THE WAR
About the middle of the month of July, 1914, Ballin, when staying at
Kissingen for the benefit of his health, received a letter from the
Foreign Secretary, Herr v. Jagow, which made him put an immediate end to
his holiday and proceed to Berlin. The letter was dated July 15th, and
its principal contents were as follows:
The _Berliner Tageblatt_, it said, had published some information
concerning certain Anglo-Russian agreements on naval questions. The
Foreign Office did not attach much value to it, because it was at
variance with the general assumption that Germany's relations with Great
Britain had undergone a change for the better, and also with the
apparent reluctance of British statesmen to tie their country to any
such agreements. The matter, however, had been followed up all the same,
and through very confidential channels it had been ascertained that the
rumours in question were by no means devoid of an actual background of
fact. Grey, too, had not denied them point blank at his interview with
Lichnowsky. It was quite true that Anglo-Russian negotiations were
proceeding on the subject of a naval agreement, and that the Russian
Government was anxious to secure as much mutual co-operation between the
two countries as possible. A definite understanding had not, so far,
been reached, notwithstanding the pressure exercised by Russia. Grey's
attitude had become somewhat uncertain; but it was thought that he
would ultimately give his consent, and that he would quieten his own
conscience by arguing that the negotiations had not really been
conducted between the Cabinets, but between the respective naval
authorities. It was also quite likely that the British, who were adepts
at the art of making nice distinctions, would be negotiating with the
mental reservation that they would refrain from taking an active part
when the critical moment arrived, if it suited them not to do so; and a
_casus foederis_ would presumably not be provided for in the
agreement. At any rate, the effect of the latter would be enormously to
strengthen the aggressive tendencies of Russia. If the agreement became
perfect, it would be useless for Germany to think any longer of coming
to a _rapprochement_ with Great Britain, and therefore it would be a
matter of great importance to make a last effort towards counteracting
the Russian designs. His (v. Jagow's) idea was that Ballin, who had
intimate relations with numerous Englishmen in leading positions, should
send a note of warning across the North Sea. This suggestion was
followed up by several hints as to the most suitable form of wording
such a note, and the letter concluded with the statement that the matter
was one of great urgency. A postscript dated July 16th added that a
further article had been published by the _Berliner Tageblatt_,
according to which the informants of the author also took a serious view
of the situation.
Ballin, in response to the request contained in the letter, did not
content himself with sending a written note to his London friends, but
he immediately went to Berlin for the purpose of gaining additional
information on the spot, with special reference to the general political
outlook. He learned that Austria intended to present a strongly worded
note to Serbia, and that it was expected that in reply a counter-note
dictated by Russia would be received. He was also told that the
Government not only wanted some information regarding the matter which
formed the special subject of Herr v. Jagow's letter, but also regarding
the general political situation in London, as it was doubted whether the
reports received from the ambassador were sufficiently trustworthy and
complete. This was all that Ballin was told. Since then many facts have
become known which throw a light on the way in which political questions
were dealt with by the Berlin authorities during the critical period
preceding the war, and if we, knowing what we know now, read the letter
of Herr v. Jagow, we ask ourselves in amazement what was the object of
the proposed action in London? Could it be that it was intended to
intimidate the British Government? This could hardly be thought
possible, so that some other result must have been aimed at. We can only
say that the whole affair is still surrounded by much mystery, and we
can sympathize with Ballin's bitter complaints in later days that he
thought people had not treated him with as much openness as they should
have done, and that they had abused his intimate relations with leading
British personages.
Ballin then left Berlin for Hamburg. He gave me his impressions of the
state of political affairs--which he did not regard as critical--and
went to London, ostensibly on business. In London he met Grey, Haldane,
and Churchill, and there also he did not look upon the situation as
critical--at least, not at first. When, however, the text of the
Austrian note became known on Thursday, July 23rd, and when its full
significance had gradually been realized, the political atmosphere
became clouded: people asked what was Austria's real object, and began
to fear lest the peace might be disturbed. Nevertheless, Ballin returned
from London on July 27th with the impression that a fairly capable
German diplomat might even then succeed in bringing about an
understanding with Great Britain and France which, by preventing Russia
from striking, would result in preserving the peace. Great Britain and
the leading British politicians, he said, were absolutely in favour of
peace, and the French Government was so much against war that its
representatives in London seemed to him to be rather nervous on the
subject. They would, he thought, do anything in their power to prevent
war. If, however, France was attacked without any provocation on her
part, Great Britain would be compelled to come to her assistance.
Britain would never allow that we, as was provided for in the old plan
of campaign, should march through Belgium. It was quite true that the
Austrian note had caused grave anxiety in London, but how earnestly the
Cabinet was trying to preserve peace might be gauged by the fact that
Churchill, when he took leave of Ballin, implored him, almost with tears
in his eyes, not to go to war. These impressions of Ballin are confirmed
by the reports of Prince Lichnowsky and other members of the German
Embassy in their observations during the critical days.
Apart from these politicians and diplomatists on active service there
were other persons of political training, though no longer in office,
who did not think at that time that there was an immediate danger of
war. In this connexion I should like to add a report of a very
remarkable conversation with Count Witte, which took place at Bad
Salzschlirf on July 24th. The Count--whose untimely death was greatly
regretted--was without any doubt one of the most capable statesmen of
his time--perhaps the only one with a touch of genius Europe
possessed--and he certainly knew more about the complicated state of
things in Russia than any living person. For these reasons his views on
the events which form the first stage of the fateful conflict are of
special interest. I shall reproduce the report of this conversation
exactly as we received it at the time, and as we passed it on to Berlin.
The authenticity of the statements of Count Witte as given here is
beyond question.
"Yesterday (on July 24th) I paid a visit to Count Witte who was
staying at Bad Salzschlirf, and in the course of the day I had
several conversations with him, the first of which took place as
early as ten o'clock in the morning. After a few words of welcome,
and after discussing some matters of general and personal interest,
I said to the Count: 'I should like to thank you for your welcome
letter and for your telegram. The question which you raise in them
of a meeting between our two emperors appears of such fundamental
importance to me that I may perhaps hope to be favoured with some
details by you personally.'
"Witte replied: 'In the first instance I wish to reaffirm what I
have repeatedly told you, both verbally and by letter, viz. that I
am not in the least anxious to be nominated Russian delegate for
the proposed negotiations concerning a commercial treaty between
Germany and Russia. Whoever may be appointed from the Russian side
will gain no laurels. I think a meeting between the Kaiser and the
Tsar some time within the next few weeks would be of very great
importance. Have you read the French papers? The tone now assumed
by Jules Hedeman is a direct challenge. I know Hedeman, and I also
know that he only writes what will please Sasonov, Poincaré and
Paléologue (the French ambassador in Petrograd). Now that the
Peterhof meeting has taken place the language employed by all the
French and Russian papers will become more arrogant than ever. It
is quite certain that the Russian diplomatists and their French
colleagues will now assume a different tone in their intercourse
with the German diplomatists. The _rapprochement_ with Great
Britain is making considerable progress, and whether a naval
convention exists or not, Great Britain will now side with Russia
and France. If even now a meeting could be arranged between the two
Emperors, this would be of immense significance. The
mischief-makers both in Russia and in France would be made to look
small, and public opinion would calm down again."
"I asked Witte: 'Do you think, Sergei Yulyevitch, that the Tsar
would avail himself of a possible opportunity of meeting the
Kaiser?'
