all over Germany, are watching the progress of events with growing
anxiety. In this respect, therefore, the desires of the German
people seem identical with those of the French.
"It would also be presumptuous on my part to speak to your
Excellency about the feeling in England and the British armaments,
as the information you derive from your official sources is bound
to be better still than that which I can obtain through my
connexions.
"With best wishes for a successful solution of this difficult and
important problem, I have the honour to remain,
"Your Excellency's most obedient servant,
(_Signed_) BALLIN."
A most interesting document, and one which casts a clear sidelight on
the divergence of opinion held in Germany and Great Britain, and on the
chances of arriving at an agreement, is an article which dates from the
latter part of 1911.
This article deals with the Anglo-German controversy and was published
by the _Westminster Gazette_. It was sent to Ballin by an English friend
with the remark that it presented a faithful picture of the views on
foreign affairs held by the great majority of British Liberals. Ballin
forwarded it to Berlin for the Kaiser's information, with a note saying
that he had received it from one of the most level-headed Englishmen he
had ever met. It was subsequently returned to him, with the addition of
a number of marginal notes and a lengthy paragraph at its close, all
written in the Kaiser's own handwriting. The numerous underlinings, too,
are the Kaiser's own work. On account of its historical interest a
facsimile reproduction of this article is inserted at the end of the
book. The following is a translation of the Kaiser's criticism at the
conclusion of the article:
"Quite good, except for the ridiculous insinuation that we are
aspiring after the hegemony in Central Europe. We simply _are_
Central Europe, and it is quite natural that other and smaller
nations should tend towards us and should be drawn into our sphere
of action owing to the law of gravity, particularly so if they are
of our own kin. To this the British object, because it absolutely
knocks to pieces their theory of the Balance of Power, i.e. their
desire to be able to play off one European Power against another at
their own pleasure, and because it would lead to the establishment
of a united Continent--a contingency which they want to prevent at
all costs. Hence their lying assertion that we aim at a predominant
position in Europe, while it is a fact that they claim such a
position for themselves in world politics. We Hohenzollerns have
never pursued such ambitious and such fantastic aims, and, God
granting it, we shall never do so.
"(_Signed_) WILHELM I.R."
The year 1912 opened with several pronouncements of the British Press in
favour of an Anglo-German understanding. It was even hinted that Britain
would raise no objections to a possible extension of Germany's colonial
activities, or, as one paper put it, "to the foundation of a German
African empire stretching from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean."
Similar sentiments were expressed in a letter from Sir Ernest Cassel to
Ballin, dated January 9th, 1912.
"Since writing to you last," says Sir Ernest, "I have had the
opportunity of a confidential chat with Mr. Winston Churchill. He
is aware that the position which he has now occupied for some time
ties him down to some special limitations which will not allow him
to pay a visit of the kind you suggest so long as the situation
remains what it is. Should the King go to Germany, and should he
take Winston with him, he--Winston--would feel highly honoured if
he were permitted to discuss the important questions that were
demanding a solution. Such an opportunity would have to come about
quite spontaneously, and Winston would have to secure the previous
consent of the Prime Minister and of Sir Edward Grey.
"Thus far Winston. His friendly sentiments towards Germany are
known to you. I have been acquainted with him since he was quite a
young man, and he has never made a secret of his admiration of the
Kaiser and of the German people. He looks upon the estrangement
existing between the two countries as senseless, and I am quite
sure he would do anything in his power to establish friendly
relations.
"The real crux of the situation is that Great Britain regards the
enormous increase of the German Navy as a grave menace to her vital
interests. This conviction is a deep-rooted one, and there are no
two opinions in London as to its significance.
"If it were possible to do something which, without endangering the
safety of Germany, would relieve Great Britain of this nightmare,
it is my opinion that people over here would go very far to
conciliate German aspirations."
The striking fact that after a long interval, and in spite of the
failure of the previous endeavours, a renewed attempt was made to arrive
at a naval understanding, and that special pains were taken to ensure
its success, may be due to various causes. For instance, the Morocco
incident of 1911 had shown how easily a series of comparatively
unimportant events might lead within reach of a dangerous catastrophe,
unless the atmosphere of general distrust could be removed, and it was
felt in Great Britain that this distrust was largely the result of the
constant and regular increase of Germany's armaments. Moreover, it was
known that a new Navy Bill was then forthcoming in Germany which, in its
turn, would be bound to cause fresh alarm, and growing expenditure in
Great Britain, and that the Liberal Cabinet would prefer to gain its
laurels by bringing about a more peaceful frame of mind. Finally, Mr.
Winston Churchill had been appointed First Lord of the Admiralty in
October, 1911, and as he was known to be by no means anti-German, his
entering upon office may have given rise to the hope that, while he was
administering the affairs of the Navy, it would be possible to settle
certain purely technical matters affecting his department, which could
then furnish the conditions preliminary to an understanding with
Germany. Ballin, at any rate, had cherished the hope--as is borne out by
the letter quoted above--that Mr. Churchill could be induced to pay a
visit to Germany, and that an opportunity might then be found to bring
the naval experts of both countries face to face with each other. Ballin
had always eagerly desired that such a meeting should take place,
because his long experience in settling difficult business questions had
taught him that there was no greater barrier between people, and
certainly none that hampered their intellectual _rapprochement_ to a
larger extent, than the fact of their never having come into personal
contact with one another, and of never having had a chance to actually
familiarize themselves with the mentality and the whole personality of
the man representing the other side. It might also be assumed that, once
the two really responsible persons--Churchill and Tirpitz--had met in
conclave, the feeling of their mutual responsibility would be too strong
to allow the negotiations to end in failure.
Unfortunately, such a meeting never took place; all that was achieved
was a preliminary step, viz. the visit of Lord Haldane to Berlin.
