THE PICKENS-AND-STEALIN'S REBELLION.

Had any one ventured to prophesy on the Fourth of March that the

immediate prospect of Civil War would be hailed by the people of the

Free States with a unanimous shout of enthusiasm, he would have been

thought a madman. Yet the prophecy would have been verified by what we

now see and hear in every city, town, and hamlet from Maine to Kansas.

With the advantage of three months' active connivance in the cabinet of

Mr. Buchanan, with an empty treasury at Washington, and that reluctance

to assume responsibility and to inaugurate a decided policy, the common

vice of our politicians, who endeavor to divine and to follow popular

sentiment rather than to lead it, it seemed as if Disunion were

inevitable, and the only open question were the line of separation. So

assured seemed the event, that English journalists moralized gravely on

the inherent weakness of Democracy. While the leaders of the Southern

Rebellion did not dare to expose their treason to the risk of a popular

vote in any one of the seceding States, the "Saturday Review," one of

the ablest of British journals, solemnly warned its countrymen to learn

by our example the dangers of an extended suffrage.

Meanwhile the conduct of the people of the Free States, during all these

trying and perilous months, had proved, if it proved anything, the

essential conservatism of a population in which every grown man has

a direct interest in the stability of the national government. So

abstinent are they by habit and principle from any abnormal intervention

with the machine of administration, so almost superstitious in adherence

to constitutional forms, as to be for a moment staggered by the claim to

a _right_ of secession set up by all the Cotton States, admitted by the

Border Slave-States, which had the effrontery to deliberate between

their plain allegiance and their supposed interest, and but feebly

denied by the Administration then in power. The usual panacea of palaver

was tried; Congress did its best to add to the general confusion of

thought; and, as if that were not enough, a Convention of Notables

called simultaneously to thresh the straw of debate anew, and to

convince thoughtful persons that men do not grow wiser as they grow

older. So in the two Congresses the notables talked,--in the one,

those who ought to be shelved, in the other, those who were shelved

already,--while those who were too thoroughly shelved for a seat in

either addressed Great Union Meetings at home. Not a man of them but had

a compromise in his pocket, adhesive as Spalding's glue, warranted to

stick the shattered Confederacy together so firmly, that, if it over

broke again, it must be in a new place, which was a great consolation.

If these gentlemen gave nothing very valuable to the people of the Free

States, they were giving the Secessionists what was of inestimable

value to them,--Time. The latter went on seizing forts, navy-yards, and

deposits of Federal money, erecting batteries, and raising and arming

men at their leisure; above all, they acquired a prestige, and

accustomed men's minds to the thought of disunion, not only as possible,

but actual. They began to grow insolent, and, while compelling absolute

submission to their rebellious usurpation at home, decried any exercise

of legitimate authority on the part of the General Government as

_Coercion_,--a new term, by which it was sought to be established as a

principle of constitutional law, that it is always the Northern bull

that has gored the Southern ox.

During all this time, the Border Slave-States, and especially Virginia,

were playing a part at once cowardly and selfish. They assumed the right

to stand neutral between the Government and rebellion, to contract a

kind of morganatic marriage with Treason, by which they could enjoy the

pleasant sin without the tedious responsibility, and to be traitors in

everything but the vulgar contingency of hemp. Doubtless the aim of the

political managers in these States was to keep the North amused with

schemes of arbitration, reconstruction, and whatever other fine

words would serve the purpose of hiding the real issue, till the new

government of Secessia should have so far consolidated itself as to

be able to demand with some show of reason a recognition from foreign

powers, and to render it politic for the United States to consent to

peaceable secession. They counted on the self-interest of England and

the supineness of the North. As to the former, they were not wholly

without justification,--for nearly all the English discussions of

the "American Crisis" which we have seen have shown far more of the

shop-keeping spirit than of interest in the maintenance of free

institutions; but in regard to the latter they made the fatal mistake of

believing our Buchanans, Cushings, and Touceys to be representative men.

They were not aware how utterly the Democratic Party had divorced itself

from the moral sense of the Free States, nor had they any conception

of the tremendous recoil of which the long-repressed convictions,

traditions, and instincts of a people are capable.

