The Correspondence with General Thomas previous to the Battle of
Franklin--The Untenable Position at Pulaski--Available Troops which
were not Sent to the Front--Correspondence with General Thomas--
Instructions Usually Received too Late--Advantage of Delaying the
Retreat from Duck River--No Serious Danger at Spring Hill--General
Thomas Hoping that Hood might be Delayed for Three Days at Franklin.
I will now add to the foregoing sketch what seems to me necessary
to a full understanding of the operations preceding and immediately
following the battle of Franklin, referring briefly, as necessary
to an exact understanding of some things that occurred, to the
relation in which I stood to General Thomas. He was my senior by
thirteen years as a graduate of the Military Academy, where I had
known him well as my highly respected instructor. He had won high
distinction in Mexico, and had been twice brevetted for gallant
services in that war. He had seen far more service in the field
than I had, and in much larger commands, though almost always under
the immediate command of a superior--Buell, Rosecrans, and Sherman.
Even in the Atlanta campaign, then recently ended, his command was
nearly five times as large as mine. In 1864 he had already become
a brigadier-general in the regular army, having risen to that rank
by regular stages, while I was only a captain thirty-three years
of age. It will also be necessary for the reader to realize that
when I asked for and received orders to report with the Twenty-
third Corps to General Thomas in Tennessee, I felt in the fullest
degree all the deference and respect which were due to his seniority
in years and rank and services.
When I went back to Tennessee my only anxiety respecting the
situation, so far as General Thomas's personality affected it, was
on account of his constitutional habit of very deliberate action.
I was apprehensive that, in some emergency created by the action
of the daring and reckless, though not over-talented, antagonist he
would have to meet, General Thomas might not be able to determine
and act quickly enough to save from defeat his army, then understood
to be so far inferior to the enemy in numerical strength. I had
far too high an opinion of his capacity as a general to doubt for
a moment that with sufficient time in which to mature his plans to
resist Hood's invasion and to execute those plans so far as was in
his power, he would do all that the wisest generalship could
suggest.
I will also refer to the official returns of that period, which
show what troops General Thomas had elsewhere in his department
and available for service, as well as the effective strength of
the force then under my immediate command in the field, and that
of General A. J. Smith's three divisions, which had been ordered
from Missouri to join the forces of General Thomas. In his entire
department, excluding the Fourth and Twenty-third Corps in the
field, the infantry and artillery force, present for duty equipped,
officers and men, November 20, 1864, amounted to 29,332; the two
corps in the field, to 24,265; and A. J. Smith's corps, to about
10,000. The entire cavalry force, mounted and equipped, was about
4800; that unmounted, about 6700.
THE CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL THOMAS
It is necessary to exclude from this statement of troops available
for service in middle Tennessee those in Kentucky and East Tennessee,
belonging to the Department of the Ohio, for the reason that just
at that time unusual demand was made upon those troops for service
in East Tennessee, where some of the State forces had met with
disaster. This probably accounts in part for the discrepancies in
General Sherman's estimates referred to later.
Hood's forces were then understood by General Thomas to consist of
from 40,000 to 45,000 infantry and artillery, and 10,000 to 12,000
cavalry, including Forrest's command. I find from General Sherman's
despatch to Thomas, dated October 19, that his estimate of Hood's
strength, October 19, 1864, was about 40,000 men of all arms.
I do not find in General Thomas's report or despatches any exact
statement of his own estimate; but the following language in his
official report of January 20, 1865, seems quite sufficiently
explicit on that point: "Two divisions of infantry, under Major-
General A. J. Smith, were reported on their way to join me from
Missouri, which, with several one-year regiments then arriving in
the department, and detachments collected from points of minor
importance, would swell my command, when concentrated, to an army
nearly as large as that of the enemy. Had the enemy delayed his
advance a week or ten days longer, I would have been ready to meet
him at some point south of Duck River. . . . "
This must of course be accepted as General Thomas's own estimate
of the enemy's strength, on which his own action was based. And
it should be remembered that military operations must be based upon
the information then in possession of the commander, and just
criticism must also be based upon his action upon that information,
and not upon any afterward obtained.
General Sherman estimated the force left with Thomas ( 1) at about
45,000 (exclusive of the Fourth and Twenty-third Corps, and Smith's
corps coming from Missouri), in which he included about 8000 or
10,000 new troops at Nashville, and the same number of civil
employees of the quartermaster's department. The Fourth and Twenty-
third corps he estimated at 27,000 men, and Smith's at 10,000, and
the cavalry in the field at 7700. All this was sufficiently accurate
if no account were taken of men unfit for duty or not equipped.
But the official returns show that the number of officers and men
present for duty equipped amounted to 49,322 in the department,
and in the two corps in the field to 24,265, and in the cavalry in
the field, to 4800. There were therefore the following discrepancies
in Sherman's estimate, due in part to the discharge of men whose
terms had expired, as well as to the usual number of men not equipped
for duty in the ranks: In the troops in the department, a discrepancy
of 8000; in the army corps in the field, 2735; in the cavalry in
the field, 2900 ( 2)--a total discrepancy of 13,635. That is to
say, Sherman's own estimate was in excess of Thomas's actual strength
by a force greater than either of the two army corps he sent back
to help Thomas. If he had sent back another large corps,--say the
Fourteenth, 13,000 strong, having besides the moral strength due
to the fact that it was Thomas's old corps,--the discrepancy in
his own estimate would doubtless have been sufficiently overcome,
and the line of Duck River at least, if not that of the Tennessee,
as Sherman had assured Grant, would have been securely held until
A. J. Smith arrived and Thomas could assume the offensive.
Hood's force was ready to invade Tennessee in one compact army,
while Thomas then had in the field ready to oppose it a decidedly
inferior force, even admitting the lowest estimate made of that
hostile army.
THE UNTENABLE POSITION AT PULASKI
The superiority of the enemy's cavalry made it necessary that the
garrisons of all essential posts and the guards of important railroad
bridges should be strong enough to resist attack from a large force
of dismounted cavalry and light artillery, so long as Thomas was
compelled to remain on the defensive. The records of that time
indicate that Thomas then appreciated, what mature consideration
now confirms, that if Hood's advance had induced him (Thomas) to
draw off sufficient troops from garrisons and railroad guards to
enable him to give battle on equal terms to Hood at Pulaski or
Columbia, a raid by Hood's cavalry would probably have resulted in
the destruction or capture of nearly everything in the rear, not
only in Tennessee, but also in Kentucky, except perhaps Nashville
and Chattanooga. It was only wise forethought which suggested that
such might be the nature of Hood's plans, especially in view of
the season of the year and the condition of the roads, which made
aggressive operations of a large army, where all the hard roads
were held by the opposing forces, extremely difficult. The official
returns, now published in the War Records,( 3) show that the troops
were sufficient only for the purpose of garrisons and guards and
defensive action in the field until after the arrival of A. J.
Smith; and this is true even if Hood's cavalry force was no larger
than that which now appears from Forrest's report--5000; for Forrest
might easily have got a day or two the start of his pursuer at any
time, as had often been done on both sides during the war.
It is true that Sherman's instructions to Thomas appear to have
contemplated the possibility, at least, that Thomas might be reduced
to the extreme necessity of holding Nashville, Chattanooga, and
Decatur defensively, even during a long siege, and of abandoning
all points of less importance than the three named, so that all
the garrisons of such minor points and all the railroad guards
might be concentrated with the garrisons of these three important
strategic points, for their defense during a siege. This must of
course have referred to the defensive period of the campaign only,
for the moment that Thomas's reinforcements should enable him to
assume the offensive all the necessities above referred to must
have disappeared. It must, I think, be admitted as beyond question
that, in view of his daily expectation of the arrival of A. J.
