Condition of the Troops at Knoxville--Effect of the Promotion of
Grant and Sherman--Letter to Senator Henderson--A Visit from General
Sherman--United with his other Armies for the Atlanta Campaign--
Comments on Sherman's "Memoirs"--Faulty Organization of Sherman's
Army--McPherson's Task at Resaca--McPherson's Character--Example of
the Working of a Faulty System.
I arrived at Knoxville, Tennessee, on February 8, 1864, and the
next day relieved General John G. Foster. The troops then about
Knoxville were the Ninth Corps, two divisions of the Twenty-third,
and about one thousand cavalry and two divisions of the Fourth
Corps; the latter belonged to the Department of the Cumberland,
but had been left with General Burnside after the siege of Knoxville
was raised by General Sherman.
The Ninth and Twenty-third Corps were reduced in effective strength
to mere skeletons, the former reporting present for duty equipped
only 2800 men, and the latter 3000 men; and these had for a long
time been living on half rations or less, and were generally far
less than half clad, many of them being entirely without shoes.
The remainder of these troops were disabled by wounds, sickness,
lack of food or clothing, or were employed in the care of the sick
or on extra duty.
Many thousands of dead horses and mules were scattered round the
town, while the few remaining alive were reduced to skeletons. Of
about 30,000 animals with which General Burnside had gone into East
Tennessee, scarcely 1000 remained fit for service; while his army
of over 25,000 men had been reduced to not more than 7000 fit for
duty and effective for service in the field. Such was the result
of the siege of Knoxville, and such the Army of the Ohio when I
became its commander.
But the splendid victory gained a short time before at Chattanooga
had raised the blockade upon our line of supply, and the railroad
to Chattanooga and Nashville was soon opened, so that our starving
and naked troops could begin to get supplies of food and clothing.
The movement of the first train of cars was reported by telegraph
from every station, and was eagerly awaited by the entire army.
When the locomotive whistle announced its approach, everybody turned
out to welcome it with shouts of joy. It proved to consist of ten
car-loads of horse and mule shoes for the dead animals which strewed
the plains! Fortunately the disgust produced by this disappointment
was not of long duration. The next train, which followed very
soon, contained coffee, sugar, and other articles to gladden the
hearts of hungry soldiers.
The Confederate army under Longstreet still remained in East
Tennessee. A movement had recently been made by our troops, under
the immediate command of General John G. Parke (General Foster
being too lame to take the field in person), to drive Longstreet
out. But the movement had failed, the troops returning to Knoxville
with the loss of considerable material. In consequence of this,
much anxiety was felt in Washington regarding the situation in East
Tennessee. It was even apprehended that Knoxville might be in
danger; and an advance of Longstreet's force to Strawberry Plains,
where he laid a bridge over the Holston and crossed a part of his
troops, seemed to give some ground for such apprehensions.
CONDITION OF THE TROOPS AT KNOXVILLE
The miserable condition of our troops, the season of the year, the
almost total lack of means of transportation for supplies and of
a pontoon bridge to cross the river, rendered any considerable
movement on our part impossible. But to relieve the existing
apprehension, I determined to assume the offensive at once, and to
maintain it as far as possible.
Early in February General Grant had proposed to give me 10,000
additional troops from General Thomas's army at Chattanooga, and
to let me begin the campaign against Longstreet at once. But on
February 16 he informed me that the movement would have to be
delayed because of some operations in which General Thomas was to
engage. Nevertheless, I advanced on the 24th with what force I
had, at the same time sending a reconnaissance south of the French
Broad River to ascertain the nature of a hostile movement reported
in that direction.
Upon our advance, Longstreet's troops withdrew across the Holston
and French Broad and retreated toward Morristown. His advance had
evidently been intended only to cover an attempted cavalry raid
upon our rear, which the high water in the Little Tennessee rendered
impracticable.
