The “Ashburton Capitulation”--Boundaries of Quebec--Arbitration
in 1831--Lord Ashburton’s Mission--The questions in dispute--“The
Sea” _v._ “The Atlantic”--American Diplomatists--Franklin’s
Red Line--Compromise--The Maps--Maine--Damage to Canada--Mr.
Webster’s Defence--His Opinion of the Road--Value of the
Heights--Our Share of Equivalents--Value of Rouse’s
Point--Vermont--New Hampshire.
It was by the celebrated Treaty of Washington, August 9th, 1842,
that the boundary line between the British possessions in Canada
and the State of Maine in the territories of the United States, was
settled and determined. That treaty has been sometimes spoken of
as the “Ashburton Capitulation.” The story of the two maps which
played so distinguished a part in the negotiations, is tolerably
well known, and has formed a subject of many discussions which
have now settled down into fixed convictions. By many, if not
by most Americans, acquainted with the subject, it is believed
that Mr. Webster did a very smart thing. Englishmen, similarly
instructed, believe their country to have been cheated by the
great American elocutionist. Canadians are of opinion that they
have suffered an irreparable injury at the hands of, or through
the weakness of, those appointed to guard their interests by the
Imperial Government. The Treaty of Paris, in 1783, did not define
the north-eastern boundary of the United States; it merely declared
that the boundary was drawn along the highlands which divide the
rivers that empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence from those
which fall into the Atlantic Ocean. If we had had at that time
the knowledge of geography and geology, with respect to the basin
of the St. Lawrence, which, thanks to the labours of the United
States’ engineers and of Sir William Logan, we now possess, there
would not have been much difficulty in fixing on the real line,
as there could not well be any dispute respecting the exact line
of highlands from which the rivers flowing into the St. Lawrence
came, and from the other side of which the water-shed was towards
the Atlantic Ocean. Tons of pamphlets, years of controversy, and
thousands of pounds might have been spared, not to speak of much
national animosity.
It may be remarked here, that the difficulty of reconciling
States’ rights with Imperial Federal policy was fore-shadowed in
the original disputes which took place at the time of the treaty
adjustment. The Treaty speaks of the “boundaries between the
possessions of Her Britannic Majesty in North America and the
territories of the United States;” but the State of Maine in its
vehement protest against the line of the King of the Netherlands,
assumed the language and the port of an independent Power. Mr.
Thomas Colley Grattan, in his work, “Civilised America,” has
collected an immense amount of information, and has drawn up an
argument on the subject, which prove beyond a doubt, even without
collateral aid, that the line yielded by Lord Ashburton was not
that which was meant by the framers of the Treaty of 1783. Let us
consider how the case stood.
In 1763 the French possessions in North America were ceded to
Great Britain, and in the October of that year a royal proclamation
defined the boundaries of the government of Quebec, “bounded on the
Labrador coast by the river St. John, which falls into the mouth
of the St. Lawrence, and from there by a line drawn from the head
of that river through the Lake of St. John to the south end of the
Lake Nipissing, from whence the said line, crossing the river St.
Lawrence and Lake Champlain in 45 degrees of north latitude, passes
along the highlands which divide the rivers that empty themselves
into the said river St. Lawrence from those which fall into the
sea, and also along the north coast of the Bay of Chaleurs and the
coast of the Gulf of St. Lawrence to Cape Rosière, and from thence
crossing the mouth of the river St. Lawrence by the west end of the
island of Anticosti, terminates in the aforesaid Lake of St. John.”
It is fortunate enough that we have no neighbours to raise any
question about “the line drawn through the Lake of St. John to the
south end of the Lake Nipissing.”
Previous to the Treaty of Independence only one Act was passed
bearing upon the southern boundary of Canada. The Quebec Act of
1774 draws its boundaries between the province of Quebec and
the colonies of Nova Scotia and Massachusetts, in words nearly
the same as those of the Proclamation of 1763. When the State
of Massachusetts and the State of Maine were acknowledged to be
“free, sovereign, and independent,” by the Treaty of 1783, the
contracting parties appeared to have defined the boundary-line with
tolerable exactitude. They wished to prevent disputes between the
United States and the colonies, and therefore the boundaries were
constituted “from the north-west angle of Nova Scotia,--viz., that
angle which is formed by a line drawn due north from the source
of the St. Croix river to the highlands, along the said highlands
which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the St.
Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean,--to the
north-westernmost head of Connecticut river east, by a line to be
drawn along the middle of the river St. Croix from its mouth in the
Bay of Fundy to its source, and from its source directly north to
the aforesaid highlands which divide the rivers which fall into the
Atlantic Ocean from those which fall into the river St. Lawrence,
comprehending all highlands within twenty leagues of any harbour
of the United States, and lying between lines to be drawn due east
from the points where the aforesaid boundaries between Nova Scotia
on the one part, and East Florida on the other, shall respectively
touch the Bay of Fundy and the Atlantic Ocean, except such
highlands as now are, or heretofore have been, within the limits of
the said province of Nova Scotia.”
The north-west angle of Nova Scotia thus becomes a point of
consequence--upon the determination of it rests the true line.
The British maintain that the angle is contained at the point
“where the line due north from the river St. Croix touches the
highlands at a point about 100 miles south of the point claimed by
the United States.” The Americans argue that the north-west angle
was “considerably nearer to the St. Lawrence, at a spot 145 miles
north of the source of the St. Croix.” In 1794 Commissioners were
appointed to determine “where a line drawn due north from the
St. Croix would intersect a line of highlands corresponding with
those mentioned in the Treaty of 1783.” The umpire called in by the
Commissioners fixed on the most northern point of the river as the
place from which the line to the highlands was to be drawn, and
the result was that the line so drawn did not strike the highlands
which we held to be those meant by the treaty, but passing them
at a distance of twenty miles on the west, came to an isolated
mountain called Mars Hill, from which the Americans desired to
prolong it northwards beyond the river St. John to the highlands
above the source of the Restigouche; but the British Commissioners
insisted that the line should not proceed further north, and that
the highlands which ran west from near that point to the head of
the Connecticut river should form the next boundary-line.
Events of greater importance for a time prevented any attempt to
adjust a question, which promised, however, no slight difficulty
in time to come. Then war broke out between the United States
and Great Britain; but the Peace of 1814 rendered it necessary
to renew the attempt to define the boundaries of the two States.
The Commissioners appointed by the Treaty of Ghent were not more
fortunate than their predecessors; and it was thirteen years after
the signing of that treaty before the Governments of the two
countries arranged a convention, to carry out the provision made
by an article in the Treaty for the appointment of a referee in
case of disagreement. The King of the Netherlands, who accepted the
office of arbiter in 1831, delivered his award, which, taking the
line drawn north from the St. Croix to Mars Hill, passed beyond
it to the river St. John, whence it took the course of the river
westward, inside the line claimed by the United States to the
head of the Connecticut River. This compromise was identical with
the actual line established by the Treaty of 1842, except on the
western side, where the line fixed by the King and that claimed
by the United States are the same. The King’s line approximates
much more closely to the United States’ line than it does to that
which we claim: however, the Americans refused to accept it, on the
grounds that the King had no right to go beyond the matter referred
to him of determining which of the two lines was right, and that he
had exceeded his province in proposing a line which had not been
referred to him by either of the parties.
Eleven years passed in unavailing endeavours to adjust a question
which rose into the highest rank of diplomatic difficulties. Lord
Ashburton, the head of the commercial house of Baring, whose
relations with American commerce were supposed to be likely to
recommend him to American statesmen, was dispatched in 1842
to determine the boundary, in concert with Mr. Webster. These
gentlemen were assisted by seven Commissioners from Maine and
Massachusetts. The author of a pamphlet of very great ability,
quoted by Mr. Grattan, arrived at the conclusion that the line
designated in the Proclamation of 1763, is identical with that
claimed by the United States, and that the line indicated in the
treaty of 1783 is almost the same as that claimed by Great Britain.
He argued that it was clearly intended to create a new boundary,
because Mr. Townsend said so, and Lord North repeated the statement
in Parliament. He maintained that the variations in the wording
of the treaty from that of the proclamation, were specially
introduced to show that a new boundary was intended, and that if it
had not been so, the description in the treaty would have been the
same as it was in the proclamation; and he then proceeded further
to contend, with greater force of reasoning, that the proclamation
boundary, although it might have adequately defined the limits
of a province, would have been obviously unsuitable as between
two independent nations, because it would cut off communication
between two portions of the territory of one of the Powers, and
give it to another independent State. He further asserted, that
all negotiations and projects for peace on the part of the United
States were based on the supposition that England would demand a
new line, and that Congress never contemplated an adherence to
the Proclamation of 1763. All the reasoning of the pamphleteer in
support of these propositions is distinguished by acuteness, and
inclines the mind to accept them with confidence; and he is not
less happy in his argument that the Madawaska river is distinct
from the river St. John--that it is a tributary, not a branch, of
that stream.
