HEAD OF THE PACKETFAHRT'S PASSENGER DEPARTMENT
On May 31st, 1886, Albert Ballin first took part in a joint meeting of
the Board of Trustees and the Board of Directors of the Packetfahrt. On
this occasion two proposals were put forward by him: one, to provide new
premises for the work connected with the booking of passengers at an
annual rent of 5,000 marks; the other, to start a direct service from
Stettin to New York _via_ Gothenburg. This latter proposal was prompted
by the desire to reduce the influence of the British lines competing for
the Hamburg business. Such a reduction could only be brought about if it
were proved to the British lines that their position was by no means
unassailable. The Scandinavian emigrant business to the United States
which for long had been a source of great profit to the British, lent
itself admirably to such purposes. Ballin's proposal was agreed to by
the Company's management, with the result that in July, 1886, a pool
agreement was concluded between the Packetfahrt (on behalf of a Stettin
Line of steamers) and the Danish Thingvalla Line. Steamers now began to
call at Gothenburg and Christiansand on their voyages from Stettin to
the United States. The new line was known as the "Scandia Line"; and in
later years, when a similar object was aimed at, it was called into
existence once more. The aim was not to establish a new steamer service
for its own sake, but rather to create an object for compensation which,
in the negotiations with the British lines, could be given up again in
exchange for concessions on the part of the latter regarding the
Hamburg business. If this plan failed, Ballin had another one mapped
out: he threatened to attack the British in their own country by
carrying steerage passengers either from Liverpool _via_ Havre, or from
Plymouth _via_ Hamburg. People in England laughed at this idea.
"Surely," they said, "no British emigrant will travel on a German
vessel." The British lines replied to Ballin's threat by declaring that
they would again reduce to 30s. their rates from Hamburg to New York
_via_ a British port. However, the negotiations which Ballin entered
into with them in England during the month of September, 1886, soon
cleared the air, and led to the conclusion of an agreement towards the
end of the year. The Packetfahrt promised to withdraw its Scandia Line,
and the British lines, in return, agreed to raise their steerage rates
from Hamburg to 85 marks gross, and those from Liverpool, Glasgow, and
London to £2 10s. net. A clearing house which should be under the
management of a representative of the British lines, and which was also
to include the business done by the Bremen agents of the latter, was to
be set up in Hamburg. This clearing house was kept on until other and
more far-reaching agreements with the British lines made its continued
existence superfluous.
The arrangements which Ballin made with the agents represented in the
clearing house show his skill in his dealings with other people. The
whole agreement, especially the fixing of the terms governing the share
to be assigned to the agents--which amounted to 55 per cent, of the
Hamburg business--was principally aimed at the realization of as high a
rate as possible. This policy proved to be a great success. Another step
forward was that the Packetfahrt now consented to accept passengers
booked by the agents, thus reversing their previous policy of ignoring
them altogether.
The agreement with the British lines also provided that the Union Line
should raise its rates to 90 marks, the Packetfahrt to 95 marks, and the
Lloyd those charged for its services to Baltimore and New York to 100
and 110 marks respectively. Henceforward both competing groups were
equally interested in obtaining as high a rate as possible.
The practical working of the agreement did not fail to give
satisfaction, and the Continental lines could, undisturbed by external
interference, put their own house in order. A few years later, in 1890,
the British lines complained that they did not succeed in getting the
percentage of business to which they were entitled. Negotiations were
carried on at Liverpool, during which Ballin was present. He pointed out
that, considering the whole Continental position, the British lines
would be ill-advised to withdraw from the agreement, and he stated that
he would be prepared to guarantee them their share (33 per cent.) of the
Hamburg business. The outcome was that the British lines declared
themselves satisfied with these new stipulations. A few years later,
when the British lines joined the Continental Pool, the Hamburg
agreement ceased to be necessary, and in 1893 the clearing house was
abolished.
The new Emigration Law of 1887--due to the exertions of the North German
Lloyd and the Packetfahrt--strengthened the position of the lines
running direct services from German ports. Another step forward was the
increase of the passage rates which was agreed upon after negotiations
had taken place at Antwerp and in England, and after the German, Dutch,
and Belgian lines had had a conference at Cologne. Contact was also
established with the chief French line concerned.