"Witte replied: 'I am firmly convinced of it; I may, indeed, state
without hesitation that the Tsar would be delighted to do so. The
personal relations between the Tsar and the Kaiser are not of an
ordinary kind. They converse with each other in terms of intimate
friendship, and each time the Tsar has had a chat with the Kaiser
he has been in better spirits. Believe me, if this meeting comes
off, the impression which the French visit has left on the Tsar
will be entirely wiped out. The effect of the showy reception of
the French visitors which the press agitators have not failed to
use for their own ends will be obliterated. Such a meeting will
express in unambiguous terms that, whatever value the Tsar attaches
to the Franco-Russian alliance, he insists on the maintenance of
amicable relations with Germany. The meeting will have to be
arranged without loss of time, in about four or six weeks, because
in two months from now the Tsar will be leaving for Livadia. The
army manoeuvres will be held within the next few weeks, and the
Tsar will then go to the Finnish skerries where, in my opinion, the
meeting might take place without difficulty.'
"I asked Witte: 'Do you not think that, if the meeting were
officially proposed by Germany, it might be looked upon as a sign
of weakness on her side, especially in view of the now existing
tension between the two countries?'
"Witte replied: 'By no means. One has always to take into account
the fact that the relations between the Tsar and the Kaiser, as I
explained before, are in the highest degree friendly and intimate.
I do not know how the Kaiser would feel on the subject, but I am
convinced that he is possessed of the necessary political sagacity
to find the way that will lead to a meeting. He might, e.g., write
to the Tsar quite openly that, as the relations between their two
countries had lately been somewhat under a cloud in consequence of
the inefficient diplomacy of their respective representatives, he
would be particularly happy to meet him at this juncture. Or the
suggestion might reach the Tsar _via_ the Grand Duke of Hesse and
his sister, the Tsarina. But this is immaterial, because the Kaiser
is sure to find the right way. I can only repeat that the effect of
the meeting would be enormous. The Russian press and Russian
society would change their whole attitude, and the agitation in the
French press would receive a severe setback.'
"I said to Witte: 'I shall communicate the gist of our conversation
to Mr. Ballin. As it is quite possible that he will be ready to
endorse this suggestion, I should like to know your answer to one
more question, viz., whether, if Mr. Ballin were to submit the
proposal to the proper quarters, you would allow him to refer to
you as the originator of the suggestion.'
"Witte replied: 'Certainly. He may say that I look upon this
meeting as an event of the utmost importance to both countries at
the present moment.'
"I said: 'Seeing that you will be leaving Germany within five days
from now, would you be prepared to go to Berlin if the Kaiser would
receive you unofficially?'
"Witte replied: 'Certainly. At any moment.'
"When we went for a walk in the afternoon, Witte made reference,
amongst other things, to various political questions. I shall
confine myself to quoting only a few of his remarks.
"'Practically speaking,' he said, 'I think that there will be no
war, although theoretically the air is thick with difficulties
which only a war can clear away. But nowadays there is nobody who,
like William the First, would put his foot down and say: "Now I
will not yield another inch!" The spot at Ems where this happened
is now adorned with a monument. Within a few years when the
armaments which for the present are on paper only, shall be
completed, Russia will really be strong. But even then, one has
still to reckon with the possibility of internal complications.
France, however, need not fear any such difficulties, because
countries possessing a constitution acknowledged by all their
inhabitants are not liable to revolutionary movements, no matter
how often their governments change.'
"In speaking of Hartwig, Witte remarked: 'His death is the severest
blow to Russian diplomacy. He was unquestionably the most gifted
Russian diplomatist. When Count Lammsdorff, who was a great friend
of mine, was Minister for Foreign Affairs, he used to do nothing
without first asking my advice. Hartwig, at that time, was the
chief of his departmental staff, and he often came to see me. Even
in those early days I had an opportunity of admiring his eminent
diplomatic gifts.'"
The suggestion which formed the principal subject of the above
conversations--viz. that a personal meeting of the two Emperors should
be arranged in order to remove the existing tension--was not followed
up, and the proposal would in any case have been doomed to failure,
because the politicians who were responsible for the conduct of affairs
at that time had done nothing to prevent the Kaiser from embarking on
his customary cruise in Northern waters.
The latter end of July was full of excitement for the directors and the
staff of the Hamburg-Amerika Linie. We endeavoured to acquaint the
vessels that were under way with the critical situation, and we
instructed each captain to make for a neutral port in case war should
break out. The naval authorities warned us not to allow any ships to put
to sea, and we were particularly asked not to permit the sailing of the
s.s. _Imperator_, which was fixed for July 31st, because the attitude of
Great Britain was uncertain. At a midnight meeting held at Ballin's
private residence it was decided to postpone the departure of the vessel
"on account of the uncertain political situation." Every berth on the
steamer was booked, and hundreds of passengers were put to the greatest
inconvenience. Most of them proceeded to a neutral or to a British port
from which they subsequently embarked for the United States.
After this, events followed upon each other's heels in swift succession.
When war broke out, most of the ships succeeded in reaching neutral
ports, so that comparatively few of them were lost in the early part of
the war. By August 5th the cables had been cut. This circumstance made
it very difficult to keep up communications with New York, and compelled
the majority of our agencies and branches abroad to use their own
discretion as to what to do. The place of regular business was taken by
the work involved in carrying out the various agreements which the
company had entered into during peace time, viz. those for the
victualling and bunkering of various units of the Imperial Navy, for the
supply of auxiliary vessels, and for the establishment of an
organization which was to purchase the provisions needed by the navy.
In the meantime, the Ministry of the Interior had started to devise
measures for provisioning the country as a whole, as far as that was
still possible. It is well known that the responsible authorities had
done far too little--indeed, hardly anything at all--to cope with this
problem, because they had never taken a very serious view of the danger
of war. Even the arrangements of the military authorities in connexion
with the plans of mobilization were utterly deficient in this respect.
The first who seriously studied the question as to what would have to be
done for the provisioning of the military and civil population if
Germany had to fight against a coalition of enemies, and if the overseas
supplies were stopped, was General Count Georg Waldersee, who became
Quartermaster General in 1912. In a letter which he wrote to Ballin
about that time, he gave a very clear description of the probable state
of things in such an emergency. He pointed out that the amount of
foodstuffs required during a war would probably be larger than the
quantities needed in peace time--a contingency which had escaped
attention in Germany altogether--and that above all there would be an
enormous shortage of raw materials. Therefore, he said, if it was
desired to guard the country against disagreeable surprises, it was
imperative to make certain preparations for an economic and a financial
mobilization. The military authorities at least had studied this problem
theoretically, but the civil authorities would not make any move at all.
The general said he thought it desirable that this question should
receive more attention in the future, and he asked Ballin to let him
know his views on the matter, and to give him some practical advice. The
anxiety felt in military quarters was largely augmented by the receipt
of disquieting rumours about the increase of Russian armaments.
In reply we furnished Count Waldersee with a brief memorandum written by
myself in which, amongst other items, I referred him to some suggestions
put forward by Senator Possehl, of Lübeck, in the course of a lecture
delivered about the same time before a selected audience. In view of the
fact that Germany depended for her food supply and for her raw materials
to an increasing extent on foreign sources, there could be no doubt as
to the necessity for making economic preparations against the
possibility of a war, if a war was considered at all probable.
Nevertheless, and in spite of the newly awakened interest on the part of
the military authorities, these economic preparations had, before the
war, made absolutely no progress worth mentioning. The only practical
step which, as far as my knowledge goes, had been taken by the civil
authorities, was the conclusion of an agreement entered into with a
Dutch firm dealing with the importation of cereals in case of war. When,
in the fateful summer of 1914, this contingency arose, the firm in
question had chartered some British steamers, which instead of carrying
their cargoes to Rotterdam took them to British ports.
