previous agreement for

that purpose with the Inhabitants, Proprietors, or Possessors

of the ground.

IV. It is agreed, that Creditors on either side shall meet

with no lawful impedimenta to the recovery of the full

value in sterling money of all bonâ fide debts heretofore

contracted.

V. It is agreed, that the Congress shall earnestly recommend

it to the legislatures of the respective states to provide

for the restitution of all estates, rights and properties

which have been confiscated, belonging to real British

subjects; and also of the estates, rights and properties

of persons resident in districts in the possession of his

Majesty’s arms, and who have not borne arms against the said

United States; and that persons of any other description

shall have free liberty to go to any part or parts of

any of the Thirteen United States, and therein to remain

twelve months unmolested in their endeavours to obtain the

restitution of such of their estates, rights and properties

as may have been confiscated; and that Congress shall also

earnestly recommend to the several states, a reconsideration

and revision of all acts or laws regarding the premises, so

as to render the said laws or acts perfectly consistent,

not only with justice and equity, but with that spirit of

conciliation, which, on the return of the blessings of peace,

should universally prevail. And that Congress shall also

earnestly recommend to the several states, that the estates,

rights and properties of such last-mentioned persons shall

be restored to them, they refunding to any persons who may

be now in possession the bonâ fide price (where any has been

given) which such persons may have paid on purchasing any of

the said lands, rights or properties, since the confiscation.

And it is agreed, that all persons who have any interest in

confiscated lands, either by debts, marriage settlements

or otherwise, shall meet with no lawful impediment in the

prosecution of their just rights.

VI. That there shall be no future confiscations made, nor any

prosecutions commenced against any person or persons, for or

by reason of the part which he or they may have taken in the

present war; and that no person shall on that account suffer

any future loss or damage either in his person, liberty

or property, and that those who may be in confinement on

such charges at the time of the ratification of the Treaty

in America, shall be immediately set at liberty, and the

prosecutions so commenced be discontinued.

VII. There shall be a firm and perpetual Peace between His

Britannic Majesty and the said States, and between the

Subjects of the one and the Citizens of the other, wherefore

all hostilities both by sea and land shall from henceforth

cease: all Prisoners on both sides shall be set at liberty,

and His Britannic Majesty shall with all convenient speed,

and without causing any destruction, or carrying away any

Negroes or other property of the American Inhabitants,

withdraw all his Armies, Garrisons and Fleets from the said

United States, and from every Port, Place, and Harbour

within the same; leaving in all Fortifications the American

Artillery that may be therein: and shall also order and cause

all Archives, Records, Deeds, and Papers belonging to any of

the said States, or their Citizens which in the course of

the War may have fallen into the hands of his Officers, to

be forthwith restored and delivered to the proper States and

Persons to whom they belong.

VIII. The navigation of the River Mississippi, from its

source to the Ocean, shall for ever remain free and open to

the Subjects of Great Britain and the Citizens of the United

States.

IX. In case it should so happen that any Place or Territory

belonging to Great Britain, or to the United States, should

have been conquered by the arms of either, from the other,

before the arrival of the said Provisional Articles in

America, it is agreed that the same shall be restored without

difficulty, and without requiring any compensation.

X. The solemn Ratifications of the present Treaty, expedited

in good and due form, shall be exchanged between the

Contracting Parties in the space of 6 months, or sooner if

possible, to be computed from the day of the signature of the

present Treaty.

In witness whereof, we, the undersigned, their Ministers

Plenipotentiary, have in their name, and in virtue of our

Full Powers, signed with our Hands the present definitive

Treaty, and caused the Seals of our Arms to be affixed

thereto,

Done at Paris, this 3rd day of September, in the year of our

Lord, 1783.

(L.S.) D. HARTLEY. (L.S.) JOHN ADAMS.

(L.S.) B. FRANKLIN.

(L.S.) JOHN JAY.

APPENDIX II

THE BOUNDARY LINE OF CANADA

[Sidenote: The North-Eastern boundary.]

On the North-Eastern side, the Treaty of 1783 prescribed the

boundary as follows:--

‘From the North-West angle of Nova Scotia, viz., that

angle which is formed by a line drawn due North; from the

source of St. Croix river to the Highlands; along the said

Highlands which divide those rivers that empty themselves

into the river St. Lawrence from those which fall into the

Atlantic Ocean, to the North-Westernmost head of Connecticut

river; ... East by a line to be drawn along the middle of

the river St. Croix, from its mouth in the Bay of Fundy

to its source, and from its source directly North to the

aforesaid Highlands, which divide the rivers that fall into

the Atlantic Ocean from those which fall into the river St.

Lawrence; comprehending all islands within twenty leagues

of any part of the shores of the United States, and lying

between lines to be drawn due East from the points where the

aforesaid boundaries between Nova Scotia on the one part, and

East Florida on the other, shall respectively touch the Bay

of Fundy and the Atlantic Ocean, excepting such islands as

now are or heretofore have been within the limits of the said

province of Nova Scotia.’

So far as these words refer to the sea boundary of the United

States no difficulty arose, except in the Bay of Fundy. East

Florida was ceded to Spain by Great Britain at the same time that

the treaty with the United States was signed, and therefore the

boundary line in the South had no further concern for the English.

[Sidenote: The border land between Acadia and New England.]

The North-East had been the border land between Acadia and the New

England States. In old days, as was inevitable, there had been

constant disputes between French and English as to the boundary

between Acadia and New England, while Acadia still belonged to

France; and, after the Treaty of Utrecht had given Acadia to Great

Britain, as to the boundary between Acadia and Canada. When, by the

Peace of 1763, Canada was ceded to Great Britain, the question of

boundaries ceased to have any national importance; and no further

difficulty, except as between British Provinces, arose until

the United States became an independent nation. Then it became

necessary to draw an international frontier line, which as a matter

of fact had never yet been drawn. There seems to have been a more

or less honest attempt, with the help of maps which were, as might

have been expected, inaccurate, to adopt a line for which there

was some authority in the past, instead of evolving a wholly new

frontier; and the result of looking to the past was eventually to

fix a boundary which was in no sense a natural frontier.

[Sidenote: The river St. Croix taken in 1763 as the boundary of

Nova Scotia and hence adopted as the boundary line in the Treaty of

1783.]

The river St. Croix had always been a landmark in the history

of colonization in North America. It was the scene of the first

settlement by De Monts and Champlain; and, when Sir William

Alexander in 1621 received from the King the famous grant of Nova

Scotia, the grant was defined as extending to

‘the river generally known by the name of St. Croix and to

the remotest springs, or source, from the Western side of the

same, which empty into the first mentioned river’,

Later, the French claim on behalf of Acadia extended as far as

the Penobscot river, if not to the Kennebec; but after the Treaty

of Utrecht, the claims of Massachusetts to the country up to the

St. Croix river were allowed in 1732;[230] and in 1763, after the

Peace of Paris, the St. Croix river was, in the Commission to

the Governor of Nova Scotia, designated as the boundary of the

province, the following being the terms of the Commission:--

‘Although Our said province has anciently extended, and does

of right extend, so far as the river Pentagoet or Penobscot,

it shall be bounded by a line drawn from Cape Sable across

the entrance of the Bay of Fundy to the mouth of the river

St. Croix, by the said river to its source, and by a line

drawn due North from thence to the Southern boundary of Our

Colony of Quebec.’

