Early in August, at the time when public feeling against the embargo
was beginning to turn into personal hatred of Jefferson, news of the
Spanish outbreak reached America, and put a new weapon into Federalist
hands. The embargo, in its effects upon Spain and her colonies was
a powerful weapon to aid Napoleon in his assault on Spanish liberty
and in his effort to gain mastery of the ocean. In an instant
England appeared as the champion of human liberty, and America as an
accomplice of despotism. Jefferson, in his pursuit of Florida, lost
what was a thousand times more valuable to him than territory,--the
moral leadership which belonged to the head of democracy. The New
England Federalists seized their advantage, and proclaimed themselves
the friends of Spain and freedom. Their press rang with denunciations
of Napoleon, and of Jefferson his tool. For the first time in many
years the Essex Junto stood forward as champions of popular liberty.
So deeply mired was Jefferson in the ruts of his Spanish policy and
prejudices that he could not at once understand the revolution which
had taken place. On hearing the earlier reports of Spanish resistance
his first thought was selfish. “I am glad to see that Spain is likely
to give Bonaparte employment. _Tant mieux pour nous!_”[293] To each
member of his Cabinet he wrote his hopes:[294]--
“Should England make up with us, while Bonaparte continues at
war with Spain, a moment may occur when we may without danger of
commitment with either France or England seize to our own limits
of Louisiana as of right, and the residue of the Floridas as
reprisals for spoliations. It is our duty to have an eye to this in
rendezvousing and stationing our new recruits and our armed vessels,
so as to be ready, if Congress authorizes it, to strike in a moment.”
The victories at Bailen and Vimieiro, the flight of Joseph from
Madrid, the outburst of English enthusiasm for Spain, and the loud
echo from New England, in the anxieties of a general election, brought
the President to wider views. October 22 the Cabinet debated the
subject, arriving at a new result, which Jefferson recorded in his
memoranda:[295]--
“Unanimously agreed in the sentiments which should be
unauthoritatively expressed by our agents to influential persons
in Cuba and Mexico; to wit: ‘If you remain under the dominion of
the kingdom and family of Spain, we are contented; but we should be
extremely unwilling to see you pass under the dominion or ascendency
of France or England. In the latter case, should you choose to
declare independence, we cannot now commit ourselves by saying we
would make common cause with you, but must reserve ourselves to act
according to the then existing circumstances; but in our proceedings
we shall be influenced by friendship to you, by a firm feeling
that our interests are intimately connected, and by the strongest
repugnance to see you under subordination to either France or
England, either politically or commercially.’”
No allusion to Florida was made in this outline of a new policy,
and none was needed, for Florida would obviously fall to the United
States. The Spanish patriots,--who were as little disposed as Don
Carlos IV. and the Prince of Peace to see their empire dismembered,
and who knew as well as Godoy and Cevallos the motives that controlled
the United States government,--listened with only moderate confidence
to the protests which Jefferson, through various agents, made at
Havana, Mexico, and New Orleans.
“The truth is that the patriots of Spain have no warmer friends than
the Administration of the United States,” began the President’s
instructions to his agents;[296] “but it is our duty to say nothing
and to do nothing for or against either. If they succeed, we shall
be well satisfied to see Cuba and Mexico remain in their present
dependence, but very unwilling to see them in that of France or
England, politically or commercially. We consider their interests and
ours as the same, and that the object of both must be to exclude all
European influence from this hemisphere.”
The patriotic junta at Cadiz, which represented the empire of Spain,
could hardly believe in the warm friendship which admitted its object
of excluding them from influence over their own colonies. In private,
Jefferson avowed[297] that American interests rather required the
failure of the Spanish insurrection. “Bonaparte, having Spain at his
feet, will look immediately to the Spanish colonies, and think our
neutrality cheaply purchased by a repeal of the illegal parts of
his decrees, with perhaps the Floridas thrown into the bargain.” In
truth, Jefferson and the Southern interest cared nothing for Spanish
patriotism; and their indifference was reflected in their press. The
independence of the Spanish colonies was the chief object of American
policy; and the patriots of Spain had no warmer friends than the
Administration of the United States so far as they helped and hurried
this great catastrophe; but beyond this purpose Jefferson did not look.
