While the people of the United States waited to see the effect of
the embargo on Europe, Europe watched with breathless interest the
death-throes of Spain.
The Emperor Napoleon, in December, 1807, hurried in triumphal progress
from one ancient city to another, through his Italian kingdom, while
his armies steadily crossed the Pyrenees, and spread over every road
between Bayonne and Lisbon. From Madrid, Godoy saw that the end was
near. Until that moment he had counted with certainty on the devotion
of the Spanish people to their old King. In the last months of 1807 he
learned that even Spanish loyalty could not survive the miseries of
such a reign. Conspiracy appeared in the Escorial itself. Ferdinand,
Prince of the Asturias, only son of Don Carlos IV., was discovered in
a plot for dethroning his father by aid of Napoleon. Ferdinand was
but twenty-three years old; yet even in the flower of youth he showed
no social quality. Dull, obstinate, sullen, just shrewd enough to
be suspicious, and with just enough passion to make him vindictive,
Ferdinand was destined to become the last and worst of the Spanish
Bourbon kings; yet in the year 1807 he had a strong bond of sympathy
with the people, for he hated and feared his father and mother and
the Prince of Peace. Public patience, exhausted by endless disaster,
and outraged by the King’s incompetence, the Queen’s supposed amours,
and Godoy’s parade of royal rank and power, vanished at the news that
Ferdinand shared in the popular disgust; and the Prince of Peace
suddenly woke to find the old King already dethroned in his subjects’
love, while the Prince of the Asturias, who was fitted only for
confinement in an asylum, had become the popular ideal of virtue and
reform.
Godoy stifled Ferdinand’s intrigue, and took from Napoleon that
pretext for interference; but he gained at most only a brief respite
for King Charles. The pardon of Ferdinand was issued Nov. 5, 1807;
December 23, Napoleon sent from Milan to his minister of war
orders[234] to concentrate armies for occupying the whole peninsula,
and to establish the magazines necessary for their support. He was
almost ready to act; and his return to Paris, Jan. 3, 1808, announced
to those who were in the secret that the new drama would soon begin.
Among the most interested of his audience was General Armstrong, who
had longed, since 1805, for a chance to meet the Emperor with his own
weapons, and who knew that Napoleon’s schemes required control of
North and South America, which would warrant Jefferson in imposing
rather than in receiving terms for Florida. Whatever these terms might
be, Napoleon must grant them, or must yield the Americas to England’s
naval supremacy. The plan as Armstrong saw it was both safe and sure.
Napoleon made no secret of his wants. Whatever finesse he may have
used in the earlier stage of his policy was flung aside after his
return to Paris, January 3. In reply to Armstrong’s remonstrances
against the Milan Decree, the Emperor ordered Champagny to use the
language of command:[235]--
“Answer Mr. Armstrong, that I am ashamed to discuss points of which
the injustice is so evident; but that in the position in which
England has put the Continent, I do not doubt of the United States
declaring war against her, especially on account of her decree of
November 11; that however great may be the evil resulting to America
from war, every man of sense will prefer it to a recognition of the
monstrous principles and of the anarchy which that Government wants
to establish on the seas; that in my mind I regard war as declared
between England and America from the day when England published her
decrees; that, for the rest, I have ordered that the American vessels
should remain sequestered, to be disposed of as shall be necessary
according to circumstances.”
No coarser methods were known to diplomacy than those which Napoleon
commonly took whenever the moment for action came. Not only did he
thus hold millions of American property sequestered as a pledge for
the obedience of America, but he also offered a bribe to the United
States government. January 28 he gave orders[236] for the occupation
of Barcelona and the Spanish frontier as far as the Ebro, and for
pushing a division from Burgos to Aranda on the direct road to Madrid.
These orders admitted of no disguise; they announced the annexation of
Spain to France. A few days afterward, February 2, the Emperor began
to dispose of Spanish territory as already his own.
“Let the American minister know verbally,” he wrote to
Champagny,[237] “that whenever war shall be declared between America
and England, and whenever in consequence of this war the Americans
shall send troops into the Floridas to help the Spaniards and
repulse the English, I shall much approve of it. You will even let
him perceive (_vous lui laisserez même entrevoir_) that in case
America should be disposed to enter into a treaty of alliance, and
make common cause with me, I shall not be unwilling (_éloigné_) to
intervene with the court of Spain to obtain the cession of these same
Floridas in favor of the Americans.”
