extraordinary heroism in the line of their profession, may be
promoted to forward warrant officers, or acting master's mates,
as they may be best qualified, upon the recommendation of their
commanding officer, approved by the flag officer and the
department. Upon such promotion they shall receive a gratuity of
$100 and a medal of honor to be prepared by the Navy Department.
Approved July 16, 1862.
No. 72. (p. 368)
PLATE LXXII b.
_July 12, 1862, and March 3, 1863._
ARMY MEDAL OF HONOR.
A five-pointed star, tipped with trefoils, each point containing a
crown of laurel and oak; in the middle, within a circle of thirty-four
stars, America, personified as Minerva, stands with her left hand
resting on the fasces, while with her right, in which she holds a
shield blazoned with the American arms, she repulses Discord,
represented with two snakes in each hand; the whole suspended by a
trophy of two crossed cannons, balls, and a sword, surmounted by the
American eagle, which is united by a ribbon of thirteen stripes,
paleways, gules and argent, and a chief, azure, to a clasp composed of
two cornucopias and the American arms. On the platform: PAQUET. F.
(_fecit_).
_____
ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS.
_Resolution and Act of Congress Instituting Army Medals of Honor._
_Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled_: That the
President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized
to cause 2,000 "medals of honor" to be prepared with suitable
emblematic devices, and to direct that the same be presented, in
the name of Congress, to such non-commissioned officers and
privates as shall most distinguish themselves by their gallantry
in action, and other soldier-like qualities during the present
insurrection, and that the sum of $10,000 be, and the same is
hereby, appropriated for the purpose of carrying this resolution
into effect.
Approved July 12th, 1862.
SECTION 9. _And be it further enacted_, That the President (p. 369)
cause to be struck from the dies recently prepared at the
United States Mint for that purpose, "medals of honor"
additional to those authorized by the act (Resolution of July
twelfth, eighteen hundred and sixty-two), and present the same to
such officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates as have
most distinguished or who may hereafter most distinguish
themselves in action, and the sum of $20,000 is hereby
appropriated out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, to defray the expenses of the same.
Approved March 3d, 1863.
No. 73. (p. 370)
PLATE LXXIII.
_February 16, 1862, July 4 and November 25, 1863._
Major General Ulysses S Grant. Joint resolution of Congress
December 17, 1863. [Rx]. Donelson. Vicksburg, etc.
MAJOR-GENERAL ULYSSES SIMPSON GRANT.
[_Victories of Fort Donelson, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga._]
MAJOR GENERAL ULYSSES S. (_Simpson_) GRANT. JOINT RESOLUTION OF
CONGRESS DECEMBER 17. 1863. Bust of General Grant, in uniform, facing
the left. In the upper part of a circle, branches of laurel and oak;
in the lower part, sugarcane, the cotton plant, tobacco leaves and
wheat, united by the national flag; in a second circle, thirteen
stars, emblematical of the thirteen original States of the Union.
ANTROBUS. D. (_delineavit._) PAQUET. F. (_fecit_).
America, personified as a maiden, is seated on a rainbow, with the
eagle at her side. She holds in her left hand a cornucopia of flowers,
and in her right a crown of laurel and the American shield, on which,
in bend, is the word DONELSON. Below, dividing the medal into two
parts, is a trophy of arms, surmounted by the cap of liberty, and
protected by two sentinels kneeling; to the left is the city of
Vicksburg, at the foot of which flows the Mississippi river, bearing
two steamboats; VICKSBURG; to the right are Lookout Mountain and
Missionary Ridge; the Federal army encamped on the banks of the
Tennessee river; CHATTANOOGA. In a first circle the Mississippi river,
on which are four steamers, two of which are gunboats; MISSISSIPPI
RIVER; in a second, thirteen stars--emblematical of the thirteen
original States of the Union.[117]
[Footnote 117: See INTRODUCTION, page viii.]
ANTROBUS, who designed the medal to General Grant, was living in (p. 371)
Iowa in 1870.
ULYSSES SIMPSON GRANT was born at Point Pleasant, Clermont County,
Ohio, April 27, 1822. He was graduated at West Point as second
lieutenant in the 4th infantry, July 1, 1843, and served under General
Taylor at Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, and Monterey, and in all
General Scott's battles, from Vera Cruz to the City of Mexico. He was
breveted first lieutenant at Molinos del Rey, and captain at
Chapultepec, for gallantry in the field. He resigned in 1854, and in
the early part of 1860 removed to Galena, Illinois. In the Civil War
he entered the service as colonel of the 21st Illinois Volunteers,
May, 1861. As brigadier-general of volunteers he fought the battle of
Belmont, November 7, of the same year; captured Fort Donelson,
February 16, 1862, for which he was appointed, on the same day,
major-general of volunteers; and won the battle of Shiloh, April 6 and
7, 1862. He took Vicksburg, and was made major-general in the United
States Army, July 4, 1863; won the battle of Chattanooga, November 25,
same year, and was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general. He
became commander-in-chief of the army, March 17, 1864; fought the
battles of the Wilderness, in May, and besieged Richmond, 1864-1865.
He received Lee's surrender at Appomattox Court House, April 9, 1865.
Congress gave him a vote of thanks and a gold medal for Fort Donelson,
Vicksburg, and Chattanooga, December 17, 1863. In July, 1866, he was
made general; acted as secretary of War _ad interim_ (12 August, 1867,
February, 1868); President of the United States (first term),
1869-1873; (second term), 1873-1877.
_____
ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS.
_Resolutions of Congress Voting a Medal to General Grant._
_Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled_: That the thanks
of Congress be, and they hereby are, presented to Major-General
Ulysses S. Grant, and through him to the officers and soldiers
who have fought under his command during the rebellion, for their
gallantry and good conduct in the battles in which they have been
engaged; and that the President of the United States be (p. 372)
requested to cause a gold medal to be struck, with suitable
emblems, devices and inscriptions, to be presented to
Major-General Grant.
SECTION 2. _And be it further resolved_, That, when the said
medal shall have been struck, the President shall cause a copy of
this joint resolution to be engrossed on parchment, and shall
transmit the same, together with the said medal, to Major-General
Grant, to be presented to him in the name of the people of the
United States of America.
SECTION 3. _And be it further resolved_, That a sufficient sum of
money to carry this resolution into effect is hereby appropriated
out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated.
Approved December 17, 1863.
_____
_General Grant to General Cullum._
Headquarters, District of West Tennessee,
To Fort Donelson, February 16th, 1862.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL GEORGE W. CULLUM,
Chief of Staff, Department of the Missouri.
General: I am pleased to announce to you the unconditional
surrender, this morning, of Fort Donelson, with twelve to fifteen
thousand prisoners, at least forty pieces of artillery, and a
large amount of stores, horses, mules, and other public property.
I left Fort Henry on the 12th instant, with a force of about
fifteen thousand men, divided into two divisions, under the
command of Generals McClernand and Smith. Six regiments were sent
around by water the day before, convoyed by a gunboat (or boats),
and with instructions not to pass it.
The troops made the march in good order, the head of the column
arriving within two miles of the fort at twelve o'clock, m. At
this point the enemy's pickets were met and driven in. The
fortifications of the enemy were from this point gradually
approached and surrounded, with occasional skirmishing on the
line. The following day, owing to the non-arrival of the gunboats
and re-enforcements sent by water, no attack was made, but the
investment was extended on the flanks of the enemy, and drawn
closer to his works, with skirmishing all day. On the evening of
the 13th, the gunboats and re-enforcements arrived. On the 14th a
gallant attack was made by flag-officer Foote upon the enemy's
river batteries with his fleet.
The engagement lasted probably one hour and a half, and bid fair
to result favorably, when two unlucky shots disabled two of the
armed boats, so that they were carried back by the current. The
remaining two were very much disabled also, having received a
number of heavy shots about the pilot-houses and other parts of
the vessels. After these mishaps, I concluded to make the
investment of Fort Donelson as perfect as possible, and partially
fortify, and await repairs to the gunboats. This plan was
frustrated, however, by the enemy making a most vigorous attack
upon our right wing, commanded by Brigadier-General J. A. (p. 373)
McClernand, and which consisted of his division and a portion
of the force under General L. Wallace.
The enemy were repelled, after a closely contested battle of
several hours, in which our loss was heavy. The officers suffered
out of proportion. I have not the means of determining our loss,
even approximately, but it cannot fall far short of twelve
hundred killed, wounded and missing. I shall retain here enough
of the enemy to exchange for them, as they were immediately
shipped off, and not left for recapture.
About the close of this action the ammunition and cartridge boxes
gave out, which, with the loss of many of the field officers,
produced great confusion in the ranks. Seeing that the enemy did
not take advantage of it, convinced me that equal confusion, and,
consequently, great demoralization existed with him. Taking
advantage of this fact, I ordered a charge upon our left (enemy's
right) with the division under General C. F. Smith, which was
most brilliantly executed, and gave to our arms full assurance of
victory. The battle lasted until dark, and gave us possession of
part of the intrenchment. An attack was ordered from the flank
after the charge by General Smith was commenced, by the divisions
under McClernand and Wallace, which, notwithstanding hours of
exposure to a heavy fire in the fore part of the day, was
gallantly made, and the enemy further repulsed. At the points
thus gained, night having come on, all the troops encamped for
the night, feeling that a complete victory would crown their
efforts at an early hour in the morning. This morning, at a very
early hour, a note was received from General Buckner, under a
flag of truce, proposing an armistice. A copy of the
correspondence which ensued is herewith enclosed.
I could mention individuals who especially distinguished
themselves, but will leave this to division and brigade
commanders, whose reports will be forwarded as soon as received.
Of the division commanders, however, Generals Smith, McClernand
and Wallace, I must do the justice to say that all of them were
with their commands in the midst of danger, and were always ready
to execute all orders, no matter what the exposure to themselves.
At the hour the attack was made on General McClernand's command,
I was absent, having received a note from flag officer Foote,
requesting me to go and see him, he being unable to call on me,
in consequence of a wound received the day before.
My staff: Colonel J. D. Webster, first Illinois artillery, chief
of staff; Captain J. A. Rawlins, assistant adjutant-general;
first lieutenants C. B. Lagone and William S. Hillyer, aids; and
Lieutenant Colonel J. B. McPherson, chief engineer and Colonel
John Riggin, junior, volunteer aid, are all deserving of personal
mention for their gallantry and services.
For details, see reports of engineers, medical director and
commanders of divisions and brigades to follow.
I have the honor to be, General, very respectfully your obedient
servant,
U. S. GRANT,
_Brigadier-General U. S. A._, _commanding_.
_____
[Copy.] (p. 374)
_General Buckner to General Grant._
Headquarters, Fort Donelson,
To February 16th, 1862.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL U.S. GRANT,
Commanding United States Forces near Fort Donelson.
Sir: In consideration of all the circumstances governing the
present situation of affairs at this station, I propose to the
commanding officer of the Federal forces the appointment of
commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces
and post under my command, and in that view suggest an armistice
until twelve o'clock to-day.
I am, Sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. B. BUCKNER,
_Brigadier-General C. S. A._
_____
[Copy.]
_General Grant to General Buckner._
Headquarters, Army in the Field,
To Fort Donelson, February 16th, 1862.
GENERAL S. B. BUCKNER,
Confederate Army.
Sir: Yours of this date proposing armistice and appointment of
commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received.
No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be
accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works.
I am, Sir, very respectfully your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT,
_Brigadier-General commanding_.
_____
[Copy.]
_General Buckner to General Grant._
Headquarters, Dover, Tennessee,
To February 16th, 1862.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL GRANT,
United States Army.
Sir: The distribution of the forces under my command, incident to
an unexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming force
under your command, compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant
success of the Confederate arms yesterday, to accept the
ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you propose.
I am, Sir, your very obedient servant,
S. B. BUCKNER,
_General commanding C. S. A._
_____
_General Orders No. 2._ (p. 375)
Headquarters, District of West Tennessee,
Fort Donelson, February 17th, 1862.
