EUPHELIA.

No. 47. TUESDAY, AUGUST 28, 1750.

_Quamquam his solatiis acquiescam, debilitor et frangor eadem

illa humanitate quæ me, ut hoc ipsum permitterem, induxit. Non

ideo tamen velim durior fieri: nec ignoro alios hujusmodi casus

nihil amplius vocare quam damnum; eoque sibi magnos homines

et sapientes videri. Qui an magni sapientesque sint, nescio;

homines non sunt. Hominis est enim affici dolore, sentire:

resistere tamen, et solatia admittere._

PLIN. Epist. viii. 16.

These proceedings have afforded me some comfort in my distress;

notwithstanding which, I am still dispirited and unhinged

by the same motives of humanity that induced me to grant such

indulgences. However, I by no means wish to become less susceptible

of tenderness. I know these kind of misfortunes would be estimated

by other persons only as common losses, and from such sensations

they would conceive themselves great and wise men. I shall not

determine either their greatness or their wisdom; but I am certain

they have no humanity. It is the part of a man to be affected with

grief; to feel sorrow, at the same time that he is to resist it,

and to admit of comfort.

Earl of ORRERY.

Of the passions with which the mind of man is agitated, it may be

observed, that they naturally hasten towards their own extinction, by

inciting and quickening the attainment of their objects. Thus fear urges

our flight, and desire animates our progress; and if there are some which

perhaps may be indulged till they outgrow the good appropriated to their

satisfaction, as it is frequently observed of avarice and ambition, yet

their immediate tendency is to some means of happiness really existing,

and generally within the prospect. The miser always imagines that

there is a certain sum that will fill his heart to the brim; and every

ambitious man, like king Pyrrhus, has an acquisition in his thoughts that

is to terminate his labours, after which he shall pass the rest of his

life in ease or gaiety, in repose or devotion.

Sorrow is perhaps the only affection of the breast that can be expected

from this general remark, and it therefore deserves the particular

attention of those who have assumed the arduous province of preserving

the balance of the mental constitution. The other passions are diseases

indeed, but they necessarily direct us to their proper cure. A man at

once feels the pain and knows the medicine, to which he is carried with

greater haste as the evil which requires it is more excruciating,

and cures himself by unerring instinct, as the wounded stags of Crete

are related by Ælian to have recourse to vulnerary herbs. But for

sorrow there is no remedy provided by nature; it is often occasioned by

accidents irreparable, and dwells upon objects that have lost or changed

their existence; it required what it cannot hope, that the laws of the

universe should be repealed; that the dead should return, or the past

should be recalled.

Sorrow is not that regret for negligence or errour which may animate us to

future care or activity, or that repentance of crimes for which, however

irrevocable, our Creator has promised to accept it as an atonement; the

pain which arises from these causes has very salutary effects, and is

every hour extenuating itself by the reparation of those miscarriages

that produce it. Sorrow is properly that state of the mind in which our

desires are fixed upon the past, without looking forward to the future,

an incessant wish that something were otherwise than it has been, a

tormenting and harassing want of some enjoyment or possession which

we have lost, and which no endeavours can possibly regain. Into such

anguish many have sunk upon some sudden diminution of their fortune,

an unexpected blast of their reputation, or the loss of children or of

friends. They have suffered all sensibility of pleasure to be destroyed

by a single blow, have given up for ever the hopes of substituting any

other object in the room of that which they lament, resigned their lives

to gloom and despondency, and worn themselves out in unavailing misery.

Yet so much is this passion the natural consequence of tenderness and

endearment, that, however painful and however useless, it is justly

reproachful not to feel it on some occasions; and so widely and

constantly has it always prevailed, that the laws of some nations, and

the customs of others, have limited a time for the external appearances

of grief caused by the dissolution of close alliances, and the breach of

domestick union.

It seems determined by the general suffrage of mankind, that sorrow

is to a certain point laudable, as the offspring of love, or at least

pardonable, as the effect of weakness; but that it ought not to be

suffered to increase by indulgence, but must give way, after a stated

time, to social duties, and the common avocations of life. It is at

first unavoidable, and therefore must be allowed, whether with or without

our choice; it may afterwards be admitted as a decent and affectionate

testimony of kindness and esteem; something will be extorted by nature,

and something may be given to the world. But all beyond the bursts of

passion, or the forms of solemnity, is not only useless, but culpable;

for we have no right to sacrifice, to the vain longings of affection,

that time which Providence allows us for the task of our station.