Owing to the lack of documentary evidence it is not possible to say who
first suggested this visit, but it is clear that the suggestion--whoever
may have been its author--was eagerly taken up by Sir Ernest Cassel and
Ballin, and that it also met with a warm welcome on the part of Herr v.
Bethmann. In reply to a telegram which Ballin, with the approval--if not
at the actual desire--of the Chancellor, sent to his friend in London, a
message reached him on February 2nd, 1912, when he was in Berlin engaged
on these very matters. This reply, which originated with the Foreign
Office, expressed the sender's thanks for the invitation to attend a
meeting of delegates in Berlin and his appreciation of the whole spirit
which had prompted the German suggestion, and then went on to say that
the new German Navy Bill would necessitate an immediate increase in the
British naval estimates, because the latter had been framed on the
supposition that the German programme would remain unaltered. If the
British Government were compelled to find the means for such an
increase, the suggested negotiations would be difficult, if not
impossible. On the other hand, the German programme might perhaps be
modified by spreading it out over a longer period of time or by some
similar measure, so that a considerable increase of British naval
construction in order to balance the German efforts could be avoided. In
that case the British Government would be ready to proceed with the
negotiations without loss of time, as it would be taken for granted that
there was a fair prospect of the proposed discussions leading to a
favourable result. If this suggestion was acceptable to Germany, the
British Government thought the next step should be a private--and not an
official--visit of a British Cabinet Minister to Berlin.
Perhaps it is now permissible to give the text of some documents without
any further comment, as these latter speak for themselves. The first is
a letter of the Chancellor addressed to Ballin, and reads as follows:
"BERLIN. _Febr. 4th, 1912._
"DEAR MR. BALLIN,--
"We are still busy wording the text of our reply, and I shall not
be able to see you at 11 o'clock. As soon as the text is settled, I
shall submit it to His Majesty for his approval. Under these
circumstances I think it is doubtful whether we ought to adhere to
the time fixed for our appointment. I rather fancy that I cannot
tell you anything definite before 12 or 1 o'clock, and I shall ring
you up about that time. You have already made such great sacrifices
in the interest of our cause that I hope you will kindly accept
this alteration as well.
"In great haste.
"(_Signed_) BETHMANN-HOLLWEG."
The next document is a letter of Ballin to Sir Ernest Cassel, intended
to explain the situation.
"The demand raised by your official telegram rather complicates
matters. The fact is that the Bill as it stands now only asks for
half as much as was contained in the original draft. This reduced
demand is much less than the nation and the Reichstag had expected.
If after this a still further curtailment is decided upon, such a
step will create the highly undesirable impression that, in order
to pave the way for an understanding with London, it had become
necessary to make very considerable sacrifices. This, of course,
must be avoided at all costs, because if and when an understanding
is arrived at, there must be neither victors nor vanquished.
"I need not emphasize the fact that our Government is taking up the
matter with the greatest interest and that it is keenly anxious to
bring about a successful issue. The reception with which you have
met on our side must have given you convincing and impressive
proofs of this attitude.
"I have now succeeded in making our gentlemen promise me--although
not without much reluctance on their part--that they would not
object to the formula proposed by your Government, viz. 'It is
agreed to submit the question of the proposed increase of naval
tonnage to a _bona fide_ discussion.' Thus there is now a fair
prospect of reaching a favourable result, and the preliminary
condition laid down by your Government has been complied with.
"I think that the delegate sent should be accompanied by a naval
expert. The gentleman in question should also understand that he
would have to use the utmost frankness in the discussions, and that
he must be able to give an assurance that it is intended to subject
the British programme, too, to such alterations as will make it not
less, but rather more, acceptable than it is now. Surely, your
Government has never desired that we should give you a definite
undertaking on our part, whereas you should be at liberty to extend
your programme whenever you think fit to do so. A clearly defined
neutrality agreement is another factor which will enter into the
question of granting the concessions demanded by your Government.
"'Reciprocal assurances' is a term which it is difficult to define;
if, for instance, the attitude of Great Britain and her action last
summer had been submitted to a court of law, it would hardly be
found to have violated the obligations implied by such 'reciprocal
assurances,' and yet we were at the edge of war owing to the steps
taken by your people.
"I thought it my duty, my dear friend, to submit these particulars
to you, so that you, for the benefit of the great cause we are
engaged in, may take whatever steps you consider advisable before
the departure of the delegate.
"Our people would appreciate it very much if you would make the
great sacrifice of coming over to this country when the meeting
takes place. I personally consider this also necessary, and it
goes without saying that I shall be present as well.
"P.S.--The Chancellor to whom I have shown this letter thinks it
would be better not to send it, because the official note contains
all that is necessary.
"However, I shall forward it all the same, because I believe it
will present a clearer picture of the situation to you than the
note. Please convince the delegate that it is a matter of give and
take, and please come. It entails a great sacrifice on your part,
but the cause which we have at heart is worth it.
"The bearer of this note is our general secretary, Mr. Huldermann.
He is a past master of discretion, and fully acquainted with the
situation."
I was instructed to hand the following note by the German Government to
Sir Ernest Cassel with the request to pass it on to the British
Government, and at the same time I was to explain verbally and in
greater detail the contents of Ballin's letter on the situation.
The text of the official note is as follows:
"We are willing to continue the discussion in a friendly spirit.
The Navy Bill is bound to lead to a discussion of the naval plans
of both countries, and in this matter we shall be able to fall in
with the wishes of the British Government if we, in return, receive
sufficient guarantees as to a friendly disposition of British
policy towards our own interests. Any agreement would have to state
that either Power undertakes not to join in any plans,
combinations, or warlike complications directed against the other.
If concluded, it might pave the way for an understanding as to the
sums of money to be spent on armaments by either country.
