1899
CAPE COLONY
It was with great reluctance that Sir Redvers Buller had been persuaded
to give any forecast to the War Office in London of the disposition of
troops he intended to make on reaching Capetown. But whatever these
may have been, he found on his arrival that the situation had so
materially changed that he had to rearrange his plans to suit the
emergency.
The Boers were bringing so much pressure to bear on Ladysmith, where
Sir George White had established his headquarters, and on Kimberley,
that he decided to send the First Division under Lord Methuen to the
relief of the latter place, and to employ in Natal the Second Division
and the two brigades of which the Third Division had been originally
composed. It seemed at the same time so important to reassure the
loyal colonists in Eastern Cape Colony that he sent Gatacre there with
one battalion of infantry and a promise of speedy reinforcements.
Writing on board ship between Capetown and {222} East London, on
November 16, Sir William says:
"I am ordered to go to East London, and take command of the district up
to Bethulie Bridge. Now, what does this mean? Why, that with the
Royal Irish Rifles, which has never been on service before, together
with half-battalion Berkshire Regiment, and a few Volunteers, I become
responsible for the railway line and adjacent country up to the Orange
River, about 200 miles long--but the last 100 miles are much
disaffected. I have no definite orders, except that I am to hold
Queenstown if possible, but East London at any rate, and am to raise as
many Volunteers as possible."
When the General reached East London he found that it could be left
under the care of a local Volunteer Corps, and so he proceeded by train
to Queenstown the same day. Here he found the half-battalion named
above, a small detachment of Royal Garrison Artillery, and half a
company of Royal Engineers. Besides these regular troops there were
229 men of the Frontier Mounted Rifles, and 285 of the Queenstown Rifle
Volunteers.
Sir Redvers Buller, who was the General Commanding-in-Chief, chose
Natal for his headquarters. Sir F. Forestier-Walker was in command of
the Lines of Communication, with headquarters at Capetown. Sometimes
Sir Redvers sent his messages direct to Gatacre, and sometimes they
came through Capetown. There was no friction and no contradiction,
{223} but it may well have been that this duplication of important
telegrams created an atmosphere of unrest and added poignancy to
Gatacre's feeling of helplessness.
On November 18 a telegram was received from Sir Redvers Buller,
pointing out that "the great thing in this sort of warfare is to be
pretty certain that one position is safe before you advance to another,
and that we are not yet strong enough to play tricks."[1]
[1] See _Official History of the War in South Africa_, 1899-1902, vol.
i. pp. 286, 287.
[Sidenote: Conflicting messages]
Three days, later, however, the General Commanding-in-Chief strikes a
different note:
"I calculate it will be at least five days and probably a week before I
have a second battalion to send you, or a battery of field artillery,
but I am anxious to get into a position to protect the Indwe mines
better than we do. Do you think it would be safe for you to advance
your force or part of it to Stormberg, and hold that instead of
Queenstown? I am told it is a good position for a force the size of
yours. Of course you will have no support."[2]
[2] From contemporary copy of telegram in W. F. G.'s own handwriting.
To this Sir William replied that he had not sufficient men as yet to
advance on Stormberg, but as soon as more troops arrived he intended to
occupy that junction and clear the country round it.
At the time this message was sent the Boers had not yet crossed the
Orange River {224} in strength, but by November 5 they had occupied
Aliwal North and Stormberg, and were advancing on Dordrecht. The first
is an important town on the Orange River, near which there are good
bridges, both for the road and the railway; the second is a railway
junction fifty-five miles north-west of Queenstown, and Dordrecht is a
small town only thirty-five miles from Queenstown to the north-east.
[Illustration: Invasion of Cape Colony: the Boers marching south over
the Orange River at Aliwal North.]
On hearing of the occupation of Dordrecht, Sir Redvers grew anxious
lest his former suggestion should be taken too seriously, and
telegraphed to Sir F. Forestier-Walker:
"Caution Gatacre to be careful. I think he is hardly strong enough to
advance beyond Putters Kraal before Methuen's return."[3]
[3] See _Official History_, vol. i. p. 288.
And on the following day he added instructions to reinforce Gatacre by
one, or if possible two battalions, and "any mounted men that can be
spared."[4]
[4] _Ibid._
Writing on November 24, Sir William says:
"I have not yet got any more troops, but am hoping for some directly.