We now occupied Strawberry Plains, rebuilt the railroad bridge,
pushed forward the construction of a bateau bridge which had been
commenced, in the meantime using the bateaux already constructed
to ferry the troops across the river. In this manner we were able
to advance as far as Morristown by February 29 with sufficient
force to reconnoiter Longstreet's position. This reconnaissance
demonstrated that the enemy held Bull's Gap, and that his entire
force was grouped about that strong position. The object of this
movement having been accomplished without loss, our troops retired
to New Market to await the arrival of the troops to be sent by
General Thomas, the completion of the railroad bridge, and other
necessary preparations for the expected campaign.
On March 12 another reconnaissance was made as far as Bull's Gap,
which was found to be still occupied by the enemy, although reliable
information indicated that Longstreet was preparing for, and had
perhaps already begun, his movement toward Virginia. Although his
force, if concentrated, was much superior to mine, I determined to
endeavor to take advantage of his movement to attack his rear. My
advance held Morristown; all the troops were ordered forward to
that place, and preparations were made for an attack, when, on the
15th, orders came from General Grant to send the Ninth Corps to
the Army of the Potomac.
Such a reduction of my command, instead of the expected reinforcement,
left me wholly unable to do more than observe Longstreet as he
leisurely withdrew from Tennessee and joined Lee in Virginia, and
prepare for the campaign of the coming summer, the nature of which
I could then only conjecture.
EFFECT OF THE PROMOTION OF GRANT AND SHERMAN
This entire change of program doubtless resulted from the promotion
of General Grant to lieutenant-general and commander-in-chief, and
General Sherman to his place in command of the Military Division
of the Mississippi, which occurred at that time. The change of
plans was undoubtedly wise. The Confederate government could not
afford to leave Longstreet's force in East Tennessee during the
summer. He must join Lee or Johnston before the opening of the
summer campaign. It was not worth while for us to expend time and
strength in driving him out, which ought to be devoted to preparations
for vastly more important work. I felt disappointed at the time
in not having an opportunity of doing something that would silence
my enemies in Washington, who were not slow to avail themselves of
any pretext for hostile action against me. It was not difficult
to manufacture one out of the public reports of what had been done,
or not done, in East Tennessee, and the Military Committee of the
Senate reported against the confirmation of my appointment as major-
general. Of this I was informed by my friend Senator J. B. Henderson,
in a letter urging me to "whip somebody anyhow." This information
and advice elicited a long reply, from which the following are
extracts, which expressed pretty fully my views and feelings on
the subject, and which, with events that soon followed, ended all
trouble I ever had with that august body, the United States Senate.
I recollect in this connection a very pertinent remark made by
General Grant soon after he became President. My nomination as
major-general in the regular army, with those of Sherman and Sheridan
as general and lieutenant-general, had been sent to the Senate and
returned approved so promptly as to occasion comment. I remarked
that it had on one occasion taken me a year and a half to get
through the Senate. President Grant, as he handed me my commission,
replied: "Yes; and if your conduct then had been such as to avoid
that difficulty with the Senate, you would probably never have
received this commission at all." I have no doubt he was right.
To have pleased the radical politicians of that day would have been
enough to ruin any soldier.
LETTER TO SENATOR HENDERSON
"Headquarters, Army of the Ohio,
"Knoxville, Tenn., April 15, 1864.
"Dear Senator: I have just received your letter of the 7th informing
me that the Military Committee has reported against my nomination,
and urging me to 'whip somebody anyhow.' I am fully aware of the
importance to me personally of gaining a victory. No doubt I might
easily get up a little 'claptrap' on which to manufacture newspaper
notoriety, and convince the Senate of the United States that I had
won a great victory, and secure my confirmation by acclamation.
Such things have been done, alas! too frequently during this war.
But such is not my theory of a soldier's duties. I have an idea
that my military superiors are the proper judges of my character
and conduct, and that their testimony ought to be considered
satisfactory as to my _military qualities_.
"I have the approval and support of the President, the Secretary
of War, General Halleck, General Grant, and General Sherman. I am
willing to abide the decision of any one or all of them, and I
would not give a copper for the weight of anybody's or everybody's
opinion in addition to, or in opposition to, theirs.