The improvement, however, was merely temporary. The termination of the
struggle for the Hamburg business did not mean that all the differences
between all the transatlantic lines had been settled. On the contrary,
all the parties concerned gradually realized that it would be necessary
to institute quite different arrangements; something to ensure a fairer
distribution of the traffic and a greater consolidation of their common
interests. A proposal to gain these advantages by the establishment of a
pool was submitted by the representative of the Red Star Line at a
conference held in the autumn of 1886, and a memorandum written by
Ballin, likewise dating from 1886, took up the same idea; but an
agreement was not concluded until the close of 1891.
That, in spite of Ballin's advocacy, five years had to elapse before
this agreement became perfect is perhaps to some extent due to the fact
that Ballin--who at that time, after all, was only the head of the
Passenger Department of his Company--could not always speak with its
full authority where his own personal views were concerned. Moreover,
the influence of his Company was by no means very considerable in those
early days. The only passenger boat of any importance which the Company
possessed in the early 'eighties, before Ballin had entered its
services, was the _Hammonia_, and she was anything but a success. She
was inferior both as regards her efficiency and her equipment. At last,
however, Ballin's desire to raise the prestige of the Company triumphed,
and the building of several fast boats was definitely decided upon. In
addition to a comparatively large number of passengers--especially those
of the first cabin--they were to carry a moderate amount of cargo. In
size they were subject to the restrictions imposed upon them by the
shortcomings of the technical knowledge of that time, and by the absence
of the necessary improvements in the fairway of the lower Elbe. Speed,
after all, was the main consideration; and it was the struggle for the
blue riband of the Atlantic which kept the attention of the travelling
public riveted on these boats.
A statement giving details of the financial results obtained by the
first four of the new fast steamers which were entered into the service
of the Company between 1889 and 1891 showed that the earnings up to and
including the year 1895 did not even cover the working expenses, and
that those up to 1899 were not sufficient to allow for an interest of 4
per cent, on the average book values of the steamers. It must be
remembered, however, that the first of these two periods included the
disastrous season of 1892-93, when Hamburg was visited by an epidemic of
cholera. And a different light is shed on the matter also if we further
remember that depreciation had been allowed for on a generous scale, no
less than 50 per cent, of the cost price plus the expenditure incurred
through an enlargement of the _Auguste Victoria_, the oldest of the
boats, having been deducted on that account. The Packetfahrt, like all
the other German shipping companies, has always been very liberal in
making ample provision for depreciation. When, therefore, these steamers
were sold again at the time of the Spanish-American and Russo-Japanese
wars, a considerable profit was realized on the transactions which
enabled the Company to replace them by a very high-grade type of vessel
(the _Deutschland_, _Amerika_, and _Kaiserin Auguste Victoria_). It must
be admitted in this connexion that perhaps no shipowner has ever been
more favoured by fortune than Ballin where the sale of such difficult
objects as obsolete express steamers was concerned. The value which
these boats had in relation to the prestige of the Company was very
considerable; for, as Ballin expressed it to me one day: "The possession
of the old express steamers of the Packetfahrt certainly proved to be
something like a white elephant; but just consider how greatly they
have enhanced the prestige of the Company." They attracted thousands of
passengers to the Line, and acted as feeders to its other services.
The orders for the first two of these steamers were given towards the
close of 1887 to the Vulkan yard, at Stettin, and to the firm of Laird
respectively, at a price of £210,000 each, and the boats were to be
completed early in 1889. They were the first twin-screw steamers, and
were provided with the system of "forced draught" for the engines. This
system had just been introduced in British yards, and Ballin's attention
had been drawn to it by his friend Wilding, who was always ready to give
him valuable advice on technical matters. In order to find the means for
the construction of these and of some other boats, the general meeting
of the shareholders, held on October 6th, 1887, voted a capital increase
of 5,000,000 marks and the issue of 6,250,000 marks of debentures.
Knowing that an improvement of the services was the great need of the
time, Ballin, since the time of joining the Company, had done all he
could to make the latter a paying concern again, and in this he
succeeded. For the year 1886 a dividend of 5 per cent. was paid, and
thus it became possible to sanction an increase of the joint-stock
capital.
