1898
ATBARA AND OMDURMAN
[Sidenote: Combined force]
All through the winter every movement on the part of the Dervish
leaders was carefully watched by the gun-boats on the Nile and the
Egyptian cavalry on its banks. The Intelligence Department had a
system of espionage by which the feeling inside Omdurman was made known
to them. The Sirdar knew that the Khalifa was unwilling to turn out
his main army, but that a large force was preparing to move out of
Metemma under the combined command of the Emir Mahmoud and the cavalry
leader Osman Digna. Before long the Sirdar knew that this force had
crossed to Shendy on the right bank of the Nile on February 28, and
that on March 13 they had reached Aliab, which is only twenty miles
south of Dakila, the Egyptian outpost. But their subsequent designs
were not known. It was doubtful whether their scheme was to attack the
Sirdar at Dakila, a fort which had recently been built on the right
bank of the Nile, where the large tributary stream of the Atbara flows
in from the south-east, or to make a dash {199} on Berber and sever the
railway communication lower down. Eventually the Dervish leader found
himself unable to carry out either of these schemes, the fortress
appearing too formidable after the arrival of the British contingent,
and Berber proving too remote. He decided therefore to threaten both
points, and took up a strong position on the banks of the Atbara, about
thirty miles above Dakila, which he fortified and entrenched
elaborately, and waited for his foes to take the initiative.
The force with which the Sirdar could meet the enemy was composed of
the British Brigade, which had now been completed to four battalions by
the arrival of the Seaforth Highlanders, and three Brigades of the
Egyptian Army, commanded respectively by Colonel Maxwell, Colonel
Macdonald, and Colonel Lewis. There were also eight squadrons of
cavalry, and two Maxim guns under Colonel Broadwood, six companies of
the Camel Corps under Major Tudway, and some artillery, both heavy and
light, under Colonel Long. The total ran up to nearly 14,000 men of
all arms. This force was concentrated at Kenur on the Nile, and all
the officers seem genuinely to have held the opinion that contact with
the enemy might occur at any moment. But as it turned out, it was not
till seventeen days after the Sirdar's force started on their march to
meet the enemy that the two armies met.
On Sunday, March 20, the whole force marched across the angle of the
desert to Da {200} Hudi, a camp on the Atbara River about twelve miles
south-east of Kenur. They started as if only for a reconnaissance in
force, for we read: "We are taking only one day's supplies and what we
stand up in, one blanket being carried for us on camels." The hospital
staff and transport was cut down to such narrow dimensions that it was
hardly adequate for the work when the big fight really took place.
Through all the next seventeen days the force lived on tinned beef and
biscuits, in daily anticipation of closing with the enemy. But what
was privation, discomfort, and hardship to every man in the force was
vexation of spirit also to Gatacre. Writing on March 30, he says:
"We may move to-morrow against Mahmoud, who is still in his entrenched
jungle position at Hilgi on the east bank of the Atbara, eighteen miles
south of this. I have been urging the Sirdar to move forward and
attack him, as we have been inactive for some days, while Mahmoud is
merely sitting and waiting for us. The inaction has a bad effect, both
on our men and on the enemy."
And again on April 3:
"We are leaving the camp to-morrow, and going on to one three and a
half to four miles south of Abadar. I was in great hopes that the
Sirdar would attack Mahmoud at once. I thought I had persuaded him,
but he wired my recommendation to Lord Cromer, and gave his own opinion
and that of General Hunter, which were for waiting. To-day he got a
wire from Lord Cromer, deciding not to attack--a great {201} pity, I
think. At present the situation is as under: Mahmoud is in a zariba
about ten miles from here, with about 20,000 men, very much crushed up
for space, exceedingly hard up for food, and so placed that they
cannot, in the event of a reverse, get away at all as an organised
force. There never was such a chance, and we are missing it."
Continuing his letter on the following day, he says:
"Yesterday, after writing so far, I got a bad go of colic, or malaria,
or something, which made me feel very bad; but I am better to-day, and
hope to be all right to-morrow. I hear that another telegram has come
from Lord Cromer, saying, on consideration he leaves the matter to the
Sirdar, so I presume he will now attack as soon as possible. I hope
so. We have moved to-day to Abadar, and are encamped in a shady belt
of trees, near the river, but it is getting very hot."