The question as to the range of highlands meant by the treaties
can only be settled by analytical reasoning, which, in relation to
matters of fact of the kind under dispute, is satisfactory only to
those who direct their own course of argument. There are two ranges
of highlands dividing the rivers which flow into the St. Lawrence
and those which empty themselves into the Atlantic; the first,
running from the sources of the Connecticut towards the Bay of
Chaleurs, certainly separates rivers emptying into the St. Lawrence
from those emptying into the sea; but the second line starting
from the same mountainous germ at the sources of the Connecticut,
branching off from the first range at a point about eighty miles
from its commencement, takes a southern course towards the head of
the St. Croix, and divides the rivers which empty themselves into
the St. Lawrence from those which flow into the Atlantic Ocean.
It is contended on one side, with much force of reasoning and
probability, that the highlands specified in the Treaty of 1783
are those of the southern range. It was necessary of course to
fix upon some great natural features in a district vast in extent
and unknown to all but the Red men and the hunter. Rivers and
the summit level between two great watersheds would be obviously
selected. It was the object of England to secure free communication
between all parts of her American territory, and, of course,
between Canada and Nova Scotia. The Americans proposed the line of
the St. John, which was at once rejected. That being the case, it
is difficult to conceive how they could go back and propose, as a
line more likely to meet the views of England, the highlands of the
northern range close to the St. Lawrence, which would throw the
greatest difficulties in the way of the communication which it was
a vital point for England to secure. It will have been observed
that the words “the Sea” and the “Atlantic Ocean” are used in
the treaties, and it certainly is not easy to comprehend how the
Americans can maintain that these terms have an identical meaning,
if the description of the maps which they had before them at the
time is correct. The Connecticut, the Penobscot, and the Kennebeck,
can be considered as flowing into the Atlantic Ocean from one
range of highlands only, and it is equally plain that the other,
or northern, range was that which was meant as the highlands from
which rivers flowed into the “sea.”
It has been urged, ingeniously and truly, that the words “The Sea,”
give a larger range of boundary than the words “The Atlantic;” and
that therefore the boundary which depended on a reference to the
Atlantic, was intended to have a smaller extent than that which was
made to depend upon the Sea. The Atlantic was certainly substituted
for the Sea, not only in the treaty, but in the Commissions of the
Governors of Quebec, showing an alteration of the boundary of their
jurisdiction, whilst no change was made in the Commissions of the
Governors of New Brunswick, because the boundary of their province
depended upon that of Quebec. The highlands separating rivers that
empty into the Atlantic Ocean, are by no means identical with
the highlands separating the rivers that empty into the Sea. The
Americans have urged that the northern range divides the rivers
of the St. Lawrence from the Atlantic rivers, but it certainly
does not separate the Penobscot branches north and east which
flow into the Atlantic from the southern range; and the term “The
rivers,” of course means all the rivers, because, otherwise, such
a considerable stream as the Penobscot would have been excepted
specially. The southern range separated all the rivers which flow
into the Atlantic, from all the rivers which flow into the St.
Lawrence.
Had the Commissioners drawn the due north line from the western
branch of the St. Croix, which formed the ancient boundary of
Nova Scotia, instead of from the northern branch, the whole of
the complicated and vexatious questions might have been evaded,
and the claim urged by the United States might never have been
heard. It was the doctrine of State rights alone which justified
the rejection of the Netherlands compromise. The tract in dispute
was indeed but seven million acres of river, mountain, and forest,
but the northern boundary of this tract overlooked the course of
the St. Lawrence, and carried American territory within a day’s
march of its stream, whilst the direct roads and communications
between the Provinces east and west, would be placed inside
American territory. To the Maine lumberers, however, this tract
was not uninviting, and it became a debateable land, in which
British colonists from New Brunswick, and American squatters,
carried on a series of inroads and forcible settlements, which were
fortunately unattended by actual bloodshed. Lord Palmerston, who in
1835 notified the refusal of the British Government to accept the
Netherlands compromise, appointed Commissioners in 1839 to inquire
into the state of the question upon the spot, and their report,
which was handed to the United States Government in 1840, in the
most absolute terms laid it down that the southern range was that
intended by the treaty of 1783. Mr. Grattan, who was by no means
unduly disposed to favour American pretensions, describes with
terse propriety the disputes which now arose. “All on our side,”
he says, “was supercilious pride; on that of the United States,
aggressive coarseness.”