Further foundations for later successes were laid by the reform of the
organization and of the technical services of the Company. His work in
connexion with the Carr Line had taught the youthful head of the
passenger department that careful attention to the material comfort of
the steerage passengers could be of great benefit to the Company. He
continued along lines such as these, and at his suggestion the steerage
accommodation on two of the Packetfahrt's steamers was equipped with
electric light, and provided with some single berths as well. This
latter provision was extended still further during the succeeding year.
In addition to the fast steamers, some ordinary ones were also ordered
to be built. In 1888 two steamers were ordered for the Company's West
Indies service, and shortly afterwards eight units of the Union Line
were bought at a price of 5,200,000 marks. All these new orders and
purchases of steamers led to the joint-stock capital being raised from
20 to 30 million marks. Two more boats were laid down in the Stettin
Vulkan yard, and a third with the firm of Laird. The express steamer
then building at the Vulkan yard was named _Auguste Victoria_ in honour
of the young Empress.
During the summer months of 1887 Ballin, together with Mr. Johannes
Witt, one of the members of the Board of Trustees, went to New York in
order to discuss with the agents a reorganization of the New York
representation, which was looked after by Edward Beck and Kunhardt. In
consequence of the negotiations which Ballin carried on to that end, the
agents undertook to submit their business for the Company to the control
of an officer specially appointed by the Packetfahrt. This small
beginning led, in later years, to the establishment in New York of the
Company's direct representation under its own management.
When Ballin joined the Packetfahrt, he did not strictly confine his
attention to matters connected with the passenger services. When, for
instance, the head of the freight department was prevented from
attending a meeting called by the Board of Trustees, Ballin put forward
a proposal for raising the rates on certain cargo. It was therefore only
but fit acknowledgment of his many-sided talents, and recognition that
his energetic character had been the guiding spirit in the Company's
affairs, that the Board of Trustees appointed Ballin in 1888 a member of
the Board of Directors after two years with the Packetfahrt. This
appointment really filled a long-felt gap.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE POOL
The term "pool" may be defined in a variety of ways, but, generally
speaking, the root idea underlying its meaning is always the same, both
in its application to business and to betting. A pool, in brief, is a
combination of a number of business concerns for their own mutual
interests, all partners having previously agreed upon certain principles
as to the distribution of the common profits. In other words, it is a
community of interests concluded upon the basis of dividing the profits
realized in a certain ratio. I have been unable to discover when and
where this kind of combination was first used in actual practice. Before
the transatlantic steamship companies did so, the big trunk lines of the
United States railway system are said to have used it in connexion with
the westbound emigrant traffic, and possibly for other purposes also.
When Ballin wrote his memorandum of February 5th, 1886, the steamship
lines must already have been familiar with the meaning of the term, for
the memorandum refers to it as something well known. Ballin begins by
stating that the "Conference of the Northern European Lines" might be
looked upon as having ceased to exist, seeing that two parties were
represented on it whose claims were diametrically opposed to each other.