Thus, no serious efforts of any kind had been made to grapple with the
problem. On Sunday, August 2nd, Geheimrat Frisch, who afterwards became
the director of the _Zentral-Einkaufs-Gesellschaft_ (Central Purchasing
Corporation), came to Hamburg, in order to inform Ballin, at the request
of the Ministry for the Interior, that the latter felt very anxious in
regard to the quantity of food actually to be found in Germany, which,
it was feared, would be very small, and that it was expected that a
great shortage would arise after a very brief period. He therefore asked
him to use his best endeavours in order to secure supplies from abroad.
A Hamburg firm was immediately requested to find out how much food was
actually available in the country, and, although the figures obtained
were not quite so bad as it was expected, steps were taken at once to
remedy the deficiencies by importing food from neutral countries. A
great obstacle to the rapid success of these efforts was the absolute
want of any preparatory work. The very attempt to raise the necessary
funds abounded with difficulties of every kind, because no money had
been set aside for such expenditure in connexion with the scheme of
mobilization, and the time taken by the attempts made in this direction,
as well as the circumstance that communication with the United States
could only be maintained _via_ neutral countries, were the causes of a
great deal of serious delay.
At Ballin's suggestion the _Reichseinkauf_ (Government Purchasing
Organization) was then formed. For this organization the Hamburg-Amerika
Linie was to do all the purchasing, and it was arranged that it should
put at the disposal of the new body all those members of its staff who
were not called up, and who were considered suitable for the work.
Buyers were sent to every neutral country; but the mobilization then in
progress led to a complete stoppage of railway travelling for the civil
population, thus causing no end of difficulties to these buyers, and
making personal contact with the Berlin authorities almost impossible.
Added to all this, there was the inevitable confusion which the
replacement of the civil administration by the army commands brought in
its train. It had, in fact, been assumed that this war would resemble
its predecessors in every respect, and no one was prepared for a world
war. Hence, such important matters as the importation of foodstuffs from
abroad and the work of supplying political information to neutral
countries concerning the German standpoint were sadly neglected;
everything had to be provided at a moment's notice, and had to be
carried through in the face of a great deal of opposition. Funds and
energy were largely wasted; the military, naval, and civil organizations
were working against one another instead of co-operating; and it took a
long time before a little order could be introduced into the chaos. It
was also found that the German credits abroad were quite inadequate for
such enormous requirements. An attempt to dispose of some treasury bills
in New York was only moderately successful, and in consequence of this
lack of available funds the supplies obtained from the United States
were but small. Even the fact that the Hamburg-Amerika Linie immediately
succeeded in establishing the necessary connexions with American
shippers, and in securing a sufficient amount of neutral tonnage, did
not improve matters in the least. To obtain the required funds in
Berlin, as has been explained before, involved considerable loss of
time; and as the months passed the British blockade became more and more
effective. Thus, as the war continued, large quantities of food could
only be procured from European countries.
Ballin took a large personal share in the actual business transacted by
the _Reichseinkauf_. He did so, if for no other reason, because he
needed some substitute for the work connected with the real shipping
business which was rapidly decreasing in extent. The only benefit his
company derived from its new work was that it gave employment to part of
the members of its staff, thus reducing in some measure the expenses.
With the stoppage of the company's real business its principal source of
income ran dry in no time, and the small profits made out of the supply
of provisions to the navy was only a poor compensation.
The world's economic activities in those days presented a picture of
utter confusion. All the stock exchanges were closed; all dealings in
stocks and shares had ceased, so that no prices could be quoted; several
countries had introduced a moratorium, and numerous banks had stopped
payment. Germany had no longer any direct intercourse with the overseas
countries; the British censorship was daily increasing its hold on the
traffic proceeding _via_ neutral ports. At first those foreign steamship
companies which maintained passenger services to America did splendid
business, because Europe was full of American tourists and business men
who were anxious to secure a berth to get home, and numerous cabin
passengers had to be content with steerage accommodation. When this rush
was past, however, shipping business, like international commerce,
entered upon its period of decline. The freight rates came down, the
number of steamers laid up assumed large proportions, and the world's
traffic, in fact, was paralysed.
After a comparatively brief period it was found too difficult to conduct
the _Reichseinkauf_ organization with its headquarters at Hamburg,
because the intercourse with the Imperial Treasury at Berlin, which
provided the funds, took up too much time, and also because it seemed
highly advisable to purchase the foreign foodstuffs needed by the
military as well as the civil population through one and the same
organization. The state of things in respect to these matters was
simply indescribable; indeed, if it had been purposely intended to
encourage the growth of war profiteering, it would have been impossible
to find a better method of setting about it. Numerous buyers,
responsible to different centres, not merely purchased without regard to
each other, but even outbid each other, thus causing a rise in prices
which the public had to pay. Conditions such as these were brought about
by the utter unpreparedness of the competent civil authorities and by
the fact that the military authorities could dispose of the vast amounts
of money placed at their command at the outbreak of the war. These
conditions were doubtless the soil from which sprang all the evils which
later on developed into the pernicious system we connect with the name
of _Kriegswirtschaft_, and for which it will be impossible to demand
reparation owing to the lost war and to the outbreak of the revolution.
In order to facilitate the intercourse with the proper Government
boards, and to centralize the purchasing business as much as possible,
Ballin's suggestion that the seat of the organization should be removed
to Berlin was adopted, and at the same time the whole matter was put on
a sounder footing by its conversion into a limited company under the
name of _Zentral-Einkaufs-Gesellschaft_ (Central Purchasing
Corporation). The history of the Z.E.G. is well known in the country,
and its work has been subject to a great deal of criticism, largely due
to the fact that all the annoyance caused by the many restrictions which
the Government found it necessary to impose, and which had to be put up
with during the war, was directed against this body. Generally speaking,
this attitude of the population was very unfair, because the principal
grievances concerned the distribution of the foodstuffs, and for this
part the Z.E.G. was not responsible. Its only task was to obtain the
necessary supplies from abroad. If it is remembered that the
transactions of the corporation reached enormous proportions, and that,
after all, it was improvised at a time of war, we cannot be surprised to
see that some mistakes and even some serious blunders did occur
occasionally, and that the right people were not always found in the
right places. Moreover, some of the really amazing feats accomplished by
the Z.E.G--e.g. the supply of grain from Roumania, which necessitated
enormous labour in connexion with the transhipment from rail to steamer
and with the conveyance up the Danube--were only known to a few people.
It is obvious that nothing could be published during the war about these
achievements nor about the agreements concluded, after endless
negotiations, with neutral countries and thus the management of the
Z.E.G. was obliged to suffer in silence the criticisms and reproaches
hurled at it without being able to defend itself.
The volume of the work done by the Z.E.G. may be inferred from the fact
that the goods handled by the organization during the four years from
1915 to 1918 represented a value of 6,500 million marks, in which
connexion it must not be forgotten that at that time the purchasing
power of the mark was still nearly the same as before the war. When the
Roumanian harvest was brought in the daily imports sometimes reached a
total of 800 truck-loads. However, the greatest credit, in my opinion,
is due to the Z.E.G. for putting a stop to the above-mentioned confusion
in the methods of buying abroad and for establishing normal conditions.
To-day it is scarcely possible to realize how difficult it was and how
much time it required to overcome the opposition often met with at home.
Not much need be said here about the activities of the Hamburg-Amerika
Linie during the war. The longer the struggle lasted, and the larger the
number of countries involved in the war against Germany became, the
heavier became the company's losses of tonnage and of other property.
All the shore establishments, branch offices, pier accommodation, etc.,
situated in enemy countries, were confiscated, and the anxiety about the
post-war reconstruction grew from month to month. Ballin never lost
sight of this problem, and it is chiefly due to his efforts that the
Government and the Reichstag passed a Bill (1917) providing the means
for the rebuilding of the country's mercantile marine. Along with this
he tried to keep the company financially independent by cutting down
expenses, by finding work for the inland offices of the company, by
selling tonnage, and by other means. The families and dependents of
those employees who had been called to the colours were assisted as far
as the funds at the company's disposal permitted. Of all these measures
the company has already given the necessary information to the public,
and I can confine myself to these brief statements. There is only one
circumstance which requires special mention.