Never was a nation so in want of a leader; never was it more plain,

that, without a head, the people "bluster abroad as beasts," with plenty

of the iron of purpose, but purpose without coherence, and with no

cunning smith of circumstance to edge it with plan and helve it with

direction. What the country was waiting for showed itself in the

universal thrill of satisfaction when Major Anderson took the

extraordinary responsibility of doing his duty. But such was the general

uncertainty, so doubtful seemed the loyalty of the Democratic Party as

represented by its spokesmen at the North, so irresolute was the tone

of many Republican leaders and journals, that a powerful and wealthy

community of twenty millions of people gave a sigh of relief when they

had been permitted to install the Chief Magistrate of their choice in

their own National Capital. Even after the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln,

it was confidently announced that Jefferson Davis, the Burr of the

Southern conspiracy, would be in Washington before the month was out;

and so great was the Northern despondency, that the chances of such an

event were seriously discussed. While the nation was falling to pieces,

there were newspapers and "distinguished statesmen" of the party so

lately and so long in power base enough to be willing to make political

capital out of the common danger, and to lose their country, if

they could only find their profit. There was even one man found in

Massachusetts, who, measuring the moral standard of his party by his

own, had the unhappy audacity to declare publicly that there were

friends enough of the South in his native State to prevent the march of

any troops thence to sustain that Constitution to which he had sworn

fealty in Heaven knows how many offices, the rewards of almost as many

turnings of his political coat. There was one journal in New York which

had the insolence to speak of _President_ Davis and _Mister_ Lincoln in

the same paragraph. No wonder the "dirt-eaters" of the Carolinas could

be taught to despise a race among whom creatures might be found to do

that by choice which they themselves were driven to do by misery.

Thus far the Secessionists had the game all their own way, for

their dice were loaded with Northern lead. They framed their sham

constitution, appointed themselves to their sham offices, issued their

sham commissions, endeavored to bribe England with a sham offer of

low duties and Virginia with a sham prohibition of the slave-trade,

advertised their proposals for a sham loan which was to be taken up

under intimidation, and levied real taxes on the people in the name

of the people whom they had never allowed to vote directly on their

enormous swindle. With money stolen from the Government, they raised

troops whom they equipped with stolen arms, and beleaguered national

fortresses with cannon stolen from national arsenals. They sent out

secret agents to Europe, they had their secret allies in the Free

States, their conventions transacted all important business in secret

session;--there was but one exception to the shrinking delicacy becoming

a maiden government, and that was the openness of the stealing. We had

always thought a high sense of personal honor an essential element of

chivalry; but among the _Romanic_ races, by which, as the wonderful

ethnologist of "De Bow's Review" tells us, the Southern States were

settled, and from which they derive a close entail of chivalric

characteristics, to the exclusion of the vulgar Saxons of the North,

such is by no means the case. For the first time in history the

deliberate treachery of a general is deemed worthy of a civic ovation,

and Virginia has the honor of being the first State claiming to be

civilized that has decreed the honors of a triumph to a cabinet officer

who had contrived to gild a treason that did not endanger his life with

a peculation that could not further damage his reputation. Rebellion,

even in a bad cause, may have its romantic side; treason, which had not

been such but for being on the losing side, may challenge admiration;

but nothing can sweeten larceny or disinfect perjury. A rebellion

inaugurated with theft, and which has effected its entry into national

fortresses, not over broken walls, but by breaches of trust, should

take Jonathan Wild for its patron saint, with the run of Mr. Buchanan's

cabinet for a choice of sponsors,--godfathers we should not dare to call

them.

