well for the English in America. Carleton from Canada, Howe from
New York, had uninterrupted progress to report. With Christmas
night there came another tale. In fancied security after the
late campaign, Howe’s troops in New Jersey were quartered at
different points, the commander-in-chief remaining at New York, and
Cornwallis, who had commanded in New Jersey, being on the point
of leaving for England. The village of Trenton on the Delaware,
through which passed the road from New York to Philadelphia, was
held by a strong detachment of Hessians under General Rahl, whose
whole force, including a few British cavalry, numbered about 1,400
men. No entrenchments had been constructed, few precautions had
been taken against attack, and Christmas time and Christmas weather
made for want of vigilance. Crossing the Delaware with 2,500 men,
Washington broke in upon the position in the early morning of
December 26th, amid snow and rain, and the surprise was complete:
General Rahl was mortally wounded; between 900 and 1,000 of his
men were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners; and not many more
than 400 made good their escape. Returning with his prisoners to
Philadelphia, Washington again re-crossed the Delaware, and during
the rest of the winter and the first six months of the year 1777
continually harassed the English in New Jersey, avoiding a general
engagement, which Howe vainly endeavoured to bring on. At length,
towards the end of July, Howe evacuated the territory, and, leaving
Clinton with over 8,000 men at New York, shipped the rest of his
army for Chesapeake Bay, resolved to attack the enemy from the
opposite direction and to take Philadelphia. Washington gave him
battle on the Brandywine river early in September and was defeated.
On the 26th of September Howe entered Philadelphia: and on the 4th
of October at Germantown, five miles distant from the city, he
successfully repelled a sudden attack by which Washington attempted
to repeat the success of Trenton. At Brandywine, Washington lost
some 1,300 men, at Germantown over 1,000; but, while Germantown was
being fought, Burgoyne’s army on the upper reaches of the Hudson
was nearing its final disaster.
[Sidenote: Far-reaching consequences of the fight at Trenton.]
The War of American Independence, to quote the words of the
_Annual Register_ for 1777,[109] was ‘a war of posts, surprises,
and skirmishes, instead of a war of battles’. The disaster to the
Hessians at Trenton was what would have been called in the late
South African war a regrettable incident, but it had far-reaching
consequences. The German troops employed by the British Government
were not unnaturally regarded by the American colonists with
special dislike and apprehension. They were foreigners and
professional soldiers, alien in sympathies and in speech, partisans
in a quarrel with which they had no concern, fighting for profit
not for principle. The citizen general, at the darkest time of the
national cause, came back to Philadelphia, bringing a number of
them prisoners, and broke at once the spell of ill success. There
followed, as a direct consequence, the abandonment of the Jerseys
by the English, the rising again of colonial feeling throughout
the region, and corresponding depression of the Loyalists. But
almost more important was the effect on the side of Canada; for
the Trenton episode led to the supersession of Carleton and to his
eventual resignation.
[Sidenote: The Secretary of State for the American Department.]
In the year 1768 the office of Secretary of State for the American
Department was created in England, to deal especially with
colonial matters. The Council of Trade and Plantations, which in
one form or another had hitherto taken charge of the colonies,
was not superseded, but to the new Secretary of State it fell to
handle questions of war and peace with the American colonies. The
appointment was not long lived, being abolished, together with
the Council of Trade and Plantations, by Burke’s Act in 1782. The
first Secretary of State for the American Department was Lord
Hillsborough; the second, appointed in 1772, was Lord Dartmouth,
in character and sympathy, a pleasing exception to the type of
politicians who at the time had power in Great Britain; the third,
appointed at the beginning of 1776, was Lord George Germain who,
when he took office, was about sixty years of age.
[Sidenote: Lord George Germain.]
No name in English political history during the last 150 years
is less loved than that of Lord George Sackville, or, as he was
known in later years, Lord George Germain. He was born in 1716, a
younger son of the first Duke of Dorset. Lady Betty Germain, who
died in 1769, left him the Drayton estate[110] in Northamptonshire,
and he took her name. Ten years before, he had been cashiered
for disobedience to an order to charge at the battle of Minden
in 1759, laying himself open by his conduct in that battle to
what was no doubt an unfounded charge of cowardice. He took to
political life, and has been commonly regarded as in a special
manner the evil genius of the British ministry during the war
with America. Yet he was not a man without parts. In his early
life he had some reputation as a soldier, being highly spoken of
by Wolfe. After he was dismissed from the army, he pertinaciously
demanded a court-martial, though warned that more serious results
even than dismissal might follow from re-opening the case. The
inquiry was held, and the dismissal confirmed; but, helped no doubt
by his family connexions, he held up his head in public life,
and became, in Horace Walpole’s opinion, one of the five best
speakers in the House of Commons.[111] Walpole, and probably others
also, disbelieved the charge of cowardice;[112] and certainly in
politics, whatever may have been the case on the battlefield,
Germain cannot be denied the merits of courage and tenacity, though
he may well have been embittered by his past, and hardened into
fighting narrowly for his own hand. He became a follower of Lord
North, and under him was appointed a Lord Commissioner of Trade and
Plantations and Secretary of State for the American Department.
He was an unbending opponent of the colonists and their claims.
‘I don’t want you to come and breathe fire and sword against the
Bostonians like that second Duke of Alva, the inflexible Lord
George Germain,’ wrote Horace Walpole in January, 1775,[113] before
Germain had taken office. To use Germain’s own words, he would be
satisfied with nothing less from the Americans than ‘unlimited
submission’.[114]
Germain seems to have been deeply imbued with the great political
vice of the time, that of dealing with national questions from a
personal and partisan point of view. It was a vice inculcated by
George the Third. The King was a narrow man: his school bred narrow
men: and one of the narrowest was Lord George Germain. Such men are
fearful of power passing from their hands, and are consequently
prone to be constantly interfering with their officers. Hence it
was that the evil of ministers trying to order the operations
of generals, and of men in one continent purporting to regulate
movements in another, was more pronounced at this time than at
almost any other period in English history. Moreover, Lord George
Germain having been a soldier, though a discredited one, no
doubt thought that he could control armies; and, mixing military
knowledge with political intrigue, he communed with the generals
who came home, and formulated plans with slight regard to the views
of the responsible men in America. The result was disastrous, in
spite of the fact that he seems to have formed a true conception of
the campaign, viz., that the one army in Canada and the other at
New York should co-operate and cut in two the revolting colonies.
The immediate outcome of his arrogant meddling was the loss of
Carleton’s services.
[Sidenote: His correspondence with Carleton.]
[Sidenote: Carleton censured and superseded in command of the army
on the side of Canada.]
On the 22nd of August, 1776, while Carleton was busy making
preparations to drive the Americans back up Lake Champlain, Germain
wrote to him, commending what had been done, expressing a hope that
the frontiers of Canada would soon be cleared of the rebel forces,
and giving instructions that, when this task had been accomplished,
Carleton should return to Quebec, to attend to civil duties and the
restoration of law and order, while detaching Burgoyne with any
troops that could be spared to co-operate with Howe’s army acting
from New York. Written when it was, the letter could hardly have
been received in any case before the year’s campaign was drawing to
its close, and before events had already determined what could or
could not be done. It might have been received, wrote Carleton in
a dignified and reasoned reply, at the beginning of November,[115]
and coming to hand then could only have caused embarrassment. As
a matter of fact, the ship which carried Germain’s letter, was
driven back three times, and Carleton only received a duplicate
in May, 1777, under cover of a second letter from Germain which
was dated the 26th of March in that year. This second letter
attributed the disaster to the Hessians at Trenton, which had
happened in the meantime, in part to the fact that by retreating
from before Ticonderoga in the preceding autumn Carleton had
relaxed the pressure on the American army in front of him, which
had thereby been enabled to reinforce Washington; and it announced
that two expeditions were in the coming campaign to be sent from
Canada, one under Colonel St. Leger, the other under Burgoyne,
while Carleton himself was to remain behind in Canada and devote
his energies to the defence of the province, and to furnishing
supplies and equipment for the two expeditions in question. It
will be remembered that Burgoyne had in the meantime returned to
England, reaching Portsmouth about the 9th of December, 1776, and
had brought with him Carleton’s plans for the operations of 1777,
which were therefore well known to Germain when he wrote in March.
[Sidenote: Personal relations of Germain and Carleton.]
It is difficult to imagine how a responsible minister could have
been at once so ignorant and so unfair as Germain showed himself to
be in this communication. To suppose that the movement or want of
movement on Lake Champlain could have had any real connexion with
the cutting off of a detachment on the Delaware river, which was
within easy reach of the rest of Howe’s forces, overpowering in
numbers as compared with Washington’s, was at best wilful blindness
to facts. To supersede Carleton in the supreme command of the
troops on the Canadian side was an act of unwisdom and injustice.