Yet it too often happens that sorrow, thus lawfully entering, gains such

a firm possession of the mind, that it is not afterwards to be ejected;

the mournful ideas, first violently impressed and afterwards willingly

received, so much engross the attention, as to predominate in every

thought, to darken gaiety, and perplex ratiocination. An habitual sadness

seizes upon the soul, and the faculties are chained to a single object,

which can never be contemplated but with hopeless uneasiness.

From this state of dejection it is very difficult to rise to cheerfulness

and alacrity; and therefore many who have laid down rules of intellectual

health, think preservatives easier than remedies, and teach us not to

trust ourselves with favourite enjoyments, not to indulge the luxury of

fondness, but to keep our minds always suspended in such indifference,

that we may change the objects about us without emotion.

An exact compliance with this rule might, perhaps, contribute to

tranquillity, but surely it would never produce happiness. He that

regards none so much as to be afraid of losing them, must live for ever

without the gentle pleasures of sympathy and confidence; he must feel no

melting fondness, no warmth of benevolence, nor any of those honest joys

which nature annexes to the power of pleasing. And as no man can justly

claim more tenderness than he pays, he must forfeit his share in that

officious and watchful kindness which love only can dictate, and those

lenient endearments by which love only can soften life. He may justly

be overlooked and neglected by such as have more warmth in their heart;

for who would be the friend of him, whom, with whatever assiduity he may

be courted, and with whatever services obliged, his principles will not

suffer to make equal returns, and who, when you have exhausted all the

instances of good-will, can only be prevailed on not to be an enemy?

An attempt to preserve life in a state of neutrality and indifference, is

unreasonable and vain. If by excluding joy we could shut out grief, the

scheme would deserve very serious attention; but since, however we may

debar ourselves from happiness, misery will find its way at many inlets,

and the assaults of pain will force our regard, though we may withhold it

from the invitations of pleasure, we may surely endeavour to raise life

above the middle point of apathy at one time, since it will necessarily

sink below it at another.

But though it cannot be reasonable not to gain happiness for fear of

losing it, yet it must be confessed, that in proportion to the pleasure

of possession, will be for some time our sorrow for the loss; it is

therefore the province of the moralist to enquire whether such pains

may not quickly give way to mitigation. Some have thought that the most

certain way to clear the heart from its embarrassment is to drag it by

force into scenes of merriment. Others imagine, that such a transition

is too violent, and recommend rather to sooth it into tranquillity, by

making it acquainted with miseries more dreadful and afflictive, and

diverting to the calamities of others the regards which we are inclined

to fix too closely upon our own misfortunes.

It may be doubted whether either of those remedies will be sufficiently

powerful. The efficacy of mirth it is not always easy to try, and the

indulgence of melancholy may be suspected to be one of those medicines,

which will destroy, if it happens not to cure.

The safe and general antidote against sorrow is employment. It is commonly

observed, that among soldiers and seamen, though there is much kindness,

there is little grief; they see their friend fall without any of that

lamentation which is indulged in security and idleness, because they

have no leisure to spare from the care of themselves; and whoever shall

keep his thoughts equally busy, will find himself equally unaffected with

irretrievable losses.

Time is observed generally to wear out sorrow, and its effects might

doubtless be accelerated by quickening the succession, and enlarging the

variety of objects.

_----Si tempore reddi_

_Pax animo tranquilla potest, tu sperne morari:_

_Qui sapiet, sibi tempus erit.----_

GROTIUS, Consol. ad Patrem.

'Tis long ere time can mitigate your grief;

To wisdom fly, she quickly brings relief.

F. LEWIS.

Sorrow is a kind of rust of the soul, which every new idea contributes in

its passage to scour away. It is the putrefaction of stagnant life, and

is remedied by exercise and motion.

No. 48. SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1750.

_Non est vivere, sed valere, vita._

MART. Lib. vi. Ep, 70. 15.

For life is not to live, but to be well.

ELPHINSTON.

Among the innumerable follies, by which we lay up in our youth repentance

and remorse for the succeeding part of our lives, there is scarce any

against which warnings are of less efficacy, than the neglect of health.