The next day Champagny sent for Armstrong and gave him a verbal
message, which the American minister understood as follows:[238]--
“General, I have to communicate to you a message from the Emperor.
I am instructed to say that the measure of taking the Floridas, to
the exclusion of the British, meets entirely the approbation of his
Majesty. I understand that you wish to purchase the Floridas. If such
be your wish, I am further instructed to say that his Majesty will
interest himself with Spain in such way as to obtain for you the
Floridas, and, what is still more important, a convenient western
boundary for Louisiana, on condition that the United States will
enter into an alliance with France.”
Weary of verbal and semi-official advances, Armstrong determined to
put this overture on record, and in doing so, to tell the Emperor
plainly the price of American friendship. February 5 he wrote to
Champagny a note, embodying the message as he understood it, and
promising to convey it to the President.[239]
“I should little deserve,” he added, “and still less reciprocate
the frankness of this declaration, were I to withhold from your
Excellency my belief that the present conduct of France toward the
commerce of the United States, so far from promoting the views of
his Majesty, are directly calculated to contravene them. That the
United States are at this moment on the eve of a war with Great
Britain on account of certain outrages committed against their rights
as a neutral nation is a fact abundantly and even generally known.
Another fact, scarcely less known, is that under these circumstances
France also has proceeded, in many instances and by various means,
to violate these very rights. In both cases all the injunctions
of public law have been equally forgotten; but between the two we
cannot fail to remark a conspicuous difference. With Great Britain
the United States could invoke no particular treaty providing rights
supplementary to these injunctions; but such was not their situation
with France. With her a treaty did exist, ... a treaty sanctioned
with the name and guaranteed by the promise of the Emperor ‘that all
its obligations should be inviolably preserved.’”
This was hardly the reply which the Emperor expected; but, temper
for temper, Napoleon was not a man to be thus challenged by a mere
diplomatist.
“You must write to the American minister,” was his order to
Champagny,[240] “that France has taken engagements with America, has
made with her a treaty founded on the principle that the flag covers
the goods, and that if this sacred principle had not been solemnly
proclaimed, his Majesty would still proclaim it; that his Majesty
treated with America independent, and not with America enslaved
(_asservie_); that if she submits to the King of England’s Decree of
November 11, she renounces thereby the protection of her flag; but
that if the Americans, as his Majesty cannot doubt without wounding
their honor, regard this act as one of hostility, the Emperor is
ready to do justice in every respect.”
In forwarding these documents to Washington, Armstrong expressed
in plain language his opinion of Napoleon and Champagny. “With one
hand they offer us the blessings of equal alliance against Great
Britain; with the other they menace us with war if we do not accept
this kindness; and with both they pick our pockets with all imaginable
diligence, dexterity, and impudence.” Armstrong’s patience was
exhausted. He besought the Government to select its enemy, either
France or England; but “in either case do not suspend a moment the
seizure of the Floridas.”[241] A week afterward he wrote to Madison
that “in a council of Administration held a few days past, when it
was proposed to modify the operation of the Decrees of November,
1806, and December, 1807, though the proposition was supported by the
whole weight of the council, the Emperor became highly indignant, and
declared that these decrees should suffer no change, and that the
Americans should be compelled to take the positive character either of
allies or of enemies.”[242]
These letters from Armstrong, enclosing Champagny’s version of
Napoleon’s blunt words, were despatched to Washington during the
month of February; and, as the story has already shown, President
Jefferson roused a storm against France by communicating to Congress
the Emperor’s order that the United States government should regard
itself as at war with England. Turreau felt the publication as a
fatal blow to his influence; but even Turreau, soldier as he was,
could never appreciate the genius of his master’s audacity. Napoleon
knew his ground. From the moment England adopted the Orders in Council
the United States were necessarily a party in the war, and no process
of evasion or delay could more than disguise their position. Napoleon
told Jefferson this plain truth, and offered him the Floridas as a
bribe to declare himself on the side of France. These advances were
made before the embargo system was fairly known or fully understood at
Paris; and the policy of peaceable coercion, as applied to England,
had not been considered in the Emperor’s plans. Alliance or war seemed
to him the necessary alternative, and from that point of view America
had no reason or right to complain because he disregarded treaty
stipulations which had become a dead letter.