Mr. Lincoln's Inaugural Speech was of the kind usually called "firm, but

conciliatory,"--a policy doubtful in troublous times, since it commonly

argues weakness, and more than doubtful in a crisis like ours, since it

left the course which the Administration meant to take ambiguous, and,

while it weakened the Government by exciting the distrust of all

who wished for vigorous measures, really strengthened the enemy by

encouraging the conspirators in the Border States. There might be a

question as to whether this or that attitude were expedient for the

Republican Party; there could be none as to the only safe and dignified

one for the Government of the Nation. Treason was as much treason in the

beginning of March as in the middle of April; and it seems certain now,

as it seemed probable to many then, that the country would have sooner

rallied to the support of the Government, if the Government had shown an

earlier confidence in the loyalty of the people. Though the President

talked of "repossessing" the stolen forts, arsenals, and custom-houses,

yet close upon this declaration followed the disheartening intelligence

that the Cabinet were discussing the propriety of evacuating not only

Fort Sumter, which was of no strategic importance, but Fort Pickens,

which was the key to the Gulf of Mexico, and to abandon which was almost

to acknowledge the independence of the Rebel States. Thus far the Free

States had waited with commendable patience for some symptom of vitality

in the new Administration, something that should distinguish it from the

piteous helplessness of its predecessor. But now their pride was too

deeply outraged for endurance, indignant remonstrances were heard from

all quarters, and the Government seemed for the first time fairly to

comprehend that it had twenty millions of freemen at its back, and that

forts might be taken and held by honest men as well as by knaves and

traitors. The nettle had been stroked long enough; it was time to try

a firm grip. Still the Administration seemed inclined to temporize, so

thoroughly was it possessed by the notion of conciliating the Border

States. In point of fact, the side which those States might take in the

struggle between Law and Anarchy was of vastly more import to them than

to us. They could bring no considerable reinforcement of money, credit,

or arms to the rebels; they could at best but add so many mouths to an

army whose commissariat was already dangerously embarrassed. They could

not even, except temporarily, keep the war away from the territory of

the seceding States, every one of which had a sea-door open to the

invasion of an enemy who controlled the entire navy and shipping of the

country.

The position assumed by Eastern Virginia and Maryland was of consequence

only so far as it might facilitate a sudden raid on Washington, and the

policy of both these States was to amuse the Government by imaginary

negotiations till the plans of the conspirators were ripe. In both

States men were actively recruited and enrolled to assist in attacking

the capital. With them, as with the more openly rebellious States, the

new theory of "Coercion" was ingeniously arranged like a valve, yielding

at the slightest impulse to the passage of forces for the subversion

of legitimate authority, closing imperviously so that no drop of power

could ooze through in the opposite direction. Lord de Roos, long

suspected of cheating at cards, would never have been convicted but for

the resolution of an adversary, who, pinning his hand to the table with

a fork, said to him blandly, "My Lord, if the ace of spades is not under

your Lordship's hand, why, then, I beg your pardon!" It seems to us that

a timely treatment of Governor Letcher in the same energetic way would

have saved the disasters of Harper's Ferry and Norfolk,--for disasters

they were, though six months of temporizing had so lowered the public

sense of what was due to the national dignity, that people were glad to

see the Government active at length, even if only in setting fire to its

own house.