When the springs of motion are yet elastick, when the heart bounds with

vigour, and the eye sparkles with spirit, it is with difficulty that we

are taught to conceive the imbecility that every hour is bringing upon

us, or to imagine that the nerves which are now braced with so much

strength, and the limbs which play with so much activity, will lose all

their power under the gripe of time, relax with numbness, and totter with

debility.

To the arguments which have been used against complaints under the

miseries of life, the philosophers have, I think, forgot to add the

incredulity of those to whom we recount our sufferings. But if the

purpose of lamentation be to excite pity, it is surely superfluous for

age and weakness to tell their plaintive stories; for pity pre-supposes

sympathy, and a little attention will shew them, that those who do not

feel pain, seldom think that it is felt; and a short recollection will

inform almost every man, that he is only repaid the insult which he has

given, since he may remember how often he has mocked infirmity, laughed

at its cautions, and censured its impatience.

The valetudinarian race have made the care of health ridiculous by

suffering it to prevail over all other considerations, as the miser has

brought frugality into contempt, by permitting the love of money not to

share, but to engross his mind: they both err alike, by confounding the

means with the end; they grasp at health only to be well, as at money

only to be rich; and forget that every terrestrial advantage is chiefly

valuable, as it furnishes abilities for the exercise of virtue.

Health is indeed so necessary to all the duties, as well as pleasures of

life, that the crime of squandering it is equal to the folly; and he that

for a short gratification brings weakness and diseases upon himself, and

for the pleasure of a very few years passed in the tumults of diversion,

and clamours of merriment, condemns the maturer and more experienced

part of his life to the chamber and the couch, may be justly reproached,

not only as a spendthrift of his own happiness, but as a robber of the

publick; as a wretch that has voluntarily disqualified himself for the

business of his station, and refused that part which Providence assigns

him in the general task of human nature.

There are perhaps very few conditions more to be pitied than that of an

active and elevated mind, labouring under the weight of a distempered

body. The time of such a man is always spent in forming schemes, which

a change of wind hinders him from executing, his powers fume away in

projects and in hope, and the day of action never arrives. He lies down

delighted with the thoughts of to-morrow, pleases his ambition with

the fame he shall acquire, or his benevolence with the good he shall

confer. But in the night the skies are overcast, the temper of the air

is changed, he wakes in langour, impatience, and distraction, and has

no longer any wish but for ease, nor any attention but to misery. It

may be said that disease generally begins that equality which death

completes; the distinctions which set one man so much above another are

very little perceived in the gloom of a sick chamber, where it will be

vain to expect entertainment from the gay, or instruction from the wise;

where all human glory is obliterated, the wit is clouded, the reasoner

perplexed, and the hero subdued; where the highest and brightest of

mortal beings finds nothing left him but the consciousness of innocence.

There is among the fragments of the Greek poets a short Hymn to Health,

in which her power of exalting the happiness of life, of heightening the

gifts of fortune, and adding enjoyment to possession, is inculcated with

so much force and beauty, that no one, who has ever languished under the

discomforts and infirmities of a lingering disease, can read it without

feeling the images dance in his heart, and adding from his own experience

new vigour to the wish, and from his own imagination new colours to

the picture. The particular occasion of this little composition is not

known, but it is probable that the author had been sick, and in the first

raptures of returning vigour addressed Health in the following manner:

Ὑγιεια πρεσβιστα Μακαρων,

Μετα σου ναιοιμι

Το λειπομενον βιοτας·

Συ δε μοι προφρων συνοικος ειης.

Ει γαρ τις η πλουτου χαρις η τεκεων,

Τας ευδαιμονος τ' ανθρωποις

Βασιληιδος αρχας, η ποθων,

Ους κρυφιοις Αφροδιτης αρκυσιν θηρευομεν,

Η ει τις αλλα θεοθεν ανθρωποις τερψις,

Η πονων αμπνοα πεφανται·

Μετα σειο, μακαιρα, Ὑγιεια,

Τεθηλε παντα, και λαμπει χαριτων εαρ·

Σεθεν δε χωρις, ουδεις ευδαιμων πελει.