"We assume that the British Government shares the views expressed
in this note, and we should be glad if a British Cabinet minister
could proceed to Berlin, in the first instance for the purpose of a
private and confidential discussion only."
On the evening of the same day (February 4th) I left for London. I
arrived there the following evening and went straight to Sir Ernest
Cassel. I prepared the following statement for Ballin at the time, in
which I described the substance of our conversation and the outcome of
my visit:
"The note which I had brought with me did not at first satisfy our
friend. He made a brief statement to the effect that we saw a fair
prospect of reaching a successful solution of the problem was all
that was needed, and that our answer was lengthy, but evasive. This
opinion, however, he did not maintain after the close of our
conversation, which lasted more than two hours. I pointed out to
him that, as I understood it, the phrase 'We are willing to
continue the discussion in a friendly spirit' amounted to a
declaration on the part of the German Government that, in its
opinion, there was a 'fair prospect,' and that an accommodating
spirit was all one could ask at present. He thought that Lord
Haldane had been asked to go to Berlin so that a member of the
Cabinet should have an opportunity of ascertaining on the spot that
Berlin was really disposed to discuss matters in a friendly spirit.
On this point positive assurances were needed before Sir Edward
Grey and Mr. Winston Churchill went across, who, if they did go,
would not return without having effected the object of their visit.
Sir Ernest always emphasized that he only stated his own private
views, but it was evident that he spoke with the highest authority.
The demand for three Dreadnoughts, he said, which the new German
Navy Bill asked for, amounted to a big increase of armaments, and
Great Britain would be compelled to counterbalance it by a
corresponding increase, which she would not fail to do. If,
however, Germany were prepared not to enlarge her existing
programme, Great Britain would be pleased to effect a reduction on
her part. When I referred to the apprehension of the German
Government lest Great Britain should take advantage of the fact
that Germany had her hands tied, in order to effect big armaments
which it would be impossible for us to equal, our friend remarked
that, for the reason stated above, such fears were groundless. In
spite of this assurance, I repeatedly and emphatically drew his
attention to the necessity for limiting the British programme just
as much as the German one. He evidently no longer fancied the
suggestion previously put forward that the question of agreeing
upon a definite ratio of strength for the two navies should be
discussed; because, if this was done, one would get lost in the
details. Nevertheless, he did not, as the discussion proceeded,
adhere to this standpoint absolutely. He agreed that the essential
thing was to establish friendly political relations, and if, as I
thought, Germany had reason to complain of British opposition to
her legitimate expansion, one could not do better than discuss the
various points at issue one by one, similar to the method which had
proved so successful in the case of the Anglo-French negotiations.
Great Britain would not raise any objections to our desire for
rounding-off our colonial empire, and she was quite willing to
grant us our share in the distribution of those parts of the globe
that were still unclaimed.
"By keeping strictly to the literal text of the German note, he
found the latter quite acceptable as far as it referred to the
question of a declaration of neutrality. He said there was a great
difference between such declarations, and often it was quite
possible to interpret them in various ways. I imagined that what
was in his mind were the obligations which Britain had taken upon
herself in her agreement with France, and I therefore asked him for
a definition of the term 'neutrality.' His answer was very guarded
and contained many reservations. What he meant was something like
this: Great Britain has concluded agreements with France, Russia,
and other countries which oblige her to remain neutral where the
other partner is concerned, except when the latter is engaged in a
war of aggression.
"Applied to two practical cases, this would mean: If an agreement
such as the one now under consideration had been in existence at
the time of the Morocco dispute last summer, Great Britain would
have been free to take the side of France if war had broken out
between that country and ourselves, because in this case we--as he
argued with much conviction--had been the aggressors. On the other
hand, if we had severed our relations with Italy during the
Turco-Italian war and had come to the support of Turkey, Great
Britain would not have been allowed to join Italy in conspiring
against us if we had an agreement such as the one in question.
"In the interval between my first and my second visit Sir Ernest
evidently had, by consulting his friend Haldane, arrived at a very
definite opinion, and when I visited him for the second time he
assured me most emphatically that Great Britain would concede to us
as much as she had conceded to the other Powers, but not more. We
could rely on her absolute loyalty, 'and,' he added, 'our attitude
towards France proves that we can be loyal to our friends.'
"For the rest, the manner in which he pleaded the British point of
view was highly interesting. Great Britain, he argued, had done
great things in the past, but owing to her great wealth a decline
had set in in the course of the last few decades. ('Traces of this
development,' he added, 'have also been noticeable in your
country.') Germany, however, had made immense progress, and within
the next fifteen or twenty years she would overtake Great Britain.
If, then, such a dangerous competitor commenced to increase his
armaments in a manner which could be directed only against Britain,
he must not be surprised if the latter made every effort to check
him wherever his influence was felt. Great Britain, therefore,
could not remain passive if Germany attempted to dominate the whole
Continent; because this, if successful, would upset the Balance of
Power. Neither could she hold back in case Germany attacked and
annihilated France. Thus, the situation being what it was, Britain
was compelled--provided the proposed agreement with Germany was not
concluded--to decide whether she would wait until her competitor
had become still stronger and quite invincible, or whether she
would prefer to strike at once. The latter alternative, he thought,
would be the safer for her interests.
"Our friend had a copy of the German note made by his secretary,
and then forwarded it to Haldane. In the course of the evening the
latter sent an acknowledgment of its receipt, from which Sir
Ernest read out to me the words: 'So far very good.' It was evident
that his friend's opinion had favourably influenced his own views
on the German note.
"On Tuesday Sir Ernest and Lord Haldane drove to the former's house
after having attended Thanksgiving Service. Lord Haldane stayed for
lunch, and was just leaving when I arrived at 3 o'clock. He did not
want to be accompanied by a naval expert, for, although he did not
pretend to understand all the technical details, he said that he
knew all that was necessary for the discussion. He stated that he
would put all his cards on the table and speak quite frankly.
