SECTION II

THE FIRST TREK INTO THE NAMIB DESERT

There were some skirmishes outside Swakopmund early in February. On the

23rd the Commander-in-Chief took the field; leaving the base shortly

after dawn, he carried out a driving movement which pushed the enemy

back from the outspan at Nonidas to his posts much further into the

desert. In the course of this successful operation we first heard

rumours that the Germans as a whole were not anxious to fight. The

Union patrols captured several prisoners, amongst whom was an officer

with whom I had several chats when I got the opportunity. As was the

case with many of the prisoners afterwards taken, for a while he

feigned total ignorance of English. It was not long before it became

perfectly clear that he of course understood it well.

Following the operations on the 23rd of February, the mounted troops

pushed steadily into the desert, occupying with merely nominal

resistance Goanikontes, the water-hole and police post at Haigamkhab,

and the water-hole at Husab.

On the 18th of March the Commander-in-Chief and Staff, with all forces

except those detailed to the base and infantry already holding the line

and stores depots, etc., trekked out from Swakopmund on what was

officially described as a "reconnaissance." It was really the first big

push into the Namib Desert. The enemy had taken up an extremely strong

position on the edge of the desert proper, on the front indicated on

the general diagram of the campaign marked Pforte-Jakalswater-Riet.

I have little official knowledge on the tactics of the campaign; it is

necessary, however, here to allude to the plan of proceeding known to

every one who took any part in it. The vital consideration to the

advance of any army across the Namib Desert is to secure the

water-holes on the Swakop River. The Swakop is by no means the usual

prepossessing kind of stream that flows efficiently between wide banks.

It flowed actually for a day just after General Botha landed at

Swakopmund--the first and last time, apparently, within the memory of

man. But it has water in it nevertheless; and at fixed and charted

spots are to be found bore-holes and wells for the convenience of

dwellers in the profitless wilderness. The principal wells and holes

are at the places marked on the diagram. General Botha's principal task

was to take an army right across the Namib Desert, and to do that he

had to capture every water-hole and keep it. It is true that at certain

points in the Swakop and other of the large rivers of South-West Africa

you can find water by digging very near the surface--perhaps. But when

you have a parched army at your back you must deal as little as

possible in speculation. At Riet and Jakalswater the enemy had

determined to hold the valuable water-holes at any cost, but especially

at Riet.

When General Botha treks he treks at express speed. With him the

intention is that the essence of strategy shall be surprise. The

Commander-in-Chief left Swakopmund at 2.30 a.m. on the 18th of March.

We outspanned at Goanikontes, thirty-four kilos, at 10.30 that night.

Goanikontes was left at 6.30 a.m., and the Husab Outspan was made at

10.20 that morning. The rest of the day was spent at Husab; at 6.30 in

the evening the Commander-in-Chief, and with him General Brits, left

for Riet, outspanned for a few hours and attacked the German position

at Riet at dawn on the 20th. The general action which was fought on the

Pforte-Jakalswater-Riet front on this day was conceivably the most

important move of the campaign. It was essential that the water-holes

should be secured.

[Illustration: Main Guard aboard--en route to hunt the Huns]

[Illustration: On the Great Trek--the Chief of the Staff has a

hair-cut]

[Illustration: Action at Riet]

Around Riet, the principal point of attack and defence, the disposition

of the Germans was as strong as it is possible to imagine. My sketch of

the place should give a fair idea of things. In the technical sense it

is not a true plan; but accuracy is not sacrificed to clearness. The

veld around the Riet water-holes is just a mass of small kopjes and

rocks; it narrows to a small defile that opens suddenly on to the

coverless Husab Road. This defile is the only main approach to the Riet

wells, and it is commanded close up on both flanks--on the right by the

great bare kopje, Langer Heinreich, on the other by small kopjes and a

line of ridges.

In attacking this position General Botha had to consider not only the

enemy's strength of position, but also the fact that his troops had to

go into action after a waterless twenty-odd mile trek over the desert.

As the Commander-in-Chief got up to his front on the 20th the big guns

had started. The artillery duel continued well into the afternoon.

Every credit is due to the other units, but it was our artillery that

cracked the nut at Riet. The range was 2,700 yards; but the Germans

never got it. Why it is difficult to say; they had every advantage, and

one understands that the Germans are nothing if not artillerists. But

they were a wash-out at Riet; they were over-firing the whole time. On

the other hand, the Union gunners got the range at once and were all

over the enemy. They put an ammunition wagon out of action after three

shots, and did further deadly work. That afternoon General Botha sent a

detachment out to attempt an enveloping movement. But they came back

later, reporting that the slopes of Langer Heinreich on the right and

the sharp kopjes on the left made the thing impossible.

As the afternoon came on I may say I don't think we knew too much about

the state of affairs with the enemy, and when he ceased artillery fire

about 3.30 p.m. everyone seemed pleased enough. Few knew then that the

German Commander had begun to evacuate the position; his supply of

shells was said to have run short. On account of our numbers, also, he

feared an enfilading movement on his left flank should our mounted

infantry advance to the defile Q.

