French Intervention in Mexico--A Plan to Compel the Withdrawal of
the French Army--Grant's Letter of Instructions to General Sheridan
--Secretary Seward Advocates Moral Suasion--A Mission to Paris With
That End in View--Speechmaking at the American Thanksgiving Dinner
--Napoleon's Method of Retreating with Dignity--A Presentation to
the Emperor and Empress.
While the government of the United States was fully occupied with
the contest for the preservation of the Union, Napoleon III, Emperor
of the French, attempted to overthrow the republican government of
Mexico, and establish in its stead an empire under the Archduke
Maximilian of Austria. If the American conflict had resulted in
the triumph of secession, so also might Napoleon have succeeded in
re-establishing monarchical government on the American continent.
But from the moment when the Union of the States became reassured,
European interference in the political affairs of the American
republic became impossible. Upon this subject there appeared to
be no division of sentiment among the people of the United States.
Certainly there was none among the responsible American statesmen
of that time. It was their unanimous voice that the French
intervention in Mexico must be speedily terminated; but there was
naturally some division of opinion respecting the means by which
this should be effected. Some favored the most prompt and vigorous
military action, while others, not unmindful of the long-existing
friendship between the people of the United States and France,
preferred more peaceful measures.
FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO
As the first and necessary step in either line of policy, whether
for immediate active military operations or as conclusive evidence
of ultimate military purpose in aid of diplomacy, General Sheridan
was sent, with an army of about fifty thousand men, to the line of
the Rio Grande. But Sheridan's troops were Union volunteers who
had been enlisted especially for the Civil War, then terminated;
and the necessity was at once recognized of organizing a new army
for the express purpose of acting against the French army in Mexico,
in case of need. It was proposed that this new army should be
enlisted and organized under the republican government of Mexico,
the only government recognized by the United States in that country.
This course would avoid the necessity of any political action of
the government of the United States in the premises. Lieutenant-
General U. S. Grant, then commander-in-chief of the armies of the
United States, was requested to select an officer to organize and
command the proposed army.
In June, 1865, at Raleigh, North Carolina, I received a message
from General Grant informing me of my selection, and desiring me,
if I was willing to consider the proposition, to come to Washington
for consultation on the subject. Upon my arrival in Washington,
I consulted freely with General Grant, Señor Romero (the Mexican
minister), President Johnson, Secretary of State Seward, and
Secretary of War Stanton, all of whom approved the general proposition
that I should assume the control and direction of the measures to
be adopted for the purpose of causing the French army to evacuate
Mexico. Not much was said between me and the President or either
of his secretaries at that time about the means to be employed;
but it appeared to be understood by all that force would probably
be necessary, and for some time no other means were considered.
The subject was fully discussed with General Grant and Señor Romero,
and I then consented to take charge of the matter, with the
understanding that I should have perfect freedom of action and
choice of means and of time, so far as circumstances would permit.
To enable me to do this, the War Department gave me leave of absence
for twelve months, with permission to go beyond the limits of the
United States and to take with me any officers of my staff whom I
might designate. It was proposed to organize in Mexican territory
an army corps under commissions from the government of Mexico, the
officers and soldiers to be taken from the Union and Confederate
forces, who were reported to be eager to enlist in such an
enterprise.
The Mexican authorities proposed to furnish the means by which this
army should be paid and the expenses of military operations defrayed,
and to that end a loan was to be negotiated in the United States.
To facilitate the enlistment and equipment of the proposed army
corps, General Grant gave me a manuscript order, dated West Point,
July 25, 1865, addressed to General P. H. Sheridan, then commanding
the Military Division of the Gulf, with a large force near the
Mexican frontier. The following is a copy of General Grant's order:
GRANT'S LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS TO SHERIDAN
"Head Quarters Armies of the United States.
"West Point, N. Y., July 25, 1865.
"Maj.-Gen. P. H. Sheridan, Com'd'g Mil. Div. of the Gulf.
"General: Maj.-General J. M. Schofield goes to the Rio Grande on
an inspection tour, carrying with him a leave of absence for one
year, with authority to leave the United States. If he avails
himself of this leave he will explain to you the object more fully
than I could do in the limits of a letter, and much more fully than
I could do now, under any circumstances, because much that will
have to be learned to fix his determination, whether to go or not,
has yet to be found out in Washington whilst I shall be away.