Health, most venerable of the powers of heaven! with thee may

the remaining part of my life be passed, nor do thou refuse to

bless me with thy residence. For whatever there is of beauty or

of pleasure in wealth, in descendants, or in sovereign command,

the highest summit of human enjoyment, or in those objects of

desire which we endeavour to chase into the toils of love; whatever

delight, or whatever solace is granted by the celestials, to

soften our fatigues, in thy presence, thou parent of happiness,

all those joys spread out and flourish; in thy presence blooms

the spring of pleasure, and without thee no man is happy.

Such is the power of health, that without its co-operation every other

comfort is torpid and lifeless as the powers of vegetation without

the sun. And yet this bliss is commonly thrown away in thoughtless

negligence, or in foolish experiments on our own strength; we let it

perish without remembering its value, or waste it to show how much we

have to spare; it is sometimes given up to the management of levity and

chance, and sometimes sold for the applause of jollity and debauchery.

Health is equally neglected, and with equal impropriety, by the votaries

of business and the followers of pleasure. Some men ruin the fabrick

of their bodies by incessant revels, and others by intemperate studies;

some batter it by excess, and others sap it by inactivity. To the noisy

route of bacchanalian rioters, it will be to little purpose that advice

is offered, though it requires no great abilities to prove, that he loses

pleasure who loses health; their clamours are too loud for the whispers

of caution, and they run the course of life with too much precipitance

to stop at the call of wisdom. Nor perhaps will they that are busied in

adding thousands to thousands, pay much regard to him that shall direct

them to hasten more slowly to their wishes. Yet since lovers of money are

generally cool, deliberate, and thoughtful, they might surely consider,

that the greater good ought not to be sacrificed to the less. Health is

certainly more valuable than money, because it is by health that money

is procured; but thousands and millions are of small avail to alleviate

the protracted tortures of the gout, to repair the broken organs of sense,

or resuscitate the powers of digestion. Poverty is, indeed, an evil from

which we naturally fly; but let us not run from one enemy to another,

nor take shelter in the arms of sickness.

_----Projecere animam! quàm vellent æthere in alto_

_Nunc et pauperiem, et duros tolerare labores!_

For healthful indigence in vain they pray,

In quest of wealth who throw their lives away.

Those who lose their health in an irregular and impetuous pursuit of

literary accomplishments are yet less to be excused; for they ought to

know that the body is not forced beyond its strength, but with the loss

of more vigour than is proportionate to the effect produced. Whoever

takes up life beforehand, by depriving himself of rest and refreshment,

must not only pay back the hours, but pay them back with usury: and

for the gain of a few months but half enjoyed, must give up years to

the listlessness of languor, and the implacability of pain. They whose

endeavour is mental excellence, will learn, perhaps too late, how much it

is endangered by diseases of the body, and find that knowledge may easily

be lost in the starts of melancholy, the flights of impatience, and the

peevishness of decrepitude.

No. 49. TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1750.

_Non omnis moriar; multaque pars mei_

_Vitabit Libitinam, usque ego posterâ_

_Crescum lande recens._

HOR. Lib. iii. Ode xxx. 6.

Whole Horace shall not die; his songs shall save

The greatest portion from the greedy grave

CREECH.

The first motives of human actions are those appetites which Providence

has given to man in common with the rest of the inhabitants of the earth.

Immediately after our birth, thirst and hunger incline us to the breast,

which we draw by instinct, like other young creatures, and when we are

satisfied, we express our uneasiness by importunate and incessant cries,

till we have obtained a place or posture proper for repose.

The next call that rouses us from a state of inactivity, is that of our

passions; we quickly begin to be sensible of hope and fear, love and

hatred, desire and aversion; these arising from the power of comparison

and reflection, extend their range wider, as our reason strengthens, and

our knowledge enlarges. At first we have no thought of pain, but when

we actually feel it; we afterwards begin to fear it, yet not before it

approaches us very nearly; but by degrees we discover it at a greater

distance, and find it lurking in remote consequences. Our terrour in

time improves into caution, and we learn to look round with vigilance

and solicitude, to stop all the avenues at which misery can enter, and

to perform or endure many things in themselves toilsome and unpleasing,

because we know by reason, or by experience, that our labour will be

overbalanced by the reward, that it will either procure some positive

good, or avert some evil greater than itself.