We are by no means inclined to criticize the Administration, even if

this were the proper time for it; but we cannot help thinking that there

was great wisdom in Napoleon's recipe for saving life in dealing with a

mob,--"First fire grape-shot _into_ them; after that, over their

heads as much as you like." The position of Mr. Lincoln was already

embarrassed when he entered upon office, by what we believe to have been

a political blunder in the leaders of the Republican Party. Instead of

keeping closely to the real point, and the only point, at issue, namely,

the claim of a minority to a right of rebellion when displeased with the

result of an election, the bare question of Secession, pure and simple,

they allowed their party to become divided, and to waste themselves

in discussing terms of compromise and guaranties of slavery which had

nothing to do with the business in hand. Unless they were ready to

admit that popular government was at an end, those were matters already

settled by the Constitution and the last election. Compromise was out

of the question with men who had gone through the motions, at least, of

establishing a government and electing an anti-president. The way to

insure the loyalty of the Border States, as the event has shown, was to

convince them that disloyalty was dangerous. That revolutions never go

backward is one of those compact generalizations which the world is so

ready to accept because they save the trouble of thinking; but, however

it may be with revolutions, it is certain that rebellions most commonly

go backward with disastrous rapidity, and it was of the gravest moment,

as respected its moral influence, that Secession should not have time

allowed it to assume the proportions and the dignity of revolution,

in other words, of a rebellion too powerful to be crushed. The secret

friends of the Secession treason in the Free States have done their

best to bewilder the public mind and to give factitious prestige to a

conspiracy against free government and civilization by talking about the

_right_ of revolution, as if it were some acknowledged principle of the

Law of Nations. There is a right, and sometimes a duty, of rebellion, as

there is also a right and sometimes a duty of hanging men for it; but

rebellion continues to be rebellion until it has accomplished its

object and secured the acknowledgment of it from the other party to

the quarrel, and from the world at large. The Republican Party in the

November elections had really effected a peaceful revolution, had

emancipated the country from the tyranny of an oligarchy which had

abused the functions of the Government almost from the time of its

establishment, to the advancement of their own selfish aims and

interests; and it was this legitimate change of rulers and of national

policy by constitutional means which the Secessionists intended to

prevent. To put the matter in plain English, they resolved to treat the

people of the United States, in the exercise of their undoubted and

lawful authority, as rebels, and resorted to their usual policy of

intimidation in order to subdue them. Either this magnificent empire

should be their plantation, or it should perish. This was the view even

of what were called the moderate slave-holders of the Border States;

and all the so-called compromises and plans of reconstruction that were

thrown into the caldron where the hell-broth of anarchy was brewing had

this extent,--no more,--What terms of _submission_ would the people make

to their natural masters? Whatever other result may have come of the

long debates in Congress and elsewhere, they have at least convinced the

people of the Free States that there can be no such thing as a moderate

slave-holder,--that moderation and slavery can no more coexist than

Floyd and honesty, or Anderson and treason.

We believe, then, that conciliation was from the first impossible,--that

to attempt it was unwise, because it put the party of law and loyalty in

the wrong,--and that, if it was done as a mere matter of policy in order

to gain time, it was a still greater mistake, because it was the rebels

only who could profit by it in consolidating their organization, while

the seeming gain of a few days or weeks was a loss to the Government,

whose great advantage was in an administrative system thoroughly

established, and, above all, in the vast power of the national idea, a

power weakened by every day's delay. This is so true, that already men

began to talk of the rival governments at Montgomery and Washington, and

Canadian journals recommend a strict neutrality, as if the independence

and legitimacy of the mushroom despotism of New Ashantee were an

acknowledged fact, and the name of the United States of America had no

more authority than that of Jefferson Davis and Company, dealers in

all kinds of repudiation and anarchy. For more than a month after

the inauguration of President Lincoln there seemed to be a kind of

interregnum, during which the confusion of ideas in the Border States as

to their rights and duties as members of the "old" Union, as it began

to be called, became positively chaotic. Virginia, still professing

neutrality, prepared to seize the arsenal at Harper's Ferry and the

navy-yard at Norfolk; she would prevent the passage of the United

States' forces "with a serried phalanx of her gallant sons," two

regiments of whom stood, looking on while a file of marines took seven

wounded men in an engine-house for them; she would do everything but her

duty,--the gallant Ancient Pistol of a commonwealth. She "resumed her

sovereignty," whatever that meant; her Convention passed an ordinance

of secession, concluded a league offensive and defensive with the

rebel Confederacy, appointed Jefferson Davis commander-in-chief of

her land-forces and somebody else of the fleet she meant to steal at

Norfolk, and then coolly referred the whole matter back to the people

to vote three weeks afterwards whether they _would_ secede three weeks

before. Wherever the doctrine of Secession has penetrated, it seems to

have obliterated every notion of law and precedent.

The country had come to the conclusion that Mr. Lincoln and his cabinet

were mainly employed in packing their trunks to leave Washington, when

the "venerable Edward Ruffin of Virginia" fired that first gun at Fort

Sumter which brought all the Free States to their feet as one man.

That shot is destined to be the most memorable one ever fired on this

continent since the Concord fowling-pieces said, "That bridge is ours,

and we mean to go across it," eighty-seven Aprils ago. As these began a

conflict which gave us independence, so that began another which is to

give us nationality. It was certainly a great piece of good-luck for the

Government that they had a fort which it was so profitable to lose.

The people were weary of a masterly inactivity which seemed to consist

mainly in submitting to be kicked. We know very well the difficulties

that surrounded the new Administration; we appreciate their reluctance

to begin a war the responsibility of which was as great as its

consequences seemed doubtful; but we cannot understand how it was hoped

to evade war, except by concessions vastly more disastrous than war

itself. War has no evil comparable in its effect on national character

to that of a craven submission to manifest wrong, the postponement of

moral to material interests. There is no prosperity so great as courage.