It is universally acknowledged that no German industry has suffered so
greatly through the action of the German Government as the shipping
business. When the discussions as to the rebuilding of the merchant
fleet were being carried on, the Government frankly admitted this fact.
I am not thinking, in this connexion, of those measures which were
imposed upon the Government by the Versailles Treaty, such as the
surrender of the German mercantile marine, but what I have in mind is
the steps taken whilst the war was in actual progress. These have one
thing in common with those imposed by the enemy: their originators have,
more or less, arrived at the belated conviction that they have
sacrificed much valuable property to no purpose. In Great Britain it is
admitted quite openly that the confiscation of the German merchant
fleet has very largely contributed to the ensuing collapse of the
world's shipping markets, and to the confusion which now prevails on
every trade route. The war measures of the German Government--or,
rather, of the German naval authorities--have sacrificed enormous values
merely for the sake of a phantom, thus necessitating the compensation
due to the shipowners--a compensation far from sufficient to make good
even a moderate fraction of the loss. The vessels that can be built for
the sums thrown out for this purpose will not be worth the twentieth
part of the old ones, if quality is taken into account as well as
quantity. This will become apparent when the compensation money has been
spent, and when it will be possible to compare the fleet of German
passenger boats then existing with what the country possessed previous
to the war.
The phantom just referred to was the foolish belief that it would be
possible to eliminate all ocean tonnage from the high seas--a belief
which was in itself used to justify the submarine war, and which was
responsible for the assumption that the withdrawal of German tonnage
from the high seas would affect the food and raw material supply of the
enemy countries. This mistaken idea was also the reason for prohibiting
the sale of the German vessels in neutral ports, and for ordering the
destruction of their engines when it became impossible to prevent their
confiscation. The latter measure, and in particular the manner in which
it was carried out, prove the utter inability of the competent
authorities to grasp the very elements of the great problem they were
tackling, and in view of such lack of knowledge it is easy to understand
the bitterness of tone which characterizes Ballin's criticism of these
measures as contained in his memorandum to the Minister of the Interior
(1917). He wrote:
"When Your Excellency decided to permit the sale of our vessels in
the United States it was too late to do so, because the U.S.
Government had already seized them. Previous to that, when we saw
that war would be inevitable, and when we had received an
exceedingly favourable purchasing offer from an American group, we
had asked permission to sell part of our tonnage laid up in that
country.
"Your Excellency, acting on behalf of the Chancellor, declined to
grant this permission. I am quite aware that neither the Chancellor
nor Your Excellency as his representative were responsible for this
refusal, but that it was due to a decision of the Admiralty Staff.
However, the competent authority to which the protection and the
furtherance of the country's shipping interests are entrusted is
the Ministry of the Interior. With the Admiralty Staff itself, as I
need not remind Your Excellency, we have no dealings whatever, and
we are not even entitled to approach that body directly in such
matters.
"Our company which was the biggest undertaking of its kind in the
world, and which previous to the war possessed a fleet aggregating
about 1,500,000 tons, has lost practically all its ships except a
very few. The losses are not so much due to capture on the part of
the enemy as to the measures taken by our own Government. If our
Government had acted with the same foresight as did the
Austro-Hungarian Government with respect to its ships in United
States and Chinese waters, the German vessels then in Italy,
Portugal, Greece, the United States, Brazil, and elsewhere, might
have been either retained by us or disposed of at their full value.
"The Austrian ships, with their dismantled engines were, at the
instance of the Austrian Government, sold in such good time that
the shipping companies concerned are not only in a position to-day
to refrain from asking their Government to pass a Shipowners'
Compensation Bill, as we are bound to do, but they have even
enriched the Austrian national wealth by such handsome additions
that their capital strength has reached a sum never dreamt of
before, and that they are now able to rebuild their fleet by
drawing upon their own funds, and to make such further additions to
their tonnage that in future we shall not only be compelled to
compete with the shipping companies of neutral and enemy
countries--which have accumulated phenomenal profits--but with the
Austrian mercantile marine as well.
"From the point of view of our country's economic interests it is
greatly to be regretted that the policy of the Government has not
changed in this respect even now. We have received reliable news
from private sources to the effect that the engines of the German
vessels now in Argentine waters have been destroyed without Your
Excellency having so far informed us of this action, and without
Your Excellency having asked us to take steps to utilize the
vessels, if possible, for the benefit of the country's economic
interests and for that of the completely decimated German merchant
fleet.
"Moreover, a wire sent by His Excellency Herr v. Jonquières to the
competent Hamburg and Bremen authorities states that the ships in
Uruguayan waters are also in great jeopardy. The Government of that
country, according to this report, would prefer to purchase them
rather than confiscate them. After what has been done before, we
fear that the Admiralty Staff will either not permit the sale at
all, or only grant its permission when it is too late.
"Your Excellency, I am sure, is fully aware of the fact that the
methods of the Admiralty Staff--ignoring, as it does, all other
considerations except its own--have caused one country after the
other to join the ranks of Germany's enemies. In view of the
shortage of tonnage which Great Britain and other of our enemies
systematically try to bring about--evidently with the intention of
inconveniencing neutral countries as much as possible--these latter
feel compelled, for the very reason of this lack of tonnage, to
declare war upon us, because the politics of our country are guided
by a body of men who, unfortunately, shut their eyes to the
economic and political consequences of their decisions.
"Several months ago, at a time when nobody thought of unrestricted
submarine warfare, an opportunity presented itself to us of
concluding an agreement with the Belgian Relief Committee by which
it would have been possible for us to withdraw our steamers, one
after the other, from American ports and, under the flag of that
committee, to bring them to Rotterdam. At that time, it was again
the Admiralty Staff which prevented the conclusion of this
agreement, because, for reasons best known to itself, it would
grant permission for only three of these vessels, although Great
Britain had agreed that the whole of our fleet interned in U.S.
ports, representing 250,000 tons in all, could sail under the terms
of the proposed agreement, and although the Allies as a whole had
signed a written declaration to the effect that they would not
interfere with our ships so long as they were used for the
provisioning of Belgium. I took the liberty of pointing out to
Captain Grashoff, the representative of the Admiralty Staff, that
nothing could have prevented us from letting the ships remain at
Rotterdam after they had completed their mission, and that
afterwards, as has been borne out by later facts, they could have
been safely taken to Hamburg.
"I respectfully ask Your Excellency whether it is not possible to
enter a protest against such unnecessary dismemberment of part of
the German national assets....
" ... I must also protest most emphatically against the
insinuation--which is sure to be made--that I have no right to
criticize any steps which the Admiralty Staff has regarded as
necessary for reasons of our naval strategy. Without reservation
the German shipowners agree to any measures which are strategically
necessary, however greatly they may injure their interests. The
criticism which I beg to make on behalf of German
shipping--although possessing no formal mandate--concerns itself
with those steps which might have been taken without jeopardizing
the success of our naval strategy if the vital necessities of
German mercantile shipping had been studied with as much
consideration as this branch of the economic activities of our
country has a right to claim.
"What we principally take exception to in this connexion is that no
information was sent to us before the decision to destroy the
engines of our ships was arrived at, and that we were not assisted
in making use of these dismantled vessels in the financial
interests of our country. Nothing of this kind was done, although
it was the most natural thing to do so, and although such action
would have deprived many a country of a reason to declare war upon
Germany."