All this while the Emperor held Spain in suspense, but February 21
he gave orders for securing the royal family. Murat was to occupy
Madrid; Admiral Rosily, who commanded a French squadron at Cadiz,
was to bar the way “if the Spanish Court, owing to events or a folly
that can hardly be expected, should wish to renew the scene of
Lisbon.”[243] Godoy saw the impending blow, and ordered the Court to
Cadiz, intending to carry the King even to Mexico if no other resource
remained. He would perhaps have saved the King, and Admiral Rosily
himself would have been the prisoner, had not the people risen in
riot on hearing of the intended flight. March 17 a sudden mob sacked
Godoy’s house at Aranjuez, hunting him down like a wild beast, and
barely failing to take his life; while by sheer terror Don Carlos IV.
was made to abdicate the throne in favor of his son Ferdinand. March
19 the ancient Spanish empire crumbled away.
Owing to the skill with which Napoleon had sucked every drop of blood
from the veins, and paralyzed every nerve in the limbs of the Spanish
monarchy, the throne fell without apparent touch from him, and his
army entered Madrid as though called to protect Carlos IV. from
violence. When the news reached Paris the Emperor, April 2, hurried to
Bordeaux and Bayonne, where he remained until August, regulating his
new empire. To Bayonne were brought all the familiar figures of the
old Spanish _régime_,--Carlos IV., Queen Luisa, Ferdinand, the Prince
of Peace, Don Pedro Cevallos,--the last remnants of picturesque Spain;
and Napoleon passed them in review with the curiosity which he might
have shown in regarding a collection of rococo furniture. His victims
always interested him, except when, as in the case of Toussaint
Louverture, they were not of noble birth. King Charles, he said,[244]
looked a _bon et brave homme_.
“I do not know whether it is due to his position or to the
circumstances, but he has the air of a patriarch, frank and good.
The Queen carries her heart and history on her face; you need to
know nothing more of her. The Prince of Peace has the air of a bull;
something like Daru. He is beginning to recover his senses; he has
been treated with unexampled barbarity. It is well to discharge him
of every false imputation, but he must be left covered with a slight
tinge of contempt.”
This was a compliment to Godoy; for Napoleon made it his rule to throw
contempt only upon persons--like the Queen of Prussia, or Mme. de
Staël, or Toussaint--whose influence he feared. Of Ferdinand, Napoleon
could make nothing, and became almost humorous in attempting to
express the antipathy which this last Spanish Bourbon aroused.
“The King of Prussia is a hero in comparison with the Prince of the
Asturias. He has not yet said a word to me; he is indifferent to
everything; very material; eats four times a day, and has no ideas;
... sullen and stupid.”
Madrid and Aranjuez, the Escorial and La Granja were to know King
Charles and his court no more. After showing themselves for a few
days at Bayonne, these relics of the eighteenth century disappeared
to Compiègne, to Valençay, to one refuge after another, until in 1814
unhappy Spain welcomed back the sullen and stupid Ferdinand, only
to learn his true character; while old King Charles, beggared and
forgotten, dragged out a melancholy existence in Italy, served to the
last by Godoy with a loyalty that half excused his faults and vices.
The Bourbon rubbish was swept from Madrid; Don Carlos had already
abdicated; Ferdinand, entrapped and terrified, was set aside; the
old palaces were garnished for newcomers; and after Lucien and Louis
Bonaparte had refused the proffered throne, Napoleon sent to Naples
for Joseph, who was crowned, June 15, King of Spain at Bayonne.
Meanwhile the Spanish people woke to consciousness that their ancient
empire had become a province of France, and their exasperation broke
into acts of wild revenge. May 2 Madrid rose in an insurrection which
Murat suppressed by force. Several hundred lives on either side were
lost; and although the affair itself was one of no great importance,
it had results which made the day an epoch in modern history.
