PART III: ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS

Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem

to be treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural

phenomena following nature's general laws. They appear to

conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a

kingdom: for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows

nature's order, that he has absolute control over his actions,

and that he is determined solely by himself. They attribute

human infirmities and fickleness, not to the power of nature

in general, but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man,

which accordingly they bemoan, deride, despise, or, as

usually happens, abuse: he, who succeeds in hitting off

the weakness of the human mind more eloquently or more

acutely than his fellows, is looked upon as a seer. Still there

has been no lack of very excellent men (to whose toil and

industry I confess myself much indebted), who have written

many noteworthy things concerning the right way of life,

and have given much sage advice to mankind. But no one,

so far as I know, has defined the nature and strength of the

emotions, and the power of the mind against them for their

restraint.

I do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though he

believed, that the mind has absolute power over its actions,

strove to explain human emotions by their primary causes,

and, at the same time, to point out a way, by which the mind

might attain to absolute dominion over them. However,

in my opinion, he accomplishes nothing beyond a display

of the acuteness of his own great intellect, as I will show

in the proper place. For the present I wish to revert to

those, who would rather abuse or deride human emotions

than understand them. Such persons will, doubtless think

it strange that I should attempt to treat of human vice and

folly geometrically, and should wish to set forth with rigid

reasoning those matters which they cry out against as

repugnant to reason, frivolous, absurd, and dreadful.

However, such is my plan. Nothing comes to pass in nature,

which can be set down to a flaw therein; for nature is always

the same, and everywhere one and the same in her efficacy

and power of action; that is, nature's laws and ordinances,

whereby all things come to pass and change from one form

to another, are everywhere and always the same; so that

there should be one and the same method of understanding

the nature of all things whatsoever, namely, through nature's

universal laws and rules. Thus the passions of hatred, anger,

envy, and so on, considered in themselves, follow from this

same necessity and efficacy of nature; they answer to certain

definite causes, through which they are understood, and

possess certain properties as worthy of being known as

the properties of anything else, whereof the contemplation

in itself affords us delight. I shall, therefore, treat of the

nature and strength of the emotions according to the same

method, as I employed heretofore in my investigations

concerning God and the mind. I shall consider human

actions and desires in exactly the same manner, as though

I were concerned with lines, planes, and solids.

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