The general commanding takes great pleasure in congratulating the
troops of this command for the triumph over rebellion gained by
their valor on the 13th, 14th, and 15th instant.
For four successive nights, without shelter during the most
inclement weather known in this latitude, they faced an enemy in
large force in a position chosen by himself. Though strongly
fortified by nature, all the safeguards suggested by science were
added. Without a murmur this was borne, prepared at all times to
receive an attack, and with continuous skirmishing by day,
resulting ultimately in forcing the enemy to surrender without
conditions.
The victory achieved is not only great in breaking down
rebellion, but has secured the greatest number of prisoners of
war ever taken in one battle on this continent.
Fort Donelson will hereafter be marked in capitals on the maps of
our united country, and the men who fought the battle will live
in the memory of a grateful people.
U. S. GRANT,
_Major-General commanding_.
_____
_General Grant to the Assistant Adjutant-General._
To Headquarters, Department of the Tennessee,
COLONEL J. C. KELTON, Vicksburg, Mississippi, July 6, 1863
Assistant Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C.
Colonel: I have the honor to submit the following report of the
operations of the Army of the Tennessee, and co-operating forces,
from the date of my assuming the immediate command of the
expedition against Vicksburg, Mississippi, to the reduction of
that place.
From the moment of taking command in person I became satisfied
that Vicksburg could only be turned from the south side, and, in
accordance with this conviction, I prosecuted the work on the
canal, which had been located by Brigadier-General Williams,
across the peninsula, on the Louisiana side of the river, with
all vigor, hoping to make a channel which would pass transports
for moving the army and carrying supplies to the new base of
operations thus provided. The task was much more herculean than
it at first appeared, and was made much more so by the almost
continuous rains that fell during the whole of the time this work
was prosecuted. The river, too, continued to rise and make a
large expenditure of labor necessary to keep the water out of our
camps and the canal.
Finally, on the 8th of March, the rapid rise of the river (p. 376)
and the consequent great pressure upon the dam across the
canal, near the upper end, at the main Mississippi levee, caused
it to give way and let through the low lands at the back of our
camps a torrent of water that separated the north and south
shores of the peninsula as effectually as if the Mississippi
flowed between them. This occurred when the enterprise promised
success within a short time. There was some delay in trying to
repair damages. It was found, however, that with the then stage
of water, some other plan would have to be adopted for getting
below Vicksburg with transports.
Captain F. E. Prime, Chief Engineer, and Colonel G. G. Pride, who
was acting on my staff, prospected a route through the bayous
which run from near Milliken's Bend on the north and New Carthage
on the south, through Roundaway Bayou into the Tensas river.
Their report of the practicability of this route determined me to
commence work upon it. Having three dredge boats at the time, the
work of opening this work was executed with great rapidity. One
small steamer and a number of barges were taken through the
channel thus opened, but the river commencing about the middle of
April to fall rapidly, and the roads becoming passable between
Milliken's Bend and New Carthage, made it impracticable and
unnecessary to open water communication between these points.
Soon after commencing the first canal spoken of, I caused a
channel to be cut from the Mississippi river into Lake
Providence; also one from the Mississippi river into Coldwater,
by way of Yazoo Pass.
I had no great expectations of important results from the former
of these, but having more troops than could be employed to
advantage at Young's Point, and knowing that Lake Providence was
connected by Bayou Baxter with Bayou Macon, a navigable stream
through which transports might pass into the Mississippi below,
through Tensas, Wachita, and Red rivers, I thought it possible
that a route might be opened in that direction which would enable
me to co-operate with General Banks at Port Hudson.
By the Yazoo Pass route I only expected at first to get into the
Yazoo by way of Coldwater and Tallahatchie with some lighter
gunboats and a few troops and destroy the enemy's transports in
that stream and some gunboats which I knew he was building. The
navigation, however, proved so much better than had been expected
that I thought for a time of the possibility of making this the
route for obtaining a foothold on high land above Haines Bluff,
Mississippi, and small class steamers were accordingly ordered
for transporting an army that way. Major-General J. B. McPherson,
commanding seventeenth army corps, was directed to have his corps
in readiness to move by this route; and one division from each
the thirteenth and fifteenth corps were collected near the
entrance of the Pass to be added to his command. It soon became
evident that a sufficient number of boats of the right class
could not be obtained for the movement of more than one division.
Whilst my forces were opening one end of the Pass the enemy was
diligently closing the other end, and in this way succeeded in
gaining time to strongly fortify Greenwood, below the junction of
the Tallahatchie and Yallobusha. The advance of the expedition,
consisting of one division of McClernand's corps from Helena,
commanded by Brigadier-General L. F. Ross, and the 12th and 17th
regiments of Missouri infantry, from Sherman's corps, as (p. 377)
sharpshooters on the gunboats, succeeded in reaching Coldwater
on the 2d day of March, after much difficulty, and the partial
disabling of most of the boats. From the entrance into Coldwater
to Fort Pemberton, at Greenwood, Mississippi, no great difficulty
of navigation was experienced nor any interruption of magnitude
from the enemy. Fort Pemberton extends from the Tallahatchie to
the Yazoo at Greenwood. Here the two rivers come within a few
hundred yards of each other. The land around the fort is low, and
at the time of the attack was entirely overflowed. Owing to this
fact, no movement could be made by the army to reduce it, but all
depended upon the ability of the gunboats to silence the guns of
the enemy and enable the transports to run down and land troops
immediately on the fort itself. After an engagement of several
hours the gunboats drew off, being unable to silence the
batteries. Brigadier-General I. F. Quinby, commanding a division
of McPherson's corps, met the expedition under Ross with his
division on its return from Fort Pemberton, on the 21st of March,
and being the senior, assumed command of the entire expedition,
and returned to the position Ross had occupied.
On the 23d of March I sent orders for the withdrawal of all the
forces operating in that direction, for the purpose of
concentrating my army on Milliken's Bend.
On the 14th day of March, Admiral D. D. Porter, commanding
Mississippi squadron, informed me that he had made a
reconnoissance up Steele's Bayou, and partially through Black
Bayou toward Deer Creek, and so far as explored these water
courses were reported navigable for the smaller iron-clads.
Information given mostly, I believe, by the negroes of the
country, was to the effect that Deer Creek could be navigated to
Rolling Fork, and that from there through the Sunflower to the
Yazoo river there was no question about the navigation. On the
following morning I accompanied Admiral Porter in the ram Price,
several iron-clads preceding us, up through Steele's Bayou to
near Black Bayou.
At this time our forces were at a dead-lock at Greenwood, and I
looked upon the success of this enterprise as of vast importance.
It would, if successful, leave Greenwood between two forces of
ours, and would necessarily cause the immediate abandonment of
that stronghold.
About thirty steamers of the enemy would have been destroyed or
fallen into our hands. Seeing that the great obstacle to
navigation, so far as I had gone, was from overhanging trees, I
left Admiral Porter near Black Bayou and pushed back to Young's
Point for the purpose of sending forward a Pioneer corps to
remove these difficulties. Soon after my return to Young's Point
Admiral Porter sent back to me for a co-operating force. Sherman
was promptly sent with one division of his corps. The number of
steamers suitable for the navigation of these bayous being
limited, most of the force was sent up the Mississippi river to
Eagle's Bend, a point where the river runs within one mile of
Steele's Bayou, thus saving an important part of this difficult
navigation. The expedition failed, probably more from want of
knowledge as to what would be required to open this route than
from any impracticability in the navigation of the streams and
bayous through which it was proposed to pass. Want of this
knowledge led the expedition on until difficulties were
encountered, and then it would become necessary to send back to
Young's Point for the means of removing them. This gave the enemy
time to move forces to effectually checkmate further (p. 378)
progress, and the expedition was withdrawn when within a few
hundred yards of free and open navigation to the Yazoo.
All this may have been providential in driving us ultimately to a
line of operations which has proven eminently successful.
For further particulars of Steele's Bayou expedition see report
of Major-General W. T. Sherman, forwarded on the 12th of April.
As soon as I decided to open water communication from a point on
the Mississippi near Milliken's Bend to New Carthage I determined
to occupy the latter place, it being the first point below
Vicksburg that could be reached by land at the stage of water
then existing, and the occupancy of which, while it secured to us
a point on the Mississippi river, would also protect the main
line of communication by water. Accordingly the thirteenth army
corps, Major-General J. A. McClernand commanding, was directed to
take up its line of march on the 29th day of March for New
Carthage, the fifteenth and seventeenth corps to follow, moving
no faster than supplies and ammunition could be transported to
them.
The roads though level were intolerably bad, and the movement was
therefore necessarily slow. Arriving at Smith's Plantation, two
miles from New Carthage, it was found that the levee of Bayou
Vidal was broken in several places, thus leaving New Carthage an
island.
All the boats that could be were collected from the different
bayous in the vicinity, and others were built, but the
transportation of an army in this way was found exceedingly
tedious. Another route had to be found. This was done by making a
further march around Vidal to Perkins' Plantation, a distance of
twelve miles more, making the whole distance to be marched from
Milliken's Bend to reach water communication on the opposite side
of the point thirty-five miles. Over this distance, with bad
roads to contend against, supplies of ordnance stores and
provisions had to be hauled by wagons with which to commence the
campaign on the opposite side of the river.
At the same time that I ordered the occupation of New Carthage,
preparations were made for running transports by the Vicksburg
batteries with Admiral Porter's gunboat fleet.
On the night of the 16th of April Admiral Porter's fleet and the
transports Silver Wave, Forest Queen, and Henry Clay ran the
Vicksburg batteries. The boilers of the transports were protected
as well as possible with hay and cotton. More or less commissary
stores were put on each. All three of these boats were struck
more or less frequently while passing the enemy's batteries, and
the Henry Clay, by the explosion of a shell or by other means,
was set on fire and entirely consumed. The other two boats were
somewhat injured, but not seriously disabled. No one on board of
either was hurt.
As these boats succeeded in getting by so well, I ordered six
more to be prepared in like manner for running the batteries.
These latter, viz.: Tigress, Anglo-Saxon, Cheeseman, Empire City,
Horizonia, and Moderator, left Milliken's Bend on the night of
the 22d April, and five of them got by, but in a somewhat damaged
condition. The Tigress received a shot in her hull below the
water line, and sunk on the Louisiana shore soon after passing
the last of the batteries. The crews of these steamers, with (p. 379)
the exception of that of the Forest Queen, Captain D. Conway,
and the Silver Wave, Captain McMillan, were composed of
volunteers from the army. Upon the call for volunteers for this
dangerous enterprise, officers and men presented themselves by
hundreds, anxious to undertake the trip. The names of those whose
services were accepted will be given in a separate report.
It is a striking feature, so far as my observation goes, of the
present volunteer army of the United States, that there is
nothing which men are called upon to do, mechanical or
professional, that accomplished adepts cannot be found for the
duty required in almost every regiment.
The transports injured in running the blockade were repaired by
order of Admiral Porter, who was supplied with the material for
such repairs as they required, and who was and is ever ready to
afford all the assistance in his power for the furtherance of the
success of our arms. In a very short time five of the transports
were in running order, and the remainder were in a condition to
be used as barges in the moving of troops. Twelve barges loaded
with forage and rations were sent in tow of the last six boats
that run the blockade; one half of them got through in a
condition to be used.
Owing to the limited number of transports below Vicksburg it was
found necessary to extend our line of travel to Hard Times,
Louisiana, which, by the circuitous route it was necessary to
take, increased the distance to about seventy miles from
Milliken's Bend, our starting point.
The thirteenth army corps being all through to the Mississippi
and the seventeenth army corps well on the way, so much of the
thirteenth as could be got on board the transports and barges
were put aboard and moved to the front of Grand Gulf on the 29th
of April. The plan here was that the navy should silence the guns
of the enemy, and the troops land under cover of the gunboats and
carry the place by storm.
