Differences Between the Commanding General of the Army and the War
Department--General Grant's Special Powers--His Appointment as
Secretary of War _Ad interim_--The Impeachment of President Johnson
--Memorandum of Interviews with William M. Evarts and General Grant
in Regard to the Secretaryship of War--Failure of the Impeachment
Trial--Harmony in the War Department--A New Policy at Army
Headquarters.
During nearly the entire history of the government of the United
States the relations between the general-in-chief, or nominal
commanding general of the army, and the War Department have been
the cause of discord, sometimes descending to bitter personal
controversy, and in a few instances leading to very serious results.
The differences between General Scott and the Secretary became so
serious that the general removed his headquarters from Washington
to New York, and remained away from the capital several years,
until the time when civil war was imminent. General Sherman also
found it necessary to escape from an intolerable situation by
removing to St. Louis, and did not return to Washington until the
condition of the War Department led to the impeachment of the
Secretary of War. During their long absence from the capital
neither of these generals could exercise any appreciable influence
over either the administration or the command of the army. It is
thought to be worthy of note that during one of these periods of
absence of the general-in-chief the military resources of the
country were mostly placed within easy reach of those about to
engage in an effort to break up the Union, and that during the
other period corruption in the War Department led to impeachment.
It is no reflection upon the many eminent, patriotic citizens who
have held the war portfolio to say that the very few men who have
proved unworthy of that great trust would have been much less likely
to do serious harm to the public interests if they had been under
the watchful eye of a jealous old soldier, like Scott or Sherman,
who was not afraid of them.
THE COMMANDING GENERAL AND THE WAR DEPARTMENT
As hereafter explained, the controversy between General Grant and
the Secretary of War was the primary cause which finally led to
the impeachment of the President of the United States. The cause
of this trouble has seemed to be inherent in the form and character
of the government. An essential provision of the Constitution
makes the President commander-in-chief of the army and navy. It
is manifestly indispensable that the executive head of a government
be clothed with this authority. Yet the President is not, as a
rule, a man of military education or experience. The exigencies
of party politics also seem to require, in general, that the
Secretary of War be a party politician, equally lacking with the
President in qualifications for military command.
The art of war has in all ages called forth the highest order of
genius and character, the great captains of the world having been
esteemed as among the greatest men. So, also, and in continually
increasing degree in modern times, the military art has called for
scientific education of the very highest character, supplemented
by practical experience. It cannot be questioned that the military
profession requires ability, education, and practical training no
less than the legal or any other profession. A Supreme Court of
the United States composed of merchants and bankers would be no
more of an anomaly than a body of general and staff officers of
like composition. The general policy of our government seems to
be based upon a recognition of this self-evident principle. We
have a national military academy and other military schools inferior
to none in the world, and well-organized staff departments which
are thoroughly efficient in war as well as in peace. The laws also
provide a due proportion of subordinate general officers for the
command of geographical departments in time of peace, or of divisions
and brigades in the field in time of war. But no provision is made
for an actual military commander of the entire army either in peace
or in war. During only a single year since the adoption of the
Constitution of the United States has this not been the fact. In
pursuance of a special act of Congress and the orders of President
Lincoln, General Grant in fact commanded "all the armies of the
United States" during the last year of the Civil War; but at no
other time has there been an actual military commander of the army
or armies whose authority as such was recognized by the War
Department.
Why, it may be asked, this strange departure from the recognized
rule of organization in all governmental and business affairs?
Why provide educated and trained experts for all subordinate
positions, and none for the head or chief, vastly the most important
of all?
In the first place, it is important to observe that the matter
rests absolutely in the hands of the President. Congress has no
power in the matter. To create by law a military head for the army
would be a violation of the essential provision of the Constitution
which makes the President commander-in-chief.