We do not believe that any amount of forbearance would have conciliated

the South so long as they thought us pusillanimous. The only way to

retain the Border States was by showing that we had the will and the

power to do without them. The little Bopeep policy of

"Let them alone, and they'll all come home

Wagging their tails behind them"

was certainly tried long enough with conspirators who had shown

unmistakably that they desired nothing so much as the continuance of

peace, especially when it was all on one side, and who would never have

given the Government the great advantage of being attacked in Fort

Sumter, had they not supposed they were dealing with men who could not

be cuffed into resistance. The lesson we have to teach, them now is,

that we are thoroughly and terribly in earnest. Mr. Stephens's theories

are to be put to a speedier and sterner test than he expected, and we

are to prove which is stronger,--an oligarchy built _on_ men, or a

commonwealth built _of_ them. Our structure is alive in every part with

defensive and recuperative energies; woe to theirs, if that vaunted

corner-stone which they believe patient and enduring as marble should

begin to writhe with intelligent life!

We have no doubt of the issue. We believe that the strongest battalions

are always on the side of God. The Southern army will be fighting for

Jefferson Davis, or at most for the liberty of self-misgovernment, while

we go forth for the defence of principles which alone make government

august and civil society possible. It is the very life of the nation

that is at stake. There is no question here of dynasties, races,

religions,--but simply whether we will consent to include in our Bill of

Rights--not merely as of equal validity with all other rights, whether

natural or acquired, but by its very nature transcending and abrogating

them all--the Right of Anarchy. We must convince men that treason

against the ballot-box is as dangerous as treason against a throne, and

that, if they play so desperate a game, they must stake their lives on

the hazard. The one lesson that remained for us to teach the political

theorists of the Old World was, that we are as strong to suppress

intestine disorder as foreign aggression, and we must teach it

decisively and thoroughly. The economy of war is to be tested by the

value of the object to be gained by it. A ten years' war would be cheap

that gave us a country to be proud of and a flag that should command the

respect of the world because it was the symbol of the enthusiastic unity

of a great nation.

The Government, however slow it may have been to accept the war which

Mr. Buchanan's supineness left them, is acting now with all energy and

determination. What they have a right to claim is the confidence of the

people, and that depends in good measure on the discretion of the

press. Only let us have no more weakness under the plausible name of

Conciliation. We need not discuss the probabilities of an acknowledgment

of the Confederated States by England and France; we have only to

say, "Acknowledge them at your peril." But there is no chance of the

recognition of the Confederacy by any foreign governments, so long as it

is without the confidence of the brokers. There is no question on which

side the strength lies. The whole tone of the Southern journals, so far

as we are able to judge, shows the inherent folly and weakness of the

Secession movement. Men who feel strong in the justice of their cause,

or confident in their powers, do not waste breath in childish boasts of

their own superiority and querulous depreciation of their antagonists.

They are weak, and they know it. And not only are they weak in

comparison with the Free States, but we believe they are without the

moral support of whatever deserves the name of public opinion at home.

If not, why does their Congress, as they call it, hold council always

with closed doors, like a knot of conspirators? The first tap of the

Northern drum dispelled many illusions, and we need no better proof of

which ship is sinking than that Mr. Caleb Gushing should have made such

haste to come over to the old Constitution with the stars and stripes at

her mast-head.

We cannot think that the war we are entering on can end without some

radical change in the system of African slavery. Whether it be doomed

to a sudden extinction, or to a gradual abolition through economical

causes, this war will not leave it where it was before. As a power in

the State, its reign is already over. The fiery tongues of the batteries

in Charleston harbor accomplished in one day a conversion which the

constancy of Garrison and the eloquence of Phillips had failed to bring

about in thirty years. And whatever other result this war is destined to

produce, it has already won for us a blessing worth everything to us as

a nation in emancipating the public opinion of the North.

The Atlantic Monthly, Volume 07, No. 44, June, 1861 A Magazine of Literature, Art, and Politics · 第 43 / 45 题