To Sir Robert Peel is due the praise of having taken a decided step
to settle the north-eastern boundary. Lord Ashburton, received
with considerable enthusiasm in the United States, was at once
accepted by President Tyler, and for the better adjustment of the
difficulty, it was arranged that he should be met by Mr. Webster
in a spirit of perfect candour; that memoranda and despatches
were to be dispensed with, and that every honest, straightforward
exertion should be made on both sides to come to a satisfactory
settlement of the vexed question. Lord Ashburton had, however, to
encounter not only the Secretary of State, but the Commissioners of
Maine and Massachusetts, among whom were Mr. Abbott Lawrence and
Mr. Preble.
Mr. Grattan, who was actually invited to assist at the negotiations
by the American Commissioners, and went to Washington as _amicus
curiæ_, gives a most minute and interesting account of the whole
of the proceedings, and states positively that Mr. Webster sent a
confidential agent to the Commissioners, proposing a line far south
of the St. John’s River, before they had got further than New York,
which gave great offence to Mr. Preble, by whose influence it was
rejected. His pertinacity and the pomposity of Lawrence, with which
we are well acquainted in England, were obstacles in the way of a
calm discussion of adverse claims, but the other Commissioners are
described as exceedingly forbearing, unassuming, and well-behaved.
At first Lord Ashburton seemed to make way with Mr. Webster,
and to be on the point of obtaining a more favourable line than
that proposed by the Netherlands compromise, but the British
Commissioner had no special proof or absolute document to show that
the highlands south of St. John indicated the boundary meant by the
treaty of 1783. It was known that Dr. Franklin sent from Paris to
Washington, at the time of making the treaty, a map on which was
drawn a red ink line to show the boundary to Mr. Jefferson.
It is strange enough that, in the state of confusion caused by
conflicting statements and contradictory documents, it should not
have occurred to Lord Ashburton or to Mr. Grattan, who records his
own anxious searches after Dr. Franklin’s map, that a counterpart
might have been readily found in Paris in the archives of the
Foreign Office; but the fact was, Franklin’s map could nowhere be
found in the State Paper Department of Washington.
The production of that map with the red ink line must have placed
the boundary question beyond the reach of controversy; in fact, the
map of De Vergènnes could have been consulted at Paris, and the
same red line might have been seen on it as that which was seen in
Franklin’s. Lord Aberdeen had for some inscrutable reason resolved
that the boundary should be drawn so as to include the settlement
of Madawaska on the St. John, within the British possessions,
whilst the Commissioners were equally resolute not to except an
inch south of the St. John itself; and the arrangement proposed by
a small European monarch was regarded by the Americans as a proof
that they were entitled to all that they had asked, and that the
compromise was suggested to propitiate England.
The expectations which had been entertained of an immediate
adjustment were followed by a renewal of angry feeling and
political commotion. Lord Ashburton, after an unequal struggle with
Webster and the Commissioners, in a controversial correspondence
on which he had not very wisely entered, yielded in a spirit of
honourable concession the claim of Great Britain to the southern
line of highlands. He was impressed somewhat, no doubt, by the
vehemence and force of unanimous public opinion in America
respecting the justice of their claim, the strong and general
conviction felt that the country was in the right. Extended and
accessible on every side, his mind could not resist the constant
pressure of the audacious and penetrating weight of Webster’s
intellect, and he gradually gave way like a crumbling wall to the
flood-tide of intense determination by which he was assailed. The
middle of the St. John was accepted as the boundary, but instead of
following the highlands overlooking the valley of the St. Lawrence,
a line was determined upon sixty miles more to the south, which
thus removes the United States frontier to a tolerable distance
from the navigation of the river and the military control of the
banks.
On both sides of the Atlantic this compromise was received with
expressions of disgust and anger. The Americans, knowing themselves
very well and Englishmen very little, declared that Daniel Webster
had been bought.
In the land of liberty it is the custom of the representatives of
the people to conduct their debates in secret whenever any question
of public interest arises, and the Senate ratified the treaty by a
large majority, after a long debate carried on with closed doors
for several days.
Some time after the treaty had been signed, it turned out that
Mr. Webster had all the time possessed a map on which Franklin’s
red line, tracing the boundary of 1783 south of the St. John, was
distinctly marked.
The map in question was an authentic copy of one which was given
to De Vergènnes by Dr. Franklin himself when the treaty was made.
Its existence had been made known to the President, to the Senate,
and to all the Americans engaged in the negotiation. This map was
no doubt the same as that which had disappeared from the State
Department. Its existence was known to many people. It appears that
Mr. Jared Sparkes, of Boston, found in the archives at Paris the
following letter.