GENERAL GRANT'S SPECIAL POWERS
In the case of General Grant, Congress fully recognized this fact,
saying: "Under the direction and during the pleasure of the
President" he "may" command the armies of the United States. Even
this, if intended as conveying authority to the President, was
superfluous, and if intended as more than that would have been
unconstitutional. In fact, it was only a suggestion, intended to
be entirely within the limits of constitutional propriety, of what
was the general opinion of the people and of Congress, that after
three years of failure the President ought to select a soldier and
put him in actual command of all the armies. The President then
went far beyond the suggestion of Congress, and even to the extreme
limit of military abdication. He not only gave General Grant
absolute, independent command, placing at his disposal all the
military resources of the country, but he even denied to himself
any knowledge whatever of the general's plans. In this patriotic
act of extreme self-abnegation President Lincoln undoubtedly acted
in exact accord with what he believed to be the expressed popular
opinion, and probably in accord with his own judgment and inclination;
for no one could have been more painfully aware than he had by
that time become of the absolute necessity of having a military
man actually in control of all the armies, or more desirous than
he of relief from a responsibility to which he and his advisers
had proved so unequal. But it must be admitted that in this
President Lincoln went beyond the limit fixed by his constitutional
obligation as commander-in-chief. He would have more exactly
fulfilled that obligation if he had endeavored faithfully to
comprehend and adopt as his own all the plans proposed by his chosen
and trusted general-in-chief, guarding the latter against all
possible interference, theretofore so pernicious, from the War
Department or any other source. By such means the President could
have actually exercised the chief command imposed upon him by the
Constitution, sharing in due measure with his chief military officer
the responsibilities imposed by their high offices. In no other
way, it is believed, can the duties imposed upon a constitutional
commander-in-chief who is not possessed of military education and
experience be fully and conscientiously performed. Indeed, such
is the method pursued by great military sovereigns all over the
world, except in a few instances where the monarch believes himself,
either truly or falsely, superior in military ability to his chief
of staff. It is only in this country, where the chief of state
has generally no military training, and his war minister the same,
that a chief of staff of the army is supposed to be unnecessary.
While it is easy to understand the reasons which led to the action
of the government in the spring of 1864, it is much less easy to
understand why some reasonable approximation to that course, as
above suggested, and in accord with the practice of all military
nations, has never been adopted as a permanent system in this
country. Perhaps it may be like the case of that citizen of Arkansas
who did not mend the roof of his house when it was not raining
because it did not then need mending. But it would seem the part
of wisdom to perfect the military system so far as practicable in
time of peace rather then continue a fruitless controversy over
the exact location of an undefined and undefinable line supposed
to separate the military administration from the command in the
army, or the functions of the Secretary of War from those of the
commanding general. The experience of many years has shown that
the Secretary was sure to get on both sides of that line, no matter
where it was drawn. But it is encouraging to note that some
experiments made in more recent years, in the direction of the
generally recognized sound military system, have not proved by any
means unsatisfactory.
GENERAL GRANT'S SPECIAL POWERS
This chronic controversy between the military administration and
the command once gave rise to one of the most dangerous crises in
American history. The facts in respect to the origin of that crisis
soon became obscured by other events, and have never been correctly
published.
The assassination of President Lincoln occurred a very short time
before the end of the Civil War. It appears that his successor in
the Presidential office did not withdraw any part of the supreme
authority which had been conferred upon General Grant by President
Lincoln a year before. Nevertheless, Secretary Stanton, who had
very reluctantly yielded to President Lincoln's order, began, soon
after the end of hostile operations, to resume the exercise of
those functions which had formerly been claimed as belonging to the
War Department, and which had been suspended by President Lincoln.