Accordingly the river St. Croix was designated as the international

boundary in the Treaty of 1783.

[Sidenote: Doubt as to the identity of the St. Croix river.]

[Sidenote: Commission appointed under the Treaty of 1794 to

identify the river.]

But then the question arose which was the St. Croix river. Between

1763 and 1783 attempts had been made to identify it, but without

success, for at least three rivers flowing into Passamaquoddy Bay

were each claimed as the St. Croix. After the Peace of 1783, the

dispute continued, and eventually the further Treaty of 19th of

November, 1794, known from the name of the American statesman who

negotiated it in London as Jay’s Treaty, provided in the Fifth

Article that the question should be left to the final decision

of three Commissioners, one to be appointed by the British

Government, one by that of the United States, and a third by the

two Commissioners themselves. The article provided that

‘the said Commissioners shall by a Declaration under their

hands and seals decide what river is the river St. Croix

intended by the treaty. The said Declaration shall contain

a description of the said river and shall particularize the

latitude and the longitude of its mouth and its source.’

[Sidenote: The St. Croix river determined in 1798.]

In August, 1795, the Treaty was ratified by Washington as President

of the United States; and, in 1796, the Commissioners began their

work, the third Commissioner being an American lawyer. The work

was not concluded until another explanatory article had been, on

the 15th of March, 1798, signed on behalf of the two Governments,

relieving the Commissioners from the duty of particularizing the

latitude and longitude of the source of the St. Croix, provided

that they described the river in such other manner as they judged

expedient, and laying down that the point ascertained and described

to be the source should be marked by a monument to be erected and

maintained by the two Governments. Eventually, on the 25th of

October, 1798, the Commissioners, who had discharged their duties

with conspicuous fairness and ability, gave their award. They

identified the Scoodic river, as it was then called, with the St.

Croix of Champlain; they selected the Eastern or Northern branch of

the river as the boundary line in preference to the South-Western,

thereby including in American territory a considerable area which

the English had claimed; they marked beyond further dispute the

point which was thereafter to be held to be the source of the St.

Croix; but they did not demarcate the actual boundary line down the

course of the river.

[Sidenote: The Maine Boundary question.]

From the source of the St. Croix, according to the words of the

Treaty of 1783, which have been already quoted, a line was to be

drawn due North to the Highlands which formed the water parting

between the streams running into the St. Lawrence and those running

into the Atlantic Ocean, and this line was supposed to form the

North-West angle of Nova Scotia. No provision was made in the

Treaty of 1794 for determining the boundary North of the source of

the St. Croix river, and the labours of the St. Croix Commission

were confined to identifying that river from the mouth to the

source. A far more serious and more prolonged controversy arose

over the territory to the North of the source, threatening to bring

war between Great Britain and the United States, and not settled

for sixty years.

[Sidenote: The old definitions of the boundary.]

As in the case of the St. Croix, the framers of the Treaty of 1783,

in specifying a line drawn due North from the source of that river,

to meet the Highlands which parted the basin of the St. Lawrence

from that of the Atlantic, had recourse to past history and used

definitions already in existence. Nova Scotia, as granted to Sir

William Alexander, was, according to the terms of the charter,

bounded from the source of the St. Croix

‘by an imaginary straight line which is conceived to extend

through the land, or run Northward to the nearest bay, river,

or stream emptying into the great river of Canada’.

The Royal Proclamation of 1763, which constituted the province of

Quebec after the peace signed in that year, defined the Southern

boundary of Quebec as passing

‘along the Highlands which divide the rivers that empty

themselves into the said river St. Lawrence from those which

fall into the sea’.

The Quebec Act of 1774 again defined the Southern boundary of

Quebec as

‘along the Highlands which divide the rivers that empty

themselves into the river St. Lawrence from those which fall

into the sea, to a point in 45 degrees of Northern latitude

on the Eastern bank of the River Connecticut’.

In the Commission to the Governor of Nova Scotia issued in 1763,

the Western boundary of Nova Scotia from the source of the St.

Croix was defined

‘by a line drawn due North from thence to the Southern

boundary of Our colony of Quebec’.

Therefore the Treaty of 1783, in defining the international line as

a line drawn from the source of the St. Croix

‘directly North to the aforesaid Highlands which divide the

rivers that fall into the Atlantic Ocean from those which

fall into the river St. Lawrence’,

used the previous definitions of the Western boundary of Nova

Scotia and the Southern boundary of Quebec.

[Sidenote: The ‘North-West angle of Nova Scotia’.]

There were only two new points in the wording of the Treaty. The

first was that the sea was defined as the Atlantic Ocean, thereby

excluding the Bay of Chaleurs, and possibly the Bay of Fundy also,

which was, in the Treaty, at any rate according to the British

contention, treated as separate from the Atlantic Ocean. The second

was the importation of the words ‘the North-West angle of Nova

Scotia.’ It was obvious that wherever the Western boundary of Nova

Scotia met the Southern boundary of Quebec there must be such an

angle, but the Treaty spoke of it as a fixed starting point from

whence to draw the boundary line; it assumed that this angle rested

on highlands which divided the waters that flowed into the Atlantic

from those which were tributaries of the St. Lawrence; and it

assumed also that it would be reached by a due North line from the

source of the St. Croix river. So the inaccurate maps of the day

testified, and so paper boundaries, already recognized, prescribed.

When, however, the matter was put to the test of actual geography,

it was found that a line drawn due North from the source of the St.

Croix nowhere intersected a water parting between the St. Lawrence

basin and that of the Atlantic Ocean. The sources of the rivers

which run into the Atlantic were found to be far to the West of

the Northern line from the St. Croix river, to the West of that

line even if it had been drawn from the source of the South-Western

branch of the St. Croix, and not, as the St. Croix Commission had

drawn it, from the source of its more easterly branch. It was

evident that the earlier documents, which the Treaty of 1783 had

followed, were based upon inaccurate information and that it had

never been realized that the source of the St. John river, beyond

which would naturally be sought the head waters of the streams

running into the Atlantic, lay so far to the West, as is actually

the case.

[Sidenote: The terms of the 1783 Treaty were not in accord with

actual facts.]

