THE RETIREMENT OF CASS
Thus far Mr. Buchanan's policy of conciliation through concession had
brought him nothing but disappointment, and whatever faint hope his
loyal Cabinet advisers may have had at the outset in its saving
efficacy was by practical experiment utterly destroyed. The
non-coercion doctrine had been adopted as early as November 20, in
the Attorney-General's opinion of that date. The fact was rumored,
not only in the political circles of the capital, but in the chief
newspapers of the country; and the three secession members of the
Cabinet had doubtless communicated it confidentially to all their
prominent and influential confederates. Since that time South Carolina
had continued her preparation for secession with unremitting industry;
Mississippi had authorized a convention and appointed commissioners
to visit all the slave-States and propagate disunion, among them Mr.
Thompson, Buchanan's Secretary of the Interior, who afterwards
exercised this insurrectionary function while yet remaining in the
Cabinet; the North Carolina Legislature had postponed the election of
United States Senator; Florida had passed a convention bill; Georgia
had instituted legislative proceedings to bring about a conference of
the Southern States at Atlanta; both houses of the National Congress
had rung with secession speeches, while frequent caucuses of the
conspirators took place at Washington.
[Sidenote] Cobb to Buchanan, "Washington Constitution," Dec. 12,
1860.
Mr. Buchanan's truce with the South Carolina Representatives had as
little effect in arresting the secession intrigues as his non-coercion
doctrine officially announced in the annual message. On the evening of
the day (December 8)[1] on which he received the South Carolina
pledge, the Secretary of the Treasury, Howell Cobb, of Georgia,
tendered his resignation, announcing in the same letter his intention
to embark in the active work of disunion. It had been generally
understood that the non-coercion theories of the message were adopted
by the President in deference to the wishes and under the influence of
Cobb, Thompson, and Floyd, and undoubtedly they had also been largely
instrumental in bringing about the unofficial truce at Charleston. If,
amid all his fears, Mr. Buchanan retained any sensibility, he must
have been profoundly shocked at the cool dissimulation with which Mr.
Cobb, everywhere recognized as a Cabinet officer of great ability, had
assisted in committing the Administration to these fatal doctrines and
measures, and then abandoned it in the moment of danger. "My
withdrawal," he wrote to the President, "has not been occasioned by
anything you have said or done. Whilst differing from your message
upon some of its theoretical doctrines, as well as from the hope so
earnestly expressed that the Union can be preserved, there was no
practical result likely to follow which required me to retire from
your Administration. That necessity is created by what I feel it my
duty to do; and the responsibility of the act, therefore, rests alone
upon myself." Ignoring the fact that the Treasury was prosperous and
solvent when he took charge of it, and that at the moment of his
leaving it could not pay its drafts, Mr. Cobb, five days later,
published a long and inflammatory address to the people of Georgia,
concluding with this exhortation: "I entertain no doubt either of your
right or duty to secede from the Union. Arouse, then, all your manhood
for the great work before you, and be prepared on that day to announce
and maintain your independence out of the Union, for you will never
again have equality and justice in it."
[Sidenote] G.T. Curtis, "Life of James Buchanan." Vol. II., p. 399.
The President had scarcely found a successor for Mr. Cobb when the
head of his Cabinet, Lewis Cass, Secretary of State, tendered his
resignation also, and retired from the Administration. Mr. Cass had
held many offices of distinction, had attained high rank as a
Democratic leader, and had once been a Presidential candidate. His
resignation was, therefore, an event of great significance from a
political point of view. The incident brings into bold relief the
mental reservations under which Buchanan's paradoxical theories had
been concurred in by his Cabinet. A private memorandum, in Mr.
Buchanan's handwriting, commenting on the event, makes the following
emphatic statement: "His resignation was the more remarkable on
account of the cause he assigned for it. When my late message (of
December, 1860) was read to the Cabinet before it was printed, General
Cass expressed his unreserved and hearty approbation of it,
accompanied by every sign of deep and sincere feeling. He had but one
objection to it, and this was, that it was not sufficiently strong
against the power of Congress to make war upon a State for the purpose
of compelling her to remain in the Union; and the denial of this power
was made more emphatic and distinct upon his own suggestion."
[Sidenote] See proceedings of convention in "Charleston Courier,"
Dec., 1860.
But this position was probably qualified and counterbalanced in his
mind by the President's direct promise that he would collect the
Federal revenue and protect the Federal property. In the nature of
things the execution of this policy must not only precede but exclude
all other theories and abstractions, and the Secretary of State
probably waited in good faith to see the President "execute the laws."
