The Final Blow at Atlanta--Johnston's Untried Plan of Resistance--
Hood's Faulty Move--Holding the Pivot of the Position--Anecdotes
of the Men in the Ranks--Deferring to General Stanley in a Question
of Relative Rank--The Failure at Jonesboro'--The Capture of Atlanta
--Absent from the Army--Hood's Operations in Sherman's Rear--Sent
Back to Thomas's Aid--Faulty Instructions to Oppose Hood at Pulaski
--At Columbia--Reason of the Delay in Exchanging Messages.
When all our efforts to accomplish decisive results by partial
operations upon the flanks had failed, this question was much
discussed: What more decisive movement shall next be made for the
capture of Atlanta? There were practically but two propositions
to be considered: That of General Sherman, which was adopted with
success; and that heretofore referred to as having never been tried,
to detach two or more corps to make a lodgment on the railroad at
or below East Point, and then compel the enemy to come out of
Atlanta and endeavor to regain control of his only line of supply,
or abandon that city altogether. General Sherman thought it too
hazardous to detach two corps, though he was willing for me to
undertake it with one. In fact, this feeling marked General
Sherman's action throughout the campaign. He had no hesitation in
detaching a small force, the loss of which would still leave him
greatly superior in numbers to the enemy, or a very large force
under his own command, leaving the enemy to the care of the smaller
part, as in his march to Savannah. General Thomas, on the contrary,
thought the movement proposed by General Sherman "extra hazardous,"
as Sherman says in his "Memoirs" (Vol. II, page 106). I did not
regard either of them as very hazardous, and upon consideration
rather preferred General Sherman's, because I thought it could not
fail to be decisive of the capture of Atlanta, while the other
might fail if not executed with promptness and vigor, and this,
experience had warned us, we could not be quite sure of.
JOHNSTON'S UNTRIED PLAN OF RESISTANCE
Some time after the war, that very able commander General Joseph
E. Johnston told me that in his judgment Sherman's operations in
Hood's rear ought not to have caused the evacuation of Atlanta;
that he (Johnston), when in command, had anticipated such a movement,
and had prepared, or intended to prepare, to oppose it by constructing
artillery redoubts at all suitable points in the rear of Atlanta,
as well as in front, which redoubts could be very speedily connected
by infantry intrenchments whenever necessary; that he aimed to keep
on longer than Sherman's army could subsist on the contents of
their wagons and haversacks; and that Sherman could not possibly
hold all the railroads leading into Atlanta _at the same time_, nor
destroy any one of them so thoroughly that it could not be repaired
in time to replenish Johnston's supplies in Atlanta.
Here is presented a question well worthy of the candid study of
military critics. Whatever may be the final judgment upon that
question, it seems perfectly clear that Johnston's plan of defense
ought at least to have been tried by his successor. If Hood had
kept all his troops in compact order about Atlanta, he would have
been in the best possible condition to resist Sherman if the latter
turned back from Jonesboro' and attacked Atlanta from the rear, or
to strike Sherman's rear or flank in full force if he made any
other movement. The division of Hood's forces at that time, one
part holding on to Atlanta while the other went to _head off_
Sherman, was the worst disposition that could have been made.
As related to me personally by General Sheridan,--for I have not
yet studied the Virginia campaigns so thoroughly as to justify me
in speaking from the records,--it was a similar mistake on the part
of the Confederate cavalry commander J. E. B. Stuart, in trying to
get between Sheridan and Richmond, which gave Sheridan the advantage
and led to Stuart's defeat. Stuart had ridden hard all night, and
got between Sheridan and Richmond, his men and horses exhausted,
while Sheridan had been resting and feeding his own men and animals.
In the morning Sheridan "rode over" his exhausted antagonist.
These are among the many cases where exaggerated ideas of the
importance of places have led to the defeat of armies. I knew
Stuart well at West Point, he having been in the class next to
mine. He then gave promise of his future as a cavalry leader.