[Sidenote: A forward policy]
During this time there had been frequent reconnaissances in the
direction of the enemy's camp by the cavalry and Camel Corps and
artillery. Three small actions had been fought; and with the help of
the information thus obtained, and from the tales of deserters, the
position, size, and strength of Mahmoud's camp were known with
considerable accuracy.
It was the responsibility which Gatacre had incurred by advocating an
early attack on this fortified position, against the advice of others
better acquainted with Soudan warfare, that {202} coloured all his
dispositions when the day arrived. He did not, however, let his
natural forwardness of character deceive him as to the resistance to be
overcome. The author of _The River War_ has already made this point,
although he did not know the true interpretation of the situation.
"It is impossible not to sympathise with General Gatacre's obvious
determination that, whatever happened to the other parts of the
assault, the British Brigade should burst into the enclosure at all
costs.[1]
[1] _The River War_, vol. i. p. 457.
This feeling of exaggerated personal responsibility led the General to
take up his position at the head of his Brigade. In his letter written
four days later he anticipates the criticism that would be levelled
against him on this account, and shows that he had weighed the point,
and had deliberately forsaken the traditional place. Scientific
soldiers may criticise his action, but, according to Mr. Churchill,
there was to a civilian a certain grim splendour in the spectacle.[2]
[2] _Ibid._, vol. i. p. 468.
In the General's last letter before the fight we find the following
words:
"My men are ready. I have taught them all I know. We shall do our
best, and I think my regiments will do all I expect of them; God bless
you."
[Sidenote: The assault]
The battle of the Atbara was fought on Good Friday, April 8, 1898. It
was a brilliant victory, and resulted in the capture of Mahmoud and the
{203} total defeat of his army. The enemy's losses were estimated at
40 Emirs and 3,000 Dervishes killed. On our side the losses were 24
killed and 101 wounded in the British Brigade, and 56 killed and 371
wounded in the Egyptian Army. It is interesting to note that the
casualties in the two Egyptian Brigades, which took part in the assault
on the zariba simultaneously with the British regiments, amount to 381,
which gives a higher ratio per Brigade than the figure for the British
troops, which is 125. So that it is scarcely possible to maintain that
the formation adopted in Gatacre's brigade was peculiarly destructive.
The General's own letter of April 14 from Darmali furnishes a very
graphic account of the engagement and the return march:
"They all did very well, but I had to get a bit forward to watch that
all went well. Between you and me, a General Officer should not get up
into the firing line of his Brigade without good reason; this I know,
but I had good reasons for going there. When your whole Brigade only
covers a space of 200 yards by 200 yards, it is immaterial where you
are, so far as the penetration of bullets is concerned, but what is
important is that the G.O.C. should be where he can watch any important
point.... Well, our men started the ball, and we pushed straight on
over the stockade. It was pretty hot when we were pulling away the
zariba fence; the ground was flying up as if it was being harrowed all
round me, with the fire of the riflemen, and I lost a terrible bunch of
men at that {204} spot. Of course I saw the sooner we got to the
stockade the sooner we should stop the rifle fire, so we rushed it, and
as soon as we were in we soon killed all the riflemen and the spearmen
there, but we had a real good fight. The general operations of the
day, however, were as follows: On evening of the 7th (Thursday) the
British Brigade and three Egyptian Brigades moved out from Abadar at 6
p.m., my Brigade leading; we moved in square about three miles, sat
down in the Desert, had some food and water, and slept in square till 1
o'clock a.m. Of course we took no blankets or anything with us, merely
one day's food, ammunition, and water. At one o'clock we moved on in
square, the other brigades following; it was moonlight, and a curious
sight to see these three enormous hollow squares moving solemnly on
with not a note or a whisper even--no smoking. We went on till just
before dawn, then halted and deployed into line; a fine line it
was--the Camerons, Seaforths, and Lincolnshires, with the Warwicks in
column on the left flank at right angles.