In the meantime the authorities had decided we must find water in the

rear; for that purpose a party was at once despatched to Gawieb, in the

Swakop River bed. It was found by a party from the Commander-in-Chief's

Bodyguard, and at the Gawieb Hole the greater part of the forces

watered that night. And they took seven hours to do it.

Before sundown General Botha, with Staff and Bodyguard, fell back two

miles on the Husab-Riet Road and camped there for the night. Scarcely

had the Headquarters party arrived before news came that the enemy was

in precipitate flight, had evacuated Riet and had blown up his small

ammunition and railway water-tanks at the Riet terminus of the narrow

gauge railway line to Jakalswater. Bodies of the Union troops had

occupied Riet on the evening of the 20th.

The actions at the Jakalswater and Pforte fronts, to fight which the

columns had swept away to our left the night before, were equally

successful.

That is the general story of the fight of the 20th March on the inland

edge of the Namib Desert. But how to picture vividly the scene before

Riet that day? At dawn in those parts conditions are bearable enough;

the sun has little strength; the night wind refreshes. From 6.30 till

10 o'clock the desert is endurable. Then comes the change. All along

the front the stark yellow sand is taking on a different hue under the

climbing sun rays. It turns almost to glaring whiteness all around--to

where it stops short at the foot of those scorched and smothered rocks

on the left flank. To our right the members of the Headquarters Staff

are standing--sitting--resting. An officer brings his glasses down

slowly, blinks, feels for a pipe, lights it. Another moves head and

extended arm to the right and makes a remark to a colleague. Along the

ridge we occupy the Bodyguard are standing-to and watching the action;

you see that fellow wearily ease a heavy bandolier; further down

another brings an army biscuit from his haversack and breaks it on his

boot.

And now look at that little group almost straight ahead of us; as the

tall Chief-of-Staff moves aside you see a figure on a little camp

stool. The left hand is just under the hip, binoculars are in the

right; up go both hands with the glasses; down they come. He speaks to

the Chief-of-Staff; there is the favourite gesture--the arm is jerked

out horizontally, the hand pointing loosely, and dropped again. The

face is powdered with fine sand and dust; during the day he has been

allowed a small beaker of water from the artillery. A favour indeed.

That is Botha--Louis Botha, Commander-in-Chief, the man who leads us.

And on either flank, well screened, little knots of men are grouped

round the guns--and "Hampang-ky-yao!" they go in our ears, their report

carrying ten miles back into the desert where our transport hears them

in muffled thunder. And look up as you hear that screeching whistle.

The enemy's shells burst in the depression behind us on both flanks--

"Pa-ha-ha." They look like slabs of cotton wool against the brazen blue

sky. And all afternoon the heat strikes up at you overpowering, like

the breath of a wild animal. Then the wind rises, and the sand shifts

in eddies. Veils and goggles are useless. They can't keep out that

spinning curtain of grit. The horses rattle the hard, dry bits in their

mouths, trying to get some moisture.

On the 21st Headquarters moved into Riet. Here we found two water-holes

in the bed of the river; one was a splendid Persian well, with chain

buckets. Riet was no paradise; it was a luxury though, even if the

river sand was blinding, to lie under a wagon and hear the water

running.

[Illustration: An unique picture of General Botha, the

Commander-in-Chief and his Staff reconnoitring]

[Illustration: After Riet water in blessed profusion]

Our casualties in the actions on the Pforte-Jakalswater-Riet front were

fifteen killed, thirty-nine wounded and forty-two missing. On the 21st

our commandos occupied Salem, eight miles further up the Swakop River.

The Commander-in-Chief and his party remained at Riet till the 24th. It

was then decided that a supply depot must be established at Riet before

further advance was made. On the evening of the 24th Headquarters

returned to Swakopmund, reaching the coast at 9.30 on the morning of

the 26th--an extremely fast trek.

Looking out of my window in the heart of civilisation at the evening

sun that glorifies the Pretoria green kopjes, the scene dissolves. In

its place comes the picture of the first gaunt daylight on the 26th of

March last at fifteen kilometres, just going into Swakopmund. The mist

from the coast had rolled inland; through it after dawn came miles of

horsemen and wagons, guns, limbers, lorries, ambulances. Every human

unit in that column was covered in white dust, and every horse was

weary. And except for the staccato "click-click" of bits and an

occasional deep hum from a passing motor the army moved in perfect

silence through the sand.

The official history of the South-West campaign remains to be written,

of course; in the meantime I am convinced that the actions on the

twenty-one mile Pforte-Jakalswater-Riet front were practically the

deciding factors of the campaign.

[Illustration: A Typical Parade of the Germans in South-West Africa]

With Botha in the Field · 第 2 / 4 章