Brundisium failed. After waiting two months, Marcus Antonius succeeded
in making the passage, at a time when weather conditions made it
impossible for the enemy’s ships to interfere with the landing. With
this accession of strength, four legions and additional cavalry,
Cæsar’s force was now superior to that of his opponent; but Pompeius
was strongly intrenched on the shore, close to a city well supplied
with provisions, and by means of his fleet, in communication with the
rest of the world.
The problem of supplies on Cæsar’s side was a difficult one, since
the neighboring country was nearly exhausted. It was probably this
reason which induced him to divide his force by sending some three and
a half legions into the interior of the country, partly to intercept
a Pompeian relieving army under Scipio, and partly to operate in
Greece itself with a view of winning adherents for his cause. With the
remainder he proceeded to inclose Pompeius’ camp, not so much to force
a capitulation, which seemed hopeless because at any time they wished
the Pompeian fleet could carry the army away, as to produce a moral
effect on the Pompeians, who would be dispirited everywhere, when they
learned that their leader was not acting on the offensive.
The siege operations proved calamitous; Cæsar’s veterans suffered
a severe defeat, and in some places the lines of the inclosing
fortifications were destroyed. The other side, elated by victory, were
now prepared for a decisive battle. This hazard Cæsar declined to take;
instead of this he gave his troops time enough to recover from the
effects of their defeat and then moved off from the coast, taking the
road to Thessaly in order there to join the other detachments of his
army, who were occupied in trying to force Scipio to an engagement.
He was soon followed by Pompeius, and the great pitched battle of the
year took place on the plains of Thessaly. The two sides were far from
being evenly matched; probably Pompeius had 40,000 legionaries and
3000 cavalry, while under Cæsar there were 30,000 legionaries and 2000
horse. When the armies came in sight of one another, there was some
preliminary manœuvering to get the advantage of a favorable position,
but finally Pompeius advanced some distance from his camp on level
ground, and Cæsar, who was about to march away rather than attack under
unfavorable conditions, decided to give battle. Pompeius’ right wing
rested near a brook with precipitous sides. Relying on this to protect
his flanks, he placed the light-armed infantry and the cavalry, under
the command of Labienus, on the left wing with directions to make a
vigorous onslaught on the troops opposed to them. If the enemy gave
way, they were then to attack the legionaries on the sides and rear; in
the meantime, Pompeius’ own legions were ordered not to advance but to
await, where they were, the attack from the other side. It was hoped
that Cæsar’s men would be in confusion before the hand-to-hand conflict
began, as the distance they would have to traverse was greater than was
usual in the battles of this period.
Probably all of Cæsar’s cavalry were disposed in such a way that they
faced the opposing cavalry. In order to compensate for his inferiority
of numbers in this arm, he had trained some of his best legionaries
to fight interspersed with the cavalry, after the practice among the
Germans. The cavalry were separated, too, by a division of 3000 men,
and behind his whole order of battle there was a considerable reserve
force. It was to be supposed that, even without the assistance of this
last support, his seasoned veterans would withstand the enemy for a
long time. This expectation was all the more likely to be realized,
just because of Pompeius’ orders that his own infantry were to be held
back from engagement and should maintain their own ground, while his
cavalry were at work.
The battle opened with the cavalry charge on the Pompeian side. Cæsar’s
German and Gallic horse, as they were instructed, withdrew, and as soon
as the Pompeian horse followed them, the 3000 men placed previously
to support them, attacked the Pompeian cavalry in the flank. This
manœuver was immediately followed by a quick action on the part of
Cæsar’s cavalry. They swerved about, attacked in their turn those who
had just been pressing them, and forced them back in confusion. There
was not time enough for Pompeius now to get together a mass of infantry
to protect his cavalry. The hand-to-hand conflict immediately began,
Cæsar’s whole force of infantry throwing themselves on the opposing
legionaries, who now no longer had the support of their cavalry. The
pressure on the front and sides was too much for the Pompeians; first
the left wing gave way and then the entire army. (August 8, 48 B.C.)