To a man of the type of Ballin--who had, throughout his life, been
accustomed to perform a huge amount of successful work--a period of
enforced inactivity was unbearable. The longer it lasted the more he
suffered from its effects, especially because the preparatory work for
the post-war reconstruction, the work connected with the war
organization of the German shipowners, etc., was only a poor substitute
for the productive labour he had been engaged in during more than thirty
years of peace. There is no doubt but that the Government could have
made better use of Ballin's gift of organization, but it must be
remembered that there was really no effective central Government in
Germany throughout the war. The civil administration was not exactly
deposed, but it was subordinated to the military one from the very
beginning, and the latter carried on its work along the guiding lines
laid down in the scheme of mobilization. The authorities to whose care
the economic aspects of the war were entrusted did not often--if at
all--avail themselves of Ballin's advice; and to offer it unbidden never
entered his mind, because he was cherishing the hope that the war would
not last long, and because it was his belief that the world would be
sensible enough to put an end to the wholesale destruction before long.
It was a bitter disappointment to him to find how greatly he was
mistaken, and to see that the forces of unreason remained in the
ascendancy, especially as he was always convinced that Time would be on
the side of Germany's enemies. The sole aim of his political activities
during the war was to bring about peace as early as possible.
Of all the attempts at mediation known to me, the one which seemed to be
most likely to succeed passed through the hands of Ballin. To give a
detailed account of it must be left to a time which need no longer pay
regard to governments and individuals. Ballin's share in it was brought
about through his former international connexions. Through him it
reached the Kaiser and the Chancellor, and owing to his untiring
efforts, which lasted for two years, the position in the early part of
1917 was such that the establishment of direct contact between the two
sides was imminent. Then the unrestricted submarine war began, the
intended direct contact could not be established, and the carefully
woven thread was definitely snapped asunder; because from that time on
the Allies were certain that the United States would join them, and they
felt assured of victory. No other mediation scheme with which I am
acquainted has been pursued with so much unselfishness, devotion, and
energy as this one. This attempt, however, no more than any other, could
have procured for us that kind of peace which public opinion in Germany
had been led for years to expect, thanks to the over-estimation of the
country's strength, fostered by the military censorship and by the
military reports.
From such exaggerated opinions Ballin always held himself aloof. He
recognized without reservation the immense achievements of Germany in
the war, but he was fearful lest the strength of the country could not
cope in the long run with the ever-increasing array of enemies, and he
therefore maintained that, if it was desired to bring about peace, the
Government would have to be moderate in its terms. A much discussed
article which he contributed to the _Frankfürter Zeitung_ on January
1st, 1915, under the heading of "The Wet Triangle," is not inconsistent
with these views of his. In it he pointed out that Germany's naval
power, in order to make a future blockade impossible, should no longer
be content to be shut up in the "wet triangle," i.e. the North Sea, but
ought to establish itself on the high seas. This statement has been
alleged to refer to Belgium, and Ballin has been wrongly claimed a
partisan by those who supported the annexation of that country. What he
really meant was that Germany should demand a naval base on the
Atlantic, somewhere in the northern parts of Africa, and this idea
seemed to be quite realizable if taken in conjunction with the terms of
peace he had in view, viz. no annexations, no indemnities, economic
advantages, a permanent political and naval understanding with Great
Britain, based on her recognition that a military defeat of Germany was
impossible. All this would be somewhat on the lines of the article
published by the _Westminster Gazette_, referred to in the eighth
chapter and a facsimile of which is given at the end of the book. Ballin
was firmly convinced that, even if a mere peace of compromise was the
outcome, i.e. one which left Germany without any territorial gains and
without any indemnities, the impression which the German achievements
during the war would produce on the rest of the world would be so
overwhelming that the country would secure indirectly far greater
advantages than could be gained by means of the largest possible
indemnity and the most far-reaching annexations. Besides, the
experiences of former times had proved that Germany would be quite
unable to absorb such large accessions of territory as certain people
had in mind. These views of Ballin, of course, were looked upon as those
of a "pacificist," and Ballin was classified among their number.
In a letter which Ballin wrote to a friend of his, a naval officer, in
April, 1915, he puts up a highly characteristic defence of himself
against the accusations implied by describing him as "pacificist" and
"pro-English."
"If," he wrote, "the fact that I have been privileged to spend a
considerable part of my life in close contact with you, entitles me
to add a few personal remarks, I should like to say that I have
made up my mind to retire from my post after the end of the war
altogether. I told you shortly after the outbreak of the war that
my life's work was wrecked. To-day I am convinced that it will soon
come to life again, but my youth would have to be restored to me
before I could ever dream of taking up again that position in
international shipping which I held before the war. I cannot
imagine that I would ever go to London again and take the chair at
the conferences at which the great problems of international
shipping would come up for discussion, and nobody, I think, can
expect that I should be content to play second fiddle at my age.
Indeed, I cannot see how I could ever re-enter upon intimate
relations with the British, the French, the Italians, and
especially with the Americans. Strangely enough, influential
circles on our side, and even His Majesty himself, look upon me as
'pro-English,' and yet I am the only German who can say with truth
that he has been fighting the English for supremacy in the shipping
world during the last thirty years. During this long period I have,
if I am allowed to make use of so bold a comparison, conquered one
British trench after the other, and I have renewed my attacks
whenever I could find the means for doing so."
It is no secret that during the war many prominent politicians and
economists--men of sound political training--viewed the question of the
war aims which it was desirable to realize very much in the same light
as did Ballin, but that the censorship made it impossible for anyone to
give public expression to such opinions. Ballin's appreciation of the
probable gain which Germany would derive from a peace by compromise has
now been amply confirmed by the undeniable fact that the rest of the
world has been tremendously impressed by Germany's achievements, an
impression which has made foreigners regard her chances of recovery with
much more confidence than she has felt herself, stunned as she was by
the immensity of her _débâcle_.
The following notes, which are largely based on Ballin's own diary, are
intended to supplement the information given so far as to his political
activities during the war.
The outbreak of war, as may be inferred from what has already been
related, took him completely by surprise, and he did not think that the
struggle would last very long. "The necessities of the world's commerce
will not stand a long war," was his opinion during the early days. For
the rest, he tried to find work for himself which would benefit his
country. "What we need to-day," he wrote to a friend, "is work. This
will lift us up and keep us going, and will make those of us who are no
longer fit to fight feel that we are still of some use after all." But
in connexion with this thought another one began to occupy his mind. He
anxiously asked: "Which of the men now at headquarters will have the
strength and the wisdom required to negotiate a successful peace when
the time comes?" All his thoughts centred round the one idea of how to
secure peace; what advantages his country would derive from it; and how
it would be possible to bring about an international grouping of the
Powers which would be of the greatest benefit to Germany. On October
1st, 1914, he wrote to Grand Admiral v. Tirpitz:
" ... I quite agree with what you say in your welcome letter.
Indeed, you could not view these matters[3] with graver anxiety
than I do myself. I hope I shall soon have the opportunity I desire
of discussing these things with you personally.
"To win the peace will be hardly less difficult than to win the
war. My opinion is that the result of this world war, if it lasts
12 months, will be exactly the same as if it lasts six months. I
mean to say that, if we do not succeed in acquiring the guarantees
for our compensation demands within a few months, the further
progress of events will not appreciably improve our chances in this
direction.
"What we must aim at is a new grouping of the Powers round an
alliance between Germany, Great Britain and France. This alliance
will become possible as soon as we shall have vanquished France and
Belgium, and as soon as you shall have made up your mind to bring
about an understanding with Great Britain concerning the naval
programme.
"I am aware that this idea will find but slight favour with you,
but you will never secure a reasonable peace with Great Britain
without a naval agreement.
"By a reasonable peace I mean one which will enable both Germany
and Britain to sheathe their swords in honour, and which will not
burden either nation with a hatred which would contain within it
the germs of future war.