This, however, I can say: Gen. Schofield's leave has been given
with the concurrence of the President, he having full knowledge of
the object. I have both written my views to the President and had
conversations with him on the subject. In all that relates to
Mexican affairs he agrees in the duty we owe to ourselves to maintain
the Monroe doctrine, both as a principle and as a security for our
future peace.
"On the Rio Grande, or in Texas, convenient to get there, we must
have a large amount of surrendered ordnance and ordnance stores,
or such articles accumulating from discharging men who leave their
stores behind. Without special orders to do so, send none of these
articles back, but rather place them convenient to be permitted to
go into Mexico if they can be got into the hands of the defenders
of the only Government we recognize in that country. I hope Gen.
Schofield may go with orders direct to receive these articles; but
if he does not, I know it will meet with general approbation to
let him have them if contrary orders are not received.
"It is a fixed determination on the part of the people of the United
States, and I think myself safe in saying on the part of the
President also, that an empire shall not be established on this
continent by the aid of foreign bayonets. A war on the part of
the United States is to be avoided, if possible; but it will be
better to go to war now, when but little aid given to the Mexicans
will settle the question, than to have in prospect a greater war,
sure to come if delayed until the empire is established. We want,
then, to aid the Mexican without giving cause of war between the
United States and France. Between the would-be empire of Maximilian
and the United States all difficulty can easily be settled by
observing the same sort of neutrality that has been observed toward
us for the last four years.
"This is a little indefinite as a letter of instructions to be
governed by. I hope with this you may receive them--instructions
--in much more positive terms. With a knowledge of the fact before
you, however, that the greatest desire is felt to see the Liberal
Government restored in Mexico,--and no doubt exists of the strict
justice of our right to demand this, and enforce the demand with
the whole strength of the United States,--your own judgment gives
you a basis of action that will aid you.
"I will recommend in a few days that you be directed to discharge
all the men you think can be spared from the Dept. of Texas, where
they are, giving transportation to their homes to all who desire
to return. You are aware that existing orders permit discharged
soldiers to retain their arms and accoutrements at low rates, fixed
in orders.
"Very respectfully, your obt. svt.,
"U. S. Grant, Lt.-Gen."
In effect this order required General Sheridan to turn over to me
all of his volunteer troops who might wish to take part in the
Mexican enterprise, with their arms and equipments, and all
"surrendered ordnance and ordnance stores," etc., thus making it
easy for me to arm and equip at small cost the ex-Confederates and
others who would join my standard. Soon after the date of General
Grant's order to General Sheridan, and at the request of Secretary
Seward, conveyed to me by Mr. Stanton, I met Mr. Seward at Cape
May. He then proposed to me to go to France, under authority of
the State Department, to see if the French emperor could not be
made to understand the necessity of withdrawing his army from Mexico,
and thus save us the necessity of expelling it by force. Mr. Seward
expressed the belief that if Napoleon could be made to understand that
the people of the United States would never, under any circumstances,
consent to the existence in Mexico of a government established and
sustained by foreign power, he would withdraw his army from that
country. If this were done, the friendly relations between the
people of France and the United States would not be disturbed,
while the expulsion of a French army from Mexico by American
volunteers would engender great bitterness of feeling among the
French people, even if it did not lead to war between France and
the United States.
SECRETARY SEWARD ADVOCATES MORAL SUASION
This proposition from Mr. Seward seemed to put upon me the
responsibility of deciding the momentous question of future friendship
or enmity between my own country and our ancient ally and friend.
I had, on the one hand, full authority from the War Department and
the general-in-chief of the army, given with the knowledge and
consent of the President of the United States, to organize and
equip an army for the purpose of driving the French out of Mexico,
and on the other hand a request from the State Department to go to
France and try by peaceful means to accomplish the same end.
As the negotiation of the Mexican loan had not made great progress,
the funds were not yet available for the support of an army. It
was expected that the actual beginning of operations on the Rio
Grande would stimulate subscriptions to the loan, yet the lack of
ready money was a sufficient cause for some delay in making the
proposed "inspection tour" to the Rio Grande; and this fact, added
to a natural love of peace rather then of war, and a due sense of
the dictates of patriotism as contrasted with mere military ambition,
determined the decision of that question. It is reason for profound
thankfulness that the peaceful course was adopted.