The crucial feature of the whole battle was Cæsar’s skilful disposition
of the 3000 men, placed, as some authorities describe it, in a kind
of ambuscade. It was this that upset the whole plan of Pompeius’
massive cavalry charge. The intelligent manœuvering of the Gallic and
German horse, first giving way, then returning to charge superior
numbers, is an illuminating illustration of the discipline prevailing
in all arms of Cæsar’s force. The close of the battle was followed
by the occupation of the Pompeian camp. The commander himself fled
in deep dejection from Greece, and met his death by an assassin’s
hands, when landing from a boat on the coast of Egypt. As a military
leader he had proved himself in this war unimaginative and sluggish.
He was a master of the technique of warfare, but failed to make use
of his opportunities; he seemed to have worked out his own campaign
in advance, and to have followed the scheme with deliberation, but in
other respects he was resourceless, both when the advantage was his own
and when the enemy made mistakes.
With two very much reduced legions and a few horse, Cæsar pursued
his rival to Egypt, where he was too late to take him alive. But the
factional contests in Egypt as to the royal succession and perhaps,
too, the desire to get his hands on the Egyptian treasury, induced the
conqueror to use this opportunity of asserting Roman sovereignty over
the dependent kingdom. It proved to be a rash step, for the Egyptians
were fanatically attached to their autonomous position, and Cæsar’s
small force was in great danger, not only from the Egyptian army, but
also from the turbulent Alexandrian populace, who tried and almost
succeeded in shutting him up in part of the city, and in preventing
supplies and reinforcements coming to him by sea. At times the Romans
were in great danger; there were furious combats in the city and in
the harbor, and it was not till many months had passed that Cæsar was
master of the situation. It took all the resources of his versatile
genius to hold out until large enough reinforcements came from the East
to bring the Alexandrians into subjection.
The whole winter after the battle of Pharsalus was spent in this way,
and when the war was over in March, there was three months more delay
in Alexandria, owing, it was said, to the fascination exerted over
the conqueror by the famous Egyptian queen, Cleopatra. During the
summer preparations were made for an extensive expedition throughout
the Farther East with a small body of men, the design being to pacify
the Oriental provinces. This proved not very difficult; most of the
problems were solved by diplomacy and only one battle was fought, that
of Zela, in Pontus, with Pharnaces, king of Pontus, who had taken
advantage of the civil war to try to set up an independent rule over a
large part of Asia Minor.
While Cæsar was absent in the East, his cause in the West had been
far from successfully handled by his lieutenants. The Pompeian fleet
had given great trouble on the Italian coast and in the Adriatic Sea.
Affairs in Spain had been hopelessly muddled by a corrupt and tyrannous
governor, who angered the provincials and got into trouble with the
native tribes. In Rome the victory at Pharsalus had been followed
by great activity on the part of the Senate and popular assembly in
heaping additional honors on Cæsar. He was made Dictator with virtually
unlimited powers. The administration, so far as any semblance of
legality was concerned, seemed to have gone to pieces, while Cæsar
was having his troubled experiences in Alexandria. No provision had
been made for filling up the magistracies, and the conduct of affairs
fell into the hands of an irresponsible agitator, Dolabella, Cicero’s
son-in-law, who prepared a social program containing, as its chief
items, canceling of debts and remission of rents. There were serious
riots in the city, the mob becoming so powerful that even the Cæsarian
Senate had to call on Marcus Antonius, Cæsar’s chief local lieutenant,
to suppress the violence by the use of military power.
When Cæsar arrived in Italy from the Orient, there was much to be done
and not much time in which to do it, because all the irreconcilable
partisans of Pompeius, trusting in the help of the Numidian king, Juba,
had gathered in Africa, where, since the defeat of Curio, they met with
no opposition in their control of the country. During Cæsar’s stay in
Rome, there were various measures passed, some to relieve the financial
crisis, others to provide against disturbances of public order, while
political rewards had to be distributed to his followers in the way
of nominations to the Senate, or by the creation of additional places
among the magistracies. On account of the government’s embarrassments,
there was a resort to the policy of forced loans, both from individuals
and from communities. The private property of Pompeius and some of his
adherents was sold at public auction, a questionable proceeding which
gave rise to a good deal of unpleasant jobbery among Cæsar’s friends,
who bought the property in, and then, depending on their influence with
their all-powerful master, tried to evade payment. (47 B.C.)