At 8 o'clock A.M. the navy made the attack, and kept it up for
more than five hours in the most gallant manner. From a tug out
in the stream I witnessed the whole engagement. Many times it
seemed to me the gunboats were within pistol-shot of the enemy's
batteries. It soon became evident that the guns of the enemy were
too elevated and their fortifications too strong to be taken from
the water side. The whole range of hills on that side were known
to be lined with rifle-pits, besides the field artillery could be
moved to any position where it could be made useful in case of an
attempt at landing. This determined me to again run the enemy's
batteries, turn his position by affecting a landing at Rodney, or
at Bruinsburg, between Grand Gulf and Rodney. Accordingly orders
were immediately given for the troops to debark at Hard Times,
Louisiana, and march across to the point immediately below Grand
Gulf. At dark the gunboats again engaged the batteries, and all
the transports run by, receiving but two or three shots in the
passage, and these without injury. I had some time previously
ordered a reconnoissance to a point opposite Bruinsburg, to
ascertain if possible from persons in the neighborhood the
character of the road leading to the highlands back of
Bruinsburg. During the night I learned from a negro man that
there was a good road from Bruinsburg to Port Gibson, which
determined me to land there.
The work of ferrying the troops to Bruinsburg was commenced (p. 380)
at daylight in the morning, the gunboats as well as transports
being used for the purpose.
As soon as the thirteenth army corps was landed, and could draw
three days' rations to put in haversacks (no wagons were allowed
to cross until the troops were all over) they were started on the
road to Port Gibson. I deemed it a matter of vast importance that
the highlands should be reached without resistance.
The seventeenth corps followed as rapidly as it could be put
across the river.
About 2 o'clock on the 1st of May, the advance of the enemy was
met eight miles from Bruinsburg, on the road to Port Gibson. He
was forced to fall back, but as it was dark, he was not pursued
far until daylight. Early on the morning of the 1st I went out,
accompanied by members of my staff, and found McClernand with his
corps engaging the enemy about four miles from Port Gibson. At
this point the roads branched in exactly opposite directions,
both, however, leading to Port Gibson. The enemy had taken
position on both branches, thus dividing as he fell back the
pursuing forces. The nature of the ground in that part of the
country is such that a very small force could retard the progress
of a much larger one for many hours. The roads usually run on
narrow, elevated ridges, with deep and impenetrable ravines on
either side. On the right were the divisions of Hovey, Carr, and
Smith, and on the left the division of Osterhaus, of McClernand's
corps. The three former succeeded in driving the enemy from
position to position back toward Port Gibson steadily all day.
Osterhaus did not, however, move the enemy from the position
occupied by him on our left until Logan's division of McPherson's
corps arrived.
McClernand, who was with the right in person, sent repeated
messages to me before the arrival of Logan to send Logan's and
Quinby's divisions of McPherson's corps to him.
I had been on that as well as all other parts of the field, and
could see how they could be used there to advantage. However, as
soon as the advance of McPherson's corps (Logan's division)
arrived, I sent one brigade to McClernand on the right, and sent
one brigade, Brigadier-General J. E. Smith commanding, to the
left to the assistance of Osterhaus.
By the judicious disposition made of this brigade, under the
immediate supervision of McPherson and Logan, a position was soon
obtained giving us an advantage which soon drove the enemy from
that part of the field, to make no further stand south of Bayou
Pierre.
The enemy was here repulsed with a heavy loss in killed, wounded,
and prisoners. The repulse of the enemy on our left took place
late in the afternoon. He was pursued toward Port Gibson, but
night closing in, and the enemy making the appearance of another
stand, the troops slept upon their arms until daylight.
In the morning it was found that the enemy had retreated across
Bayou Pierre, on the Grand Gulf road, and a brigade of Logan's
division was sent to divert his attention whilst a floating
bridge was being built across Bayou Pierre immediately at Port
Gibson. This bridge was completed, eight miles marched by
McPherson's corps to the north fork of Bayou Pierre, that stream
bridged, and the advance of this corps commenced passing over it
at 5 o'clock the following morning.
On the 3d the enemy was pursued to Hawkinson's Ferry, with (p. 381)
slight skirmishing all day, during which we took quite a
number of prisoners, mostly stragglers from the enemy.
Finding that Grand Gulf had been evacuated, and that the advance
of my forces was already fifteen miles out from there, and on the
road, too, they would have to take to reach either Vicksburg,
Jackson, or any intermediate point on the railroad between the
two places, I determined not to march them back, but taking a
small escort of cavalry, some fifteen or twenty men, I went to
the gulf myself, and made the necessary arrangements for changing
my base of supplies from Bruinsburg to Grand Gulf.
In moving from Milliken's Bend, the fifteenth army corps,
Major-General W. T. Sherman commanding, was left to be the last
to start. To prevent heavy re-enforcements going from Vicksburg
to the assistance of the Grand Gulf forces, I directed Sherman to
make a demonstration on Haines's Bluff, and to make all the
_show_ possible. From the information since received from
prisoners captured this ruse succeeded admirably.
It had been my intention, up to the time of crossing the
Mississippi river, to collect all my forces at Grand Gulf, and
get on hand a good supply of provisions and ordnance stores
before moving, and in the meantime to detach an army corps to
co-operate with General Banks on Port Hudson and effect a
junction of our forces.
About this time I received a letter from General Banks giving his
position west of the Mississippi river, and stating that he could
return to Baton Rouge by the 10th of May; that by the reduction
of Port Hudson he could join me with 12,000 men.
I learned about the same time that troops were expected at
Jackson from the southern cities with General Beauregard in
command. To delay until the 10th of May, and for the reduction of
Port Hudson after that, the accession of 12,000 men would not
leave me relatively so strong as to move promptly with what I
had. Information received from day to day of the movements of the
enemy also impelled me to the course pursued. Whilst lying at
Hawkinson's Ferry waiting for wagons, supplies, and Sherman's
corps, which had come forward in the mean time, demonstrations
were made, successfully, I believe, to induce the enemy to think
that route and the one by Hall's Ferry above were objects of much
solicitude to me. Reconnoissances were made to the west side of
the Big Black to within six miles of Warrenton. On the 7th of May
an advance was ordered, McPherson's corps keeping the road
nearest Black river to Rocky Springs, McClernand's corps keeping
the Ridge road, with his corps divided on the two roads. All the
ferries were closely guarded until our troops were well advanced.
It was my intention here to hug the Black river as closely as
possible, with McClernand's and Sherman's corps, and get them to
the railroad, at some place between Edward's Station and Bolton.
McPherson was to move by way of Utica to Raymond, and from there
into Jackson, destroying the railroad, telegraph, and public
stores, etc., and push west to rejoin the main force. Orders were
given to McPherson accordingly. Sherman was moved forward on the
Edward's Station road, crossing Fourteen Mile creek at Dillon's
Plantation; McClernand was moved across the same creek, further
west, sending one division of his corps by the Baldwin's Ferry
road as far as the river. At the crossing of Fourteen Mile (p. 382)
creek both McClernand and Sherman had considerable skirmishing
with the enemy to get possession of the crossing.
McPherson met the enemy near Raymond, two brigades strong under
Gregg and Walker, on the same day engaged him, and after several
hours hard fighting, drove him with heavy loss in killed,
wounded, and prisoners. Many threw down their arms and deserted.
My position at this time was with Sherman's corps, some seven
miles west of Raymond, and about the centre of the army.
On the night of the 12th of May, after orders had been given for
the corps of McClernand and Sherman to march toward the railroads
by parallel roads, the former in the direction of Edward's
Station and the latter to a point on the railroad between
Edward's Station and Bolton, the order was changed and both were
directed to move toward Raymond.
This was in consequence of the enemy having retreated toward
Jackson after his defeat at Raymond, and of information that
re-enforcements were daily arriving at Jackson, and that General
Joe Johnston was hourly expected there to take command in person.
I therefore determined to make sure of that place and leave no
enemy in my rear.
McPherson moved on the 13th to Clinton, destroyed the railroad
and telegraph, and captured some important despatches from
General Pemberton to General Gregg, who had commanded the day
before in the battle of Raymond. Sherman moved to a parallel
position on the Mississippi Springs and Jackson road; McClernand
moved to a point near Raymond.
The next day Sherman and McPherson moved their entire forces
toward Jackson. The rain fell in torrents all the night before,
and continued until about noon of that day making the roads at
first slippery and then miry, notwithstanding, the troops marched
in excellent order without straggling and in the best of spirits
about fourteen miles, and engaged the enemy about 12 o'clock, M.,
near Jackson. McClernand occupied Clinton with one division,
Mississippi Springs with another, Raymond with a third, and had
his fourth division and Blair's division of Sherman's corps with
a wagon train still in the rear near New Auburn, while McArthur
with one brigade of his division of McPherson's corps was moving
toward Raymond on the Utica road. It was not the intention to
move these forces any nearer Jackson, but to have them in a
position where they would be in supporting distance if the
resistance at Jackson should prove more obstinate than there
seemed reason to expect.
The enemy marched out the bulk of his force on the Clinton road
and engaged McPherson's corps about two and a half miles from the
city. A small force of artillery and infantry took a strong
position in front of Sherman, about the same distance out. By a
determined advance of our skirmishers these latter were soon
driven within their rifle-pits just outside the city. It was
impossible to ascertain the strength of the enemy at this part of
the line in time to justify an immediate assault; consequently
McPherson's two divisions engaged the main bulk of the rebel
garrison at Jackson, without further aid than the moral support
given them by the knowledge the enemy had a force to the south
side of the city and the few infantry and artillery of the enemy
posted there to impede Sherman's progress. Sherman soon
discovered the weakness of the enemy by sending a (p. 383)
reconnoitering party to his right, which also had the effect of
causing the enemy to retreat from this part of his line. A few of
the artillerists, however, remained in their places, firing upon
Sherman's troops, until the last moment, evidently instructed to
do so, with the expectation of being captured in the end. On
entering the city it was found that the main body of the enemy
had retreated north, after a heavy engagement of more than two
hours with McPherson's corps, in which he was badly beaten. He
was pursued until near night, but without further damage to him.
During that evening I learned that General Johnston, as soon as
he satisfied himself that Jackson was to be attacked, had ordered
Pemberton peremptorily to march out from the direction of
Vicksburg and attack our rear. Availing myself of this
information, I immediately issued orders to McClernand and Blair,
of Sherman's corps, to face their troops towards Bolton, with a
view of reaching Edward's Station, marching on different roads
converging near Bolton. These troops were admirably located for
such a move. McPherson was ordered to retrace his steps early in
the morning of the 15th on the Clinton road. Sherman was left in
Jackson to destroy the railroads, bridges, factories, workshops,
arsenals, and everything valuable for the support of the enemy.
This was accomplished in the most effectual manner.
On the afternoon of the 15th I proceeded as far west as Clinton,
through which place McPherson's corps passed to within supporting
distance of Hovey's division of McClernand's corps, which had
moved that day on the same road to within one and a half mile of
Bolton. On reaching Clinton, at 4.45 P.M., I ordered McClernand
to move his command early the next morning toward Edward's
Station, marching so as to feel the enemy, if he encountered him,
but not to bring on a general engagement unless he was confident
he was able to defeat him; and also to order Blair to move with
him.
About five o'clock on the morning of the 16th, two men, employees
on the Jackson and Vicksburg railroad, who had passed through
Pemberton's army the night before, were brought to my
headquarters. They stated Pemberton's force to consist of about
eighty regiments, with ten batteries of artillery, and that the
whole force was estimated by the enemy at about twenty-five
thousand men. From them I also learned the positions being taken
up by the enemy, and his intention of attacking our rear. I had
determined to leave one division of Sherman's corps one day
longer in Jackson, but this information determined me to bring
his entire command up at once, and I accordingly dispatched him
at 5.30 A.M. to move with all possible speed until he came up
with the main force near Bolton. My despatch reached him at 7.10
A.M., and his advance division was in motion in one hour from
that time. A despatch was sent to Blair at the same time, to push
forward his division in the direction of Edward's Station with
all possible dispatch. McClernand was directed to establish
communication between Blair and Osterhaus, of his corps, and keep
it up, moving the former to the support of the latter. McPherson
was ordered forward at 5.45 A.M. to join McClernand, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, of my staff, was sent forward to
communicate the information received, and with verbal
instructions to McClernand as to the disposition of his forces.