Stanton "boldly took command of the armies."( 1) By this General
Grant was deeply offended, and finally declared that the action of
the Secretary of War was intolerable; although he refers to it in
his "Memoirs" as "another little spat." The authority which Stanton
assumed was the constitutional authority of the commander-in-chief
of the army, a large part of which authority had been delegated by
the President to General Grant, not to Secretary Stanton. Hence
the Secretary's assumption was offensive alike to the general and
to the President. General Grant acted with great forbearance, and
endeavored to obtain from Secretary Stanton due recognition of his
rightful authority as general commanding the army, but with no
permanent effect.( 2)
General Grant opposed the removal of Mr. Stanton by the exercise
of the President's prerogative alone, for the reason, with others,
that such action would be in violation of the Tenure-of-Office
Act.( 3) He also objected at first to either removal or suspension,
mainly for fear that an objectionable appointment might be made in
Stanton's place.( 4) But those two objections being removed by
Johnson's tender of the appointment to Grant himself, _vice_ Stanton
suspended instead of removed, General Grant gave his full countenance
and support to President Johnson in the _suspension_ of Mr. Stanton,
with a view on the part of the President to his ultimate removal,
either with the concurrence of the Senate or through a judicial
decision that the Tenure-of-Office Act was, as Johnson claimed,
unconstitutional.( 5)
On August 12, 1867, Grant himself accepted the appointment of
Secretary of War _ad interim_, and informed Stanton that he had
done so. Stanton denied the right of the President to suspend him
without the consent of the Senate, but wrote to the President, and
to the same effect to General Grant: "But inasmuch as the general
commanding the armies of the United States has been appointed _ad
interim_, and has notified me that he has accepted the appointment,
I have no alternative but to submit, under protest, to superior
force."
In 1866, 1867, and 1868 General Grant talked to me freely several
times of his differences with Secretary Stanton. His most emphatic
declaration on that subject, and of his own intended action in
consequence, appears from the records to have been made after
Stanton's return to the War Office in January, 1868, when his
conduct was even more offensive to Grant than it had been before
Stanton's suspension in August, 1867, and when Grant and Sherman
were trying to get Stanton out of the War Office.( 6) At the time
of General Grant's visit to Richmond, Va., as one of the Peabody
trustees, he said to me that the conduct of Mr. Stanton had become
intolerable to him, and, after asking my opinion, declared in
emphatic terms his intention to demand either the removal of Stanton
or the acceptance of his own resignation. But the bitter personal
controversy which immediately followed between Grant and Johnson,
the second attempt to remove Stanton in February, 1868, and the
consequent impeachment of the President, totally eclipsed the more
distant and lesser controversy between Grant and Stanton, and,
doubtless, prevented Grant from taking the action in respect to
Stanton's removal which he informed me in Richmond he intended to
take.( 7)
GRANT AS SECRETARY OF WAR _AD INTERIM_
Of the impeachment and trial of President Johnson it is not my
province to write. My special knowledge relates only to its first
cause, above referred to, and its termination, both intimately
connected with the history of the War Department, the necessities
of which department, real or supposed, constituted the only vital
issue involved in the impeachment trial. The following memorandum,
made by me at the time, and now published with the consent of Mr.
Evarts, explains the circumstances under which I became Secretary
of War in 1868, and the connection of that event with the termination
of the impeachment trial:
"Memorandum
"May, 1868
"In compliance with a written request from Mr. W. M. Evarts, dated
Tuesday, April 21, 1868, 2 P. M., I called upon that gentleman in
his room at Willard's Hotel, Washington, a few minutes before three
o'clock P. M. of the same day.
"Mr. Evarts introduced conversation by saying something about the
approaching trial of Mr. Jefferson Davis, but quickly said that
was not what he wished to see me about. The business upon which
he wished to see me was of vastly greater importance, involving
the safety of the country and the maintenance of the Constitution.
Mr. Evarts then asked my consent that the President might at any
time before the close of the impeachment trial send my nomination
to the Senate as Secretary of War in place of Mr. Stanton. I asked
upon what ground, and for what reasons, the proposition was made,
which question was then answered in part, and in the evening of
the same day more fully, as hereafter related. It having been
announced that General Grant was waiting at the door for me, this
first interview was cut short with an agreement to renew it about
eight o'clock the same evening. Before separating I asked Mr.
Evarts whether I was at liberty to mention the subject to any other
person. Mr. Evarts replied: 'I suppose you mean General Grant.'
I said: 'Yes, my relations with General Grant, and his with the
President, are such that I do not wish to act in such a matter
without consulting him.' Mr. Evarts said he could not give consent
that any persons should be informed that such a proposition had
been made on behalf of the President, and suggested some objections
to consulting General Grant on the subject, for the reason of his
being a candidate for the Presidency, but finally intimated that
it might be well to talk to General Grant about it incidentally,
and thus learn his views.