Smith's troops from Missouri, Thomas was perfectly right in not
acting upon Sherman's suggestion of extreme defensive action, and
thus abandoning his railroad to destruction.
If, on the other hand, Thomas's reinforcements had arrived in time
to enable him to take the initiative by moving against Hood from
Pulaski or Columbia, then he might have drawn quite largely from
his garrisons in the rear to reinforce his army in the field, since
his "active offensive" operations would have fully occupied Hood's
cavalry, and thus have prevented a raid in Thomas's rear. But
until he was strong enough to advance, unless forced to the extreme
necessity of defending Nashville, Chattanooga, and Decatur, and
abandoning all else, Thomas could not prudently have reduced his
garrisons or guards.
I knew nothing at that time of Sherman's instructions to Thomas,
and little about the actual strength of Thomas's garrisons and
railroad guards. But I was under the impression that some
reinforcements must be available from his own department, and felt
a little impatient about the long delay in their arrival, and hence
telegraphed General Thomas, November 24, suggesting the concentration
of R. S. Granger's troops and those along the railroad. The
despatches to me at that time, to be found in the War Records,( 4)
fully show the earnest determination of General Thomas to send
forward reinforcements as soon as possible, and even in detail,
and to fight Hood at or near Columbia. Indeed, those despatches
misled me somewhat as to what I might expect.
AVAILABLE TROOPS NOT SENT TO THE FRONT
Notwithstanding this earnest desire, General Thomas does not appear
to have realized the existence of a force available for the purpose
he had in view. The railroad guards from Atlanta to Chattanooga
or Dalton, withdrawn after Sherman started on his march, and
convalescents, men returning from furlough and others going to the
front, but failing to reach Sherman's army in time, all assembled
at Chattanooga, made a surplus force at that point of about 7000
men.( 5) Some of these troops had been sent to East Tennessee, as
well as all the mounted troops available in Kentucky, for the
purpose of retrieving the disaster which had befallen the Tennessee
military governor's troops there, under Gillem. But all sent from
Chattanooga had been returned by November 21, about the time when
Hood's advance from Florence had become certainly known. Yet it
does not appear that General Thomas even inquired what force was
available at Chattanooga until November 25, when, in reply to a
telegram, he learned that Steedman could raise 5000 men (in fact,
7000), in addition to all necessary garrisons and guards, "to
threaten enemy in rear," in case he should "get on Chattanooga
railroad." It may then (November 25) have been too late to send
those 5000 or 7000 men to the line of Duck River, or perhaps even
to Franklin. They were sent to Nashville, reaching there after
the battle of Franklin. If they had been ordered to Columbia by
rail, via Nashville, as soon as Hood's advance was known to General
Thomas, they must have reached Duck River some time before Hood
attempted to cross that stream. This addition to the Fourth and
Twenty-third Corps would have raised the infantry in the field to
nearly an equality with that of Hood in fact, though not nearly to
what Hood's force was then supposed to be. That increased force
would doubtless have made it possible to prevent Hood from crossing
Duck River anywhere near Columbia for several days, and perhaps to
force him to select some other line of operations, or to content
himself with sending his cavalry on another raid. In any case,
the arrival of A. J. Smith a few days later would have enabled
Thomas to assume the aggressive before Hood could have struck a
serious blow at Thomas's army in the field. In view of the earnest
desire of General Thomas to reinforce the army in the field at
Columbia, there does not appear to be any rational explanation of
the fact that he did not send those 7000 men from Chattanooga to
Columbia. His own report states the fact about those "7000 men
belonging to his [General Sherman's] column," but does not give
any reason why they were not used in his "measures to act on the
defensive." As General Thomas says: "These men had been organized
into brigades, to be made available at such points as they might
be needed." At what other point could they possibly be so much
needed as that where the two corps were trying to oppose the advance
of the enemy long enough for Thomas to get up his other reinforcements?
AVAILABLE TROOPS NOT SENT TO THE FRONT
General Thomas appears to have been puzzled by doubt whether Hood
would aim for Nashville or some point on the Nashville and Chattanooga
Railroad, and not to have realized that his own plan should have
been to concentrate all his available force into one army, so as
to move against the enemy with the greatest possible force, no
matter what the enemy might do. With the exception of those 7000
men belonging to Sherman's column, Thomas had for necessary garrisons
and railroad guards essentially the same number of men as had been
employed in that service all the preceding summer,--no more and no
less,--and the necessity for that service had not been very much
diminished, except at and about Decatur, Stevenson, and Tullahoma,
which Hood's advance from Florence had rendered of no further
consequence at that time. But the 7000 men available at Chattanooga
ought unquestionably to have been sent to Columbia, or at least
moved up to Nashville or Franklin, where they could "join the main
force," as suggested in my despatch of November 24 to Thomas,( 6)
instead of being left in Chattanooga "to threaten enemy in rear."( 7)
As suggested in my despatch of November 24, R. S. Granger's force
and others along the railroad south of Duck River, as well as
Steedman's, might have joined the main force at Columbia, if orders
had been given in time, thus increasing the army in the field by
fully 10,000 men.
If R. S. Granger's force had been left at Decatur, it would have
drawn off from Hood's invading army at least an equal force to
guard his bridges at Florence, or else would have destroyed those
bridges and cut off his retreat after the battle of Nashville.
This was practically what had been suggested by Sherman in his
instructions to Thomas. But the withdrawal of Granger's troops
and their detention at Murfreesboro', instead of sending them to
"join the main force," served no good purpose at the time, and
prevented their use in the capture of Hood's defeated and retreating
troops. The failure to make this timely concentration was the one
great fault in Thomas's action, instead of his delay in attacking
at Nashville, for which he was so much criticized. But Hood's
repulse at Franklin had made this previous mistake a matter of past
history, and hence it was lost sight of in view of the imminent
danger afterward supposed to exist at Nashville, just as the
brilliant victory at Nashville was accepted as demonstrating the
wisdom of all that had gone before, even including Sherman's division
of his army between himself and Thomas before his march to the sea.
Such is the logic of contemporaneous military history!
In my long conversations with General Grant on the steamer _Rhode
Island_ in January, 1865, I explained to him fully the error into
which he had been led in respect to Thomas's action or non-action
at Nashville in December, and he seemed to be perfectly satisfied
on that point. But he did not ask me anything about what had
occurred before the battle of Franklin, and hence I did not tell
him anything.
In connection with the action of General Thomas previous to the
battle of Franklin, the following instructions from General Sherman
on October 31 are important: "You must unite all your men into
one army, and abandon all minor points, if you expect to defeat
Hood. General Schofield is marching to-day from here. . . . "( 8)
Again, on the same date, he telegraphed: "Bear in mind my instructions
as to concentration, and not let Hood catch you in detail."( 9)
Sherman thus gave the most emphatic warning against the mistake
which Thomas nevertheless made by failing to concentrate all his
own available troops until it was too late to meet Hood's advance,
thus leaving two corps to bear the entire brunt of battle until
the crisis of the campaign was passed at Franklin.
CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL THOMAS
The following correspondence relating to the command of an army in
the field, to increasing the Fourth and Twenty-third corps, and to
the use to be made of R. S. Granger's troops, and the reason why
Thomas should assume the offensive as soon as possible, is also
important, especially as showing that Sherman expected the two
corps to be increased to 50,000 men, and that Thomas should command
in person:
"Kingston, November 7, 1864, 10 A. M.
"Major-General Thomas: Despatch of 12:30 P. M. yesterday received.
General Schofield is entitled to the command [over Stanley] by
virtue of a recent decision of the War Department. I would advise
you to add to those corps new regiments until they number 25,000
men each. If Beauregard advances from Corinth, it will be better
for you to command in person. Your presence alone will give
confidence. Granger should continue all the time to threaten the
rear, and as soon as possible some demonstration should be made
from the direction of Vicksburg against the Mobile and Ohio Railroad.
Also I want you to assume the offensive as quick as possible, as
I have reason to believe all of Beauregard's army is not there,
but that he has also divided his forces.
"W. T. Sherman, Major-General."(10)
On the same day Thomas telegraphed to Sherman in reply to the above:
"It is, and always has been, my intention to command the troops
with me in person. My object in giving the preference to General
Schofield [over Stanley] was merely that he should exercise command
should accidental circumstances prevent my presence."(11)
Sherman and Thomas were equally right--Sherman in saying "It will
be better for you to command in person. Your presence alone will
give confidence"; and Thomas in replying, "It is, and always has
been, my intention to command the troops with me in person." The
proper place for a general-in-chief is with his army in the field,
where battles are to be fought, and not in the rear, where there
is little to do but to assemble reinforcements, which his chief of
staff could do as well as he. Thomas could have reached the army
at Columbia by rail in two hours, and at Franklin in one hour; yet
he left a subordinate to fight against a superior force, while he
remained in Nashville until he had collected there an army superior
to that of his adversary. But General Thomas must have had some
reason which seemed to him good and sufficient for his absence from
the field. He was the last man in the world to shrink from his
duty in battle.
Before the above correspondence between General Sherman and General
Thomas was known to me I had written the following: "The relations
existing between General Thomas and me, and the confidence he had
shown in all his despatches, commencing with those received at
Pulaski, left little room for hesitation or doubt about doing, in
every emergency, what my own judgment dictated, as if I had been
in chief command, confident of the approval which he so fully
expressed after the events. Yet my experience then, as always,
led me to the opinion that it is better for the general-in-chief,
in all operations of a critical nature, to be present with the
troops in the field, if possible; he must be able to act with more
confidence than any subordinate can possibly feel. He was the sole
judge as to the necessity of his remaining in Nashville, and no
good reason could now be given for questioning the correctness of
his judgment. It is only intended as an expression of a general
rule for the consideration of military students."
CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL THOMAS
General Thomas's orders to General D. S. Stanley upon his being
sent to Pulaski, and his subsequent orders to me, dated November
19, to fight the enemy at Pulaski if he advanced against that place,
were, as shown in the following despatch from me, quite inapplicable
to the then existing situation:
"Pulaski, November 20, 1864.
"Major-General Thomas: After full consideration I am of the opinion
that this is not the best position for the main body of our troops,
at least so long as we are inferior in strength to the enemy. If
Hood advances, whether his design be to strike this place or
Columbia, he must move via Lawrenceburg on account of the difficulty
of crossing Shoal Creek. Under cover of his cavalry, he can probably
reach Lawrenceburg without our knowledge, and move his forces a
day's march from that point toward Columbia before we could learn
his designs, and thus reach that point ahead of us; or he might
move upon this place, and while demonstrating against it throw his
forces on to the pike north of us, and thus cut us off from Columbia
and from our reinforcements. Lynnville would be free from these
objections as a point of concentration for our forces. On the
other hand, a force at this point covers the Nashville and Chattanooga
Railroad to the best advantage; but a brigade in the inclosed works
at this place could hold out against any force until relieved,
while the main force at Lynnville would be sure of concentrating
with the troops in the rear. I respectfully submit these views
for your consideration.
"J. M. Schofield, Major-General."
To this General Thomas replied at once:
"Nashville, November 20, 1864.
"General Schofield: Your despatch of 2 P. M. this day just received.
Two other despatches of to-day were received previous to this one.
Do you mean that one brigade in the intrenchments at Pulaski could
hold out for a week? The reason I ask is, General Smith cannot
get here before next Friday. If one brigade can hold the fortifications
of Pulaski for a week or ten days, you are authorized to leave a
brigade or a division there, and concentrate the rest of your force
at Lynnville preparatory to support Hatch, or fall back on Columbia,
whichever may be necessary. Part of Ruger's troops will start for
Columbia to-night, the remainder at two o'clock to-morrow, and the
railroad superintendent says he will have them at Columbia by to-
morrow night. The very moment Smith's troops arrive I will start
them for Columbia. In any event, all surplus transportation should
be sent to Columbia. I have just received General Hatch's of this
P. M., and it seems from it that Hood is advancing. His movements
will indicate to you what disposition you should make--whether to
concentrate at Columbia or remain at Lynnville. If Hood's entire
army should advance, you must use your own discretion as to holding
the fortifications at Pulaski or withdrawing the troops.
"Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General."
General Thomas thus gave me the full freedom of action demanded by
the situation in which I was placed, in lieu of his previous
embarrassing orders about fighting the enemy at Pulaski.
The following correspondence,(12) with the above, shows the situation
as reported by me to General Thomas, and his "plans and wishes" as
then explained to me immediately before and after Hood began his
advance:
"Thomas to Schofield.
"November 24, 1864.
". . . Have the fords above Columbia as well guarded as you can,
and I think you will then have checked the advance of Hood, and we
shall have time to get up our reinforcements."
"Schofield to Thomas.
"November 24, 1864, 1:39 P. M.
"Do you think it important to hold Columbia? My force is not large
enough to cover the town and railroad bridge. I can hold a shorter
line covering the railroad bridge, leaving the town and railroad
depot outside; but in any case the enemy can turn the position by
crossing above or below, and render my withdrawal to the north bank
very difficult. Please give me your views soon."
"Thomas to Schofield.
"November 24, 1864.
"If you cannot hold Columbia, you had better withdraw to the north
bank of the river. From the description given I supposed the line
was sufficiently short to enable you and Stanley to hold it securely
and have a reserve. But it is better, of course, to substantially
check the enemy than to run the risk of defeat by risking too much.
Where is Stanley? Is he with you?"
CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL THOMAS
"Schofield to Thomas
"Columbia, November 24, 1864, 8:30 P. M.
"I have examined the ground and considered the situation carefully.
My troops are in position on the outer line, covering the railroad
depot and bridge, and pretty well intrenched. The line is too
long; yet if Hood wishes to fight me on it to-morrow, I am willing.
I think he will attack to-morrow, if at all. If he does not, I
must prepare to meet any attempt to cross Duck River above or below.
For this purpose I am preparing an interior line covering the
railroad bridge, which can be held by about seven thousand men,
which I propose to occupy, and put the rest of my troops and material
on the north bank of the river, ready to move as may be necessary.
With the fords guarded, as will then be practicable, I think Hood
cannot get the start of me. I think it best not to risk much now;
for a few days' delay, if we concentrate rapidly, will make us
strong enough to drive Hood back. My theory is that he will operate
against the Chattanooga Railroad, and I do not see how we can save
it from some damage at least. But if we concentrate Granger's
troops and those along the road promptly, so that they can join
the main force, there can be no doubt of the final result. Please
inform me whether my proposed arrangements meet with your approval."