It was therefore physically impossible to mark out a boundary in

accordance with the terms of the Treaty. If the due Northern line

was adhered to, the Highlands mentioned by the Treaty could not

be reached. If those Highlands were adhered to, the due Northern

line must be abandoned. In either case the North-Western angle

of Nova Scotia, instead of being a fixed starting point, was an

unknown factor, an abstraction which could only be given a real

existence by bargain and agreement. The matter was one of vital

importance to Great Britain, for it involved the preservation or

abandonment of communication between the Maritime Provinces and

Canada, all important in winter time when the mouth of the St.

Lawrence was closed. The direct North line cut the St. John river

slightly to the west of the Grand Falls on that river; and, had

it been prolonged in the same direction, searching for Highlands

till the St. Lawrence was nearly reached, Canada and New Brunswick

would have been almost cut off from each other. The longer the

controversy went on, the more clearly this result was seen by the

Americans as well as by the English, hence the bitterness of the

dispute and the tenacity with which either party maintained their

position and accentuated their claims.

[Sidenote: Attempt at settlement in 1803.]

[Sidenote: The second American war.]

[Sidenote: The British Contention.]

On the 12th of May, 1803, a Convention was signed between Great

Britain and the United States providing that the dispute should be

left to the decision of an International Commission constituted

in precisely the same manner as the St. Croix Commission had

been constituted; but the Convention was never ratified, and the

points at issue were still outstanding when the negotiations were

set on foot which ended in the Treaty of Ghent at the close of

the second war between the two nations. During the war formal

possession was taken on behalf of Great Britain of the country

between the Penobscot river and New Brunswick, which included

the area under dispute, a proclamation to that effect being

issued at Halifax on the 21st of September, 1814;[231] but at

the date of the proclamation negotiations for peace were already

proceeding, and the only basis on which the Americans would treat

was the restitution of the status quo ante bellum, proposals

for an adjustment of the boundary between New Brunswick and

Massachusetts,[232] of which Maine then formed part, being treated

as a demand for cession of territory belonging to the United

States. On the British side it was maintained that the line claimed

by the Americans

‘by which the direct communication between Halifax and Quebec

becomes interrupted, was not in contemplation of the British

Plenipotentiaries who concluded the Treaty of 1783’,[233]

and in a later letter, replying to the American representatives,

the British negotiators wrote[234]

‘the British Government never required that all that portion

of the State of Massachusetts intervening between the

Province of New Brunswick and Quebec should be ceded to Great

Britain, but only that small portion of unsettled country

which interrupts the communication between Halifax and

Quebec, there being much doubt whether it does not already

belong to Great Britain’.

The inference to be drawn from the correspondence is that, on the

strict wording of the Treaty of 1783, apart from the intention of

those who negotiated it, the American claim was recognized to be

stronger than the British.

[Sidenote: The Treaty of Ghent.]

[Sidenote: A Boundary Commission appointed.]

[Sidenote: The Commissioners disagree.]

The Treaty of Ghent was signed on the 24th of December, 1814,

and the Fifth Article provided that two Commissioners should be

appointed to locate the North-West angle of Nova Scotia as well as

the North-Westernmost head of the Connecticut river, between which

two points the Treaty of 1783 provided that the dividing line along

the Highlands was to be drawn. A map of the boundary was to be

made, and the latitude and longitude of the North-West angle and

of the head of the Connecticut were to be particularized. If the

Commissioners agreed, their report was to be final; but if they

disagreed, they were to report to their respective governments, and

some friendly sovereign or state was to arbitrate between them. The

Commission first met in 1816, much time was taken up in surveying

the North line from the source of the St. Croix to the watershed

of the St. Lawrence, and it was not until 1821 that the two

representatives, having failed to agree, gave distinct awards, the

British Commissioner placing the North-West angle at the Highlands

known as Mars Hill nearly 40 miles south of the St. John river, and

the American Commissioner locating it nearly 70 miles north of that

river, either Commissioner adopting the extreme claim put forward

by his side.

[Sidenote: The Convention of 1827.]

[Sidenote: Award given by the King of the Netherlands as

Arbitrator.]

[Sidenote: The award not accepted by the Americans.]

In view of the divergence between the two reports, it was

necessary, in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Ghent, to

submit the matter to arbitration; but this step was not taken until

yet another Convention had been signed on the 29th of September,

1827, providing that new statements of the case on either side

should be drawn up for submission to the arbitrator. It was laid

down that the basis of the statements should be two specified

maps, one of which was referred to as the map used in drawing

up the original Treaty of 1783. The inaccuracies in this map,

Mitchell’s map, had been the origin of all the difficulties which

had subsequently arisen. The King of the Netherlands was selected

to arbitrate. In 1830 the statements were laid before him, and

in January, 1831, he gave his award. It was to the effect that

it was impossible, having regard either to law or to equity, to

adopt either of the lines proposed by the two contending parties,

and that a compromise should be accepted which was defined in

the award. The line which the king proposed was more favourable

to the Americans than to the English, but the Americans declined

to consent to it, on the ground that, while the arbitrator

might accept either of the two lines which were presented for

arbitration, he was not empowered to fix a third and new boundary.

[Sidenote: Collision in the Aroostook region.]

[Sidenote: The Ashburton Treaty.]

[Sidenote: Final settlement of the Maine boundary question.]

Thus this troublesome matter was still left outstanding, and yet

the necessity for a settlement was more pressing than ever. The new

state of Maine maintained the American claim with more pertinacity

and less inclination to compromise than the Government of the

United States had shown; the United States Government was ready to

accept a conventional line, but Maine objected, and meanwhile the

result of the uncertainty and delay was that the backwoodsmen of

Maine and New Brunswick were coming to blows. About the beginning

of 1839 the disputes in the region of the Aroostook river nearly

brought on war between the two nations, which was only averted

by the mediation of General Winfield Scott then commanding the

American forces on the frontier. Immediately afterwards two British

Commissioners, Colonel Mudge and Mr. Featherstonhaugh, were deputed

to survey the debatable territory and reported in April, 1840,[235]

their report being followed by a survey on the part of the American

Government. At length, on the 9th of August, 1842, Daniel Webster

then Secretary of State for the United States, and Lord Ashburton,

sent out as special Commissioner from Great Britain, concluded the

Treaty of Washington, which put an end to the long and dangerous

controversy. By the First Article of that Treaty the present

boundary was fixed; the North line from the monument at the head of

the St. Croix river was followed to the point where it intersected

the St. John; the middle of the main channel of that river was then

taken as far as the mouth of its tributary the St. Francis; thence

the middle of the channel of the St. Francis up to the outlet of

the Lake Pohenagamook; from which point the line was drawn in a

South-Westerly direction to the dividing Highlands and the head of

the Connecticut river until the 45th degree of North latitude was

reached. The boundary was subsequently surveyed and marked out, and

upon the 28th of June, 1847, the final results were reported and

the matter was at an end.

[Sidenote: Settlement of the boundary between the province of

Quebec and that of New Brunswick.]