INTERVIEWS WITH EVARTS AND GRANT
"While walking with General Grant after dinner the same day, I said
to him, in effect, that I had reason to believe that a proposition
like to one referred to above would probably be made to me, and
that upon the theory, as I understood, that the President would
not be convicted by the Senate, and I asked General Grant's opinion
in regard to it. General Grant replied that he had supposed there
was no reasonable doubt of the President's removal, but if that
was not the case, or if it were, he (General Grant) would be glad
to have me as Secretary of War during the remainder of the term;
that Mr. Wade would have some difficulty in making up a cabinet
for so short a portion of a term.
"About eight o'clock P. M. of the same day (April 21) I again called
upon Mr. Evarts at the hotel, when a long conversation took place
upon the subject referred to in the morning. The substance of what
Mr. Evarts said was as follows: He was fully satisfied that the
President could not be convicted upon the evidence; if he was
removed, it would be done wholly from supposed party necessity;
that this was the opinion and feeling of a considerable number of
the ablest lawyers and statesmen among the Republican senators;
that it was his and their opinion that if the President was removed,
it would be not really from anything he had done, but for fear of
what he might do; that he (Mr. Evarts) did not believe the President
could possibly be convicted in any event, but that senators were
at a loss how to remove the apprehensions of the Republican party
as to what the President would do in case of acquittal, unless the
War Department was placed in a satisfactory condition in advance.
He said: 'A majority of Republicans in both houses of Congress
and throughout the country now regret the commencement of the
impeachment proceedings, since they find how slight is the evidence
of guilty intent. But now the serious question is, how to get out
of the scrape? A judgment of guilty and removal of the President
would be ruinous to the party, and cause the political death of
every senator who voted for it as soon as the country has time to
reflect upon the facts and appreciate the frivolous character of
the charges upon which the removal must be based. The precedent
of the impeachment and removal of the President for political
reasons would be exceedingly dangerous to the government and the
Constitution; in short, the emergency is one of great national
peril.'
"He added that this was the view of the case entertained by several
among the most prominent Republican senators, and that from such
senators came the suggestion that my nomination as Secretary of
War be sent to the Senate, in order that the Senate might vote upon
the President's case in the light of that nomination. Mr. Evarts
believed that I was so named because my appointment would be
satisfactory to General Grant, and would give the Republican party
a sense of security as to the President's future action in reference
to the War Department and the military districts of the South; that
it was not with anybody a question of friendship or hostility toward
the President personally, for he really had no friends. That while
the Democrats in the Senate would of course vote for his acquittal,
and do their whole duty in the case, just so soon as he was removed
they would rejoice that it was done, feeling confident that it
would cause the overthrow of the Republican party and the defeat
of General Grant. Mr. Evarts was not at liberty to mention names
of senators holding these views and originating the proposition of
my nomination.
"I suggested a number of objections, some personal as to myself,
and others of a public character, to giving my assent to the proposed
nomination, in reply to which objections many of the above statements
by Mr. Evarts were made. I then said I would again talk with
General Grant upon the subject, and give a definite reply the next
morning. About eleven o'clock the same night (April 21) I informed
General Grant at his house that the proposition above named had
been (or it would be) made to me; that it originated with Republican
senators; and I gave in substance the reasons above stated as what
I understood to be the grounds upon which the proposition was made.
I did not give any names of senators, nor the channel through which
my information or the proposition came. My remarks to General
Grant were prefaced by the statement that while I would be glad of
General Grant's advice if he felt at liberty to give it, I did not
wish to ask General Grant to commit himself in so delicate a matter
unless he desired to do so; but that the matter was one of so great
importance that I thought it my duty to tell him all about it, and
what I believed I ought to do, and leave General Grant to advise
me or not, as he thought best. I said that although the statement
of the views and wishes of senators above referred to came to me
indirectly, they came in such a way as not to permit me to doubt
their correctness, and I believed it my duty to yield to the request.