“_Paissey, Decr. 6th, 1782._
“SIR,--I have the honour of returning herewith the map your
Excellency sent me yesterday. I have marked with a strong red
line, according to your desire, the limits of the United States
as settled in the preliminaries between the British and American
Plenipotentiaries.
“With great respect,
“I am, &c.,
“B. FRANKLIN.”
This letter was addressed to the Count De Vergènnes, the French
Minister. Mr. Sparkes, in fact, discovered the actual map of
North America of 1746, and on it was drawn a strong red line
throughout the entire boundary of the United States, answering
exactly to Franklin’s description. “Imagine,” says Mr. Sparkes, “my
surprise on discovering that this line runs wholly south of the
St. John’s, and between the head waters of that river and those
of the Penobscot and Kennebec; in short, it is exactly the line
contended for by Great Britain, except that it concedes more than
is claimed.”
When the secret debates of the Senate were published, it was seen
that Mr. Rives, the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
had fortified his argument against the rejection of this Ashburton
line by quoting the existence of this map, and warning them of the
risk and danger of a further search into the archives of Europe. In
the debate that followed, Mr. Benton, eager to overthrow the value
of Mr. Sparkes’ discovery and of Mr. Rives’s argument, produced a
map from the Jefferson collection in the library of Congress, which
contained a dotted line marking the boundary of the Government
of Quebec under the proclamation of 1763, but strange to say, he
overlooked the fact which was at once visible to every eye, that
a strong red line, indicating the limits of the United States
according to the Treaty of Peace, was traced across it, which
coincided minutely and exactly with the boundary on Mr. Sparkes’
map.
Those who wish for the most minute details respecting this map, may
be referred to Mr. Grattan’s work. The map of Baron Steiben, and
that of Faden, coincide in a most remarkable manner in marking the
limits of the United States.
It is worthy of note that Mr. Buchanan, the last President of the
United States, did his very best to maintain the propriety of the
deceit. Mr. Calhoun is supposed to have appreciated the importance
of the discoveries, and to have felt the injury to American
diplomacy which Mr. Webster’s suppressions of truth might create on
future occasions. The Americans actually made use of the weakness
of the English Minister as an argument that they had been cheated
themselves, and Mr. Webster’s ability in concealing the truth was
considered evidence that he had not gone far enough in the same
line, and his reputation as a skilful and successful negotiator
was considered not to stand very high. The action of Sir Robert
Peel, however, prevented any endeavour to obtain the legitimate
advantages which the discovery of these maps ought to have produced.
The decision arrived at affected the State of Maine and the
pretensions of its people, but it had little to do with the
prosperity or military strength of the whole of the Union: whilst
it weakened Canada in its weakest point, and conferred most signal
advantage on the only enemy it had to fear: it bit in to the
substance of the Provinces, and at the same time cut the vein of
communication with the sea for five long winter months. Strange
that a line drawn upon a piece of paper by the hand of a man
gathered to his fathers for so many years, should for a time at
least decide so much of a nation’s happiness and prosperity--for
a time only, because it must soon be that the increasing power or
failing resources of the United States, or of Canada, will cause a
modification of the present frontier, more in accordance with the
commercial and military exigencies of the two States. The Canadians
feel that Imperial diplomacy has done them a great wrong, possibly
very much as France feels in respect to her Rhenish boundary; but
in a military point of view, perhaps the cession of Rouse’s Point
has been the most serious of all the circumstances affecting the
relations for aggressive purposes of the United States with the
Provinces.
In order that we may appreciate the importance of Mr. Webster’s
achievement, let us quote his own description of it in the great
debate which took place in the Senate on the Washington Treaty.
Mr. Webster, in noticing some of the many charges made against him
in reference to the treaty, dealt with the question of military
concession in the following manner:--
“Lord Palmerston (if he be the author of certain publications
ascribed to him) says that all the important points were given
up by Lord Ashburton to the United States. I might here state,
too, that Lord Palmerston called the whole treaty ‘the Ashburton
capitulation,’ declaring that it yielded everything that was of
importance to Great Britain, and that all its stipulations were
to the advantage of the United States, and to the sacrifice of
the interests of England. But it is not on such general, and, I
may add, such unjust statements, nor on any off-hand expressions
used in debate, though in the roundest terms, that this question
must turn. He speaks of this military road, but he entirely
misplaces it. The road which runs from New Brunswick to Canada
follows the north side of the St. John to the mouth of the
Madawaska, and then, turning north-west, follows that stream to
Lake Temiscoata, and thence proceeds over a depressed part of
the highlands till it strikes the St. Lawrence 117 miles below
Quebec. This is the road which has been always used, and there is
no other.
