Lessons of the Civil War--Weakness of the Military Policy at the
Outbreak of the Rebellion--A Poor Use of the Educated Soldiers of
the Army--Military Wisdom Shown by the Confederate Authorities--
Territorial Strategy--General Military Education Indispensable to
Good Citizenship--Organization of the National Guard--General Grant
Without Military Books--Measures Necessary to the National Defense.
In my opinion, the most important of all the lessons taught by the
Civil War is the necessity of using in the most effective manner
the means at the disposal of the government when war breaks out.
The necessity for adequate preparation is a different question,
which has been much discussed, and in regard to which some progress
has been made toward a satisfactory solution. Whatever the outcome
may be in respect to preparation for war, certainly the government
and the people ought to adopt such a policy as will lead to the
best practicable use of the preparations which have actually been
made.
In this respect the policy adopted by the National Government in
1861 was about as weak as possible, while that of the Confederates
was comparatively strong. It is said that this weak policy was
due largely to General Scott, and grew out of his distrust of
volunteer troops; he having thought it necessary to have a considerable
body of regular troops to give steadiness and confidence to the
volunteers or militia. This is a very good theory, no doubt,
providing the regulars could be provided in advance in such numbers
as to produce the desired effect. But if that theory had been
relied upon in 1861, the "Confederate States" would have established
their independence long before the regular army could be organized
and made effective. What was demanded by the necessities of the
country in 1861 was the best large army that could be made in the
shortest possible time, not a better small army to be made in a
much longer time.
The United States government actually had in hand the means of
creating in a very short time a far larger efficient army than the
South could possibly have raised in the same time. This means had
been provided, with great care and at great expense, through a long
term of years, by the education of young men at the Military Academy,
and their practical training in the small regular army in all kinds
of actual service, including one foreign war and almost constant
campaigns against the Indians. Nowhere in the world could have
been found a better corps of officers to organize, instruct, and
discipline new troops. Yet those officers were hardly employed at
all in that service at first, when it was of supreme importance.
Some time later, when the necessity was not so great, a few officers
of the army were permitted to accept commands in the volunteers.
Even then it often required great "influence" to secure such
"indulgences." Scores of young officers, qualified in every way
to do such service in the first six months of the war, sought in
vain for opportunities to render the valuable services for which
the government had educated them, and were compelled to drag along
four years in the discharge of duties several grades below their
qualifications.
WEAKNESS OF THE MILITARY POLICY
In the regular army in 1861 there were, exclusive of those who went
South, at least 600 officers who, after graduating at West Point,
had served several years with their regiments, and were well
qualified to drill a regiment and command it in battle. A large
proportion of them were fitted to command brigades, and some of
them divisions, and even army corps. The three years' volunteers
first called out could have been fully supplied with brigade,
division, and corps commanders from graduates of West Point who
were thoroughly qualified by theoretical education and established
character, and many of them by practical experience in the Mexican
war and Indian campaigns, for the instruction, discipline, and
command of troops, still leaving a sufficient number with the
regulars for efficient service. The old sergeants of the army in
1861 were relatively competent company commanders. One commissioned
officer to four companies of these veteran Indian-fighters made as
reliable a battalion as any general could wish for in the conditions
then existing.
Experience demonstrated that a volunteer regiment could in a very
few weeks be converted into an efficient and thoroughly reliable
force in battle by a single young officer of the regular army. In
other words, by a judicious use of the small body of officers whom
the country had educated at so great an expense, a fine army of
500,000 men, or more, could have been called into service, organizied,
disciplined, and put into the field by August 1, 1861; and that
without interfering in any way with the three months' militia called
out to meet the first emergency, which militia ought, of course,
to have acted strictly on the defensive until the more permanent
force could take the field. In a few months more, certainly by
the spring of 1862, the instruction, discipline, and field experience
of the first levy would have given good officers enough to organize
and command a million more men. It required, in short, only a wise
use of the national resources to overwhelm the South before the
spring of 1863.
The supply of arms, it is true, was deplorably deficient in 1861.
But the South was only a little better off than the North in that
regard. Besides, the National Government had command of all the
markets of the world, and of the means of ocean transportation.
It could have bought at once all the available arms everywhere,
and thus fully equipped its own troops, while preventing the South
from doing the same. Hence the excuse given at the time--namely,
want of muskets--was no excuse whatever for delay in the organization
of armies.
The rebellion made some progress at first, and offered effective
resistance for a long time, simply because the Southern authorities
manifested greater military wisdom than the Northern. The difference
in preparations and in military training in advance was quite
insignificant. The North had many more educated and competent
military men than the South. The difference was that the South
used the few they had to the best advantage, while the North so
used only a very few of their many.