The existing boundary is on the whole more favourable to Great

Britain than the line which the King of the Netherlands proposed

and the Americans rejected; but notwithstanding, Lord Ashburton’s

settlement has always been regarded in Canada as having given to

the United States territory to which Great Britain had an undoubted

claim. The fault, however, was not with Lord Ashburton but with the

wording of the original Treaty of 1783; and that treaty, as has

been shown, was based on such geographical information as there

was to hand, accepted at the time in good faith, but subsequently

proved to be incorrect. It should be added that by the Third

Article of the Ashburton Treaty the navigation of the river St.

John was declared to be free and open to both nations, and that

the settlement of the international boundary was followed by an

adjustment of the frontier between Canada and New Brunswick. The

dispute between the two provinces was, at the suggestion of the

Imperial Government, eventually referred to two arbitrators, one

chosen by each province, with an umpire selected by the arbitrators

themselves. The award was given in 1851, and in the same year its

terms were embodied in an Imperial Act of Parliament

‘for the settlement of the boundaries between the provinces

of Canada and New Brunswick’.

[Sidenote: The International boundary in the Bay of Fundy.]

In the Bay of Fundy the boundary line between British and American

territory was, by the terms of the 1783 Treaty, to be drawn due

East from the mouth of the St. Croix river, assigning to the United

States all islands within twenty leagues of the shore to the South

of the line,

‘excepting such islands as now are or heretofore have been

within the limits of the said province of Nova Scotia.’

Here was a further ground of dispute, touching the ownership of

the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay. Geographically they would belong

to the United States, unless they could be shown to have been

within the limits of Nova Scotia. The Convention of 1803, which

has already been mentioned as never having been ratified, in the

First Article prescribed the boundary; and the Treaty of Ghent

in the Fourth Article referred the matter to two Commissioners

on precisely the same terms as were adopted by the next Article

of the Treaty in the case of the North-West angle controversy,

i.e., each nation was to appoint an arbitrator, and, if the two

arbitrators failed to agree, separate reports were to be made to

the two governments, and the final decision was to be left to some

friendly sovereign or state. Fortunately the two arbitrators came

to an agreement, delivering their award on the 24th of November,

1817. Three little islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy, named

Moose Island, Dudley Island, and Frederick Island, were allotted

to the United States, and the rest of the islands in the bay,

together with the island of Grand Manan, lying further out in the

Bay of Fundy, were assigned to Great Britain. The actual channel,

however, was not delimited; and though many years afterwards, under

a Convention of 1892, Commissioners were appointed for the purpose,

they failed to come to a complete agreement; this small question

therefore between the two nations is still awaiting settlement

under the Treaty for the delimitation of International Boundaries

between Canada and the United States which was signed on 11th

April, 1908.[236]

[Sidenote: The line from the North-Westernmost head of the

Connecticut river to the St. Lawrence.]

From the point where the boundary line struck the North-Westernmost

head of the Connecticut River, the Treaty of 1783 provided that it

should be carried

‘down along the middle of that river to the forty-fifth

degree of North latitude, from thence by a line due West

on said latitude until it strikes the river Iroquois or

Cataraquy’.

Iroquois or Cataraquy was the name given to the St. Lawrence

between Montreal and Lake Ontario, and the First Article of Lord

Ashburton’s Treaty, identifying the North-Westernmost head of the

Connecticut River with a river called Hall’s Stream, re-affirmed

in somewhat different words the provision of the older Treaty as

to this section of the boundary. Here there was no dispute. The

line had already been laid down in the Proclamation of 1763 and the

Quebec Act of 1774. In the words of the Ashburton Treaty it was the

line

‘which has been known and understood to be the line of actual

division between the States of New York and Vermont on one

side and the British province of Canada on the other’.

[Sidenote: The line up the St. Lawrence and the lakes.]

From the point where the 45th parallel intersected the St.

Lawrence, the line was, under the Treaty of 1783, to be carried

up the middle of the rivers and lakes to the water communication

between Lake Huron and Lake Superior, with the necessary result

that Lake Michigan was entirely excluded from Canada. By the

Sixth Article of the Treaty of Ghent two Commissioners were to

be appointed to settle doubts as to what was the middle of the

waterway and to which of the two nations the various Islands

belonged: and, as in other cases, if the Commissioners disagreed,

they were to report to their respective governments with a view

to arbitration by a neutral power. A joint award was given,[237]

signed at Utica on the 18th of June, 1822, the boundary being

elaborately specified and the report being accompanied by a series

of maps.

[Sidenote: The line between Lake Huron and Lake Superior, and to

the most North-Western point of the Lake of the Woods.]

[Sidenote: Nonexistence of the ‘Long Lake’.]

[Sidenote: The ‘most North-Western point of the Lake of the Woods’

determined.]

[Sidenote: The Ashburton Treaty and the Treaty of 1871.]

[Sidenote: Navigation of the St. Lawrence.]

The Treaty of 1783 laid down that the line was to be drawn, as

already stated, through the middle of Lake Huron

‘to the water-communication between that lake and Lake

Superior; thence through Lake Superior, Northward of the

Isles Royal and Phelipeaux to the Long Lake; thence through

the middle of said Long Lake and the water communication

between it and the Lake of the Woods to the said Lake of the

Woods, thence through the said lake to the most North-Western

point thereof’.

Under the Sixth Article of the Treaty of Ghent the Commissioners

defined the frontier line well into the strait between Lakes Huron

and Superior, but stopped short of the Sault St. Marie, at a point

above St. Joseph’s Island and below St. George’s or Sugar Island.

Here they considered that their labours under the Sixth Article

terminated. But the next Article of the Treaty of Ghent provided

that the same two Commissioners should go on to determine

‘that part of the boundary between the dominions of the two

powers, which extends from the water communication between

Lake Huron and Lake Superior to the most North-Western point

of the Lake of the Woods’.

Comparing these words with the terms of the 1783 Treaty, it will

be noticed that mention of the Long Lake is eliminated, as it had

been discovered in the meantime that the Long Lake could not be

identified. On this section of the boundary the Commissioners were

not at one. Accordingly on the 23rd of October, 1826,[238] they

presented an elaborate joint report showing the points on which

they had come to an agreement, and those on which they were at

variance, with their respective recommendations. As to a great

part of the line they were in accord, and especially they defined

by latitude and longitude the most North-Western point of the Lake

of the Woods, but they wholly disagreed as to the ownership of

St. George’s or Sugar Island in the strait between Lake Huron and

Lake Superior, and also as to the line to be taken from a point

towards the Western end of Lake Superior[239] to the Lac de Pluie

or Rainy Lake. They made, however, on either side suggestions for

compromise. The matter was set at rest by the Second Article of

Lord Ashburton’s Treaty, St. George’s Island being assigned to the

United States, and a compromise line being drawn from Lake Superior

to Rainy Lake. The channels along the whole boundary line from the

point where it strikes the St. Lawrence are open to both nations;

and by the Twenty-sixth Article of the Treaty of Washington, dated

the 8th of May, 1871, the navigation of the St. Lawrence, from the

point where it is intersected by the International Boundary down

to the sea is declared to be free and open for the purposes of

Commerce to the citizens of the United States, subject to any laws

and regulations of Great Britain and Canada not inconsistent with

the privilege of free navigation.