"We then advanced a bit, till we could see the Dem (zariba), pulled up,
and commenced firing with our artillery, in hopes of drawing Mahmoud
out to fight, and secondly of pounding his army well before we
assaulted the position. Our cavalry was on my left, watching the left
flank; the Dervishes made several attempts to get their cavalry out,
but failed. Well, after hammering away for an hour, the order for
assault was given, and away we went, the, Camerons covering the front
of the assaulting column, and firing as they went; directly we got on
to the crest of the hill men began to tumble about, and I gave the
order to rush the zariba and stockade.
{205}
[Sidenote: The return march]
"We lost some very good officers and men killed, but that must always
be; we lost fewer than I expected. Captain Findlay, Camerons, a nice
fellow, was killed getting over the zariba. Captain Urquhart, of the
Camerons, too, was killed. He had just come back from the Staff
College on purpose to take part in the expedition. Gore was quite a
boy. I was with Captain Findlay most of the march to the zariba, as
his was the company of direction, and as we were marching principally
by the stars, I had to be there or thereabouts. After they were dead I
cut off a bit of hair from Findlay and Urquhart to send home; Gore had
had his hair cut so short that none was procurable. We buried them all
in one grave, immediately after the fight. A curious sight: the Pipers
and Buglers of a Soudanese battalion played the Dead March in Saul,
then the Pipers of the Camerons and Seaforths played a Lament, then we
filled in the grave. We had amongst the four Brigades about 600 killed
and wounded, and we had, immediately we had buried the dead and dressed
the wounded, to carry all these men back about eight miles across the
desert. We told off eight men to each stretcher, and moved slowly
homewards, leaving at 6 p.m. The fight was over about 8.45 a.m. I
think, but it took us all day to dress the wounded and build sheds for
them (of bushes). The sun, of course, is very hot, and we had all to
sit in the desert, as the bush and the river-bank was so full of dead
and dying Dervishes as to make it inadvisable for our men to lie there.
* * * * *
"Now I suppose we shall be here for three months, to refit and prepare
for the next go-in at Khartoum, which will require careful doing."
{206}
The Sirdar was naturally very much gratified at the decisive nature of
his victory, and was overwhelmed with telegrams of congratulation. The
following quotation from an article in _Blackwood's Magazine_ of
December 1902 tells us how the Sirdar expressed himself to his
colleague:
"Kitchener was dictating his dispatch to the Queen when there passed in
front of us a pony led by a syce, and laden with spoils selected from
that field of plenty with the praiseworthy discrimination of an art
connoisseur. Kitchener hailed the man, and selecting the finest coat
of mail and the most beautifully finished spear, bade me take them to
General Gatacre with his warmest thanks for the splendid gallantry and
good judgment with which he had led his fine Brigade. I seem now to
see the pleasant light that shone in that brave soldier's eyes as I
gave him the message word for word. What a splendid fellow, and how
willingly any of us would have given our right hands to save him from
the fate that befell him--at the hands of his own chiefs--in South
Africa."[3]
[3] _Ex_ article, "Campaigning with Kitchener," December 1902, p. 738.
In the official dispatch the Sirdar wrote:
"The high state of efficiency to which the British Brigade was brought
is, I consider, in a large measure due to the untiring energy and
devotion to duty of Major-General Gatacre and the loyal support
rendered him by the commanding officers of his battalions, all of whom
he has brought to favourable notice. During the engagement on the 8th
inst. General Gatacre showed a fine example of gallant leading. The
{207} cordiality and good feeling existing between the British and
Egyptian troops, who have fought shoulder to shoulder, is to a great
extent due to the hearty co-operation of General Gatacre, and I cannot
speak too highly of the services rendered by him and the troops under
his command in the recent operations."[4]
[4] _The Times_, Wednesday, May 25, 1898.
All through May, June, and July the time hung heavily for the British
Brigade. They were quartered in the villages of Darmali and El Sillem,
the General's headquarters being at the former. The temperature ran up
to 106° and 108° in the shade, but he makes light of the heat and says,
"One does not feel it as one does in India."
One little incident of these weary days has survived, and is recorded
by an officer in his recollections.
"When the General was inspecting the Ordnance workshops at our camp on
the Nile, a non-commissioned officer was brought to his notice as
having done very good work. Gatacre complimented him highly, and said:
"'Now, what can I do for you? I'll tell you what, you shall carry my
flag when we advance to Omdurman.'