In the Eastern States the Democratic and Southern indifference toward
the terrible struggle raging in Spain helped to stimulate the anger
against Jefferson, which had already swept many firm Republicans into
sympathy with Federalism. In their minds indifference to Spain meant
submission to Napoleon and hatred of England; it proved the true
motives which had induced the President to suppress Monroe’s treaty
and to impose the Non-importation Act and the embargo; it called for
vehement, universal, decisive protest. The New England conscience,
which had never submitted to the authority of Jefferson, rose with an
outburst of fervor toward the Spaniards, and clung more energetically
than ever to the cause of England,--which seemed at last, beyond the
possibility of doubt, to have the sanction of freedom. Every day made
Jefferson’s position less defensible, and shook the confidence of his
friends.
With the sanguine temper which had made him victorious in so many
trials, the President hoped for another success. He still thought that
England must yield under the grinding deprivations of the embargo,
and he was firm in the intention to exact his own terms of repeal.
Pinkney’s earlier despatches offered a vague hope that Canning might
withdraw the orders; and at this glimpse of sunshine Jefferson’s
spirits became buoyant.
“If they repeal their orders, we must repeal our embargo; if
they make satisfaction for the ‘Chesapeake,’ we must revoke our
proclamation, and generalize its application by a law; if they keep
up impressments, we must adhere to non-intercourse, manufactures, and
a Navigation Act.”[298]
Canning was not altogether wrong in thinking that concession by Great
Britain would serve only to establish on a permanent footing the
system of peaceable coercion.
The first blow to the President’s confidence came from France.
Armstrong’s letters gave no hope that Napoleon would withdraw or even
modify his decrees.
“We must therefore look to England alone,” wrote Madison September
14,[299] “for the chances of disembarrassment,--and look with
the greater solicitude as it seems probable that nothing but
some striking proof of the success of the embargo can arrest the
successful perversion of it by its enemies, or rather the enemies of
their country.”
To England, accordingly, the President looked for some sign of
successful coercion,--some proof that the embargo had been felt, or at
least some encouragement to hold that its continuance might save him
from the impending alternative of submission or war; and he had not
long to wait. The “Hope,” bringing Canning’s letters of September 23,
made so quick a voyage that Pinkney’s despatches came to hand October
28, as the President was preparing his Annual Message to Congress for
its special meeting November 7.
Had Canning chosen the moment when his defiance should have most
effect, he would certainly have selected the instant when the
elections showed that Jefferson’s authority had reached its limit.
Friends and enemies alike united in telling the President that his
theory of statesmanship had failed, and must be thrown aside. The
rapid decline of his authority was measured by the private language
of representative men, speaking opinions not meant for popular
effect. In the whole Union no men could be found more distinctly
representative than Wilson Cary Nicholas, James Monroe, John Marshall,
and Rufus King. Of these, Nicholas was distinguished as being the
President’s warm and sympathetic friend, whose opinions had more
weight, and whose relations with him were more confidential, than
those of any other person not in the Cabinet; but even Nicholas
thought himself required to prepare the President’s mind for
abandoning his favorite policy.
“If the embargo could be executed,” wrote Nicholas October 20,[300]
“and the people would submit to it, I have no doubt it is our wisest
course; but if the complete execution of it and the support of the
people cannot be counted upon, it will neither answer our purpose
nor will it be practicable to retain it. Upon both these points I
have the strongest doubts.... What the alternative ought to be, I
cannot satisfy myself. I see such difficulties at every turn that
I am disposed to cling to the embargo as long as there is anything
to hope from it; and I am unwilling to form an opinion until I have
the aid of friends upon whom I rely, and who are more in the way of
information.”
This admission of helplessness coming from the oldest Virginian
Republicans betrayed the discouragement of all Jefferson’s truest
friends, and accorded with the language of Monroe, who whatever might
be his personal jealousies was still Republican in spirit. After
his return from England, at the moment when his attitude toward the
Administration was most threatening, both Jefferson and Madison had
made efforts, not without success, to soothe Monroe’s irritation; and
in the month of February Jefferson had even written to him a letter
of friendly remonstrance, to which Monroe replied, admitting that he
had been “deeply affected” by his recall, and had freely expressed
his feelings. The correspondence, though long and not unfriendly,
failed to prevent Monroe from appearing as a rival candidate for the
Presidency. One of his warmest supporters was Joseph H. Nicholson,
to whom he wrote, September 24, a letter which in a different tone
from that of Wilson Cary Nicholas betrayed the same helplessness of
counsel:[301]--
“We seem now to be approaching a great crisis. Such is the state of
our affairs, and such the compromitment of the Administration at
home and abroad by its measures, that it seems likely that it will
experience great difficulty in extricating itself.... We are invited
with great earnestness to give the incumbents all the support we
can,--by which is meant to give them our votes at the approaching
election; but it is not certain that we could give effectual support
to the person in whose favor it is requested, or that it would be
advisable in any view to yield it. While we remain on independent
ground, and give support where we think it is due, we preserve
a resource in favor of free government within the limit of the
Republican party. Compromit ourselves in the sense proposed, and that
resource is gone. After what has passed, it has no right to suppose
that we will, by a voluntary sacrifice, consent to bury ourselves in
the same tomb with it.”
