Chapter 37

In the days following the hearing, the Belmont administration

directed its attention to the complaint brought against it in

the County Superior Court. On its behalf, attorney Simon Murrain

began the usual returns from the baseline destined to increase costs,

delay judgment and frustrate justice.

The analogy to tennis is not farfetched. One side, the plaintiff

via her attorney, Al Garret, serves. A volley of paper ensues

from both sides directed at each other, but under the supervision

and rule of the official, a judge.

Where the analogy loses ground is that very little action occurs

in the court. Sure, the plaintiff and respondent and the lawyers must

show up for hearings, but most everything goes on in the judges' chambers.

Simon Murrain had a great deal of practice in delaying tactics.

Over the last four years, seven people had brought suit against Belmont

for sex discrimination. All seven had been forced to withdraw

as their cases dragged on and on and their resources dwindled.

Simon's initial move this time was to have the case go to a higher court,

in this instance the United States District Court.

This move placed two additional burdens on the plaintiff and her attorney.

First, the cost of the proceedings was greater than at the district level

and second, the travel distance to attend hearings increased fifty-fold.

An advantage was also inadvertently given. The judge who was appointed

to sit at this session was known for his fairness and knowledge of the law.

Al Garret immediately filed an amended complaint to the federal court

which could rule on federal laws as well as state. In it, he listed

six charges against Belmont University: 1. Violation of due process;

2. violation of constitutional law; 3. violation of the state

administrative procedures act; 4. violation of the state

open meeting law; 5. violation of the state access to public records

and 6. violation of the fair employment practices act.

With the listing of these charges, he asked that the court issue

a restraining order, an injunction that would order the respondent,

Belmont University, to grant the plaintiff her right to a fair

and impartial hearing by the university and access to the documents

that had been withheld from her.

It was at this time, shortly after the final university hearing had ended,

that Diana began getting threatening phone calls. She was told to drop

the court proceedings if she didn't want something really bad to happen to her.

After the initial hearing on the complaint and before any decision

was handed down by the judge, Murrain filed a motion for summary judgment

on counts three, four, five and six--all of the counts related to state law.

In effect, he was asking the judge to throw out the four charges for lack

of validity.

His motion caused a veritable flurry of other motions from both sides

and effectively delayed the process of law by dividing the charges.

It also increased the cost to the plaintiff. It was a gamble for

the university. If it paid off, it would cut the charges down to two--

both federal, while disposing of all the others. If it didn't?

No problem, there were always appeals to be made that could

continue the process indefinitely.

At the hearing on these motions, Al Garret limited his argument to

a synopsis of his brief. He carefully related the applicable laws

and requested that the defendant, Belmont University, be ordered

to grant a fair, open hearing to the plaintiff, Diana. Also,

that the plaintiff be supplied with the student feedback evaluations

she had requested and that had been denied to her.

Al was an intelligent work-horse of an attorney. At 57, he took

his legal duties seriously. His heavy glasses with their

thick rims gave him a scholastic air. All that was needed

to complete the image of absent minded professor was a pipe.

He had diligently searched the literature for precedents

which he presented to the judge in a mild but measured tone.

A reasonable man, he projected this image to the court and made

a fine presentation. No sparkle, just facts and precedents

clearly presented.

When the judge turned his attention to the respondent, Simon

Murrain stood to address the court looking more like a walking

advertisement for expensive men's wear than an attorney.

Simon oozed charm with all the proficiency of a hangman leading

the way to the gallows. Close to Al in age, Simon was of a

different bent. His argument was presented with show and words--

it worked well with juries who tended to watch him instead of what

he said. Today, there was no jury present, but his modus operandi

didn't change.

"Your honor," he commenced. "The plaintiff was given a fair hearing

under the rules of Belmont University. She was given due process.

Despite the fact that she forged many evaluation forms causing untold

harm to two young faculty persons, the university made every effort

to treat her with fairness and consideration." He continued for some

time in the same vein, constantly and consistently referring to

the plaintiff as a forger--a criminal.

Gleefully, Murrain reflected, in court, we attorneys can say anything,

or most anything, we want to. We do not have to operate under the

constraints imposed on the rest of the populace and preface a charge

with the word alleged. Truth is not required of us either,

although most judges attempt to keep the elocution within

the bounds of propriety.

Another check in the system is the presence of the opposing

attorney who is supposed to function to limit any freewheeling

antics of his colleague by appealing to the judge.

But Al did not object to Simon's presentation. He felt confident

that the judge would rule on the law, not on the performance.

Besides, he rather enjoyed watching and listening to Simon's kind of theater.

Following the hearing, the wait began. How would the judge decide?

When would the judge decide?

Even though the hearing committee at Belmont had made its

report and recommendation to terminate, the actual termination

letter had not yet been sent. From the time she was accused,

Diana had found life at work to be difficult. As a plaintiff,

in a lawsuit against Belmont, it was nearly impossible.

Nearly, that is, because her students never wavered in their efforts

to encourage and help her. It was during this wait that factual

information was obtained concerning a dean at Belmont who had falsified

a faculty promotion sheet. The occurrence had been rumored,

but now the players were known. Al Garret had talked to the

principals of the event and obtained two affidavits attesting

to the misconduct and subsequent lack of punishment awarded

the dean who was still employed at the university.

The man had suffered no loss of rank or pay for his transgression.

These affidavits were added to the pile of papers already on file

with the judge.

Early in June, the Opinion and Order of the judge arrived.

Al Garret's third charge had been thrown out by the judge

who wrote that the law cited did not apply to Belmont University.

The other three charges were sustained.

On charge number four, relating to the open meeting law,

the judge wrote in part: "To permit this hearing panel to operate

outside the Open Meeting Law would be to enable the university

to take round-about steps to avoid its public duty."

He continued by describing the hearing panel as resembling,

". . .the type of secret activities the Open Meeting Law seeks

to prevent. . ." and suggested that if the panel had considered

any area to be extremely sensitive, it could have gone into

executive session. Even this he qualified--asserting that

it was subject to the plaintiff's right to a public hearing.

As to the public record law, charge number five, he ruled that

the plaintiff should have access to the evaluations requested.

"The Court finds," he wrote, "that Belmont must comply with

the Public Records Law."

Finally, on charge number six, relating to the fair employment law,

the judge found the evidence submitted to be sufficient to indicate

retaliatory, sexual discrimination.

A few days later, with this Opinion and Order from the court in hand,

John T. Pope, president of Belmont University, terminated the plaintiff,

effective immediately.

The Pope's action was expected by everyone except Al Garret,

Diana's attorney--he still thought he'd won the case.

Belmont had been thumbing its nose at the judicial system

as long as anyone could remember.

Diana Trenchant packed up the teaching and research accumulations

of nearly twenty-five years and left for home.

Neither the president nor any of the Vees could be reached for comment.

However, Bob Alastar, the PR for Belmont, called in the press.

"We have no comment," he asserted. "It is the university's policy

not to discuss personnel decisions with the press."

Now there was a new angle in the threatening phone calls to

the plaintiff. The caller would start out in a friendly fashion.

In a conversational tone, he would advise Diana to, "go down to

the courthouse and examine the court records for the past ten years.

Just check the directory for all the cases that Belmont has been

involved in and read the outcome. The court clerk will help you."

Then the voice would become threatening. "You will see that no one

has ever won a case against Belmont. It owns the courts and it

owns the lawyers. You'll lose all your money and you'll be hurt

in other ways. It can and will make appeal after appeal.

It can and will tie this case up for years. Give it up

before you get hurt."

Wild Justice · 第 37 / 41 章