citadel of the Germans, Ariovistus determined to give battle. The
battle itself was won through the superior discipline of the Romans;
once during its progress the left wing was in danger, but it was saved
by the prompt action of the younger Crassus, who was in command of
the cavalry. Cæsar with the right wing carried all before him. As to
the numbers engaged, it was Napoleon’s opinion that the Germans were
not stronger than Cæsar; the probability is that they were weaker.
Ariovistus’ whole army, though with it he controlled a large part of
Gaul, need not have been more than 20,000 men. They were, of course,
a better trained fighting force than anything the Gallic tribes could
create, and it was not difficult, using the divisions among the Gauls,
to establish an effective overlordship with a small, well-disciplined
army.
Apparently the bulk of the German army was destroyed; Ariovistus,
however, succeeded in making his escape beyond the Rhine. The defeat
of the Germans had important consequences; before the opening of the
campaign against Ariovistus, news had come from the north that the
Suevi, an important German tribe, were about to move across the Rhine.
The knowledge of the fate of Ariovistus forced them back again into the
depths of Germany.
During the winter Cæsar crossed the Alps to attend to the
administration of the Cisalpine province, leaving his troops quartered
in Gaul under the command of his trusted lieutenant, Labienus. He
raised two new legions, and when he returned northward it was already
plain that the pacification of the country was far from complete. The
Gauls feared the expansion of Roman power, and there were rumors of an
uprising to be led by the tribes of the Belgæ. Cæsar marched directly
to the danger spot, and taking advantage of tribal jealousies, induced
the Remi, whose territory lay between the Maas, the Oise, and the
Maine, to accept the alliance and protectorate of Rome. (57 B.C.)
This was a wise move, for it was clear from reports on the spot that
the whole Belgic confederacy, representing the most warlike of the
Gallic tribes, were up in arms. The fate of Ariovistus, the year
before, had shown that the only way to resist the extension of Roman
rule in Gaul was by tribal combination. The Belgæ thoroughly realized
their danger, and when Cæsar passed their frontiers, they opposed him
with a large allied army composed of contingents of all the neighboring
peoples.
The great difficulty was to keep such large masses of men together
and to provide them with food. In the time of Marius, the Germanic
invaders, the Cimbri and the Teutones, in order to secure provisions as
they went, had divided into several smaller groups, each one of which
was beaten in detail by the Roman general. Cæsar’s strategy was to be
governed by the same principles; he meant to wear the Belgæ out and
to refuse to give battle until they had lost their unity, until each
dissevered fraction might be drawn into action without support from the
rest. Cæsar having recruited two new legions, in all there were eight.
Besides, there served under him a variegated band of allies, Numidians,
Cretans, men of the Balearic Islands, and Gallic cavalry.
Altogether the Roman fighting host may be reckoned at fifty to sixty
thousand men, with camp followers, perhaps nearly one hundred thousand
in all. To keep such a body in the field for a considerable time meant
a carefully organized system of transportation and economic equipment.
A strongly fortified camp was constructed on the north bank of the
River Aisne, where the soldiers were kept in good discipline. The
remains of extensive fortifications, in the form of ditches eighteen
feet wide and nine or ten feet deep, and a wall with palisades twelve
feet high, were found on the site of Cæsar’s camp by the archæologists
who worked under the direction of Napoleon III.
The camp was in the country of the Remi, who had, as we have
mentioned, become allies of the Romans; it was their town Bibrax
which the Belgæ first attacked, hoping to induce Cæsar to leave his
fortified position to repel them. He remained, however, where he was,
sending sufficient help in the way of defensive artillery to enable the
townsmen to defend themselves and to force the Belgæ to give up the
siege. They then turned to attack the Roman camp. Cæsar drew up his
army, but neither side had any desire to come to close quarters, as in
front of the camp there was a considerable stretch of swampy ground.
The Belgæ then tried to cut off the Roman line of communications, but
this involved crossing the Aisne, and its banks were closely watched by
Cæsar’s men. A few horsemen and war engines were sufficient to deter
them from making the attempt.