If Wilson Cary Nicholas and James Monroe stood in such attitudes
toward the Administration, admitting or proclaiming that its policy
had failed, and that it could command no further confidence, what
could be expected from the Federalists, who for eight years had
foretold the failure? New England rang with cries for disunion.
The Federalist leaders thought best to disavow treasonable
intentions;[302] but they fell with their old bitterness on the
personal character of President Jefferson, and trampled it deep in
the mire. Many of the ablest and most liberal Federalist leaders had
lagged behind or left the party, but the zealots of Pickering’s class
were stronger than ever. Pickering bent his energies to the task of
proving that Jefferson was a tool of Napoleon, and that the embargo
was laid in consequence of Napoleon’s command. The success of this
political delusion, both in England and America, was astounding. Even
a mind so vigorous and a judgment so calm as that of Chief-Justice
Marshall bent under this popular imposture.
“Nothing can be more completely demonstrated,” he wrote to
Pickering,[303] “than the inefficacy of the embargo; yet that
demonstration seems to be of no avail. I fear most seriously that the
same spirit which so tenaciously maintains this measure will impel us
to a war with the only power which protects any part of the civilized
world from the despotism of that tyrant with whom we shall then be
arranged. You have shown that the principle commonly called the Rule
of 1756 is of much earlier date, and I fear have also shown to what
influences the embargo is to be traced.”
Chief-Justice Marshall had read Canning’s insulting note of September
23 more than a month before this letter to Pickering was written; yet
the idea of resenting it seemed not to enter his mind. Napoleon alone
was the terror of Federalism; and this unreasoning fear exercised upon
Marshall’s calm judgment hardly less power than upon the imagination
of Fisher Ames or the austerity of Timothy Pickering. Second only to
Marshall, Rufus King was the foremost of Federalists; and the same
horror of France which blinded Marshall, Ames, and Pickering to the
conduct of England led King to hold the President responsible for
Napoleon’s violence. December 1, 1808, King wrote to Pickering a long
letter containing views which in result differed little from those of
Nicholas and Monroe. The Berlin Decree, he said, had violated treaty
rights:[304]
“How dare then our Government with this document before them,
to affirm and endeavor to impose upon the country so gross a
misstatement as they have done in reference to this French Decree?
The Berlin Decree, being an infringement of our rights, should
have been resisted, as a similar decree of the Directory was
resisted by the Federalists in 1798. Had we so done, there would
have been no Orders in Council, no embargo, and probably before
this we should have been again in peace with France.... We are now
told that the embargo must be continued or the country disgraced.
Admitting the alternative, how shameful is it--how criminal rather,
might I say--that the men who have brought the country to this
condition should have the effrontery to make this declaration! The
Administration will be disgraced by the repeal, and they deserve to
be; perhaps they merit more than disgrace. But will the continuance
of the embargo save the country from disgrace? As to its effect on
France and England, we have sufficient evidence of its inefficacy.
The longer it is continued, the deeper our disgrace when it is
raised. It is earnestly to be hoped that the Federalists will leave
to the Administration and its supporters all projects by way of
substitute to the embargo. Having plunged the nation into its present
embarrassment, let them bear the whole responsibility for their
measures. The embargo must be repealed. That simple, unqualified
measure must be adopted. It is high time to discard visionary
experiments. For God’s sake, let the Federalists abstain from any
share in them!”
King was not only the ablest of the Northern Federalists, he was also
the one who knew England best; and yet even he condescended to the
excuse or palliation of England’s conduct, as though Jefferson could
have resisted the Berlin Decree without also resisting the previous
robberies, impressments, and blockades of Great Britain. So deeply
diseased was American opinion that patriotism vanished, and the best
men in the Union took active part with Lord Castlereagh and George
Canning in lowering and degrading their own government. Not even Rufus
King could see the selfishness of that Tory reaction which, without
regard to Napoleon’s decrees, swept Great Britain into collision
with the United States, and from which no act of Jefferson could
have saved American interests. Though King were admitted to be right
in thinking that the system of peaceable coercion, the “visionary
experiments” of President Jefferson’s statesmanship, the fretfulness
of Madison’s diplomacy, had invited or challenged insult, yet after
these experiments had evidently failed and the failure was conceded,
a modest share of patriotism might consent that some policy for the
future should be indicated, and that some remnant of national dignity
should be saved. No such sentimental weakness showed itself in the
ranks of Federalism. Jefferson’s friends and enemies alike foresaw
that the embargo must be repealed; but neither friend nor enemy could
or would suggest a remedy for national disgrace.