At an early hour I left for the advance, and on arriving at the
crossing of the Vicksburg and Jackson railroad with the road (p. 384)
from Raymond to Bolton, I found McPherson's advance and his
pioneer corps engaged in rebuilding a bridge on the former road
that had been destroyed by the cavalry of Osterhaus's division
that had gone into Bolton the night before. The train of Hovey's
division was at a halt, and blocked up the road from further
advance on the Vicksburg road. I ordered all quartermasters and
wagonmasters to draw their teams to one side and make room for
the passage of troops. McPherson was brought up by this road.
Passing to the front, I found Hovey's division of the thirteenth
army corps at a halt, with our skirmishers and the enemy's
pickets near each other. Hovey was bringing his troops into line,
ready for battle, and could have brought on an engagement at any
moment. The enemy had taken up a very strong position on a narrow
ridge, his left resting on a height where the road makes a sharp
turn to the left approaching Vicksburg. The top of the ridge and
the precipitous hill-side to the left of the road are covered by
a dense forest and undergrowth. To the right of the road the
timber extends a short distance down the hill, and then opens
into cultivated fields on a gentle slope and into a valley
extending for a considerable distance. On the road and into the
wooded ravine and hill-side Hovey's division was disposed for the
attack. McPherson's two divisions, all of his corps with him on
the march from Milliken's Bend (until Ransom's brigade arrived
that day after the battle), were thrown to the right of the road
properly speaking, the enemy's rear. But I would not permit an
attack to be commenced by our troops until I could hear from
McClernand, who was advancing with four divisions, two of them on
a road intersecting the Jackson road about one mile from where
the troops above described were placed, and about the centre of
the enemy's line; the other two divisions on a road still north
and nearly the same distance off.
I soon heard from McClernand, through members of his staff and my
own, whom I had sent to him early in the morning, and found that
by the nearest practicable route of communication he was two and
a half miles distant. I sent several successive messages to him
to push forward with all rapidity. There had been continuous
firing between Hovey's skirmishers and the rebel advance, which
by 11 o'clock grew into a battle. For some time this division
bore the brunt of the conflict, but finding the enemy too strong
for them, at the instance of Hovey I directed first one and then
a second brigade from Crocker's division to re-enforce him. All
this time Logan's division was working upon the enemy's left and
rear and weakened his front attack most wonderfully. The troops
here opposing us evidently far outnumbered ours. Expecting
McClernand momentarily with four divisions, including Blair's, I
never felt a doubt at the result. He did not arrive, however,
until the enemy had been driven from the field, after a terrible
contest of hours, with a heavy loss of killed, wounded and
prisoners, and a number of pieces of artillery. It was found
afterward that the Vicksburg road, after following the ridge in a
southerly direction for about one mile and to where it
intersected one of the Raymond roads, turns almost to the west,
down the hill and across the valley in which Logan was operating
on the rear of the enemy. One brigade of Logan's division had,
unconscious of this important fact, penetrated nearly to this
road and compelled the enemy to retreat to prevent capture. As it
was, much of his artillery and Loring's division of his army was
cut off, besides the prisoners captured. On the call of Hovey
for more re-enforcements, just before the rout of the enemy (p. 385)
commenced, I ordered McPherson to move what troops he could by a
left flank around to the enemy's front. Logan rode up at this
time and told me that if Hovey could make another dash at the
enemy he could come up from where he then was and capture the
greater part of their force. I immediately rode forward and found
the troops that had been so gallantly engaged for so many hours
withdrawn from their advanced position and were filling their
cartridge boxes. I directed them to use all dispatch and push
forward as soon as possible, explaining to them the position of
Logan's division. Proceeding still further forward, expecting
every moment to see the enemy, and reaching what had been his
line, I found he was retreating. Arriving at the Raymond road, I
saw to my left and on the next ridge a column of troops which
proved to be Can's division and McClernand with it in person; and
to the left of Carr, Osterhaus's division soon afterward appeared
with his skirmishers well in advance. I sent word to Osterhaus
that the enemy was in full retreat, and to push up with all
haste. The situation was soon explained, after which I ordered
Carr to pursue with all speed to Black river, and across it if he
could, and to Osterhaus to follow. Some of McPherson's troops had
already got into the road in advance, but having marched and
engaged the enemy all day they were fatigued, and gave the road
to Carr who continued the pursuit until after dark, capturing a
train of cars loaded with commissary and ordnance stores and
other property.
The delay in the advance of the troops immediately with
McClernand was caused, no doubt, by the enemy presenting a front
of artillery and infantry where it was impossible, from the
nature of the ground and the density of the forest, to discover
his numbers. As it was, the battle of Champion's Hill or Baker's
Creek was fought mainly by Hovey's division of McClernand's corps
and Logan's and Quinby's divisions (the latter commanded by
Brigadier-General M. M. Crocker) of McPherson's corps.
Ransom's brigade, of McPherson's corps, came on to the field
where the main battle had been fought immediately after the enemy
had begun his retreat.
Word was sent to Sherman, at Bolton, of the result of the day's
engagement, with directions to turn his corps toward Bridgeport,
and to Blair to join him at this latter place.
At daylight, on the 17th, the pursuit was renewed with
McClernand's corps in the advance. The enemy was found strongly
posted on both sides of the Black river. At this point, on Black
river, the bluffs extended to the water's edge on the west bank.
On the east side is an open, cultivated bottom of near one mile
in width, surrounded by a bayou of stagnant water, from two to
three feet in depth, and from ten to twenty feet in width, from
the river above the railroad to the river below. Following the
inside line of this bayou the enemy had constructed rifle-pits,
with the bayou to serve as a ditch on the outside and immediately
in front of them. Carr's division occupied the right in investing
this place, and Lawless brigade the right of his division. After
a few hours skirmishing Lawler discovered that by moving a
portion of his brigade under cover of the river bank he could get
a position from which that place could be successfully assaulted,
and ordered a charge accordingly. Notwithstanding the level
ground over which a portion of his troops had to pass without
cover, and the great obstacle of the ditch in front of the
enemy's works, the charge was gallantly and successfully (p. 386)
made, and in a few minutes the entire garrison with seventeen
pieces of artillery were the trophies of this brilliant and
daring movement. The enemy on the west bank of the river
immediately set fire to the railroad bridge and retreated, thus
cutting off all chance of escape for any portion of his forces
remaining on the east bank.
Sherman, by this time, had reached Bridgeport, on the Black river
above. The only pontoon train with the expedition was with him.
By the morning of the 18th he had crossed the river, and was
ready to march on Walnut Hills. McClernand and McPherson built
floating bridges during the night, and had them ready for
crossing their commands by 8 A.M. of the 18th.
The march was commenced by Sherman at an early hour by the
Bridgeport and Vicksburg road, turning to the right when within
three and a half miles of Vicksburg to get possession of Walnut
Hills and the Yazoo river. This was successfully accomplished
before the night of the 18th. McPherson crossed Black river above
the Jackson road, and came into the same road with Sherman, but
to his rear. He arrived after nightfall with his advance to where
Sherman turned to the right. McClernand moved by the Jackson and
Vicksburg road to Mount Albans, and there turned to the left to
get into Baldwin's Ferry road. By this disposition the three army
corps covered all the ground their strength would admit of, and
by the morning of the 19th the investment of Vicksburg was made
as complete as could be by the forces at my command.
During the day there was continuous skirmishing, and I was not
without hope of carrying the enemy's works. Relying upon the
demoralization of the enemy in consequence of repeated defeats
outside of Vicksburg, I ordered a general assault at 2 P.M. on
this day.
The fifteenth army corps, from having arrived in front of the
enemy's works in time on the 18th to get a good position, were
enabled to make a vigorous assault. The thirteenth and
seventeenth corps succeeded no further than to gain advanced
positions, covered from the fire of the enemy. The 20th and 21st
were spent in perfecting communications with our supplies. Most
of the troops had been marching and fighting battles for twenty
days, on an average of about five days' rations, drawn from the
commissary department. Though they had not suffered from short
rations up to this time, the want of bread to accompany the other
rations was beginning to be much felt. On the 21st my
arrangements for drawing supplies of every description being
complete, I determined to make another effort to carry Vicksburg
by assault. There were many reasons to determine me to adopt this
course. I believed an assault from the position gained by this
time could be made successfully. It was known that Johnston was
at Canton with the force taken by him from Jackson, re-enforced
by other troops from the east, and that more were daily reaching
him. With the force I had, a short time must have enabled him to
attack me in the rear, and possibly succeeded in raising the
siege. Possession of Vicksburg at that time would have enabled me
to have turned upon Johnston and driven him from the State, and
possess myself of all the railroads and practical military
highways, thus effectually securing to ourselves all territory
west of the Tombigbee, and this before the season was too far
advanced for campaigning in this latitude. I would have saved (p. 387)
government sending large re-enforcements much needed elsewhere;
and finally, the troops themselves were impatient to possess
Vicksburg, and would not have worked in the trenches with the
same zeal, believing it unnecessary, that they did after the
failure to carry the enemy's works. Accordingly on the 21st
orders were issued for a general assault on the whole line, to
commence at 11 A.M. on the 22d. All the corps commanders set
their time by mine, that there should be no difference between
them in movement of assault. Promptly at the hour designated, the
three army corps then in front of the enemy's works commenced the
assault. I had taken a commanding position near McPherson's
front, and from which I could see all the advancing columns from
his corps, and a part of each of Sherman's and McClernand's. A
portion of the commands of each succeeded in planting their flags
on the outer slopes of the enemy's bastions and maintained them
there until night. Each corps had many more men than could
possibly be used in the assault, over such ground as intervened
between them and the enemy. More men could only avail in case of
breaking through the enemy's line or in repelling a sortie. The
assault was gallant in the extreme on the part of all the troops,
but the enemy's position was too strong, both naturally and
artificially, to be taken in that way. At every point assaulted,
and at all of them at the same time, the enemy was able to show
all the force his works could cover. The assault failed, I regret
to say, with much loss on our side in killed and wounded, but
without weakening the confidence of the troops in their ability
to ultimately succeed.
No troops succeeded in entering any of the enemy's works with the
exception of Sergeant Griffith, of the 21st regiment Iowa
volunteers, and some eleven privates of the same regiment. Of
these none returned except the sergeant and possibly one man. The
work entered by him, from its position, could give us no
practical advantage, unless others to the right and left of it
were carried and held at the same time.
About 12 M., I received a despatch from McClernand that he was
hard pressed at several points, in reply to which I directed him
to re-enforce the points hard pressed from such troops as he had
that were not engaged. I then rode round to Sherman, and had just
reached there, when I received a second despatch from McClernand
stating positively and unequivocally that he was in possession of
and still held two of the enemy's forts; that the American flag
was then waved over them, and asking me to have Sherman and
McPherson make a diversion in his favor. This despatch I showed
to Sherman, who immediately ordered a renewal of the assault on
his front. I also sent a messenger to McClernand, directing him
to order up McArthur to his assistance, and started immediately
to the position I had just left on McPherson's line to convey to
him the information from McClernand by this last despatch, that
he might make the diversion requested. Before reaching McPherson
I met a messenger with a third despatch from McClernand, of which
the following is a copy:
Headquarters 13th Army Corps,
To In the Field near Vicksburg, Mississippi,
MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT. May 22d, 1863.
General: We have gained the enemy's intrenchments at several
points, but are brought to a stand. I have sent word to McArthur
to re-enforce me if he can. Would it not be best to (p. 388)
concentrate the whole or part of his command on this point?