"If the Senate is not satisfied with such testimony, I can't help
it. I never have and never will resort to 'buncombe' for the
purpose of securing my own advancement. If I cannot gain promotion
by legitimate means, I do not want it at all. . . . In all this
time I have yet to hear the first word of disapproval, from my
superior officer, of any one of my military operations (unless I
except Curtis, who disapproved of my pursuing Hindman so far into
Arkansas), and in general have received high commendation from my
superiors, both for my military operations and administration. I
would rather have this record without a major-general's commission,
then to gain the commission by adding to my reputation one grain
of falsehood. . . .
"Grant was here in the winter, and Sherman only a few days ago.
They are fully acquainted with the condition of affairs. I have
been acting all the time under their instructions, and I believe
with their entire approval. They are generally understood to be
men whose opinions on military matters are entitled to respect.
I cannot do more or better than refer the Senate to them.
"One thing is certain: I shall not be influenced one grain in the
discharge of my duty by any questions as to what action the Senate
may take on my nomination. . . . If the Senate is not satisfied as
to my past services, why not wait until they can know more? I am
tired enough of this suspense, but still am perfectly willing to
wait. In fact, I have become, in spite of myself, very indifferent
on the subject. I am pretty thoroughly convinced that a major-
general's commission is not worth half the trouble I and my friends
have had about mine, and I feel very little inclination to trouble
them, or even myself, any more about it.
"The Senate has its duty to perform in this matter, as well as
myself and my superior officers. If senators are not willing to
act upon the concurrent testimony of all my superior officers as
to what services I have rendered, I shall not condescend to humbug
them into the belief that I have done something which I really have
not.
"You ask me what are the prospects of putting down the rebellion.
I answer unhesitatingly that when the management of military matters
is left to military men, the rebellion will be put down very quickly,
and not before. I regard it as having been fully demonstrated that
neither the Senate, nor the House of Representatives, nor the
newspapers, nor the people of the United States, nor even all of
them together, can command an army. I rather think if you let
Grant alone, and let him have his own way, he will end the war this
year. At all events, the next ninety days will show whether he
will or not.
"I find this letter is both too long and too ill-natured. I feel
too much as if I would like to 'whip somebody anyhow,' so I will
stop where I am. Let me hear from you again soon.
"Yours very truly,
"J. M. Schofield.
"Hon. J. B. Henderson,
"U. S. Senate, Washington, D. C."
Of course I knew the advice of my friend Senator Henderson was not
intended to be taken seriously, but only as expressing his view,
much the same as my own, of the then existing situation in the
Senate. But it gave me, all the same, the opportunity I wanted to
give his brother senators, through him, "a piece of my mind."
General Sherman, on a visit to Knoxville about the end of March,
a few days before the date of the foregoing letter, disclosed to
me his general plans for the coming campaign, and the part I was
expected to take in it.
It would be difficult to give an adequate conception of the feeling
of eager expectation and enthusiasm with which, having given my
final salutation to my "friends" in the Senate, I entered upon the
preparations for this campaign. Of its possible results to the
country there was room in my mind only for confidence. But for
myself, it was to decide my fate, and that speedily. My reputation
and rank as a soldier, so long held in the political balance, were
at length to be settled. The long-hoped-for opportunity had come,
and that under a general whose character and ability were already
established, and of the justice of whose judgment and action
regarding his subordinates there could be no reason for doubt in
my mind. My command was to be mostly of veteran troops, and not
too large for my experience. Its comparative smallness was a source
of satisfaction to me at that time, rather than anything like
jealousy of my senior brother commanders of the Cumberland and
Tennessee.
My first care was to provide my men with all necessary equipments
for the campaign, and to fill up the ranks by calling in all
absentees. It was a refreshing sight to see the changed aspect
and feeling of the gallant little army as it marched with full
ranks and complete equipment, newly clad, from Knoxville toward
Dalton.
My next thought was to win the respect and confidence of my men.
An opportunity to do this was speedily afforded in the delicate
operations in front of Dalton. The result may perhaps be fairly
expressed in the words of an old soldier who was overhead to say
as I passed his regiment that day under fire: "It is all right,
boys; I like the way the old man chaws his tobacco." From that
day forward I felt that the Twenty-third Corps confided in me as
I did in them. I never had any doubt they would do just what I
expected them to do, and would take it for granted that it was "all
right."
