EXSĬLĬUM (φυγή), banishment. (1) GREEK. Banishment among the Greek
states seldom, if ever, appears as a punishment appointed by law for
particular offences. We might, indeed, expect this, for the division
of Greece into a number of independent states would neither admit of
the establishment of penal colonies, as among us, nor of the various
kinds of exile which we read of under the Roman emperors. The general
term φυγή (flight) was for the most part applied in the case of those
who, in order to avoid some punishment or danger, removed from their
own country to another. At Athens it took place chiefly in cases of
homicide, or murder. An action for wilful murder was brought before
the Areiopagus, and for manslaughter before the court of the Ephetae.
The accused might, in either case, withdraw himself (φεύγειν) before
sentence was passed; but when a criminal evaded the punishment to
which an act of murder would have exposed him had he remained in his
own land, he was then banished for ever (φεύγει ἀειφυγίαν), and not
allowed to return home even when other exiles were restored upon a
general amnesty. Demosthenes says, that the word φεύγειν was properly
applied to the exile of those who committed murder with malice
aforethought, whereas the term μεθίστασθαι was used where the act was
not intentional. The property also was confiscated in the former
case, but not in the latter. When a verdict of manslaughter was
returned, it was usual for the convicted party to leave his country
by a certain road, and to remain in exile till he induced some one
of the relatives of the slain man to take compassion on him. We are
not informed what were the consequences if the relatives of the slain
man refused to make a reconciliation; supposing that there was no
compulsion, it is reasonable to conclude that the exile was allowed
to return after a fixed time. Plato, who is believed to have copied
many of his laws from the constitution of Athens, fixes the period of
banishment for manslaughter at one year.--Under φυγή, or banishment,
as a general term, is comprehended _Ostracism_, (ὀστρακισμός). Those
that were ostracised did not lose their property, and the time, as
well as place of their banishment, was fixed. This ostracism is
supposed by some to have been instituted by Cleisthenes, after the
expulsion of the Peisistratidae; its nature and object are thus
explained by Aristotle:--“Democratical states (he observes) used to
ostracise, and remove from the city for a definite time, those who
appeared to be preeminent above their fellow-citizens, by reason
of their wealth, the number of their friends, or any other means
of influence.” Ostracism, therefore, was not a punishment for any
crime, but rather a precautionary removal of those who possessed
sufficient power in the state to excite either envy or fear. Thus
Plutarch says, it was a good-natured way of allaying envy by the
humiliation of superior dignity and power. The manner of effecting
it at Athens was as follows:--A space in the _agora_ was enclosed
by barriers, with ten entrances for the ten tribes. By these the
tribesmen entered, each with his _ostracon_ (ὄστρακον), or piece of
tile (whence the name _ostracism_), on which was written the name
of the individual whom he wished to be ostracised. The nine archons
and the senate, _i.e._ the presidents of that body, superintended
the proceedings, and the party who had the greatest number of votes
against him, supposing that this number amounted to 6000, was obliged
to withdraw (μεταστῆναι) from the city within ten days; if the number
of votes did not amount to 6000, nothing was done. Some of the most
distinguished men at Athens were removed by ostracism, but recalled
when the city found their services indispensable. Among these were
Themistocles, Aristeides, and Cimon, son of Miltiades. The last
person against whom it was used at Athens was Hyperbolus, a demagogue
of low birth and character; but the Athenians thought their own
dignity compromised, and ostracism degraded by such an application of
it, and accordingly discontinued the practice.--From the ostracism
of Athens was copied the _Petalism_ (πεταλισμός) of the Syracusans,
so called from the πέταλον, or leaf of the olive, on which was
written the name of the person whom they wished to remove from the
city. The removal, however, was only for five years; a sufficient
time, as they thought, to humble the pride and hopes of the exile.
In connection with petalism it may be remarked, that if any one were
falsely registered in a demus, or ward, at Athens, his expulsion was
called ἐκφυλλοφορία, from the votes being given by leaves. Besides
those exiled by law, or ostracised, there was frequently a great
number of political exiles in Greece; men who, having distinguished
themselves as the leaders of one party, were expelled, or obliged
to remove from their native city, when the opposite faction became
predominant. They are spoken of as οἱ φεύγοντες or οἱ ἐκπεσόντες, and
as οἱ κατελθόντες after their return (ἡ κάθοδος) the word κατάγειν
being applied to those who were instrumental in effecting it.--(2)
ROMAN. Banishment as a punishment did not exist in the old Roman
state. The _aquae et ignis interdictio_, which we so frequently read
of in the republican period, was in reality not banishment, for
it was only a ban, pronounced by the people (by a _lex_), or by a
magistrate in a criminal court, by which a person was deprived of
water and of fire; that is, of the first necessaries of life; and its
effect was to incapacitate a person from exercising the rights of a
citizen; in other words, to deprive him of his citizenship. Such a
person might, if he chose, remain at Rome, and submit to the penalty
of being an outcast, incapacitated from doing any legal act, and
liable to be killed by any one with impunity. To avoid these dangers,
a person suffering under such an interdict would naturally withdraw
from Rome, and in the earlier republican period, if he withdrew to
a state between which and Rome isopolitical relations existed, he
would become a citizen of that state. This right was called _jus
exsulandi_ with reference to the state to which the person came;
with respect to his own state, which he left, he was _exsul_, and
his condition was _exsilium_; and with respect to the state which
he entered, he was _inquilinus_.[2] In the same way a citizen of
such a state had a right of going into exsilium at Rome; and at
Rome he might attach himself (_applicare se_) to a quasi-patronus.
Exsilium, instead of being a punishment, would thus rather be a
mode of evading punishment; but towards the end of the republic the
_aquae et ignis interdictio_ became a regular banishment, since the
sentence usually specified certain limits, within which a person
was interdicted from fire and water. Thus Cicero was interdicted
from fire and water within 400 miles from the city. The punishment
was inflicted for various crimes, as _vis publica_, _peculatus_,
_veneficium_, &c. Under the empire there were two kinds of exsilium;
_exsilium_ properly so called, and _relegatio_; the great distinction
between the two was, that the former deprived a person of his
citizenship, while the latter did not. The distinction between
_exsilium_ and _relegatio_ existed under the republic. Ovid also
describes himself, not as _exsul_, which he considers a term of
reproach, but as _relegatus_. The chief species of exsilium was the
_deportatio in insulam_ or _deportatio_ simply, which was introduced
under the emperors in place of the _aquae et ignis interdictio_.
The _relegatio_ merely confined the person within, or excluded him
from particular places. In the latter case it was called _fuga
lata_, _fuga libera_, or _liberum exsilium_. The _relegatus_ went
into banishment; the _deportatus_ was conducted to his place of
banishment, sometimes in chains.