Whereas the North German Lloyd insisted on the right to lower its rates,
the Red Star Line claimed that these rates should be raised, so that it
might obtain a better differential rate for itself. A reconciliation of
these mutually contradictory views, the memorandum went on to say,
appeared to be impossible, unless all parties agreed upon an
understanding which would radically alter the relations then existing
between their respective interests; and a way leading out of the
_impasse_ would be found by adopting the pooling system proposed by the
representative of the Red Star Line. If we take the number of steeragers
carried to New York from 1881 to 1885 by the six lines concerned as a
basis, the respective percentages of the total traffic are as follows:
_Percentage_
North German Lloyd 33·45
North German Lloyd (Baltimore Line) 14·80
Packetfahrt 27·00
Union Line 5·53
Red Star Line 12·26
Holland American Line 6·96
It was, however, justly pointed out at a meeting of the Conference that
the amount of tonnage must also be taken into account in laying down the
principles which were to govern the distribution of the profits. The
average figures of such tonnage employed by the six lines during the
same period were:
_Tons_ _Percentage_
North German Lloyd 275,520 33·91
North German Lloyd (Baltimore
Line) 63,000 7·76
Packetfahrt 199,500 24·55
Union Line 42,840 5·27
Red Star Line 149,600 18·41
Holland American Line 82,080 10·10
------- -----
Total tonnage 812,540
The average of both sets of percentage figures worked out as follows:
_Percentage_
North German Lloyd 33·68
North German Lloyd (Baltimore Line) 11·28
Packetfahrt 25·77-1/2
Union Line 5·40
Red Star Line 15·33-1/2
Holland American Line 8·53
"It would be necessary," the memorandum continued, "to calculate each
Company's share annually on the basis of the average figures obtained
for the five years immediately preceding, so that, for instance, the
calculation for 1887 would be based on the figures for the five years
from 1882 to 1886; that for 1888 on those for the period from 1883 to
1887, and so on. Uniform passage rates and uniform rates of commission
would have to be agreed upon. To those lines which, like the North
German Lloyd, maintained a service which was run by fast steamers
exclusively, would have to be conceded the right to charge in their
separate accounts passage money up to 10 marks in excess of the normal
rates, seeing that their expenses were heavier than those of the other
lines. Those Companies, however, claiming differential rates below the
general ones agreed upon would have to make up the difference
themselves, which was not to exceed the amount of 30 marks--i.e. they
would have to contribute to the common pool a sum equal to the general
rate without deduction."
The two cardinal principles lying at the root of this proposal were (1)
the assigning to each line of a definite percentage of the total traffic
on the basis of the average figures ascertained for a definite period of
time, and (2) the possibility of further grading these percentages by
taking into account the amount of tonnage which each line placed at the
disposal of the joint undertaking. This latter provision--which was
known during the early stages of the movement as the tonnage clause--was
intended to prevent any single line from stagnation, and to give scope
to the spirit of enterprise.
The tonnage clause was not maintained for the whole time during which
the pool agreement was in force. It was afterwards abolished at the
instance of the North German Lloyd. This event led, in the long run, to
the last big crisis which the pool had to pass through by the notice of
withdrawal given by the Hamburg-Amerika Linie. When this Company
proposed to considerably enlarge its steerage accommodation through the
addition to its service of the three big boats of the _Imperator_ class,
it demanded a corresponding increase of its percentage figure, and, when
this claim fell through owing to the opposition of the North German
Lloyd, it gave formal notice of its withdrawal from the pool.
Precautions taken to counteract this led to negotiations which had to be
discontinued when the war broke out. Nevertheless, the pool, which was
first proposed in 1886, and which came into existence in 1892, did a
great deal of good. More than once, however, the agreement ceased to be
effective for a time, and this was especially the case on the occasion
of the struggle with the Cunard Line which followed upon the
establishment of the Morgan Trust in 1903.
The secretary of the pool was Heinrich Peters, the former head of the
passenger department of the Lloyd. The choice of Mr. Peters is probably
not unconnected with the fact that it was he who, at a moment when the
negotiations for establishing a pool had reached a critical stage,
appeared on the scene with a clearly-defined proposal, so that he, with
justice, has been described as "the father of the pool." Shortly before
his death in the summer of 1921 Mr. Peters wrote to me concerning his
proposal and the circumstances of its adoption:--
"The history of the events leading up to the creation of the 'North
Atlantic Steamship Lines Association,'" he wrote in his letter, "was not
without complications. So much so that after the Conference at Cologne,
at which it had been found impossible to come to an understanding, I
went to bed feeling very worried about the future. Shortly afterwards--I
don't know whether I was half awake or dreaming--the outline of the plan
which was afterwards adopted stood out clearly before my mind's eye, its
main features being that each line should be granted a fixed percentage
of the traffic on the basis of 'Moore's Statistics' (reports issued
periodically and showing the number of passengers landed in New York at
regular intervals), and that the principle of compensation should be
applied to adjust differences. When I was fully awake I found this plan
so obviously right that, in order not to let it slip my memory, I jotted
down a note concerning it on my bedside table. Next morning, when
Ballin, Reuchlin (of the Holland American Line), Strasser (of the Red
Star Line), and myself met again in the smoking-room of the Hotel du
Nord, I told them of my inspiration, and my plan was looked upon by them
with so much favour that Ballin said to me: 'Well now, Peters, you have
discovered the philosopher's stone.' We then left, previously agreeing
amongst ourselves that we would think the matter over at our leisure,
and that we should refrain from taking any steps leading to a conflict,
at least for the time being. On my return to Bremen I went straight to
Lohmann (who was director general of the Lloyd at that time), but he
immediately threw a wet blanket over my enthusiasm. His objection was
that such an agreement would interfere with the progressive development
of the Lloyd. A few days later a meeting of the Board of Trustees was
held at which I entered into the details of my proposal; but I am sorry
to say that my oratorical gifts were not sufficient to defend it against
the objections that were raised, nor to prevent its rejection. I can
hardly imagine what the representatives of the other lines must have
felt on hearing that it was the Lloyd itself which refused to accept the
proposal which had been put forward by its own delegate, although the
share allotted to it was very generous. Thus the struggle went on for
another eighteen months, and it was not until January, 1892, that the
principal lines concerned definitely concluded a pool agreement closely
resembling the draft agreement I had originally proposed.