More serious than these matters of local politics was the sullenness of
Cæsar’s troops, which developed into open mutiny when they were ordered
to make ready for the coming campaign in Africa. They refused to budge
until the promises of money and land made them before the battle of
Pharsalus were strictly carried out. Cæsar dealt successfully with
the situation; he had no cash to give them, but he discharged them,
calling them citizens and not soldiers, and assured them at the same
time that all of their demands, with back interest, would be paid as
soon as he returned from Africa to celebrate his triumph. The veterans
were placed in a dilemma; they could not turn against Cæsar, for their
hope of reward lay in his success. Most of them were taken back as
volunteers for the African campaign. Before leaving Italy, Cæsar again
arranged to become Consul for the year 46, at the same time making
arrangements for the distribution of provincial charges. One assignment
was especially noteworthy: a pardoned Pompeian senator, Junius Brutus,
nephew of Cato, at the time in arms against Cæsar, was appointed to
Cisalpine Gaul.
A year and a half had passed since Pompeius’ defeat at Pharsalus, but
his cause was being energetically upheld in Africa, where his partisans
were making a final stand. It was here that Scipio, Labienus, Cato,
Afranius, and Petreius gathered together with the forces that remained,
ten legions in all, no inconsiderable force in itself; but there
were besides a large contingent of well-trained cavalry and heavy-
and light-armed troops, supplied by Juba, king of Numidia, who was
implacably hostile to Cæsar’s cause, and who meant to use the divisions
of the Romans for the purpose of carving out for himself an independent
kingdom. The only danger point, apart from an attack from Italy, lay
further west, where the two Mauretanian kings, Bocchus and Bogud, acted
together as a check to the power of the Numidians. They were able to
carry out their policy intelligently, because they had the help of a
Roman adventurer, Publius Sittius, suspected of being an accomplice of
Catiline, and for this reason an enemy of the remnant of the senatorial
party in Africa.
Cæsar landed in Africa in December with only a small force, and for a
time he had to maintain himself in an intrenched camp on the coast. His
six legions were made up of raw material, and it was impossible for
him to take the offensive, until his veterans, who had been sent for,
arrived. The situation was saved by Sittius, who made a diversion in
the West, and so drew off Juba to the defense of his own kingdom. Among
the provincials, the Cæsarian cause began to be popular, for they saw
in it a protection against the nationalist schemes of Juba. Moreover,
the Roman aristocratic commanders had treated the population of the
province with scant consideration, so there were many desertions to
Cæsar’s side. Owing to the incompetent strategy of his opponents, who
do not seem to have known how to handle their fleet, communications
with Italy were kept open. It was Cæsar’s purpose, after the veteran
legions arrived, to compel Scipio to give battle. This he refused
to do, until his hands were forced. When Cæsar began the siege of
the important seaport town of Thapsus, Scipio was obliged to come to
the rescue, and a pitched battle was fought early in April, in which
the Pompeian force was completely routed. Cæsar’s troops occupied
the enemy’s camp, and despite the entreaties of their commander, a
wholesale butchery by the legionaries followed the fight.
The campaign was soon completed. Utica, where Cato commanded the
garrison, surrendered, after their leader, seeing the ruin of his
cause, had committed suicide. Scipio perished at sea, Varus and
Labienus succeeded in making their escape to Spain. Even Juba was
ruined by the misfortunes of his allies, for his own subjects rejected
him on his return, and he and Petreius met deaths by suicide. After
setting the affairs of Africa in order, and annexing the kingdom of
Numidia as a province, Cæsar returned to Rome after an absence from the
capital of 180 days. (46 B.C.)