In a letter dated August 4, 1865, I informed Mr. Seward of my
decision, "after mature reflection," "to undertake the mission"
which he had proposed. Mr. Seward acknowledged my letter on August
9, and on the 19th I received a telegram from the War Department
to "report at the State Department upon your [my] next visit to
Washington." This order was promptly obeyed. On August 23 the
Secretary of War sent a letter to the Secretary of State, accrediting
me as an officer of the army, in which capacity, and unofficially,
I was to be understood by the public as visiting Europe. A copy
of this letter, inclosed in one from the State Department, was sent
to Mr. Bigelow, United States minister at Paris; and similar letters
were sent to several other United States ministers in Europe. But
time passed until November 4, and thus more than two months elapsed
before the Secretary of State was ready for me to start to Europe.
Mr. Seward then gave me a confidential letter, dated November 4,
1865, addressed to Mr. Bigelow, and a letter of credit on the
Barings, and requested me to proceed on my mission.
In his letter to Mr. Bigelow he said: "General Schofield proceeds
to Paris. He is, I believe, fully informed of the feelings and
sentiments, not only of this government, but of the American people.
I commend him to your confidence," etc. Mr. Seward explained to
me several times during this period of delay that correspondence
then going on with the French government rendered it advisable that
my visit be delayed until he should receive expected answers from
that government. The Atlantic cable did not then exist, and hence
correspondence across the ocean was necessarily slow. The expected
despatch--viz., that from the French Foreign Office to their minister
at Washington, dated October 18, 1865, and communicated to Mr.
Seward on the 29th of the same month--was no more satisfactory,
though in better tone, than those which had preceded. In effect
it demanded a recognition by the United States of the government
of Maximilian in Mexico as a condition precedent to the recall of
the French army. The time had evidently arrived when Napoleon must
be informed in language which could not be misunderstood what was
the real sentiment of the government and people of the United States
on the Mexican question. It was difficult, perhaps impossible, to
express that sentiment in official diplomatic language that an
emperor could afford to receive from a friendly power. It was
therefore desirable that the disagreeable information be conveyed
to Napoleon in a way which would command his full credence, and
which he yet need not regard as offensive. Mr. Seward's explanation
and instructions to me, after several long conversations on the
subject, were summed up in the words; "I want you to get your legs
under Napoleon's mahogany, and tell him he must get out of Mexico."
A MISSION TO PARIS
In my visit to Paris I was accompanied by two officers of my staff,
Brevet Brigadier-General William M. Wherry and Brevet Brigadier-
General G. W. Schofield, who had been given leave of absence for
the purpose of going with me to Mexico or elsewhere. We sailed
from New York, November 15, 1865, on the Cunard steamer _Java_,
and stayed a day in Liverpool and several days in London, where I
explained to Mr. Adams, United States minister, the purpose of my
visit.
Mr. Adams expressed hearty sympathy with the object of my mission,
and gave cordial assent to my wish that I might feel at liberty to
consult him in regard to it at any time.
Mr. Motley, United States minister at Vienna, whom I had the pleasure
of meeting at the residence of Mr. Adams, assured me that the
government of Austria was especially desirous of not being regarded
by the United States as responsible in any manner for the attempt
to establish an empire under the Austrian archduke in Mexico. Mr.
Motley thought a visit by me to Vienna while the Mexican question
was pending might produce undue excitement. Hence I limited my
tour in that direction to Italy.
We proceeded to Paris on the 2d of December. Our arrival had been
preceded by vague rumors of an official mission more or less hostile
to the interests of France, which caused great excitement among
the French people and the American residents in Paris, and serious
depression of United States, Mexican, and French securities in the
financial markets of Europe. It was also understood that no little
anxiety was felt at the French court, then at Compiègne. It was
manifestly desirable to allay so far as possible this undue excitement
in the public mind. Hence I availed myself of an early opportunity,
given by the American Thanksgiving dinner at the Grand Hotel, to
intimate in unmistakable terms that my mission, if any, was one
entirely friendly to the people of France.