If the Belgæ had crossed with their whole army, they could have carried
out their purpose; the Roman communications would have been broken, but
the Romans could have gone ahead, and the Belgæ, outside of their own
land, had no way of maintaining their supplies. The only thing to do
was to surround the Roman camp from all sides and starve it out. Even
with their superior numbers, which Cæsar gives as 306,000, this was a
difficult operation, for the enveloping lines, owing to the country
being traversed by two rivers, would have been large. In any case the
Belgæ recognized that they could not keep the field long, and when
they heard that Cæsar’s allies, the Ædui, were invading their country,
they decided to withdraw, the confederated tribes engaging to help one
another if Cæsar’s army invaded their territory. The retreat of the
Belgæ was so unexpected that at first the Romans took it for a feint
meant to provoke them to leave their camp.
As soon as the news was well authenticated, the cavalry pursued the
retreating barbarians, keeping up a series of irritating attacks. The
Belgic strongholds surrendered soon after; only three tribes, the
Nervii, the Viromandui, and the Atrebates, tried to strike a blow for
Gallic freedom. They fell upon the Romans, while they were arranging to
encamp in a woody country on the Sambre, and caused almost a panic.
The allied troops fled in confusion, but the legionaries held their
ground, getting themselves in line, and as they were far superior in
numbers to the Nervii, they soon got the upper hand of them, although
there was some sharp fighting and for a time two of the legions were
hard pressed. It was part of the Roman general’s strategy not to face a
superior force. This point is apparent in the previous campaigns, but,
as a military writer, Cæsar had no scruples in manipulating his figures
for popular consumption. When the Nervii made peace unconditionally,
they represented themselves, according to Cæsar, as having only 500 men
left out of an original 60,000 capable of bearing arms; a few years
later they appear again in the Commentaries as having a considerable
army. They also sent a contingent of 5000 to Alesia at the close of
the Gallic war. Probably a just estimate of the fighting force of the
Nervii would give them 30,000 men, because the whole population of the
district could hardly have been more than 150,000 souls. They occupied
a territory of four hundred square kilometers, and with the slight
density of population in Gaul, they could not have numbered more than
the figures given above. Even in the Italian peninsula, which was more
thickly settled, there was altogether a population of not more than
three and a half millions and a density of only twenty-five per square
kilometer. The Roman legions who opposed the Nervii in this last fight
numbered at least 40,000 men.
Dwelling east of the Nervii were the Aduatuci, said to be descendants
of the survivors of the former Cimbri and Teutones, whom Marius had
destroyed. They had promised to help the Nervii, but had come too late
for the battle. Now they withdrew to their chief fortress, but when
they saw themselves being enveloped in the complicated and scientific
siege works of the Romans, their hearts failed and they surrendered
before the final assault was made. What they had not been able to do
openly they hoped to accomplish by treachery, for they reserved a part
of their arms, at the time they made their submission, and when the
Romans were off their guard at night, made a sudden attack upon them.
They were defeated with heavy loss, and the next day, in order to
make an example of them, Cæsar sold the whole tribe, men, women, and
children, into slavery, 53,000 souls in all.
After the Belgic campaign was over, Cæsar laid plans for the further
expansion of Roman control in Gaul by sending one of his lieutenants
to Armorica, modern Normandy and Brittany, to secure the submission of
the inhabitants. Moreover, seven legions were placed in winter quarters
along the Loire, ready to use the stream to transport themselves to the
territory of the Veneti, the chief tribe in the west of Gaul. (56 B.C.)
The announcement of Cæsar’s great success made a profound impression
in Rome; new and unknown domains were being annexed, and the people
were granted an unprecedented space of fifteen days for a public
thanksgiving. During the winter the general himself took up the
detailed work of governor of the Cisalpine province, and also made a
tour of Illyria, which had been previously unvisited by him. It was
filled with a hardy and brave population and might well be used for
drawing auxiliary troops for his army.
In Gaul the situation of affairs showed that the people of Armorica
could not be depended upon, though they professed loyalty to the
Romans. Young Crassus, who commanded a garrison encamped at the mouth
of the Loire, when he found his soldiers suffering from lack of
supplies, sent some of his officers to collect provisions from the
neighboring districts supposedly friendly. The Veneti seized these men,
and refused to give them up except in exchange for their own hostages
in the hands of the Romans, and they proceeded to bind themselves
together for common action, showing their desire to repudiate the
sovereignty of Rome. Cæsar’s reply to the challenge was to order the
preparation of a fleet of ships to be put into service the following
summer against the Veneti, whose chief seats were along the sea coast.