Little by little, however, delay and concession rendered this
impossible. The collector at Charleston still nominally exercised
his functions as a Federal officer; but it was an open secret among
the Charleston authorities, and one which, must also by this time
have become known to the Government at Washington, that he was only
holding the place in trust for the coming secession convention. As to
protecting the Federal property, the refusal to send Anderson troops,
the President's truce, the gradual development of Mr. Buchanan's
irresolution and lack of courage, and finally Mr. Cobb's open defection
must have convinced Mr. Cass that, under existing determinations,
orders, and influences, it was a hopeless prospect.
[Sidenote] Floyd's Richmond Speech, N.Y. "Herald," Jan. 17, 1861,
p. 2.
The whole question seems to have been finally decided in a long and
stormy Cabinet session held on December 13. The events of the few
preceding days had evidently shaken the President's confidence in his
own policy. He startled his dissembling and conspiring Secretary of War
with the sudden questions, "Mr. Floyd, are you going to send recruits
to Charleston to strengthen the forts?" "Don't you intend to strengthen
the forts at Charleston?" The apparent change of policy alarmed the
Secretary, but he replied promptly that he did not. "Mr. Floyd,"
continued Mr. Buchanan, "I would rather be in the bottom of the Potomac
to-morrow than that these forts in Charleston should fall into the
hands of those who intend to take them. It will destroy me, sir, and,
Mr. Floyd, if that thing occurs it will cover your name with an infamy
that all time can never efface, because it is in vain that you will
attempt to show that you have not some complicity in handing over those
forts to those who take them."
The wily Secretary replied, "I will risk my reputation, I will trust my
life that the forts are safe under the declarations of the gentlemen of
Charleston." "That is all very well," replied the President, "but does
that secure the forts?" "No, sir; but it is a guaranty that I am in
earnest," said Floyd. "I am not satisfied," said the President.
Thereupon the Secretary made the never-failing appeal to the fears and
timidity of Mr. Buchanan. He has himself reported the language he used:
"I am sorry for it," said he; "you are President, it is for you to
order. You have the right to order and I will consider your orders when
made. But I would be recreant to you if I did not tell you that this
policy of garrisoning the forts will lead to certain conflicts; it is
the inauguration of civil war, and the beginning of the effusion of
blood. If it is a question of property, why not put an ordnance
sergeant into them--a man who wears worsted epaulets on his shoulders
and stripes down his pantaloons--as the representative of the property
of the United States. That will be enough to secure the forts. If it is
a question of property, he represents it,[2] and let us wait until the
issue is made by South Carolina. She will go out of the Union and send
her commissioners here. Up to that point the action is insignificant.
Action after this demands the attention of the great council of the
nation. Let us submit the question to Congress--it is for Congress to
deal with the matter."
[Sidenote] Floyd's Richmond Speech, N.Y. "Herald," Jan. 17, 1861,
p. 2.
This crafty appeal to the President's hesitating inclinations, and in
accord with his policy hitherto pursued, was seconded by the active
persuasions of the leading conspirators of Congress whom Floyd promptly
called to his assistance. "I called for help from that bright Saladin
of the South, Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi--and I said, 'Come to
my rescue; the battle is a little more than my weak heart can support.
Come to me;' and he came. Then came that old jovial-looking,
noble-hearted representative from Virginia, James M. Mason. Here came
that anomaly of modern times, the youthful Nestor, here came Hunter....
From the north, the south, the east, and the west there came up the
patriots of the country, the champions of constitutional liberty, and
they talked with the President of the United States, and they quieted
his fears and assured him in the line of duty. They said, 'Let there be
no force'; and the President said to me, 'I am content with your
policy'; and then it was that we determined that we would send no more
troops to the harbor in Charleston."
Strip this statement of its oratorical exaggeration, and the reader
can nevertheless see, in the light of after occurrences, a vivid and
truthful picture of a conspiring cabal, stooping to arts and devices
difficult to distinguish from direct personal treachery, flattering,
threatening, and coaxing by turns, and finally lulling the fears of the
President, through his vain hope that they would help him tide over a
magnified danger, and shift upon Congress a responsibility he had not
the courage to meet.
Mr. Cass, however, could no longer be quieted. Through all the rhetoric,
sophistry, and bluster of the conspirators he saw the diminishing
resources of the Government and the rising power of the insurrection.
With a last bold effort to rouse the President from his lethargy, he
demanded, in the Cabinet meeting of the 13th, that the forts should be
strengthened. But he was powerless to break the spell. Says Floyd: "The
President said to him in reply, with a beautiful countenance and with a
heroic decision that I shall never forget, in the council chamber, 'I
have considered this question. I am sorry to differ from the Secretary
of State; I have made up my mind. The interests of the country do not
demand a reënforcement of the forces in Charleston. I cannot do it--and
I take the responsibility of it upon myself.'"
