with the popular side of politics represented by Marius. So far as
descent was concerned, he was an aristocrat of the aristocrats,
belonging to an ancient patrician _gens_ which traced back its
legendary origin to a divine being--the goddess Venus. Of the early
years of Cæsar only a little is known; and that little is handed down
in the form of anecdotes the value of which lies in the incidental
light they throw on his travels in the eastern part of the Roman world.
It would be more interesting to know something of Cæsar’s education
than of his capture by pirates off the coast of Asia Minor--an accident
used by his ancient biographers to prove what everybody knows--that
he was a brave man even in the most hazardous circumstances. His
early years could not have been spent carelessly, for he acquired a
remarkably sound education. His literary tastes must have been the
result of long discipline. His manysidedness and intellectual facility
were fully recognized by his contemporaries. Even Cicero, who claimed
to have spent his youth as a model “grind,” tacitly allows that Cæsar’s
intellectual equipment was fully the equal of his own. The years of
study were a necessity as well as a diversion. It was not safe even for
a brilliant young man, while the truculent Sulla was dictator, to show
practical interest in home politics, especially if his sympathies were
with the Marian party.
And Cæsar was from the first a partisan of Marius. He was pledged
to this political faction by family ties as well as by personal
conviction. Marius’s wife was Cæsar’s aunt, and Cæsar himself had made
the alliance with the Marians closer by taking as his wife the daughter
of Cinna, one of the most active of Marius’s supporters. During the
Reign of Terror caused by the proscriptions of Sulla, Cæsar, because of
his relations with the democratic party, had with difficulty escaped
the dictator’s vengeance, and while Sulla continued to control the
Republic Cæsar found it prudent to withdraw into obscurity, from which
he only emerged when the revival of the democratic tradition could be
safely undertaken. Then he took the first opportunity that offered
itself to make a declaration of loyalty to Marius, the old leader of
the democracy. It was at the death of his aunt, Marius’s widow, that he
delivered a funeral address in which he praised Marius’s principles and
achievements. (68 B.C.) This challenge made to the dominant party by
the young politician was a bold stroke. His speech was the sensation of
the hour, and the glowing words which expressed his purpose of working
for the restoration of the Marian democracy won for him the warm
approval of the popular party. Not long after this Cæsar was chosen
to his first elective office, that of Ædile, in 65 B.C., a somewhat
irregular proceeding, for he was two years short of the legal age.
He used his term of service in order to increase his favor with the
democracy, and he showed a keen political scent in discovering ways
and means by which he could keep himself constantly in the foreground
as the champion of popular rights, earning a reputation for lavish
expenditure of money by giving public games, fairs, and gladiatorial
shows. It was not difficult at this time to win the favor of the
Roman democracy. Pompeius, who controlled the army and through his
position as commander-in-chief exerted a preponderating influence on
the government, was on the point of completing the destruction of the
upstart empire of Mithridates and bringing the Asiatic provinces with
firm hand again under the sway of Rome. There stood in Cæsar’s way as
a competitor for political honors only the second-rate personality of
Crassus, the richest man in Rome, who, somehow, despite his belief in
the venality of the populace and his readiness to act upon his belief,
seemed never to have struck the popular imagination powerfully enough
to acquire the momentum of the genuine demagogue.
Cæsar had great advantages through his family connections; his position
as the legitimate heir of Marius made him already a central figure in
the political life of the city, and even Crassus found it advisable
to work for him and with him, by advancing him large sums of money to
cover the lavish expenditure of the three years’ ædileship. Cæsar was
already looking beyond Rome and its purely local interests. That he
had no confidence in the kind of government under which he served is
shown by pretty clear intimations that he was aware of the existence
of a plot, intended to reduce the power of the senatorial oligarchy to
zero. It is certain, too, that Cæsar worked hard to secure a military
command in Egypt, which was not yet a Roman province and, therefore,
could furnish him an admirable vantage ground by its wealth and by
its strategical position for blocking the plans of Pompeius, who was
working through control of the senatorial oligarchy for a revival in
his own hands of personal rule after the Sullan model. This design
of Cæsar was a bold one and conceived with a large vision. Its aim
was to provide a stronghold for the democracy should the central
government, as seemed likely to happen, be manipulated by an irregular
dictatorship. The plan may have been suggested by the career of
Sertorius in Spain, where this successful opponent of the Sullan
régime had so long offered a refuge to all those who were enemies of
the oligarchy that ruled the capital. It was characteristic of Cæsar’s
confident temperament that he was willing, without previous military
training, to undertake a hazardous adventure that meant certainly a
conflict with the seasoned generals of the oligarchy.