John A. MCCLERNAND,
_Major-General commanding_.
P.S. I have received your despatch, my troops are all engaged,
and I cannot withdraw any to re-enforce others.
MCCLERNAND.
The position occupied by me during most of the time of the
assault gave me a better opportunity of seeing what was going on
in front of the thirteenth army corps than I believed it possible
for the commander of it to have. I could not see his possession
of forts, nor necessity for re-enforcements, as represented in
his despatches, up to the time I left it, which was between 12 M.
and 1 P.M., and I expressed doubts of their correctness, which
doubts the facts subsequently, but too late, confirmed. At the
time I could not disregard his reiterated statements, for they
might possibly be true; and that no possible opportunity of
carrying the enemy's stronghold should be allowed to escape
through fault of mine, I ordered Quinby's division, which was all
of McPherson's corps then present, but four brigades, to report
to McClernand, and notified him of the order. I showed his
despatches to McPherson, as I had to Sherman, to satisfy him of
the necessity of an active diversion on their part to hold as
much force in their fronts as possible. The diversion was
promptly and vigorously made and resulted in the increase of our
mortality list full fifty per cent., without advancing our
position or giving us other advantages.
About 3.50 P.M., I received McClernand's fourth despatch, as
follows:
To Headquarters 13th Army Corps,
MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, May 22, 1863.
Department of the Tennessee.
General: I have received your despatch in regard to General
Quinby's division and General McArthur's division. As soon as
they arrive I will press the enemy with all possible speed, and
doubt not I will force my way through. I have lost no ground. My
men are in two of the enemy's forts, but they are commanded by
rifle pits in the rear. Several prisoners have been taken who
intimate that the rear is strong. At this moment I am hard
pressed.
John A. MCCLERNAND,
_Major-General commanding_.
The assault of this day proved the quality of the soldiers of
this army. Without entire success, and with a heavy loss, there
was no murmuring or complaining, no falling back, nor other
evidence of demoralization.
After the failure of the 22d, I determined upon a regular siege.
The troops now being fully awake to the necessity of this worked
diligently and cheerfully. The work progressed rapidly and
satisfactorily until the 3d of July, when all was about ready for
a final assault.
There was a great scarcity of Engineer officers in the beginning,
but under the skillful superintendence of Captain F. E. Prime, of
the Engineer corps, Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, of my staff, (p. 389)
and Captain C. B. Comstock, of the Engineer corps, who joined
this command during the siege, such practical experience was
gained as would enable any division of this army hereafter to
conduct a siege with considerable skill in the absence of regular
Engineer officers.
On the afternoon of the 3d of July a letter was received from
Lieutenant-General Pemberton, commanding the Confederate forces
at Vicksburg, proposing an armistice and the appointment of
commissioners to arrange terms for the capitulation of the place.
The correspondence, copies of which are herewith transmitted,
resulted in the surrender of the city and garrison of Vicksburg
at 10 o'clock A.M., July 4, 1863, on the following terms: The
entire garrison, officers and men, were to be paroled, not to
take up arms against the United States until exchanged by the
proper authorities; officers and men each to be furnished with a
parole, signed by himself; officers to be allowed then side arms
and private baggage, and the field, staff and cavalry officers
one horse each; the rank and file to be allowed all their
clothing, but no other property; rations from their own stores
sufficient to last them beyond our lines; the necessary cooking
utensils for preparing their food; and thirty wagons to transport
such articles as could not well be carried. These terms I
regarded more favorable to the government than an unconditional
surrender. It saved us the transportation of them north, which at
that time would have been very difficult, owing to the limited
amount of river transportation on hand, and the expenses of
subsisting them. It left our army free to operate against
Johnston, who was threatening us from the direction of Jackson,
and our river transportation to be used for the movement of
troops to any point the exigency of the service might require.
I deem it proper to state here, in order that the correspondence
may be fully understood, that after my answer to General
Pemberton's letter of the morning of the 3d, we had a personal
interview on the subject of the capitulation.
The particulars and incidents of the siege will be contained in
the reports of division and corps commanders, which will be
forwarded as soon as received.
I brought forward during the siege, in addition to Lauman's
division and four regiments previously ordered from Memphis,
Smith's and Kimball's divisions of the sixteenth army corps, and
assigned Major-General C. C. Washburne to command of same. On the
11th of June, Major-General F. J. Herron's division from the
Department of the Missouri arrived; and on the 14th two divisions
of the ninth army corps, Major-General J. G. Parke commanding,
arrived. This increase in my force enabled me to make the
investment most complete, and at the same time left me a large
reserve to watch the movements of Johnston. Herron's division was
put into position on the extreme south of the city, and Lauman's
division was placed between Herron and McClernand. Smith's and
Kimball's divisions and Parke's corps were sent to Haines's
Bluff. This place I had fortified to the land side and every
preparation made to resist a heavy force. Johnston crossed Big
Black river with a portion of his force, and everything indicated
that he would make an attack about the 25th of June. Our position
in front of Vicksburg having been made as strong against a sortie
from the enemy as his works were against an assault, I placed
Major-General Sherman in command of all the troops designated
to look after Johnston. The force intended to operate against
Johnston, in addition to that at Haines's Bluff, was
one division from each of the thirteenth, fifteenth, and (p. 390)
seventeenth army corps and Lauman's division. Johnston, however,
not attacking, I determined to attack him the moment Vicksburg
was in our possession, and accordingly notified Sherman that I
should again make an assault on Vicksburg at daylight on the 6th,
and for him to have up supplies of all descriptions ready to move
upon receipt of orders if the assault should prove a success. His
preparations were immediately made, and when the place
surrendered on the 4th two days earlier than I fixed for the
attack, Sherman was found ready, and moved at once with a force
increased by the remainder of both the thirteenth and fifteenth
army corps, and is at present investing Jackson where Johnston
has made a stand.
In the march from Bruinsburg to Vicksburg, covering a period of
twenty days, before supplies could be obtained from government
stores, only five days' rations were issued, and three days' of
these were taken in haversacks at the start, and were soon
exhausted. All other subsistence was obtained from the country
through which we passed. The march was commenced without wagons,
except such as could be picked up through the country. The
country was abundantly supplied with corn, bacon, beef and
mutton. The troops enjoyed excellent health, and no army ever
appeared in better spirits or felt more confident of success.
In accordance with previous instructions, Major-General S. A.
Hurlbut started Colonel (now Brigadier-General) B. H. Grierson
with a cavalry force from La Grange, Tennessee, to make a raid
through the central portion of the State of Mississippi to
destroy railroads and other public property, for the purpose of
creating a diversion in favor of the army moving to the attack on
Vicksburg. On the 17th of April this expedition started, and
arrived at Baton Rouge on the 2d of May, having successfully
traversed the whole State of Mississippi. This expedition was
skillfully conducted and reflects great credit on Colonel
Grierson and all of his command. The notice given the raid by the
Southern press confirms our estimate of its importance. It has
been one of the most brilliant cavalry exploits of the war, and
will be handed down in history as an example to be imitated.
Colonel Grierson's report is herewith transmitted.
I cannot close this report without an expression of thankfulness
for my good fortune in being placed in co-operation with an
officer of the navy who accords to every move that seems for the
interest and success of our arms his hearty and energetic
support. Admiral Porter and the very efficient officers under him
have ever shown the greatest readiness in their co-operation, no
matter what was to be done or what risk to be taken, either by
their men or their vessels. Without this prompt and cordial
support my movements would have been much embarrassed, if not
wholly defeated.
Captain J. U. Shirk, commanding the Tuscumbia, was especially
active and deserving of the highest commendation for his personal
attention to the repairing of the damage done our transports by
the Vicksburg batteries.
The result of this campaign has been the defeat of the enemy in
five battles outside of Vicksburg; the occupation of Jackson, the
capital of the State of Mississippi, and the capture of Vicksburg
and its garrison and munitions of war; a loss to the enemy of
thirty-seven thousand (37,000) prisoners, among whom were fifteen
general officers; at least ten thousand men killed and (p. 391)
wounded, and among the killed Generals Tracy, Tilghman and Green,
and hundreds and perhaps thousands of stragglers, who can never
be collected and reorganized. Arms and munitions of war for an
army of sixty thousand men have fallen into our hands, besides a
large amount of other public property, consisting of railroads,
locomotives, cars, steamboats, cotton, &c., and much was
destroyed to prevent our capturing it.
Our loss in the series of battles may be summed up as follows:
Killed. Wounded. Missing.
Port Gibson 130 718 5
Fourteen Mile creek (skirmish) 4 24 --
Raymond 69 341 32
Jackson 40 240 6
Champion's Hill 426 1842 189
Big Black railroad bridge 29 242 2
Vicksburg 545 3688 303
Of the wounded many were but slightly wounded, and continued on
duty; many more required but a few days or weeks for their
recovery. Not more than one-half of the wounded were permanently
disabled.
My personal staff and chiefs of departments have in all cases
rendered prompt and efficient service.
In all former reports I have failed to make mention of company A,
4th regiment Illinois cavalry volunteers, Captain S. D. Osband
commanding. This company has been on duty with me as an escort
company since November, 1861, and in every engagement I have been
in since that time rendered valuable service, attracting general
attention for their exemplary conduct, soldierly bearings and
promptness. It would not be overstating the merits of this
company to say that many of them would fill with credit any
position in a cavalry regiment.
For the brilliant achievements recounted in this report, the Army
of the Tennessee, their comrades of the Ninth Army corps,
Herron's division of the Army of the Frontier, and the navy
co-operating with them, deserve the highest honors their country
can award.
I have the honor to be, Colonel, very respectfully your obedient
servant,
U. S. GRANT,
_Major-General United States Army_, _commanding_.
_____
_General Pemberton to General Grant._
To Headquarters, Vicksburg,
MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, July 3, 1863.
Commanding United States Forces before Vicksburg.
General: I have the honor to propose to you an armistice
for--hours, with a view of arranging terms for the capitulation
of Vicksburg. To this end, if agreeable to you, I will (p. 392)
appoint three commissioners to meet a like number to be named
by yourself at such place and hour to-day as you may find
convenient.
I make this proposition to save the further effusion of blood,
which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling
myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite
period.
This communication will be handed you under flag of truce by
Major-General J. S. Bowen.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. C. PEMBERTON,
_Lieutenant-General_.
_____
_General Grant to General Pemberton._
Headquarters, Department of the Tennessee,
To In the Field, near Vicksburg, Mississippi, July 3, 1863.
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL J. C. PEMBERTON,
Commanding Confederate Forces, Vicksburg, Mississippi.
General: Your note of this date is just received, proposing an
armistice for several hours for the purpose of arranging terms of
capitulation through commissioners to be appointed, etc.
The useless effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course
can be ended at any time you may choose by an unconditional
surrender of the city and garrison. Men who have shown so much
endurance and courage as those now in Vicksburg will always
challenge the respect of all adversaries, and I can assure you
will be treated with all respect due to prisoners of war.
I do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to
arrange terms of capitulation, because I have no terms other than
those indicated above.
I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT,
_Major-General_.
_____
_General Grant to General Pemberton._
Headquarters, Department of the Tennessee,
To Near Vicksburg, Mississippi, July 3, 1863.
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL J. C. PEMBERTON,
Commanding Confederate Forces, Vicksburg, Mississippi.
General: In conformity with agreement of this afternoon, I will
submit the following proposition for the surrender of the city of
Vicksburg, public stores, etc. On your accepting the terms
proposed, I will march one division as a guard and take
possession at 8 A.M. to-morrow. As soon as rolls can be made out
and paroles signed by officers and men, you will be allowed to
march out of our lines, the officers taking with them their
side-arms and clothing, and the field, staff, and cavalry
officers one horse each. The rank and file will be allowed (p. 393)
all their clothing, but no other property. If these conditions
are accepted, any amount of rations you may deem necessary can be
taken from the stores you now have, and also the necessary
cooking utensils for preparing them. Thirty wagons, also,
counting two horse or mule teams as one, will be allowed to
transport such articles as cannot be carried along.