The letters which were exchanged between the President and his premier
set out the differences between them with the same distinctness. Mr.
Cass, after premising that he concurred with the general principles
laid down in the message, says:
[Sidenote] Cass to Buchanan, Dec. 12, 1860. Curtis, "Life of Buchanan,"
Vol. II., p. 397.
In some points which I deem of vital importance, it has been my
misfortune to differ from you. It has been my decided opinion,
which for some time past I have urged at various meetings of the
Cabinet, that additional troops should be sent to reënforce the
forts in the harbor of Charleston, with a view to their better
defense, should they be attacked, and that an armed vessel should
likewise be ordered there, to aid, if necessary, in the defense,
and also, should it be required, in the collection of the
revenue; and it is yet my opinion that these measures should be
adopted without the least delay. I have likewise urged the
expediency of immediately removing the custom-house at Charleston
to one of the forts in the port, and of making arrangements for
the collection of the duties there, by having a collector and
other officers ready to act when necessary, so that when the
office may become vacant the proper authority may be there to
collect the duties on the part of the United States. I continue
to think that these arrangements should be immediately made.
While the right and the responsibility of deciding belong to you,
it is very desirable that at this perilous juncture there should
be, as far as possible, unanimity in your councils, with a view
to safe and efficient action.
To this statement the President replied:
[Sidenote] Buchanan to Cass, Dec. 15, 1860. Curtis, "Life of Buchanan,"
Vol. II, p. 398.
The question on which we unfortunately differ is that of ordering
a detachment of the army and navy to Charleston, and is correctly
stated in your letter of resignation. I do not intend to argue
this question. Suffice it to say that your remarks upon the
subject were heard by myself and the Cabinet, with all the
respect due to your high position, your long experience, and your
unblemished character; but they failed to convince us of the
necessity and propriety, under existing circumstances, of
adopting such a measure. The Secretaries of War and of the Navy,
through, whom the orders must have issued to reenforce the forts,
did not concur in your views; and whilst the whole responsibility
for the refusal rested upon myself, they were the members of the
Cabinet more directly interested. You may have judged correctly
on this important question, and your opinion is entitled to grave
consideration; but under my convictions of duty, and believing as
I do that no present necessity exists for a resort to force for
the protection of the public property, it was impossible for me
to have risked a collision of arms in the harbor of Charleston,
and thereby defeated the reasonable hope which I cherish of the
final triumph, of the Constitution and of the Union.
[Sidenote] Holt, conversation with J.G.N., 1874.
The other Union members of the Cabinet received the rumor of Mr. Cass's
resignation with gloomy apprehensions. Postmaster-General Holt, with
whom by reason of their kindred opinions he had been on intimate
terms, hastened to him to learn whether it were indeed true and
whether his determination were irrevocable. Cass confirmed the report,
saying that representing the Northern and loyal constituency which he
did, he could no longer without dishonor to himself and to them remain
in such treasonable surroundings. Holt endeavored to persuade him that
under the circumstances it was all the more necessary that the loyal
members of the Cabinet should remain at their posts, in order to
prevent the country's passing into the hands of the secessionists by
mere default. But Cass replied, No; that the public feeling and
sentiment of his section would not tolerate such a policy on his part.
"For you," he said, "coming from a border State, where a modified,
perhaps a divided, public sentiment exists, that is not only a
possible course, but it is a true one; it is your duty to remain, to
sustain the Executive and counteract the plots of the traitors. But my
duty is otherwise; I must adhere to my resignation."
In this honorable close of a long public career, General Cass gave
evidence of the spirit which was to actuate many patriotic Democrats
when the final ordeal came. It was to be regretted that he had not
taken issue with his chief when his paradoxical message was read to
the Cabinet, but much is to be allowed to the inertness of a man in
his seventy-ninth year. Life-long placeman and unflinching partisan
that he was, there was still so much of patriotic conscience in him
that he could not stand by and see premeditated dishonor done to the
flag he had followed in his youth and as Jackson's Secretary of War
upheld in his maturer years. If Mr. Buchanan had been capable of
amendment, he might have learned a salutary lesson from the manner in
which this veteran politician ended his half century of public
service.
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[1] Cobb to Buchanan, "Washington Constitution," Dec. 12, 1860. The
President's reply says: "I have received your communication of
Saturday evening, resigning," etc.
[2] Jefferson Davis in his "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government,"
Vol. I., page 215, also lays claim to this artful suggestion:
"The President's objection to this was, that it was his bounden duty
to preserve and protect the property of the United States. To this I
replied, with all the earnestness the occasion demanded, that I would
pledge my life that, if an inventory were taken of all the stores and
munitions in the fort, and an ordnance sergeant with a few men left in
charge of them, they would not be disturbed."