"Our friend spoke of our German politics in most disparaging terms,
saying that they had been worth nothing since Bismarck's time. What
Ballin had attained in his dealings with the shipping companies was
far superior to all the achievements of Germany's diplomatists."
The positive information which this report contained was passed on to
the Chancellor.
By way of explanation it may be added that the German Navy Bill, which
later on, at the end of March, 1912, was laid before the Reichstag,
provided for the formation of a third active squadron in order to adapt
the increase in the number of the crews to the increase in the material.
This third squadron necessitated the addition of three new battleships
and of two small cruisers, and it was also intended to increase the
number of submarines and to make provision for the construction of
airships.
The discussions with Lord Haldane took place at the Royal Castle,
Berlin, on February 9th, the Kaiser being in the chair. The Chancellor
did not attend, he had a separate interview with Haldane. The outcome of
the conference is described in a statement from an authoritative source,
viz. in a note which the Kaiser dispatched to Ballin by special
messenger immediately after the close of the conference. It reads as
follows:
"THE CASTLE, BERLIN.
"9.2.1912. 6 P.M.
"DEAR BALLIN,
"The conversation has taken place, and all the pros and many cons
have been discussed. Our standpoint has been explained in great
detail, and the Bill has been examined. At my suggestion, it was
resolved to agree on the following basis (informal line of action):
"(1) Because of its scope and its importance, the Agreement must be
concluded, and it must not be jeopardized by too many details.
"(2) Therefore, the Agreement is not to contain any reference to
the size of the two fleets, to standards of ships, to
constructions, etc.
"(3) The Agreement is to be purely political.
"(4) As soon as the Agreement has been published here, and as soon
as the Bill has been laid before the Reichstag, I, in my character
of commander-in-chief, instruct Tirpitz to make the following
statement to the Committee: The third squadron will be asked for
and voted, but the building of the three additional units required
to complete it will not be started until 1913, and one ship each
will be demanded in 1916 and 1919 respectively.
"Haldane agreed to this and expressed his satisfaction. I have made
no end of concessions. But this must be the limit. He was very nice
and very reasonable, and he perfectly understood my position as
commander-in-chief, and that of Tirpitz, with regard to the Bill. I
really think I have done all I could do.
"Please remember me to Cassel and inform him.
"Your sincere friend,
"(_Signed_) WILHELM I.R."
After Lord Haldane's departure from Berlin there was a gap of
considerable length in the negotiations which had made such a promising
start, and unfortunately during that time Mr. Churchill made a speech
which not only the German papers but also the Liberal Press in Great
Britain described as wanting in discretion. The passage which German
opinion resented most of all was the statement that, in contrast with
Great Britain, for whom a big navy was an absolute necessity, to Germany
such navy was merely a luxury.
For the rest, the following two letters from the Chancellor to Ballin
may throw some light on the causes of the break in the negotiations:
"BERLIN.
"2.3.1912.
"DEAR MR. BALLIN,
"Our supposition that it is the contents of the Bill which have
brought about the change of feeling is confirmed by news from a
private source. It is feared that the Bill as it stands will have
such an adverse influence on public opinion that the latter will
not accept a political agreement along with it. Nevertheless, the
idea of an understanding has not been lost sight of, even though it
may take six months or a year before it can be accomplished.
"In consequence of this information the draft reply to London
requires to be reconsidered, and it has not been dispatched so far.
I shall let you know as soon as it has left.
"Sincerely yours.
"(_Signed_) BETHMANN-HOLLWEG."
"BERLIN.
"8.3.1912.
"DEAR MR. BALLIN,
"This is intended for your confidential information. Regarding the
naval question Great Britain now, as always, lays great stress on
the difficulty of reconciling public opinion to the inconsistency
implied by a big increase in the Naval Estimates hand in hand with
the conclusion of a political and colonial agreement. However, even
if an agreement should not be reached, she hopes that the
confidential relations and the frank exchange of opinions between
both Governments which have resulted from Lord Haldane's mission
may continue in future. The question of a colonial understanding is
to be discussed in the near future.
"It is imperative that the negotiations should not break down.
Success is possible in spite of the Navy Bill if the discussions
are carried on dispassionately. As matters stand, the provisions
of the Bill must remain as they are. Great Britain has no right to
interfere with our views on the number of the crews which we desire
to place on board our existing units. As far as the building dates
of the three battleships are concerned, I should have preferred--as
you are aware--to leave our hands untied, but His Majesty's
decision has definitely fixed 1913 and 1916 as the years for laying
them down. This is a far-reaching concession to Great Britain.
"Discreet support from private quarters will be appreciated.
"Many thanks for your news. You know that and why I was prevented
from writing these last few days.
"Sincerely yours,
"(_Signed_) BETHMANN-HOLLWEG."
In order to find out whether any foreign influence might have been at
work in London, I was commissioned to meet Sir Ernest Cassel in the
South of Europe early in March. Ballin supplied me with a letter
containing a detailed account of the general situation. Owing to a delay
in the proposed meeting, I took the precaution of burning the letter, as
I had been instructed to do, and I informed Sir Ernest of its contents
by word of mouth.
In this document Ballin gave a brief résumé of the situation as it
appeared to him after his consultations with the various competent
departments in Berlin, somewhat on the following lines:
(1) After Lord Haldane's return Sir Edward Grey officially told Count
Metternich that he was highly pleased with the successful issue of Lord
Haldane's mission, and gave him to understand that he thought it
unlikely that any difficulties would arise.
(2) A few days later Mr. Asquith made a statement in the House of
Commons which amply confirmed the views held by Sir Edward Grey, and
which produced a most favourable impression in Berlin.
(3) This induced the Chancellor to make an equally amicable and hopeful
statement to the Reichstag.