Fancy what a predicament for a General Officer to be in--no troops, no
transport, no horses for his Mounted Infantry; but I trust all are
coming. The only unfortunate thing is that our people in front,
police, civilian officers, etc., are obliged to fall back for want of
support. I have been over a good deal of country the last few days,
round our outposts, and am delighted with it. It is fine and open, and
the farmers are a nice set of people. The sun is hot, but nothing like
India: {225} one can ride in it all day without inconvenience, and it
hardly ever gives you sunstroke."
[Sidenote: An anxious time]
And again on the 28th:
"I have had a terribly anxious time the last two days, the Boers
wrecking everything in my front, and no troops to drive them out. I am
thankful to say that I hear to-day that a regiment, the 2nd
Northumberland Fusiliers, is arriving here to-morrow, ... and so I
shall be able to make some kind of show--but I am still badly off for
everything. I am still praying for artillery, hospitals, etc. The
whole country is seething with rebellion, and to put it down we require
a lot of men."
Immediately after the arrival of this reinforcement, Gatacre advanced
his Headquarters to Putters Kraal, twenty-five miles up the railway,
and placed outposts at Sterkstroom, Bushman's Hoek, and Penhoek. The
cross railway line running from Stormberg westwards through Rosmead to
Naauwpoort was soon afterwards destroyed by the enemy, thus putting a
stop to any combined action between Sir William and Sir John French,
who was defending a parallel railway which runs up from Port Elizabeth
through Naauwpoort and Colesberg to Bloemfontein.
On November 30 Sir William writes:
"I fear this is a grumbling letter, but I am in a miserable state of
inefficiency. I have only two regiments (one joined yesterday). We
have waggons but no harness, and only {226} half the mules to draw
them--and are within a few miles of the enemy. I have orders to raise
Mounted Volunteers, but have no saddlery, no equipment, no clothing to
supply them with: it would be laughable if it were not lamentable and
serious....
"The worst point about the whole thing is that I can hear nothing of
any more troops coming to me, that the Boers are eating up the country
in our front, and forcing the farmers to join them, because I cannot
move: and consequently they are getting stronger every day. I assure
you that I am perfectly sick at such a display of inefficiency,
unpreparedness, and apathy.
"Yesterday I made a dash out to Molteno, some sixteen miles ahead of my
present position, and seized some 7,000 bags of food, meal, etc., and
brought it in on some trains which I took out."
On Saturday, December 2, Sir William sent the following message to Sir
Redvers Buller:
"Military situation here requires dealing with extreme carefulness.
Boers have occupied Dordrecht, and enemy is advancing in a southerly
direction, evidently pointing for Queenstown. I have two British
regiments only, and I am thirty-three miles to the north of Queenstown.
I am holding Bushman's Hoek range, to endeavour to prevent descent into
Queenstown district, which would mean general state of rebellion of
Dutch. Force will be strengthened at Queenstown by next British
regiment, which should arrive at Queenstown December 5, but Queenstown
is indefensible position. Are there any orders, especially as regards
my movements?"[5]
[5] See _Official History_, vol. i. p. 288.
{227} To which this reply was returned:
"We have to make the best of the situation, and if the enemy is
advancing by Dordrecht, the importance of Bushman's Hoek is diminished.
You have a force which altogether is considerably stronger than the
enemy can now bring against you. Cannot you close with him, or else
occupy a defensible position which will obstruct his advance? You have
an absolutely free hand to do what you think best."[6]
[6] See _Official History_, vol. i. p. 288.
[Sidenote: Night attack suggested]
On the following day the message given below reached Gatacre through
Sir F. Forestier-Walker:
"General Buller inquires whether you can safely leave your present
position and advance to Henning's Station, or somewhere near where you
can get a safe position, and also institute a policy of worry. He
thinks if you could occupy Henning's Station Boers would fall back on
Burghersdorp, or if you could get near enough to Burghersdorp to make
night attack, it would be the thing to stop anxiety (_sic_). He adds
Hildyard with a battalion and half sent a column of seven thousand
Boers under Joubert himself flying. The above was probably wired
before Buller read notification of the enemy's occupation of Dordrecht.
He wired last night as follows: tell Gatacre he will have to take care
of himself till 5th Division arrives. A telegram just received says he
has given you a free hand."[7]
[7] From copy of telegram in A.D.C.'s handwriting.
Burghersdorp is about twenty-three miles north of Stormberg, and
Henning is a station about ten miles west of Stormberg on the cross
{228} line. This telegram, therefore, sketched a far more arduous and
hazardous enterprise than that which Gatacre afterwards attempted.