General Grant at once replied that under those circumstances he
did not see how I could do otherwise. General Grant said he did
not believe in any compromise of the impeachment question. The
President ought to be convicted or acquitted fairly and squarely
on the facts proved. That if he was acquitted, as soon as Congress
adjourned he would trample the laws under foot and do whatever he
pleased; that Congress would have to remain in session all summer
to protect the country from the lawless acts of the President; that
the only limit to his violation of law had been, and would be, his
courage, which had been very slight heretofore, but would be vastly
increased by his escape from punishment. General Grant said he
would not believe any pledge or promise Mr. Johnson might make in
regard to his future conduct. In his opinion, the only safe course,
and the most popular one, would be to remove the President. He
could understand the grounds of apprehension in the minds of some
leading Republicans, but he did not agree with them. He believed
the safest and wisest course was the bold and direct one. In this
General Grant was very emphatic; he said he would not advise me to
enter into any project to compromise the impeachment question, but
if the facts were as represented that I could not well do otherwise
than to acquiesce in the nomination.
INTERVIEWS WITH EVARTS AND GRANT
"The next morning (April 22), about ten o'clock, I called upon Mr.
Evarts at Willard's Hotel, and informed him that I had considered
the matter as carefully as I was able to do, and that there was
only one difficulty in my mind. That was as to what would be the
policy of the President during the remainder of his term, in the
event of his being acquitted. I mentioned some of the President's
recent acts, such as the creation of the Military Division of the
Atlantic, disregard of military usage in sending orders to army
officers out of the regular channels, etc.--acts for which no good
reason could be given, and which at least tended to create discord
and trouble. Mr. Evarts replied that he could not tell anything
about those matters, but presumed that such annoying irregularities
would disappear with the removal of their cause, namely, hostility
between the President and the Secretary of War. Mr. Evarts said
he did not see how I could satisfy myself of that subject without
a personal interview with the President, which would not be advisable
in the circumstances. I then said I did not expect any pledge from
the President, and did not expect to receive any communication from
him on the subject, either directly or indirectly; and that I was
not willing to converse with the President, nor with any other
person except Mr. Evarts, on the subject; but that I wished the
President to understand distinctly the conditions upon which I was
willing to accept the appointment, and desired Mr. Evarts to inform
the President of these conditions. If the nomination was then
made, I would take it for granted that the conditions were
satisfactory. I then said I had always been treated kindly by the
President, and felt kindly toward him; that I had always advised
him, whenever any excuse had been given for offering advice, to
avoid all causes of irritation with Congress, and try to act in
harmony with the legislative department; that I regarded the removal
of Mr. Stanton, in the way it was done, as wrong and unwise; that
I understood this proposition as coming originally from the Republican
side of the Senate, and as being accepted by the President in the
interest of peace, and for the purpose of securing harmony between
the legislative and executive departments of the government, and
a just and faithful administration of the laws, including the
reconstruction acts. I added: 'And the President knows from
General Schofield's acts what he means by this,--if, after these
conditions have been fully stated to the President, he sends my
name to the Senate, I will deem it my duty to say nothing on the
subject of accepting or declining the appointment until the Senate
has acted upon it.'
"Mr. Evarts intimated that the above was satisfactory, and the
interview then ended."
I returned to Richmond on Thursday, April 23, being then in command
in Virginia, executing the reconstruction acts. On the 24th the
President sent to the Senate my nomination as Secretary of War.
On the morning of the 26th I received from General Grant a confidential
letter, dated April 25, advising me under the circumstances to
decline the secretaryship in advance.( 8)
To the above letter I sent the following letters in reply:
"(Confidential.)
"Richmond, Va., April 26, 1868.
"Dear General: I regret exceedingly that your advice came too
late. I have already promised not to decline the nomination in
advance of any action of the Senate.
"Yours very truly,
"J. M. Schofield, Bvt. Maj.-Gen.
"Gen'l Grant, Washington, D. C."
"Richmond, Va., April 26, 1868.
"Dear General: I see from the papers that the President has
nominated me to the Senate as Secretary of War. You are aware that
I do not want that office; yet under existing circumstances, if
the Senate should wish me to serve I could not decline. I presume
my nomination will not be confirmed, but have no right to act upon
any such presumption.
"Yours very truly,
"J. M. Schofield, Bvt. Maj.-Gen.
"Gen'l Grant, Washington, D. C."