It is true that, already in the previous August, while Carleton
was still on the full tide of success, it had been determined to
confine his authority to Canada, and apparently, in order that
his commission might not clash with that of Howe, to place under
a subordinate officer the troops which were intended to effect a
junction with Howe’s army. But in any case it is not easy to resist
the conclusion that Germain had some personal grudge against the
governor.[116] From a letter written by the King to Lord North in
February, 1777, it would seem that, had Germain been given his
way, Carleton would have been recalled, and, writing to Germain on
the 22nd of May, Carleton did not hesitate to refer to the reports
which were set abroad when Germain took office, to the effect that
he intended to remove Carleton from his appointment, and in the
meantime to undermine his authority. In his answer, dated the 25th
of July, 1777, Germain gave the lie to these allegations, assuring
Carleton that ‘whatever reports you may have heard of my having
any personal dislike to you are without the least foundation. I
have at no time received any disobligation from you’; he stated
categorically that the action which had been taken for giving
Burgoyne an independent command was by ‘the King’s particular
directions’, and he added that the hope that Carleton would in
his advance in the previous autumn penetrate as far as Albany was
based upon the opinions of officers who had served in the country,
and was confirmed by intelligence since received to the effect that
the Americans had intended to abandon Ticonderoga, if Carleton had
attacked it.[117] But, whatever may have been the facts as to the
personal relations of Carleton and Germain, it seems clear that the
small-minded minister in England was bent on ridding himself of the
best man who served England in America.[118]
[Sidenote: The case of Chief Justice Livius.]
As Germain superseded Carleton in his military command, so he set
aside his advice, and over-rode his appointments in civil matters.
Reference has already been made to the evil effects produced by
appointing unfit men to legal and judicial offices in Canada. The
climax was reached when Germain in August, 1776, appointed to the
Chief Justiceship of Canada a man named Livius, whose case attained
considerable notoriety in the annals of the time. Peter Livius
seems to have been a foreigner by extraction. Before the war broke
out, he had been a judge in New Hampshire; and, his appointment
having been abolished, he came back to England with a grievance
against the governor and council, with whom he had been on bad
terms while still holding his judgeship. A provision in the Quebec
Act had annulled all the commissions given to the judges and other
officers in Canada under the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which
that Act superseded: and the English ministry seems to have taken
advantage of this provision to displace men who had done their work
well, and whose services Carleton desired to retain, substituting
for them unfit nominees from England.
[Sidenote: Carleton’s description of Livius.]
One of the men thus substituted was Livius, for whom they saw
an opportunity of providing in Canada. Lord Dartmouth wrote to
Carleton in May, 1775, notifying the appointment of Livius as a
judge of Common Pleas for the district of Montreal; and in August
of the following year he was promoted by Germain to be Chief
Justice of Canada. Livius succeeded Chief Justice Hey, who had
held the office since 1766, and had in August, 1775, requested to
be allowed to retire after ‘ten years honest, however imperfect,
endeavours to serve the Crown in an unpleasant and something
critical situation’.[119] Hey was a man of high standing and
character, and had been much consulted by the Government in passing
the Quebec Act. Livius was a man of a wholly different class.
Carleton’s unflattering description of him in a letter written on
the 25th of June, 1778,[120] was that he was ‘greedy of power and
more greedy of gain, imperious and impetuous in his temper, but
learned in the ways and eloquence of the New England provinces,
valuing himself in his knowledge how to manage governors, well
schooled, it seems, in business of this sort’. ‘’Tis unfortunate,’
he wrote in another and earlier letter, referring apparently to
Livius, ‘that your Lordship should find it necessary for the King’s
service to send over a person to administer justice to this people,
when he understands neither their laws, manners, customs, nor their
language.’[121]
[Sidenote: He dismisses him from office.]
Livius’ appointment as Chief Justice apparently did not take effect
till 1777, and he lost no time in making difficulties. Though paid
better than his predecessor, he protested as to his emoluments
and position; he claimed the powers which had been enjoyed by the
Intendant under the old French régime, and both in his judicial
capacity and as a member of the council, constituted himself an
active opponent of the government. As Chief Justice, he espoused
the cause of a Canadian who had been arrested and sent to prison
for disloyalty by the Lieutenant-Governor Cramahé, and in the
council, in April, 1778, he brought forward motions directed
against what he held to be illegal and irregular proceedings on the
part of the governor. The result of his attitude was that on the
1st of May, 1778, Carleton, before he left Canada, summarily, and
without giving any reason, dismissed him from office.
[Sidenote: Livius appeals to the King.]
[Sidenote: Merits of the case.]
Both Livius and Carleton went back to England, and in September
Livius appealed to the King. His appeal was referred to the Lords
Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, whose report on the case
was in turn referred to the Lords of the Committee of Council for
Plantation Affairs, and with their recommendation was brought
before the King in Privy Council, Livius having in the course of
the inquiry stated his case fully both in person and in writing,
while Carleton declined to appear, and contented himself with
referring to his dispatches and to the minutes of council. On
technical grounds Livius had a strong case. Appointed by the King,
he had been dismissed by the governor without any reason being
assigned in the letter of dismissal. His conduct in a judicial
capacity had not been specifically impugned, and the two motions
directed against Carleton, which he had brought forward in the
Legislative Council immediately prior to his dismissal, had,
at any rate, some show of reason. The first was to the effect
that the governor should communicate to the council the Royal
Instructions which had been given him with respect to legislation,
and which by those instructions he was to communicate so far as
it was convenient for the King’s service. The second referred
to a committee of five members of the council, which Carleton
had constituted in August, 1776, a kind of Privy Council for the
transaction of executive, as opposed to legislative business, in
which Livius was not included. Livius contended, and his contention
was upheld, that the instruction under which the governor had
appointed this board or committee, did not contemplate the
formation of a standing committee of particular members of council,
but only authorized the transaction of executive business by any
five councillors, if more were not available at the time.
[Sidenote: The appeal upheld and Livius restored to office. His
subsequent career.]
The result of the inquiry was that the Chief Justice was restored
to his office, but he never returned to Canada. In July, 1779,
a mandamus for his re-appointment as Chief Justice was sent to
Governor Haldimand, Carleton’s successor, and in the same month he
was ordered to go back at once to Quebec. But he remained on in
England on one pretext or another. In March, 1780, he was still in
London asking for further extension of leave, to see his brother
who was coming home from India. Two years later, in April, 1782,
he had not gone, though he alleged that he had attempted to cross
the Atlantic and had been driven back by stress of weather; and he
pleaded with rare audacity that it was advisable that he should
still prolong his absence from Canada, as otherwise it would be his
duty to oppose the high-handed proceedings, as he deemed them to
be, of General Haldimand. So matters went on until Carleton, now
Lord Dorchester, returned to govern Canada in the autumn of 1786,
when a new Chief Justice was at once appointed, and Livius finally
disappeared from history.[122]
[Sidenote: Moral of the case.]
It has been worth while to give at some length the details of this
somewhat squalid incident, because it is a good illustration of
the difficulties which may arise from one of the most valued and
valuable of English principles, the independence of the judicature.
In the distant possessions of Great Britain, even more than at
home, a great safeguard and a strong source of confidence is and
always has been that the judges are in no way dependent on the
Executive; and yet the case of Livius is by no means the only
case in which serious mischief to the public service has resulted
from this very cause. There can be no doubt that on technical
grounds the Privy Council were right in upholding Livius’ appeal.
What weighed with them most of all was that Livius had not been
dismissed for judicial misconduct; and short of such misconduct,
flagrant and proved beyond all shadow of doubt, it would still be
held that a judge should not be removed from office by the King
himself, much less by the governor. Carleton, like other men cast
in a large mould, did not sufficiently safeguard his action. A
mischief-making adventurer was placed in high office for which
he was clearly unfit. At a time of national crisis he used his
powers of making mischief, and feeling secure in the independence
of his judicial position, sought to undermine the authority of the
Government. Unwilling to leave the difficulty for his successor to
solve, the outgoing governor, fearless of responsibility, summarily
dismissed the man, and contemptuously refused to justify the
grounds of dismissal. He acted in the best interests of the public
service, but, in doing so, he placed himself in the wrong, and the
restoration of Livius to his office must be held to be justified,
while his original appointment admits of no excuse.
[Sidenote: Carleton resigns.]
[Sidenote: Germain’s plan of campaign for 1777.]
In June, 1777, Carleton sent in his resignation, but a year passed
before he was able to leave Canada, and a bitter year it was for
the English cause in America. Germain’s letter to him of the
26th of March, to which reference has already been made, gave a
minute account of the plans for the year’s campaign. Carleton was
to remain behind in Canada with 3,770 men. He was to place under
command of General Burgoyne 7,173 men, in addition to Canadians and
Indians, and after providing him with whatever artillery, stores,
and provisions he might require, and rendering him every assistance
in his power, ‘to give him orders to pass Lake Champlain and
from thence, by the most vigorous exertion of the force under his
command, to proceed with all expedition to Albany, and put himself
under the command of Sir William Howe.’ In an earlier part of the
same letter the phrase is used that Burgoyne was ‘to force his way
to Albany’, leaving no doubt of the writer’s intention that at all
hazards Burgoyne was to effect a junction with Howe. Carleton was
further to place under Lieutenant-Colonel St. Leger 675 men, also
to be supplemented by Canadians and Indians, to give him all the
necessaries for his expedition, and to instruct him to advance to
the Mohawk river, and down that river to Albany, where he was to
place himself under Sir William Howe. St. Leger’s force was to
be supplementary to Burgoyne’s: as phrased elsewhere in the same
letter, he was ‘to make a diversion on the Mohawk river’.
[Sidenote: Minuteness of the instructions.]
[Sidenote: Germain fails to communicate with Sir W. Howe.]