[Sidenote: The line from the most North-Western point of the Lake

of the Woods to the Mississippi.]

[Sidenote: Mistake as to the source of the Mississippi in the

Treaty of 1783.]

[Sidenote: Corrected by Jay’s Treaty of 1794.]

According to the 1783 Treaty the boundary line from the most

North-Western point of the Lake of the Woods was to be drawn

‘on a due West course to the river Mississippi’,

and was then to follow that river Southwards. Here geographical

knowledge was again wanting. The framers of the treaty were under

the impression that the source of the Mississippi was further North

than is actually the case, and they prescribed a geographical

impossibility. It was not long before the mistake was found out,

for the Fourth Article of Jay’s Treaty of 1794[240] began with the

words

‘Whereas it is uncertain whether the river Mississippi

extends so far to the Northward as to be intersected by a

line to be drawn due West from the Lake of the Woods.’

The same Article provided that there should be a joint survey of

the sources of the river, and, if it was found that the Westward

line did not intersect the river, the boundary was to be adjusted

‘according to justice and mutual convenience and in

conformity to the intent of’

the 1783 Treaty.

[Sidenote: The Convention of 1818.]

[Sidenote: First mention in the boundary agreements of the 49th

Parallel and the Rocky Mountains.]

The Fifth Article of the unratified Treaty of 1803 provided that a

direct line should be drawn from the North-West point of the Lake

of the Woods to the nearest source of the Mississippi, leaving it

to three Commissioners to fix the two points in question and to

draw the line. A further attempt at adjustment was made in 1806-7,

when the negotiators provisionally agreed to an Article to the

effect that the line should be drawn from the most North-Western

point of the Lake of the Woods to the 49th parallel of latitude,

and from that point due West along the parallel

‘as far as the respective territories extend in that quarter’.

This solution again was not carried into effect; and though the

subject was raised in the negotiations which preceded the Treaty

of Ghent in 1814, no mention was made of it in the Treaty itself.

Eventually, however, on the 20th of October, 1818, a Convention was

signed in London, the Second Article of which ran as follows:--

‘It is agreed that a line drawn from the most North-Western

point of the Lake of the Woods along the 49th parallel of

North latitude or, if the said point shall not be in the

49th parallel of North latitude, then that a line drawn

from the said point due North or South, as the case may be,

until the said line shall intersect the said parallel of

North latitude, and from the point of such intersection due

West along and with the said parallel, shall be the line

of demarcation between the territories of His Britannic

Majesty and those of the United States, and that the said

line shall form the Southern boundary of the said territories

of His Britannic Majesty and the Northern boundary of the

territories of the United States from the Lake of the Woods

to the Stony Mountains.’[241]

Here the Rocky Mountains, under the name of the Stony Mountains,

first come in, their existence having been unknown, except by vague

report, when the Peace of 1783 was signed.[242]

[Sidenote: The boundary line as far as the Rocky Mountains finally

determined by the Ashburton Treaty.]

[Sidenote: The Ashburton Treaty finally determined the points

arising out of the wording of the Treaty of 1783.]

Geographical knowledge was creeping on, but the wording of

the Article shows that it was still uncertain whether the

North-Westernmost point of the Lake of the Woods was North or South

of the 49th parallel. This doubt was finally cleared up by the

Commissioners who, as already stated, reported in October, 1826,

and who fixed the point in question in 49° 23′ 55″ North; thus,

when Lord Ashburton negotiated the 1842 Treaty, it was only left

for him, adopting the point which the Commissioners had fixed, to

lay down in the Second Article that the boundary line ran

‘thence, according to existing treaties, due South to its

intersection with the 49th parallel of North latitude, and

along that parallel to the Rocky Mountains’.

The 49th parallel runs through the Lake of the Woods, but the

anterior provision that the boundary line should be carried to the

North-Westernmost point of the lake, coupled with the fact that

that point had been already determined, necessitated an unnatural

and inconvenient diversion of the frontier line first to the

North-West and then due South again, thereby including in American

territory a small corner of land which should clearly have been

assigned to Canada. For this result Lord Ashburton has been blamed,

as he was blamed in the matter of the Maine boundary, but in either

case his hands were tied by previous negotiations and the wording

of existing treaties. A fair review of the whole subject leads to

the conclusion that the Treaty of Washington in 1842 was a not

inadequate compromise of the almost insuperable difficulties which

the wording of the original Treaty of 1783 had left outstanding.

[Sidenote: Later boundary questions.]

In tracing the evolution of the boundary between Canada and the

United States we have now reached the point where the 1783 Treaty

ceased to operate, and have seen that the negotiations connected

with the interpretation of the Treaty resulted in the line of

demarcation being carried far beyond that point, viz., the head of

the Mississippi, up to the range of the Rocky Mountains. Meanwhile

the Pacific Coast had begun to attract attention, and a new crop of

international questions had come into existence.

[Sidenote: The Oregon boundary dispute.]

The Western territory in dispute between the two nations was known

as the Oregon or Columbia territory, and it lay between the 42nd

degree of North latitude and the Russian line in 54° 40′ North

latitude. The Columbia river took its name from the fact that it

had been entered in May, 1792, by an American ship from Boston

named the _Columbia_, commanded by Captain Gray, who thus claimed

to be the discoverer of the river. In 1805 Lewis and Clark, the

first Americans to cross the continent, reached its head waters and

followed the river down to the sea. In 1811 an American trading

settlement was planted at Astoria near its mouth. This settlement

was voluntarily surrendered to Great Britain in the war which

followed shortly afterwards, but was restored, without prejudice,

to the United States under the general restitution article of the

Treaty of Ghent. The Third Article of the subsequent Treaty of

October 20th, 1818, provided that

‘any country that may be claimed by either party on the

North-West coast of America, Westward of the Stony Mountains,

shall, together with its harbours, bays, and creeks and the

navigation of all rivers within the same, be free and open

for the term of 10 years’

to both Powers, without prejudice to the claims either of

themselves or of foreign Powers; and this Article was, by a

Convention of 6th of August, 1827, indefinitely prolonged--subject

to one year’s notice on either side--all claims being, as before,

reserved. This last Convention was concluded, as its terms

specified, in order to prevent all hazard of misunderstanding and

to give time for maturing measures for a more definite settlement.

[Sidenote: The position in 1842.]