The only specially hazardous part of Sherman's movement was that
which would fall to my lot--namely, to hold the "pivot" against a
possible attack of Hood's whole army while Thomas and Howard should
swing round it, and then draw out and join them after the swing
was made. Upon my reporting that I was perfectly willing to
undertake this task, and had no doubt of the ability of my corps
to accomplish it, all question about making the movement appeared
to be settled, and it was at once ordered. Hood did not avail
himself of his opportunity to attack me when alone, either in
position or in motion, hence my part of the movement proved easiest
of all.
I had placed my corps in a completely inclosed field-work, large
enough to contain all my trains, and strong enough to resist any
attack from a greatly superior force until Sherman's movement could
be accomplished.
ANECDOTES OF THE MEN IN THE RANKS
I recollect even to this day a little incident of that time which
was, at least to me, both amusing and instructive. After receiving
Sherman's orders, which meant "suspend aggressive work and go to
fortifying," I was directing the laying out of the new work at the
most important part of the line, and the men had been ordered to
commence digging, when I heard an old volunteer, as he laid aside
his gun and put off his accoutrements with manifest reluctance,
say, _sotto voce:_ "Well, if digging is the way to put down the
rebellion, I guess we will have to do it." Our old soldiers had
a "mind of their own," and were not afraid to let their commanders
know it; yet they were essentially as thoroughly subordinate and
reliable as any troops any general ever had the honor to command.
I now recall another incident which occurred a few days earlier,
in which a young Indiana volunteer was somewhat less respectful,
though he had no idea whom he was addressing, nor, probably, any
thought whatever about "relative rank." I had come out from my
tent, before sunrise in the morning, and was performing my morning
ablutions in the ordinary camp basin, preparatory to putting on my
outer clothing. None of my "people" were yet up, and the night
sentinel of my camp was a little way off. There came up a weary,
belated soldier who had, perhaps, been trudging along much of the
night, trying to overtake his regiment. I heard him ask in a loud
voice: "Where is the 128th Indiana?" Not supposing the question
was addressed to me, I did not look up. Then came in still louder
tones and in an amended form which left no room for doubt as to
whom it was addressed: "I mean you old fellow there with the red
shirt! Where is the 128th Indiana?"
If from lapse of time my memory may not be exact as to the number
of the regiment, I am sure no apology is necessary to the gallant
128th. It was, anyhow, one of those very high-numbered new Indiana
regiments which had recently joined the army. The young soldier
was sent to the headquarters escort, given his breakfast, and
carried along until his regiment was overtaken.
The Twenty-third Corps reached the railroad about the close of day
on August 31, having time to do no more than intrench our positions.
The orders that day and night were urgent to make the destruction
of the railroad thorough and extensive. This was evidently General
Sherman's primary object, showing a doubt in his mind whether the
effect of his movement would be the speedy abandonment of Atlanta,
or whether he would have to trust to his destruction of the railroad
to accomplish that object.
Late in the night of the 31st, after General Stanley and I, who
were encamped near together, had gone to sleep, we received despatches
from General Sherman stating in effect that as we were too far from
the main body of the army to receive orders from him or General
Thomas, our two corps must act on the morrow under the orders of
the highest commander present, and that General Stanley, having
the older commission, was that highest commander. I was therefore
directed to report to General Stanley and act under his orders.
I replied to General Sherman that while I differed from him in
opinion upon the question of relative rank, I would for the present
cheerfully abide his decision and execute his orders. Early the
next morning, before I had time to report to General Stanley, he
appeared at my camp, evidently much disturbed by the orders he had
received. He said General Sherman was wrong; that he was not
entitled to the command and did not want it; and urged me to accept
the chief command, and let him act under my orders. I replied that
General Sherman's order was imperative, and I could not relieve
him (General Stanley) from the responsibility of executing it. It
was all wrong, but there was no present remedy, and he must do the
best he could. The position of his corps on the right made it
necessary that it should have the advance in the day's movement,
while I would follow close after and support him under all
circumstances.