It is noteworthy how this remarkable letter purported to settle all
the details. The exact number of men for each service are counted,
the particular regiments and companies of regiments are told off,
no discretion is left to Carleton or to Burgoyne as to whom they
should send forward to Lake Champlain or the Mohawk, and whom they
should keep in Canada. No mention is made of the reinforcements
which Carleton had written were necessary. Nothing is allowed
apparently for sick or ineffectives. All is on paper, concocted
by the man at a distance who persisted in knowing better than the
far more capable man on the spot. But the most damning passage in
the letter is as follows, ‘I shall write to Sir William from hence
by the first packet, but you will nevertheless endeavour to give
him the earliest intelligence of this measure, and also direct
Lieutenant-General Burgoyne and Lieutenant-Colonel St. Leger to
neglect no opportunity of doing the same, that they may receive
instructions from Sir William Howe.’ Sir William Howe’s Narrative
of his operations, given to a Committee of the House of Commons in
April, 1779, states explicitly that the promised letter was never
sent to him by Germain; that it was not until the 5th of June that
he received from Carleton a copy of the letter which has been
quoted above, unaccompanied by any instructions; and that, before
Burgoyne left England, Germain had received Howe’s plans for the
Philadelphia expedition, and had written approving them. Such was
Lord George Germain’s conduct of the war in America.
[Illustration:
Map to illustrate =THE BORDER WARS= _to face page 145_
B. V. Barbishire, Oxford, 1908
]
[Sidenote: Burgoyne and Carleton.]
On the 27th of March Burgoyne left London. On the 6th of May he
arrived at Quebec. There was no friction between him and Carleton.
He had made no attempt to supplant Carleton, and, bitterly as
Carleton resented his own treatment by Germain, he gave Burgoyne
the utmost assistance for the coming campaign. ‘Had that officer
been acting for himself or for his brother, he could not have shown
more indefatigable zeal than he did to comply with and expedite
my requisitions and desires.’ Such was Burgoyne’s testimony to
Carleton, in his Narrative of the ‘state of the Expedition from
Canada’ as given to the House of Commons.[123]
[Sidenote: St. Leger’s expedition to the Mohawk river.]
[Sidenote: Oswego.]
Before following the fortunes of Burgoyne and his army, it will be
well to give an account of how St. Leger fared in the ‘diversion on
the Mohawk river’. As in the days of the French and English wars,
the twofold British advance from Canada followed the course of the
waterways. While the main army moved up Lake Champlain to strike
the Hudson at Fort Edward and thence move down to Albany, St.
Leger’s smaller force was dispatched up the St. Lawrence to Oswego
on Lake Ontario, in order by lake and stream to reach and overpower
Fort Stanwix on the upper waters of the Mohawk river, and then to
follow down that river to the Hudson, and reach the meeting-point
with Burgoyne’s troops at Albany. At Albany both Burgoyne and St.
Leger were to place themselves under Sir William Howe’s command.
Oswego, the starting-point of St. Leger’s expedition, owing to
its geographical position always played a prominent part in the
border wars of Canada and the North American colonies. From this
point Count Frontenac started when, in 1696, he led his men to
Onondaga, burnt the villages of the Iroquois, and laid waste their
cornfields. The first fort at Oswego was built in 1727 by Governor
Burnet of New York, who reported that he had built it with the
consent of the Six Nations. It was built on the western bank of the
mouth of the Onondaga or Oswego river, which here runs into Lake
Ontario, and it was still the main fort in 1756, when Oswego was
taken by Montcalm, although a subsidiary fort had also lately been
built upon the opposite--the eastern side of the river. The effect
produced both in England and in America by the French general’s
brilliant feat of arms marked the importance which was attached to
the position. The place was re-occupied by Prideaux and Haldimand
with Sir William Johnson in 1759; and subsequently a new fort was
constructed on the high ground which forms a promontory on the
eastern side of the estuary. This fort, which after the War of
Independence passed into American hands, was stormed and taken by
Gordon Drummond in the war of 1812.
[Sidenote: The Six Nations.]
[Sidenote: Allies of the English.]
The Oswego river, or one branch of it, runs out of Lake Oneida:
and into that lake, at the eastern end, runs the stream which was
known as Wood Creek. From the Wood Creek there was a portage to the
Mohawk river, and at the end of the portage stood Fort Stanwix,
held by an American garrison, and barring St. Leger’s way to the
Mohawk valley and the Hudson. All this was the country of the Six
Nation Indians, Six Nations instead of Five since the early part
of the eighteenth century, when the Tuscaroras, driven up from
the south by the white men, had been admitted to the Iroquois
Confederacy. The people of the Long House, as the Iroquois called
themselves, had always been, in the main, allies of the English
as against the French. From the time when the state of New York
became a British possession, these Indians, who had had friendly
trading relations with the Dutch, transferred their friendship to
the English, and the chain of the covenant, though often strained,
was never completely broken. When the War of American Independence
began, and the English were divided, the Six Nations, though
confused by the issue and by the competing appeals of the two
parties, adhered as a whole to the Royalist cause. The majority of
the Oneidas, and possibly the Tuscaroras, inclined to the American
side, the Oneidas having come under the strong personal influence
of a New England missionary, Samuel Kirkland, but the other members
of the league were for the King. After the battle of Oriskany,
where, among others, the powerful clan of Senecas suffered heavily,
the enmity between these Indians and the colonists became more
pronounced, and took the form of a blood feud, accompanied by all
the horrors of militant savagery.
There were various reasons why the Iroquois should espouse the side
of England against America. They looked to the Great King beyond
the sea as their father and protector. The English colonists on
their borders had shown little respect for their lands: and in
1774, in one of the inevitable conflicts between white men and red
on the Virginian frontier, which was known as Cresap’s war, some
of the Six Nation warriors had been involved, and the family of a
friendly Cayuga chief had been murdered by the whites, bringing
bitterness into the hearts of the western members of the Iroquois
Confederacy. But, most of all, the Mohawks shaped the policy of the
league, and they in turn were guided by the Johnson family, and by
their famous fighting chief Thayandenegea, more commonly known by
his English name of Joseph Brant.
[Sidenote: The Mohawks.]
[Sidenote: Sir William Johnson.]
The Mohawks had always been the leaders among the Six Nation
Indians, though, by the time when war broke out between England
and America, they were comparatively few in number, worn down by
constant fighting, and by other causes.[124] Of all the Iroquois,
they had been most consistently loyal to the English, and the most
determined foes of the French. Their homes were at the eastern end
of the Long House, in the valley of the Mohawk river, and they
had therefore always been in close touch with the settlements at
Albany, Schenectady, and along the course of the river to which
they gave their name. They had mingled much and intermarried with
their white neighbours; and for thirty-five years they had had
living among them the Englishman, or rather the Irishman, who
above all others won the confidence of the North American Indians,
Sir William Johnson. They adopted him and he adopted them, taking
to wife in his later years, a Mohawk girl, Mary or Molly Brant.
If Johnson in large measure lived down to the Indians, he also
endeavoured to make the Indians live up to the white men’s level.
He encouraged missionary effort, and promoted education, sending,
among others, Joseph Brant, brother of Molly Brant, to a school
for Indian boys at Lebanon in the state of Connecticut. Johnson
represented the authority of the King, and he used his authority
and his influence for the protection of the Indians against the
inroads of the white men into their lands. The Mohawks, from
their position, were more exposed than the other members of the
confederacy to white land-jobbers, whose aggressiveness increased
after Johnson’s death in 1774. Accordingly, while their traditional
sympathies had always been with the English, when the civil war
came, they had no hesitation in attaching themselves to the King’s
cause. It was the cause of their protector; it was the cause of
the Johnson family; it was the cause to which both interest and
sentiment bade them to adhere. When Sir William Johnson died, he
left as his political representative, his nephew and son-in-law,
Colonel Guy Johnson: the heir of his estates was his own son, Sir
John Johnson. Both the one and the other were pronounced Loyalists:
they drew the Mohawks after them; and when, in the summer of 1775,
after hearing of the fight at Bunker’s Hill, Guy Johnson left the
Mohawk Valley for Oswego and crossed over to Canada, the majority
of the Mohawks left their homes and followed him. In Canada, it was
said, they received assurances from Carleton, which were confirmed
by Haldimand, that they should not be allowed to suffer for their
loyalty to the King.[125]
[Sidenote: Joseph Brant.]
The leader of these Mohawk friends of England was Joseph Brant,
who was born, the son of a full-blooded Mohawk, in 1742. He was
therefore a man of between thirty and forty years of age at the
time of the American Revolution. In the period intervening between
the British conquest of Canada and the battle of Waterloo, North
America produced three very remarkable men of pure Indian descent.