The lesson next in importance taught by our experience is the
necessity of general military education in a country having popular
government. No man can be fully qualified for the duties of a
statesman until he has made a thorough study of the science of war
in its broadest sense. He need not go to a military school, much
less serve in the army or in the militia. But unless he makes
himself thoroughly acquainted with the methods and conditions
requisite to success in war, he is liable to do almost infinite
damage to his country. For instance, the very first success of
the Union armies--the capture of Fort Donelson--was quickly followed
by a proclamation of thanksgiving and an order to stop recruiting.
That one act of "statesmanship" cost the country untold millions
of dollars and many thousands of lives. It was necessary only to
take the ordinary military advantage of the popular enthusiasm
throughout the country after Grant's first victory to have made
the Union armies absolutely irresistible by any force the South
could raise and arm at that time.
A POOR USE OF THE EDUCATED SOLDIERS OF THE ARMY
There has been much irrelevant discussion about the ability or
inability of commanders in the North and South. The fact is that
political instead of military ideas controlled in a very large
degree the selection of commanders in the Union armies; while for
three whole years the authorities in Washington could not see the
necessity of unity of action in all the armies under one military
leader. It required three years of costly experience to teach the
government that simple lesson, taught in the military text-books!
As experience finally proved, there was no lack of men capable of
leading even large armies to victory; but, with few exceptions,
they were not put in command until many others had been tried.
Information as to military fitness was not sought from military
sources. If a lawyer is wanted for the supreme bench, or an engineer
to construct a great bridge, information is sought from the best
men of the profession concerned; but the opinions of politicians
were thought sufficient in determining the selection of major-
generals!
Again, the policy of the government required the capture and
occupation of all the important seaports and other places in the
South, and the permanent occupation and protection of all the
territory gained in military operations. Until near the close of
the war, neither the public nor the government seemed to have the
remotest conception of the fundamental fact that Confederate armies,
wherever they might go, instead of places and States, were the only
real objectives. Even some of the best Union generals were
constrained to act upon this popular heresy, contrary to their own
sound military judgment and education. Yet while this erroneous
"territorial" strategy was insisted on, no adequate conception was
formed of the vastly greater force required to hold all the territory
gained, and to push aggressive operations still further into the
heart of the South. Very rarely indeed were the Union armies large
enough, until near the end of the war, to assure success. The end
finally came through a long succession of desperate battles between
forces so nearly equal that decisive victory was impossible until
the weaker side finally became exhausted. Thus the aggregate loss
in men as well as in money was vastly greater than it would have
been if the Union had put forth its full strength and ended the
rebellion in two years instead of four.
It is true that some of the worst of these "blind guides" were men
supposed to have a very high military education. But if sound
military education had been at all general in the country, statesmen
would have known by what standard to judge of any one man's fitness
for high command.
It is true that no amount of military education can supply the
place of military genius or create a great commander. It may
possibly happen at any time that there may not be among all the
living graduates of West Point one Grant or Sherman or Sheridan,
or one Lee or Johnston or Jackson. So much greater the need of a
well-educated staff and a well-disciplined army. Nobody is wise
enough to predict who will prove best able to command a great army.
But it is the easiest thing in the world to tell who can best create
such an army and command its subdivisions, and this is the work to
be done instantly upon the outbreak of war. The selection of
commanders for the several armies, and, above all, of a general-in-
chief, must of course be the most difficult; for it is not probable
that any man young enough will have had any experience in such
commands in this country. But even this difficulty will disappear
in a very great measure if statesmen will make the study of the
art and science of war, instead of far less important subjects, a
part of their pastime. They will thus acquire the ability to judge,
from personal acquaintance with military men and conversation with
other best informed, of the relative fitness of officers for the
highest commands.
GENERAL MILITARY EDUCATION INDISPENSABLE
There is no possible remedy for such evils as this country has
suffered except general military education. In my opinion, no man
is fit for a seat in Congress unless he has had such an education.
The first thing he ought to learn is the old and trite military
maxim that the only was to carry on war economically is to make it
"short, sharp, and decisive." To dole out military appropriations
in driblets is to invite disaster and ultimate bankruptcy. So it
is in respect to the necessary preparations for war in time of
peace. No man is wise enough to tell when war will come. Preparations
are made upon the theory that it may come at any time. If a hundred
millions are necessary for adequate preparation for defense, and
you have spent only fifty when war comes, you might as well have
thrown your fifty millions into the sea. There is no such thing
as partial defense in modern war. If there are weak points in your
defense, your enemy is sure to find them. Indeed, he knows about
them all the time, and will strike them at once. Then your whole
costly system will be worthless.