Within the next few days the Third Division was strengthened by the
arrival of the 74th and 77th Batteries Royal Field Artillery, the First
Battalion Royal Scots, the 33rd Company Army Service Corps, and the
16th Field Hospital. All these units were only just arrived from
England, so that, although the additional battalion of infantry was
very valuable, Gatacre was unable to employ the men on the raid that he
had been planning for some time past. They would serve, however, to
protect the camp, and would thus set the other two battalions free for
use as a striking force. Even these had only been two and three weeks
in the country respectively, and the General had had no opportunity of
getting them into the hard condition and fighting form that was reached
by his Brigade on the Nile.
On December 8 he writes:
"I am frightfully busy and worried. The whole of this country is
seething with rebels, and as they are all mounted, and I have only a
few mounted infantry on half-fed ponies, it is very difficult to cope
with them.
"I have now three regiments of infantry, but have a long railway line
to guard, and every culvert has a couple of armed men in it. Fancy
what an anxiety this is--their safety, their food, their overworked
condition. If I had my Division I could really strike somewhere....
"I am hoping to move on a bit to-morrow or next day to recover some of
the country given {229} up prior to my arrival, as I think occupation
of a position in advance of this may tend to awe the Dutch behind me."
In the _Official History_ we read that--
"The General Officer Commanding considered that, in the existing
strategic situation, any further prolongation of the defensive attitude
he had hitherto been obliged to maintain would be injurious. He
determined, therefore, to take advantage of the free hand left to him
by Sir Redvers Buller, and to follow the further suggestion that he
should close with the enemy."[8]
[8] See _Official History_, vol. i. p. 289.
The first week in December was spent in reconnoitring the Stormberg
position so far as wandering parties of Boers would permit. The
general himself prepared a sketch of the hills surrounding it and the
roads leading thereto, which he carried with him on the march. The
only map available was on too small a scale (twelve and a half miles to
the inch) to be useful for tactical purposes, but all possible
information was extracted from every man acquainted with the locality.
Their accounts of the features and the distances were often inexact,
and did not always agree, but eventually five local men, belonging to
the Cape Mounted Police, under Sergeant Morgan of the same corps, were
selected as guides.
The General's scheme was to attack the Boer laager on the Stormberg
Nek; by a night march of nine miles from Molteno he hoped to reach a
{230} position from which the enemy's camp could be assaulted at
daybreak.
The concentration was made at Molteno, on the afternoon of December 9,
the troops being brought from Putters Kraal by train, about sixteen
miles, and some from Bushman's Hoet, which was half the distance. The
force consisted of the two field batteries, with an escort of Mounted
Infantry and two Infantry Battalions. It should have been further
augmented by the detachment from Penhoek of 235 Cape Mounted Rifles,
but, owing to the miscarriage of a telegram, these men failed to appear.
Another circumstance that modified the original plan was a report that
was brought in at the last minute that the enemy had fortified and
entrenched the pass between the Kissieberg and Rooi Kop, over which
runs the main road and the railway to the junction. The informant
affirmed that the Boer main laager was placed on the heights of the
Kissieberg, which could be easily ascended from the western side, where
there were no artificial defences. The General was assured by all
those who should have known that to reach this hill on its western
flank would only add two miles to the projected march, and that they
could lead him to a favourable spot for such an attempt.
[Sidenote: The start]
A council was held in the station-master's room at Molteno, and all the
commanding officers were consulted as to their men's condition and
fitness for the expedition. Although the train service had been most
carefully timed, a {231} delay of two hours had somehow crept in; the
railway was but a single line and the siding accommodation very
limited. However, no one foresaw any difficulty, and so the start was
made at nine o'clock that evening by moonlight. Indeed, so eager were
the men that they set out at an unusually brisk pace.
In the General's official report we read:
"The force marched, with the usual halts, for about eight miles by
moonlight, and halted near Roberts's farm at 12.30. The chief guide
now reported that we were within one and a half miles of the enemy's
position, and, after a rest of about three-quarters of an hour, we
marched off again in the dark."[9]
[9] See _Despatches_ published March 17, 1900.
It was soon after this halt that the General realised that the guides
had not brought him along the road that he had indicated, but, as he
wrote, to turn back in consequence of this discovery did not commend
itself to him. So the men tramped on, and at 4.20 a.m. found
themselves under a face of the Kissieberg. A single shot from a Boer
picket precipitated the attack, and before long the enemy had located
the British column.