Pontiac was one, Joseph Brant was the second, the third was
Tecumseh, who fought and fell in the war of 1812. Of these three,
Joseph Brant alone sprang from the famous Iroquois stock. Pontiac
was to a greater extent than the others a leader of the red men
against the whites. So far as he had sympathies with white men,
they were with the French as against the English. Brant, in the
main, and Tecumseh played their parts when French rule had ceased
to exist in North America; they were fast allies of the English
as against the Americans or, to put it more accurately, of the
English controlled from home as against the English installed in
their own right in America. But all these three Indian chiefs
had, in one form or another, the same main motive for action, to
prevent what the red man had being taken from him by the white
man. Of the three, Brant was by far the most civilized. He was
an educated man and a Christian. He was, as has been seen, sent
to school in Connecticut, he was a friend of the missionaries,
he visited England twice, went to Court, had interviews and
correspondence with Secretaries of State, made acquaintance with
Boswell, was painted by Romney, and was presented by Fox with a
silver snuff-box. He was poles asunder from the ordinary native
inhabitant of the North American backwoods. He had known war from
early boyhood, had borne arms under Sir William Johnson against the
French, and had apparently fought against Pontiac. At the outbreak
of the revolution he followed Guy Johnson to Canada, and seems to
have taken part in opposing the American advance on Montreal. He
paid his first visit to England towards the end of 1775, returned
to New York in July 1776, and before the year closed made his
way back up country to the lands belonging to or within striking
distance of the Six Nations. Throughout the coming years of the war
his name was great and terrible in the borderland, the main scene
of his warfare being what was then known as the Tryon county of New
York, the districts east of the Fort Stanwix treaty line, which
were watered by the Mohawk river and its tributaries, and by the
streams which flow south and south-west to form the Susquehanna.
Once portrayed as the embodiment of ruthless ferocity, Brant was
afterwards given a place in history as a hero. He was present at
the Cherry Valley massacre, but in his fighting he seems to have
been beyond question more humane than most Indian warriors, and at
least as humane as some white men in these border wars, while his
courage, his skill in bush-fighting, and his rapidity of movement
were never surpassed. He was not a devil, and not an angel. Like
other men, both coloured and white, he no doubt acted from mixed
motives. His friendship for the English, and his patriotism for the
native races, may well have been coupled with personal ambition.
But he fought heart-whole and with no little chivalry for the cause
which he espoused; and in war, as in peace, he was above and beyond
the normal level of the North American Indian. After the war was
over, he settled with his people in Canada, where he died in 1807,
and the town of Brantford preserves his name.
[Sidenote: St. Leger’s force too small for the task.]
St. Leger’s expedition had been suggested to Germain by Burgoyne,
while the latter was in England: indeed, some enterprise of the
kind had been contemplated by Carleton. In view alike of past
history and of the general plan of the summer’s campaign, it had
much to recommend it; but the opposition which the English were
likely to encounter, and actually did encounter, was under-rated,
and the force was too small for the task imposed upon it. The total
number has usually been given at 1,700 men, including Indians; but
this seems to have been an over-estimate, at any rate when the
fighting came. The white troops probably did not in any case exceed
650 in number. There were only 200 British regulars, half of whom
were a detachment of the 8th, now the King’s (Liverpool Regiment),
the same regiment which had furnished a company for the attack on
the Cedars. There were a few German troops, who had just arrived in
Canada, and some of whom did not reach Oswego until the expedition
was over. The Germans, being wholly ignorant of the country, were
quite unsuited for bush-fighting and bateau-work. There was a corps
of New York Loyalists under the command of Sir John Johnson, and
known as Johnson’s Royal Greens. Colonel John Butler led a company
of the Rangers, and a small body of Canadians also took part in
the expedition. The Indian contingent numbered over 800 men.
Brant joined at Oswego at the head of 300 Indian warriors, mostly
Mohawks, and the Senecas were much in evidence. The Indians, as a
whole, were under the command of Colonel Daniel Claus, Johnson’s
brother-in-law, who for many years was one of the officers charged
by the British Government with the superintendence of Indian
affairs. Thus St. Leger had with him most of the men whose names
are best known on the British side in the annals of the border
warfare in these troubled times. Guns were taken with the force,
though of too small calibre to overpower a well-built fort; and,
when the advance began towards the end of July, no precautions were
neglected, a detachment was sent on a day’s march or so in front of
the main column, and the latter was led and flanked on either side
by Indians.
[Sidenote: Fort Stanwix.]
Fort Stanwix had at the time been renamed Fort Schuyler by the
Americans, presumably in honour of General Schuyler, who commanded
the American forces in the Northern Department. The older and
better known name was subsequently restored. The fort stood on the
Mohawk river, not actually on the bank of the river, but about 300
yards distant, guarding the end of the portage from Wood Creek.
The length of the portage where the two rivers were nearest to
each other, was rather over a mile.[126] The old blockhouse, Fort
Williams, which had been the predecessor of the existing fort,
and the ruins of which were standing at the time of St. Leger’s
expedition, was destroyed by the English general, Daniel Webb, in
1756, as he retreated in hot haste on hearing of the capture of
Oswego by Montcalm. Two years later General Stanwix built a new
fort, which bore his own name. The town of Rome now covers the site
on which Fort Stanwix stood. The fort was square in form. It had
evidently been carefully designed by a trained soldier and strongly
constructed, but during the years of peace, in this case as in
those of the other border forts, the defences had fallen more or
less into decay, and had not been fully repaired or rebuilt when
the siege began. None the less, they proved to be too strong to be
overpowered by St. Leger’s light guns. The garrison consisted of
750 men, 200 of whom came in, bringing stores and provisions, on
the very day on which the forerunners of St. Leger’s force appeared
on the scene. The commander of the garrison was Colonel Gansevoort,
the second in command was Colonel Willett, both thoroughly
competent men.
[Sidenote: The siege of Fort Stanwix begins.]
St. Leger’s advanced guard, consisting of a detachment of 30 men of
the 8th Regiment, under Lieutenant Bird, with 200 Indians under
Brant, arrived before the fort on the 2nd of August. They had
been sent on, as is told in St. Leger’s dispatch, ‘to seize fast
hold of the lower landing-place, and thereby cut off the enemy’s
communication with the lower country.’[127] It had been hoped that
they would be in time to intercept the reinforcements which were
due at the fort, but they arrived too late for this purpose. They
took up their position at the point named, below and due south of
the fort, on the bank of the Mohawk river, athwart the road to
Albany. On the following day, the 3rd of August, St. Leger came up
himself, sent a proclamation into the fort, and began to invest
it, fixing his main encampment about half a mile to the north-east
of the fort, and higher up the river, which here runs in a curving
course, so that a straight line drawn from the main British camp
to the post at the lower landing-place would cross and recross
the river, forming the base of a semi-circle. The Americans had
blocked up Wood Creek with fallen timber, and St. Leger reported
that it took nine days and the work of 110 men to clear away the
obstructions, while two days were spent in making several miles of
track through the woods in order in the meantime to bring up stores
and guns. The siege, therefore, began long before the necessary
preparations had been made, and long before the besieging force had
been concentrated and duly entrenched. On the evening of the 5th of
August there were not 250 of the white troops in camp, and at this
juncture St. Leger was threatened by a strong body of Americans who
had gathered for the relief of the fort.
[Sidenote: The fight at Oriskany.]
When news came to the New York settlements of the British advance,
the militia of Tryon county were called out by their commander,
General Nicholas Herkimer. The rendezvous was Fort Dayton, at the
German Flatts, lower down the Mohawk valley than Fort Stanwix. The
German Flatts were so named after settlers from the Palatinate,
who had come out early in the eighteenth century, and from this
stock Herkimer was himself descended. On the 4th of August he
moved forward, the number of his force being usually given at
from 800 to 1,000 men. St. Leger reported that they were 800
strong, and assuming that the total was between 700 and 800, the
relief force and the garrison together equalled, if they did not
outnumber, the whole of St. Leger’s army, the majority of which
moreover consisted, as has been seen, of Indians. On the 5th
Herkimer encamped near a place called Oriskany, about eight[128]
miles short of Fort Stanwix, where a stream called the Oriskany
Creek flowed into the Mohawk river. From this point he sent on
messengers to the fort to secure the co-operation of the garrison.
Meanwhile intelligence had reached St. Leger, sent it was said by
Molly Brant, of the coming relief force, and at five o’clock on the
evening of the 5th he dispatched 80 white troops, being all that he
could spare, with 400 Indians, to intercept the advancing Americans
before they came into touch with the fort, and ambush them among
the woods. Sir John[129] Johnson was placed in command of the
detachment, and with him were Butler and Joseph Brant. It was work
for which Brant was eminently suited, and he seems to have been
the leading spirit in planning the ambuscade. Very early on the
morning of the 6th of August, urged on by his impatient followers,
and against his own better judgement, Herkimer, without waiting
for reinforcements or for a sign from the beleaguered fort,
continued his advance. He reached a point between two and three
miles beyond Oriskany, and within six miles of the fort, where the
path descended into a semi-circular ravine, with swampy ground at
the bottom and high wooded ground at the sides. Here the Americans
were caught in a trap, which would have been more complete had
not the Indians begun fighting before the plan of ambush had been
fully developed. The American rearguard, which had not yet entered
the ravine, broke and fled: the main body were surrounded, Johnson
barring their way in front, Brant falling on their rear, while
others of the Indians and Butler’s rangers fought on the flanks.
There followed a confused fight among the trees, gradually becoming
a hand to hand struggle, with a brief interlude caused by a heavy
storm of rain. Herkimer was mortally wounded, many, if not most,
of the other leading American officers were killed; while, on the
British side, the Indians suffered heavy losses. In the end the
remnant of the American force seem to have beaten off or tired out
their assailants, and made good their retreat, but according to St.
Leger’s report only 200 of them escaped. Butler estimated the total
American casualties in killed, wounded, and prisoners, at 500, and,
according to American accounts, the total was about 400. The white
casualties on the British side were very small, but the casualties
among the Indians seem to have numbered from 60 to 100.