The gradual breaking up of the old European system of politics was
marked by an anniversary among each of the Western nations. The
English race dated from July 4, 1776, the beginning of a new era;
the French celebrated July 14, 1789, the capture of the Bastille, as
decisive of their destinies. For a time, Bonaparte’s _coup d’état_ of
the 18th Brumaire in 1799 forced both France and England back on their
steps; but the dethronement of Charles IV. began the process in a new
direction. The Second of May--or as the Spaniards called it, the Dos
de Maio--swept the vast Spanish empire into the vortex of dissolution.
Each of the other anniversaries--that of July 4, 1776, and of July
14, 1789--had been followed by a long and bloody convulsion which
ravaged large portions of the world; and the extent and violence
of the convulsion which was to ravage the Spanish empire could be
measured only by the vastness of Spanish dominion. So strangely had
political forces been entangled by Napoleon’s hand, that the explosion
at Madrid roused the most incongruous interests into active sympathy
and strange companionship. The Spaniards themselves, the least
progressive people in Europe, became by necessity democratic; not only
the people, but even the governments of Austria and Germany felt the
movement, and yielded to it; the Tories of England joined with the
Whigs and Democrats in cheering a revolution which could not but shake
the foundations of Tory principles; confusion became chaos, and while
all Europe, except France, joined hands in active or passive support
of Spanish freedom, America, the stronghold of free government, drew
back and threw her weight on the opposite side. The workings of human
development were never more strikingly shown than in the helplessness
with which the strongest political and social forces in the world
followed or resisted at haphazard the necessities of a movement
which they could not control or comprehend. Spain, France, Germany,
England, were swept into a vast and bloody torrent which dragged
America, from Montreal to Valparaiso, slowly into its movement; while
the familiar figures of famous men,--Napoleon, Alexander, Canning,
Godoy, Jefferson, Madison, Talleyrand; emperors, generals, presidents,
conspirators, patriots, tyrants, and martyrs by the thousand,--were
borne away by the stream, struggling, gesticulating, praying,
murdering, robbing; each blind to everything but a selfish interest,
and all helping more or less unconsciously to reach the new level
which society was obliged to seek. Half a century of disorder failed
to settle the problems raised by the Dos de Maio; but from the first
even a child could see that in the ruin of a world like the empire of
Spain, the only nation certain to find a splendid and inexhaustible
booty was the Republic of the United States. To President Jefferson
the Spanish revolution opened an endless vista of democratic ambition.
Yet at first the Dos de Maio seemed only to rivet Napoleon’s power,
and to strengthen the reaction begun on the 18th Brumaire. The Emperor
expected local resistance, and was ready to suppress it. He had
dealt effectually with such popular outbreaks in France, Italy, and
Germany; he had been overcome in St. Domingo not by the people, but,
as he believed, by the climate. If the Germans and Italians could
be made obedient to his orders, the Spaniards could certainly offer
no serious resistance. During the two or three months that followed
the dethronement of the Bourbons, Napoleon stood at the summit of
his hopes. If the letters he then wrote were not extant to prove
the plans he had in mind, common-sense would refuse to believe that
schemes so unsubstantial could have found lodgment in his brain.
The English navy and English commerce were to be driven from the
Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean, and American waters, until the
ruin of England should be accomplished, and the empire of the world
should be secured. Order rapidly followed order for reconstructing
the navies of France, Spain, and Portugal. Great expeditions were to
occupy Ceuta, Egypt, Syria, Buenos Ayres, the Isle de France, and the
East Indies.
“The concurrence of these operations,” he wrote May 13,[245] “will
throw London into a panic. A single one of them, that of India, will
do horrible damage there. England will then have no means of annoying
us or of disturbing America. I am resolved on this expedition.”
For this purpose the Emperor required not only the submission of
Spain, but also the support of Spanish America and of the United
States. He acted as though he were already master of all these
countries, which were not yet within his reach. Continuing to treat
the United States as a dependent government, he issued April 17 a
new order directing the seizure of all American vessels which should
enter the ports of France, Italy, and the Hanse towns.[246] This
measure, which became famous as the Bayonne Decree, surpassed the
Decrees of Berlin and Milan in violence, and was gravely justified
by Napoleon on the ground that, since the embargo, no vessel of the
United States could navigate the seas without violating the law of
its own government, and furnishing a presumption that it did so with
false papers, on British account or in British connection. “This is
very ingenious,” wrote Armstrong in reporting the fact.[247] Yet it
was hardly more arbitrary or unreasonable than the British “Rule of
1756,” which declared that a neutral should practise no trade with a
belligerent which it had not practised with the same nation during
peace.