A further indication, if any were needed, of the purpose of the new
leader of the democratic party to treat Pompeius as the danger point
on the horizon, was a proposed scheme of an agrarian legislation by
which a board was to be created with extensive military and judicial
power for the purpose of selling all the properties and territories
acquired by the state since the year 88, along with all of the war
booty and confiscated revenues now in the hands of Pompeius. To this
measure was added a clause intended to transform the bill into a
popular manifesto for the colonization of Italy with small landholders,
and therefore constructed on the lines of those earlier agrarian laws
which mark the commencement of the struggle of the Roman democracy with
the capitalistic oligarchy two generations before Cæsar’s time. This
agrarian legislation was defeated by Cicero, who in this case, as often
elsewhere, championed the interests of the moneyed classes. He who was
now Consul and was posing as the Grand Conciliator, praised Pompeius
as the strict constitutional champion, and characterized Cæsar’s
agrarian legislation as revolutionary. In the face of the Consul’s
opposition Cæsar hesitated to press the matter and withdrew his bill.
(64 B.C.) As this is the first legislative act brought forward under
Cæsar’s influence, it is interesting to note that his later political
methods and policies are anticipated in it. His Agrarian Law, when
analyzed, contains two elements. There is the purely personal feature,
more or less cleverly concealed in various clauses of the measure
so constructed as to forward the political interests of its author,
and, secondly, one can detect in Cæsar’s plan for agrarian reform a
keen-sighted appreciation of existing social and economic needs. This
last showed itself in the provision that the surplus population of Rome
should be employed as cultivators of the soil. Cicero’s methods of
defeating the bill by appealing to party prejudice were as essentially
demagogic as were Cæsar’s plans for winning popular support for his
measure. The only difference between them was that Cicero was working
in the interest of a capitalistic oligarchy, while Cæsar directly
aimed at the establishment of personal rule under the protection of an
irresponsible commission with unlimited powers. The campaign against
the dominant party was not, however, allowed to drop because of the
withdrawal of the Agrarian Bill. Cæsar, through one of his lieutenants,
brought impeachment proceedings against the murderer of a democratic
leader who had distinguished himself in the last days of Marius. It was
part of his pin-pricking policy, meant to intimidate the senatorial
faction, and the aim was clear, for the Senate had by a decree relieved
the murderer of responsibility years before. Nothing came of the
impeachment, but it went on record as showing Cæsar’s loyalty to the
democracy. His next proposal was especially gratifying to the admirers
of Marius, because it involved the removal from the children of the
victims of the Sullan proscription the disqualification by which they
were prevented from holding public office.
Soon after this, in the spring of 63, when there was a vacancy in
the office of Pontifex Maximus, the supreme head of the religion of
the city of Rome, Cæsar became a candidate. There were no religious
qualifications necessary; the office had no more relation to personal
belief than that of a prince bishop of the later history of the German
States, when territorial princes added the episcopal to their other
titles. Cæsar was one of the most advanced free-thinkers in Rome. But
he felt no incongruity, and apparently no one else did, in his desire
to figure as the director of the traditional religious usages of the
capital. The position meant so much to Cæsar that, heavily indebted as
he was, he refused to withdraw his name, when a large sum was offered
by an opposing candidate on condition that he would retire from the
contest. The office of Pontifex Maximus carried with it a number of
powers with great political possibilities, because in addition to
controlling the property attached to the college of priests over which
he presided, the Pontifex had important jurisdiction in religious
questions, the determination of religious scruples, and the charge of
the Calendar. All of these matters were intimately connected with the
Roman legislative procedure and also with the judicial system as worked
by the Roman magistrates. Moreover, it was a life position, and one’s
only surprise is that Cæsar’s administration of the office was not
attacked by his enemies. As a matter of fact, his career as an official
religious leader is marked by beneficent reforms in the Calendar and
by a solid contribution to the science of chronology.