"Thomas to Schofield
"Nashville, November 24, 1864.
". . . Can you not cover the pontoon bridge with a bridge-head,
and hold it so as to preserve the bridge for crossing whenever we
get ready to advance? General Rousseau informed me that the
blockhouses protecting the railroad bridge cannot be reached by
the enemy's artillery; therefore the enemy could not get near enough
to the bridge to destroy it if the blockhouses are held. . . ."
As stated in my official report, I did prepare and hold a bridge-
head covering both the railroad and the pontoon bridges over Duck
River at the same time, for which purpose I floated the pontoons
down the river to a point near the railroad bridge, having found
that the blockhouses referred to by General Rousseau could not be
made available for the protection of the pontoon bridge where it
before was--at the crossing of the turnpike. I abandoned that
bridge-head on the night of November 27, upon receipt of information
leading me to believe that Hood intended to cross Duck River above
Columbia.
On November 25 General Thomas telegraphed me, in the following
terms, his approval of the dispositions I had made, and the
information that he had already ordered the concentration of troops
which I suggested in my despatch of the 24th:
"Your cipher despatch of 8:30 P. M. is just received; some difficulty
in transmission the cause. Your arrangements are judicious and
approved. I gave orders two days ago to make the concentration
you suggest, and hope it will be nearly or quite completed to-day.
Will telegraph you further this morning."
This despatch was more than twelve hours in transmission.
Again, November 26, I reported the situation at Columbia, and my
action, as follows; also suggesting that infantry be sent forward
at once:
"The enemy has kept up a strong demonstration with dismounted
cavalry since yesterday morning. He now shows a column of infantry
on the Mount Pleasant pike, about three miles distant. I cannot
yet tell how great the force. I have drawn my force in the interior
line, and will fight him there. If you have any infantry available,
I think it should be sent forward at once."
Yet no infantry reinforcements were sent, although the "7000 men"
at Chattanooga could easily have reached Columbia before that time.
At 8 A. M. the next day General Thomas replied as follows:
"Your despatch of 10 A. M. yesterday received. I will send you
all the available infantry force I can raise. I expect some of
Smith's command here to-day, and will send it forward as rapidly
as possible. Sent you two regiments of cavalry day before yesterday,
two yesterday, and will send another to-day. If you can hold Hood
in check until I can get Smith up, we can whip him."
Thus it appears that even as late as November 27 General Thomas
had not thought of sending the 7000 men at Chattanooga to "join
the main force," although so anxious that I should hold Hood in
check until he could get Smith up. He was still relying entirely
upon A. J. Smith, whose advance, so surely expected on the 25th,
was still expected on the 27th. It seems incredible that General
Thomas had not thought of sending Steedman's troops from Chattanooga,
instead of waiting for the uncertain arrival of A. J. Smith.
DELAYING THE RETREAT FROM DUCK RIVER
On November 27 I received an important despatch from General Thomas,
dated November 25. It was written under the apprehension that
Hood's design might be to move upon the Nashville and Chattanooga
Railroad, as I had suggested to Thomas on the 24th, and informed
me fully of his plans and instructions to meet such a movement,
requesting me to give him my views in reply. In that despatch
General Thomas said:
"In case you have to move to the north bank of Duck River, I wish
you to keep some cavalry on the south side to observe and delay
Hood's advance on the Chattanooga Railroad as much as possible.
I hope to have five regiments of Granger's troops in Murfreesboro'
to-day. Have made arrangements for Milroy to fall back to
Murfreesboro' or this side of Duck River also, if the enemy advances.
The cavalry on the south side of Duck River should cover the
approaches to Shelbyville, and cross at that place, and hold the
bridge in case of an advance in force. I have asked General Steedman
how large a force he can raise to threaten the enemy's rear, should
he get on the Chattanooga road, and expect an answer soon. About
1000 of Hatch's cavalry have arrived here from Memphis, dismounted,
but they will be mounted here as soon as possible and sent to the
front; three regiments should start to-day, making about 1000 men.
I have not heard from any of Smith's troops yet; some of them will
surely be here to-day. If Hood moves on the Chattanooga road, I
will send Smith to Murfreesboro', as we shall be enabled thereby
to concentrate more rapidly. If you can hold Hood on the south
side of Duck River, I think we shall be able to drive him back
easily after concentrating. Answer, giving your views."
Although that despatch of the 25th was not deciphered so as to be
read by me until the 27th, forty-eight hours after it was sent,
nevertheless it gave me timely information that Thomas had concentrated
all his available troops (except Steedman's, which he appears to
have overlooked until the 25th, and about which I had no knowledge)
at Murfreesboro', from which place they could "join the main force,"
as I had suggested, in a few hours, either by rail or by wagon-
road, as circumstances might indicate. I was also led to infer
from Thomas's language on the 25th--"Some of them [A. J. Smith's
troops] will surely be here to-day"--that on the 27th Smith's corps
was already at Nashville, and that Thomas was only waiting for
information respecting the enemy's designs to select his point of
concentration and order all his available troops to join the army
in the field at that point. And it was still expected on the 27th
that this junction might be effected on the north bank of Duck
River, opposite Columbia. Hence I telegraphed General Thomas,
November 27, at 12:30 P. M.:
"The enemy has made no real attack, and I am satisfied he does not
intend to attack. My information, though not very satisfactory,
leads me to believe that Hood intends to cross Duck River above
Columbia, and as near it as he can. I shall withdraw to the north
bank to-night and endeavor to prevent him from crossing. Wilson
is operating mainly on my left, with a portion of his command south
of the river. I have no late information from him. I have succeeded
in getting your cipher of the 25th translated. I believe your
dispositions are wise."
DELAYING THE RETREAT FROM DUCK RIVER
It appears from his despatch of November 25 that Thomas hoped we
might be able to hold the line of Duck River from Columbia as far
east as Shelbyville, as well as west to the Tennessee River.
Although this proved to be impracticable on account of the enemy's
superiority in cavalry at that time, the point (Murfreesboro')
which Thomas had selected for his concentration was far enough to
the rear of that line (Duck River) to make the concentration certain
if orders were given in due time.
I learned in the afternoon of November 27, by General Thomas's
despatch of 8 A. M., already quoted, that A. J. Smith's troops were
not, as I had supposed, already in Nashville, but that some of them
were expected there that day, and would come forward to join me at
once.
In the morning of November 28, at 8:45, I reported my withdrawal
to the north side of the river, saying:
"My troops and material are all on the north side of Duck River.
The withdrawal was completed at daylight this morning without
serious difficulty. Cox holds the ford in front of Columbia, and
Ruger the railroad bridge, which I partially destroyed. Stanley
is going into position a short distance in rear of Cox. I think
I can now stop Hood's advance by any line near this, and meet in
time any distant movement to turn my position. I regret extremely
the necessity of withdrawing from Columbia, but believe it was
absolute. I will explain fully in time. Reinforcements will have
to march from Spring Hill or Thompson's Station. Supplies should
be sent to Thompson's Station."
After withdrawing to the north bank of Duck River I telegraphed on
the morning of November 28:
"I am in doubt whether it is advisable, with reference to future
operations, to hold this position or to retire to some point from
which we can move offensively. Of course we cannot recross the
river here. I could easily have held the bridge-head at the
railroad, but it would have been useless, as we could not possibly
advance from that point. Please give me your views and wishes."