It is with greatest pleasure that I record here the just tribute
paid to that splendid body of men by General Sherman about the
close of the Atlanta campaign: "The Twenty-third Corps never failed
to do all that was expected of it."
COMMENTS ON SHERMAN'S "MEMOIRS"
And it is with equal pleasure that I record the just and generous
treatment shown by General Sherman toward me from the beginning of
that campaign. Although much my senior in years, experience, and
reputation, he never showed that he was aware of it, but always
treated me as his peer. In his official reports and his memoirs
he has never been unkind or unjust, though it has never been his
habit to bestow much praise on individuals, or to think much of
the rewards due his subordinates, generally giving credit as justly
due to troops rather than to commanders. It would be impossible
for me not to cherish feelings of strong affection for my old
commander, as well as the profound respect due his character as a
man and solider, and his brilliant genius.
If anything I may say in criticism of General Sherman's acts or
words shall seem unkind or be considered unjust, I can only disclaim
any such feeling, and freely admit that it would be wholly unworthy
of the relations that always existed between us. I write not for
the present, but for the future, and my only wish is to represent
the truth as it appears to me. If I fail to see it clearly, I do
but condemn myself. History will do impartial justice. Having
been in a subordinate position in the campaigns of 1864 in Georgia
and Tennessee, I shall not attempt to write a full account of those
campaigns, but shall limit myself to such comments as seem to me
to be called upon the already published histories of those
campaigns.
In estimating the merits of Sherman's "Memoirs,"( 1) it should be
remembered that he does not, and does not claim to, occupy the
position of a disinterested, impartial historian. He writes, not
for the purpose of doing equal and exact justice to all actors in
a great historical drama, but for the purpose of elucidating his
own acts and motives, and vindicating himself against the harsh
criticism and censure which have followed some of his most important
transactions. However unconscious General Sherman himself may have
been of the influence of such motives, their existence was natural,
even inevitable, and they have manifestly given their coloring to
all of the memoirs. This should not occasion surprise, nor even
regret, much less be held to justify unkind criticism. It is
desirable for the future historian to have the view of the chief
actor in any portion of history taken from his own standpoint. It
is only by a critical, laborious and honest comparison of this view
with those of other actors and eye-witnesses that impartial history
may ultimately be written.
My present purpose is simply to direct attention to some points in
the history of those campaigns of General Sherman in which I was
one of his principal subordinates, upon which the views of others
were at the time, or have since been, different from his own. In
what I have to say the motive of self-vindication can have little
or no influence; for, with some unimportant exceptions, General
Sherman does relatively full justice to me and to the little army
which I had the honor to command. I shall speak mainly of the acts
of others, especially the noble dead.
FAULTY ORGANIZATION OF SHERMAN'S ARMY
I must preface my remarks by observing that the organization of
Sherman's army during the Atlanta campaign was extremely faulty,
in that the three grand divisions were very unequal in strength,
the Army of the Cumberland having nearly _five times_ the infantry
strength of the Army of the Ohio, and more than twice that of the
Army of the Tennessee, even after the junction of Blair's corps.
The cavalry, of which two divisions belonged to the Army of the
Ohio, always acted either under the direct orders of General Sherman
or of the nearest army commander, according to the flank on which
it was operating. This inequality resulted from the fact that
Sherman's army was composed of three separate armies, or such
portions of them as could be spared from their several departments,
united for that campaign. General Thomas was, naturally enough,
disinclined to part with any of his troops, and the troops did not
wish to be separated from the old army in which they had won so
much honor, nor from the commander whom they revered. Besides,
General Thomas had had much greater experience in the command of
troops in the field than I, and General Sherman, if he thought of
it at all, may well have doubted the wisdom of diminishing the
command of the one to increase that of the other. I do not know
whether this matter was discussed at all before the opening of the
campaign, certainly not by me, who would have been restrained by
motives of delicacy, if by no other, from mentioning it. But in
fact my ambition was then limited to fighting well and successfully
with the single corps under my command. It was only after experience
had drawn attention more pointedly to the evils resulting from
faulty organization, and success had inspired legitimate confidence,
that this subject became matter of much thought and some discussion.