While the engagement was going on, a sortie was made from the
fort, and it was probably news of this movement, coupled with the
Indian losses, which put an end to the fight at Oriskany. Bird, the
commander of the post at the lower landing-place, had been misled
by a rumour that Johnson was hard pressed, and led out his men to
support him, leaving the post undefended. Meanwhile, Willett at the
head of 250 men marched out of the fort, apparently in ignorance of
the ambuscade and designing to join hands with Herkimer’s force.
Willett found the post practically deserted, mastered it, and
carried off its contents, eluding an attempt which St. Leger made
to cut him off on his return to the fort.[130] This ended the
day’s work. Herkimer’s force had been blotted out, but it must have
become increasingly evident that St. Leger’s men and resources were
hopelessly inadequate for the task which had been set him, to force
his way to Albany.
[Sidenote: St. Leger fails to take Fort Stanwix and retreats to
Oswego.]
After the battle of Oriskany, St. Leger summoned the fort to
surrender, but without effect. He continued the siege, but made
little or no impression upon the defences. On the night of the
10th of August Willett made his way out of the fort, reached Fort
Dayton, and went on to Albany where he met Benedict Arnold who
had been charged with the duty of relieving Fort Stanwix. Arnold
gathered troops for the purpose and in the meantime, with his
usual cleverness, contrived to send on rumours which caused alarm
in the British camp. A thousand men were reported to be coming,
then 2,000, then 3,000, and Arnold’s own name may well have been
a potent source of apprehension. The Indians, already depressed
by their losses at Oriskany, and by the prolonging of the siege,
became more and more out of hand, deserting, marauding, and
spreading exaggerated tales; and at length, on the 22nd or 23rd of
August, St. Leger beat a hasty retreat by night, leaving behind him
most of his stores and guns, and returned to Oswego, whence he went
back to Montreal and on to Lake Champlain in the wake of Burgoyne’s
army. Joseph Brant took a less circuitous route. When St. Leger
retreated from Fort Stanwix, Brant made one of his marvellous
flying marches down the Mohawk Valley: and, after passing for over
a hundred miles through the heart of the enemy’s country, which was
also his own, in two or three days’ time joined Burgoyne’s force on
the banks of the Hudson river.
[Sidenote: Misconduct of the Indians.]
[Sidenote: Bad effects of employing them in the war.]
When he returned to Oswego, St. Leger, on the 27th of August, wrote
a dispatch to Burgoyne, giving details of his expedition, but not
punctuating his failure. The failure was due to insufficiency
of numbers and artillery in the first place, and in the second,
beyond question, to the misconduct of his Indian allies. The
employment of Indians in this war with British colonists may have
been inevitable, but it was certainly politically inexpedient,
notwithstanding the fact that the colonists themselves were ready
to avail themselves of similar aid. Indians had been engaged on the
English side in the wars with the French, but sparingly and under
strict supervision. Carleton, as long as he directed operations in
the War of Independence, had been equally careful in using these
savage tools.[131] In St. Leger’s expedition the disadvantages of
enlisting Indian fighting men came fully to light. They became, St.
Leger wrote to Burgoyne, ‘more formidable than the enemy we had to
expect.’ Disappointed of looting the enemy, they plundered their
friends and endangered, if they did not in some cases take, their
lives. Unstable as friends, ferocious as foes, they were not fit
helpmates for Englishmen in fighting Englishmen, even their value
as scouts was diminished by their incurable habit of believing and
exaggerating any report. As in the war with the French in Canada,
the English gained ground by the scrupulous care which they took
to prevent outrages on the part of the savages who accompanied
their armies, so in the later war with their own countrymen, they
distinctly lost ground through calling out the coloured men of
America against colonists of British birth.
[Sidenote: Burgoyne’s address to the Indians.]
Burgoyne’s instructions from Lord George Germain included the
employment of Indians under due precautions; and he formally
addressed his Indian followers in his camp at the river Bouquet,
on the western side of Lake Champlain, on the 21st of June, 1777.
‘The collective voices and hands of the Indian tribes over this
vast continent,’ were, he told them, with a few exceptions, ‘on the
side of justice, of law, and the King.’ He bade them ‘go forth in
might of your valour and your cause: strike at the common enemies
of Great Britain and America’. On the other hand, he sternly
forbade bloodshed except in battle, and enjoined that ‘aged men,
women, children, and prisoners must be held sacred from the knife
or hatchet, even in the time of actual conflict’. Compensation
would be given for the prisoners taken, but the Indians would be
called to account for scalps. His listeners replied, through an
old chief of the Iroquois--‘We have been tried and tempted by the
Bostonians, but we have loved our father, and our hatchets have
been sharpened upon our affections.’ They promised with one voice
obedience to the general’s commands.
[Sidenote: Burgoyne.]
At this date, in the year 1777, Burgoyne was fifty-five years
of age, having been born in 1722, two years before Carleton was
born. He was clearly a man of ability, and unusually versatile. He
was also, as times went, an honourable man. In his relations to
Carleton, at any rate, he seems to have been open to no reproach.
But he tried too many things to be first-rate in anything; he was
not adequate to a great crisis and to heavy responsibility: and
because he was not of the first class, and also because he had
much dramatic instinct, he seems to have had more eye for present
effect than for the root of matters. He was educated at Westminster
School, and, when he died in 1792, he was buried in the northern
cloister of Westminster Abbey. He was a soldier, a politician, a
dramatist, and a man of society. He entered the army in 1740, again
two years before Carleton’s military service began. He became so
involved in debt that he had to sell his commission. He rejoined
the army in 1756, and in 1762 he distinguished himself in Portugal,
where the English supported the Portuguese against Spain and
France. A few years later, however, in 1769, Junius referred to him
as ‘not very conspicuous in his profession’.[132] He went into the
House of Commons in 1761 as member for Midhurst. In 1768, through
the influence of his father-in-law, Lord Derby, he became member
for Preston, and, in connexion with his election, was attacked
by Junius for corruption and also for his gambling propensities.
As a politician he was, before he went to America, more or less
of a free-lance. He spoke on foreign and Indian questions, and
in 1773 made a speech in the House of Commons, attacking Clive.
After the catastrophe at Saratoga, and his return to England, he
threw in his lot with the Whigs, having been befriended by Fox
and his followers; he became Commander-in-Chief in Ireland under
Rockingham; and in 1787 he managed the impeachment of Warren
Hastings. Before the American war broke out, he produced in 1774 a
play called _The Maid of the Oaks_, of which Horace Walpole wrote:
‘There is a new puppet show at Drury Lane as fine as scenes can
make it, called _The Maid of the Oaks_, and as dull as the author
could not help making it.’[133] At a later date, however, Walpole
had to confess that ‘General Burgoyne has written the best modern
comedy’.[134] This was _The Heiress_, which was brought out in the
beginning of 1786, and achieved a great success. Walpole had no
love for Burgoyne, at any rate at the time when the latter served
in America. ‘You ask the history of Burgoyne the pompous,’ he
wrote in October, 1777,[135] the month in which the surrender at
Saratoga took place; and after describing him as ‘a fortunate
gamester’, he continued, ‘I have heard him speak in Parliament,
just as he writes: for all his speeches were written and laboured,
and yet neither in them nor in his conversation did he ever impress
me with an idea of his having parts.’ Burgoyne’s affectation and
mannerism may have been due to the fact that he was essentially a
man of society, as society was then. He had eloped in early life
with Lord Derby’s daughter, and, like Charles Fox, was a confirmed
gambler. The world of London was his world, and the standard by
which he measured things was not the standard of all time. When
he went out in 1777 to command the expedition from Canada, he was
on the flowing tide of fortune, and the tone of his proclamations
gave Walpole cause for sarcastic comment. ‘Have you read General
Burgoyne’s rhodomontade, in which he almost promises to cross
America in a hop, step, and a jump?’[136] ‘Burgoyne has sent over
a manifesto that if he was to over-run ten provinces would appear
too pompous.’[136] ‘I heard to-day at Richmond that Julius Caesar
Burgonius’s Commentaries are to be published in an Extraordinary
Gazette of three-and-twenty pages in folio to-morrow--a counterpart
to the _Iliad_ in a nutshell.’[136] All these three passages
were written in August, 1777, while Burgoyne’s expedition was
proceeding. The writer of them did not like Burgoyne, and did not
like the war in which Burgoyne was engaged; but, though Burgoyne
lent himself to criticism and lacked the qualities which the time
and place demanded, his story is by no means the story either
of a bad soldier or of a bad man; it is rather the story of a
second-rate man set with inadequate means to solve a problem of
first-rate importance.
[Sidenote: Burgoyne’s advance against Ticonderoga.]
[Sidenote: The American position at Ticonderoga.]
Having completed his preparations, Burgoyne reached Crown Point on
the 26th of June, preparatory to attacking Ticonderoga. The full
control of the operations had passed into his own hands, for, by
Germain’s instructions, Carleton’s authority was limited by the
boundary line of Canada, and that line was drawn far north of
Crown Point and Ticonderoga, cutting the outlet of Lake Champlain
near the point of land named Point au Fer. The total force amounted
to rather over 7,000 men, nearly half of whom were Germans under
the command of Baron Riedesel. The advance was made on both sides
of the lake, the Germans being on the eastern shore, the British on
the western--the side on which were Crown Point and Ticonderoga.