While these portentous events were passing rapidly before the eyes of
Europe, no undue haste marked Madison’s movements. Champagny’s letter
of Jan. 15, 1808, arrived and was sent to Congress toward the end of
March; but although the United States quickly knew by heart Napoleon’s
phrase, “War exists in fact between England and the United States, and
his Majesty considers it as declared from the day on which England
published her decrees;” although Rose departed March 22, and the
embargo was shaped into a system of coercion long before Rose’s actual
departure,--yet Congress waited until April 22 before authorizing the
President to suspend the embargo, if he could succeed in persuading or
compelling England or France to withdraw the belligerent decrees; and
not until May 2--the famous Dos de Maio--did Madison send to Armstrong
instructions which were to guide that minister through the dangers of
Napoleonic diplomacy.
The Secretary began by noticing Champagny’s letter of January 15,
which had assumed to declare war for the United States government.
“That [letter],” said Madison,[248] “... has, as you will see by
the papers herewith sent, produced all the sensations here which
the spirit and style of it were calculated to excite in minds alive
to the interests and honor of the nation. To present to the United
States the alternative of bending to the views of France against
her enemy, or of incurring a confiscation of all the property of
their citizens carried into the French prize courts, implied that
they were susceptible of impressions by which no independent and
honorable nation can be guided; and to prejudge and pronounce for
them the effect which the conduct of another nation ought to have
on their councils and course of proceeding, had the air at least
of an assumed authority not less irritating to the public feeling.
In these lights the President makes it your duty to present to the
French government the contents of Mr. Champagny’s letter; taking
care, as your discretion will doubtless suggest, that while you make
that Government sensible of the offensive tone employed, you leave
the way open for friendly and respectful explanations, if there be a
disposition to offer them, and for a decision here on any reply which
may be of a different character.”
While Armstrong waited for Napoleon’s “friendly and respectful
explanations,” he was to study the Act of Congress which vested in the
President an authority to suspend the embargo:--
“The conditions on which the suspending authority is to be exercised
will engage your particular attention. They appeal equally to the
justice and the policy of the two great belligerent Powers now
emulating each other in violations of both. The President counts on
your best endeavors to give to this appeal all the effect possible
with the French government. Mr. Pinkney will be doing the same with
that of Great Britain.”
The Florida affair remained to be discussed. The President courteously
acknowledged the Emperor’s wishes “for an accession of the United
States to the war against England, as an inducement to which his
interposition would be employed with Spain to obtain for them the
Floridas.” Armstrong was told to say in reply “that the United
States having chosen as the basis of their policy a fair and sincere
neutrality among the contending Powers, they are disposed to adhere
to it as long as their essential interests will permit, and are more
particularly disinclined to become a party to the complicated and
general warfare which agitates another quarter of the globe, for
the purpose of obtaining a separate and particular object, however
interesting to them; but,” Madison added, “should circumstances demand
from the United States a precautionary occupation against the hostile
designs of Great Britain, it will be recollected with satisfaction
that the measure has received his Majesty’s approbation.” Finally,
Armstrong’s advice to seize the Floridas without delay was answered
only by the singular remark that the Emperor had given no reason to
suppose he would approve the step. In private Jefferson gave other
explanations, but perhaps he most nearly expressed his true feeling
when he added that Armstrong wrote “so much in the buskin that he
cannot give a naked fact in an intelligible form.”[249]
Turreau, who stood nearer than any other man to the secrets of
American foreign politics, attempted to draw the President from this
defensive attitude. Turreau’s instructions were such as to warrant him
in using strong language. In a despatch dated February 15, Champagny
repeated to his minister at Washington in still plainer words the
substance of what had been said to Armstrong: “Some American ships
have been seized, but the Emperor contents himself for the moment
with holding them in sequestration. His conduct toward the Americans
will depend on the conduct of the United States toward England.” As
previously to Armstrong, so again to Turreau, the threat was supported
by the bribe:--
“The Emperor, wishing on this occasion to establish a still more
intimate union of interests between America and France, has
authorized me to notify Mr. Armstrong verbally that if England
should make any movement against the Floridas, he would not take
it ill if the United States should move troops there for defence.