But this faulty organization continued to the end of the Atlanta
campaign, and was, as I think will clearly appear, one of the causes
of many of the partial failures or imperfect successes that
characterized our operations. General Thomas's command often proved
unwieldy and slow from being larger than one man could handle in
a rough and in many places densely wooded country, while the others
were frequently too small for the work to be done. It was often
attempted to remedy this defect by ordering a division or corps of
the Army of the Cumberland to "co-operate with" or "support" one
of the others in making an attack; but military experience has
shown that "co-operate" and "support" mean, in general, to do
nothing effective. The corps commanders, generally, not being in
the habit of acting independently, and not being in direct
communication with the general-in-chief, and hence not familiar
with his plans and views, would not act with the necessary promptness
or vigor; and not regarding themselves as absolutely under the
orders of the general they were directed to support, they would
not obey his orders or requests unless they were in accord with
their own views; while one of these corps commanders, General
Sherman says, manifested an ambition to get one of the separate
armies under his command and win a victory on his "own hook." But
General Sherman fails to state that he encouraged all this by his
own now well-known erroneous opinion upon the question of the
relative rank of army and corps commanders; that this vital question
was evaded until its decision in a special case--that of Stanley
and Schofield--became absolutely necessary, and was then decided
erroneously, the error resulting in failure and great disappointment
to Sherman. Had this question been decided at an early day according
to the plain import of the law, as was afterward done by the War
Department, and orders given to corps commanders to obey instead
of "co-operate" or "support," much trouble would have been avoided.
First among the most important events of the Atlanta campaign were
the operations about Dalton and Resaca. Here I have always thought
General Sherman committed the mistake, so common in war (and, as
I believe, not infrequently afterward committed by himself and
others in the Union armies), of assigning to too small a force the
main attack upon the vital point of an enemy's position. McPherson
had only about 22,000 infantry, while Sherman estimated Johnston's
force at about 60,000. Thomas's position in front of Rocky-face
Ridge was virtually as unassailable as that of Johnston behind it.
The only weak point of our position was that of two divisions of
the Twenty-third Corps on our left, north of Dalton. Had those
divisions been attacked, as Sherman apprehended, they might have
suffered severely, but would have drawn off force enough from the
enemy to increase largely the probabilities of success in the attack
in Johnston's rear. One half of Sherman's infantry was ample for
the demonstration in front of Dalton. At least one half should
have been sent through Snake Creek Gap to strike the enemy's rear.
There was no necessity to attack Resaca at all, and experience has
shown what terrible losses a small force in a strongly fortified
position may inflict upon a very large attacking force. Two or
three brigades could have invested Resaca, with the garrison it
then held, while a force large enough to hold its ground against
Johnston's whole army could have been put upon the railroad between
Resaca and Dalton. The result would then, in all probability, have
been what Sherman expected. Indeed, the fate of Johnston's army
might perhaps have been decided then and there.
McPHERSON'S TASK AT RESACA
Sherman certainly cannot be suspected of wishing to do injustice
to the memory of McPherson, for he loved and respected him most
highly, and mourned his death with evident sincerity. But I think
he is in error in saying that "at the critical moment McPherson
seems to have been a little timid." I believe the error was
Sherman's, not McPherson's; that McPherson was correct in his
judgment, which certainly was mine (after passing over the same
ground and fighting the battle of Resaca), that his force was
entirely too small for the work assigned it. I had not the same
opportunity General Sherman had of judging of McPherson's qualities
as a commander; but I knew him well and intimately, having sat upon
the same bench with him at West Point for four years, and been his
room-mate for a year and a half. His was the most completely
balanced mind and character with which I have ever been intimately
acquainted, although he did not possess in a very high degree the
power of invention or originality of thought. His personal courage
seemed to amount to unconsciousness of danger, while his care of
his troops cannot, I believe, be justly characterized otherwise
than as wise prudence. I consider this to be only a just tribute
to the memory of the nearest and dearest friend of my youth.