This was answered by General Thomas at "8 P. M.," the answer being
received by me next morning, November 29.
It is thus seen that up to the morning of November 28 I was still
hoping for reinforcements on the line of Duck River, and thought
I could stop Hood's advance by any line near the Columbia and
Franklin pike, which I then held, as well as meet in good time any
distant movement to turn my position. Accordingly, at 9:10 A. M.
that day I telegraphed to General Thomas:
"I have all the fords above and below this place well watched and
guarded as far as possible. Wilson is operating with his main
force on my left. The enemy does not appear to have moved in that
direction yet to any considerable distance. I will probably be
able to give you pretty full information this evening. Do you not
think the infantry at the distant crossings below here should now
be withdrawn and cavalry substituted? I do not think we can prevent
the crossing of even the enemy's cavalry, because the places are
so numerous. I think the best we can do is to hold the crossings
near us and watch the distant ones."
But I learned soon after noon of the same day that our cavalry
found the fords so numerous that they could hardly watch them all,
much less guard any of them securely; and a little later I learned
that the enemy's cavalry had forced a crossing at some point only
a few miles above, between Huey's Mill and the Lewisburg-Franklin
pike. At 2:30 P. M. I telegraphed General Thomas:
"The enemy was crossing in force a short distance this side of the
Lewisburg pike at noon to-day, and had driven our cavalry back
across the river on the pike at the same time. The force is reported
to be infantry, but I do not regard it as being probable. Wilson
has gone with his main force to learn the facts, and drive the
enemy back, if possible."
DELAYING THE RETREAT FROM DUCK RIVER
In the appendix to General Thomas's report the date of the above
despatch is given as "3:30 A. M." It was answered by General Thomas
at "10:30 P. M." and his answer was received by me November 29 (no
hour mentioned in the records). The Department of the Ohio records
say that I sent it at "2:30 P. M." The appendix to my report
mentions the date "November 29," but does not give the hour. My
official report, as published, also says this information was
received "about 2 A. M. on the 29th"; but this is evidently a
clerical error: Clearly the report should read, "about 2 P. M. on
the 28th."
But our cavalry was unable to drive that of the enemy back, and
hence Hood was free to lay his pontoon bridge and cross his infantry
and artillery at any point above Columbia. We had not been able
to hold even the crossings near us.
The same day, November 28, at 4 P. M., I telegraphed:
"If Hood advances on the Lewisburg and Franklin pike, where do you
propose to fight him? I have all the force that is necessary here,
and General Smith's troops should be placed with reference to the
proposed point of concentration."
And again, at 6 P. M.:
"The enemy's cavalry in force has crossed the river on the Lewisburg
pike, and is now in possession of Rally Hill.
"Wilson is trying to get on to the Franklin road ahead of them.
He thinks the enemy may swing around in behind him and me, and
strike Spring Hill, and wants Hammond's brigade to halt there.
Please give it orders if you know where it is. Also, I think it
would be well to send A. J. Smith's force to that place."
In the night of November 28-9, about 2 A. M., I received the report
of the cavalry commander, conveying the information given him by
prisoners that the enemy had commenced to bridge the river near
Huey's Mill, and urging the necessity of immediate retreat to
Franklin.(13) The staff officer who handed me the despatch called
my attention especially to the words urging immediate action, and
I considered the subject quite a long time. But there did not seem
to me to be any necessity for such haste. The enemy could not
accomplish much before morning. It would then be early enough to
decide what must be done. Besides, it was not yet certain that
Hood was attempting to cross his infantry at Huey's Mill. The
vigorous action of his cavalry might be intended only to induce me
to fall back, and thus give him the use of the crossing at Columbia,
and of the turnpike from that place, for the movement of his
infantry, artillery, and trains.
In the morning, November 29, I sent a brigade of infantry toward
Huey's Mill to reconnoiter and report the enemy's movements. At
the same time Stanley was ordered to Spring Hill, with two divisions
of his corps, to occupy and intrench a good position commanding
the roads at that place and protecting the trains and reserve
artillery which had been ordered to be parked there. Ruger's
division of the Twenty-third Corps, except one regiment, was ordered
to follow Stanley. The army was ready to occupy Spring Hill in
full force, and in ample time to meet any possible movement of the
enemy either on that place or, by the Lewisburg pike, on Franklin.
In my orders to Ruger, dated 8 A. M., directing him to move at once
to Spring Hill, he was ordered to leave one regiment to guard the
river until dark and then join him at Spring Hill. It was then
intended, in any event, to hold Spring Hill until the morning of
November 30. At the same time Ruger was directed to order his
troops guarding the river below to march at once for Franklin.
DELAYING THE RETREAT FROM DUCK RIVER
But very soon after these orders were issued--that is, soon after
8 A. M.--a courier from Franklin brought me the two following
despatches from General Thomas:
"Franklin, November 28, 1864.
"(By telegraph from Nashville, 9 P. M.)
"To Major-General Schofield:
"If you are confident you can hold your present position, I wish
you to do so until I can get General Smith here. After his arrival
we can withdraw gradually and invite Hood across Duck River, and
fall upon him with our whole force, or wait until Wilson can organize
his entire cavalry force, and then withdraw from your present
position. Should Hood then cross river, we can surely ruin him.
You may have fords at Centreville, Bean's [Beard's] Ferry, Gordon's
Ferry, and Williamsport thoroughly obstructed by filling up all
the roads leading from them with trees, and then replace your
infantry by cavalry. Send an intelligent staff officer to see that
the work is properly done. As soon as relieved, concentrate your
infantry; the cavalry will be able to retard, if not prevent, Hood's
crossing, after the roads are thoroughly obstructed, if they do
their duty. The road leading from Centreville to Nashville should
be thoroughly obstructed. I am not sure but it would be a good
plan to invite Hood across Duck River if we can get him to move
toward Clarksville. Is there no convenience for unloading beyond
Thompson's Station?
"Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General, Commanding."(14)
The published records give this despatch as having been sent at "8
P. M." The Department of the Cumberland records say that it was
telegraphed in cipher to Franklin at 9 P. M., and there deciphered
and sent by courier to my position near Columbia. The records do
not show the hour of receipt by me; but my reply to General Thomas
of 8:30 A. M., November 29, and my orders to Ruger of 8 and 8:45
A. M., and to Stanley before and after 8 A. M., and my despatch to
Wilson of 8:15 A. M., fix the time of the receipt by me of this
despatch from General Thomas at a few minutes after 8 A. M., November
29.
The other despatch was as follows:
"(U. S. Military Telegraph.)
"Franklin, Tenn., November 28, 1864.
"(By telegraph from Nashville. 9:30 P. M.)
"To Major-General Schofield:
"Your despatch of 3:30 [2:30] P. M. just received. If Wilson cannot
succeed in driving back the enemy, should it prove true that he
has crossed the river, you will necessarily have to make preparation
to take up a new position at Franklin, behind Harpeth, [while]
immediately, if it become necessary, to fall back.
"(Signed) Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General, Commanding."