You will be cautious in making use of this communication, which is
purely conditional, and can take effect only in case the Floridas are
attacked.”[250]
Not until late in the month of June did Turreau find an opportunity
to talk at his ease with the President and Secretary of State; but,
as usual, his account of the conversation was interesting.[251] He
began with Madison; and after listening with some impatience to the
Secretary’s long list of complaints, he brought forward the suggestion
of alliance:--
“I watched the Secretary of State, and the experience I have in
dealing with him made me easily perceive that my proposal embarrassed
him; so he replied in an evasive manner. At last, finding himself
too hard pressed, for a third time he said to me ‘that the intention
of the Federal government was to observe the most exact impartiality
between France and England.’ ‘You have departed from it,’ said I,
‘when you place the two Powers on the same line relatively to their
conduct toward you.’... ‘Well,’ said he, ‘we must wait the decision
of the next Congress with regard to the embargo; doubtless it will be
raised in favor of the Power which shall first recall the measures
that harass our commerce.’”
For three hours Turreau lectured the secretary on the iniquities
of England, while the secretary doggedly repeated his phrases.
Wearied but not satisfied, the French minister abandoned Madison and
attacked the President. Jefferson entertained him with a long list of
complaints against Spain, which Turreau had heard so often as to know
them by memory. When at last the conversation had been brought to the
subject of alliance against England, Jefferson took a new view of the
situation, which hardly agreed with that taken by the Secretary of
State.
“You have complained,” replied the President, “that in consequence
of our measures and of the proceedings of the last Congress, France
has been put on a level with England in regard to the wrongs we
allege against both Powers, while there was no kind of analogy either
in the date or the gravity of their wrongs toward the Americans. I
am going to prove to you generally that we never intended to admit
any comparison in the conduct of these two Powers, by recalling to
you the effect of the very measures you complain of. The embargo,
which seems to strike at France and Great Britain equally, is in
fact more prejudicial to the latter than to the former, by reason of
the greater number of colonies which England possesses, and their
inferiority in local resources.”
After pursuing this line of argument Jefferson reverted to his own
policy, and made an advance toward an understanding.
“It is possible,” he said, “that Congress may repeal the embargo, the
continuation of which would do us more harm than a state of war. For
us in the present situation all is loss; whereas, however powerful
the English may be, war would put us in a way of doing them much
harm, because our people are enterprising. Yet as it is probable that
Congress will favor raising the embargo if the Orders in Council
are withdrawn, it would be necessary for your interests, if you are
unwilling to withdraw your decrees, that at least you should promise
their withdrawal on condition that the embargo be withdrawn in your
favor. You will also observe that were the embargo withdrawn in
favor of the English, this will not close our differences with them,
because never--no, never--will there be an arrangement with them if
they do not renounce the impressment of our seamen on our ships.”
With this avowal, which Turreau understood as a sort of pledge
that Jefferson would lean toward war with England rather than with
France, the French minister was obliged to content himself; while he
pressed on his Government the assurance that both the President and
the secretary wished more than all else to obtain the Floridas. Such
reports were little calculated to change the Emperor’s course. Human
ingenuity discovered but one way to break Napoleon’s will, and this
single method was that of showing power to break his plans.
In due time Armstrong received his instructions of May 2, and wrote
June 10 to Champagny a note declining the proposed alliance, and
expressing the satisfaction which his Government felt at hearing the
Emperor’s approval of “a cautionary occupation of the Floridas.”
Napoleon, who was still at Bayonne in the flush of his power, no
sooner read this reply than he wrote to Champagny,[252]--
“Answer the American minister that you do not know what he means
about the occupation of the Floridas; and that the Americans, being
at peace with the Spaniards, cannot occupy the Floridas without the
permission or the request of the King of Spain.”