"I believe the man's face was a picture, and he did not see it at all
in the same light."[5]
[5] _With the 72nd Highlanders in the Sudan Campaign_, by Colonel
Granville Egerton.
For, as all the Brigade knew, the General's flag had been carried at
the battle of the Atbara by Staff-Sergeant Wyeth, who had been shot
through the knee and had subsequently died of his {208} wound, so that
the non-commissioned officer had good cause to look on it as an
undesirable honour.
This matter of carrying a flag into action has also aroused comment,
but it is recorded that the Sirdar was always accompanied by the red
Egyptian Flag, and it is probable that, in flying a little Union Jack
behind him, the General had merely adopted this practice to flatter the
nationality of his troops.
At the end of May he made a trip in a gunboat to Shendy and Metemma,
which he much enjoyed. In June he took a fortnight's leave to
Alexandria and Cairo. It was while staying there that he received
official intimation of his having been advanced to Major-General's
rank, for hitherto his name had appeared in the Army List as a Colonel
with the temporary and local rank of Major-General. According to
regulations, a medical examination was necessary before this promotion
could be confirmed. The idea that there could be any question about
his health amused Gatacre greatly, and he offered, as a test, to run a
hundred yards' race with the Principal Medical Officer. The challenge
was politely declined, and an appointment made for the formal
examination.
[Sidenote: Promotion]
In August Gatacre had the great satisfaction of finding himself in
command of a Division in the field. A second Brigade of British troops
was being sent up, and Colonel Wauchope[6] and Colonel Lyttelton[7]
arrived from England to take {209} over the First and Second Brigades
respectively. But however gratifying this promotion might be, it
lifted him farther from the soldiers and the fighting, and it is owing
to this circumstance that his name was so little mentioned in the story
of the fight before Omdurman. This elevation, however, made no
difference to his work or his activity. On August 17 he writes from
Dakila:
[6] The late Major-General Andrew Wauchope, C.B.
[7] General the Hon. Sir Neville Lyttelton, G.C.B.
"We are very busy now with embarkations and detrainments of troops
arriving from the north; we are up nearly every night, as trains arrive
at most unearthly hours; this of course is unavoidable. My first
Brigade has gone on, and the embarkation of the second commences at
daybreak to-morrow morning.... We move by steamers towing barges to
Wad Bishara, about 145 miles, and thence by route march."
Wad Bishara is just below the Sixth Cataract, and lies on the western
bank about fifty-five miles north of Omdurman.
The defeat of the Dervish army at the battle of Omdurman took place on
Sunday, September 2, 1898. The story was told with much detail in the
newspapers at the time, and has since been elaborately set out in _The
River War_, but, notwithstanding the existence of many records, this
book would not be complete without some account of such an important
event. Though far from being a comprehensive narrative, the General's
letter is interesting in itself:
"_September_ 7, 1898.
"On the morning of September 1 we marched twelve miles through jungle,
finding everywhere {210} traces of the flight of the Dervish
outposts--dead animals, men, etc., who had been killed by them,
probably people attempting to desert.
"We arrived at Kerreri about 12 noon, and found a village on the river
with much open ground to our front and south-west, with a conical hill
standing up in the plain about two miles to the south. We settled down
to eat in the village, and in about an hour our cavalry sent in to say
that the Khalifa's army was on the march from Omdurman towards us in
three bodies, a centre and two wings. As soon as we had had our food,
we set to work to get our troops into position in a kind of semicircle
round the village, and strengthened ourselves with a zariba and trench,
where zariba thorns were unprocurable; this we finished by dark, and
then sat down to eat and sleep. The night passed quietly. The Khalifa
missed a chance of doing us much damage by not attacking at night, but
luckily he did not disturb us.