The records of the Department of the Cumberland merely state that
this despatch was sent in "cipher." The appendix to my report
gives the hour "9:30 P. M." The appendix to General Thomas's report
fixes it at "10:30 P. M." The despatch from General Thomas to
General Halleck of 10 P. M., November 28, forwarding my despatch
of "8:45 A. M.," indicates that at 10 P. M. Thomas had not received
my report of "2:30 P. M." Hence "10:30 P. M.," as given by General
Thomas, must be the correct hour of the above despatch. It was
answered by me, together with the preceding telegram, at 8:30 A.M.,
November 29; and was probably received by me at the same time
as the previous despatch,--very soon after 8 A. M.,--as indicated
by my despatch to Wilson of 8:15 A. M.
I thus learned, a short time after eight o'clock on the morning of
the 29th, that A. J. Smith had not yet arrived at Nashville, and
that the position behind the Harpeth River at Franklin was that to
which I must retire when compelled to fall back.
DELAYING THE RETREAT FROM DUCK RIVER
(Another despatch from Thomas, dated November 28, 10 A. M., appears
in the records, in which he said: ". . . General Smith will certainly
be here in three days. . . ." But when that despatch reached my
headquarters in the field, the cipher-operator had left his post
and gone to Franklin. Hence the despatch could not be read by me
in time to be of any service. The records do not show when I
received it.)
I was then confronted with the grave question, How long might it
be possible to hold Hood back, and thus gain time for Thomas to
get up his reinforcements? By holding on to the crossing of Duck
River at Columbia until dark that night, and thus preventing Hood
from using the turnpike for the movement of his artillery and trains
until the next day, we would practically gain twenty-four hours;
for he could not move them readily over his mud road from Huey's
Mill. To do this, I must not only head Hood off at Spring Hill,
but defeat any attempt he might make to dislodge me from the north
bank of Duck River.
Early on November 29, I sent the following brief despatch in reply
to both of those which had been received a few minutes before from
General Thomas:
"The enemy's cavalry has crossed in force on the Lewisburg pike,
and General Wilson reports the infantry crossing above Huey's Mill,
about five miles from this place. I have sent an infantry
reconnaissance to learn the facts. If it proves true, I will act
according to your instructions received this morning. Please send
orders to General Cooper,(15) via Johnsonville. It may be doubtful
whether my messenger from here will reach him."
The appendix to General Thomas's report says that I sent this
despatch at "8:30 A. M." The appendix to my report says "8:20 A.M."
This despatch was evidently in answer to those from General
Thomas of 8 P. M. and 10:30 P. M., November 28, as indicated by my
orders to Stanley and Ruger, and my despatch of 8:15 A. M. to
Wilson.
Soon after 10 A. M., November 29, the first report from the brigade
sent toward Huey's Mill showed that the enemy's infantry was crossing
the river at that place. That report is not found in the records,
and I do not recollect its words. But it did not produce the
impression upon my mind that Hood's movement was so rapid or
energetic as to prevent me from doing what seemed of such vital
importance. Therefore I decided not to yield my position unless
compelled by force to do so. While considering this question I
had detained one of Stanley's two divisions (Kimball's), and had
suspended the orders for Ruger's division to march to Spring Hill.
When the decision was reached, I put Kimball's and Wood's divisions
in position between Duck River and Rutherford's Creek, and Ruger's
north of that creek, to resist any attempt the enemy might make
upon our position. I then sent the following to Stanley at Spring
Hill:
"Near Columbia, Tenn., November 29, 1864, 10:45 A. M.
"Major-General Stanley, Commanding Fourth Army Corps.
"General: General Wood's reconnoissance shows a considerable force,
at least, on this side of the river. I have halted Kimball's
division this side of the creek and put it in position. I will
try to hold the enemy until dark, and then draw back. Select a
good position at Spring Hill, covering the approaches, and send
out parties to reconnoiter on all roads leading east and southeast.
Try to communicate with Wilson on the Lewisburg pike. Tell him to
cover Franklin and Spring Hill, and try not to let the enemy get
between us.
"Very respectfully,
"J. M. Schofield, Major-General."
NO SERIOUS DANGER AT SPRING HILL
The situation early in the morning had been a very simple one, free
from any embarrassment or unusual danger. If the plan then decided
on and ordered had been carried out, three divisions of infantry
and nearly all the artillery of the army would have been in position
at Spring Hill and well intrenched long before the head of Hood's
infantry column, without any artillery, came in sight of that place
late in the afternoon. That position would have been secured beyond
doubt until the next morning. The other two divisions (Cox's and
Wood's) would have withdrawn from Duck River and marched to Spring
Hill early in the afternoon, before the enemy could seriously
interfere with them. Ruger's one regiment, without impedimenta,
was directed to march along the railway track to Spring Hill, and
thus avoid any interference from the enemy. The army would have
marched to Franklin early in the night of the 29th, instead of
after midnight as it actually did. That would have given the enemy
the afternoon and night in which to lay his pontoons and cross his
artillery and trains at Columbia. But that would not have been a
serious matter, in view of the situation as it was understood by
me up to about 8 A. M. of the 29th; for the information I had
received up to that hour justified the belief that both A. J.
Smith's troops and those concentrated at Murfreesboro' would meet
me at Franklin, or perhaps at Spring Hill, where we would be able
to give battle to the enemy on equal terms.
But in view of the information received by me after eight o'clock
that morning, and the altered plan decided on soon after ten o'clock,
the situation became very materially different. Under this plan
the army must be ready to encounter a formidable enemy either in
the position then occupied on Duck River, or at some point on the
road between that place and Spring Hill. Hence I determined to
keep the main body of troops together, and trust to Stanley's one
division to hold Spring Hill until the army should reach that point.
That is to say, I decided to take the chances of a pitched battle
at any point the enemy might select between Duck River and Spring
Hill, as well as that of holding the latter place with one division
against any hostile force which might reach it before dark.
There was no anxiety in my mind about what might happen at Spring
Hill after dark. The danger which actually developed there between
dark and midnight--of which I knew nothing until several days
afterward--resulted entirely from faulty execution of my orders.
I arrived at Spring Hill at dusk with the head of the main column,
having ordered all the troops to follow in close order, and (except
Ruger's troops, which I took to Thompson's) to form line on the
right of Stanley's division at Spring Hill, covering the pike back
toward Columbia. Cox's division, being the last, was to form our
extreme right. In that contemplated position, if Hood had attacked
at any time in the night we would have had decidedly the advantage
of him. I had no anxiety on that point. When informed, about
midnight, that Cox had arrived, I understood that my orders had
been exactly executed, and then ordered Cox to take the lead and
the other divisions to follow, from the right by the rear, in the
march to Franklin.
But it happened that only Whitaker's brigade of Kimball's division,
to which I gave the orders in person, followed Ruger's. Hence
that one brigade was the only force we had in line between Hood's
bivouac and the turnpike that night. If that fact had been known
to the enemy, the result would have been embarrassing, but not very
serious. If the enemy had got possession of a point on the pike,
the column from Duck River would have taken the country road a
short distance to the west of Spring Hill and Thompson's Station,
and marched on it to Franklin. The situation at Spring Hill in
the night was not by any means a desperate one. Veteran troops
are not so easily cut off in an open country.
NO SERIOUS DANGER AT SPRING HILL
The annotation upon the copy filed in the War Department of the
order actually given to the troops on November 29 explains how that
mistake occurred. In brief, the draft of an order prepared in
writing for another purpose, but not issued, was by some unexplained
blunder substituted for the oral orders actually dictated to a
staff officer. It was an example of how the improvised staff of
a volunteer army, like the "non-military agencies of government,"
may interfere with military operations.