"We have had no difficulty in putting up with the French clamour
for _revanche_ for a period of 44 years, because in this case we
had only to deal with a small group of nationalist firebrands, but
a British clamour for revenge would produce an exceedingly adverse
effect on the future of our national well-being and of our share in
the world's trade and commerce.
"For a long time past it has been my conviction that the era of the
super-Dreadnoughts has passed, and some time ago I asked Admiral
von Müller if it was not possible to consider the question of a
naval understanding simply on the basis of an agreement as to the
sum of money which either Government should be entitled to spend
annually on naval construction, leaving it to the discretion of
each side how to make use of the money agreed upon for the building
of the various types of ships.
"Great Britain is putting up a fight for her existence just as much
as we do, if not to an even greater extent. Her continuance as a
world power depends on the superiority--the numerical superiority
at least--of her navy.
"I am convinced--always supposing that we shall succeed in
conquering France and Belgium--that the British terms concerning
her naval supremacy will be very moderate, and I cannot help
thinking that a fair understanding regarding naval construction is
just as important to Germany as it is to Great Britain.
"The present state of things is the outcome of a _circulus
vitiosus_, and is bound to produce a soreness which will never
permit of a sound understanding....
" ... And what about the further course of the war? I sincerely
hope that your Excellency will not risk the navy. The expression
'The Fleet in being' which has never left my memory, and which has
lately been heard of again, implies exactly all I mean.
"The navy, in my opinion, has never been, and never ought to be,
anything but the indispensable reserve of a healthy international
policy. Just as a conscientious director-general would never dream
of reducing the reserve funds of his company, unless compelled to
do so by sheer necessity, we ought not to drag the navy into the
war, if it could possibly be avoided.
"What would it profit you to risk a naval battle on the high seas?
Not only our own, but British experts as well, believe that our
ships, our officers, and our crews are superior to the British, and
King Edward emphasized at every opportunity that the crews on
British warships are not a match to those on German vessels. But
what are you going to do? Are you going to make them fight against
a numerically superior enemy? Such a course would be open to great
objections, and even, if the battle turned out successfully, the
victors would not escape serious damage.
"I do not know how your Excellency, and their Excellencies v.
Müller and Pohl look upon these matters, but since you yourself
have asked me to state my views, I hope you will not take it amiss
if my zeal causes me to enlarge upon a subject which is not quite
within my province. Besides, I have another reason for doing so.
"It is our duty to prepare ourselves in good time for the peace
that is to come. Does your Excellency believe it would augur well
for the future peace if Germany succeeded in inflicting a naval
victory on the British? I do not think so myself, but I rather
fancy that the opposite effect would take place.... If the British
should suffer a big naval defeat, they would be forced to fight to
the bitter end. That is inherent in the nature of things; even
those who can only argue in terms of a Continental policy must
understand it.
"Even a partial loss of her naval prestige would spell ruin to
Great Britain. It would imply the defection of the great dominions
which now form part of her world empire. The _raison d'être_ for
Great Britain's present position ceases to exist as soon as she has
lost her naval supremacy....
" ... And, please, do not lose sight of one further consideration.
We must find our compensation by annexing valuable territories
beyond the seas; but for the peaceful enjoyment of such overseas
gains we shall be dependent on the good will of Great Britain....
At present, men of German blood occupy leading positions in the
economic life of almost every British colony, and the open door has
been the means by which we have acquired a great deal of that
national wealth of ours which caused the smooth working of our
financial mobilization when the war broke out.
" ... For all these reasons I consider it a great mistake that the
press should be allowed to excite German public opinion against
Great Britain to the extent it is done. I was in Berlin during the
week, and I was alarmed when I became acquainted with the wild
schemes which are entertained not only by the people of Berlin, but
also by distinguished men from the Rhineland and Westphalia."
Apart from the peace problem there was another matter which gave Ballin
grave cause for anxiety. This was the circumstance that the Kaiser,
because of his long absences from Berlin, lost the necessary touch with
the people, and could not, therefore, be kept properly informed of
popular feeling. He expressed his fears on this account in a letter to a
friend of his amongst the Kaiser's entourage in which he wrote:
"I hope you will soon be able to induce His Majesty to remove his
winter quarters to Germany. My common sense tells me that, if a war
is waged on French and Russian soil, the headquarters ought to be
situated in Germany. From the point of view of security also I
consider this very desirable, and I feel a great deal of anxiety
concerning His Majesty.... Whether it is wise to exercise the
censorship of the press to the extent it is done, is a question on
which more opinions than one are possible.... I have just had a
call from a Mr. X., a former officer, and an exceedingly reliable
and capable man. He complained bitterly of the rigid censorship,
and he thought it would be a mistake from which we should have to
suffer in days to come. It would certainly be a blessing if such a
man who is highly esteemed by the Foreign Office could be given a
chance of explaining his views at headquarters."
Among the problems of foreign policy with which Germany saw herself
faced in the early part of the war, those referring to Italy and
Roumania were of special interest to Ballin. The question was how to
prevent these two countries from joining the ranks of Germany's enemies.
Ballin did all he could to bring about the Italian mission of Prince
Bülow. He not only urged the Chancellor to select Bülow for this task,
but he also tried hard to induce the Prince to undertake the thankless
errand involved. In addition to the political importance of the mission,
he laid great stress on its bearing on the food problem.
"The question of provisioning the German people," he wrote in a
letter to the Army Headquarters, "is closely connected with the
solution of the Italian and Roumanian difficulties. No pressure is,
in my opinion, too strong in order to make it perfectly clear to
Austria that some sort of an agreement with Italy is a _sine qua
non_ for the successful termination of this war. If it were argued
that Italy would come forward with fresh demands as soon as her
original claims had been satisfied, I think the German Government
could combat this objection by insisting upon a written promise on
the part of Italy to the effect that she would not extend her
demands.
" ... Political and military considerations make it plain beyond
any question of doubt that Italy, who will be armed to the teeth in
March, will not be able to lay down her arms again unless Austria
arrives at an understanding with her. Thus our greatest danger is
the uncertainty as to what these neutrals will do, and I hope that
the ministerial changes in Austria will smooth the way for a
reasonable attitude towards this regrettable but unavoidable
necessity. Our aim should be to prevent the scattering of our
forces, for the burden imposed upon ourselves because of the
inadequacy of our allies is almost superhuman, and contains the
danger of exhaustion."
The German mission to Italy suffered through the vacillations of
Austrian politics, and was therefore doomed to failure. Austrian feeling
concerning a compromise with Italy was always dependent on the news from
the Italian front; if this was favourable, people did not want to hear
of it, and in the opposite case they would only discuss such an
understanding most unwillingly. The proposed compromise was looked upon
as a heavy sacrifice, and people were by no means favourably disposed
towards German mediation. Prince Bülow was accused of having "presented
Italy with the Trentino." Disquieting news which Ballin received from
Vienna induced him to report to the Chancellor on the state of Austrian
feeling, and to offer his services if he thought that his
old-established relations with Vienna could be of any use. His offer was
also prompted by his conviction that the German diplomatic
representation in Vienna was not adapted to Austrian mentality.
Thereupon Ballin, early in March, 1915, entered upon a semi-official
mission to Vienna. He first acquainted himself with the actual state of
the Austrian mind by calling on his old friend, his Excellency v.
Schulz, the Vice-President of the Austrian Chief Court of Audits, who
was regarded as one of the best informed personages in the capital, and
who was one of the regular partners of the old Emperor Francis Joseph
for his daily game of tarock. This gentleman told Ballin that the
people of Austria felt a good deal of resentment towards Germany, who
had stepped in far too early as the "advocate of Italy," at a time when
Austria was still hoping to settle Serbia all by herself. This hope,
indeed, had proved an illusion; but Germany's strategy had also turned
out a failure, because she had misjudged the attitude of Great Britain,
and had not finished with France as rapidly as she had expected to do.