"The North Atlantic Steamship Lines Association was originally intended
to remain in existence for the period of five years; but as it was
recognized by all parties that it was necessarily a step in the dark,
people had become so doubtful as to the wisdom of what they had done
that a clause was added to the effect that it could be cancelled after
the first six months provided a fortnight's notice was given by any
partner to it. Nevertheless, the agreement successfully weathered a
severe crisis during the very first year of its existence, when the
disastrous cholera epidemic paralysed the Hamburg trade and shipping."
That this account is correct is confirmed by the minutes of the Cologne
meeting of February 6th, 1890.
The British lines definitely declined in March, 1892, to join the pool.
Thus the plan finally agreed upon in 1892 was subscribed to by the
Continental lines alone, with the exception of the French line. In
contrast with previous proposals, the eastbound traffic was also to be
parcelled out by the lines forming the pool.
This so-called North Atlantic Steamship Lines Association, the backbone
of the later and greater pool, was built up on the following
percentages:
_Westbound_ _Eastbound_
_traffic_ (_p.c._) _traffic_ (_p.c._)
North German Lloyd 46·16 44·53
Packetfahrt (including the Union
Line) 28·84 18·47
Red Star Line 15·70 20·68
Holland American Line 9·30 16·32
These percentages were subject to the effect of the tonnage clause by
which it was provided that 50 per cent. of the tonnage (expressed in
gross registered tons) which any line should possess at any time in
excess of that possessed in 1890 should entitle such line to an increase
of its percentage.
It has already been stated that Mr. Heinrich Peters was appointed
secretary of the pool. He, in compliance with the provision that the
secretariat should be domiciled at a "neutral" place, chose the small
university town of Jena for his residence. Thus this town, so famous in
the literary annals of Germany, became, for more than twenty years, the
centre of an international organization with which few, if any, other
places could vie in importance, especially since the four lines which
had just concluded the original pool were joined, in course of time, by
the British lines, the French line, the Austrian line, and some
Scandinavian and Russian lines as well. Later on a special pool was set
up for the Mediterranean business which, in addition to the German,
British, and Austro-Hungarian lines, also comprised the French
Mediterranean, the Italian, and the Greek lines, as well as one Spanish
line. The business of all these lines was centred at Jena.
Of considerable importance to the smooth working of the pool was the
court of arbitration attached to its organization. On account of the
prominent position occupied by the German companies, German law was
agreed to as binding for the decisions, and since at the time when the
pool was founded, Germany did not possess a uniform Code of Civil Law
for all parts of the Empire, the law ruling at Cologne was recognized to
be applicable to such purposes. Cologne was the city at which the
establishment of the pool was decided upon, and there all the important
meetings that became necessary in course of time were held. The chairman
of the Cologne Association of Solicitors was nominated president of the
arbitration court, but later on this office devolved on President
Hansen, a member of the Supreme Court for the Hanseatic cities, who
filled his post for a long term of years--surely a proof of the
confidence and esteem with which he was honoured by all parties
concerned. Numerous awards issued by him, and still more numerous
resolutions adopted at the many conferences, have supplemented the
original pool agreement, thus forming the nucleus of a real code of
legislation affecting all matters dealing with the pool in which a large
number of capable men drawn from the legal profession and from the world
of business have collaborated.