There was some difficulty in the election, for it had been placed by
Sulla in the hands of the members of the college. But this measure was
repealed, and when the people became the electors, Cæsar had easily the
majority of the votes over his two conservative opponents. The year 63
had not been, as we have seen, a happy or tranquil one for the men in
power; there had been a constant series of attacks made upon them, and
they had been forced to stand steadily on the defensive.
Before the time for the consular elections the extreme wing of the
popular party appeared to have got out of hand. They selected for
their candidate Catiline, a leading spirit among the criminal and
corrupt order of Roman society, who had contested the election before
and had been defeated. Cæsar had already energetically supported
Catiline, but in the latter’s second attempt to be elected Consul,
it seems clear that Cæsar’s support was at best half-hearted. Cæsar
had come to know the reckless nature of Catiline’s program, with its
appeal for a general canceling of debts and its general attack on all
capitalistic interests. The scheme, however, did win the approval of
the discontented classes, and the occasion for carrying it through
was favorable, because Pompeius, the only man with a military force
adequate to act forcibly on behalf of the senatorial oligarchy, was
absent still in the East. It was understood that Catiline, if he
obtained office, would use it to inaugurate a social revolution;
if he were defeated, it was planned that violent methods should be
used to force a change of government on the oligarchy. An army was
to be collected in Italy, the city was to be set on fire, and in the
confusion the reins of government would be taken by Catiline and his
followers.
The plot was shrewdly defeated by Cicero, who was given by the
Senate unlimited powers, after a state of siege had been proclaimed.
Catiline escaped from the city, taking refuge with his army, which had
been collected near Florence; but several of the other conspirators
were taken prisoners in Rome, and the question of their fate was
brought up before the Senate. Cæsar had by report been implicated in
the conspiracy, but Cicero refused to follow up these suspicions.
Accordingly, in the senatorial debate, Cæsar appeared rather in the
light of a cross bench statesman than as a firm supporter of the
revolutionary leader.
It must be remembered that the Senate had no right to condemn a man
to death or to banishment. A general in the field could inflict the
death sentence without appeal, but no magistrate within the precincts
of the city could do so; there was an appeal from his decision to the
people legally assembled. Cicero wished to get from the Senate an
authoritative opinion, as to whether under their previous decree of
martial law he could exercise in the city the summary rights allowed to
a general in the field. Cæsar spoke after the consular members of the
Senate, all of whom had declared for the administration of the extreme
penalty. He opposed it in a careful and statesmanlike speech, using
his opportunity for putting himself on record as the upholder of the
democratic view of the constitution.
As no verbal report of any other of Cæsar’s speeches has come down to
us, it is interesting to give an extract from Sallust’s version, which
may be taken as an accurate outline, for, owing to Cicero’s personal
interest in the matter, the whole proceedings of the Senate during this
crucial debate were taken down in shorthand. After deprecating the use
of rhetoric as likely to prejudice the judgment, and remarking that
eloquent pictures of the horrors of war and rebellion were alien to
the matter in hand, Cæsar’s words were: “And indeed, for the crimes we
have to deal with, no penalty is in itself too cruel; death at least
cannot be so, for it puts an end to the misery of this life and brings
no torment in another. But the penalty will be looked on as cruel,
simply because it is unconstitutional. It has been over and over again
forbidden by express legislation to scourge or kill a citizen without
trial. You do not propose to scourge these men, presumably because the
law forbids it. Why, then, do you propose to put them to death? Both
penalties are equally illegal. I must remind you also of the precedent
your action will create. Once place such a power as you claim in the
hands of a government and you cannot put a limit on its use; it may be
and will be used against good and bad alike, as it was by the Thirty
at Athens and in our own recollection by Sulla. I do not fear this
now or with Cicero as Consul; but I will not answer for the power of
the sword in the hands of future Consuls. Let us abide by the law and
not seek in a panic to overrule it. My advice is, not indeed that we
let these men go, and thus increase the resources of Catiline, but
that we commit them for life to close custody in the largest Italian
towns, securing them by holding over each town the heaviest possible
penalty in case they should escape. And I further propose that we pass
a decree embodying our opinion that no proposal touching them shall be
made henceforth either in Senate or assembly; and that disregard of
the decree shall be treated by the Senate as high treason against the
state.”