Now Austria, confronted by stern necessity, would have to make
concessions to Italy which every true Austrian would view with bitter
grief; and, to bring about the active assistance of Roumania, Count
Tisza would consider a sacrifice in the Bukovina debatable, but never
one in Transylvania. Ballin told his friend that, as far as Roumania was
concerned, he would have to leave it to Austria to settle that question
by herself; and that his mission with regard to Italy was so difficult
that he preferred not to make it more so by trying to solve the
Roumanian problem as well.
Ballin's subsequent interviews with the Prime Minister, Count Stürgkh,
and with the Minister v. Koerber, as well as those with other
influential personages, confirmed these impressions, and he left Vienna
buoyed up by the hope that the conference between German, Austrian, and
Italian delegates which it was proposed to hold at Vienna would lead to
a successful result. Such, however, was not the case, and it is quite
probable that the possibility of arriving at an understanding with Italy
had passed by that time, or, assuming the most favourable circumstances,
that only immediate and far-reaching Austrian concessions could have
saved the situation; but these were not forthcoming.
The next subject which caused much anxiety to Ballin was the question as
to what Roumania would do, a country to whose attitude, considering her
importance to Germany as a food-producing area, he attached even more
value than to that of Italy. In his notes dating from that time he said:
" ... June 21st, 1915. The news which I received from X. regarding
the political situation in Roumania and Bulgaria was so serious
that I felt bound to send copies of these letters to the Chief of
the General Staff, General v. Falkenhayn, and to inform him that,
in my opinion, our Foreign Office had now done all it could
possibly do, and that nothing but some forcible military pressure
such as he and Baron Conrad could exercise on Count Tisza would
induce this obstinate gentleman to settle his differences with the
Balkan States...."
" ... On this occasion X. expressed a great deal of contempt at the
suggestion that we should draw upon the members of the old
diplomacy for additional help. On the whole, he seemed to be very
proud of the achievements of the Foreign Office, whereas I am of
opinion that this body has entirely failed, and is of no practical
use any longer. Things must be in a pretty bad state if Herr
Erzberger, of all people, is looked upon as the last hope of the
country. I suggested to the gentlemen that it would do some good if
the Chancellor were to request the more virulent of the Pan-Germans
to see him, and to ask Hindenburg to explain to them the military
situation without any camouflage. This suggestion was favourably
received, and it is to be passed on to the Chancellor....
" ... The Chancellor informed me that he was considering whether,
if Roumania remained neutral, and if the operations against the
Dardanelles terminated successfully for us, he ought to submit any
official proposals for peace to our enemies. I expressed my
admiration of the plan, but told the Chancellor of my objections to
its practical execution. The Entente, I feared, would refuse to
entertain the proposals, and the German people would regard it as a
sign of weakness. The Chancellor asked me to refrain from
pronouncing a definite opinion for the present, but to think it
over until our next meeting."
In a letter of July 31st, 1915, Ballin wrote as follows:
"I should like to express my heartfelt gratitude to you for sending
on to me the report which contains some of the finest observations
that have come to my knowledge since the outbreak of the war.
" ... The writer lays great stress on the belief prevalent in enemy
and neutral countries alike that Germany is making a bid for
universal supremacy and for supremacy on the high seas--a belief
which has spurred on the resistance of the enemy to the utmost, and
has caused a good deal of bad feeling amongst the neutrals. I
repeatedly brought this fact to the knowledge of the Chancellor and
I urgently suggested to him that in some way--e.g., by an Imperial
proclamation on the anniversary of the outbreak of war, or by some
other suitable means--we should announce to all and sundry that
such hare-brained schemes are not entertained by any responsible
person or body of persons in Germany. I sincerely trust that some
such steps will be taken at an early opportunity, because otherwise
I do not see when the war will be over. Though not a pessimist I do
not believe in taking too rosy a view of things. I envy the British
because they have the courage openly to discuss in their press and
parliament the reverses as well as the successes they have had.
" ... You see I am not taking too cheerful a view of matters. I
have nothing but the most enthusiastic admiration for the
achievements of the German people, both at the front and at home.
Although not gifted politically this people could do wonders if led
by great statesmen and by great politicians."
" ... August 10th, 1915. This morning I spent an hour with the
Chancellor, who had requested me to call on him.... We had a long
discussion as to the advisability of publishing a statement to the
effect that Germany would be ready at any moment to discuss an
honourable peace. She had achieved great successes in the field,
she was in possession of important mortgages, her armies were
occupying large tracts of the enemy's country, and she was not
carrying on a war of aggression but one of defence: therefore such
a step could not be regarded as a sign of weakness. The
Chancellor, nevertheless, was afraid that such a step might after
all be interpreted in that sense. I suggested to him that it might
be of some use if the Pope could be induced to address a peace
message to the rulers of the various countries.
"I also called the Chancellor's urgent attention to the need for
dealing with the food problem during the ensuing winter, especially
with relation to the price of meat."
" ... August 12th, 1915. The United States Ambassador, Mr. Gerard,
had expressed the desire to discuss with me the question as to the
advisability of suggesting that President Wilson should mediate
between the belligerents. I therefore called on him on Tuesday,
August 10th, and advised him to refrain from any official action in
that direction, but said that I thought he might ask the President
to sound opinion in Great Britain as to the chances of such peace
proposals."
In the early part of September, 1915, Admiral v. Holtzendorff was
appointed Chief of the Admiralty Staff. This appointment gave rise to a
conflict with Grand Admiral v. Tirpitz, who threatened to resign
because, _inter alia_, the Kaiser had issued instructions to the effect
that the Chief of the Admiralty Staff should no longer be subject to the
authority of the Secretary for the Navy, but that he could communicate
with the Kaiser and with the Chancellor direct. Ballin thought a
possible resignation of Admiral v. Tirpitz would be fraught with serious
consequences at that moment, as it would produce a bad impression on
public opinion and be inimical to the position of the Kaiser. These
considerations caused Ballin to intervene in person with Admiral v.
Tirpitz and with the Chief of the Naval Cabinet, with the result that
the Grand Admiral withdrew his intended resignation.
The following extracts are taken from Ballin's notes during the next few
months:
" ... October 20th, 1915. I am annoyed at the importunity with
which some interested parties, such as the Central Association of
German Manufacturers and the representatives of agriculture, are
pushing forward their views on the peace terms. Moreover, my
alleged readiness to conclude a 'bad peace' with Great Britain is
being talked about so widely that even His Excellency Herr v.
Zimmermann has drawn my attention to the ill effects of such
calumnies. All this has prompted me to avail myself of the
opportunity presented by the annual meeting of the Association of
Hamburg Shipowners of making a speech in which I have explained my
views as to the freedom of the seas.
"Prince Bülow will be leaving for Lucerne to-day where he intends
to stay for some time, and the Prussian _chargé d'affaires_, Herr
v. Mutius--of whom it has been alleged that the Chancellor
appointed him to his post on the death of his predecessor (the
excellent Herr v. Bülow, Prussian Minister to Hamburg) for the
reason that he might have a watchful eye on Prince Bülow and
myself--has been promptly transferred to Warsaw. Evidently the
Berlin authorities now think the danger has passed, since Prince
Bülow has left."
" ... November 23rd, 1915. Hammann[4] asked me why I did not call
on the Chancellor, and I told him that I thought the Chancellor
might feel annoyed with me for my interference in favour of
Tirpitz, which, however, would not affect me in any way, because I
was convinced that I had acted in the best interests of the Kaiser,
and that it would have been unwise to remove Tirpitz from his post
so long as the war lasted."