The same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded
officers and soldiers as fast as they become able to travel.
The paroles for these latter must be signed, however, whilst
officers are present authorized to sign the roll of prisoners.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT,
_Major-General_.
_____
_General Pemberton to General Grant._
To Headquarters, Vicksburg,
MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, July 3, 1863.
Commanding United States Forces before Vicksburg.
General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of this date, proposing terms of capitulation for
this garrison and post.
In the main your terms are accepted; but in justice both to the
honor and spirit of my troops manifested in the defence of
Vicksburg, I have to submit the following amendments, which, if
acceded to by you, will perfect the agreement between us.
At 10 o'clock, A.M., to-morrow, I propose to evacuate the works
in and around Vicksburg, and to surrender the city and garrison
under my command, by marching out with my colors and arms,
stacking them in front of my present lines, after which you will
take possession.
Officers to retain their side-arms and personal property, and the
rights and property of citizens to be respected.
I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. C. PEMBERTON,
_Lieutenant-General_.
_____
_General Grant to General Pemberton._
Headquarters, Department of the Tennessee,
To Before Vicksburg, July 4, 1863.
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL J. C. PEMBERTON,
Commanding Confederate Forces, Vicksburg, Mississippi.
General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of 3d July. The amendment proposed by you cannot be
acceded to in full. It will be necessary to furnish every (p. 394)
officer and man with a parole signed by himself, which with
the completion of the roll of prisoners, will necessarily take
some time. Again I can make no stipulations with regard to the
treatment of citizens and their private property. While I do not
propose to cause them any undue annoyance or loss, I cannot
consent to leave myself under any restraint by stipulations. The
property which officers will be allowed to take with them will be
as stated in my proposition of last evening; that is, officers
will be allowed their private baggage and side arms, and mounted
officers one horse each.
If you mean by your proposition for each brigade to march to the
front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack arms at 10 A.M.,
and then return to the inside and there remain as prisoners
until properly paroled, I will make no objection to it.
Should no notification be received of your acceptance of my terms
by 9 o'clock A.M., I shall regard them as having been rejected,
and shall act accordingly.
Should these terms be accepted, white flags should be displayed
along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may not have
been notified from firing upon your men.
I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT,
_Major-General_.
_____
_General Pemberton to General Grant._
To Headquarter, Vicksburg,
MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, July 4, 1863.
Commanding United States Forces before Vicksburg.
General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of this day, and in reply to say that the terms
proposed by you are accepted.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. C. PEMBERTON,
_Lieutenant-General_.
_____
_General Grant to the Assistant Adjutant-General._
Headquarters, Military Division of the Mississippi,
To In the Field, Chattanooga, Tennessee,
COLONEL J. C. KELTON, December 23d, 1863.
Assistant Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C.
Colonel: In pursuance of General Orders, No. 337, War Department,
of date Washington, October 16th, 1863, delivered to me by the
Secretary of War, at Louisville, Kentucky, on the 18th of the
same month, I assumed command of the "Military Division of the
Mississippi," comprising the Departments of the Ohio, the
Cumberland, and the Tennessee, and telegraphed the order (p. 395)
assuming command, together with the order of the War
Department, referred to, to Major-General A. E. Burnside, at
Knoxville, and to Major-General W. S. Rosecrans, at Chattanooga.
My action in telegraphing these orders to Chattanooga in advance
of my arrival there, was induced by information furnished me by
the Secretary of War, of the difficulties with which the Army of
the Cumberland had to contend in supplying itself over a long,
mountainous, and almost impassable road from Stevenson, Alabama,
to Chattanooga, Tennessee, and his fears that General Rosecrans
would fall back to the north side of the Tennessee river. To
guard further against the possibility of the Secretary's fears, I
also telegraphed to Major-General Thomas on the 19th of October,
from Louisville, to hold Chattanooga at all hazards; that I would
be there as soon as possible. To which he replied, on same date,
"I will hold the town till we starve."
Proceeding directly to Chattanooga, I arrived there on the 23d of
October, and found that General Thomas had immediately, on being
placed in command of the Department of the Cumberland, ordered
the concentration of Major-General Hooker's command at Bridgeport
preparatory to securing the river and main wagon road between
that place and Brown's Ferry, immediately below Lookout Mountain.
The next morning after my arrival at Chattanooga, in company with
Thomas and Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, Chief Engineer, I made
a reconnoissance of Brown's Ferry and the hills on the south side
of the river, and at the mouth of Lookout Valley. After the
reconnoissance, the plan agreed upon was for Hooker to cross at
Bridgeport to the south side of the river with all the force that
could be spared from the railroad, and move on the main wagon
road by way of Whitesides to Wauhatchie, in Lookout Valley.
Major-General J. M. Palmer was to proceed by the only practicable
route north of the river from his position opposite Chattanooga,
to a point on the north bank of the Tennessee river, and opposite
Whitesides, there to cross to the south side to hold the road
passed over by Hooker. In the meantime and before the enemy could
be apprised of our intentions, a force under the direction of
Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, Chief Engineer, was to be thrown
across the river at or near Brown's Ferry to seize the range of
hills at the mouth of Lookout Valley, covering the Brown's Ferry
road, and orders were given accordingly.
It was known that the enemy held the north end of Lookout Valley
with a brigade of troops, and the road leading around the foot of
the mountain from their main camps in Chattanooga Valley to
Lookout Valley. Holding these advantages, he would have had
little difficulty in concentrating a sufficient force to have
defeated or driven Hooker back. To remedy this the seizure of the
range of hills at the mouth of Lookout Valley and covering the
Brown's Ferry road was deemed of the highest importance. This, by
the use of pontoon bridges at Chattanooga and Brown's Ferry,
would secure to us by the north bank of the river, across
Moccasin Point, a shorter line by which to re-enforce our troops
in Lookout Valley, than the narrow and tortuous road around the
foot of Lookout Mountain afforded the enemy for re-enforcing his.
The force detailed for this expedition consisted of four thousand
men, under command of General Smith, Chief Engineer, eighteen
hundred of which under Brigadier-General W. B. Hagen, in sixty
pontoon boats, containing thirty armed men each, floated (p. 396)
quietly from Chattanooga past the enemy's pickets to the
foot of Lookout Mountain on the night of the 27th of October,
landed on the south side of the river at Brown's Ferry, surprised
the enemy's pickets stationed there, and seized the hills
covering the ferry, without the loss of a man killed and but four
or five wounded. The remainder of the force, together with the
material for a bridge, was moved by the north bank of the river
across Moccasin Point to Brown's Ferry, without attracting the
attention of the enemy, and before day dawned the whole force was
ferried to the south bank of the river; 2nd the almost
inaccessible heights rising from Lookout Valley, at its outlet to
the river and below the mouth of Lookout creek were secured. By
ten o'clock A.M. an excellent pontoon bridge was laid across the
river at Brown's Ferry, thus securing to us the end of the
desired road nearer the enemy's forces, and the shorter line over
which to pass troops if a battle became inevitable. Positions
were taken up by our troops from which they could not have been
driven except by vastly superior forces, and then only with great
loss of the enemy. Our artillery was placed in such position as
to completely command the roads leading from the enemy's main
camps in Chattanooga Valley to Lookout Valley.
On the 28th Hooker emerged into Lookout Valley at Wauhatchie by
the direct road from Bridgeport by way of Whitesides to
Chattanooga, with the 11th Army Corps, under Major-General
Howard, and Geary's Division of the 12th Army Corps, and
proceeded to take up positions for the defence of the road from
Whitesides, over which he had marched, and also the road leading
from Brown's Ferry to Kelly's Ferry, throwing the left of
Howard's Corps forward to Brown's Ferry. The Division that
started under command of Palmer for Whitesides, reached its
destination, and took up the position intended in the original
plan of this movement. Three movements so successfully executed,
secured to us two comparatively good lines by which to obtain
supplies from the terminus of the railroad at Bridgeport, namely,
the main wagon road by way of Whitesides, Wauhatchie, and Brown's
Ferry, distant but twenty-eight miles, and the Kelly's Ferry and
Brown's Ferry road, which, by the use of the river from
Bridgeport to Kelly's Ferry, reduced the distance for wagoning to
but eight miles.
Up to this period our forces at Chattanooga were practically
invested, the enemy's lines extending from the Tennessee river
above Chattanooga to the river at and below the point of Lookout
Mountain below Chattanooga, with the south bank of the river
picketed to near Bridgeport, his main force being fortified in
Chattanooga Valley, at the foot of and on Missionary Ridge and
Lookout Mountain, and a brigade in Lookout Valley. True, we held
possession of the country north of the river, but it was from
sixty to seventy miles over the most impracticable of roads to
any supplies. The artillery horses and mules had become so
reduced by starvation that they could not have been relied on for
moving anything. An attempt at retreat must have been with men
alone, and with only such supplies as they could carry. A retreat
would have been almost certain annihilation, for the enemy,
occupying positions within gunshot of, and overlooking our very
fortifications, would unquestionably have pursued our retreating
forces. Already more than ten thousand animals had perished in
supplying half rations to the troops by the long and tedious
route from Stevenson and Bridgeport to Chattanooga, over (p. 397)
Waldron's Ridge. They could not have been supplied another
week.
The enemy was evidently fully apprised of our condition in
Chattanooga, and of the necessity of our establishing a new and
shorter line by which to obtain supplies, if we would maintain
our position, and so fully was he impressed of the importance of
keeping from us these lines, lost to him by surprise, and in a
manner he little dreamed of, that in order to regain possession
of them, a night attack was made by a portion of Longstreet's
forces on a portion of Hooker's troops (Geary's Division of the
12th Corps) the first night after Hooker's arrival in the valley.
This attack failed, however, and Howard's Corps, which was moving
to the assistance of Geary, finding that it was not required by
him, carried the remaining heights held by the enemy west of
Lookout Creek. This gave us quiet possession of the line of
communication heretofore described south of the Tennessee river.
Of these operations I cannot speak more particularly, the
sub-reports having been sent to Washington without passing
through my hands.
By the use of two steamboats, one of which had been left at
Chattanooga by the enemy and fell into our hands, and one that
had been built by us at Bridgeport, plying between Bridgeport and
Kelly's Ferry, we were enabled to obtain supplies with but eight
miles of wagoning. The capacity of the railroad and steamboats
was not sufficient, however, to supply all the wants of the army,
but actual suffering was prevented.
Ascertaining from scouts and deserters that Bragg was detaching
Longstreet from the front and moving him in the direction of
Knoxville, Tennessee, evidently to attack Burnside, and feeling
strongly the necessity of some move that would compel him to
retain all his forces and recall those he had detached,
directions were given for a movement against Missionary Ridge
with a view of carrying it, and threatening the enemy's
communication with Longstreet, of which I informed Burnside by
telegraph on the 7th of November. After a thorough reconnoissance
of the ground, however, it was deemed utterly impracticable to
make the move until Sherman could get up, because of the
inadequacy of our force and the condition of the animals then at
Chattanooga, and I was forced to leave Burnside, for the present,
to contend against superior forces of the enemy until the arrival
of Sherman with his men and means of transportation. In the
meantime reconnoissances were made and plans matured for
operations. Despatches were sent to Sherman, informing him of the
movement of Longstreet and the necessity of his immediate
presence at Chattanooga. On the 14th of November, I telegraphed
to Burnside as follows:
"To
"MAJOR-GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE.
"Your despatch and Dana's just received. Being there, you can
tell better how to resist Longstreet's attack than I can direct.
With your showing you had better give up Kingston at the last
moment, and save the most productive part of your possessions.