The hint of a reaction was not an oratorical commonplace; it was
suggested by the recent history of Rome itself, and proved most
effective, for even Cicero’s own brother, Quintus, who followed Cæsar,
expressed his agreement with him. Cicero himself, in his reply, took
a rather wavering position, paying special attention to the practical
proposals of Cæsar, which so many modern historians have decided to
be weak and specious. But these have forgotten that, even if Cæsar’s
plans for keeping the prisoners as perpetual ticket-of-leave men in
various Italian communities offered no effective guarantee that they
would not escape, there was no especial reason for fearing their
presence again in Rome after Catiline and his army had been destroyed.
None of the conspirators was a man of first-rate ability, and besides,
the experience of unsuccessful conspiracy has almost as strong an
educational effect as imprisonment. Many Paris communards settled down
as peaceful citizens.
Cicero made an unfortunate experiment at this juncture. The Senate
listened readily to the summary appeals for justice to traitors
made by Cato, but Cicero’s execution of the Catilinarians was stored
up against him in the popular mind, and much of the good he might
have done in his political career was frustrated by his weakness in
identifying himself with the blind passion of the reactionary party.
For the moment, however, Cicero carried the people with him; they lost
their heads, alarmed by the wild tales of conflagration and massacre.
Cæsar’s life was in danger, because he had pleaded for a policy of
moderation, and it must be allowed that the words of his speech did not
represent a pose. The principles he stood for in 63 he adhered to after
the civil wars were over, when a word from him might have initiated a
proscription after the Sullan model.
II ALLIANCE WITH POMPEIUS AND CRASSUS
The year following the suppression of the Catiline conspiracy was one
of uncertainty. Pompeius was returning home after his six years’ stay
in the East. The question was whether he would play the rôle of a new
Sulla. It seems generally to have been expected that he would. There
was no army in Italy strong enough to resist his will; certainly the
force which had overcome Catiline near Fiesole was quite unequal to
such a work. The question was, who were to be his friends and what
policy would he pursue. One of the general’s emissaries appeared in
Rome, and made it clear that Pompeius could not be used as a mere tool
of the senatorial party. Cicero made tactless overtures to secure his
favor, and met with a cold reception.
Cæsar showed more diplomacy, paying the general the compliment of
requesting him to finish the Capitoline temple, one of the chief
shrines of the civic religion of Rome. This duty came within Cæsar’s
province as Pontifex Maximus, and besides as Prætor for this year
he held a position which made his influence useful to the returning
general. Both the scheme for the restoration of the temple and a
measure for recalling Pompeius to the city, which was supported by
Cæsar, were opposed by the Senate, and the discussion led to such
violence that the Senate suspended Cæsar from his functions as
magistrate, and only restored him when he had personally intervened to
quiet the passions of the mob.
Though Cæsar’s year of office was over (61 B.C.), and the time had
come for him to administer Spain as Proprætor, that being the province
assigned him, he delayed his departure. There were many grounds for
this course. Pompeius had been keeping his own counsel as to his
future plans, and required watching. Cæsar had difficulties with his
creditors; he had long been heavily in debt, and his year of office,
with its sensational political activities, must have severely drained
his resources.
But the chief cause which delayed his journey west was the violation,
in the House of the Pontifex Maximus, of the sacred mysteries of the
Bona Dea by a young Quæstor-elect, Clodius, who was suspected of being
the lover of Cæsar’s wife, Pompeia. A scandal involving the head of the
state religion was a serious matter, and Cæsar lived up to the rôle
assigned him by sententiously remarking that Cæsar’s wife ought not
even to be suspected and by seizing this opportunity of divorcing her.