(4) In spite of this, however, there arose an interval of several weeks,
during which neither Count Metternich nor anybody in Berlin received any
news from the proper department in London. This silence naturally caused
some uneasiness.
(5) Count Metternich was asked to call at the Foreign Office, where Sir
Edward Grey commenced to raise objections mainly in reference to the
Navy Bill. "I must add in this connexion--as, no doubt, Lord Haldane has
also told you verbally--that on the last day of his stay in Berlin an
understanding was arrived at between the competent quarters on our side
and Lord Haldane with regard to the building dates of the three
battleships. As you will remember, it had been agreed not to discuss the
proposed establishment of the third squadron on an active footing and
the increase in the number of the crews connected with it, but to look
upon these subjects as lying outside the negotiations." Quite suddenly
and quite unexpectedly we are now faced with a great change in the
situation. Grey, as I have said before, objects--in terms of the
greatest politeness, of course--to the increase in the number of the
crews, asks questions as to our intentions with regard to torpedo boats
and submarines, and--this is most significant--emphasizes that the
Haldane mission has at any rate been of great use, even if the
negotiations should not lead to any definite result.
(6) The next event was a further interview with Count Metternich during
which it was stated that, according to the calculations of the First
Lord of the Admiralty, the increase in the number of the crews amounted
to 15,000 men, whilst it had been thought in England that it would be a
question of from 4,000 to 5,000 men at the outset. It appeared that this
large increase was looked upon with misgivings, and that it was desired
to enter into fresh negotiations which would greatly interfere with the
arrangements made by the German competent quarters with regard to the
navy. Hence Metternich replied that, in his opinion, these explanations
could only mean that the Cabinet did not agree to the arrangements made
by Lord Haldane. Grey's answer was full of polite assurances couched in
the language of diplomacy, but, translated into plain German, what he
meant was: "You are quite right."
Ballin's letter went on to say that the German Navy Bill had gradually
been reduced to a minimum, and that it was not possible to cut it down
any further. We could not, and we would not, give rise to the suspicion
that great alterations had been made merely to meet British objections.
Finally, Ballin requested his friend to go to London in order to make
inquiries on the spot, and also declared his readiness to go there
himself.
My report on my conversations with Sir Ernest Cassel, which took place
at Marseilles on March 9th and 10th, is as follows:
"Our friend arrived about four hours late, but he received me all
the same at 10 P.M. on that evening. I told him all about my
journey and related to him verbally the contents of Ballin's
letter. When I described the incident of how Grey had raised new
objections at his interview with Metternich, and when I explained
how, after that, the matter had come to a dead stop, so that
nothing further was heard of it in Germany, our friend interrupted
me by saying that since then the British Government had presented a
memorandum containing the objections raised against the German Navy
Bill. The latter, he suggested, was the only stumbling-block, as
could be inferred from a letter which he had received _en route_
from Haldane.
"When I remarked that Ballin, in a postscript to his letter, had
expressed an apprehension lest some foreign influence had
interfered with the course of events, our friend positively denied
this. France, he said, was on good terms with Great Britain, and
had no reason for intriguing against an Anglo-German agreement
destined, as it was, to promote the cause of peace.
"When I then proceeded with my account, drawing his special
attention to the reduction of the estimates contained in the Navy
Bill, Sir Ernest interposed that he was not sufficiently _au
courant_ as to the details. He himself, in his statement prepared
for the British Government, had only referred to the battleships,
and he thought he had perhaps given too cursory an account of the
other factors of the case. He also threw out some fairly plain
hints that Haldane had gone too far in Berlin, and that he had made
statements on a subject with which he was not sufficiently
conversant. Later on, he continued, the Navy Bill had been
subjected to a careful examination by the British Admiralty, and
before his departure from Cannes he, Sir Ernest, had received a
letter from Mr. Churchill, the tone of which was very angry.
Churchill complained that Germany had presented such a long list of
the wishes with which she wanted Great Britain to comply, that the
least one could hope for was an accommodating spirit in the
question of the Navy. Everything now depended on Churchill; if he
could be satisfied, all the rest would be plain sailing. He and
Lloyd George were the greatest friends of the agreement. Sir Ernest
also made it fairly clear that Great Britain would be content with
a postponement of the building dates, or in other words with a
'retardation of the building programme.' The negotiations would be
bound to fail, unless Ballin could secure such a postponement. It
was necessary to strike whilst the iron was hot, and this
particular iron had already become rather cool. He quite accepted
Grey's statement that the Haldane mission had not been in vain, as
the feeling had doubtless become more friendly since then. Some few
individual indiscretions, such as Churchill's reference to the
German Navy as an article of luxury, should not be taken too
seriously. If the German Bill were passed into law in its present
shape, the British Government would be obliged to introduce one
asking for three times as much, but it could not possibly do this
and declare at the same time that it had reached an understanding
with Germany. Such a proceeding would be absurd. The argument that
it is inconsistent with common sense to conclude an agreement and
yet to continue one's armaments, is evidently still maintained in
Great Britain, and is one which, of course, it is impossible to
refute.
"In the course of our conversation Sir Ernest produced the letter
which he had received from Haldane _en route_. This letter stated
that the discussions with Metternich were then chiefly on the
subject of the Navy Bill, and that the Admiralty had prepared a
memorandum for the German Government dealing with these questions.
The letter was dated February 25th, and its tone was not
pessimistic; Churchill, however, as stated above, had previously
written him a 'very angry' letter. In this connexion it must not be
forgotten that the man on whom everything depends is not the
amiable negotiator Haldane, but Churchill."
In order to make further inquiries about the state of things and to
assist in promoting the good cause, Ballin, immediately after my return,
proceeded to Paris and then to London. He reported to the Chancellor
upon the impressions he had received in Paris. The following is an
extract from his report:
"Owing to the brief time at my disposal when I was in Paris, I
could only learn the views of the members of the '_haute finance_.'