“I admit that it is very convenient for the British Government
to possess territory through which they may enjoy a road; it
is of great value as an avenue of communication in time of
peace; but as a military communication it is of no value at all.
What business can an army ever have there? Besides, it is no
gorge, no pass, no narrow defile, to be defended by a fort. If
a fort should be built there, an army could, at pleasure, make
a _détour_ so as to keep out of the reach of its guns. It is
very useful, I admit, in time of peace. But does not everybody
know, military man or not, that unless there is a defile, or
some narrow place through which troops must pass, and which a
fortification will command, that a mere open road must, in time
of war, be in the power of the strongest? If we retained by
treaty the territory over which the road is to be constructed,
and war came, would not the English take possession of it if
they could? Would they be restrained by a regard to the treaty
of Washington? I have never yet heard a reason adduced why this
communication should be regarded as of the slightest possible
advantage in a military point of view.
“But the circumstance to which I allude is, that, by a map
published with the speech of the honourable member from Missouri,
made in the Senate, on the question of ratifying the treaty, this
well-known and long-used road is laid down, probably from the
same source of error which misled Lord Palmerston, as following
the St. John, on its south side, to the mouth of the St. Francis;
thence along that river to its source, and thence, by a single
bound, over the highlands to the St. Lawrence, near Quebec. This
is all imagination. It is called the ‘Valley Road,’ Valley Road,
indeed! Why, Sir, it is represented as running over the very
ridge of the most inaccessible part of the highlands! It is made
to cross abrupt and broken precipices, 2000 feet high! It is, at
different points of its imaginary course, from fifty to a hundred
miles distant from the real road.
“So much, Mr. President, for the great boon of military
communication conceded to England. It is nothing more nor less
than a common road, along streams and lakes, and over a country
in great part rather flat. It then passes the heights to the St.
Lawrence. If war breaks out, we shall take it if we can, and if
we need it, of which there is not the slightest probability. It
will never be protected by fortifications, and never can be. It
will be just as easy to take it from England, in case of war, as
it would be to keep possession of it, if it were our own.
“In regard to the defence of the heights, I shall dispose of that
subject in a few words. There is a ridge of highlands which does
approach the river St. Lawrence, although it is not true that it
overlooks Quebec; on the contrary, the ridge is at the distance
of thirty or forty miles.
“It is very natural that military men in England, or indeed in
any part of Europe, should have attached great importance to
these mountains. The great military authority of England, perhaps
the highest living military authority, had served in India and
on the European continent, and it was natural enough that he
should apply European ideas of military defences to America. But
they are quite inapplicable. Highlands such as these are not
ordinarily found on the great battle-fields of Europe. They are
neither Alps nor Pyrenees; they have no passes through them, nor
roads over them, and never will have.
“Then there was another cause of misconception on this subject in
England. In 1839 an _ex parte_ survey was made, as I have said,
by Colonel Mudge and Mr. Featherstonhaugh, if survey it could be
called, of the region in the North of Maine, for the use of the
British Government. I dare say Colonel Mudge is an intelligent
and respectable officer; how much personal attention he gave the
subject I do not know. As to Mr. Featherstonhaugh, he has been in
our service, and his authority is not worth a straw. These two
persons made a report, containing this very singular statement:
That in the ridge of highlands nearest to the St. Lawrence, there
was a great _hiatus_ in one particular place, a gap of thirty or
forty miles, in which the elevation did not exceed fifty feet.
This is certainly the strangest statement that ever was made.
Their whole report gave but one measurement by the barometer,
and that measurement stated the height of 1200 feet. A survey
and map were made the following year by our own commissioners,
Messrs. Graham and Talcott, of the Corps of Topographical
Engineers, and Professor Renwick, of Columbia College. On this
map, the very spot where this gap was said to be situated is
dotted over thickly with figures, showing heights varying from
1200 to 2000 feet, and forming one rough and lofty ridge, marked
by abrupt and almost perpendicular precipices. When this map and
report of Messrs. Mudge and Featherstonhaugh were published, the
British authorities saw that this alleged gap was laid down as an
indefensible point, and it was probably on that ground alone that
they desired a line east of that ridge, in order that they might
guard against access of a hostile power from the United States.
But in truth there is no such gap; our engineers proved this, and
we quite well understood it when agreeing to the boundary. Any
man of common sense, military or not, must therefore now see,
that nothing can be more imaginary or unfounded than the idea
that any importance attaches to the possession of these heights.