The serious danger at Spring Hill ended at dark. The gallant action
of Stanley and his one division at that place in the afternoon of
November 29 cannot be over-estimated or too highly praised. If
the enemy had gained a position there in the afternoon which we
could not have passed round in the night, the situation would then
have become very serious. But, as I had calculated, the enemy did
not have time to do that before dark, against Stanley's stubborn
resistance.
The following, from the official records, has been quoted as an
order from General Thomas to me, though I never received it, the
enemy's cavalry having got possession of the road between Franklin
and Spring Hill:
"Nashville, November 29, 1864, 3:30 A. M.
"Major-General Schofield, near Columbia:
"Your despatches of 6 P. M. and 9 P. M. yesterday are received.
I have directed General Hammond to halt his command at Spring Hill
and report to your for orders, if he cannot communicate with General
Wilson, and also instructing him to keep you well advised of the
enemy's movements. I desire you to fall back from Columbia and
take up your position at Franklin, leaving a sufficient force at
Spring Hill to contest the enemy's progress until you are securely
posted at Franklin. The troops at the fords below Williamsport,
etc., will be withdrawn and take up a position behind Franklin.
General A. J. Smith's command has not yet reached Nashville; as
soon as he arrives I will make immediate disposition of his troops
and notify you of the same. Please send me a report as to how
matters stand upon your receipt of this.
"Geo. H. Thomas,
"Major-General U. S. Vols., Commanding."(16)
This despatch does not appear upon any of the records as having
been received by me. If it was telegraphed in cipher to Franklin,
and there deciphered and sent by courier, this should have reached
me not long after noon. But the courier was probably driven back
or captured by the enemy's cavalry, who had possession of the direct
road, near Spring Hill, about noon.
If any "orders" had been necessary in such a case, they had been
rendered unnecessary by Hood's movement to cross Duck River, of
which I had already learned at 2 A. M. of the same day (November
29). The only question in my mind that General Thomas could solve
--namely, to _what place_ I must retire--was settled by his despatch
of 10:30 P. M., November 28, above quoted, received by me about
8 A. M. of the 29th. But there still remained the question _when_
I must do it; and that I must solve myself, for General Thomas was
much too far away, and communication was much too slow and uncertain,
for him to give me any help on that subject.
I had received information of Hood's movement at 2 A. M., _six
hours earlier_, and I had ample time to get out of his way before
morning. After 8 A. M. it would, of course, not have been so easy.
Yet a retreat to Franklin that day (November 29), commencing at
eight or nine in the morning, and across the Harpeth that night,
would not have been at all difficult or dangerous. There would
have been some fighting with Hood's cavalry, but little or none
with his infantry. Hood would have had to lay a pontoon bridge at
Columbia, after my rear-guard had withdrawn, before his advance
from that point could begin; and, as events proved, he could not
reach Spring Hill by his mud road from Huey's Mill until late in
the afternoon. I had time to pass Spring Hill with my entire army
before Hood's infantry advance-guard could reach that place. Hence
I had ample time to consider the mathematical and physical questions
involved before deciding finally that I would not let Hood drive
me back from Duck River that day. But I did not at any time
contemplate a retreat that day farther back then Spring Hill, as
is shown by my direction to Ruger to have his regiment from Ducktown
join him there that night.
NO SERIOUS DANGER AT SPRING HILL
I am entirely willing to leave to intelligent military criticism
any question in respect to the accuracy of my calculations, also
the question whether I was justifiable, under the conditions then
existing or understood to exist respecting Thomas's preparations
in the rear to fight a decisive battle, in taking the risks, which
are always more or less unavoidable, of failure in the execution
of plans based upon so close an estimate of what could be done by
my adversary as well as by myself. I content myself with the simple
remark that, in my opinion, if my own orders had been carried out
as I gave them, and my reasonable suggestion to my superior in the
rear to bridge the Harpeth at Franklin had been promptly acted on,
there would have been far less risk of failure than must frequently
be incurred in war.
If I had had satisfactory assurance of the timely arrival of
sufficient reinforcements on the line of Duck River, I would have
been justified in dividing my infantry into several detachments to
support the cavalry in opposing the crossing of Duck River at the
numerous places above Columbia. But, sooner or later, Hood could
have forced a crossing at some one of those places, and thus have
interposed a compact body of troops, larger than my entire army,
between my detachments. If that had occurred before my reinforcements
arrived, I would have been caught in the worst possible condition.
Hence, in the absence of certain information in respect to when
reinforcements would arrive, and their aggregate strength, a division
of my force was inadmissible. An inferior force should generally
be kept in one compact body, while a superior force may often be
divided to great advantage.
I now direct attention to the correspondence between General Thomas
and myself, on November 30, before the battle of Franklin, showing
that he was not ready for battle at Nashville, and his desire that
I should, if possible, hold Hood back three days longer; and showing
that my estimate of the importance of time when I was at Columbia
was by no means exaggerated; also showing General Thomas's views
and mine of the military situation before the battle, and the action
then determined on and ordered and partially executed by the movement
of trains toward Nashville before the battle opened. The results
of the battle were not such, even if they had been fully known at
the time, as to have rendered admissible any change in those orders.
"Nashville, [November] 30, [1864,] 4 A. M.
"Captain A. J. Twining, Franklin:
"Your despatch of 1 A. M. to-day is received. Please inform General
Schofield that Major-General Smith's troops have just arrived at
the levee and are still on boats, and that it is impossible for
them to reach Franklin to-day. He must make strong efforts to
cover his wagon-train, protecting it against the enemy, as well as
to reach Franklin with his command and get into position there.
I will despatch him further in a few hours.
"Geo. H. Thomas"
HOPING TO DELAY HOOD FOR THREE DAYS AT FRANKLIN
The next despatch from General Thomas was at 10:25 A. M. By that
time he had received two more despatches from me, as follows, I
having arrived at Franklin between 4 and 5 A. M.:
"Franklin, November 30, 1864, 5 A. M.
"Have just seen your despatch to Captain Twining of 4 A. M. If
Smith is not needed for the immediate defense of Nashville, I think
he had better march for Franklin at once. He could at least cover
my wagon-train if I have to fall back from here."
"Franklin, November 30, 1864, 5:30 A. M.
"I hope to get my troops and material safely across the Harpeth
this morning. We have suffered no material loss so far. I shall
try and get Wilson on my flank this morning. Forrest was all around
us yesterday, but we brushed him away in the evening and came
through. Hood attacked in the front and flank, but did not hurt
us."
This last despatch was written before daylight, on my arrival at
Franklin, before I learned that there were no bridges across the
river. If pontoons had been laid or the wagon and railroad bridges
improved on the 29th, as was done by me after my arrival, all could
have crossed by noon of the 30th.
General Thomas's reply of 10:25 A. M. was as follows:
"Your despatches of 5:30 and 5:50, and Wilson's despatches, forwarded
by you, have been received. It will take Smith quite all day to
disembark; but if I find there is no immediate necessity to retain
him here, will send him to Franklin or Brentwood, according to
circumstances. If you can prevent Hood from turning your position
at Franklin, it should be held; but I do not wish you to risk too
much. I send you a map of the environs of Franklin."
Again I telegraphed at 9:50 A. M.:
"My trains are coming in all right, and half of the troops are here
and the other half about five miles out, coming on in good order,
with light skirmishing. I will have all across the river this
evening. Wilson is here, and has his cavalry on my flank. I do
not know where Forrest is. He may have gone east, but, no doubt,
will strike our flank and rear again soon. Wilson is entirely
unable to cope with him. Of course I cannot prevent Hood from
crossing the Harpeth whenever he may attempt it. Do you desire me
to hold on here until compelled to fall back?"