It is well known that in France the attitude taken up by financial
circles is always regarded as authoritative. They look upon the
present situation as decidedly pacific; they are pleased that the
Morocco affair is settled, and they feel quite sure that the
political sky is unclouded by complications. They would gladly
welcome an agreement between Germany and Great Britain. My friends
assure me that the Government also does not view the idea of such
an understanding with displeasure; on the contrary, it looks upon
it as an advantage. It is, however, thought unlikely that an
agreement will be reached, because it is believed that popular
feeling in Germany is too much opposed to it. If, notwithstanding
these pacific views held by influential and competent sections, the
casual visitor to the French capital is impressed by a certain
bellicose attitude of the nation as a whole, it is largely due to
the propaganda carried on by the _Matin_ with the purpose of
obtaining voluntary subscriptions for the furtherance of aviation.
The French are enthusiastic over this idea, and as it has a strong
military bearing, the man in the street likes to connect the French
aviation successes with a victorious war."
From London Ballin sent me some telegrams which I was instructed to pass
on to the Chancellor. In these messages he stated that his conversations
with the German Ambassador and with Haldane had convinced him that
people in London believed that the increase in the number of the crews,
if the proposed German Navy Bill became law, would be greater than the
figures given by Berlin would make it appear. It would therefore be most
desirable to arrange for a meeting of experts to clear up this
discrepancy. Ballin's impression was that the British Cabinet, and also
the King, were still favourably disposed to the whole plan, and that the
Cabinet was unanimous in this view. A conversation with Churchill, which
lasted several hours, confirmed these impressions. In London the
increase in the number of the crews had previously been estimated at
half of what it would really be, and alarm was felt about the large
number of torpedo boats and submarines demanded; but since the German
Government had explained that the figures arrived at in London--i.e.
those stated in the memorandum which had been addressed to the German
Government some time before--were not correct, Churchill had agreed that
both sides should nominate experts who would check the figures and put
them right. Churchill was anxious to see that the matter was brought to
a successful issue, and he was still hoping that a neutrality agreement
would induce the German Government to make concessions in regard to the
Navy Bill.
When Ballin had satisfied himself as to this state of things, he
immediately returned to Berlin, as he did not consider it appropriate
that any private person should do anything further for the time being,
and as he thought that the conduct of the discussions concerning the
neutrality agreement were best left to the Ambassador.
Meanwhile, however, the German Government had definitely made up its
mind that the Navy Bill would have to remain as it stood. This was the
information Ballin received from the Kaiser and the Chancellor when he
returned from London on March 16th.
Sir Ernest Cassel then suggested to the British Government that the
negotiations concerning the neutrality agreement should be re-opened as
soon as the first excitement caused by the Navy Bill had subsided, which
would probably be the case within a few months, and that the interval
should be utilized for clearing up the details. In Berlin, however, the
discussions were looked upon as having been broken off, as may be seen
from the following telegram which the Kaiser sent to Ballin on March
19th in reply to Ballin's information about his last exchange of
telegrams with London:
"Many thanks for letter. The latest proposals arriving here
immediately after you had left raised impossible demands and were
so offensive in form that they were promptly rejected. Further harm
was done by Churchill's arrogant speech which a large section of
the British press justly described as a provocation of Germany. The
'agreement' has thus been broken by Great Britain, and we have done
with it. The negotiations must be started afresh on quite a
different basis. What apology has there been offered to us for the
passage in the speech describing our fleet as an article of luxury?
"(_Signed_) WILHELM I.R."
That the negotiations had actually been broken off was confirmed to
Ballin by a letter of the Chancellor of the same date:
"DEAR MR. BALLIN,
"My cordial thanks for your letter of the 18th. What your friend
told Metternich is identical with what he wired you. Churchill's
speech did not come up to my expectations. He really seems to be a
firebrand past praying for. The Army and Navy Bills will probably
not go up to the Federal Council until the 21st, as the Army Bill
requires some amendments at the eleventh hour. Their contents will
be published simultaneously.
"My opinion is that our labours will now have to be stopped
altogether for some time. The problem before us suffers from the
defect that, because of its inherent difficulties, it admits of no
solution. I shall always remain sincerely grateful to you for your
loyal assistance. When you come to Berlin next time, please don't
forget to call at the Wilhelmstrasse.
"With kindest regards,
"Sincerely yours,
"(_Signed_) BETHMANN-HOLLWEG."
The conviction of the inherent impossibility of solving the problem was
shared by many people in Germany--chiefly, of course, by those connected
with the Navy; and some critics went so far as to say that Great Britain
had never honestly meant to arrive at an understanding, or at any rate
that Haldane--whose honesty and sincerity were beyond doubt--was
disowned by his fellow-members in the Cabinet.
When Ballin, in compliance with the wishes of the Foreign Office, went
to London during the critical period before the outbreak of the war in
1914, he wrote a letter from there to a naval officer of high rank with
whom he had been on terms of friendship for years. This document is of
interest now because it shows what Ballin's own standpoint was with
regard to the views described in the previous paragraph:
"People over here," he wrote, "do not believe that negotiations
with Great Britain on the subject of a naval agreement could
possibly be crowned with success, and you yourself contend that it
would have been better if such negotiations had never been started.
Your standpoint is that the failure of any efforts in that
direction would merely tend to aggravate the existing situation, a
point of view with which I entirely concur.