On this basis matters stood in 1842, when the Ashburton Treaty was

signed. There was joint occupation of the Oregon territory by

British and American subjects, and freedom of trade for both. Lord

Ashburton had been empowered to negotiate for a settlement of the

North-Western as well as the North-Eastern frontier line; but the

latter, which involved the question of the Maine--New Brunswick

boundary, being the more pressing matter, it was thought well to

allow the determination of the line West of the Rocky Mountains

to stand over for the moment. As soon as Lord Ashburton’s Treaty

had been signed at Washington in August, 1842, Lord Aberdeen, then

Foreign Secretary in Sir Robert Peel’s Ministry, made overtures

to the United States with a view to an early settlement of the

Oregon question. A long diplomatic controversy ensued, complicated

by changes of government in the United States, and tending, as is

constantly the case in such negotiations, to greater instead of

less divergence of view.

[Sidenote: The rival claims.]

The Americans contended that they had a title to the whole

territory up to the Russian line, and they claimed the entire

region drained by the Columbia river. As a compromise, however,

they had already, in the negotiations which ended in the Convention

of 1827, suggested that the boundary line along the 49th parallel

should be continued as far as the Pacific, the navigation of the

Columbia river being left open to both nations. This offer was

repeated as the controversy went on, with the exception that on the

one hand free navigation of the Columbia river was excluded, and on

the other the American Secretary of State proposed

‘to make free to Great Britain any port or ports on

Vancouver’s Island, south of this parallel, which the British

Government may desire’.[243]

The counter British proposal was to the effect that the boundary

line should be continued along the 49th parallel until it

intersected the North-Eastern branch of the Columbia river, and

that then the line of the river should be followed to its mouth,

giving to Great Britain all the country on the north of the river

and to the United States all on the south, the navigation of the

river being free to both nations, and a detached strip of coast

land to the north of the river being also conceded to the United

States, with the further understanding that any port or ports,

either on the mainland or on Vancouver Island, South of the 49th

parallel, to which the United States might wish to have access,

should be constituted free ports.

[Sidenote: Settlement of the Oregon boundary question by the Treaty

of 1846.]

The arguments advanced on both sides, based on alleged priority

of discovery and settlement and on the construction of previous

treaties, are contained in the Blue Book of 1846, and are too

voluminous to be repeated here. The controversy went on from 1842

to 1846; and, when the spring of the latter year was reached, the

Americans had withdrawn their previous offer and had refused a

British proposal to submit the whole matter to arbitration. There

was thus a complete deadlock, but shortly afterwards a debate

in Congress showed a desire on the American side to effect a

friendly settlement of a dispute which had become dangerous, and,

the opportunity being promptly taken by the British Government, a

Draft Treaty was sent out by Lord Aberdeen, which was submitted by

President Polk to the Senate, who by a large majority advised him

to accept it.[244] The Treaty was accordingly signed at Washington

on the 15th of June, 1846. By the First Article the boundary line

was

‘continued Westward along the said forty-ninth parallel of

North latitude to the middle of the channel which separates

the continent from Vancouver Island, and thence Southerly,

through the middle of the said channel and of Fuca’s Straits,

to the Pacific Ocean’,

the navigation of the channel and straits South of the 49th

parallel being left free and open to both nations. By the Second

Article of the same Treaty, the navigation of the Columbia river,

from the point where the 49th parallel intersects its great

Northern branch, was left open to the Hudson’s Bay Company and

to all British subjects trading with the same. The effect of the

Treaty was that Great Britain abandoned the claim to the line of

the Columbia river, and the United States modified its proposal

to adopt the 49th parallel as the boundary so far as to concede

the whole of Vancouver Island to Great Britain. The news that the

treaty had been signed reached England just as Sir Robert Peel’s

ministry was going out of office.

[Sidenote: The San Juan boundary question.]

[Sidenote: Arbitration under the Treaty of 1871.]

The delimitation of the boundary which the Treaty had affirmed

gave rise to a further difficulty. The Treaty having provided that

the sea line was to be drawn southerly through the middle of the

channel which separates Vancouver Island from the continent and of

Fuca’s Straits into the Pacific Ocean, the two nations were unable

to agree as to what was the middle of the channel in the Gulf of

Georgia between the Southern end of Vancouver Island and the North

American coast. The main question at issue was the ownership of

the island of San Juan, and the subject of dispute was for this

reason known as the San Juan boundary question. The British claim

was that the line should be drawn to the Eastward of the island,

down what was known as the Rosario Straits. The Americans contended

that it should be drawn on the Western side, following the Canal

de Haro or Haro Channel. Eventually it was laid down by the 34th

and following Articles of the Treaty of Washington of 8th of

May, 1871--the same Treaty which provided for arbitration on the

_Alabama_ question--that the Emperor of Germany should arbitrate

as to which of the two claims was most in accordance with the true

interpretation of the Treaty of 1846, and that his award should be

absolutely final and conclusive. On the 21st of October, 1872, the

arbitrator gave his award in favour of the United States, and it

was immediately carried into effect, thus completing the boundary

line from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

[Sidenote: The Alaska boundary question.]

In a message to Congress on the subject of the San Juan Boundary

Award, President Grant stated

‘The Award leaves us, for the first time in the history of

the United States as a nation, without a question of disputed

boundary between our territory and the possessions of Great

Britain on this continent;’

and he suggested that a joint Commission should determine the line

between the Alaska territory and the conterminous possessions of

Great Britain, on the hypothesis that here there was no ground of

dispute and that all that was required was the actual delimitation

of an already admitted boundary line. The matter proved to be more

complex than the President’s words implied.

[Sidenote: Russian America ceded to the United States.]

[Sidenote: Line of demarcation between British and Russian

possessions in North America drawn in 1825.]

By a Treaty signed on the 30th of March, 1867, the territory

now known as Alaska was ceded by Russia to the United States.

It was the year in which the Dominion Act was passed; and, when

British Columbia[245] in 1871 joined the Dominion, Canada became,

in respect of that province, as well as in regard to the Yukon

Territory, a party to the Alaska boundary question. The limits of

Russian America, as it was then called, had been fixed as far back

as 1825, when, by a treaty between Great Britain and Russia, dated

the 28th of February in that year, a line of demarcation was fixed

between British and Russian possessions

‘upon the coast of the continent and the islands of America

to the North-West’.

The line started from the Southernmost point of Prince of Wales

Island, which point was defined as lying in the parallel of 54°

40′ North latitude and between the 131st and 133rd degrees of West

longitude. It was carried thence to the North, along the channel

called Portland Channel, up to that point of the continent where it

intersected the 56th parallel of North latitude. From this point it

followed the summit of the mountains parallel to the coast until

it intersected the 141st degree of West longitude, and was carried

along that meridian to the Arctic Ocean. The Treaty provided that

the whole of Prince of Wales Island should belong to Russia, and

that wherever the summit of the mountains running parallel to the

coast between the 56th parallel of North latitude and the point

where the boundary line intersected the 141st meridian was proved

to be at a distance of more than 10 marine leagues from the ocean,

the line should be drawn parallel to the windings of the coast at a

distance from it never exceeding 10 marine leagues.