The step satisfied public opinion at the time, but the dignity of the
act is somewhat lessened in the eyes of later critics from the fact
that the Pontifex Maximus himself was, even according to the flexible
standards of Rome, notorious for his moral laxity.
When Clodius’ trial was held, Cæsar diplomatically denied that he had
any certain knowledge of the case. Politics were so much involved in
this trial that proscriptions might have been initiated. Clodius was
a figure in the popular party, and, in the end, by the common method
of bribing the judges, an acquittal was secured. Pompeius, in the
midst of this exciting time, had arrived in Rome, thus giving Cæsar
an opportunity of taking the measure of the over-praised Eastern
conqueror. Before Cæsar left for Spain, mutual advances had taken
place, and he felt sure that Pompeius would not ally himself with the
senatorial party. Cæsar also continued to be on good terms with the
millionaire Crassus, and before leaving Italy he borrowed from him
eighteen hundred talents to satisfy the demands of creditors.
Of the period of Cæsar’s rule in Spain little is known; but his service
there was valuable to him because, while contending with the hardy hill
tribes, who were constantly in arms against the Romans, he received
a training in war that afterwards stood him in good stead. He showed
himself, too, an able and conscientious administrator, regardful of
the condition of the provincials, who had suffered from the loss of
property and from heavy taxation during the unintermitted war that took
place while the government at Rome was destroying the home-rule system
set up by Sertorius. The beneficent character of Cæsar’s administration
showed itself in his friendly relation with the free city of Gades,
where he was called in to reform the local laws and to settle factional
disputes. The prosperity of the town in after years may reasonably
be supposed to have dated from this period. Even Cicero speaks in
glowing language of Cæsar’s supervision. The generous character of his
treatment of the town is seen in its admission twelve years afterwards
to the full Roman franchise. One of the most distinguished of the
citizens of Gades, Balbus, became Cæsar’s confidential agent and
secretary, serving in this capacity for many years without a break.
After his master’s death, Balbus rose to be Prætor and Consul; he was
the first enfranchised foreigner who held these highest offices in Rome.
All the affairs relating to his provincial government were set in order
in the spring of 59 B.C., when Cæsar set out for Rome to be there in
time for the consular elections, which were usually held in summer. He
had two objects in view: one to secure the dignity of a triumph, the
official stamp of a successful military commander; the other to present
himself as a candidate for the consulship. It was impossible for him
while holding a military command to appear within the walls and
formally solicit the votes of his fellow-citizens. He therefore asked
for permission to become a candidate without fulfilling the formal
conditions, and this request the Senate refused to grant. Cæsar solved
the difficulty by sacrificing the triumph; he resigned his command and
entered the city as a private individual.
But now the opposition to him took another form. A determined
aristocrat, M. Calpurnius Bibulus, who, apart from his political
tenets, had a long-standing personal grudge against Cæsar, was put up
by the senatorial party as his colleague for the consulship, and was
elected by the lavish use of money. Cæsar’s next move in this game of
political strategy was a master stroke of astuteness; he formed a close
combination with Pompeius, whom the senatorial party had just irritated
by vetoing all his pet schemes, among them an opportunity of a second
consulship and a plan to reward his soldiers by a distribution of
public lands. As a third member of the alliance Crassus was introduced,
a valuable asset because of the great financial backing he could give.
He saw a chance for promoting his political advancement with two such
colleagues to help him. It was a frank system of give and take; there
were no strong personal ties between any of the three members of the
junta, but they had at least a common opponent, the senatorial party.
An effort was made, though it was unsuccessful, to detach Cicero from
his friendly relations with the aristocratic majority in the Senate;
as he declined the invitation, the new political machine became a
triumvirate, the union of three influential persons to overcome
opposition and to prevent the wheels of public business from being
blocked by the endless methods of obstruction ever ready to be employed
in the complicated system of Roman government, where the checks were
more numerous than the balances. It simply meant that these three men,
and not the reactionary senators, should decide on the distribution of
provinces, on the candidates for offices, and on the command of armies.
From the record of all three, it was clear that the technique of the
constitutional system would not be treated with great reverence, for
all were practical politicians and had definite personal ambitions to
gratify.