“Sir, there are two old and well-known roads to Canada; one by
way of Lake Champlain and the Richelieu, to Montreal--this is the
route which armies have traversed so often, in different periods
of our history. The other leads from the Kennebec river to the
sources of the Chaudière and the Du Loup, and so to Quebec--this
last was the track of Arnold’s march. East of this, there is no
practicable communication for troops between Maine and Canada,
till we get to the Madawaska. We had before us a report from
General Wool, while this treaty was under negotiation, in which
that intelligent officer declares that it is perfectly idle to
think of fortifying any point east of this road. East of Arnold’s
track it is a mountain region, through which no army can possibly
pass into Canada. With General Wool was associated, in this
examination, Major Graham, whom I have already mentioned. His
report to General Wool, made in the year 1838, clearly points out
the Kennebec and Chaudière road as the only practicable route for
an army between Maine and Quebec. He was subsequently employed
as a commissioner in the _ex parte_ surveys of the United
States. Being an engineer officer of high character for military
knowledge and scientific accuracy, his opinion had the weight it
ought to have, and which will be readily given to it by all who
know him. His subsequent and still more thorough acquaintance
with this mountain range, in its whole extent, has only confirmed
the judgment which he had previously formed. And, Sir, this
avenue to Canada, this practicable avenue, and only practicable
avenue east of that by way of Lake Champlain, is left now just as
it was found by the treaty. The treaty does not touch it, nor in
any manner affect it.
“But I must go further. I said that the treaty of Washington was
a treaty of equivalents, in which it was expected that each party
should give something and receive something. I am now willing to
meet any gentleman, be he a military man or not, who will make
the assertion, that, in a military point of view, the greatest
advantages derived from that treaty are on the side of Great
Britain. It was on this point that I wished to say something in
reply to an honourable member from New York, who will have it
that in this treaty England supposes that she got the advantage
of us. Sir, I do not think the military advantages she obtained
by it are worth a rush. But even if they were, if she had
obtained advantages of the greatest value, would it not have been
fair in the member from New York to state, nevertheless, whether
there were not equivalent military advantages obtained on our
side, in other parts of the line? Would it not have been candid
and proper in him, when adverting to the military advantages
obtained by England, in a communication between New Brunswick and
Canada, if such advantages there were, to have stated, on the
other hand, and at the same time, our recovery of Rouse’s Point,
at the outlet of Lake Champlain? an advantage which overbalanced
all others, forty times told. I must be allowed to say, that I
certainly never expected that a member from New York, above all
other men, should speak of this treaty as conferring military
advantages on Great Britain without full equivalents. I listened
to it, I confess, with utter astonishment. A distinguished
senator from that State saw at the time, very clearly, the
advantage gained by this treaty to the United States and to New
York. He voted willingly for its ratification, and he never will
say that Great Britain obtained a balance of advantages in a
military point of view.
“Why, how is the State of New York affected by this treaty? Sir,
is not Rouse’s Point perfectly well-known, and admitted, by every
military man, to be the key of Lake Champlain? It commands every
vessel passing up or down the lake, between New York and Canada.
It had always been supposed that this point lay some distance
south of the parallel of 45°, which was our boundary line with
Canada, and therefore was within the United States; and, under
this supposition, the United States purchased the land, and
commenced the erection of a strong fortress. But a more accurate
survey having been made in 1818, by astronomers on both sides, it
was found that the parallel of 45° ran south of this fortress,
and thus Rouse’s Point, with the fort upon it, was found to be
in the British dominions. This discovery created, as well it
might, a great sensation here. None knows this better than the
honourable member from South Carolina, who was then at the head
of the Department of War. As Rouse’s Point was no longer ours,
we sent our engineers to examine the shores of the lake, to find
some other place or places which we might fortify. They made a
report on their return, saying that there were two other points
some distance south of Rouse’s Point, one called Windmill Point,
on the east side of the lake, and the other called Stony Point,
on the west side, which it became necessary now to fortify, and
they gave an estimate of the probable expense. When this treaty
was in process of negotiation, we called for the opinion of
military men respecting the value of Rouse’s Point, in order to
see whether it was highly desirable to obtain it. We had their
report before us, in which it was stated that the natural and
best point for the defence of the outlet of Lake Champlain was
Rouse’s Point. In fact, anybody might see that this was the case
who would look at the map. The point projects into the narrowest
passage by which the waters of the lake pass into the Richelieu.