No record remains to show in what temper Jefferson received the
letters of Canning and the warnings of Wilson Cary Nicholas. Had he
in the course of his sorely tried political life ever given way to
unrestrained violence of temper, he might fairly have flamed into
passion on reading Canning’s notes; but he seemed rather to deprecate
them,--he made even an effort to persuade Canning that his innuendoes
were unjust. A long memorandum in his own handwriting recorded an
interview which took place November 9 between him and Erskine, the
British minister.[305]
“I told him I was going out of the Administration, and therefore
might say to him things which I would not do were I to remain in. I
wished to correct an error which I at first thought his Government
above being led into from newspapers; but I apprehended they had
adopted it. This was the supposed partiality of the Administration,
and particularly myself, in favor of France and against England. I
observed that when I came into the Administration there was nothing
I so much desired as to be on a footing of intimate friendship with
England; that I knew as long as she was our friend no enemy could
hurt; that I would have sacrificed much to have effected it, and
therefore wished Mr. King to have continued there as a favorable
instrument; that if there had been an equal disposition on their
part, I thought it might have been effected; for although the
question of impressments was difficult on their side, and insuperable
with us, yet had that been the sole question we might have shoved
along in the hope of some compromise; ... that he might judge
from the communications now before Congress whether there had been
any partiality to France, to whom he would see we had never made
the proposition to revoke the embargo immediately, which we did
to England; and, again, that we had remonstrated strongly to them
on the style of M. Champagny’s letter, but had not to England on
that of Canning, equally offensive; that the letter of Canning now
reading to Congress, was written in the high ropes, and would be
stinging to every American breast.... I told him in the course of the
conversation that this country would never return to an intercourse
with England while those Orders in Council were in force. In some
part of it also I told him that Mr. Madison (who, it was now pretty
well understood, would be my successor, to which he assented) had
entertained the same cordial wishes as myself to be on a friendly
footing with England.”
Erskine reported this conversation to his Government;[306] and his
report was worth comparing with that of Jefferson:--
“I collected from the general turn of his sentiments that he would
prefer the alternative of embargo for a certain time, until the
Congress should be enabled to come to some decided resolution as
to the steps to be pursued. By this observation I believe he meant
that he would wish to wait until March next, when the new Congress
would be assembled, and the general sense of the people of the United
States might be taken upon the state of their affairs.... He took an
opportunity of observing in the course of his conversation that his
Administration had been most wrongfully accused of partiality toward
France; that for his own part he felt no scruple, as he was about
to retire, to declare that he had been always highly desirous of an
intimate connection with Great Britain; and that if any temporary
arrangement on the subject of impressment could have been made,
although he never would have consented to abandon the principle of
immunity from impressment for the citizens of the United States, yet
that the two countries might have shoved along (was his familiar
expression) very well until some definite settlement could have taken
place. He remarked also that these were, he knew, the sentiments of
Mr. Madison, who would in all probability succeed him in his office.
He hinted also that both had been long jealous of the ambitious views
and tyrannical conduct of Bonaparte.”
“These declarations,” continued Erskine, “are so opposite to the
general opinion of what their real sentiments have been that it is
very difficult to reconcile them.” In truth, the footing of intimate
friendship with England so much desired by Jefferson demanded from
England more concessions than she was yet ready to yield; but nothing
could be truer or more characteristic than the President’s remark
that under his charge the two countries might have “shoved along very
well,” had peace depended only upon him. In this phrase lay both the
defence and the criticism of his statesmanship.