What would be thought of the business capacity of a man who would
not insure his house or his store or his stock of goods against
fire because he did not happen to have money enough in bank to pay
the premium, but would have to borrow it at three per cent.? Or
of a man who would wait until he had realized the expected profit
on a commercial venture before insuring the goods? If preparation
for defense is the policy of a country, it would be little short
of blindness to delay it on account of a temporary deficiency in
the current revenue.
All now admit that universal education is an indispensable requisite
to fitness for universal suffrage. The most serious questions upon
which a free people can be called to vote are: A question of war,
a question of preparation for war, and a question of approval and
support, or disapproval and condemnation, of an administration on
account of the mode in which war has been conducted. Can this
highest duty of the citizen be intelligently performed without
military education? A sovereign _individual_ regards this as
demanding the highest education and the ablest counsel he can
possibly obtain. Can sovereign _millions_ do it wisely without
any education whatever? I believe no proposition could possibly
be plainer than that general military education is indispensable
to good citizenship in this country, and especially to all who may
be intrusted with high responsibilities in the legislative and
executive departments of the National Government. What would be
thought of a general of the army who tried to shield himself from
censure or punishment behind his ignorance of the law? Can a
legislator be excused because he knows nothing of the art and
science of war? If there is any one offense in this country which
ought never, under any circumstances, to be pardoned, it is ignorance
in those who are trusted by the people to manage the affairs of
their government. As in the military, so in the civil departments
of government, there a few greater crimes than that of seeking and
assuming the responsibilities of an office for which the man himself
knows he is not fit. It is nearly as great as that committed by
the appointing power under similar circumstances.
GENERAL MILITARY EDUCATION INDISPENSABLE
A system of general military education should of course include
elementary training in all the schools, public and private, so that
every boy, before he is sixteen years old, would know how to use
the rifled musket in ranks, and be familiar with the simple evolutions
of a company and battalion. Young men never forget such training
received when they are boys. The country would have in a few years
several millions of fairly well-trained young soldiers, requiring
only competent officers and a few days drill in regimental tactics
to make a reliable army for any service this country will probably
ever require of her volunteer soldiery. If it were a question of
the invasion of a foreign country against a modern veteran army,
the case would be different. But for defense against any possible
landing of a hostile army on our shores, our available force ought
to be so overwhelming in numbers as to far more than compensate
for lack of experience. Yet it must not be forgotten that some
training is _indispensable_. No possible advantage in numbers can
overcome the disadvantage resulting from total ignorance of tactics
and of the use of the modern long-range rifle. Good parents who
apprehend evil effects from giving their boys military training
ought to reflect that the boys will go, all the same, whether
trained or not, when the country is threatened with invasion.
Then, if ignorant, the will simply be doomed to fall the victims
of skilled marksmen to whose shots they know not how to reply.
Possibly the most cruel fate which American parents could prepare
for their sons would be to keep them in ignorance of the highest
duty their country may call upon them to perform, so that, unable
to offer and effective resistance to invasion, they could only die
in a hopeless effort to do their duty as citizen soldiers and
patriots--or, worse, live only to be driven in disgrace from a
field which a little education would have enabled them gloriously
to win.
There should be, under State authority, a general enrolment and
organization of all the young men who have received military
training, and places of rendezvous fixed at convenient centers at
or near railway-stations. Officers of all grades up to that of
colonel should be appointed in advance, and occasional musters held
under State laws, even if military exercises were not attempted.
Our colleges and high schools, besides the military academies of
the country, are even now educating a fair percentage of young men
to be officers of such an organization of enrolled regiments as
that here suggested. This percentage could easily be increased in
accordance with the demand. Besides, the retired men of the
regiments of the National Guard in the several States might furnish
some officers for the enrolled militia. But those well-trained
and fully equipped regiments would be required to move with full
ranks at once to the place of danger. Hence their active members
would not be available in the great expansion of the army in the
first period of war. The organization of the first reserve must,
for this reason, be entirely independent of the National Guard.
A great and very important advance has already been made in bringing
the regular army into close relations with the National Guard of
the several States, and in the employment of regular officers in
disseminating military education, both theoretical and practical,
throughout the country. These are among the most valuable services
the regular army can render in time of peace, and they should be
extended, if practicable, still further. Especially in the State
artillery, which must soon be organized for war service in the new
fortifications, instruction by regular officers will be indispensable,
and this can best be given in conjunction with the regular garrisons,
the same as in war service. It would also be well to perfect an
arrangement by which the new infantry regiments, when first taking
the field upon the breaking out of war, might be accompanied by
small bodies of regulars, to lead the way and indicate by example
what is to be done. Experience has shown that under such example
the rawest volunteers will be almost as stanch in battle as the
regulars themselves. The beneficial effect upon new troops of the
example of men who have before been in battle is very great. Hence
it is that old regiments should always be kept full by the addition
of recruits, rather than that the casualties of service be replaced
by new regiments.
ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD
What constitutes valuable education, military no less than civil,
is often greatly misunderstood. Elementary education and practical
training are indispensable to everybody, while higher education
may be rather injurious than beneficial, unless it is so regulated
as to elevate the reasoning faculties and independence of thought,
rather than mere acquisition of knowledge. Some notable examples
of this have appeared in the military annals of this country, and
no doubt in the civil also. Men who had become famous military
scholars were total failures in war, not only as commanders in the
field, for which no amount of theoretical education alone can
qualify a man, but also as military advisers. This was apparently
because their elaborate studies had made them mere imitators or
copyists. Whatever originality of thought or power of invention
they ever possessed had ceased to exist from disuse. They could
plan and direct a campaign with absolute accuracy, according to
the teachings of the great masters, for the well-defined purpose
upon which those teachings had been based. But when a wholly new
problem was presented to them, they had no conception of the right
mode of solving it. The plan of one great campaign was based
absolutely upon the best-approved method of capturing a certain
place, without any reference to what damage might or might not be
done to the opposing army in that operation. The plan of another
great campaign had for its sole object the conquest and permanent
occupation of a great territory, and was so conducted as to avoid
the possibility of seriously hurting the enemy in that operation.
Yet the theory upon which this last plan was based, as well as the
first, governed the policy of the government more than two years.
GENERAL GRANT WITHOUT MILITARY BOOKS
It was not until Grant took command of "all the armies" that the
true strategic principle governed the general military policy. In
this connection, the story told by Grant himself about his military
studies is very instructive. When asked by the representative of
some friends who wished to present him a library for his new house
in Washington, what military books he then had, so that they might
not duplicate them, he replied that he did not have any military
books, and never had any, except the West-Point text-books. No
doubt Grant might have profited from some additional study, but
none at all was far better than so much as to have dwarfed his mind
into that of an imitator of former commanders.
The development of great military ability in Grant, as the result
of his own experience and independent thought,--that is, the
independent development of his own native military genius,--is by
far the most interesting part of his history.
In short, the great lesson taught by our own experience is that
elementary military training should be universal, because every
young man may be called upon the perform the duties of a soldier;
that general military reading, and habits of independent thought
upon all great military subjects, should be cultivated by all who
aspire to any high place in life, because they may be called upon
to discharge the highest possible duties of good citizens in peace
or in war, namely, those connected with the national defense; that
due preparation for defense ought to be made without delay, and
the requisite means kept always ready; and, above all, that the
best method of making the quickest possible effective use of those
means ought to be fully matured and understood by all who may be
called upon to execute the orders of the government.
It now seems to me amazing that the affairs of an enlightened nation
could have been so badly managed as to leave the secession issue
in doubt almost to the last moment of a four years' contest, as it
is now well known it was. Probably the one saving fact in all
those years was that the young soldiers of the republic--and they
were nearly all young then--knew little and cared less about the
wrangling of self-seeking politicians and visionary doctrinaires
in the rear, but fought steadily on to the end, never doubting for
a moment the final triumph. I have never been able to recall a
single instance of doubt manifested by any soldier in the field,
though I did know a very few cases of officers of considerable
rank, who thought they ought to have had more rank, who went to
the rear and said something about failure in the field.
I believe now that it required only some _real_ emergency, such,
for instance, as the capture of Washington in July, 1863, to call
forth the power of the North and crush the rebellion in six months.
If any man thinks a great disaster would have disheartened the
North, he knows nothing of the people of our country. It was the
slow waste of enormous resources and of latent military strength
that at length made many even of the stoutest hearts begin to feel
despondent. I do not believe there was any time when the people
would not have responded with unanimity and enthusiasm to an appeal
to put forth all their strength and end the rebellion at a single
blow.
The one lesson of reason and experience that I would impress upon
my countrymen in every possible way is, when war or insurrection
comes or is threatened, do not trifle with it. Do not invoke
judicial proceedings, or call for 75,000 men; but call for _men_,
and let them come as many as will! If some of them do not get
there in time, before it is all over, it will not cost much to send
them home again! The services of the Pennsylvania reserve, though
ready for the field, were actually, positively refused until after
the disaster of Bull Run! The greatest wonder in the history of
this wonderful republic is that the government actually survived
such a military policy as that!