Any vessel passing into or out of the lake, must come within
point-blank range of the guns of a fortress erected on this
point; and it ran out so far that any such vessel must approach
the fort, head on, for several miles, so as to be exposed to a
raking fire from the battery, before she could possibly bring her
broadside to bear upon the fort at all. It was very different
with the points farther south. Between them the passage was much
wider; so much so, indeed, that a vessel might pass directly
between the two, and not be in reach of point-blank shot from
either.”
Mr. Dickinson, of New York, here interposed, to ask whether the
Dutch line did not give us Rouse’s Point.
“Certainly not. It gave us a semicircular line, running round
the fort, but not including what we had possessed before. And
besides, we had rejected the Dutch line, and the whole point
now clearly belonged to England. It was all within the British
territory.
“I was saying that a vessel might pass between Windmill Point
and Stony Point, and be without the range of both, till her
broadside could be brought to bear upon either of them. The forts
would be entirely independent of each other, and, having no
communication, could not render each other the least assistance
in case of attack. But the military men told us there was no
sort of question that Rouse’s Point was extremely desirable as a
point of military defence. This is plain enough, and I need not
spend time to prove it. Of one thing I am certain, that the true
road to Canada is by the way of Lake Champlain. That is the old
path. I take to myself the credit of having said here, thirty
years ago, speaking of the mode of taking Canada, that, when an
American woodsman undertakes to fell a tree, he does not begin
by lopping off the branches, but strikes his axe at once into
the trunk. The trunk, in relation to Canada, is Montreal, and
the River St. Lawrence down to Quebec; and so we found in the
last war. It is not my purpose to scan the propriety of military
measures then adopted, but I suppose it to have been rather
accidental and unfortunate that we began the attack in Upper
Canada. It would have been better military policy, as I suppose,
to have pushed our whole force by the way of Lake Champlain, and
made a direct movement on Montreal; and though we might thereby
have lost the glories of the battles of the Thames and of Lundy’s
Lane, and of the sortie from Port Erie, yet we should have won
other laurels of equal, and perhaps greater value, at Montreal.
Once successful in this movement, the whole country above
would have fallen into our power. Is not this evident to every
gentleman?
“Rouse’s Point is the best means of defending both the ingress
into the lake, and the exit from it. And I say now, that on
the whole frontier of the State of New York, with the single
exception of the Narrows below the city, there is not a point
of equal importance. I hope this government will last for ever;
but if it does not, and if, in the judgment of Heaven, so great
a calamity shall befall us as the rupture of this Union, and
the State of New York shall thereby be thrown upon her own
defences, I ask, is there a single point, except the Narrows,
the possession of which she will so much desire? No, there is
not one. And how did we obtain this advantage for her? The
parallel of 45° north was established by the treaty of 1783 as
our boundary with Canada in that part of the line. But, as I
have stated, that line was found to run south of Rouse’s Point.
And how did we get back this precious possession? By running
a semicircle like that of the King of the Netherlands? No; we
went back to the old line, which had always been supposed to be
the true line, and the establishment of which gave us not only
Rouse’s Point, but a strip of land containing some thirty or
forty thousand acres between the parallel of 45° and the old line.
“The same arrangement gave us a similar advantage in Vermont;
and I have never heard that the constituents of my friend near
me made any complaint of the treaty. That State got about sixty
or seventy thousand acres, including several villages, which
would otherwise have been left on the British side of the line.
We received Rouse’s Point, and this additional land, as one of
the equivalents for the cession of territory made in Maine. And
what did we do for New Hampshire? There was an ancient dispute
as to which was the north-westernmost head of the Connecticut
River. Several streams were found, either of which might be
insisted on as the true boundary. But we claimed that which is
called Hall’s Stream. This had not formerly been allowed; the
Dutch award did not give to New Hampshire what she claimed; and
Mr. Van Ness, our commissioner, appointed under the Treaty of
Ghent, after examining the ground, came to the conclusion that
we were not entitled to Hall’s Stream. I thought that we were
so entitled, although I admit that Hall’s Stream does not join
the Connecticut River till after it has passed the parallel of
45°. By the Treaty of Washington this demand was agreed to, and
it gave New Hampshire 100,000 acres of land. I do not say that
we obtained this wrongfully; but I do say that we got that which
Mr. Van Ness had doubted our right to. I thought the claim just,
however, and the line was established accordingly. And here let
me say, once for all, that, if we had gone for arbitration, we
should inevitably have lost what the treaty gave to Vermont and
New York; because all that was clear matter of cession, and not
adjustment of doubtful boundary.”
Unfortunately Mr. Webster but too well described our share of
the advantages obtained by this “treaty of equivalents.” The
consequences to us in a war might be more disastrous than those he
indicated.