"Three companies of the Royal Irish Rifles formed to the left, and
occupied a kopje; the remainder of this battalion and the
Northumberland Fusiliers advanced up a steep hill against the enemy's
position."[10]
[10] _Ibid._
"There was no good position for the British {232} guns, except the
ridge 2,000 yards to the west of the Kissieberg. But the infantry's
need of immediate support was too pressing to allow time for that
ridge's occupation. Lieutenant-Colonel Jeffreys, by direction of
General Gatacre, caused the 77th Battery to come into action near the
kopje, the 74th unlimbering in the open veldt to the westward. The
Mounted Infantry continued to escort the batteries....
[Sidenote: A fatal mischance]
"The Boers from the main laager had now manned the hill, but the
British artillery was bursting shells on the threatened crest, and a
Boer gun, which had come into action, was for a time silenced.
"The attack had lasted half an hour, and progress up the hill was being
slowly made by the British infantry, when five companies of the
Northumberlands, on the right of the line, were ordered to retire by
their commanding officer. He considered that his battalion must leave
the hill. The three foremost companies, who were nearly on the summit,
did not hear this order, and, under the command of Captain Wilmott,
remained with the Irish Rifles, clinging on as they were. The fire of
the enemy appeared to be slackening, and for the moment the groups of
British officers were convinced that, if they were supported, they
could gain the crest. But the withdrawal of a portion of the attacking
line had made further success impossible. Nor was that all. Seeing
the five companies of the Northumberland Fusiliers falling back to the
west, the batteries conceived that all the assailants were retreating,
and exerted themselves to the utmost to cover the movement by their
fire. The sun was now rising behind the western face of the
Kissieberg, so that all the upper part presented to the British guns a
black target, on {233} which neither friend nor foe could be
distinguished. Thus a fatal mischance came about. A shell fused for
explosion just short of the Boer defensive line burst over the foremost
group of the Irish Rifles, and struck down Lieutenant-Colonel Eager,
Major H. J. Seton, the second-in-command, Major Welman, Captain Bell,
and three men. A conference had a few moments before been held between
Colonel Eager and Captain Wilmott, as to the steps which should be
taken to protect the men from the shells of their own gunners. The
former officer had stated that as the situation of the infantry was
evidently unknown to the batteries, and was masking their fire, it was
necessary to fall back. Captain Wilmott, on the other hand, urged that
if the men were once ordered to withdraw, it would be very difficult to
get them up the hill again. Colonel Eager replied that there was no
help for it. Therefore a general retirement now began."[11]
[11] See _Official History_, vol. i. pp. 297-8.
An officer of the Royal Irish Rifles writes in his official report:
"At this time I did not think there was more than a piquet in front,
and a rush at the end of the kopje would have taken that part of the
position and the Boer gun. Colonel Eager, Major Seton, Major Welman,
and Captain Bell were knocked over at this point by one of our shells,
otherwise I think they would have taken this portion of the Boer
position. From subsequent conversation with one Voss, Secretary to
Swanepoel, Commandant Smithfield Laager there is no doubt that many of
the Boers were leaving the position."
{234}
It seems, therefore, clear that the day was almost won, for had our
shells fallen a little farther forward, so that the infantry could have
held on a quarter of an hour longer, they would doubtless have found
the defences evacuated. If our victorious troops had been able to eat
the enemy's breakfast, we should have heard nothing of the fatigues of
the night march, nor of the missing telegram.
But, unfortunately, the morning ended differently. We will close the
account with a quotation from a letter written by one of the
aides-de-camp:
"The General, as soon as he realised the state of things, arranged for
the retirement, quite cool under the hottest fire, encouraging the men
and moving over the position in every direction, not recklessly, but
with a fine courage, which did us all good to watch. The retirement
was carried out in wonderful order, and, weary though the men were,
they hastened to join their units, and marched home in fair order....
Throughout the retirement he was the last man of the column, beating up
tired stragglers, and bringing in abandoned transport."
In all the accounts something is said about a secondary force of Boers
that came on to the scene soon after the general retirement had begun,
but according to the following extract from another officer's report,
they refrained from doing us as much damage as might have been effected
by a more experienced enemy.
{235}
"Just as we were moving off about 400 Boers appeared on the high
plateau on our right flank from the Steynsburg direction, but were at
once checked by the fire of our guns, and gave the infantry no further
trouble."