It was not possible for Cæsar to direct these operations in person,
for affairs in Rome demanded his presence on the southern side of
the Alps. Clodius had mismanaged the affairs of the democratic party
in Rome, had proved headstrong, had alienated Pompeius, and had
been unable to prevent the return of Cicero from exile. The cause
of the senatorial oligarchy was progressing, and a danger point was
reached when Crassus drew away from Pompeius, of whose popularity
he was jealous, and when Pompeius himself felt that his talents and
his position as conqueror of the East were not being sufficiently
recognized. Cato, too, was returning from Cyprus, and could be relied
upon to give the triumvirs trouble in his rôle of professional
obstructionist.
As there was talk already in Rome of the recalling of Cæsar, a
consultation between the triumvirs was imperatively needed. Lucca in
Tuscany was selected for the place of meeting, which took place in
April, 56. A great crowd of officials, magistrates, and senators were
present to receive orders from the triumvirs or to hear particulars of
the conference. Cæsar by his diplomacy managed to remove the causes of
estrangement between Crassus and Pompeius, and the details of a common
policy were arranged. By the conference at Lucca, through the adroit
manipulation of Cæsar, the old combination that had begun to work
haltingly, owing to the estrangement between Crassus and Pompeius, and
also to their common lack of political acumen, was re-established and
its details settled.
The main thing was to muzzle the Senate; with this done, it would be
safe for Pompeius and Crassus to carry out their plans for securing
an important province each, together with a military command for a
long term of years. The arrangement was that the other two triumvirs
(Cæsar of course returning to finish the subjugation of Gaul) should
be Consuls in 55; and after their year of magistracy was finished,
Pompeius was to have the two provinces in Spain, and Crassus was to
go to the East, where there would be a chance of achieving military
distinction in a war with the Parthians. In the local affairs of Rome
care was taken that Clodius should be kept from continuing his line of
irresponsible action, and Cicero was drawn into the sphere of Cæsar’s
influence by his brother being given a subordinate military command in
Gaul.
Cæsar, when the conference was over, soon returned to the front, to
deal with the Veneti in such an effective way that by their example the
Gallic tribes might be taught the risks of braving the power of Rome.
Divisions of the army were sent to various points of Gaul, where it
seemed likely there might be sympathetic uprisings of the populations
in favor of the national movement, led by the tribes about the Loire.
The Veneti had against them Cæsar himself, and the problem of their
subjugation offered some novel difficulties. Their fortified places
were usually on headlands; sometimes inaccessible from the mainland
except by ship. The country was cut up by many estuaries, and the
Veneti, who were practised sailors, showed great mobility in their
movements. They withdrew from one post to another, easily cutting
themselves off from attack as the Romans, who were not familiar with
the country, advanced to meet them with the hope of forcing a decisive
engagement. Their power could be destroyed only in a naval battle, and
it required both patience and ingenuity on Cæsar’s part before his men
could be trained to meet the enemy in their own waters, or even before
a fleet could be built suitable to overcome the special difficulties of
navigation on the shores of the Bay of Biscay, so unlike the conditions
in the Mediterranean. The fleet of the Veneti was finally destroyed;
their ships were rendered helpless when the men on the Roman fleet cut
their rigging with long poles having at the end sharp hooked knives,
and boarding parties disposed of the warriors on the decks. Many of the
brave tribe were put to death when they submitted, and the rest were
sold as slaves.
In the meantime the operations of the subordinate commanders had been
successful, and conspicuous results had been reached in Aquitaine,
where the younger Crassus had brought all the tribes to accept Roman
sovereignty. Indeed the only failure to be registered this year was
Cæsar’s own expedition in the far northern part of Gaul between the
Somme and the Rhine, the dwelling place of the Morini and the Menapii.
These tribes took refuge in their forests and could not be dislodged,
and even some incidental defeats failed to break their obstinacy.