THE FAILURE AT JONESBORO'
So we started early in the morning to execute Sherman's orders--
thoroughly to destroy the railroad, and close down on Thomas toward
Jonesboro'. That morning, as Sherman says (Vol. II, page 107),
"Howard found an intrenched foe (Hardee's corps) covering Jonesboro',"
and "orders were sent to Generals Thomas and Schofield to turn
straight for Jonesboro', tearing up the railroad track as they
advanced." But of course, as General Sherman had anticipated, such
orders could not reach me in time to do any good. They were not
received until after the affair at Jonesboro' was ended. But
hearing the sound of battle in our front, I rode rapidly forward
to the head of Stanley's column, which was then not advancing, made
inquiries for that officer, and was informed that he was trying to
find General Thomas to get orders. I immediately brought my infantry
of the Twenty-third Corps out of the road occupied by Stanley's
corps, moved it to the front through woods and fields, and endeavored
to find a way by which I could reach the enemy's flank or rear,
riding so far ahead with a few staff officers and orderlies that
I escaped very narrowly being captured by the enemy. Finally, near
dark, General Stanley's troops began to deploy and attack the enemy;
and as there were more troops on the ground than could possibly be
used that day, I could do not more than stand and watch their
movements, as I did with intense interest until my medical director,
Dr. Hewit, one of the bravest and coolest men I ever knew, called
my attention to the fact that the place was much too hot for a
general and his staff who had nothing to do there. I believe if
General Sherman had been in our place he would have thought it
"more than a skirmish-line" (Vol. II, page 108) in Stanley's front
that gave us that fire both of musketry and artillery which my
staff officers have frequently spoken of as one of the ugliest they
ever experienced. General Stanley's fault was, not that he deployed
his troops, but that he did not put them in at once when he arrived
on the ground, instead of waiting for orders. But General Stanley,
whose gallantry was never questioned, was a subordinate in experience.
He had but recently risen to the command of a corps, and had been
little accustomed to act on his own responsibility. Feeling
overburdened with the responsibility wrongfully thrust upon him
that day, he naturally sought relief from it by reporting for orders
to General Thomas as soon as his corps was reunited to the main
army.
The failure at Jonesboro', as at so many other places, was due to
that erroneous interpretation of the law that threw the supreme
responsibility at the crisis of battle upon untried and (in this
case) unwilling shoulders, or else left the lawful commander without
recognized authority, to beg in vain of others to "co-operate" with
him.
THE CAPTURE OF ATLANTA
During the night of August 31 others besides General Sherman were
too restless and impatient to sleep (Vol. II, page 108). The sounds
of explosion in Atlanta were distinctly heard, and the flashes of
light distinctly seen. With the compass for direction and the
watch for intervals of time between flash and sound, there was no
difficulty in locating their origin at Atlanta. An untutored farmer
may well have thought "these sounds were just like those of a
battle," but a practised ear could not have failed to note the
difference. First there would come an explosion louder and unlike
the report of one or several guns, and this would be followed by
numerous smaller, sharper, and perfectly distinct reports, quite
unlike that of musketry, which could not be mistaken for anything
but the explosion of shells. There could be no room for doubt that
these lights and sounds meant the destruction in Atlanta of magazines
or carloads of fixed ammunition, and hence that Hood was abandoning
that place. I reported my observations and conclusion to General
Sherman, but he "still remained in doubt." The doubt was to me
incomprehensible; but perhaps that was because I had no doubt from
the start, whether I was right or wrong, what the result would be.
My period of elation was when we got firm hold of the railroad at
Rough and Ready. Hood having failed to attack our exposed flank
during the movement, the fall of Atlanta was already an accomplished
fact with me when Sherman was still in doubt, as well as when Thomas
thought the news "too good to be true." But the above is worthy
of noting only as a necessary introduction to something far more
important.
Hood's army was now divided and scattered over a distance of thirty
miles, one corps below Jonesboro' being just driven from its ground
with considerable loss and in retreat to Lovejoy's, the main body
leaving Atlanta and stretched along the road toward McDonough;
while Sherman's whole army, except Slocum's corps, was in compact
order about Jonesboro', nearly in a straight line between Atlanta
and Lovejoy's. This seemed exactly the opportunity to destroy
Hood's army, if that was the objective of the campaign. So anxious
was I that this be attempted that I offered to go with two corps,
or even with one, and intercept Hood's retreat on the McDonough
road, and hold him until Sherman could dispose of Hardee or interpose
his army between him and Hood. But more prudent counsels prevailed,
and we remained quietly in our camps for five days, while Hood
leisurely marched round us with all his baggage and Georgia militia,
and collected his scattered fragments at Lovejoy's.