In this connection, it ought to be distinctly understood that the
great object of education at West Point and other military schools
in not to make high commanders, but to make thorough soldiers, men
capable of creating effective armies in the shortest possible time,
and of commanding comparatively small bodies of men. If great
commanders are ever again required in this country, they will come
to the front in due time. They cannot be selected in advance of
the actual trial in war. Even West Point, though one of the best
schools in the world, can at the most only lay the foundation of
a military education. Each individual must build for himself upon
that foundation the superstructure which is to mark his place in
the world. If he does not build, his monument will hardly appear
above the surface of the ground, and will soon be covered out of
sight.
It is of vital importance that the necessity of providing for
calling into active service a very large army in the shortest
possible time be fully understood. It is assumed that every
important seaport will in time be so fortified as to be safe against
any _unsupported_ naval attack. Modern science has rendered this
easy and certain. Hence a naval attack must necessarily be supported
by the landing of a military force upon the open coast, to attack
the land defenses in reverse; and such defenses are now far more
vulnerable to attack in rear than those of former times.
MEASURES NECESSARY TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
The sea-coasts of the United States are many thousand miles in
extent, and an attack may be made at any one or several of the many
important seaports in these long lines of coast. No one can
anticipate where the blow or blows may fall. Hence it is necessary
to be prepared to resist an attempt to land at any one of those
many points which are of such importance as to tempt an enemy to
attack them. The railroad facilities of the country are such that
the necessary armies can be moved to all exposed points in time to
meet any emergency. But the armies must be ready to move almost
at a moment's notice. There will be no time to organize, much less
to drill, new troops. Before that could be done, any one or two
or three of our largest seaport cities could be captured and
destroyed, and the invading forces get back again on their transports,
and under the protection of the guns of their own fleet. And even
if we had a navy more powerful than that of our enemy, it alone
could give us no adequate protection; for the enemy would be sure
to select a point of attack where our navy was not at the time,
and which it could not reach until too late. Indispensable as a
navy is to this country, it cannot act any very important part in
the defense of so extended a sea-coast unless it is many times more
powerful than any fleet which an enemy may send to attack us. The
enemy being free to choose his point of attack, we would required
at or near every one of the exposed points a fleet at least as
large as his, or in the aggregate at least five times as large.
No one, it is presumed, contemplates the creation of any such navy
as that in this country.
Indeed, it would be the height of folly to require the navy to take
part in the defense. In a country having the situation of the
United States, the navy is the _aggressive_ arm of the national
military power. Its function is to punish an enemy until he is
willing to submit to the national demands. For this purpose entire
freedom of action is essential; also secure depots where supplies
may be drawn and where necessary repairs may be made, and harbors
where cruisers or other vessels may seek safety if temporarily
overpowered. Hence arises one of the most important functions of
the land defense: To give the aggressive arm secure bases of
operation at all the great seaports where navy-yards or depots are
located. It may be that in special cases military forces may be
needed to act in support of naval operations, or to hold for a time
important points in a foreign country; but such service must be
only auxiliary, not a primary object. Foreign conquest and permanent
occupation are not a part of the policy of this country. There is
no division of opinion among standard naval and military authorities
on this great subject; such standard authors as Rear-Admiral Walker
and Captain Mahan have clearly set forth the relative functions of
the army and navy in enforcing the military policy of the United
States. The military problem which this country must solve is to
provide such means of aggressive and defensive action as to be able
to enforce a due observance of American public law on this continent,
and, while doing this, to defend itself against insult and spoilation.
The land defenses, including torpedoes and in a few cases floating
batteries, should be entirely independent of the active navy, so
that the latter may be free to act in one compact mass against any
enemy which may anywhere oppose it.
There will be another important necessity for very large forces of
infantry and light artillery,--that is, large in the aggregate,--
in the event of war with even a second- or third-class naval power:
To protect our long lines of open coast and small unfortified
harbors from destruction from the guns and landing-parties of the
enemy's light-draft cruisers. This would require a "picket-line"
with considerable "reserves," several thousand miles in length.
The national pride, if not the material interests involved, would
not permit the government to submit to such destruction or spoilation
without making every possible effort to prevent it. In short,
unless the government and the people of the United States are
willing to prepare in advance for putting into the field at a
moment's notice a very large and effective army, as well as to
fortify all important seaports, they may as well make up their
minds to submit, at least for a time, to whatever indignity any
considerable naval power may see fit to inflict upon them. No half-
way measures will do any good. Fortifications without an army
would be worth no more, against any country having a considerable
army and navy, than an army without fortifications.