The advanced troops got back to Molteno at 11 a.m., and all were in by
12.30. The casualties were officially returned as eight officers
wounded (one died of wounds) and thirteen missing; in other ranks there
were 25 killed, 102 wounded, and 548 missing. The whole force employed
amounted to 3,035 of all ranks.
The main facts of this account are taken from the _History of the War
in South Africa_ recently published. So little is said in the
General's despatch of the part played by the infantry that this
omission is a subject of comment in Lord Roberts's covering letter of
February 1900.[12] It may therefore be concluded that the
Field-Marshal (who was commanding the forces in Ireland at the time
that the engagement was fought) was at the time of writing ignorant of
many incidents that have since been brought to light.
[12] See _Despatches_ published March 17, 1900.
[Sidenote: With an ace]
In Sir William's letter three days later he speaks of the action as "a
most lamentable failure, and yet within an ace of being the success I
anticipated," and goes on:
"The fault was mine, as I was responsible of course. I went rather
against my better judgment in not resting the night at Molteno, but I
{236} was tempted by the shortness of the distance and the certainty of
success. It was so near being a brilliant success."
Both in the articles published at the time, and in the _Official
History_ referred to above, the circumstances in which Sir William was
placed are held to have made some demonstration imperative.
"Sir William Gatacre's decision to advance on Stormberg was fully
justified by the strategical situation. General Buller's telegram,
although it left him a free hand as to time and opportunity, had
suggested that operation. The plan, though bold, was sound in its
design, and would have succeeded had not exceptional misfortune
attended its execution."[13]
[13] See _Official History_, vol. i. pp. 301, 302.
On the following day, Monday, the battle of Magersfontein was fought on
the north-west, and on Friday of the same week Sir Redvers Buller
delivered his unsuccessful attack on Colenso. Owing to the proximity
of dates, the attempt to retake Stormberg is associated in the public
mind with the other engagements of that week; but in the numbers
employed, in the losses suffered, and in political importance it
shrinks into insignificance compared with them. At Magersfontein, on
December 11, 14,964 troops of all ranks were engaged, the total killed
and wounded was returned as 885, with 63 missing; at Colenso, out of
19,378 men, the losses were 899, with 240 missing; while at Stormberg,
out {237} of 3,035 engaged, 135 were killed and wounded, and 571 taken
prisoners.[14] From a political point of view, though no ground was
gained, still none was lost, and Sir William was actually able, the day
after, to establish his headquarters at Sterkstroom, which was five
miles farther up the railway than he had been at Putters Kraal.
[14] See _Official History_, vol. i. app. vi. pp. 468, 469, 470.
From the General Commanding-in-Chief Sir William received the following
telegram:
"Your telegram respecting your action and dispositions, I think you
were quite right to try the night attack and hope better luck next
time. I don't think you will find them attack you when in position,
but it would be better to retire than run the risk of being surrounded;
as to this you must judge for yourself, but military considerations
should be held paramount.--BULLER."[15]
[15] See original text. From Frere Camp, 2.17 p.m.; reached
Sterkstroom 4.4 p.m., December 11, 1899.
Writing on December 18, Sir William says:
"I have now three regiments--the Derbyshire, Royal Scots, and Royal
Irish Rifles. I have been obliged to send the Northumberland Fusiliers
to East London to look after the base, as Sir Redvers Buller wished
this done. My Howitzer Battery he has been obliged to send to Natal to
assist Clery.
"I have up here (Sterkstroom) a large camp with supplies, stores, etc.,
and have been ordered by Buller to entrench and endeavour with my
mounted troops to harry the district round me, but I have so few
trained troops, and these Boers {238} are so mobile (all mounted) that
it is a very difficult matter to catch them.
* * * * *
"You must not expect to see much movement from my force: I have no
strength--cannot leave my line of communications, which are long. All
the districts behind me are ready to rise, and I cannot separate my
regiments. I have received orders to entrench my camp, and this I am
about to do. This will, of course, free my mounted men a bit, as the
post, with provisions, will be safe for them to come back to. As I am
writing I hear of a threatened rising in Alice and Seymour, two
districts south-west of Stutterheim, right away behind me, which makes
it difficult for me to retain my communications with the coast. These
may be exaggerated reports, but I have had so many warnings that one
cannot afford to disregard them. You may rest assured we shall fight
to the end anyhow, and my thoughts will be with you."
{239}