Atlanta had become, like Richmond, in popular estimation the real
objective of military operations. The public lost sight of the
fact that it was armies in the field, and not fortified places,
which gave strength to the rebellion; and apparently even prominent
generals, if they did not share the popular delusion, at least
recognized its value. The capture of Atlanta was enough to meet
the "political necessity," make "the election of Mr. Lincoln
certain," and win rejoicings and congratulations from all parts of
the North! It was not worth while to run any risk of trying to do
more at that time! It had to be left for two of Sherman's corps,
after the other four had gone on "the march to the sea," to fight
Hood at Columbia and Spring Hill, hurl him back from Franklin, and
then, with reinforcements not equal to half what Sherman had taken
away, to overwhelm him at Nashville. Why was not this done with
a much larger force under Sherman at Atlanta? This is one of the
questions for the future historian to discuss.
During our rest near Lovejoy's, General Sherman requested me to
give him a statement in writing of my dissent from his decision
upon the question of relative rank, which I did. This he submitted
to the War Department for decision, as a "question of rank that
had arisen between Generals Schofield and Stanley." At this General
Stanley was very indignant, as well as at General Sherman's censure
of his conduct on September 1; for the reason that no question of
rank had been raised by us, and the command was thrust upon him in
opposition to his wish and in violation of the law as he understood
it. In due time came the decision of the War Department, written
by General Halleck, sustaining the view of the law Stanley and I
had taken, and reversing that of General Sherman; also kindly
commending my action in waiving the question during active
operations.
It was by virtue of the above decision of the War Department that
I, instead of General Stanley, had command of the force that in
the following November, 1864, opposed Hood's advance from the
Tennessee River and repulsed his fierce assault at Franklin.
ABSENT FROM THE ARMY
As I was absent from the army on business connected with my department
during most of Hood's raid upon the railroad in the rear of Atlanta
(Sherman having announced his purpose to let his army rest during
that time), I have little to say in respect to the operations
resulting therefrom. But some things in Sherman's account seem to
require a little elucidation.
Being informed by General Sherman of Hood's movement, I hurried to
the front and tried to reach the army by a special train with a
small guard from Cleveland, Tenn., but met, October 13, the head
of Hood's column at Dalton, where several trains of cars with
supplies and men without arms returning from furlough on their way
to Sherman had been stopped by the reported approach of Hood. I
ordered all back to Cleveland, and we barely had time to escape
capture by Hood's cavalry. On arriving at Cleveland, I reported
by telegraph to General Thomas, then at Nashville; and he desired
me to go to Chattanooga, take command of the troops there, and
prepare to defend that place, which it was thought Hood might
attempt to take by a _coup de main_, or to co-operate with Sherman.
As General Sherman says (Vol. II, page 156), "Hood had broken up
the telegraph, and thus had prevented quick communication"; but
through my own scouts and spies I was able to keep track of Hood's
movements. As soon as he turned westward I determined to move with
the troops, when no longer necessary to the defense of Chattanooga,
rapidly to Trenton and Valley Head, seize the passes through the
Lookout range, and prevent Hood's escape in that direction, presuming
that Sherman would intercept his retreat down the Chattanooga
valley. I sent a courier to General Sherman informing him of my
purpose, and informed General Thomas by telegraph. But the latter
disapproved my plan, and directed me to move to defend Caperton's
Ferry. This is what General Sherman refers to in his despatch of
October 16: "Your first move on Trenton and Valley Head was right;
the move to defend Caperton's Ferry is wrong. Notify General Thomas
of these, my views." But the difference between right and wrong
proved immaterial, since Hood was left free to escape down the
Chattanooga valley. Why this was done, or why Sherman did not want
to force the enemy east, by Spring Place, into the barren mountains,
where Johnston would have been compelled to go if McPherson's move
on Resaca in May had been successful, seems a mystery. The
explanation is probably to be found in Sherman's wish that Hood
would go where he would not be compelled to follow, and thus would
leave him (Sherman) a clear road for his march to the sea. Indeed
the conviction seems irresistible that Sherman and Hood could hardly
have acted in more perfect concert if they had been under the same
commander. The one did exactly what the other wanted, and the
other took care not to interfere with his movement.