SPEECHMAKING AT THE AMERICAN THANKSGIVING DINNER
The following is a part of the account of that banquet given by
the Paris correspondent of the "New York Herald," under date of
December 8, 1865:
"The American residents and transient sojourners in Paris celebrated
the national Thanksgiving by a grand dinner at the Grand Hotel,
which passed off in splendid style. . . . The next toast was the
long-looked-for-one of the evening, for it was known that it would
call up a distinguished guest from whom all were anxious to hear.
It was "The Army and Navy of the United States." When the band
had ceased playing "Yankee Doodle," Major-General Schofield rose
to reply to this toast, and was received with tremendous enthusiasm.
The ladies rose and waved their handkerchiefs, and gentlemen shouted
until they were hoarse. The general, after bowing his acknowledgments,
said: 'Fellow-countrymen--I want words to express to you the
satisfaction which will be felt in the heart of every soldier and
sailor when he learns the manner in which the names of the army
and navy have been received by you to-night. I will at this time
allude but briefly to one of the great lessons taught by the American
war--the grandest lesson of modern times. A great people who have
heretofore lived under a government so mild that they were scarcely
aware of its existence have found, in time of war, that government
to be one of the strongest in the world [cheers], raising and
maintaining armies and navies vaster than any ever before known
[cheers]. In point of character, in point of physical and moral
qualities, in point of discipline and of mobility in large masses,
the armies of the United States have never before been equaled
[loud cheers]. Yet this, great as it is, is not the greatest wonder
of the American war. This vast army, as soon as its work was done,
was quietly disbanded, and every man went to his home, as quietly
as the Christian goes back from church on Sabbath morning; and each
soldier re-entered upon the avocations of peace a better citizen
than he was before he became a soldier [renewed applause]. This
was the grandest lesson of the war. It shows that the power of a
nation to maintain its dignity and integrity does not result from
or depend upon its form of government; that the greatest national
strength--the power to mass the largest armies in time of war--is
entirely consistent with the broadest liberty of the citizen in
time of peace [enthusiasm]. Permit me, in conclusion, to propose
a toast which I know will be heartily responded to by every true
American--"The old friendship between France and the United States:
May it be strengthened and perpetuated!"' General Schofield's
toast was drunk with great enthusiasm, and upon his taking his seat
the applause which followed his remarks was deafening."
The situation of Napoleon's government at that time was extremely
critical. The opposition was powerful and aggressive. The
intervention in Mexican affairs was very unpopular in France, and
yet the national pride of the people would not permit the Emperor
to yield to menace even from the United States, nor allow his army
to be driven by force from Mexico without a supreme effort to
maintain it there. Napoleon could not have submitted to such
humiliation without the loss of his throne. In short, forcible
intervention by the American people in the Mexican question, or
the public threat of such action, arousing the national pride of
France, must have led to a long and bloody war, resulting, doubtless,
in final success to America and probably in a revolution in France.
Such a result would have been a just punishment to Napoleon for
his conduct toward the United States and Mexico during our Civil
War. But why involve the people of France and the people of the
United States in this punishment? Why make enemies of our ancient
friends? Our sister republic of Mexico must be relieved from
foreign domination, at whatever cost; but strife and lasting enmity
between the United States and France would be a fearful price to
pay for even so great a good as the freedom of Mexico. Manifestly
such extreme measures should not be resorted to until all peaceful
means had failed. Considerations of this nature determined my
course while in Paris. I had sufficient opportunity in two interviews
with Prince Napoleon, and in several conversations with officers
of high rank on the Emperor's staff, to make known to the Emperor
the views and purposes of the government and people of the United
States in respect to Mexican affairs. Our conversation was without
reserve on either side, and with the understanding that nothing
said by me would be withheld from the Emperor.
The principal of these staff-officers was the distinguished Admiral
de la Gravière, who had commanded the French squadron in American
waters in the early part of our Civil War and in the capture of
Vera Cruz. This gallant and honest old sailor had reported to his
government the exact truth about the enterprise which Napoleon had
undertaken when he ordered the bombardment and capture of the
Mexican seaport for the alleged purpose of collecting a French
claim--namely, that he was no better able to collect that claim
after the city was in his possession then he had been before, and
that the conquest of Mexico by the operations of a large army would
be necessary before any financial return could be expected. This
unwelcome report led to the admiral's recall to France, and he was
sent to his home in disgrace. But in due time the Emperor learned
that while all others had deceived him, the admiral had told him
the truth, whereupon he was called to Paris, restored to the
confidence of his chief, and appointed aide-de-camp on the staff
of the Emperor. Admiral de la Gravière was a warm friend of America,
rejoiced in the triumph of the Union cause, understood and appreciated
the sentiments of the people of the United States, among whom he
had made many friends, and was a very willing medium of communication
to the Emperor of the exact attitude of the American people respecting
the Monroe doctrine, which the Emperor of the French had been
betrayed into violating through the influence of persons high in
his confidence, but governed by sordid motives.