The Americans, too, held positions on both sides of the lake,
for, over against the peninsula on which Ticonderoga stood, there
jutted out another point of land, described in Burgoyne’s dispatch
as ‘high and circular’, but in reality rather oblong in form,
rising well above the level of the lake and skirted in part on the
land side by a rivulet. It was called Mount Independence, and was
strongly held and fortified. The lake, here narrowed to a river, is
about a quarter of a mile across, and between Ticonderoga and Mount
Independence a bridge had been constructed, consisting of sunken
timber piers connected by floating timber, the whole being guarded
in front by a heavy boom of wood strengthened by iron rivets and
chains.
[Illustration: MAP TO ILLUSTRATE BURGOYNE’S CAMPAIGN
Reduced from the Map published in ‘A State of the Expedition from
Canada as laid before the House of Commons by Lieutenant-General
Burgoyne, London, 1780’
London, published as the Act directs, Feb. 1st 1780, by WM. FADEN,
Charing Cross
_To face p. 161_
]
The Indian name Ticonderoga signified the confluence of three
waters. At this point the long narrow southern arm of Lake
Champlain, coming in from the south-east, meets the stream which
carries out the waters of Lake George into the third water, the
main lake Champlain. The outlet of Lake George describes a complete
semi-circle, and runs into Lake Champlain due west and east. The
direct route therefore from Lake Champlain to Lake George runs well
to the west of and inside the peninsula of Ticonderoga, cutting
the semi-circular stream without touching the peninsula. In this
consisted the weakness of the American position: unless the works
were extended further afield than they had men to hold them, part
of the attacking force could pass them by and invest Ticonderoga on
the southern as well as on the northern side, blocking retreat by
the line of Lake George. So it happened when Burgoyne’s army came
on the scene.
[Sidenote: Burgoyne’s operations against Ticonderoga.]
[Sidenote: The Americans evacuate their position,]
After three days’ stay at Crown Point to bring up all his forces,
the general on the 30th of June moved forward his leading corps
on either side of the lake, and on the next day the whole army
followed. On the 2nd of July the Americans were reported to have
abandoned the post which guarded the bridge over the river from
Lake George, to the west of Ticonderoga, where saw-mills stood
and which was the starting-point of the ‘carrying place’ from
Lake Champlain to Lake George. They abandoned it, in order to
concentrate their strength against the English advance on the
north-west. Burgoyne immediately moved forward his troops and,
driving the enemy back, on the night of the 2nd occupied the high
ground on the west which commanded the communications with Lake
George, and thereby cut off the possibility of retreat in that
direction. On the 3rd and 4th the attacking forces drew nearer to
the two beleaguered forts, in spite of cannonade; and on the night
of the 4th, a party of light infantry occupied a height called
Sugar Hill, which stood on the southern bank of the outlet from
Lake George, in the angle between that stream and the southern arm
of Lake Champlain, overlooking and commanding both Ticonderoga and
Mount Independence at an estimated distance of about 1,400 and
1,500 yards respectively. On the 5th guns were being brought up to
the hill, but, when the morning of the 6th came, it was found that
the American general, St. Clair, had carried his troops across by
the bridge from Ticonderoga, and, having evacuated both that post
and Mount Independence, was retreating by land and water.
[Sidenote: and are followed up by the English.]
By land and water Burgoyne’s men followed on the same day, the
bridge and boom being broken for the gunboats to pass through. At
Skenesborough, where the navigation of Lake Champlain ends, the
enemy’s vessels were taken or destroyed by the British squadron,
and the detachment of Americans who held the fort set fire to it
and retreated to Fort Anne. Meanwhile, diverging to the east in the
direction of Castleton on the road to Connecticut, General Fraser,
commanding the van of the troops who pursued by land, followed
hard throughout the 6th upon the American rearguard; Riedesel came
up behind him with supports; but, by agreement between the two
commanders, Fraser, when night fell, bivouacked three miles in
front of his colleague. Early on the 7th he attacked the Americans,
who outnumbered his own troops, near a place named Huberton, and
was on the point of being beaten back when the arrival of Riedesel
converted a repulse into a victory. The colonists were broken,
their leader, Colonel Francis, and some 200 of his men were killed,
about the same number were taken prisoners, and a large number of
wounded were supposed to have lost their lives in the woods. Having
completed the rout, on the 8th and 9th Riedesel and Fraser came
into touch with the main army at Skenesborough.
[Sidenote: Fight near Fort Anne.]
At Skenesborough there was a portage from Lake Champlain to Wood
Creek,[137] a stream which flows into the lake from the south.
While boats were being dragged across from the lake to the river
with a view to further advance, the 9th Regiment was sent on
by land to Fort Anne, twelve miles distant in a due southerly
direction. By the evening of the 7th the English drew near to
the fort, and on the following day they were attacked and hard
pressed by a stronger body of Americans. They took up a position
on a hill, and held their ground resolutely, until the whoop of
Indians told that reinforcements were coming up: the Americans
then gave way, and, setting fire to Fort Anne, fell back to Fort
Edward. The English in their turn returned to Skenesborough, in
the neighbourhood of which, on the 9th and 10th of July, the whole
army, excluding the troops required to garrison Ticonderoga, was
concentrated, the line extending eastward from the head of Lake
Champlain towards Castleton.
[Sidenote: Result of the operations.]
‘General Burgoyne has taken Ticonderoga, and given a new complexion
to the aspect of affairs, which was very wan indeed,’ wrote Horace
Walpole, when the news reached England.[138] So far the operations
had been triumphantly successful. Hardly an attempt had been made
by the Americans to hold their ground at Ticonderoga and Mount
Independence, although months had been spent in strengthening the
positions, and the number of the defenders was variously estimated
at from 3,000 to 5,000 men. Great quantities of stores, of boats,
of guns had fallen into British hands: the enemy’s loss on the
retreat had been heavy, and the rapidity with which the retreat
had been followed up had caused widespread alarm. For the moment
there seemed nothing to check the tide of British victory, but
time, place, and insufficiency of numbers gradually told against
Burgoyne’s enterprise. He, too, had suffered some losses, though
small when compared with those of the Americans; and his army,
already inadequate in numbers for the expedition, was further
weakened by the necessity of garrisoning Ticonderoga with some
900 men. He applied to Carleton to supply the requisite number
of soldiers for the garrison from the troops who, in accordance
with the instructions from home, were retained for the defence of
Canada, but Carleton felt himself bound to refuse the request. It
was Germain who had given the orders, and yet the same man, writing
from England in the following September, on receipt of Burgoyne’s
account of the capture of Ticonderoga, stated that he presumed that
the post would be garrisoned from Canada.[139]
[Sidenote: The two routes to the Hudson.]
[Sidenote: Burgoyne’s line of advance.]
[Sidenote: His object was to threaten the New England States.]
Burgoyne’s objective was the Hudson river and Albany. Fort Edward
stood on the left or eastern bank of the Hudson, a little below
the point where that river curves to the south, to flow direct to
the Atlantic. It was twenty-six miles distant from Skenesborough,
and due south of that place. The first twelve miles of the route
from Skenesborough lay along Wood Creek, until Fort Anne was
reached, and from Fort Anne to Fort Edward was an interval of
fourteen miles. Three miles short of Fort Edward the road joined
the road to Fort Edward from Fort George, previously known as
Fort William Henry, at the head of Lake George, which was at much
the same distance from Fort Edward as Fort Anne, viz., fourteen
to sixteen miles. The more obvious route of advance towards the
Hudson from Ticonderoga, and the one originally contemplated, was
along Lake George, and Burgoyne was criticized for not taking that
line--without good reason, because the American retreat had already
determined the choice of routes. Having immediately followed the
enemy up as far as Skenesborough, Burgoyne, as he justly pointed
out, would have been unwise to make a retrograde movement in order
to adopt the alternative line of advance by Lake George. Moreover,
while the troops were moving forward from Skenesborough viâ Wood
Creek and Fort Anne, supplies were being forwarded along Lake
George in order to meet him when he reached Fort Edward. But there
was a further reason, which in Burgoyne’s mind made for the more
easterly of the two routes. His own scheme for the campaign had
inclined to carrying war to the east into Connecticut and the New
England states, in preference to a direct advance to the Hudson and
Albany; and, though his instructions prevented his carrying out the
plan which he preferred, he might yet, as he advanced, threaten New
England, and at the same time gather supplies from a more promising
country than would be found in the Adirondack region on the west of
Lake George. Thus in a private letter to Germain, which accompanied
his dispatch from Skenesborough, detailing the success of his
recent operations, he wrote: ‘I a little lament that my orders
do not give me the latitude I ventured to propose in my original
project for the campaign, to make a real effort instead of a feint
upon New England. As things have turned out, were I at liberty to
march in force immediately by my left, instead of by my right, I
should have little doubt of subduing before winter the provinces
where the rebellion originated.’ It must be remembered that at this
time British troops were in occupation of Rhode Island, and that
Sir William Howe had originally planned a campaign in New England
in 1777, only giving up the scheme when he found that sufficient
reinforcements from Europe would not be forthcoming.
[Sidenote: Riedesel sent to Castleton.]
[Sidenote: The army arrives at Fort Edward on the Hudson river.]