"On the other hand, however, you cannot deny the soundness of the
argument that, if the responsible leaders of British naval policy
keep expressing their desire to enter into a discussion, the
refusal of Germany to do so must cause the British to believe that
we are pursuing aims far exceeding those we have openly avowed. My
somewhat fatigued brain is unable to see whether the German
contention is right or wrong. But naturally, I always look upon
things from the business man's point of view, and so I always think
it better to come to some kind of an agreement with a competitor
rather than allow him an unlimited measure of expansion. Once,
however, I have come to the conclusion that for financial or other
reasons this competitor can no longer keep pace with me, his
further existence ceases altogether to interest me.
"Thus the views of the expert on these matters and those of the
business man run counter to each other, and I am entitled to
dismiss this subject without entering upon a discussion of the
interesting and remarkable arguments which Winston Churchill put
before me last night. I cannot, however, refrain from contradicting
by a few brief words the contention that the motives which had
prompted the Haldane mission were not sincere. A conversation with
Sir Edward Grey the night before last has strengthened this
conviction of mine still further. I regard Sir Edward as a serious,
honest, and clever statesman, and I am sure you will agree with my
view that the Haldane mission has cleared the atmosphere
surrounding Anglo-German relations which had become very strained."
It may be supposed that history, in the meantime, has proved whose
standpoint was the correct one: that of the business man or that of the
naval expert.
Not much need be said about the subsequent development of events up to
the outbreak of the war.
The above-mentioned opinion which the Chancellor held regarding
Churchill's speech of March 18th, 1912, was probably arrived at on the
strength of the cabled reports only. Whoever reads the full original
text of the speech must fail to find anything aggressive in it, and
there was no harm in admitting that it was a perfectly frank and honest
statement concerning the naval rivalry of the two Powers. Among other
things it contained the suggestion that a "naval holiday" should be
agreed upon, i.e. both countries should abstain from building new ships
for a definite period. We, at any rate, looked upon Churchill's speech
as a suitable means of making people see what would be the ultimate
consequences of the interminable naval armaments. I made a German
translation of it which, with the aid of one of the committees for an
Anglo-German understanding, I spread broadcast all over the country.
However, it proved a complete failure, as there were powerful groups in
both countries who contended that the efforts to reconcile the two
standpoints could not lead to any positive result, and that the old
injunction, _si vis pacem, para bellum_, indicated the only right
solution. Only a master mind could have overcome these difficulties. But
Herr v. Bethmann, as we know, considered that the problem, for inherent
reasons, did not admit of any solution at all, and the Kaiser's initial
enthusiasm had probably been damped by subsequent influences of a
different kind. Ballin himself, in later years, ascribed the failure of
the mission to the circumstance that the Kaiser and his Chancellor,
between themselves only, had attempted to bring the whole matter to a
successful issue instead of entrusting this task to the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs and to Admiral Tirpitz, the Secretary for the Navy.
An interesting sidelight on the causes which led to the failure of this
last important attempt to reach an understanding is thrown by the
rumours which were spread in the German Press in March, 1912, to the
effect that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Herr v.
Kiderlen, wished to resign, because he felt that he had been left too
much in the dark with regard to the Anglo-German negotiations. It was
also reported that the Chancellor's position had been shaken, and that
Admiral Tirpitz felt dissatisfied, because the Navy Bill did not go far
enough. Probably there was some vestige of truth in all these rumours,
and this may have been connected with the attitude which the three
gentlemen concerned had taken up towards the question of the
negotiations with Great Britain.
Shortly after the visit of Lord Haldane Ballin received a letter from a
personage belonging to the Kaiser's entourage in which it was said:
"The impression which has taken root with me during the many hours
which I spent as an attentive listener is that your broad-minded
scheme is being wrecked by our official circles, partly through
their clumsiness, and partly through their bureaucratic conceit,
and--which is worse--that we have failed to show ourselves worthy
of the great opportunity."
When it had become certain that the last attempt to reach an
understanding had definitely and finally failed, the ambassador in
London, Count Metternich, did not shrink from drawing the only possible
conclusion from it. He had always expressed his conviction that a war
between Germany and a Franco-Russian coalition would find Great Britain
on the side of Germany's opponents, and his resignation--which, as
usual, was explained by the state of his health--was really due to a
report of his in which he stated it as his opinion that a continuation
of German armaments would lead to war with Great Britain no later than
1915. It is alleged that the Kaiser added a very "ungracious" marginal
note to this report. Consequently, the ambassador, who was a man of very
independent character, did the only thing he could consistently do, and
resigned his office. In taking this step he may have been influenced by
the reception which the failure of the Haldane mission met with in
Conservative circles in Great Britain, where no stone was left unturned
to urge the necessity for continuing the policy of big armaments and to
paint German untrustworthiness in the most glaring colours.
Count Metternich's successor was Herr v. Marschall, a gentleman whose
appointment the Press and the official circles welcomed with great
cordiality, and from whose considerable diplomatic abilities, which were
acknowledged on all sides, an improvement of Anglo-German relations was
confidently expected. It was said that the Kaiser had sent "his best
man," thus demonstrating how greatly he also desired better relations.
But Herr v. Marschall's activities came to a sudden end through his
early death in September, 1912, and in October his place was taken by
Prince Lichnowsky, whose efforts in the direction of an improvement in
the relations are familiar to everyone who has read his pamphlet. Apart
from the work performed by the ambassadors, great credit is also due to
the activities displayed by Herr v. Kühlmann, the then Secretary to the
Legation and subsequent Secretary of State. The public did not see a
deal of his work, which was conducted with skill and was consistent. His
close personal acquaintance with some of the leading British
politicians, especially with Sir Edward Grey, enabled him to do much
work for the maintenance of good relations and in the interest of
European peace, particularly during the time when the post of ambassador
was vacant, and also during the Balkan War. He had, moreover, a great
deal to do with the drafting of the two colonial agreements dealing with
the Bagdad Railway and the African problems respectively, both of which
were ready for signature in the summer of 1914. The former especially
may be looked upon as a proof not only that a considerable improvement
had taken place in Anglo-German relations, but also that Great Britain
was not inclined to adjust the guiding lines of her policy in Asia Minor
exclusively in conformity with the wishes of Russia. Anybody who takes
an interest in the then existing possibilities of German expansion with
the consent of Great Britain and on the basis of these colonial draft
agreements cannot do better than read the anonymous pamphlet entitled
"_Deutsche Weltpolitik und kein Krieg_" ("German World Power and No
War"), published in 1913 by Messrs. Puttkamer & Mühlbrecht, of Berlin.