In any event, nothing could be more certain than that the time for
shoving along at all was past. The country had come to a stand-still;
and some heroic resolution must be taken. The question pressing for
an answer concerned Jefferson more directly than it concerned any one
else. What did he mean to do? For eight years, in regard to foreign
relations his will had been law. Except when the Senate, in 1806, with
disastrous results, obliged him to send William Pinkney to negotiate
a treaty with England, Congress had never crossed the President’s
foreign policy by wilful interference; and when this policy ended in
admitted failure, his dignity and duty required him to stand by the
government, and to take the responsibility that belonged to him. Yet
the impression which Erskine drew from his words was correct. He had
no other plan than to postpone further action until after March 4,
1809, when he should retire from control. With singular frankness he
avowed this wish. After the meeting of Congress, November 7, when
doubt and confusion required control, Jefferson drew himself aside,
repeating without a pause the formula that embargo was the alternative
to war.[307] “As yet the first seems most to prevail,” he wrote,[308]
a few days after his interview with Erskine; and no one doubted to
which side he leaned, though as if it were a matter of course that
he should quit the government before his successor was even elected,
he added: “On this occasion I think it is fair to leave to those who
are to act on them the decisions they prefer, being to be myself but
a spectator. I should not feel justified in directing measures which
those who are to execute them would disapprove. Our situation is truly
difficult. We have been pressed by the belligerents to the very wall,
and all further retreat is impracticable.”
Madison and Gallatin did not share Jefferson’s notion of Executive
duties, and they made an effort to bring the President back to a
juster sense of what was due to himself and to the nation. November 15
Gallatin wrote a friendly letter to Jefferson, urging him to resume
his functions.
“Both Mr. Madison and myself,” wrote Gallatin,[309] “concur in the
opinion that considering the temper of the Legislature it would be
eligible to point out to them some precise and distinct course. As to
what that should be we may not all perfectly agree, and perhaps the
knowledge of the various feelings of the members, and of the apparent
public opinion, may on consideration induce a revision of our own.
I feel myself nearly as undetermined between enforcing the embargo
or war as I was at our last meeting. But I think that we must, or
rather you must, decide the question absolutely, so that we may point
out a decisive course either way to our friends. Mr. Madison, being
unwell, proposed that I should call on you, and suggest our wish that
we might, with the other gentlemen, be called by you on that subject.
Should you think that course proper, the sooner the better.”
Jefferson’s reply to this request was not recorded, but he persisted
in considering himself as no longer responsible for the government.
Although Madison could not become even President-elect before the
first Wednesday in December, when the electors were to give their
votes; and although the official declaration of this vote could
not take place before the second Wednesday in February,--Jefferson
insisted that his functions were merely formal from the moment when
the name of his probable successor was known.
“I have thought it right,” he wrote December 27,[310] “to take
no part myself in proposing measures the execution of which will
devolve on my successor. I am therefore chiefly an unmeddling
listener to what others say. On the same ground, I shall make no
new appointments which can be deferred till the fourth of March,
thinking it fair to leave to my successor to select the agents for
his own Administration. As the moment of my retirement approaches I
become more anxious for its arrival, and to begin at length to pass
what yet remains to me of life and health in the bosom of my family
and neighbors, and in communication with my friends undisturbed by
political concerns or passions.”
So freely did he express this longing for escape that his enemies
exulted in it as a fresh proof of their triumph. Josiah Quincy, his
fear of the President vanishing into contempt,--“a dish of skim-milk
curdling at the head of our nation,”--writing to the man whom eight
years before Jefferson had driven from the White House, gave an
account of the situation differing only in temper from Jefferson’s
description of himself:[311]--
“Fear of responsibility and love of popularity are now
master-passions, and regulate all the movements. The policy is to
keep things as they are, and wait for European events. It is hoped
the chapter of accidents may present something favorable within the
remaining three months; and if it does not, no great convulsion can
happen during that period. The Presidential term will have expired,
and then--away to Monticello, and let the Devil take the hindmost. I
do believe that not a whit deeper project than this fills the august
mind of your successor.”
Had Jefferson strictly carried out his doctrine, and abstained from
interference of any kind in the decision of a future policy, the
confusion in Congress might have been less than it was, and the
chance of agreement might have been greater; but while apparently
refusing to interfere, in effect he exerted his influence to prevent
change; and to prevent a change of measures was to maintain the
embargo. In insisting that the whole matter should be left to the
next Congress and President, Jefferson resisted the popular pressure
for repeal, embarrassing his successor, distracting the Legislature,
and destroying the remnants of his own popularity. Especially the
Eastern Democrats, who had reason to believe that in New England
the Union depended on repeal, were exasperated to find Jefferson,
though declaring neutrality, yet privately exerting his influence
to postpone action until the meeting of another Congress. Among the
Eastern members was Joseph Story, who had been elected to succeed
Crowninshield, as a Republican, to represent Salem and Marblehead.