But as the soul advances to a fuller exercise of its powers, the animal

appetites, and the passions immediately arising from them, are not

sufficient to find it employment; the wants of nature are soon supplied,

the fear of their return is easily precluded, and something more is

necessary to relieve the long intervals of inactivity, and to give

those faculties, which cannot lie wholly quiescent, some particular

direction. For this reason, new desires and artificial passions are by

degrees produced; and, from having wishes only in consequence of our

wants, we begin to feel wants in consequence of our wishes; we persuade

ourselves to set a value upon things which are of no use, but because

we have agreed to value them; things which can neither satisfy hunger,

nor mitigate pain, nor secure us from any real calamity, and which,

therefore, we find of no esteem among those nations whose artless and

barbarous manners keep them always anxious for the necessaries of life.

This is the original of avarice, vanity, ambition, and generally of all

those desires which arise from the comparison of our condition with that

of others. He that thinks himself poor because his neighbour is richer;

he that, like Cæsar, would rather be the first man of a village, than

the second in the capital of the world, has apparently kindled in himself

desires which he never received from nature, and acts upon principles

established only by the authority of custom.

Of these adscititious passions, some, as avarice and envy, are universally

condemned; some, as friendship and curiosity, generally praised; but

there are others about which the suffrages of the wise are divided, and

of which it is doubted, whether they tend most to promote the happiness,

or increase the miseries of mankind.

Of this ambiguous and disputable kind is the love of fame, a desire of

filling the minds of others with admiration, and of being celebrated by

generations to come with praises which we shall not hear. This ardour

has been considered by some as nothing better than splendid madness,

as a flame kindled by pride, and fanned by folly; for what, say they,

can be more remote from wisdom, than to direct all our actions by the

hope of that which is not to exist till we ourselves are in the grave?

To pant after that which can never be possessed, and of which the value

thus wildly put upon it, arises from this particular condition, that,

during life, it is not to be obtained? To gain the favour, and hear the

applauses of our contemporaries, is indeed equally desirable with any

other prerogative of superiority, because fame may be of use to smooth

the paths of life, to terrify opposition, and fortify tranquillity; but

to what end shall we be the darlings of mankind, when we can no longer

receive any benefits from their favour? It is more reasonable to wish

for reputation, while it may yet be enjoyed, as Anacreon calls upon his

companions to give him for present use the wine and garlands which they

purpose to bestow upon his tomb.

The advocates for the love of fame allege in its vindication, that it

is a passion natural and universal; a flame lighted by Heaven, and

always burning with greatest vigour in the most enlarged and elevated

minds. That the desire of being praised by posterity implies a resolution

to deserve their praises, and that the folly charged upon it, is only a

noble and disinterested generosity, which is not felt, and therefore not

understood, by those who have been always accustomed to refer every thing

to themselves, and whose selfishness has contracted their understandings.

That the soul of man, formed for eternal life, naturally springs forward

beyond the limits of corporeal existence, and rejoices to consider

herself as co-operating with future ages, and as co-extended with endless

duration. That the reproach urged with so much petulance, the reproach

of labouring for what cannot be enjoyed, is founded on an opinion which

may with great probability be doubted; for since we suppose the powers

of the soul to be enlarged by its separation, why should we conclude that

its knowledge of sublunary transactions is contracted or extinguished?

Upon an attentive and impartial review of the argument, it will appear that

the love of fame is to be regulated rather than extinguished: and that

men should be taught not to be wholly careless about their memory, but to

endeavour that they may be remembered chiefly for their virtues, since no

other reputation will be able to transmit any pleasure beyond the grave.

It is evident that fame, considered merely as the immortality of a name,

is not less likely to be the reward of bad actions than of good; he

therefore has no certain principle for the regulation of his conduct,

whose single aim is not to be forgotten. And history will inform us,

that this blind and undistinguishing appetite of renown has always

been uncertain in its effects, and directed by accident or opportunity,

indifferently to the benefit or devastation of the world. When

Themistocles complained that the trophies of Miltiades hindered him from

sleep, he was animated by them to perform the same services in the same

cause. But Cæsar, when he wept at the sight of Alexander's picture, having

no honest opportunities of action, let his ambition break out to the

ruin of his country.