FAILURE OF THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL
I have no means of knowing to what extent, if any, the Senate was
influenced by this nomination, but anxiety about the ultimate result
seemed to be soon allayed. About a month later a vote was taken
in the Senate, and the impeachment failed; my nomination was then
confirmed, as stated at the time, by a nearly unanimous vote of
the Senate.
I entered upon the duties of the office as Secretary of War on the
first day of June, and continued to discharge them until a few days
after General Grant's inauguration in March. I was greeted very
cordially by the President, by all the members of his cabinet, by
General Grant, and by a large number of senators who called upon
me at the War Department.
The duties devolved upon me were often of a very delicate character,
and it required at times no little tact to avoid serious trouble.
President Johnson's views were sometimes in direct conflict with
those which I felt compelled to maintain under the acts of Congress
affecting the States lately in rebellion; but it is due to the
memory of President Johnson to say that he did not at any time
require me to do anything contrary to my interpretation of the acts
of Congress, and the he in general acquiesced without objection in
all the measures I deemed necessary to preserve the peace and secure
a fair vote of the newly enfranchised citizens of the Southern
States in the Presidential election. The cordial assistance of
Mr. Evarts as Attorney-General was a great help to me in such
matters. When he was present I had little difficulty in respect
to the law involved in any question; but when he happened to be
absent, and I was compelled to stand alone against all the cabinet,
or all who chose to take any interest in the question, it was hard
work. But I always carried the day--at least, in act if not in
argument. The President never decided against me. He thus fulfilled
to the letter the implied promise made when he submitted my nomination
to the Senate.
If there ever had been any real ground for the wide-spread apprehension
of criminal purpose on the part of President Johnson, certainly
all indication of any such purpose disappeared with the failure of
his impeachment and the settlement of the long-standing controversy
respecting the War Department. The so-called reconstruction laws,
which the President so emphatically condemned as being unconstitutional,
were carried out without any further objection from him; the
Presidential election in the Southern States was conducted with
perfect good order; a free ballot and a full count were secured
under the supervision and protection of the army--a thing supposed
to be so dangerous to the liberties of a free people. This and
many other examples in the history of this country, from the time
when Washington surrendered his commission to the Continental
Congress down to the present time, show that a "free people" have
nothing to fear from their army, whether regular, volunteer, or
militia; the soldiers are, in fact, among the most devoted and
loyal citizens of the republic, and thoroughly imbued with the
fundamental principle of subordination of the military to the civil
power.
HARMONY IN THE WAR DEPARTMENT
With General Grant my relations while in the War Department were
of the most satisfactory character. As a candidate for the
Presidency, and as President-elect, he naturally desired to be as
free as possible from the current duties of his office as general
of the army, and he was absent from Washington much of the time,
his chief of staff, General Rawlins, remaining there to promulgate
orders in his name. Thus it devolved upon me to exercise all the
functions of "commander-in-chief of the army"--functions which it
is usually attempted to divide among three,--the President, the
Secretary of War, and the general-in-chief,--without any legal
definition of the part which belongs to each. Of course "the
machine" ran very smoothly in the one case, though there had been
much friction in the other.
In compliance with the wish of General Grant, I remained in office
under him for a few days, for the purpose of inaugurating the system
which he hoped would end the long-standing controversy between the
War Department and the headquarters of the army. The order which
was issued assigning General Sherman to command the entire army,
staff as well as line, was prepared by me under General Grant's
instructions, and the draft of the order was approved by him as
expressing the views he had maintained when he was general-in-chief.
As President he very soon yielded to the opposite views, and caused
the order to be amended accordingly.
That General Sherman then entertained views of his authority which
were too broad, as General Grant had also done, is no doubt true;
but it ought not to have been very difficult to correct such errors.
It was easier to take away all administrative authority and all
command over the general staff of the army, and the latter course
was adopted. The ancient controversy was up to 1888 no nearer
settlement than it was in 1869, though in General Sheridan's time
some progress had been made in the persistent efforts to deprive
the general-in-chief of the little authority which had been left
to General Sherman. General Sheridan had, with his usual gallantry
and confidence, renewed the contest, but had been worsted in his
first encounter with the Secretary, and then gave up the struggle.