[Sidenote: Free navigation of rivers.]

Free navigation of the rivers which flowed into the Pacific Ocean

across the strip of coast assigned to Russia was conceded in

perpetuity to British subjects; and, after the transfer of Russian

America to the United States, the Twenty-sixth Article of the

Treaty of Washington of 1871 provided that the navigation of the

rivers Yukon, Porcupine, and Stikine should for ever remain free

and open to both British and American citizens, subject to such

laws and regulations of either country within its own territory as

were not inconsistent with the privilege of free navigation.

[Sidenote: Negotiations for a settlement of the boundary with the

United States.]

[Sidenote: The Convention of 1892.]

In 1872, the year after the entry of British Columbia into the

Dominion of Canada, mining being contemplated in the northern

part of British Columbia, overtures were, at the instance of the

Canadian Government, made to the United States to demarcate the

boundary, which had never yet been surveyed and delimited. The

probable cost of a survey caused delay, and no action had been

taken when in 1875 and 1876 disputes arose as to the boundary line

on the Stikine river. The Canadian Government in 1877 dispatched

an engineer to ascertain approximately the line on the river, and

the result of his survey was in the following year provisionally

accepted by the United States as a temporary arrangement, without

prejudice to a final settlement. Negotiations began again about

1884, and, by a Convention signed at Washington on the 22nd of

July, 1892, it was provided that a coincident or joint survey

should be undertaken of the territory adjacent to the boundary

line from the latitude of 54° 40′ North to the point where the

line intersects the 141st degree of West longitude. It was added

that, as soon as practicable after the report or reports had been

received, the two governments should proceed to consider and

establish the boundary line. The time within which the results of

the survey were to be reported was, by a supplementary Convention,

extended to the 31st of December, 1895, and on that date a joint

report was made, but no action was taken upon it at the time.

[Sidenote: Discovery of gold at Klondyke.]

[Sidenote: Further negotiations.]

In 1896 the Klondyke goldfields were discovered in what now

constitutes the Yukon district of the North-West Territories,

and in the following year there was a large immigration into the

district. The goldfields were most accessible by the passes beyond

the head of the inlet known as the Lynn canal, the opening of

which into the sea is within what had been the Russian fringe of

coast. The necessity therefore for determining the boundary became

more urgent than before. In 1898 the British Government proposed

that the matter should be referred to three Commissioners, one

appointed by each government and the third by a neutral power; and

that, pending a settlement, a _modus vivendi_ should be arranged.

A provisional boundary in this quarter was accordingly agreed

upon, but, instead of the Commission which had been proposed,

representatives of Great Britain and the United States alone met in

1898 and 1899 to discuss and if possible settle various questions

at issue between the two nations, among them being the Alaska

boundary. They were to endeavour to come to an agreement as to

provisions for the delimitation of the boundary

‘by legal and scientific experts, if the Commission should so

decide, or otherwise’,

memoranda of the views held on either side being furnished in

advance of the sittings of the Commission. Again no settlement was

effected.

[Sidenote: The Convention of 1903. Joint Commission appointed.]

The dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela as to the boundary

between Venezuela and British Guiana, in which the Government of

the United States had intervened, had, by a Convention signed in

February, 1897, been referred to arbitration, the Arbitrators

being five in number, two Englishmen, two Americans, and one

representative of a neutral State. In July, 1899, before the award

in this arbitration had been given, Lord Salisbury proposed to

the American Government that a treaty on identical lines with the

Venezuela boundary Convention should apply arbitration to the

Alaska Boundary question. To this procedure, giving a casting vote

on the whole question to a representative of a neutral power,

the American Government took exception, and suggested instead a

Tribunal consisting of ‘Six impartial Jurists of repute’, three to

be appointed by the President of the United States and three by Her

Britannic Majesty. A suggestion made by the British Government that

one of the three Arbitrators on either side should be a subject of

a neutral state was not accepted; and eventually, on the 24th of

January, 1903, a Convention was signed at Washington, constituting

a tribunal in accordance with the American conditions. The three

British representatives were the Lord Chief Justice of England and

two leading Canadians, one of them being the Lieutenant-Governor of

the Province of Quebec.

[Sidenote: Points for decision.]

The preamble of the Convention stated that its object was a

‘friendly and final adjustment’ of the differences which had

arisen as to the ‘true meaning and application’ of the clauses

in the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1825 which referred to the Alaska

boundary. The tribunal was to decide where the line was intended to

begin; what channel was the Portland Channel; how the line should

be drawn from the point of commencement to the entrance to the

Portland Channel; to what point on the 56th parallel and by what

course it should be drawn from the head of the Portland Channel;

what interpretation should be given to the provision in the Treaty

of 1825 that from the 56th parallel to the point where the 141st

degree of longitude was intersected the line should follow the

crest of the mountains running parallel to the coast at a distance

nowhere exceeding ten marine leagues from the ocean; and what were

the mountains, if any, which were indicated by the treaty.

[Sidenote: Main point at issue.]

The main point at issue was whether the ten leagues should be

measured from the open sea or from the heads of the inlets, some

of which ran far into the land. If the latter interpretation were

adopted, the result would be to give to the United States control

of the main lines of communication with the Klondyke Mining

district, just as the Maine boundary threatened to cut, and in

large measure did cut, communication between the Maritime Provinces

and Quebec.

[Sidenote: The Award.]

The Convention provided that all questions considered by the

tribunal, including the final award, should be decided by a

majority of the Arbitrators. The tribunal was unanimous in deciding

that the point of commencement of the line was Cape Muzon, the

Southernmost point of Dall Island on the Western or ocean side of

Prince of Wales Island. A unanimous opinion was also given to the

effect that the Portland Channel is the channel which runs from

about 55°56′ North latitude and passes seawards to the North of

Pearse and Wales Islands; but on all subsequent points there was

a division of opinion, the three American representatives and the

Lord Chief Justice of England giving a majority award from which

the two Canadian members of the tribunal most strongly dissented.

The majority decided that the outlet of the Portland Channel to the

sea was to be identified with the strait known as Tongass Channel,

and that the line should be drawn along that channel and pass to

the South of two islands named Sitklan and Khannaghunut islands,

thus vesting the ownership of those islands in the United States.

They also decided that the boundary line from the 56th parallel of

North latitude to the point of intersection with the 141st degree

of West longitude should run round the heads of the inlets and not

cross them. One section of the line was not fully determined owing

to the want of an adequate survey. The net result of the award

was to substantiate the American claims, to give to the United

States full command of the sea approaches to the Klondyke Mining

districts, and to include within American territory two islands

hard by the prospective terminus of a new Trans-Canadian Railway.