V CÆSAR SUPREME
With his return begins the period of Cæsar’s full autocratic power in
the largest sense of that term; honors extraordinary were heaped upon
him and the whole machinery of government was in his hands. He was
perpetual Tribune, and so might check all legislation which did not
meet his approval. Moreover, he was made sole Censor, which position
included not only the guardianship of manners and morals, but also gave
him authority over the composition of the Senate, and the even more
valuable supervision of contracts and financial affairs. Besides this
there was the dictatorship and the consulship. No opposition could come
from the religious side, for he was Pontifex Maximus and a member of
all the religious colleges.
His position was not so novel as the way he used it. Sulla also had
established personal autocratic rule, and Pompeius, who was looked
to by the conservatives to preserve republican government, had been
completely oblivious of constitutional traditions when they clashed
with his interests. Cæsar did not abdicate as did Sulla, nor did he
hypocritically veil his purposes as Pompeius had done. There was much
ostentatious display in the way of triumphs, festivals, games, and
largesses, to celebrate the conqueror’s victories, nor were deeds of
cruelty absent in the Gallic triumph. Vercingetorix, who had spent
six years in a Roman dungeon, was put to death in accordance with
old-fashioned republican brutality.
Some citizens felt disgust at the extravagant expenditure of the
autocrat, but this kind of discontent was not so deep as the resentment
caused among the upper classes by the introduction of a virtual
monarchy. Their point of view is vividly presented in Cicero’s
correspondence during the closing years of Cæsar’s rule. He suffered
all the more intensely because he had to belie his own principles and
live on friendly terms with the man who had destroyed his ideals and
robbed him of his chances of political distinction. Cæsar advanced
oblivious of criticism, safe in the possession of uncontested powers.
There were many things to do, and there was nothing to which he
hesitated to set his hands. It was not a time to follow the maxim,
“quieta non movere.”
Among the most difficult problems was the allotment of land to the
discharged veterans. The plan followed was not to establish them in new
colonies, but to incorporate them in existing communities. Apparently
private rights were respected, for no serious complaints are recorded.
A much-needed reform was taken in hand when Cæsar, using his power as
Censor, reduced the number of those who received the dole of corn from
320,000 to 150,000 persons. Equally creditable was the extension of
the Roman citizenship to non-Italians, special classes being chosen
for this privilege, such as medical practitioners and teachers. Other
measures were economic, such as the restoration of customs duties,
or had a social aim like the attempt to extend free labor where
slaves were commonly used. Municipal administration received special
attention, rules being made for the maintenance of streets and lanes,
for the control of wheeled traffic, and to prevent public ground from
being occupied by the erectors of stands and platforms.
In general, the exceptional position of the city of Rome was not
preserved; rather, provincial towns were organized after the model of
the imperial metropolis. Probably it was this bold step in reducing
Rome to the level of other towns, a proceeding strictly in harmony with
Cæsar’s consistent and established policy of equal and fair treatment
to the provinces, that led to the idle bit of gossip that he thought of
transferring the capital to the East, to Alexandria or Troy. Criminal
legislation was stiffened by adding to the recognized sentence of
exile forfeiture of property as a penalty. Care was taken that Roman
citizens should not travel abroad for a lengthy period, a provision
probably intended to protect the provincials from the presence of needy
individuals who would make use of official favor for questionable
financial schemes. But perhaps the most striking of all these measures
from the personal point of view was a law restricting the tenure of
provincial governorship. There were to be no more chances open for a
series of campaigns under one leader such as Cæsar had waged in Gaul.
Under this personal government there was little place for a Senate
except as a registering body, and Cæsar did not always allow it to
perform even this humble function. It came to have a make-believe
existence. Decrees were drawn up in its name that had actually never
come before it, and the conqueror’s unpopularity with the Senators was
increased by the introduction of new members, who had no aristocratic
traditions to maintain.