Armstrong, a few days afterward, was astonished by receiving from
Champagny a note[253] denying positively that any suggestion had ever
been made to warrant an American occupation of the Floridas without
an express request from the King of Spain: “The Emperor has neither
the right nor the wish to authorize an infraction of international
law, contrary to the interests of an independent Power, his ally and
his friend.” When Napoleon chose to deny a fact, argument was thrown
away; yet Armstrong could not do otherwise than recall Champagny’s
own words, which he did in a formal note, and there left the matter
at rest, writing to his Government that the change in tone had “no
doubt grown out of the new relations which the Floridas bear to this
government since the abdication of Charles IV.”[254]
For once Armstrong was too charitable. He might safely have assumed
that Napoleon was also continuing the same coarse game he had played
since April, 1803,--snatching away the lure he loved to dangle before
Jefferson’s eyes, punishing the Americans for refusing his offer of
alliance, and making them feel the constant pressure of his will.
They were fortunate if he did not at once confiscate the property
he had sequestered. Indeed, not only did his seizures of American
property continue even more rigorously than before,[255] but such
French frigates as could keep at sea actually burned and sunk American
ships that came in their way. The Bayonne Decree was enforced like a
declaration of war. The Emperor tolerated no remonstrance. At Bayonne,
July 6, he had an interview with one of the Livingstons, who was on
his way to America as bearer of despatches.
“We are obliged to embargo your ships,” said the Emperor;[256] “they
keep up a trade with England; they come to Holland and elsewhere with
English goods; England has made them tributary to her. This I will
not suffer. Tell the President from me when you see him in America
that if he can make a treaty with England, preserving his maritime
rights, it will be agreeable to me; but that I will make war upon the
universe, should it support her unjust pretensions. I will not abate
any part of my system.”
Yet in one respect he made a concession. He no longer required a
declaration of war from the United States. The embargo seemed to
him, as to Jefferson, an act of hostility to England which answered
the immediate wants of France. In the report on foreign relations,
dated Sept. 1, 1808, Napoleon expressed publicly his approval of the
embargo:--
“The Americans,--this people who placed their fortune, their
prosperity, and almost their existence in commerce,--have given the
example of a great and courageous sacrifice. By a general embargo
they have interdicted all commerce, all exchange, rather than
shamefully submit to that tribute which the English pretend to impose
on the shipping of all nations.”
Armstrong, finding that his advice was not even considered at home,
withdrew from affairs. After obeying his instructions of May 2,
and recording the conventional protest against Napoleon’s uncivil
tone,[257] he secluded himself, early in August, at the baths of
Bourbon l’Archambault, one hundred and fifty miles from Paris, and
nursed his rheumatism till autumn. Thither followed him instructions
from Madison, dated July 21,[258] directing him to present the case of
the burned vessels “in terms which may awaken the French government to
the nature of the injury and the demands of justice;” but the limit
of Armstrong’s patience was reached, and he flatly refused to obey.
Any new experiment made at that moment, he said, would certainly be
useless and perhaps injurious:--
“This opinion, formed with the utmost circumspection, is not only a
regular inference from the ill success of my past endeavors, which
have hitherto produced only palliations, and which have latterly
failed to produce these, but a direct consequence of the most
authentic information that the Emperor does not, on this subject and
at this time, exercise even the small degree of patience proper to
his character.”[259]
Finally Armstrong summed up the results of Jefferson’s policy so far
as France was concerned, in a letter[260] dated August 30, which
carried candor to the point of severity:--
“We have somewhat overrated our means of coercing the two great
belligerents to a course of justice. The embargo is a measure
calculated above any other to keep us whole and keep us in peace;
but beyond this you must not count upon it. Here it is not felt,
and in England ... it is forgotten. I hope that unless France shall
do us justice we will raise the embargo, and make in its stead the
experiment of an armed commerce. Should she adhere to her wicked and
foolish measures, we ought not to content ourselves with doing this.
There is much, very much, besides that we can do; and we ought not to
omit doing all we can, because it is believed here that we cannot do
much, and even that we will not do what we have the power of doing.”
