SUNDAY, 25.

"Before the Revolution of 1688," says Coleridge, "metaphysics ruled

without experimental philosophy. Since the Revolution, experimental

psychology has in like manner prevailed, and we now feel the result.

In like manner, from Plotinus to Proclus, that is, from A. D. 250 to

A. D. 450, philosophy was set up as a substitute for religion; during

the dark ages, religion superseded philosophy, and the consequences are

equally instructive."

"The great maxim in legislation, intellectual or physical, is

_subordinate, not exclude_. Nature, in her ascent, leaves nothing

behind; but at each step subordinates and glorifies,--mass, crystal,

organ, sensation, sentience, reflection."

Taken in reverse order of descent, Spirit puts itself before, at each

step protrudes faculty in feature, function, organ, limb, subordinating

to glorify also,--person, volition, thought, sensibility, sense,

body,--animating thus and rounding creation to soul and sense alike.

The naturalist cannot urge too strongly the claims of physical, nor

the plea of the idealist be too vigorously pressed for metaphysical

studies. One body in one soul. Nature and spirit are inseparable, and

are best studied as a unit. "Either without the other," as Plato said

of sex, "is but half itself." Nature ends where spirit begins. The

idealist's point of view is the obverse of the naturalist's, and each

must accost his side with a first love, before use has worn off the

bloom and seduced their vision.

Goethe said of Aristotle that "he had better observed nature than any

modern, but was too rash in his inferences and conclusions"; and he

adds, "we must go to work slowly, and more indulgently with Nature, if

we would get anything from her."

Inspired by his example of dealing thus reverently and lovingly with

nature, the great naturalists of our time are reading secrets hitherto

hidden from less careful and pious observers. If the results thus

far have not satisfied the idealist, it becomes him to consider that

his methods are the reverse of theirs, and that when they shall have

tracked Life in its manifold shapes and modes of working in nature up

to Spirit, their office is fulfilled, their work complete, and their

discoveries are passed over to him for a higher generalization and

genesis. "A physical delineation of nature," says Humboldt, "terminates

at the point where the sphere of intellect begins, and a new world is

opened to our view; it marks the limit, but does not pass it."

Whether man be the successor or predecessor of his inferiors in nature,

is to be determined by exploring faithfully the realms of matter and

of spirit alike, and complementing the former in the latter. Whether

surveyed in order descending or ascending, in genesis or process, from

the side of the idealist or of the naturalist, the keystone of the arch

in either case is an ideal, underpropped by matter or upheld by mind.

"If men be worlds, there is in every one

Something to answer in fit proportion

All the world's riches, and in substance this,--

PERSON his form's form, and soul's soul, is."

Man, the sum total of animals, transcends all in being a Person, a

responsible creature. "The distinguishing mark," says Aristotle,

"between man and the lower animals is this: that he alone is endowed

with the power of knowing good and evil, justice and injustice, and

it is a participation in this that constitutes a family and a city."

Man is man in virtue of being a Person, a self-determining will, held

accountable to a spiritual Ideal. To affirm that brute creatures are

endowed with freedom and choice, the sense of responsibility, were to

exalt them into a spiritual existence and personality; whereas, it is

plain enough that they are not above deliberation and choice, but below

it, under the sway of Fate, as men are when running counter to reason

and conscience. The will bridges the chasm between man and brute,

and frees the fated creature he were else. Solitary, not himself,

the victim of appetite, inmate of the den, is man till freed from

individualism, and delivered into his free Personality. "Ye must be

born again."

The conflict between man's desires and satisfactions declares his

defection from Personal holiness. While at one personally with

himself, life suffices, his wants are seconded as they rise, and his

self-respect preserved inviolate. But lapsed from personal rectitude,

fallen out of and below himself, he is at variance with things around

as within, his senses deceive, his will is divided, and he becomes the

victim of duplicities, discontents, the prey of remorse.

"'Tis a miserable thing," says Glanvil, "to have been happy; and a

self-contented wretchedness is a double one. Had felicity always

been a stranger to humanity, our present misery had not been. And

had not ourselves been the authors of our ruin, less. We might have

been made unhappy; but since we are miserable, we chose it. He that

gave our outward enjoyments might have taken them from us, but none

could have robbed us of innocence but ourselves. While man knows no

sin, he is ignorant of nothing that it imports humanity to know; but

when he has sinned, the same transgression that opens his eyes to see

his own shame, shuts them against most things else but that, and the

newly-purchased misery. With the nakedness of his body, he sees that of

his soul, and the blindness and disarray of his faculties to which his

former innocence was a stranger; and that which shows them to him makes

them. No longer the creature he was made, he loses not only his Maker's

image, but his own. And does not much more transcend the creatures

placed at his feet, than he comes short of his ancient self."

Whose the decree

Souls Magdalens must be

To know felicity,

The path to it

Through pleasure's pit,

Soft sin undress

Them of their holiness,--

Hath heaven so writ?

Happier the fate

That opes heaven's gate

With crystal key

Of purity,

And thus fulfils life's destiny.

[Illustration]

Concord Days · 第 108 / 143 题