" ... The Chancellor asked me to see him on Wednesday at 6.30 p.m.,
and I spent nearly two hours with him. I urgently advised him to
make a frank statement in the Reichstag as to our readiness for
peace, and to do so in such a form that it could not possibly be
looked upon as a sign of weakness."
" ... On January 10th, 1916, I was commanded to dine with Their
Majesties at the _Neues Palais_. The only other guests apart from
myself were the Minister of the Royal Household, Count Eulenburg,
and the Minister of Agriculture, Herr v. Schorlemer. None of the
suite were present so that the company consisted of five persons
only. The Kaiser was in high spirits and full of confidence. The
after-dinner conversation extended to such a late hour that we did
not catch the train by which we intended to return, and we were
obliged to leave by the last train that night.
"A remark of mine concerning the possibility of an extension of
submarine warfare had, as the Chancellor had been informed, caused
the Kaiser to assume that I completely shared the point of view of
Admirals v. Holtzendorff and v. Tirpitz, who now recommend a
submarine campaign against Great Britain on a large scale. I
therefore, at the Chancellor's request, addressed the following
letter to the Kaiser:
"'A few days ago I had occasion to discuss with Grand Admiral v.
Tirpitz and Admiral v. Holtzendorff the question of a resumption of
the submarine campaign.
"'I was then given confidential information as to the number of
submarines at our disposal, and I am bound to say that even if due
allowance is made for the activity of the mine-seeking auxiliaries
I regard the number of large submarines as insufficient for the
purposes of such a finally decisive measure.
"'The first attempt at submarine warfare proved unsuccessful on
account of the insufficiency of the means employed to carry it
through; and it is my humble opinion that a second attempt should
only be undertaken if its success were beyond the possibility of a
doubt. If this cannot be guaranteed the consequences of such a
measure appear to me to be out of all proportion to the risks
attached to it.
"'I therefore beg to respectfully suggest to Your Majesty that the
work of the mine-laying auxiliaries should be carried on as
hitherto, and should even be extended. I also consider that the
submarines should be made use of to the fullest extent of their
capacity, with the proviso, however, that their employment against
passenger steamers should be subject to the restrictions recently
laid down by Your Majesty.
"'When the number of the big submarines shall be sufficient
effectively to cut off the British food supply, I think the time
will have arrived for us to employ this weapon against Great
Britain without paying regard to the so-called neutrals.
"'At present about two hundred ocean steamers or more enter
British ports every day, and an equal number leave for foreign
ports. If we sink a daily average of 30 or 40 we can, indeed,
greatly inconvenience England, but we shall assuredly not be able
to compel her to sue for peace.
"'I humbly apologize to Your Majesty for thus stating my views on
this matter; but I am of opinion that the extreme importance of the
proposed steps will be a sufficient excuse for me.'"
In the early part of 1916 Ballin went on a second mission to Vienna, and
afterwards he prepared a detailed report for the Chancellor dealing with
the state of public feeling as he found it. This document presents a
faithful picture of the precarious conditions in that capital which the
German Government had constantly to reckon with, and may therefore be of
interest even now. The following passages are extracts from it:
"If we desire to keep the Austrian fighting spirit unimpaired we
must avoid at all hazards suggesting the possibility of an
understanding with Italy. The Italian war is popular down to the
lowest classes of the people, and the successful stand against
Italy is a subject of pride and hope to all Austrians.
"Hence the circumstance that Prince Bülow has temporarily taken up
his abode at Lucerne has roused a considerable amount of suspicion.
Even the officials in the various ministerial departments fear that
the Prince might intend to make unofficial advances to Italy when
in Lucerne, and that these steps might be followed in Berlin by a
movement in favour of a separate peace with Italy by which Austria
would have to cede the Trentino. People were obviously pleased and
relieved when I could explain to them that the Prince was greatly
embarrassed on account of having lost his Villa Malta, and that the
choice of a suitable residence during the winter had been very
difficult. They were particularly gratified when I told them--what
I had heard from the Prince's own lips--that he had had no official
mission, and that he had not been engaged upon any negotiations.
"People are especially proud of the Isonzo battles, but they do not
shut their eyes to the uncertain prospects of a successful Austrian
offensive. They really consider that Austria has gained her war
aims, and the old Emperor described the military situation to Frau
Kathi Schratt by saying that the war was in many respects like a
game of tarock, in which the winner was not allowed to cease
playing because the losers insisted upon him going on with the game
so that they might have their revenge. Matters at first had been to
the advantage of our enemies: the Russians had overrun Galicia, the
Serbians had defeated the Austrians at Belgrade, and the French had
looked upon the retreat from the Marne as a great success. Now,
however, the war was all in favour of Germany and Austria, and
therefore our opponents did not want to call a truce just yet.
"If this comparison which the venerable old gentleman has borrowed
from his favourite game of cards is correct, the war will not be
over until one side has nothing further to stake, and the decision
will be brought about by that side whose human and financial
resources shall last longest.
"Banking circles, of course, view the financial situation with the
utmost gravity, but the general public--in spite of the high prices
ruling here, and in spite of the great want of food which is much
more noticeable than with us--regard matters a great deal more
serenely. This is simply due to the greater optimism so
characteristic of the Austrians, whose motto is: 'Life is so short,
and death so very, very long.' They prefer to assign to future
generations the worries which would spoil their sublunary
existence.
"The present Cabinet is looked upon as weak and mediocre. The old
Emperor clings to Count Stürgkh because of the extensive use to
which the latter puts the celebrated paragraph 14 of the
Constitution, by which Parliament is eliminated altogether, and
which provides the Government with every conceivable liberty of
action. The all-powerful Tisza gives his support to Count Stürgkh
just because of his weakness. Hence the attempt to replace the
latter by Prince Hohenlohe, the present Minister of the Interior,
is beset with much difficulty. The Emperor wants to avoid a break
with Tisza at all costs. This state of things makes people feel
very worried. The strain in the relations between Austria and
Hungary has greatly increased since my last visit, whereas the
friendly feelings for Germany are now more pronounced than ever.
"Our Kaiser everywhere enjoys an unexampled veneration. Within the
next few days he will be made the subject of great celebrations in
his honour. Although the tickets of admission are sold at enormous
prices, even General v. Georgi, the Chief of the National Defence
Organization--whom I met last night--did not succeed in obtaining a
box, notwithstanding his high connexions. This morning the
well-known member of the Hofburg Theatre, Herr Georg Reimers, read
to me two poems dedicated to the Kaiser which he is going to recite
that night, and I feel bound to say that it can hardly be an
unmixed pleasure to the members of the court to witness this act of
enthusiastic homage paid to our ruler.
"The Roumanian question, particularly in its bearing on the food
supply, is regarded by people who are able to judge with great
anxiety. It is believed that the only thing to do is to send to
Bucharest experienced men connected with the supply and the
distribution of food who must be properly authorized to purchase as
much grain as possible for ourselves and for our allies.
"The big Austro-German _Zollverein_--or by whatever other name it
is intended to describe the proposed customs union--is looked upon
with very mixed feelings. Last night Baron Skoda (the Austrian
Krupp) explained to me after a dinner given at his house, with the
lively consent of members of the court and of the big
manufacturers, that the Austrian interests might indeed profit from
such a union with the Balkan States, but that it would be better
that Germany should remain an outsider for a period of fifteen
years. This is evidently a case of _timeo Danaos, et dona
ferentes_, and people feel that Austria, owing to her economic
exhaustion, would be easily absorbed by Germany after the
conclusion of the war. The Hungarians, naturally, view matters from
a different angle, not only because the Hungarian farmers would
like to sell their grain to Germany free of any duty, and because
industry counts for very little in their country, but also because
they dislike the Austrians.