As an example of the versatility of his mind, no better one can be
given than the fact that Cæsar’s work in bringing order out of chaos
was extended to reorganization of the old Roman calendar, under which
the year lasted only 355 days, and attempts were made to make the
solar and civil years coincide by the occasional introduction of an
intercalary month, a process often guided by political or superstitious
motives. Since experienced scientists from Alexandria were called
on as experts, Cæsar’s reformed calendar of 365-1/4 days with an
intercalating day every fourth year was sufficiently accurate to stand
for centuries, and with a slight correction is still in use in the
civilized world.
The machinery of legislation, important and sound as it was, was not
entirely depended upon to reveal the whole policy of the ruler. Cæsar
is said to have explained in his public speeches that his ideal was not
a despotism, but the paternal rule of a father over his children. He
tried to live up to this standard, making a noteworthy display of doing
so by his generous treatment of his adversaries during the period of
the civil war. Some of his most truculent enemies were pardoned by an
act of grace, a treatment which induced Cicero to try his hand again at
the kind of decorative oratory he had displayed in his early panegyric
on Pompeius. Popular as this clemency was, it did not shelter Cæsar
from severe criticism when he renewed his amour with Cleopatra, now
summoned to Rome, it was said on his invitation, and it was supposed
that he was about to marry her, a foreign queen, as the first step to
the attainment, by regular process, of regal power for himself.
Invincible as Cæsar was in war, and conciliatory as he was to those who
had served against him, there was still a body of Pompeian partisans in
Spain, Labienus and Cnæus Pompeius among them, who felt that there was
reason for resistance and a chance of success. Cæsar’s governors in
the peninsula had proved incompetent either to hold the loyalty of the
provincials, or to prevent the mutiny of the troops when the Pompeian
leaders appeared on Spanish ground. All they could do was to clamor
for their leader’s presence. He left Rome hurriedly in December, 46.
This, his last campaign, was conducted with an army inferior in numbers
to that of his opponents. It was an arduous struggle, characterized
by conspicuous barbarity on both sides, for neither depended on Roman
legionaries alone. The Pompeians had native allies and liberated
slaves, and both sides were helped by auxiliary troops from the wild
tribesmen of Mauretania. After winning and taking the town of Cordova,
Cæsar forced the eldest son of Pompeius to fight a pitched battle at
Munda. (March 17, 45 B.C.)
The two armies met here in a life and death struggle, Cnæus Pompeius
appealing to his men to avenge his father, while Cæsar’s veterans,
responding to the battle cry of Venus the Victorious, the patron
goddess of the Cæsarian house and its mythical foundress, made it
plain that the cause for which they fought was also a personal one.
Neither side could look for quarter; Pompeius had already shown his
temper by cruel dealings with the provincials who had opposed him,
and Cæsar’s men were not likely to deal mercifully with those who had
rekindled the flame of civil war and so deprived them of a well-earned
peace. Both in attack and defense each side showed equal bravery and
obstinacy. For some time the issue seemed dubious; Cæsar to rally
his own men had to take sword in hand and engage in the thick of the
struggle. Finally, when the Pompeians made a change of their order to
help the wing of their army which was being hard pressed by the tenth
legion, the movement gave the Cæsarians a chance to put their opponents
in confusion and finally to flight. On the Pompeian side 30,000 are
reported to have been slain; among the dead were Labienus, Cæsar’s
right-hand man in the Gallic campaign, and Cnæus Pompeius himself, who
escaped from the field but was taken and put to death afterward.
Before the return to Italy the affairs of the Spanish provinces
had to be set in order; special favors were distributed to the
loyal communities in the way of franchise or immunities, and this
reconstructive work seems to have been accompanied by financial
exactions. The return to Italy was not made until September, and
for a whole month Cæsar remained outside the walls of Rome. To mark
the victory at Munda there was nothing tangible to do in the way of
increasing the autocratic power of the supreme and all-embracing
magistrate and executive; there were, however, no visible limitations
to the servility of the Senate and Assembly. Fifty days’ thanksgiving,
yearly games commemorative of the victory, special distinctions of
dress, extraordinary honorific titles, a state residence on the
Palatine, built after the model of a temple of the gods; special
statues in holy places connected with communal worship, all these were
voted, and most of them accepted by the conqueror.