The new year, as it opened, with news of a German invasion on a large
scale, brought fresh anxieties to the commander. It was told him that
warlike tribes living in and about the Thuringian forest were on the
move towards the west, and that others had even crossed the Rhine,
dispersing the Gallic tribes in their progress. In Gaul there was a
disposition in some quarters to welcome them as deliverers; already
some of the Gallic tribes were in communication with them on a friendly
basis. (55 B.C.)
Cæsar marched to meet the Germans, and in a conference with their
leaders told them they must leave Gallic territory, at the same time
offering to make an arrangement by which they could receive land on
the right bank of the Rhine. They seemed disposed to accept these
terms, but soon hostilities were precipitated because, while the terms
were being discussed, the Germans attacked some of the Gallic cavalry
attached to Cæsar’s army. The Romans moved suddenly, and according to
Cæsar’s own account, butchered in cold blood men, women, and children
to the number of 430,000, a hearsay number of course, but there is no
reason for doubting that there was a massacre. No Roman was killed and
few were wounded. Even in Rome, notoriously insensible to deeds of
blood, this wholesale butchery caused disgust. Cato proposed that Cæsar
should be given up to the barbarians as an act of justice. But the
Senate contented itself with decreeing honors for the victory, although
it was proposed, but not carried, that the operations in Gaul should be
investigated by a commission.
To finish up the moral effect made on the Germans by the massacre of
their kinsmen, Cæsar built a trestle across the Rhine, transported his
army into German territory, and for a short time his soldiers were
employed in laying waste the country contiguous to the river. He had
no intention of penetrating to the interior of the country, and soon
returned to Gaul, after destroying the bridge he had built.
This year’s campaign had been marked by daring adventures; it was to
have a spectacular close in the expedition to Britain, an island known
in a general way to traders from Gaul, but never yet visited by a Roman
official or by a Roman army. Cæsar affected to believe that resistance
to Roman rule in Gaul was being supported from Britain. In any case a
protectorate of the island seemed to offer great material advantages,
for exaggerated reports were in circulation as to its wealth and
fertility. The expedition was only a partial success. A few tribes made
their submission, but the troops had to be hastily withdrawn, because
Cæsar desired to be back on the mainland before the equinoctials set
in, as the fleet had already severely suffered in a storm.
In the winter preparations were made on a large scale for a second
crossing, a large body of transports being prepared and collected at
Portus Itius (perhaps Wissant, near Cape Grinez). The troops in the
meantime were carefully trained in handling newly constructed vessels
specially planned for the waters of the narrow seas. During the winter
the periodic signs of disaffection among the Gauls were again plainly
visible, this time the Treviri were intriguing with the Germans. An
advance in force from Cæsar was needed to put a check to the rising
hopes of the anti-Roman party, whose chief, Indutiomar, was forced to
give hostages for his good behavior. Much discontent was caused by the
necessity of sending contingents to the army; besides, the legions were
a burden on the food supplies of the land. The feeling against foreign
control grew so strong that Cæsar determined to take some of the Gallic
chiefs with him to Britain, to keep them under personal observation.
Dumnorix, the Æduan, tried to secure common action among all and to
induce the other chiefs not to embark. Only Dumnorix, however, withdrew
when the fleet was about to sail. A party was sent back to pursue him.
When he resisted, he was slain.
The second expedition to Britain was on an unprecedented scale. There
were five legions, two cavalry troops, and an armada of 800 vessels to
carry them. The British tribes withdrew from the coast, and there was
some fighting, as the Romans made their way inland to attack various
British strongholds. Some of the tribes submitted, but the Roman
victories were more apparent than real; the camp around the fleet was
attacked, and as the army returned, it was continually harassed by an
active enemy, who dogged each stage of the march, but refused to come
out and fight in the open. The chief result of the invasion was the
collection of reliable information about the people and their customs.
The island was not occupied or formally conquered for nearly a century.
The captives that were taken were brought over to the continent and
sold as slaves. (54 B.C.)