If, therefore, the love of fame is so far indulged by the mind as to

become independent and predominant, it is dangerous and irregular; but

it may be usefully employed as an inferior and secondary motive, and will

serve sometimes to revive our activity, when we begin to languish and

lose sight of that more certain, more valuable, and more durable reward,

which ought always to be our first hope and our last. But it must be

strongly impressed upon our minds that virtue is not to be pursued as

one of the means to fame, but fame to be accepted as the only recompence

which mortals can bestow on virtue; to be accepted with complacence, but

not sought with eagerness. Simply to be remembered is no advantage; it

is a privilege which satire as well as penegyrick can confer, and is not

more enjoyed by Titus or Constantine, than by Timocreon of Rhodes, of

whom we only know from his epitaph, _that he had eaten many a meal, drunk

many a flaggon, and uttered many a reproach_.

Πολλα φαγων, και πολλα πιων, και πολλα κακ' ειπων

Ανθρωπους, κειμαι Τιμοκρεων Ρὁδιος.

The true satisfaction which is to be drawn from the consciousness that we

shall share the attention of future times, must arise from the hope, that

with our name, our virtues will be propagated; and that those whom we

cannot benefit in our lives, may receive instruction from our examples,

and incitement from our renown.

No. 50. SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1750.

_Credebant hoc grande nefas, et morte piandum,_

_Si juvenis vetulo non assurrexerat, atque_

_Barbato cuicunque puer, licet ipse videret_

_Plura domi fraga, et majores glandis acervos._

JUV. Sat. xiii. 54.

And had not men the hoary head rever'd,

And boys paid rev'rence when a man appear'd,

Both must have died, though richer skins they wore,

And saw more heaps of acorns in their store

CREECH.

I have always thought it the business of those who turn their speculations

upon the living world, to commend the virtues, as well as to expose the

faults of their contemporaries, and to confute a false as well as to

support a just accusation; not only because it is peculiarly the business

of a monitor to keep his own reputation untainted, lest those who can

once charge him with partiality, should indulge themselves afterwards

in disbelieving him at pleasure; but because he may find real crimes

sufficient to give full employment to caution or repentance, without

distracting the mind by needless scruples and vain solicitudes.

There are certain fixed and stated reproaches that one part of mankind

has in all ages thrown upon another, which are regularly transmitted

through continued successions, and which he that has once suffered them

is certain to use with the same undistinguishing vehemence, when he has

changed his station, and gained the prescriptive right of inflicting on

others what he had formerly endured himself.

To these hereditary imputations, of which no man sees the justice, till it

becomes his interest to see it, very little regard is to be shewn; since

it does not appear that they are produced by ratiocination or inquiry, but

received implicitly, or caught by a kind of instantaneous contagion, and

supported rather by willingness to credit, than ability to prove, them.

It has been always the practice of those who are desirous to believe

themselves made venerable by length of time, to censure the new comers

into life, for want of respect to grey hairs and sage experience, for

heady confidence in their own understandings, for hasty conclusions

upon partial views, for disregard of counsels, which their fathers and

grandsires are ready to afford them, and a rebellious impatience of that

subordination to which youth is condemned by nature, as necessary to

its security from evils into which it would be otherwise precipitated,

by the rashness of passion, and the blindness of ignorance.

Every old man complains of the growing depravity of the world, of the

petulance and insolence of the rising generation. He recounts the

decency and regularity of former times, and celebrates the discipline and

sobriety of the age in which his youth was passed; a happy age, which is

now no more to be expected, since confusion has broken in upon the world,

and thrown down all the boundaries of civility and reverence.

It is not sufficiently considered how much he assumes who dares to claim

the privilege of complaining; for as every man has, in his own opinion,

a full share of the miseries of life, he is inclined to consider all

clamorous uneasiness, as a proof of impatience rather than of affliction,

and to ask, what merit has this man to show, by which he has acquired a

right to repine at the distributions of nature? Or, why does he imagine

that exemptions should be granted him from the general condition of man?

We find ourselves excited rather to captiousness than pity, and instead

of being in haste to soothe his complaints by sympathy and tenderness,

we enquire, whether the pain be proportionate to the lamentation; and

whether, supposing the affliction real, it is not the effect of vice and

folly, rather than calamity.

