IX

If scientific eugenics can put a stop to the contra-selection

incidental to civilization, Man will recover the plasticity and

the progressiveness he once possessed, and will be able to evolve

further--in whatever direction seems to him best. We need not take

alarm at this possibility, for with his superior knowledge he may

surely be trusted to make a better job of his evolution than the

_Lemur_ and the _Pithecanthropus_, who were our progenitors and managed

to evolve into modern man.

But the process will necessarily be a slow one, even though a

comprehensive scheme of eugenics will be providing simultaneously _two_

sources of improvement, by the elimination of defectives at the bottom

of the social scale, and by the increase of ability at the top. As,

moreover, time presses, and sheer destruction may overtake us before

eugenics have made much difference, it would be highly desirable if

some means could be found to accelerate the change of heart required.

For this purpose, I am much less inclined to put my trust in the

advance of pharmacology than Mr Haldane and Mr Russell.[D] Hitherto

new drugs have only meant new vices, sometimes (like cocaine) of so

fascinating a character as to distract the whole police force from

their proper function of repressing crime. So it seems legitimate to

be very sceptical about moral transformation scenes to be wrought by

pills and injections.

On the other hand there does seem to be a science from the possible

progress of which something of a sensational kind might not

unreasonably be expected. It is, moreover, the science most directly

concerned with affairs of this sort. Psychology, the science of human

mentality, is, by common consent, in a deplorably backward state. It

has remained a ground for metaphysical excursions and a playground for

the arbitrary pedantries of classificatory systematists. Its efforts

to become scientific have only led it to ape assumptions and to borrow

notions found to be appropriate in sciences with widely different

problems and objects. The results, as the psychologists themselves

confess, are meagre and disappointing; which, of course, only proves

that the borrowed notions are inappropriate and incapable of making

Psychology into an effective science. But if psychologists should

take it into their heads to settle down to business, to recognize

the primary obligation of every science to develop methods and

conceptions capable of working upon its subject-matter, and so tried

to authenticate their ‘truth’ after the ordinary fashion of the other

sciences, namely by the pragmatic test of successful working, some

surprising effects might be elicited even from the actual human mind.

For there is reason to suppose that its present organization is very

far from being the best of which it is capable. It has come about in a

very haphazard manner, and we are not at present making anything like

an adequate use of all our powers. Hence by changing the gearing and

re-arranging the traditional coupling, so to speak, of our faculties,

improvements might conceivably be wrought which would seem to us to

border on the miraculous. Thus a pragmatically efficient Psychology

might actually invert the miracle of Circe, and really transform the

Yahoo into a man.

X

I have endeavoured in this very summary sketch to show that the doom of

Tantalus is by no means unconditional, and that he can save himself if

he chooses, and that by no superhuman effort, but merely by recognizing

facts that are right before his nose and well within his comprehension,

and by a little clear thinking upon their import. But I would not

presume to predict that he _will_ save himself: history affords no

unambiguous guide. It seems to show that something worse and something

better than what actually happens is always conceivable, and that

neither our hopes nor our fears are ever fully realized. If so, poor

Tantalus, hoping against hope, fearing against reason, may muddle along

for a good while yet, without repeating either his ancient error of

imagining that he could sup with the gods, or his modern folly of using

his reason, as Goethe’s Mephistopheles declared, only to become more

bestial than any beast!

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