The author is Dr. Plehn, the then representative of the _Cologne
Gazette_ in London, and it partly reflects the views of Herr v.
Kühlmann.
In this connexion I should like to refer briefly to an episode which
took place towards the close of 1912. The German periodicals have
already discussed it, especially the _Süddeutsche Monatshafte_ in June,
1921, in a review of the reports which Count Lerchenfeld, the Bavarian
minister to the Court of Berlin, had made for the information of his
Government. In these reports he mentions an event to which the Kaiser
had already referred in a letter to Ballin dated December 15th, 1912.
The Kaiser, in commenting on the state of tension then existing between
Austria and Serbia, made some significant remarks concerning the policy
of Germany towards Austria-Hungary. When the relations between Vienna
and Petrograd, he wrote, had assumed a dangerous character, because it
was recognized that the attitude of Serbia was based on her hope of
Russian support, Germany might be faced with the possibility of having
to come to the assistance of Austria.
"The Slav subjects of Austria," the letter continued, "had become
very restless, and could only be brought to reason by the resolute
action of the whole Dual Monarchy against Serbia. Austria had
arrived at the cross roads, and her whole future development hung
in the balance. Either the German element would retain its
ascendancy, in which case she would remain a suitable ally, or the
Slav element would gain the upper hand, and she would cease to be
an ally altogether. If we were compelled to take up arms, we should
do so to assist Austria not only against Russian aggression, but
also against the Slavs in general, and in her efforts to remain
German. That would mean that we should have to face a racial
struggle of the Germanic element against Slav insolence. It is
beyond our power to prevent this struggle, because the future of
the Habsburg monarchy and that of our own country are both at
stake. (This was the real meaning of Bethmann's very plain
speaking.) It is therefore a question on which depends the very
existence of the Germanic race on the continent of Europe.
"It was of great importance to us that Great Britain had so far
supported the Austro-German standpoint in these matters. Now, since
a war against Russia would automatically imply a war with France as
well, it was of interest to us to know whether, in this purely
continental case, Great Britain could and would declare her
neutrality in conformity with her proposals of last February.
"On December 6th, Haldane, obviously sent by Grey, called on
Lichnowsky and explained to the dumbfounded ambassador in plain
words that, assuming Germany getting involved in war against Russia
and France, Great Britain would _not_ remain neutral, but would at
once come to the assistance of France. The reason given for this
attitude was that Britain could not and would not tolerate at any
time that we should acquire a position of continental predominance
which might easily lead to the formation of a united continent.
Great Britain could therefore never allow France to be crushed by
us. You can imagine the effect of this piece of news on the whole
of the Wilhelmstrasse. I cannot say that I was taken by surprise,
because I, as you know, have always looked upon Great Britain as an
enemy in a military sense. Still, this news has decidedly cleared
matters up, even if the result is merely of a negative character."
Ballin did not omit to ask his friend for some details concerning the
visit of Lord Haldane mentioned in the Kaiser's letter, and was
furnished with the following explanation by Lord Haldane himself.
Nothing had been further from his intentions, he said, than to call on
Prince Lichnowsky for the express purpose of making any such
declaration; and Balkan questions, to the best of his recollection, had
not been touched at all. He had spent a very pleasant half-hour with the
Prince, and in the course of their conversation he had seen fit to
repeat the formula which had been discussed during his stay in Berlin,
and which referred to Britain's interest in the preservation of the
integrity of France. This, possibly, might have given rise to the
misunderstanding.
Prince Lichnowsky himself, in his pamphlet entitled "My London Mission,"
relates the incident as follows:
"In my dispatches sent to Berlin I pointed out again and again that
Great Britain, being a commercial country, would suffer enormously
through any war between the European Powers, and would prevent it
by every means within her power. At the same time, however, she
could never tolerate the weakening or the crushing of France,
because it would disturb the Balance of Power and replace it by the
ascendancy of Germany. This view had been expressed to me by Lord
Haldane shortly after my arrival, and everybody whose opinion
counts for anything told me the same thing."
The failure of the negotiations aiming at an understanding led to a
continuance of the increase in the British armaments, a concentration of
the British battle fleet in the North Sea, and to that of the French
fleet in the Mediterranean. The latter arrangement was looked upon in
Germany as a menace directed against Italy, and produced a sharp
semi-official criticism in the _Frankfurter Zeitung_. In spite of all
this, however, friendly messages from London concerning the
possibilities of an understanding, the "naval holiday," etc., reached
Germany from time to time.
How closely Ballin clung to his favourite idea that the naval experts of
both countries should come to an understanding is demonstrated by the
circumstance that in 1914, when the British squadron was present during
the Kiel yachting week, he tried to bring about a meeting and a personal
exchange of views between Churchill and Tirpitz.
Churchill was by no means disinclined to come to Germany for this
purpose, but unfortunately the desire was expressed by the German side,
and especially by the Kaiser, that the British Government should make an
official inquiry whether his visit would be welcomed. The Government,
however, was not disposed to do so, and the whole thing fell through,
although Churchill sent word that, if Tirpitz really wanted to see him,
he would find means to bring about such a meeting.
Thus the last attempt at an understanding had resulted in failure, and
before any further efforts in the same direction could be made, Europe
had been overtaken by its fate.