It was with the object of keeping the New England States in fear
of invasion, or, as he himself phrased it, ‘of giving jealousy
to Connecticut, and keeping in check the whole country called
the Hampshire Grants,’[140] that Burgoyne, while encamped at
Skenesborough, detached Riedesel to occupy Castleton about fourteen
miles to the east. Castleton was an important point, because
through it ran a road which connected Skenesborough by land with
the shore of Lake Champlain opposite Ticonderoga and Crown Point.
Riedesel was absent for about twelve days, and in the meantime
preparations were pressed forward for a further advance of the
main army, the road to Fort Anne and the parallel waterway of Wood
Creek being cleared of obstructions. Simultaneous preparations
were made at Ticonderoga for forwarding supplies by Lake George.
On the 23rd of July the advanced guard moved forward to Fort Anne:
on the 25th the whole army had reached that point; on the 29th,
the van arrived at Fort Edward, which the Americans had already
evacuated, and on the 30th Burgoyne arrived at the same place. A
large convoy of provisions sent by Lake George reached the head of
that lake by the 29th, Fort George like Fort Edward having been
abandoned by the enemy, who had carried off their stores. Thus
the end of July found Burgoyne on the Hudson, well on his way to
Albany; the main difficulties of the expedition seemed to be past;
but as a matter of fact the most trying time was yet to come. His
communications were insecure, for he could not spare men to guard
them. His transport was inadequate, and so were his supplies. Delay
in bringing up stores meant time to the Americans to recover their
spirits and gather in his front: he had no tidings from Howe, and
no sure knowledge of St. Leger’s progress. He only knew that at all
hazards he was expected to make his way to Albany.
[Sidenote: The beginning of misfortunes. Murder of Jane McCrae by
the Indians.]
While he halted at Fort Edward, two untoward incidents took place.
The first was a brutal murder by Indians of a young white woman
named Jane McCrae, who had remained behind at or near Fort Edward,
when the Congress troops fell back before Burgoyne’s advance. The
story went that she was engaged and about to be married to an
officer in Burgoyne’s army. Falling into the hands of the Indians,
she was murdered with purposeless, savage fury, and the tale of the
outrage, embellished with horrors, was spread far and wide through
the land. Colonists hitherto inclined to the loyal cause, felt that
their homes and womenkind would not be safe, if they awaited the
coming of the English and their savage allies: the opponents of
England found additional justification for the stand which they had
taken up; the sympathizers with the American cause in England were
given a new text for denouncing the war; and Burgoyne lost Indian
support by taking steps to prevent a recurrence of such enormities.
[Sidenote: The expedition to Bennington.]
[Sidenote: Objects aimed at by the expedition.]
The second misfortune which happened--a most grave misfortune--was
an unsuccessful expedition in the direction of Bennington.
Bennington is in the state of Vermont, to the south-east of Fort
Edward, lying about twenty-four miles due east of the stretch of
the Hudson river, between Saratoga on the north and the confluence
of the Mohawk on the south, which was known as Stillwater. It is
in the forks of the two streams which combine to form the Hoosick
river, a tributary of the Hudson, flowing into the main river
from the east. Burgoyne’s information was to the effect, quoting
his own words, that it was ‘the great deposit of corn, flour, and
store cattle’, intended for the use of the Congress troops, which
he designed to secure for his own army in view of the difficulty
and delay experienced in bringing up supplies from Canada. The
German general, Riedesel, seems to have originally suggested such
an expedition, from knowledge gained while he was stationed at
Castleton. He was anxious to obtain horses to mount his men and to
carry the baggage; there was evidence of a considerable Loyalist
element in the population, and little reason to apprehend strong
opposition from the colonial militia. Above all Burgoyne had
constantly in his mind the object of threatening the New England
states: and, having by this time received intelligence that St.
Leger was before Fort Stanwix, he wished to make a diversion to the
east, in order to prevent reinforcements being sent up the Mohawk
river to the relief of that post. The instructions which he issued
for the expedition show that he contemplated that the detached
force, if things went well, would penetrate far beyond Bennington,
up to the Connecticut river, and possibly not rejoin the main army
until the latter had reached Albany.
[Sidenote: Strength and composition of the force.]
[Sidenote: Colonel Baum in command.]
About 500 men, according to his dispatch, were detailed for the
enterprise, but the number appears to have been larger.[141]
It was a mixed body. There was a strong contingent of Germans,
chiefly dismounted dragoons, ill suited for a cross-country march,
and there were also picked marksmen from the British regiments,
Canadians, provincials, and about 100 Indians. Out of compliment
to Riedesel, the command was given to Colonel Baum, one of his
officers, and in selecting German troops for the expedition,
Burgoyne marked his appreciation of the good service which those
regiments had rendered in following up the retreat of the Americans
from Ticonderoga. The starting-point was the Batten Kill stream,
running into the Hudson on its eastern side, ten miles lower down
than Fort Edward. From this point to Bennington, by the route
which Baum was finally instructed to take, was a distance of under
thirty miles. The advance guard of Burgoyne’s army had already
been moved down the Hudson to the Batten Kill, and, on the 14th of
August, after Baum had started, they were thrown across the main
river a little higher up under the command of General Fraser, and
moved forward on the western bank as far as Saratoga, with the
object of a further advance to Stillwater in the event of Baum’s
expedition proving successful. The temporary bridge of rafts,
however, by which they had crossed, being carried away, the troops
were recalled and passed back in boats to the eastern side.
[Sidenote: Reinforcements sent under Colonel Breyman.]
[Sidenote: Baum’s force surprised and cut up.]
[Sidenote: Baum mortally wounded.]
[Sidenote: Breyman attacked and forced to retreat with heavy loss.]
Baum started from the Batten Kill early on the morning of the 13th
of August, reached a place called Cambridge in the afternoon of
that day, and on the following day arrived at Sancoick Mill near
the confluence of the two branches of the Hoosick river, about
four miles short of Bennington. There he found that the enemy in
front of him were more numerous than had been anticipated, and
he sent back to Burgoyne for reinforcements. Colonel Breyman,
another German officer, was dispatched to his support with nearly
700 men: he started early on the morning of the 15th, but, owing
to the difficulties of the route, and want of horses and forage,
he made slow way, and was far short of Baum when evening came. On
the 16th a number of men, as from the country side, came to where
Baum was encamped: they were taken to be friends and Loyalists,
and made their way within his lines. On a sudden, while beginning
to move forward,[142] he found himself attacked on all sides: the
component parts of his little force were separated from each other,
and only the German soldiers held together, fighting bravely, as
long as they had powder left, and then vainly endeavouring to
cut their way out with their swords. The end was inevitable. The
Indians dispersed in the woods: some of the British contingent with
their commander, Captain Frazer, escaped, and so did a good many
of the Canadians and provincials: but Baum was mortally wounded,
and nearly all of his Brunswickers were killed or captured. On the
afternoon of the same day, ignorant of what had happened, Breyman’s
force was coming up and was in turn suddenly attacked. Again the
men fought hard until their ammunition gave out, and eventually
the main body made good their retreat, though they suffered heavy
losses and had to leave their guns behind. John Stark was the
leader of the Americans in these hard fought engagements.
[Sidenote: Consequences of the disaster.]
The immediate result of the fighting was the loss to the English
of over 500 men and four guns,[143] and the total failure of the
expedition. The ultimate effect was much more serious. Burgoyne’s
small army was still further reduced: his hope of securing supplies
and horses from the surrounding country was entirely gone; his
expectation of Loyalist support, upon which the English had
counted, was shown to be groundless; the chance of facilitating
the main operations by a successful diversion was lost; the enemy
were put in good heart; and such fickle allies as the Indians
were further alienated. The enterprise was subsequently made
the subject of much hostile criticism, and blame was variously
assigned. Burgoyne considered that the failure was due to the fact
that Baum had not taken up a position in the open in accordance
with instructions, to the chance co-operation of bodies of the
enemy who happened to be near, and to undue slowness on Breyman’s
part. The truth seems to have been that the expedition was not
badly conceived, but imperfect knowledge of the country and faulty
intelligence as to the enemy’s strength and movements in this, as
in many similar cases, procured disaster.[144]
[Sidenote: Burgoyne’s views on the situation.]
Burgoyne’s anxiety as to the future was expressed in a private
letter which he wrote to Germain on the 20th of August,
accompanying the public dispatch of the same date in which he
reported the failure of the Bennington expedition. He wrote that,
in spite of St. Leger’s victory, Fort Stanwix was holding out
obstinately, that no operation had been taken in his favour,
and that the American forces under Gates in his front had been
strengthened and now outnumbered his own. Only one letter had
reached him from Sir William Howe. That letter was written from
New York on the 17th of July, and in it Howe stated that he had
heard of Burgoyne’s victory at Ticonderoga, adding ‘My intention
is for Pennsylvania, where I expect to meet Washington, but if
he goes to the northward contrary to my expectations and you can
keep him at bay, be assured I shall soon be after him to relieve
you’. As has been already stated, no instructions from Germain
had reached Howe on the subject of Burgoyne and his army, though
he had received from Carleton a copy of Germain’s dispatch of
March 26th, 1777, in which the programme of the expedition from
Canada had been detailed. Situated as Burgoyne was, knowing that
further advance would entail cutting of his communications with
Ticonderoga, it is no wonder that in his letter to Germain he
wrote that, had he latitude in his orders, he would have thought
it his duty to remain where he was encamped opposite Saratoga,
or further back at Fort Edward where his communications would
be secure, until events in other quarters facilitated a forward
movement. But his instructions were ‘to force a junction with Sir
William Howe’, or at any rate to make his way to Albany; and, as he
sadly wrote, when the catastrophe was over and he was a prisoner,
‘The expedition I commanded was evidently meant at first to be
hazarded. Circumstances might require it should be devoted.’ A
very strong man in his position would have taken the responsibility
of temporary retreat, but, good soldier as he was, he was not a
commanding character. He knew the power which Germain possessed of
making and unmaking men, he had before his eyes the harsh treatment
of Carleton, because Carleton had exercised wise discretion
in falling back from Crown Point in the preceding autumn. His
instructions freed him from responsibility if he went forward, the
blame would be his alone if he fell back. The evil influence of
Germain blighted loyal commanders and soldiers in America. George
the Third’s system was working itself out, and the British Empire
was being sacrificed to the ‘King’s Friends’.