Fortunately for Jefferson, the answer made by Spain, May 2, to
Napoleon’s orders was not couched in the terms which the United States
government used on the same day. Joseph Bonaparte, entering his new
kingdom, found himself a king without subjects. Arriving July 20 at
Madrid, Joseph heard nothing but news of rebellion and disaster. On
that day some twenty thousand French troops under General Dupont,
advancing on Seville and Cadiz, were surrounded in the Sierra Morena,
and laid down their arms to a patriot Spanish force. A few days
afterward the French fleet at Cadiz surrendered. A patriot Junta
assumed the government of Spain. Quick escape from Madrid became
Joseph’s most pressing necessity if he were to save his life. During
one July week he reigned over his gloomy capital, and fled, July 29,
with all the French forces still uncaptured, to the provinces beyond
the Ebro.
This disaster was quickly followed by another. Junot and his army, far
beyond support at Lisbon, suddenly learned that a British force under
Arthur Wellesley had landed, August 1, about one hundred miles to the
north of Lisbon, and was marching on that city. Junot had no choice
but to fight, and August 21 he lost the battle of Vimieiro. August 30,
at Cintra, he consented to evacuate Portugal, on condition that he and
his twenty-two thousand men should be conveyed by sea to France.
Never before in Napoleon’s career had he received two simultaneous
shocks so violent. The whole of Spain and Portugal, from Lisbon
to Saragossa, by a spasmodic effort freed itself from Bonaparte or
Bourbon; but this was nothing,--a single campaign would recover the
peninsula. The real blow was in the loss of Cadiz and Lisbon, of the
fleets and work-shops that were to restore French power on the ocean.
Most fatal stroke of all, the Spanish colonies were thenceforward
beyond reach, and the dream of universal empire was already dissolved
into ocean mist. Napoleon had found the limits of his range, and saw
the power of England rise, more defiant than ever, over the ruin and
desolation of Spain.
FOOTNOTES:
[234] Napoleon to General Clarke, Dec. 23, 1807; Correspondance, xvi.
212.
[235] Napoleon to Champagny, Jan. 12, 1808; Correspondance, xvi. 243.
[236] Napoleon to General Clarke, Jan. 28, 1808; Correspondance, xvi.
281, 282.
[237] Napoleon to Champagny, Feb. 2, 1808; Correspondance, xvi. 301.
[238] Armstrong to Madison, Feb. 15, 1808; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[239] Armstrong to Champagny, Feb. 5, 1808; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[240] Napoleon to Champagny, Feb. 11, 1808; Correspondance, xvi. 319.
[241] Armstrong to Madison, Feb. 15, 1808; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[242] Armstrong to Madison, Feb. 22, 1808; State Papers, iii. 250.
[243] Decrès to Rosily, Feb. 21, 1808; Thiers’s Empire, viii. 669.
[244] Napoleon to Talleyrand, Correspondance, xvii. 39, 49, 65.
[245] Napoleon to Decrès, May 13, 1808; Correspondance, xvii. 112.
[246] Napoleon to Gaudin, April 17, 1808; Correspondance, xvii. 16.
[247] Armstrong to Madison, April 25, 1808; MSS. State Department
Archives. Cf. State Papers, iii. 291.
[248] Madison to Armstrong, May 2, 1808; State Papers, iii. 252.
[249] Jefferson to Madison, Sept. 13, 1808; Writings, v. 367. Cf.
Jefferson to Armstrong, March 5, 1809; Works, v. 433.
[250] Champagny to Turreau, Feb. 15, 1808; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
[251] Turreau to Champagny, June 28, 1808; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
[252] Napoleon, to Champagny, June 21, 1808; Correspondance, xvii. 326.
[253] Champagny to Armstrong, June 22, 1808; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[254] Armstrong to Madison, July 8, 1808; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[255] Napoleon to Champagny, July 11, 1808; Correspondance, xvii. 364.
[256] Armstrong to Jefferson, July 28, 1808; Jefferson MSS.
[257] Armstrong to Champagny, July 4, 1808; State Papers, iii. 254.
[258] Madison to Armstrong, July 21, 1808; State Papers, iii. 254.
[259] Armstrong to Madison, Aug. 28, 1808; MSS. State Department
Archives.
[260] Armstrong to Madison, Aug. 30, 1808; State Papers, iii. 256.