Story took his seat Dec. 20, 1808, and instantly found himself in
opposition to President Jefferson and the embargo:--
“I found that as a measure of retaliation the system had not only
failed, but that Mr. Jefferson, from pride of opinion as well as from
that visionary course of speculation which often misled his judgment,
was absolutely bent upon maintaining it at all hazards. He professed
a firm belief that Great Britain would abandon her Orders in Council
if we persisted in the embargo; and having no other scheme to offer
in case of the failure of this, he maintained in private conversation
the indispensable necessity of closing the session of Congress
without any attempt to limit the duration of the system.”[312]
Josiah Quincy and Joseph Story were comparatively friendly in their
views of Jefferson’s conduct. The extreme Federalist opinion,
represented by Timothy Pickering, placed the President in a light far
more repulsive.
“It is scarcely conceivable,” wrote Pickering[313] to Christopher
Gore Jan. 8, 1809, “that Mr. Jefferson should so obstinately
persevere in the odious measure of the embargo, which he cannot
but see has impaired his popularity and hazards its destruction, if
he were not under secret engagements to the French Emperor,--unless
you can suppose that he would run that hazard and the ruin of his
country, rather than that a measure which he explicitly recommended
should be pronounced unwise.... When we advert to the real character
of Mr. Jefferson, there is no nefarious act of which we may not
suppose him capable. _He would rather the United States should sink,
than change the present system of measures._ This is not opinion, but
history. I repeat it confidentially to you until I obtain permission
to vouch it on evidence which I trust I can obtain.”[314]
Pickering’s hatred of Jefferson amounted to mania; but his language
showed the influence which, whether intentionally or not, the
President still exerted on the decisions of Congress. All accounts
agreed that while refusing to act officially, the President resisted
every attempt to change, during his time, the policy he had
established. Canning’s defiance and Napoleon’s discipline reduced
him to silence and helplessness; but even when prostrate and alone,
he clung to the remnant of his system. Disaster upon disaster,
mortification upon mortification, crowded fast upon the man whose
triumphs had been so brilliant, but whose last hope was to escape a
public censure more humiliating than any yet inflicted on a President
of the United States. The interest attached to the history of his
administration--an interest at all times singularly personal--centred
at last upon the single point of his personality, all eyes fixing
themselves upon the desperate malice with which his ancient enemies
strove to drive him from his cover, and the painful efforts with which
he still sought to escape their fangs.
FOOTNOTES:
[293] Jefferson to Robert Smith, Aug. 9, 1808; Writings, v. 335.
[294] Jefferson to Dearborn, Aug. 12, 1808; Writings, v. 338.
Jefferson to Gallatin, v. 338. Jefferson to R. Smith, v. 337.
Jefferson to Madison, v. 339.
[295] Cabinet Memoranda; Jefferson MSS.
[296] Jefferson to Claiborne, Oct. 29, 1808; Writings, v. 381.
[297] Jefferson to Monroe, Jan. 28, 1809; Writings, v. 419.
[298] Jefferson to Madison, Sept. 6, 1808; Writings, v. 361.
[299] Madison to Jefferson, Sept. 14, 1808; Jefferson MSS.
[300] W. C. Nicholas to Jefferson, Oct. 20, 1808; Jefferson MSS.
[301] Monroe to Joseph H. Nicholson, Sept. 24, 1808; Nicholson MSS.
[302] George Cabot to Pickering, Oct. 5, 1808; Lodge’s Cabot, p. 308.
[303] Marshall to Pickering, Dec. 19, 1808; Lodge’s Cabot, p. 489.
[304] Rufus King to Pickering, Dec. 1, 1808; Pickering MSS.
[305] Cabinet Memoranda; Jefferson MSS.
[306] Erskine to Canning, Nov. 10, 1808; MSS. British Archives.
[307] Jefferson to Governor Pinckney, Nov. 8, 1808; Writings, v. 383.
[308] Jefferson to Governor Lincoln, Nov. 13, 1808; Writings, v. 387.
[309] Gallatin to Jefferson, Nov. 15, 1808; Gallatin’s Writings, i.
420.
[310] Jefferson to Dr. Logan, Dec. 27, 1808; Writings, v. 404.
[311] Josiah Quincy to John Adams, Dec. 15, 1808; Quincy’s Life of J.
Quincy, p. 146.
[312] Story’s Life of Story, i. 184.
[313] Pickering to C. Gore, Jan. 8, 1809; Pickering MSS.
[314] Cf. Pickering to S. P. Gardner; New England Federalism, p. 379.