"At 3.30 a.m. we stood to our arms, ready for an attack at dawn. It
was a beautiful moonlight night, and I had been up most of the time,
watching my line and inspecting the patrols, etc. About six in the
morning of the 2nd we got intelligence that the Khalifa's army was
coming on, and presently they began to pour across the open ground
about two miles off, yelling like demons, apparently an endless stream
of men and horses. I have never seen anything like it--banners flying
all along the line, guns firing, etc. For an hour they kept pouring
along in thousands, and suddenly the centre of the mass turned, and
came straight for us. I made all my men lie down, so that nothing
could be seen of us except our zariba fence. As soon as they got
within range, about 2,300 yds., we opened {211} fire with all our guns,
rifles, and Maxims, and a hail of lead fell on the army; but they were
impervious to any influences of this kind, and kept pressing on and on
till we literally mowed them down by hundreds. After about
three-quarters of an hour, the ground was strewn with dead and dying,
and then, as our fire did not slacken, they began to turn and go, but
only at a walk, no running about it.
[Sidenote: The great fight]
"Then we advanced, and after we had moved on about one mile the centre
of the Dervish force returned to the charge and fell upon a Soudanese
Brigade, to whose assistance I sent a British Brigade (General
Wauchope's); this stayed the Dervish attack, which was driven back and
followed up. The whole force advanced and poured a heavy fire into the
retreating Dervishes, who slowly withdrew, fighting. We had now been
at work fighting and moving from 3.30 a.m. under a heavy sun without
water, and had still four miles to march over a very sandy country, so
we started in fighting formation, keeping ourselves ready at any moment
to face west again. Well, they finally drew off to the hills, and we
moved slowly on-towards the water, which one Brigade reached at 2 p.m.
and the other at 3.30 p.m.; halted there till 4.30 p.m., and then
marched on again into Omdurman, about three and a half miles; this we
did not reach till dark, as we had to go carefully. There were still a
lot of Dervishes in the town, and our gun-boats were shelling them, up
the river and in the town. We had to bivouac out in the desert, as we
could not find a suitable place. We could get no water that night, as
the river was too far to send to, and it was not safe to allow small
parties to go out.
{212}
"Next morning we marched down to the river and bivouacked on the
water's edge, and there we are now.
"The total dead counted were 10,324 as near as could be; the wounded it
would be impossible to count, as they all crowded away on to the
river-bank and into the town, but there were thousands of them,
possibly another 10,000 or more, some with the most fearful wounds. I
went out the next afternoon and also the day following with water for
the wounded. I sent out many mules laden entirely with water, and we
relieved many of these unfortunates, but no doubt many died from want
of water.
"Now the whole thing is over, except an excursion to Fashoda, which the
Sirdar is arranging; I think he goes up to-morrow with 100 men of the
Northumberland Fusiliers in a steamer.
"We had a nice day at Khartoum; we (800 men from various battalions),
two or three bands, nearly all the officers, and an equal number of
Egyptians steamed up on gun-boats to Khartoum, landed opposite Gordon's
Palace, hoisted the Union Jack and Egyptian flag simultaneously,
saluted them, and then held a Memorial Service for Gordon. All our
clergymen were present; the Sirdar made me stand on his right hand,
thus paying a compliment to the British troops. Afterwards we wandered
about and hunted among the ruins to find traces of Gordon."
[Sidenote: Friendly words]
There is no doubt that the General enhanced his reputation enormously
in this campaign. Not only was his work done in the sight of Europe,
but it was done under the eyes of a very exacting master. _The World_
wrote at the time: {213} "Perhaps the highest compliment that can be
paid him is that he has satisfied the Sirdar." Another paper said:
"General Gatacre is a keen soldier--a workman 's'il y en a.' His idea
of practising troops in the field during a campaign was an inspiration.
The conventional idea has been that in the field the only alternatives
were fighting and taking it easy. Result when campaigning in a bad
climate, laziness in camp, rum, fever, and loss of condition generally."
In a letter of congratulation from a Civil Service friend in India, we
find the following generous appreciation:
"You yourself are becoming more famous every day, to the great delight
of your friends and well-wishers; and I was proud to see that at the
Atbara you gave them a touch of the same bravery and indifference to
danger that you delighted us with at the old club at Simla, when you
rushed across the open and disarmed that Pathan servant who, after
murdering the cook's mate, was firing 'promiscuous,' while we all
huddled in the next block. Do you remember?"
One of his former Chiefs on the Bombay side wrote:
You ought to have been a K.C.B. long ago, but you are all right now,
and nothing can keep you back."
{214}