Every arrangement is now made to throw Sherman's forces across
the river just at and below the mouth of Chicamauga creek, as
soon as it arrives. Thomas will attack on his left at the same
time, and together it is expected to carry Missionary Ridge (p. 398)
and from there push a force on to the railroad between
Cleveland and Dalton. Hooker will at the same time attack and, if
he can, carry Lookout Mountain, The enemy now seem to be looking
for an attack on his left flank. This favors us. To further
confirm this, Sherman's advance division will march direct from
Whitesides to Trenton. The remainder of his force will pass over
a new road just made from Whitesides to Kelly's Ferry, thus being
concealed from the enemy, and leave him to suppose the whole
force is going up Lookout Valley.
"Sherman's advance has only just reached Bridgeport. The rear
will only reach there on the 16th. This will bring it to the
19th, as the earliest day for making the combined movement as
desired.
"Inform me if you think you can sustain yourself until that time.
I can hardly conceive of the enemy breaking through at Kingston
and pushing for Kentucky. If they should, however, a new problem
would be left for solution.
"Thomas has ordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of
Sparta. I will ascertain, if they have started and inform you. It
will be entirely out of the question to send you ten thousand
men, not because they cannot be spared, but how could they be fed
after they got even one day east of here.
"U. S. GRANT,
"_Major-General_."
On the 15th, having received from the General-in-Chief a despatch
of date the 14th, in reference to Burnside's position, the danger
of his abandonment of East Tennessee, unless immediate relief was
afforded, and the terrible misfortune such a result would be to
our arms; and also despatches from Mr. C. A. Dana, Assistant
Secretary of War, and Colonel Wilson, of my Staff, sent at the
instance of General Burnside, informing me more fully of the
condition of affairs as detailed to them by him, I telegraphed
him as follows:
"To Chattanooga, November 15th, 1863.
"MAJOR-GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE.
"I do not know how to impress on you the necessity of holding on
to East Tennessee in strong enough terms. According to the
despatches of Mr. Dana and Colonel Wilson, it would seem that you
should, if pressed to do it, hold on to Knoxville and that
portion of the valley which you will necessarily possess, holding
to that point. Should Longstreet move his whole force across the
Little Tennessee, an effort should be made to cut his pontoons on
that stream, even if it sacrificed half the cavalry of the Ohio
army. By holding on and placing Longstreet between the Little
Tennessee and Knoxville, he should not be allowed to escape with
an army capable of doing anything this winter. I can hardly
conceive of the necessity of retreating from East Tennessee. If I
did so at all, it would be after losing most of the army, and
then necessity would suggest the route. I will not attempt to lay
out a line of retreat. Kingston, looking at the map, I thought of
more importance than any one point in East Tennessee. But my
attention being called more closely to it, I can see that it
might be passed by, and Knoxville and the rich valley about it
possessed, ignoring that place entirely. I should not think it
advisable to concentrate a force near the Little Tennessee; (p. 399)
to resist the crossing of it would be in danger of capture, but I
would harass and embarrass progress in every way possible,
reflecting on the fact that the Army of the Ohio is not the only
army to resist the onward progress of the enemy.
"U. S. GRANT,
"_Major-General_."
Previous reconnoissances, made first by Brigadier-General W. F.
Smith, Chief Engineer, and afterward by Thomas Sherman, and
myself in company with him, of the country opposite Chattanooga
and north of the Tennessee river, extending as far east as the
mouth of the North Chicamauga, and also of the mouth of the South
Chicamauga, and the north end of Missionary Ridge, so far as the
same could be made from the north bank of the river, without
exciting suspicions on the part of the enemy, showed good roads
from Brown's Ferry up the river and back of the first range of
hills opposite Chattanooga, and out of view of the enemy's
positions. Troops crossing the bridge at Brown's Ferry could be
seen and their numbers estimated by the enemy, but not seeing
anything further of them as they passed up in rear of these
hills, he would necessarily be at a loss to know whether they
were moving to Knoxville or held on the north side of the river
for further operations at Chattanooga. It also showed that the
north end of Missionary Ridge was imperfectly guarded, and that
the banks of the river from the mouth of South Chicamauga Creek,
westward to his main line in front of Chattanooga, were watched
only by a small cavalry picket. This determined the plan of
operations indicated in my despatch of the 14th to Burnside.
Upon further consideration, the great object being to mass all
the force possible against one given point, namely Missionary
Ridge, converging toward the north end of it, it was deemed best
to change the original plan, so far as it contemplated Hooker's
attack on Lookout Mountain, which would give us Howard's Corps of
his command to aid in this purpose, and on the 18th the following
instructions were given Thomas:
"To
"MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS.
"All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's
position on Missionary Ridge by Saturday at daylight. Not being
provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the mountain
and other places, such definite instructions cannot be given as
might be desirable. However, the general plan, you understand, is
for Sherman, with the force brought with him, strengthened by a
division from your command, to effect a crossing of the Tennessee
river just below the mouth of the Chicamauga, his crossing to be
protected by artillery from the heights on the north bank of the
river (to be located by your chief of artillery), and to secure
the heights from the northern extremity to about the railroad
tunnel, before the enemy can concentrate against him. You will
co-operate with Sherman. The troops in Chattanooga Valley should
be well concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the
necessary force to defend fortifications on the right and centre,
and a movable column of one division in readiness to move whereon
ordered. This division should show itself as threateningly as (p. 400)
possible on the most practical line for making an attack
up the valley Your effort will then be to form a junction with
Sherman, making your advance well toward the northern end of
Missionary Ridge, and moving as near simultaneously with him as
possible. The junction once formed and the ridge carried,
communication will at once be established between the two armies
by roads on the south bank of the river. Further movements will
then depend on those of the enemy. Lookout Valley, I think, will
be easily held by Geary's Division and what troops you may still
have there belonging to the old army of the Cumberland. Howard's
corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at
Chattanooga, or with Sherman. It should be marched on Friday
night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower
down than the first pontoon bridge, and there held in readiness
for such orders as may become necessary. All the troops will be
provided with two days cooked rations in haversacks and one
hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry
soldier. Special care should be taken by all officers to see that
no ammunition is wasted or unnecessarily fired away. You will
call on the Engineer Department for such preparations as you may
deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artillery over the
creek.
"U. S. GRANT,
"_Major-General_."
A copy of these instructions was furnished Sherman with the
following communication:
"To
"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN.
"Enclosed herewith I send you copy of instructions to
Major-General Thomas. You having been over the ground in person,
and having heard the whole matter discussed, further instructions
will not be necessary for you. It is particularly desirable that
a force should be got through to the railroad between Cleveland
and Dalton, and Longstreet thus cut off from communication with
the South; but being confronted by a large force here, strongly
located, it is not easy to tell how this is to be effected, until
the result of our first effort is known. I will add, however,
what is not now shown in my instructions to Thomas, that a
brigade of cavalry has been ordered here which, if it arrives in
time, will be thrown across the Tennessee above Chicamauga, and
may be able to make the trip to Cleveland or thereabouts.
"U. S. GRANT,
"_Major-General_."
Sherman's forces were moved from Bridgeport by way of Whitesides,
our division threatening the enemy's left flank in the direction
of Trenton, crossing at Brown's Ferry, up the north bank of the
Tennessee to near the mouth of South Chicamauga, where they were
kept concealed from the enemy until they were ready to force a
crossing. Pontoons for throwing a bridge across the river were
built and placed in the North Chicamauga, near its mouth, a few
miles further up, without attracting the attention of the enemy.
It was expected we would be able to effect the crossing on the
21st of November, but owing to heavy rains, Sherman was unable
to get up until the afternoon of the 23d, and then only with (p. 401)
Generals Morgan L. Smith's, John E. Smith's, and Hugh Ewing's
divisions of the 15th Corps, under command of Major-General
Frank P. Blair, of his army. The pontoon bridge at Brown's Ferry
having been broken by the drift consequent upon the rise in the
river and rafts sent down by the enemy, the other division
(Osterhaus') was detained on the south side, and was on the night
of the 23d ordered, unless it could get across by eight o'clock
the next morning, to report to Hooker, who was instructed, in
this event, to attack Lookout Mountain, as contemplated in the
original plan.
A deserter from the rebel army, who came into our lines on the
night of the 22d November, reported Bragg falling back. The
following letter from Bragg, received by flag of truce on the
20th, tended to confirm this report:
"To "Headquarters, Army of the Tennessee,
"MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, "In the Field, 20th November, 1863.
"Commanding United States Forces, Chattanooga.
"General: As there may still be some non-combatants in
Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would
dictate their early withdrawal.
"I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"Braxton BRAGG,
"_General commanding_."
Not being willing that he should get his army off in good order,
Thomas was directed early on the morning of the 23d to ascertain
the truth or falsity of this report by driving in his pickets and
making him develop his line. This he did with the troops
stationed at Chattanooga, and Howard's corps (which had been
brought into Chattanooga because of the apprehended danger to our
pontoon bridges from the rise in the river and the enemy's rafts)
in the most gallant style, driving the enemy from his first line
and securing to us what is known as "Indian Hill" or "Orchard
Knoll," and the low range of hills south of it. These points were
fortified during the night and artillery put in position on them.
The report of this deserter was evidently not intended to
deceive, but he had mistaken Bragg's movements. It was afterward
ascertained that one division of Buckner's corps had gone to join
Longstreet, and a second division of the same corps had started,
but was brought back in consequence of our attack.
On the night of the 23d of November Sherman, with three divisions
of his army, strengthened by Davis' division of Thomas', which
had been stationed along on the north bank of the river,
convenient to where the crossing was to be effected, was ready
for operations.
At an hour sufficiently early to secure the south bank of the
river, just below the mouth of the South Chicamauga, by dawn of
day, the pontoons in the North Chicamauga were loaded with thirty
armed men each, and floated quietly past the enemy's pickets,
landed and captured all but one of the guard, twenty in number,
before the enemy was aware of the presence of a foe. The
steamboat "Dunbar" with a barge in tow, after having finished
ferrying across the river the horses procured from Sherman, with
which to move Thomas' artillery, was sent up from Chattanooga to
aid in crossing artillery and troops, and by daylight of the (p. 402)
morning of the 24th of November, eight thousand men were
on the south side of the Tennessee and fortified in rifle
trenches. By twelve o'clock M. the pontoon bridges across the
Tennessee and the Chicamauga were laid, and the remainder of
Sherman's forces crossed over, and at half-past three P.M. the
whole of the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge to near the
railroad tunnel was in Sherman's possession. During the night he
fortified the position thus secured, making it equal if not
superior in strength to that held by the enemy.
By three o'clock of the same day, Colonel Long with his brigade
of cavalry of Thomas' army, crossed to the south side of the
Tennessee, and to the north of South Chicamauga Creek and made a
raid on the enemy's lines of communications. He burned Tyner's
station, with many stores, cut the railroad at Cleveland,
captured near a hundred wagons, and over two hundred prisoners.
His own loss was small.
Hooker carried out the part assigned him for this day, equal to
the most sanguine expectations. With Geary's division (12th
Corps) and two brigades of Stanley's division (4th Corps) of
Thomas' army, and Osterhaus' division (15th Corps) of Sherman's
army, he scaled the western slope of Lookout Mountain, drove the
enemy from his rifle pits on the northern extremity and slope of
the mountain, capturing many prisoners, without serious loss.
Thomas having done on the 23d, with his troops in Chattanooga,
what was intended for the 24th, bettered and strengthened his
advanced position during the day and pushed the 11th Corps
forward along the south bank of the Tennessee river across Citico
creek, one brigade of which with Howard in person, reached
Sherman just as he had completed the crossing of the river.
When Hooker emerged in sight of the northern extremity of Lookout
Mountain, Carlin's brigade of the 14th Corps was ordered to cross
Chattanooga creek and form a junction with him. This was effected
late in the evening and after considerable fighting.
Thus on the night of the 24th, our forces maintained an unbroken
line with unbroken communications, from the north end of Lookout
Mountain through Chattanooga Valley to the north end of
Missionary Ridge.