If McPherson had commanded one third of the army, he might, with
a corps of Thomas's army in close support, have felt strong enough
to occupy and hold a position between Dalton and Resaca. As it
was, Thomas should have followed close upon his rear through Snake
Creek Gap, with two corps. The distance between the two wings of
the army would have been so short and the ground between them so
impassable to the enemy as to give us practically a continuous line
of battle, and Thomas's two corps in the valley of the Connasauga
near Tilton would have been in far better position to strike the
retreating enemy when he was compelled to let go of Dalton, than
they were in front of Rocky-face Ridge. Impartial history must,
I believe, hold Sherman himself mainly responsible for the failure
to realize his expectations in the first movement against Johnston.
MCPHERSON'S TASK AT RESACA
It seems at least probable that at the beginning of the movement
against Dalton, Sherman did not fully understand the character of
the enemy's position; for his plan clearly appears to have been to
make the main attack in front at the moment Johnston should be
compelled to let go from his stronghold by reason of McPherson's
operations in his rear; while McPherson, after breaking the railroad
and then falling back for security to the Gap, should strike Johnston
in flank during the confusion of retreat.
The nature of the position rendered this plan impracticable for
producing any important result. Had McPherson broken the road ever
so "good" and then fallen back to the Gap as ordered, Johnston
could have moved his main army to Resaca that night, and at daylight
the next morning Sherman would have found in the enemy's trenches
at Dalton only a skirmish-line which would have leisurely retreated
before him to the new position at Resaca. The result would have
been essentially the same as that which was actually accomplished.
Indeed, as it now seems clearly to appear to General Sherman, the
only possible mode of striking an effective blow at Dalton was to
capture Resaca or seize and hold a point on the road in rear of
Dalton, and _not_ to break the road and fall back as McPherson was
ordered to do. If Sherman had seen this clearly at the time, it
is inconceivable that he would have sent less than one fourth of
his army to execute the all-important part of the plan. And now
he judges McPherson as manifesting timidity ( 2) because he did
not at the critical moment attempt to accomplish, with his
comparatively small force, what Sherman should have ordered to be
done by a much larger force.
A very bold, independent commander might have attempted, whether
successful or not, what Sherman thinks McPherson ought to have done
at Resaca; and, as Sherman says, such an opportunity does not occur
twice in the life of any man. But McPherson was a subordinate in
spirit as well as in fact, and cannot fairly be charged with timidity
for not attempting what he was not ordered to do, and what, in
fact, was no part of the plans of his superior so far as they were
indicated in his orders.
If McPherson had assaulted Resaca, it is possible, but only possible,
that he might have succeeded. There were some cases during the
Civil War where intrenchments hastily constructed and imperfectly
defended were carried by assault; many more where the assault
failed; and, I believe, not one case where intrenchments carefully
prepared in advance, with obstructions in front, and defended by
a force commensurate with the extent of the line, like those at
Resaca, were successfully assaulted.
It is true that McPherson's force was vastly superior to the single
brigade that held Resaca that day, but that practically amounts to
nothing. A single division would have been as good for such an
assault as two corps. Beyond a reasonable proportion, say of three
or four to one, numbers amount to nothing in making such an assault.
It would be physically possible for numbers to succeed in such a
case if their immediate commander was willing to sacrifice them
and they _were willing to be sacrificed_. But considering the
general unwillingness among commanders and men to sacrifice or to
be sacrificed beyond what seems to them a reasonable expenditure
of life for the object to be gained, success is _morally_ impossible,
or very nearly so, in an assault such as would have been required
to capture Resaca on May 9, 1864. Clearly, such an assault should
not be attempted except as the only chance of victory; and then
the subordinate officers and men should be clearly informed precisely
what they are expected to do, and made to understand the necessity
for so great and unusual a sacrifice. In that case, brave and true
men will make the sacrifice required, provided their pluck holds
out long enough; and that no man is wise enough to predict, even
of himself, much less of a large number of men.