NAPOLEON'S METHOD OF RETREATING WITH DIGNITY
Admiral Reno, Assistant Minister of Marine, was another of the high
French officials with whom free conversation was held.
The fidelity with which Prince Napoleon and others reported to the
Emperor the character of the unofficial message which I had to
deliver rendered it quite unnecessary that it be delivered in
person, and quite impossible that the Emperor should be willing to
receive it in that way. Hence, though I received several intimations
that I would be invited to a private interview, no invitation came,
and none was sought. My letters from Paris to Mr. Seward, to
General Grant, and to Señor Romero, reported the progress made,
and the nature of the situation as it then appeared to me.
On January 22 I was present at a dinner given by Prince Napoleon
in the Palais Royal. Every shade of political opinion in Paris
was represented among the guests. Political discussion seemed to
be entirely unrestrained, with one exception, when a remark which
savored of disloyalty to the empire was rebuked by the prince.
In the Emperor's address to the French legislature on January 22,
his future policy in respect to Mexico had been hinted at in the
words: "[Our expedition] _touche à son terme_." The declared
purpose of speedily terminating the intervention in Mexico having
been applauded by all, the prince inquired pointedly of me whether,
in my opinion, the Emperor's declaration would be satisfactory to
the United States, and received the unreserved reply that it would,
as I believed, be accepted as satisfactory.
In my report to Mr. Seward of January 24, I expressed the belief
that even his enemies in France would not be disposed to embarrass
the Emperor with respect to Mexico, "well satisfied to see him get
out of that country by any means, and thus avoid war with the United
States"; and I ventured the suggestion that "this course would also
seem wise on our part." In my letter of the same date to General
Grant I said:
"You will get by this mail Napoleon's speech delivered at the
opening of the French legislative session. I was present and heard
the speech delivered. That part of it relating to Mexico and the
United States was received with very general tokens of approbation,
while most of the remainder met with a cold reception. I have
since heard it discussed very freely by many prominent men of all
shades of political opinion, among others the Prince Napoleon.
All seem to recognize the falsity of the Emperor's assumptions
where he says: 'In Mexico the government founded by the will of
the people is consolidating itself,' etc. Yet his statements are,
no doubt, believed by a large majority of the French people, and
therefore afford him a very good reason for yielding to the demand,
made in common by the people of France and the United States, that
his intervention in Mexico shall be brought to an end. This is
the logic of his position and the solution of his difficulty, viz.:
To assert that he has accomplished the object of his expedition to
Mexico, and hence to end it. While we laugh at the absurdity of
his premises, we can hardly find fault with his conclusion, and
hence it is not worth while to criticize any part of his argument.
Rather I think it well to let him make the most of his audacity in
the creation of convenient facts. The opinion seems to be universal
here that the Emperor is sincere in his declarations of intention
as to Mexico; indeed, that he has adopted the policy of making the
strongest possible bid for the friendship of the United States.
It is certainly easy to derive such an opinion from his speech,
and I am strongly inclined to believe it correct. Yet we cannot
forget the fact that in his speech of last year he used quite as
strong language as to the speedy termination of his Mexican
expedition. Hence I shall indulge in some doubt until I see the
actual development of his present plans. I have no idea that
Napoleon believes that Maximilian can remain long in Mexico after
the French troops are withdrawn; but it is very important for him,
in order to give some appearance of truth to his assumed grounds
of action, that Maximilian be allowed to stay there some time
without French aid. And for this reason he wants some assurance
of neutrality from the government of the United States. Prince
Napoleon and others with whom I have conversed express the decided
opinion that Maximilian will come away with Marshal Bazaine, in
spite of all the Emperor may say to induce him to try to stand
alone. This, I apprehend, will be the difficulty, and may cause
much delay, unless the United States kindly lend a helping hand.