[Sidenote: The Behring Sea arbitration.]

It may be added that the Treaty of 30th March, 1867, by which

Alaska was transferred from Russia to the United States, gave rise

not only to the territorial boundary dispute of which an account

has been given above, but also to a controversy as to American and

British rights in the Behring Sea, more especially in connexion

with the taking of seals. The questions at issue were settled at a

much earlier date than the land boundary, having been, by a treaty

signed at Washington on the 29th of February, 1892, referred to

a tribunal of seven arbitrators, two named by the United States,

two by Great Britain, and one each by the President of the French

Republic, the King of Italy, and the King of Sweden and Norway.

The arbitrators met in Paris and gave their award on the 15th

of August, 1893, the substance of the award, as concurred in

by the majority of the arbitrators, being that Russia had not

exercised any exclusive rights of jurisdiction in Behring Sea or

any exclusive rights to the seal fisheries in that sea outside the

ordinary three-mile limit, and that no such rights had passed to

the United States.

[Sidenote: The Treaty of April 11, 1908.]

The last phase in the evolution of the Boundary line between Canada

and the United States is the Treaty of 11th of April, 1908, ‘for

the delimitation of International Boundaries between Canada and

the United States’, by which machinery is provided ‘for the more

complete definition and demarcation of the International Boundary’,

and for settling any small outstanding points such as, e.g., the

boundary line through Passamaquoddy Bay.

FOOTNOTES:

[230] See the report of the Lords of the Committee of Council

for Plantation Affairs, October 6, 1763, given at pp. 116-18 of

_Documents Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada,

1759-91_ (Shortt and Doughty).

[231] See _State Papers_, vol. i, Part II, p. 1369.

[232] _Note._--The territory in dispute, however, seems partly to

have been claimed by the United States as Federal Territory and

not as belonging to Massachusetts. See the letter from Gallatin to

Monroe, December 25, 1814. _State Papers_ for 1821-2, vol. ix, p.

562.

[233] See _State Papers_, vol. i, Part II, p. 1603.

[234] See _State Papers_, vol. i, Part II, p. 1625.

[235] See the two Blue Books of July, 1840, as to the ‘North

American Boundary’.

[236] The above account of the boundary disputes between Great

Britain and the United States in the region of Maine and New

Brunswick has been mainly taken from the very clear and exhaustive

_Monograph of the Evolution of the Boundaries of the Province of

New Brunswick_, by William F. Ganay, M.A., Ph.D., 1901, published

in the _Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada_, 1901-2, and

also published separately.

[237] It will be found in the _State Papers_ for 1821-2, vol. ix,

p. 791.

[238] The report will be found in the _State Papers_, 1866-7, vol.

lvii, p. 803.

[239] This point is described in the report as ‘100 yards to the

North and East of a small island named on the map Chapeau and lying

opposite and near to the North-Eastern point of Isle-Royale’.

[240] _State Papers_, vol. i, Part I (1812-14), p. 784.

[241] _State Papers_, vol. vi, 1818-19, p. 3--also in Hertslet’s

collection.

[242] As to the discovery of the Rocky Mountains, see vol. v, Part

I of _Historical Geography of the British Colonies_, p. 214 and

note.

[243] Correspondence relative to the negotiation of the question of

the disputed right to the Oregon Territory on the North-West coast

of America subsequent to the Treaty of Washington of August 9,

1842. Presented to Parliament in 1846, p. 39.

[244] A good account of the negotiations is in a _Historical Note_,

1818-46, included in a Blue Book of 1873, C.-692, North America,

No. 5 (1873).

[245] The boundaries of British Columbia had been fixed by an

Imperial Act of 1863.

INDEX

Abercromby, 51, 102, 126, 189, 203.

Acadia, 49, 50, 69, 238 n., &c.

Act of 1791. _See_ Canada Act.

Adams, John, 289.

Adet, 289.

Administration of Justice. _See_ Justice, Administration of.

Albany, 24, 140, 145-9, 154, 157, 165-72, 174-5, 182, 203.

Alleghany, the, 9, 19, 59, 83.

Allen, Ethan, 101, 106, 107, 119 n., 191.

American Civil War, 228-9.

Amherst, Lord, 11, 15, 17, 19, 23, 63, 102, 106, 125, 126, 129, 130,

189, 203, 289.

Amiens, Peace of. _See_ Treaty.

Anne, Fort, 164, 166, 167, 188.

Anticosti Island, 2, 3, 80.

Arbuthnot, Marriot, 127, 198.

Arnold, Benedict, 98 n., 101, 108-12, 113, 114, 116-20, 122, 123,

157, 175, 177, 178, 180 n., 185, 198, 199, 291.

Ashburton Treaty. _See_ Treaty.

Assemblies, Legislative, 3, 4, 71-3, 77, 87-9, 241, 243, 245,

257-65, 295-6, 318-9.

Australia, 32, 44, 45, 205, 278.

Bahamas, 223.

Barbados, 52 n., 253-4.

Bathurst, Lord, 278.

Batten Kill river, 169, 170, 175.

Baum, Colonel, 169-71, 170 n.

Baye des Chaleurs, 2, 224.

Beaver Creek, 27, 83.

Bedard, 307.

Bedford or Raestown, 17, 19, 20.

Belêtre, 12.

Bemus’ Heights, 174.

Bennington, 168-72, 171-2 n., 198.

Bermuda, 257.

Bird, Lieutenant, 153, 156.

Bloody Run. _See_ Parents Creek.

Bonaparte, Jerome, 300.

Boston, 85, 95, 96, 107, 130-2, 182, 213, 221, 309.

Bouquet, Henry, 11, 17, 18 n., 19, 20 and n., 21, 22 and n., 23, 24,

26, 27, 188.

Bouquet river, 159.

Braddock, General, 14, 18, 19, 21, 174.

Bradstreet, Colonel, 23-6, 98 n.

Brandywine, 134, 289.

Brant County, 234.

Brant, Joseph, 97 n., 119 n., 148-58, 150 n., 185-7, 186 n., 232-5.

Brant, Molly, 58, 149, 155.

Brantford, 152, 234, 235 n.

Breyman, Colonel, 170, 171, 176, 178, 179 n.

Brock, Isaac, 317.

Bunker’s Hill, 90, 106, 125-6, 130, 131, 150, 303.

Burgoyne, 116, 122, 125, 126, 129, 130, 131, 138, 139, 144, 145,

146, 152, 158-85, 160 n., 180 n., 182 n., 187, 188, 203,

237-8, 303.

Burke, 54, 83, 89, 117, 128, 135, 216, 244.

Burke’s Act 1782, 298 n.

Burnet, Governor, 147.

Burton, Colonel, 63-5, 67.

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