[Sidenote: Burgoyne’s communications attacked by the colonists.]
The first necessity was to bring up supplies from Lake George for
the further advance, enough to last for twenty-five to thirty days,
inasmuch as crossing the Hudson and moving south meant the loss
of communication with Canada. This Burgoyne anticipated, and his
apprehensions proved true. Shortly after he crossed the Hudson
and began his southward march, a force of colonists, assembling
at Skenesborough, on the 18th of September attacked the British
garrisons at Ticonderoga and Mount Independence. They were repulsed
after four or five days’ fighting, but not until they had taken
outposts at the saw-mills, Mount Hope, and Sugar Hill, captured
three companies of British soldiers, and taken or destroyed a large
amount of stores and a number of boats. Retreating up Lake George,
they attacked a detachment on an island in the lake named Diamond
Island and, though they were again beaten off, their operations
served the purpose of making Burgoyne’s communications utterly
insecure.[145]
[Sidenote: The Americans under Gates take up a position at Bemus’
Heights.]
From the 16th of August to the 13th of September, the British army
remained on the eastern bank of the Hudson over against Saratoga.
The reinforcements which joined them apparently amounted to only
300 men. News seems to have reached the army, before they moved
onward, that St. Leger was retreating from Fort Stanwix, so that
hope of co-operation in the direction of the Mohawk river was at
an end; on the other hand there was a possibility that St. Leger’s
men, brought down the St. Lawrence and up Lake Champlain and Lake
George, might be able to join the main force. It is not clear what
was the exact number of men who crossed the Hudson under Burgoyne’s
command. According to the evidence given at the subsequent
Parliamentary inquiry, the regulars, British and German, were
rather short of 5,000 men, but, if the Canadians and provincials
were included, the total fighting force must have reached 6,000.
From Fort Edward to Albany is a distance of over forty miles and
to the confluence of the Mohawk river about thirty-four; but
Burgoyne was already encamped ten miles south of Fort Edward and
the Americans, who had previously fallen back to what was known as
the Half Moon at the mouth of the Mohawk river, after the British
defeat at Sancoick Mills and the relief of Fort Stanwix, moved up
the Hudson a little way above Stillwater, and took up a strong
position on high ground called Bemus’ Heights, where they were
within ten miles’ distance of the point where Burgoyne crossed the
river.
General Philip Schuyler had been in command of the Congress troops
on the side of Canada. He was a man of the highest character, and
apparently a perfectly competent soldier, whose Fabian tactics were
beginning to achieve success when he was superseded. After the
abandonment of Ticonderoga and the rout which followed, the tide
of public opinion set against him--without any adequate reason.
The New Englanders were jealous of a general from New York state;
and, under a resolution of Congress, Schuyler was in the middle
of August replaced by Horatio Gates, a godson of Horace Walpole,
who, like Richard Montgomery, had been born in the United Kingdom
and had served in the British army, having been badly wounded in
Braddock’s disastrous expedition. Gates, who in the previous year
had commanded the garrison at Ticonderoga, was a self-seeking,
intriguing man. His subsequent disloyalty to Washington, and
his defeat at Camden, clouded what reputation he gained through
receiving Burgoyne’s surrender. When he took over the command of
the troops opposing Burgoyne, his task was comparatively easy.
He had good men with him, among others Arnold, who had returned
from the march to relieve Fort Stanwix and between whom and Gates
there was no love lost, he had also Daniel Morgan and Lincoln;
while the army under their command had received an accession to
its numbers in consequence of Howe having moved off from New York
to Philadelphia. The Americans now largely outnumbered Burgoyne’s
force, and behind them, lower down the Hudson, the Highlands were
held against a possible movement on the part of Clinton, who
commanded the troops left behind at New York when Howe sailed for
Chesapeake Bay.
[Sidenote: Burgoyne crosses the Hudson and advances South.]
About six miles below Fort Edward, between that fort and the Batten
Kill stream, at a place named Fort Miller, there were rapids in
the Hudson, where a portage was necessary for the boats descending
the river; below it navigation was unimpeded, and the stores and
baggage of the army could be carried by water. A bridge of boats
was thrown over the river about half a mile above the Batten
Kill, and by this bridge the whole army crossed the Hudson on
the 13th and 14th of September from the eastern to the western
shore. Burgoyne was subsequently criticized for crossing, but
the criticism had no sound foundation. If he was to reach Albany
at all, he must cross the river at some point or other, and the
further he went down stream the more difficult the crossing was
likely to be. Moreover the high road ran along the western bank,
while on the opposite shore swamp and mountain would have made it
impossible at certain points to march close to the river bank, and
the army would therefore have been separated from the boats. On the
western side of the Hudson the country, through which the troops
advanced, was wooded and broken, the road and bridges over the
intervening creeks had been cut up by the enemy, and progress was
slow; but by the 17th less than four miles intervened between the
two armies. On the 18th there was skirmishing, while the British
force were repairing bridges and cutting a way through the bush:
and on the 19th a general action took place.
[Sidenote: Action of September 19.]
The British army advanced in three divisions. On the right under
General Fraser were the 24th Regiment, the light infantry and the
grenadiers, accompanied by Indian and Canadian scouts and supported
by some German troops under Colonel Breyman. The centre column,
entirely composed of British regiments, was under Burgoyne’s
immediate command. The left wing was in charge of Riedesel, and
included the main body of the German soldiers with most of the
artillery. The left marched along the high road on the lowland
following the course of the river, and one British regiment, the
47th, on the bank of the river, guarded the boats which carried the
stores. There was a deep ravine between the armies, and Fraser’s
division made a wide circuit to the right in order to keep on the
high ground. The movement was successfully carried out, and Fraser
established himself in a strong position while the centre column
moved forward, crossed the ravine, formed on the other side, and
bearing to the right became engaged with the enemy. The centre
of the battle was a clearing in the woods, where there was a
homestead known as Freeman’s farm; from this farm the Americans had
molested Burgoyne’s advance, and being dislodged by artillery fell
back into the cover behind. Their intention had been to turn the
British right, but, finding that Fraser was too strongly posted,
they counter-marched and placed their full force in front of the
centre column. Here the battle was fought, and for four hours,
from three o’clock in the afternoon till seven, the brunt of the
fighting fell upon three British regiments, the 20th, the 21st and
the 62nd, a fourth regiment, the 9th, being held in reserve. Some
help came from Fraser’s men, but the safety of the army depended
upon his holding his ground on the right, so that he could not
bring up his whole division in support of the centre. Constantly
reinforced and covered by the woods, the Americans, led by Arnold,
who commanded the left wing of their army, pressed hard upon the
fighting regiments, until, late in the day, Riedesel, having pushed
forward his troops along the line of the river, wheeled them sharp
to the right and struck in on the flank. This decided the battle,
and, as darkness fell, the forces of the Congress drew off, leaving
Burgoyne’s army in possession of the field.
[Sidenote: Result of the fight--Burgoyne’s losses.]
[Sidenote: Message from Clinton.]
[Sidenote: Scarcity of provisions.]
[Sidenote: Further movement necessary.]
The fight was won, but, as Burgoyne wrote in his subsequent
dispatch, ‘it was soon found that no fruits, honour excepted, were
attained by the preceding victory.’ He had lost about 500 men, the
62nd Regiment having especially suffered, and though the losses
of the Americans had possibly been heavier, reinforcements were
available for them and their position grew stronger and stronger.
On the day after the battle the English moved forward slightly
until they were almost within cannon shot of their enemies, at a
distance of about half a mile, and in turn threw up entrenchments.
On the 21st Burgoyne received a message from Clinton, dated the
12th, to the effect that in about ten days’ time he intended to
move up the Hudson and attack the American forts in the Highlands.
Burgoyne sent back word, urging the necessity of some such
operation in his favour in order to divert part of the American
force which was barring his way, and he stated that he would hold
his ground if possible, till the 12th of October. The days went on:
provisions began to run short: on the 3rd of October it was found
necessary to reduce the soldiers’ rations: and, some movement
having become inevitable, Burgoyne determined on the 7th to make
a reconnaissance on the enemy’s left--the side furthest removed
from the Hudson, in order definitely to ascertain whether there
was a possibility of either forcing a passage or at any rate so
far dislodging the enemy as to enable the British army to retreat
unmolested. At the same time it was hoped that under cover of the
reconnaissance, forage, badly needed, might be collected for the
horses.
[Sidenote: Action of October 7.]
[Sidenote: The English heavily defeated and their corps partly
taken.]