On the morning of the 25th, Hooker took possession of the
mountain top with a small force, and with the remainder of his
command in pursuance of orders, swept across Chattanooga Valley,
now abandoned by the enemy, to Rossville. In this march he was
detained four hours in building a bridge across Chattanooga
creek. From Rossville he ascended Missionary Ridge and moved
northward toward the centre of the now shortened line.
Sherman's attack upon the enemy's most northern and most vital
points was vigorously kept up all day. The assaulting column
advanced to the very rifle pits of the enemy, and held their
position firmly and without wavering. The right of the assaulting
column being exposed to the danger of being turned, two brigades
were sent to its support. These advanced in the most gallant
manner over an open field on the mountain side to near the works
of the enemy, and laid there, partially covered from fire for
some time. The right of these two brigades rested near the head
of a ravine or gorge in the mountain side, which the enemy took
advantage of, and sent troops, covered from view below them (p. 403)
and to their right rear. Being unexpectedly fired into from
this direction, they fell back across the open field below them,
and reformed in good order in the edge of the timber. The column
which attacked them was speedily driven to its entrenchments by
the assaulting column proper.
Sherman's position not only threatened the right flank of the
enemy, but, from his occupying a line across the mountain and to
the railroad bridge across Chicamauga Creek, his rear and stores
at Chicamauga Station. This caused the enemy to mass heavily
against him. This movement of his being plainly seen from the
position I occupied on Orchard Knoll, Baird's division of the
14th Corps was ordered to Sherman's support; but receiving a note
from Sherman informing me that he had all the force necessary,
Baird was put in position on Thomas' left.
The appearance of Hooker's column was at this time anxiously
looked for and momentarily expected, moving north on the ridge,
with his left in Chattanooga Valley and his right east of the
ridge. His approach was intended as the signal for storming the
ridge in the centre, with strong columns; but the time
necessarily consumed in the construction of the bridge near
Chattanooga creek, detained him to a later hour than was
expected. Being satisfied, from the latest information from him,
that he must by this time be on his road from Rossville, though
not yet in sight, and discovering that the enemy in his
desperation to defeat or resist the progress of Sherman, was
weakening his centre on Missionary Ridge, determined me to order
the advance at once. Thomas was accordingly directed to move
forward his troops, constituting our centre,--Baird's division
(14th Corps), Wood's and Sheridan's divisions (4th Corps), and
Johnson's division (14th Corps),--with a double line of
skirmishers thrown out, followed in easy supporting distance by
the whole force, and carry the rifle pits at the foot of
Missionary Ridge, and when carried to reform his lines in the
rifle pits with a view to carrying the top of the ridge.
These troops moved forward, drove the enemy from the rifle pits
at the base of the ridge like bees from a hive, stopped but a
moment until the whole were in line, and commenced the ascent of
the mountain from right to left almost simultaneously, following
closely the retreating enemy, without further orders. They
encountered a fearful volley of grape and canister from near
thirty pieces of artillery, and musketry from still well filled
rifle pits on the summit of the ridge. Not a waver, however, was
seen in all that long line of brave men. Their progress was
steadily onward until the summit was in their possession.
In this charge the casualties were remarkably few for the fire
encountered. I can account for this only on the theory that the
enemy's surprise at the audacity of such a charge caused
confusion and purposeless aiming of their pieces.
The nearness of night and the enemy still resisting the advance
of Thomas' left, prevented a general pursuit that night, but
Sheridan pushed forward to Mission Mills.
The resistance on Thomas' left being overcome, the enemy
abandoned his position near the railroad tunnel in front of
Sherman, and by twelve o'clock at night was in full retreat, and
the whole of his strong positions on Lookout Mountain,
Chattanooga Valley and Missionary Ridge were in our possession,
together with a large number of prisoners, artillery, and small
arms.
Thomas was directed to get Granger with his corps, and (p. 404)
detachments enough from other commands, including the force
available at Kingston, to make twenty thousand men, in readiness
to go to the relief of Knoxville, upon the termination of the
battle at Chattanooga, these troops to take with them four days'
rations and a steamboat loaded with rations to follow up the
river.
On the evening of the 25th November orders were given to both
Thomas and Sherman to pursue the enemy early the next morning,
with all their available force except that under Granger,
intended for the relief of Knoxville.
On the morning of the 26th Sherman advanced by way of Chicamauga
Station, and Thomas' forces, under Hooker and Palmer, moved on
the Rossville road toward Grayville and Ringgold.
The advance of Thomas' forces reached Ringgold on the morning of
the 27th, where they found the enemy in strong position in the
gorge and on the crest of Taylor's Ridge, from which they
dislodged him after a severe fight, in which we lost heavily in
valuable officers and men, and continued the pursuit that day
until near Tunnel Hill, a distance of twenty miles from
Chattanooga.
Davies' division (14th Corps) of Sherman's column reached
Ringgold about noon of the same day. Howard's Corps was sent by
Sherman to Red Clay to destroy the railroad between Dalton and
Cleveland, and thus cut off Bragg's communication with
Longstreet, which was successfully accomplished.
Had it not been for the imperative necessity of relieving
Burnside, I would have pursued the broken and demoralized
retreating enemy as long as supplies could have been found in the
country. But my advices were that Burnside's supplies would only
last until about the 3d of December. It was already getting late
to afford the necessary relief. I determined, therefore, to
pursue no further. Hooker was directed to hold the position he
then occupied until the night of the 31st, but to go no further
south at the expense of a fight. Sherman was directed to march to
the railroad crossing of the Hiwassee, to protect Granger's flank
until he was across that stream, and to prevent further
re-enforcements being sent by that route into East Tennessee.
Returning from the front on the 28th, I found that Granger had
not yet got off, nor would he have the number of men I had
directed. Besides he moved with reluctance and complaints. I
therefore determined, notwithstanding the fact that two divisions
of Sherman's forces had marched from Memphis and had gone into
battle immediately on their arrival at Chattanooga, to send him
with his command, and orders in accordance therewith were sent
him at Calhoun, to assume command of the troops with Granger in
addition to those with him, and proceed with all possible
dispatch to the relief of Burnside.
General Elliott had been ordered by Thomas on the 26th of
November, to proceed from Alexandria, Tennessee, to Knoxville,
with his cavalry division to aid in the relief of that place.
The approach of Sherman caused Longstreet to raise the siege of
Knoxville and retreat eastward on the night of the 4th of
December. Sherman succeeded in throwing his cavalry into
Knoxville on the night of the 3d.
Sherman arrived in person at Knoxville on the 6th, and after a
conference with Burnside in reference to "_organizing a pursuing
force large enough to either overtake the enemy and beat him (p. 405)
or drive him out of the State_," Burnside was of the opinion
that the corps of Granger, in conjunction with his own
command, was sufficient for that purpose, and on the 7th
addressed to Sherman the following communication:
"To "Knoxville, December 7th, 1863.
"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN.
"I desire to express to you and to your command my most hearty
thanks and gratitude for your promptness in coming to our relief
during the siege of Knoxville, and I am satisfied that your
approach served to raise the siege. The emergency having passed,
I do not deem for the present any other portion of your command,
but the corps of General Granger, necessary for operations in
this section, and inasmuch as General Grant has weakened the
forces immediately with him in order to relieve us, thereby
rendering portions of General Thomas' less secure, I deem it
advisable that all the troops now here, except those commanded by
General Granger, should return at once to within supporting
distance of the forces operating against Bragg's army. In behalf
of my command I again desire to thank you and your command, for
the kindness you have done us.
"A. E. BURNSIDE, _Major-General_."
Leaving Granger's command at Knoxville, Sherman with the
remainder of his forces returned by slow marches to Chattanooga.
I have not spoken more particularly of the result of the pursuit
of the enemy, because the more detailed reports accompanying this
do the subject justice. For the same reason I have not
particularized the part taken by Corps and Division Commanders.
To Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, Chief Engineer, I feel under
more than ordinary obligations for the masterly manner in which
he discharged the duties of his position, and desire that his
services be fully appreciated by higher authority.
The members of my staff discharged faithfully their respective
duties, for which they have my warmest thanks.
Our losses in these battles were 757 killed, 4529 wounded, and
330 missing; total 5616. The loss of the enemy in killed and
wounded was probably less than ours, owing to the fact that he
was protected by his entrenchments, while our men were without
cover.
At Knoxville, however, his loss was many times greater than ours,
making his entire loss at the two places equal to, if not
exceeding ours. We captured 6142 prisoners, of whom 239 were
commissioned officers; 40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery
carriages and caissons, and 7000 stand of small arms.
The armies of the Cumberland and of the Tennessee, for their
energy and unsurpassed bravery in the three days battle of
Chattanooga and the pursuit of the enemy, heir patient endurance
in marching to the relief of Knoxville, and the Army of the Ohio
for its masterly defence of Knoxville and repeated repulses of
Longstreet's assaults upon that place, are deserving of the
gratitude of their country.
I have the honor to be, Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient
servant,
U. S. GRANT,
_Major-General U. S. A._
No. 74. (p. 406)
PLATE LXXIV.
_March 17, 1862._
A grateful country to her generous son Cornelius Vanderbilt.
[Rx]. Bis dat qui tempori dat 1865.
CORNELIUS VANDERBILT.
[_Free Gift of Steamship Vanderbilt._]
A GRATEFUL COUNTRY TO HER GENEROUS SON * * * CORNELIUS VANDERBILT * * *.
Undraped bust of Cornelius Vanderbilt, facing the right. On edge of
bust, S. ELLIS. F. (_fecit_).
America, personified as Minerva, stands, leaning with her left hand on
the American shield, and holding in her right a sword which rests on
her shoulder; to the right the American eagle; to the left, the genius
of the maritime cities imploring her aid and protection. In the
background, in the open sea, is the steamer Vanderbilt under steam;
above, a cloud with thunderbolts. Exergue: BIS DAT QUI TEMPORI
DAT.[118] (_He gives twice who gives in time._) 1865. ELLIS SC.
(_sculpsit._) LEUTZE DEL. (_delineavit._)[119]
[Footnote 118: The Latin proverb is BIS DAT QUI
CITO DAT.]
[Footnote 119: See INTRODUCTION, page viii.]
EMANUEL LEUTZE, who designed the reverse of the medal to Cornelius
Vanderbilt, was born in Gmünden, Württemberg, May 24, 1816. His
parents emigrated to America while he was still a child, and settled
in Fredericksburg, Virginia. In 1841 he went to Europe, and studied
art at Düsseldorf under Professor Lessing. He returned to America in
1859, and took up his residence in Washington. Among his principal
paintings, which are mostly historical, and relate to America, are:
Columbus before the Council of Salamanca, Columbus in chains, Columbus
before Queen Isabella, Washington crossing the Delaware, Washington at
Monmouth, and Washington at Princeton. One of his last works is the
fresco in the Capitol at Washington, "Westward the star of empire
takes its way." He died in Washington, July 18, 1868.
CORNELIUS VANDERBILT was born on Staten Island, New York, May 27, (p. 407)
1794. He went to New York city early in life, and engaged in the
shipping business, in which, by his energy and perseverance, he in
time acquired wealth, and became owner of several lines of steamers,
running from New York to places along the coast. In 1851 he
established a line of steamers to California, and in 1855 another to
Europe. In March, 1862, he presented to the United States Government
the magnificent ship which bore his name, for which generous gift
Congress gave him a vote of thanks and a gold medal. He was made
president of the New York and Harlem Railroad Company in May, 1863; of
the Hudson River Railroad Company in June, 1865; and of the New York
Central Railroad Company in December, 1867. In November, 1869, the two
last were consolidated, with a joint capital of ninety millions of
dollars. He died in the city of New York, January 4, 1877. Cornelius
Vanderbilt was, at the time of his death, one of the richest men in
the world. Among his charities was a gift of one million dollars to
the "Central University of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South," in
Nashville, Tennessee, which, in consequence of this munificence, was
named, in honor of him, Vanderbilt University. He was known by the
sobriquet of "Commodore."
_____
ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS.
_Resolution of Congress Voting a Medal to Cornelius Vanderbilt._