And at 11 A. M. I telegraphed: "Troops and trains in all right."
At noon I answered as follows General Thomas's last despatch:
"Your despatch of 10:25 A. M. is received. I am satisfied that I
have heretofore run too much risk in trying to hold Hood in check
while so far inferior to him in both infantry and cavalry. The
slightest mistake on my part, or failure of a subordinate, during
the last three days might have proved disastrous. I don't want to
get into so tight a place again; yet I will cheerfully act in
accordance with your views of expediency, if you think it important
to hold Hood back as long as possible. When you get all your troops
together, and the cavalry in effective condition, we can easily
whip Hood, and, I believe, make the campaign a decisive one. Before
that, the most we can do is to husband our strength and increase
it as much as possible. I fear the troops which were stationed on
the river below Columbia will be lost. I will get my trains out
of the way as soon as possible, and watch Hood carefully. Possibly
I may be able to hold him here, but do not expect to be able to do
so long."
This despatch shows not only my opinion at that time of the kind
of "place" I had been in, but my belief that the character of that
situation had been due largely to Thomas's action in leaving me
without the expected reinforcements, and in not providing the means
of crossing the Harpeth River.
HOPING TO DELAY HOOD FOR THREE DAYS AT FRANKLIN
The following seems to show that General Thomas did not even then
see the importance of prompt concentration of all his available
force in front of the enemy, but expected me, with two corps, to
fight the entire hostile force until he could complete his
concentration at Nashville. Even before the battle of Franklin he
seems to have thought he could take his time to concentrate,
reorganize his cavalry, and then "try Hood again."
"Nashville, November 30, 1864.
"Major-General Schofield, Franklin:
"General Smith reported to me this morning that one division of
his troops is still behind; we must therefore try to hold Hood
where he is now until those troops can get up, and the steamers
return. After that we will concentrate here, reorganize our cavalry,
and try Hood again. Do you think you can hold Hood at Franklin
for three days longer? Answer, giving your views; and I should
like to know what Wilson thinks he can do to aid you in holding
Hood.
"Geo. H. Thomas,
"Major-General U. S. Vols, Commanding."
Thereupon, in the following telegram, dated 3 P. M., I proposed
Brentwood as a point where A. J. Smith's and all the other troops
could surely unite with mine:
"I have just received your despatch asking whether I can hold Hood
here three days. I do not believe I can. I can doubtless hold
him one day, but will hazard something in doing that. He now has
a large force, probably two corps, in my front, and seems preparing
to cross the river above and below. I think he can effect a crossing
to-morrow in spite of all my efforts, and probably to-night, if he
attempts it. A worse position than this for an inferior force
could hardly be found. I will refer your question to General Wilson
this evening. I think he can do very little. I have no doubt
Forrest will be in my rear to-morrow, or doing some greater mischief.
It appears to me that I ought to take position at Brentwood at
once. If A. J. Smith's division and the Murfreesboro' garrison
join me there, I ought to be able to hold Hood in check for some
time. I have just learned that the enemy's cavalry is already
crossing three miles above. I will have lively times with my trains
again."
This despatch gives a very accurate estimate of the true situation
at that time, except perhaps that I did not then fully appreciate
how much our cavalry had gained in effective strength by the
reinforcements that had joined the corps in the field during the
retreat. I judged by the experience of the previous day (November
29). But the result was very different in the afternoon of the
30th, when our cavalry repulsed and drove back that of the enemy;
at the same time the infantry assault was repulsed at Franklin.
There was no apprehension of the result of an attack in front at
Franklin, but of a move of Hood to cross the river above and strike
for Nashville before I could effect a junction with the troops then
at that place.
The following despatches must have been sent either during the
progress of the battle, or very soon afterward:
"Please send A. J. Smith's division to Brentwood early to-morrow
morning. Also please send to Brentwood to-morrow morning 1,000,000
rounds infantry ammunition, 2000 rounds 3-inch, and 1000 rounds
light twelve artillery."
In reply to my advice, the following order to fall back to Nashville
was sent by Thomas _before_ the battle, but was received by me
_after_ the heavy fighting had ceased. Communication was interrupted
for a short time during the transfer of the telegraph station from
the town of Franklin to a place on the north side of the Harpeth,
rendered necessary by the battle.
"Nashville, November 30, 1864.
"Your despatch of 3 P. M. is received. Send back your trains to
this place at once, and hold your troops in readiness to march to
Brentwood, and thence to this place, as soon as your trains are
fairly on the way, so disposing your force as to cover the wagon-
train. Have all railroad trains sent back immediately. Notify
General Wilson of my instructions. He will govern himself accordingly.
Relieve all garrisons in blockhouses and send back by railroad
trains last over the road. Acknowledge receipt.
"Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General."
HOPING TO DELAY HOOD FOR THREE DAYS AT FRANKLIN
The following is my first report to General Thomas, sent immediately
after the battle:
"The enemy made a heavy and persistent attack with about two corps,
commencing at 4 P. M. and lasting until after dark. He was repulsed
at all points with very heavy loss--probably five or six thousand
men. Our losses probably not more than one fourth that number.(17)
We have captured about one thousand men, including one brigadier-
general. Your despatch of this P. M. is received. I had already
given the orders you direct, and am now executing them."
Before the battle, and in anticipation of the order from General
Thomas, the trains had been sent back and the preparations made
for the army to retire to Brentwood, the troops to commence
withdrawing from the line on the south side of the river immediately
after dark. In consequence of the battle, the movement of the
troops was suspended until midnight. General Thomas promptly
replied to my first report in these words:
"Your telegram is just received. It is glorious news, and I
congratulate you and the brave men of your command; but you must
look out that the enemy does not still persist. The courier you
sent to General Cooper, at Widow Dean's, could not reach there,
and reports that he was chased by rebel cavalry on the whole route,
and finally came into this place. Major-General Steedman, with
five thousand men, should be here in the morning. When he arrives
I will start General A. J. Smith's command and General Steedman's
troops to your assistance at Brentwood."
[( 1) See his "Memoirs," Vol. II, pp. 162, 163.]
[( 2) It appears from General Thomas's report that he did have in
his department, by November 29, the mounted cavalry force stated
by General Sherman--viz., 7700; but only 4800 of that force joined
the army in the field before the enemy forced the crossing of Duck
River. The remaining 2900 were not available for service in the
field until after the crisis of the campaign was passed so far as
the cavalry could affect it.]
[( 3) See. Vol. XLV, parts I and ii.]
[( 4) See Vols. XXXIX and XLV.]
[( 5) See General Thomas's report: War Records, Vol. XLV, part I,
p. 33.]
[( 6) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 1017.]
[( 7) Thomas to Steedman, November 25: War Records, Vol. XLV, part
I, p. 1050.]
[( 8) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 535.]
[( 9) _Ibid_., p. 536.]
[(10) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 685.]
[(11) _Ibid_.]
[(12) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I.]
[(13) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 1143.]
[(14) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 1108.]
[(15) Cooper commanded the brigade guarding the river below
Columbia.]
[(16) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 1137.]
[(17) At that time I did not know of our loss in prisoners, having
thought nearly all of Wagner's two brigades had come in with those
I had seen running to the rear.]