At the close of the Atlanta campaign, I promised General Sherman
that I would, as soon as I should be able to do so, write a full
critical history of that campaign as a text-book for military
students. I have not yet found time to fulfil that promise. The
foregoing pages were intended, when written, as only a very partial
fulfilment of that task, and that almost entirely of one side of
it--far the most difficult side. The other side is so easy,
comparatively, and is already so familiar to military students,
that further elucidation now seems hardly necessary. Yet I hope,
as a labor of love, if for no other reason, to present my impressions
of those grand tactical evolutions of a compact army of one hundred
thousand men, as I witnessed them with the intense interest of a
young commander and student of the great art which has so often in
the history of the world determined the destinies of nations.
HOOD'S OPERATIONS IN SHERMAN'S REAR
After the capture of Atlanta, in September, 1864, General Sherman
proposed to give his army rest for a month while he perfected his
plans and preparations for a change of base to some point on the
Atlantic or the gulf, in pursuance of the general plan outlined by
General Grant before the Atlanta campaign was opened in May. But
the Confederate commander took the initiative, about September 20,
by moving his army around Sherman's right, striking his railroad
about Allatoona and toward Chattanooga, doing some damage, and then
marching off westward with the design of transferring the theater
of war from Georgia to Alabama, Mississippi, or Tennessee.
Sherman very promptly decided not to accept that challenge to meet
Hood upon a field chosen by the latter, but to continue substantially
the original plan for his own operations, having in view also new
ulterior plans opened to him by this erratic movement of his
adversary. An essential modification of the original plan, to meet
the unexpected movement of Hood, was to send back into Tennessee
force enough, in addition to the troops then there and others to
be assembled from the rear, to cope with Hood in the event of his
attempting the invasion of Tennessee and Kentucky, or to pursue
and occupy his attention if he should attempt to follow Sherman.
General George H. Thomas, commanding the Department of the Cumberland,
whose headquarters were at Nashville, was already at that place,
and was directed by General Sherman to assume command of all the
troops in the three departments under Sherman's command, except
those with the latter in Georgia, and to direct the operations
against Hood.
Thomas had in his department at that time only the garrisons and
railroad guards which had been deemed essential during the preceding
operations in Georgia; and many of those were soon to be discharged
by expiration of their terms of enlistment, their places to be
supplied by new regiments coming from the rear. General A. J.
Smith's corps, then in Missouri, about ten thousand strong, was
ordered to Tennessee, and Sherman also ordered Stanley, with the
Fourth Corps, about twelve thousand men, to return from Georgia to
Tennessee and report to Thomas. Stanley had started by rail to
Tullahoma, and was to march, as he did, from the latter point to
Pulaski, Tennessee, which had been selected as the point of
concentration for Thomas's forces. This was the situation when I
returned to the army and reported in person to General Sherman.
Under Sherman's promise of a month's rest for his army, I had gone
back to attend to the business of my department, as General Thomas
had also done, and hence was in the rear when Hood made his raid
upon Sherman's railroad. Upon reporting to General Sherman near
the end of October, I learned for the first time his purpose to
march to Savannah, and what troops he had provided for Thomas in
Tennessee. I told Sherman, with that perfect candor which he always
invited, that in my opinion Thomas's force was much too small; that
Hood evidently intended to invade Tennessee; and that he would not
be diverted from his purpose by Sherman's march in the opposite
direction, but would, on the contrary, be encouraged thereby to
pursue his own plan. Hence I requested Sherman to send me back
with the Twenty-third Corps to join Thomas. Sherman at first
appeared to understand my suggestions as a desire to be left in
Tennessee instead of Thomas, the latter to go with Sherman. But
I explained to him emphatically that such was not my thought. I
took it for granted that Thomas was to command the army in Tennessee,
and I wanted only to go back and help him because he would, in my
opinion, have to do the fighting while Sherman's march would be
unopposed. Sherman then replied that he must have three grand
divisions, under Slocum, Howard, and myself, to make his army
complete, and that he could not spare me; and he gave no indication
of concurrence in my opinion that he ought to send back more troops.