McPHERSON'S TASK AT RESACA
The only chance of success was to invest Resaca on the west and
north, and put between the investing line and Dalton troops enough
to hold their ground against the main body of Johnston's army; and
this must have been done in a single day, starting from the débouché
of Snake Creek Gap, the troops moving by a single, common country
road. Johnston's whole army, except a small rear-guard, would by
the use of three roads have been in position to attack McPherson
at dawn of day the next morning, while the main body of Sherman's
army was far away on the other side of Rocky-face. Or if McPherson
had not held the entire natural position as far east as the Connasauga
River, Johnston could have passed round him in the night. It seems
to me certain that McPherson's force was too small to have taken
and held that position. Indeed it does not seem at all certain
that, however large his force might have been, he could have put
troops enough in position before night to accomplish the object of
cutting of Johnston's retreat. The case was analogous to that of
Hood's crossing Duck River in November of that year, and trying to
cut off our retreat at Spring Hill. There was simply not time
enough to do it in that one day, and if not done in one day it
could not be done at all.
So that it does not seem at all certain that this, which was
"Thomas's plan" to throw the entire Army of the Cumberland on the
road in Johnston's rear and thus cut off his retreat, would have
succeeded any better than Sherman's, yet it gave greater promise
of success, and therefore ought to have been tried. It is at least
probable that Johnston's view of the case (see his "Narrative,"
pages 15, 16, 17) is the correct one: That, with his thorough
knowledge of the ground, ample roads, and means of early information,
together with our ignorance of the ground and our extremely deficient
roads, he could have defeated any possible attempt to cut him off
from Resaca.
To illustrate the faulty system of organization and command which
characterized the Atlanta campaign, I will now refer to an incident
of the operations about Dallas, it being next in order of date of
those I wish to consider. General Sherman does not allude to it
at all in his "Memoirs."
Near the close of the operations about Dallas, the Twenty-third
Corps was moved to our left, under instructions from General Sherman
to endeavor to strike the enemy's right flank. A division of the
Army of the Cumberland was ordered to "support" the Twenty-third
Corps. There were no roads available, and the country was in the
main densely wooded. The head of the column was directed by the
compass toward a point where our maps, the general topography of
the country, and the enemy's known position indicated that his
right must probably rest. After a laborious march through dense
undergrowth, during which our skirmish-line was lost in the woods
and another deployed to replace it, we struck an intrenched line
strongly held, and a sharp action ensued. The Twenty-third Corps
was deployed as far to the left as possible, and the skirmishers
reported that they had reached the extremity of the enemy's intrenched
line, but could not overlap it. At this moment the division of
the Army of the Cumberland came up in splendid style, and _massed_
immediately in the rear of our left, in "close supporting distance,"
and under a pretty heavy fire. I first sent a staff officer and
then went myself to the division commander, explained the situation,
and asked him to put in a brigade on my left and turn the enemy's
flank so as to give us a footing beyond his parapet. He replied
that he was ordered by General Thomas only to "support" me, and
that he would do no more. The day was already far advanced, and
before I could bring troops from another part of my line darkness
came on, and the action ended for the day. By the next morning I
had brought another division of the Twenty-third Corps to the flank,
and General Sherman arrived on the ground. By his personal orders
this division was pushed straight through the woods to a point in
the enemy's rear, on the road leading from Dallas to Acworth, which
point it reached without any opposition, and there intrenched.
That night Johnston abandoned his lines. An inspection of the
enemy's intrenchments demonstrated that our skirmishers were right,
and that a single brigade on our left would have been ample to turn
the enemy's flank and open the way to victory. The above facts
were immediately reported to Sherman and Thomas. I do now know
what action, if any, was taken upon them.
EXAMPLE OF THE WORKING OF A FAULTY SYSTEM
I refer to this incident, not as especially affecting the military
reputation of any officer one way or the other, but to illustrate
the working of a faulty system. Under proper organization and
discipline, any division commander could hardly have failed with
that fine division to do all that was desired of him that day. I
believe that division commander's commission as major-general of
volunteers was anterior in date to mine, and he, no doubt, with
General Sherman and some others, thought he was not subject to my
orders.
[( 1) The following was written in 1875, soon after the appearance
of the first edition.]
[( 2) In the revised edition, Vol. II, p. 34, General Sherman
substitutes "cautious" for "timid."]