Would it not be wise for us to abstain for a few months from all
interference, direct or indirect, and thus give Napoleon and
Maximilian time to carry out their farce? Mexico would thus be
rid of the French flag in the least possible time. If the French
troops come also, Juarez can easily dispose of Maximilian at any
time. If they succeed in getting the French troops to remain as
colonists, then the United States can easily find a good reason
for disposing of the whole matter, and Napoleon will not dare to
interfere. . . . An officer of the Emperor's household left here
about ten days ago with despatches for Mexico which, it is understood,
contained the Emperor's declaration to Maximilian of his intention
to recall his troops. This will give you some idea of the time
when the matter may be arranged if all works well."
NAPOLEON'S METHOD OF RETREATING WITH DIGNITY
My views relative to the purposes of the French government appear
to have been in accord with those of Mr. Bigelow at the time, as
shown in his official despatches afterward published, and adopted
by Mr. Seward in his subsequent correspondence with the French
minister at Washington. They were soon afterward confirmed by the
official announcement which the French minister was authorized to
make to the government of the United States. In fact, I was in
almost constant conference with Mr. Bigelow during that time, and
knew that my views, as communicated to Mr. Seward and General Grant,
were in close accord with his, although I could not know anything
of Mr. Bigelow's despatches to the State Department until they were
published. Mr. Bigelow's comprehension of the French view of the
Mexican question proved to be perfectly exact. While awaiting
further instructions in reply to my report of January 24, I occupied
my time in visits to the south of France, Italy, Switzerland, and
England.
Among the personal incidents connected with my stay in Paris which
seem worthy of record were the following:
Soon after my arrival in Paris, in company with Mr. Bigelow I called
upon Marshal Randon, Minister of War, who was the only minister of
the French government then in Paris. We were received with cold
and formal politeness. Some days later, the Emperor having returned
to Paris, and having apparently become satisfied that I was not
occupied with any designs hostile to France, I received a very
courteous letter from the Minister of War, dated December 13, and
addressed to Mr. Bigelow; and Captain Guzman, the officer therein
named, reported to me immediately. Under the guidance of this
accomplished officer I saw in the most agreeable manner all the
military establishments about Paris. These courtesies were
acknowledged in a letter dated February 25, 1866, addressed to Mr.
Bigelow.
A PRESENTATION TO THE EMPEROR AND EMPRESS
My presentation to the Emperor and Empress occurred at one of those
brilliant occasions at the Tuileries for which the second empire
was famous. In conversing with the Emperor, he desired to know
something of the operations of the American armies, and especially
their marvelous methods of supply at great distances from a base
of operations.
It gives me great pleasure to record here, as I did in my correspondence
at the time, the great courtesy, the kindness, and the charming
hospitality shown me by Mr. Bigelow and his amiable family during
my stay in Paris. Mr. Adams, United States minister at London,
was also exceedingly kind, inviting a very distinguished company
to meet me at dinner, taking me to several charming entertainments,
and presenting me to the Prince of Wales, who then received in
place of the Queen. General King at Rome, and Mr. Marsh at Florence,
also entertained me very courteously during my short stay at those
places. The warmth of greeting by Americans everywhere, and the
courteous reception by all foreigners whom I met, lent a peculiar
charm to the first visit of a Union soldier among those who had
watched from a distance the great American conflict.
I now have the satisfaction of knowing, in the light of subsequent
events, that whatever my mission to France contributed toward the
solution of the momentous question of that day was wisely directed
in the interest of peace at home, continued friendship with our
former allies, the people of France, and the relief of an American
republic from foreign domination; these great blessings were combined
in the final result.
Too much cannot be said in praise of the able and patriotic
statesmanship displayed by Secretary Seward in his treatment of
the French violation of the Monroe doctrine.
Early in May, 1866, I received from Mr. Seward his final reply to
my report of January 24, in which he said: "The object for which
you were detailed to visit Europe having been sufficiently
accomplished, there is considered to be no further occasion for
you to remain in that quarter in the service of this department."
Whereupon I returned to the United States, and reported at the
State Department on the 4th of June.
The condition of the Franco-Mexican question at the time of my
return from Europe gave no further occasion for my offices in either
of the ways which had been contemplated in behalf of Mexico.
Subsequent events in Mexico included the sad fate of Maximilian
and the sadder fate of Carlotta.