SENT BACK TO THOMAS'S AID
After leaving General Sherman that afternoon and returning to my
own camp, I wrote him a letter giving a special reason why my corps,
rather than any other, should be sent back to Tennessee in order
that it might be filled up my new regiments which had been ordered
from the North. No answer came to these suggestions until I had
made three days' march toward Atlanta, _en route_ for Savannah.
Then I received an order, October 30, to march to the nearest point
on the railroad, and report by telegraph to General Thomas for
orders.
At first General Thomas ordered me to move by rail to Tullahoma,
and then march across to Pulaski, as Stanley was doing. But just
then Forrest with his cavalry appeared at Johnsonville, on the
Tennessee River west of Nashville, and destroyed a great quantity
of property, General Thomas not having sufficient force available
to oppose him; hence on November 3 Thomas ordered me to come at
once by rail to Nashville with my corps, where I reported to him
with the advance of my troops on November 5. He then ordered me
to go at once with some of my troops to Johnsonville and dispose
of the Confederate cavalry there, and then to return to Nashville
and proceed to Pulaski, to take command of all the troops in the
field, which would then include the Fourth Corps, my own Twenty-
third, except the detachment left at Johnsonville, and the cavalry
watching Hood toward Florence. My duty at Johnsonville, where I
left two brigades, was soon disposed of; and I then returned to
Nashville, and went at once by rail to Pulaski, arriving at that
place in the evening of November 13.
Some so-called histories of the Tennessee campaign have been based
upon the theory that I was marching from Georgia to Tennessee, to
unite my corps with General Thomas's army at Nashville, when I
encountered Hood at Franklin, and after a sharp contest managed to
elude him and continue my march and unite with the Army of the
Cumberland at Nashville. Hence I wish to point out clearly that
I had been with the entire Twenty-third Corps to Nashville, with
a part of it to Johnsonville and back to Nashville, and thence to
Columbia and near Pulaski, all by rail; that all of the Army of
the Cumberland then in Tennessee was the Fourth Corps and the
cavalry at and near Pulaski; that General Thomas placed those troops
under my command, and that they remained so until after the battle
of Franklin, November 30, and the retreat to Nashville that night;
and that General Thomas did not have an army at Nashville until
December 1. I had united with Thomas's troops two weeks before
the battle of Franklin, and was commanding his army in the field
as well as my own during that time. If the historians had read
the records ( 1) they could not possibly have fallen into such a
mistake.
FAULTY INSTRUCTIONS TO OPPOSE HOOD AT PULASKI
Before reaching Pulaski I was furnished with an order from General
Thomas's headquarters assigning me to the command in the field, by
virtue of my rank as a department commander, and a copy of instructions
which had already been telegraphed to General Stanley at Pulaski.
I assumed command in the morning of November 14. The moment I met
Stanley at Pulaski, in the evening of November 13, he called my
attention to the faulty position of the troops and to an error in
General Thomas's instructions, about which I then knew nothing
because I was unacquainted with the geography of the surrounding
country. Upon Stanley's statement, I halted Cox's division of the
Twenty-third Corps a few miles north of Pulaski so that the troops
might be the more readily placed as the situation required when I
had time to consider it. No part of the Twenty-third Corps actually
went to Pulaski, although that was the place to which General Thomas
had ordered it.