The querulousness and indignation which is observed so often to disfigure

the last scene of life, naturally leads us to enquiries like these. For

surely it will be thought at the first view of things, that if age be

thus contemned and ridiculed, insulted and neglected, the crime must

at least be equal on either part. They who have had opportunities of

establishing their authority over minds ductile and unresisting, they

who have been the protectors of helplessness, and the instructors of

ignorance, and who yet retain in their own hands the power of wealth,

and the dignity of command, must defeat their influence by their own

misconduct, and make use of all these advantages with very little skill,

if they cannot secure to themselves an appearance of respect, and ward

off open mockery, and declared contempt.

The general story of mankind will evince, that lawful and settled

authority is very seldom resisted when it is well employed. Gross

corruption, or evident imbecility, is necessary to the suppression

of that reverence with which the majority of mankind look upon their

governors, and on those whom they see surrounded by splendour, and

fortified by power. For though men are drawn by their passions into

forgetfulness of invisible rewards and punishments, yet they are easily

kept obedient to those who have temporal dominion in their hands, till

their veneration is dissipated by such wickedness and folly as can

neither be defended nor concealed.

It may, therefore, very reasonably be suspected that the old draw upon

themselves the greatest part of those insults which they so much lament,

and that age is rarely despised but when it is contemptible. If men

imagine that excess of debauchery can be made reverend by time, that

knowledge is the consequence of long life, however idly or thoughtlessly

employed, that priority of birth will supply the want of steadiness or

honesty, can it raise much wonder that their hopes are disappointed, and

that they see their posterity rather willing to trust their own eyes in

their progress into life, than enlist themselves under guides who have

lost their way?

There are, indeed, many truths which time necessarily and certainly

teaches, and which might, by those who have learned them from experience,

be communicated to their successors at a cheaper rate: but dictates,

though liberally enough bestowed, are generally without effect, the

teacher gains few proselytes by instruction which his own behaviour

contradicts; and young men miss the benefit of counsel, because they are

not very ready to believe that those who fell below them in practice, can

much excel them in theory. Thus the progress of knowledge is retarded,

the world is kept long in the same state, and every new race is to

gain the prudence of their predecessors by committing and redressing

the same miscarriages.

To secure to the old that influence which they are willing to claim, and

which might so much contribute to the improvement of the arts of life,

it is absolutely necessary that they give themselves up to the duties

of declining years; and contentedly resign to youth its levity, its

pleasures, its frolicks, and its fopperies. It is a hopeless endeavour

to unite the contrarieties of spring and winter; it is unjust to claim

the privileges of age, and retain the playthings of childhood. The young

always form magnificent ideas of the wisdom and gravity of men, whom they

consider as placed at a distance from them in the ranks of existence, and

naturally look on those whom they find trifling with long beards, with

contempt and indignation, like that which women feel at the effeminacy

of men. If dotards will contend with boys in those performances in

which boys must always excel them; if they will dress crippled limbs

in embroidery, endeavour at gaiety with faultering voices, and darken

assemblies of pleasure with the ghastliness of disease, they may well

expect those who find their diversions obstructed will hoot them away;

and that if they descend to competition with youth, they must bear the

insolence of successful rivals.

_Lusisti satis, edisti satis atque bibisti:_

_Tempus abire tibi est._

You've had your share of mirth, of meat and drink;

'Tis time to quit the scene--'tis time to think.

ELPHINSTON.

Another vice of age, by which the rising generation may be alienated

from it, is severity and censoriousness, that gives no allowance to

the failings of early life, that expects artfulness from childhood, and

constancy from youth, that is peremptory in every command, and inexorable

to every failure. There are many who live merely to hinder happiness, and

whose descendants can only tell of long life, that it produces suspicion,

malignity, peevishness, and persecution: and yet even these tyrants can

talk of the ingratitude of the age, curse their heirs for impatience,

and wonder that young men cannot take pleasure in their father's company.

He that would pass the latter part of life with honour and decency, must,

when he is young, consider that he shall one day be old; and remember,

when he is old, that he has once been young. In youth, he must lay up

knowledge for his support, when his powers of acting shall forsake him;

and in age forbear to animadvert with rigour on faults which experience

only can correct.

No. 51. TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1750.

_----Stultus labor est ineptiarum._

MART. Lib. ii. Ep. lxxxvi. 10.

How foolish is the toil of trifling cares!

ELPHINSTON.

The Works of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. in Nine Volumes, Volume 02 The Rambler, Volume I · 第 42 / 101 题