Upon my assignment to the "command of the army" in 1888, I determined
to profit so far as possible by the unsatisfactory experience of
Generals Scott, Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan--at least so far as
to avoid further attempts to accomplish the impossible, which
attempts have usually the result of accomplishing little or nothing.
In fact, long study of the subject, at the instance of Generals
Grant and Sherman, earnest efforts to champion their views, and
knowledge of the causes of their failure, had led me to the conclusion
heretofore suggested, namely, that under the government of the
United States an actual military commander of the army is not
possible, unless in an extreme emergency like that which led to
the assignment of Lieutenant-General Grant in 1864; and that the
general-in-chief, or nominal commanding general, can at most be
only a "chief of staff,"--that or nothing,--whatever may be the
mere title under which he may be assigned to duty by the President.
A NEW POLICY AT ARMY HEADQUARTERS
As the first step in the experimental course decided upon, I sent
an order in writing to the adjutant-general, directing him never,
under any circumstances, to issue an order dictated by me, or in
my name, without first laying it before the Secretary of War; and
I made it known to all the staff that I disclaimed the right to
issue any order to the army without the knowledge of the President
or the Secretary. I also forbade the issuing of any order in my
name without my knowledge. The first rule was easy, the latter
very difficult, to enforce. I found, with no little surprise, that
the office of the "commanding general" usually learned for the
first time of routine orders issued in his name by seeing them
published in the New York papers the next day; and it was quite
difficult at first to make it distinctly understood that such a
practice could not be tolerated. In fact, it became necessary to
call attention to the question of veracity involved in such a use
of the general's name. Such was the condition the War Department
had reached. The adjutant-general had acquired the habit of issuing
nearly all his orders to the army without the knowledge of any one
of his superiors--the President, the Secretary of War, or the
general-in-chief. In fact, the adjutant-general had in practice
come very near being "commander-in-chief."
Some time and much patience were required to bring about the
necessary change, but ere long the result became very apparent.
Perfect harmony was established between the War Department and the
headquarters of the army, and this continued, under the administrations
of Secretaries Proctor, Elkins, and Lamont, up to the time of my
retirement from active service. During all this period,--namely,
from 1889 to 1895, under the administrations of Presidents Harrison
and Cleveland,--the method I have indicated was exactly followed
by the President in all cases of such importance as to demand his
personal action, and some such cases occurred under both administrations.
The orders issued were actually the President's orders. No matter
by whom suggested or by whom formulated, they were in their final
form understandingly dictated by the President, and sent to the
army in his name by the commanding general, thus leaving no possible
ground for question as to the constitutional authority under which
they were issued, nor of the regularity of the methods, in conformity
with army regulations, by which they were communicated to the army.
It is, I think, to be hoped that the system thus begun may be fully
developed and become permanent, as being the best practicable
solution of a long-standing and dangerous controversy, and as most
in accord with the fundamental principles of our constitutional
government, under which the President, whether a soldier or a
civilian, is in fact as well as in name the commander-in-chief of
the army and navy.
[( 1) Grant's "Memoirs," Vol. II, p. 105.]
[( 2) Grant's "Memoirs," Vol. II, pp. 104, 105; Sherman's "Memoirs,"
second edition, Vol. II, pp. 446-450.]
[( 3) See General Grant's letter to President Andrew Johnson, August
1, 1867, in McPherson's "History of Reconstruction," p. 307.]
[( 4) See General Grant's letter to President Andrew Johnson,
February 3, 1868, in McPherson's "History of Reconstruction," p.
286.]
[( 5) Sherman's "Memoirs," second edition, Vol. II, p. 241; and
McPherson's "History of Reconstruction," pp. 282-293.]
[( 6) Sherman's "Memoirs," second edition, Vol. II, pp. 422-424.]
[( 7) The records of the Peabody trustees show that their meeting
in Richmond, when General Grant was present, occurred January 21
and 22, 1868.]
[( 8) From all circumstances it is fair to assume that General
Grant's change of attitude was owing to his opinion as to the effect
the nomination would have upon the impeachment proceedings.]