On the 19th General Thomas repeated to me the same orders he had
sent to General Stanley, in these words: "If the enemy advances
in force, as General Hatch believes, have everything in readiness
either to fight him at Pulaski if he advances on that place, or
cover the railroad and concentrate at Columbia, should he attempt
to turn your right flank. . . ."( 2) I then telegraphed General
Thomas, November 20, pointing out the faulty nature of the position
selected by him for the troops at Pulaski, and the danger that must
be incurred in attempting to carry out his instructions to fight
Hood at Pulaski if he should advance upon that place; also suggesting
what seemed to be the best way to avoid that difficulty. General
Thomas very promptly approved these suggestions, and thus ended
the embarrassment occasioned by the faulty instructions. But his
official report on that point has made it necessary for me to
comment upon it more fully later.
The season of Hood's invasion of Tennessee was extremely unfavorable
for aggressive operations, and hence correspondingly favorable for
the defense. The ordinary country roads were almost impassable,
while the turnpikes were in good condition. As we held the crossing
of the Tennessee River at Decatur, Hood was compelled to cross at
the Shoals below, and to advance over those very bad roads; hence
we had ample time in which to make the necessary dispositions to
oppose him.
Our cavalry gave us accurate information that the enemy was advancing
on the 21st, when Cox, with Wagner in support, was ordered to
interpose between the enemy's cavalry and Columbia; while Stanley,
with two divisions of the Fourth Corps, marched from Pulaski to
that place, and our cavalry moved on the enemy's right to cover
the turnpike and railroad. The whole army was in position at
Columbia, November 24, and began to intrench. Hood's infantry did
not appear in sight until the 26th. Cox had a brush with the
enemy's cavalry, which had driven in one of our cavalry brigades.
That action was magnified at the time, and afterward, into evidence
of a race between our troops and the enemy for the possession of
Columbia. In fact, Ruger's troops at Columbia were quite capable
of holding that place against Forrest, and Hood's infantry was not
within a day's march of either Cox or Stanley until after both had
reached Columbia.
We held our intrenched position in front of Columbia until the
evening of November 27, inviting an attack, and hoping that Thomas
would arrive with, or send, reinforcements in time to assume the
offensive from Columbia; but reinforcements did not come, and the
enemy did not attack. It became evident that Hood's intention was
not to attack that position, but to turn it by crossing Duck River
above; hence the army was moved to the north bank of the river in
the night of the 27th. It was still hoped that the line of Duck
River might be held until reinforcements could arrive. General
Thomas was very urgent that this should be done, if possible, as
the arrival of General A. J. Smith's corps from Missouri had been
expected daily for some time, when General Thomas intended, as it
was understood, to come to the front in person with that corps and
all the other troops he could assemble in his department, take
command, and move against the enemy.
REASON OF THE DELAY IN EXCHANGING MESSAGES
About that time was disclosed one of those contrivances by which
the non-military agencies of government interfere with the operations
of armies. The War Department telegraph corps alone was intrusted
with the cipher in which General Thomas and I could communicate
with each other by telegraph. Neither he, nor I, nor any of our
staff officers were permitted to know the telegraph code. The work
was so badly done that from eight to forty-eight hours were occupied
in sending and delivering a despatch. Finally the cipher-operator
attached to my headquarters in the field deserted his post and went
to Franklin, so that the time required for a messenger to ride from
Franklin to my position in the field was added to the delay caused
by deciphering despatches. From all this it resulted that my
superior at Nashville was able to give me little assistance during
the critical days of that campaign. It has been generally supposed
that I was all that time acting under orders or instructions from
General Thomas, and his numerous despatches have been quoted in
"histories" as evidence in support of that supposition. The fact
is that I was not only without any appropriate orders or instructions
nearly all the time, but also without any timely information from
General Thomas to guide my action.
This fact appears to have been fully recognized by General Thomas
in his official report, wherein he made no mention of any orders
or instructions given by him during the progress of those operations,
but referred only to "instructions already given" before I went to
Pulaski, and said: "My plans and wishes were fully explained to
General Schofield, and, as subsequent events will show, properly
appreciated and executed by him."( 3)
[( 1) War Records, Vol. XLV.]
[( 2) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 944.]
[( 3) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part I, p. 590.]