When the expedition returned, the troops were distributed through Gaul
in winter quarters as camps of observation, not more than a hundred
miles from one another; Cæsar’s own headquarters being at Amiens. The
scene of the first disturbance was in the northeast; a Roman garrison
on the march from one camp to another was cut off, and only a few
stragglers were left to tell the tale. Cicero’s brother Quintus, the
commander of another garrison, was attacked, and no message could be
got through the hostile tribes of the Nervii to tell Cæsar of his
desperate straits. Finally news was carried by means of a Gallic slave
whose master, a Nervian refugee, promised him his liberty if he were
successful.
Cæsar, with one legion and with a division of horsemen, arrived just
in time to save the beleaguered garrison. The Gauls were severely
handled when the Romans pushed through their lines to reach Cicero’s
camp. The news of the relief caused dejection among the other Gallic
tribes, who were about to attack isolated Roman garrisons. Labienus
alone had trouble with the Treviri, but managed to ward off the blow,
inflicting upon them in turn a crushing defeat, and slaying their
leader, Indutiomar. The rest of the winter and summer campaign was
spent in various expeditions directed against the Gallic tribes whose
loyalty was suspected. It was designed to make a special example of the
Eburones, who had cut off the Roman legion the preceding year. They
were doomed to destruction, and the neighboring tribes were invited to
come and enjoy the plunder. Some of those who came preferred to attack
the Romans first, and Cicero’s camp again fared badly by a sudden
raid, made by the Sigambri, a German tribe, who had crossed the Rhine,
invited by the prospect of plundering the Gauls. This mistake confused
the whole original scheme, and it resulted in the escape of the leader
of the Eburones, Ambiorix, an implacable foe of Rome.
When the winter of 53-52 came on, Cæsar’s sojourn in the Cisalpine
province was passed during a season of much anxiety. Rome had been
disturbed by factional fights between Clodius and his opponent,
Milo, in which the popular demagogue met his death. There had been a
drawing together of the senatorial party, and Pompeius, who was now
looked upon as the chief bulwark against anarchy, had been intrusted
by the Senate with extraordinary powers, enabling him to call for a
general levy of men of military age throughout Italy. Julia, the wife
of Pompeius, was dead, and with her vanished the one strong personal
link between the two triumvirs, for Crassus had perished in the East
fighting against the Parthians. The news of the troubles in Italy
spread rapidly in Gaul, causing the restless tribes there to believe
that Cæsar would be kept on the southern side of the Alps, and that,
with the commander-in-chief away, there would be no trouble in bringing
about a successful revolt, provided there were common action throughout
the whole country. The essential condition was to unite all the
Gauls against Roman control, and this had already in a large measure
been accomplished by the king of the great tribe of the Arverni,
Vercingetorix, now at the head of a confederation extending over the
whole of the central part of the country. It was difficult to overcome
the particularistic tendencies of the Gauls, but this new chieftain at
least understood the difficulties and made a brave effort to counteract
them. He showed also a sense of the strategical needs of the situation
by advising the Gauls to make use of their superiority in cavalry and
to cut off the Roman communications; another feature of his scheme was
to lay waste the country and force the Roman garrisons to withdraw as
they were gradually starved out.
A necessary part of the program was the fighting of a decisive battle
on a large scale. Vercingetorix had the men at his command, for he had
won over the Ædui, who from the first had aided the Romans in their
conquests. Cæsar’s plan was to take the various tribal strongholds
one by one; he succeeded in the case of Avaricum, the capital of the
Bituriges. He then sent Labienus against Lutetia with four legions,
while he advanced with six to lay siege to the chief city of the
Arverni, Gergovia. Cæsar’s army was not strong enough for the task; the
plan of attack failed, and the Roman legions were saved only by a quick
junction with Labienus.
The whole army was soon withdrawn from central Gaul in order to
protect the Roman province from attack and also to secure for Cæsar
a position where he could establish a fortified camp, from which it
would be difficult to be dislodged, and where he could depend upon a
regular source of supplies. He selected a place on the Saône, where
he could threaten the Æduan territory and be so protected that it
would be dangerous for Vercingetorix to follow him. On the march the
Romans were vigorously attacked by the Gallic cavalry, but, as they had
with them a detachment of German horse, they were beaten off, and the
Romans quickly turned the tables, pursuing the Gallic army and finally
enclosing it in a hill town, Alesia (Alise Ste. Reine).