The knowledge of these regulations gradually developed into a science of
its own, and each line had to possess one or more specialists who were
experts in these questions among the members of its staff. I am sure
they will unanimously agree that Albert Ballin surpassed them all in his
knowledge of the intricate details. His wonderful memory enabled him,
after a lapse of more than twenty years, to recall every phase in the
history of the pool, so that he acquired an unrivalled mastery in the
conduct of pool conferences. This is abundantly borne out by the fact
that in 1908, when negotiations were started in London for the
establishment of a general pool--i.e. one comprising the whole of
Northern Europe, including Great Britain--Ballin, at the proposal of the
British lines, was selected chairman of the conference which, after
several critical phases had been passed through, led to a complete
success and an all-round understanding.
In 1892 the normal development of business was greatly handicapped by
the terrible epidemic of cholera then raging in Hamburg. For a time the
United States completely closed her doors to all emigrants from the
Continent, and it was not until the following year that conditions
became normal again. Nevertheless Ballin, in order to extend the various
understandings between the Northern European lines, took an important
step, even before the close of 1892, by falling back upon a measure
which he had already once employed in 1886. His object was to make the
British lines more favourably inclined towards an understanding, and to
this end he attacked them once more in the Scandinavian business. The
actual occasion which led to the conflict was that the British lines,
owing to differences of opinion among themselves, had given notice of
withdrawal from the Hamburg agreement and from the Hamburg clearing
house. This gave the Packetfahrt a free hand against its British
competitors, and enabled it to carry as many as 2,500 Scandinavian
passengers via Hamburg in 1892. The position of the Packetfahrt during
the ensuing rate war was considerably improved by the agreement which it
had concluded with the Hamburg agents of the British lines, who,
although their principals had declared their withdrawal from the pool,
undertook to maintain the rate which had been jointly agreed upon by
both parties.
Some time had to elapse before this move had its desired effect on the
British lines. Early in 1894 they declared themselves ready to come to
an understanding with the Continental lines on condition that they were
granted 7 per cent. of the Continental traffic (in 1891 they had been
offered 14 per cent.), and that the Packetfahrt was to discontinue its
Scandia Line.
This general readiness of the British companies, however, did not
preclude the hostility of some of their number against any such
agreement, and so the proposal fell through. The proposed understanding
came to grief owing to the refusal of the Cunard Line to join a
Continental pool at the very moment when the negotiations with the
British lines had, after a great deal of trouble, led to a preliminary
understanding with them. A letter which Ballin received from an English
friend in January, 1894, shows how difficult it was to make the British
come round to the idea of a pool. In this letter it was said that the
time was not ripe then for successfully persuading the British lines to
join any pool or any other form of understanding which would necessitate
agreement on a large number of details. All that could be expected to be
done at the time, the writer continued, was a rate agreement of the
simplest possible kind, and he thought that if such an understanding
were agreed to and loyally carried out, that would be an important step
forward towards arriving at a general agreement of much wider scope.
To such vague agreements, however, the Continental lines objected on
principle, and the opposition of the Cunard Line made it impossible to
agree upon anything more definite. Thus the struggle was chiefly waged
against this line. The Continental lines were assisted by the American
Line, which had sailings from British ports, and with the management of
which Ballin had been on very friendly terms ever since the time when
he, as the owner of the firm of Morris and Co., had worked for it. After
the conflict had been going on for several months, it terminated with a
victory of the Continental lines. Thus the road was at last clear for
an attempt to make the whole North Atlantic business pay.
The first step in that direction was the conclusion, in 1896, of an
agreement concerning the cabin business. The Packetfahrt's annual report
for that year states that the results obtained through the carrying of
cabin passengers could only be described as exceedingly unfavourable,
considering that the huge working expenses connected with that kind of
business had to be taken into account. Nevertheless, this traffic, which
had reached a total of more than 200,000 passengers during the preceding
year, could be made a source of great profit to the companies if they
could be persuaded to act in unison. The agreement then concluded was at
first restricted to the fixing of the rates on a uniform scale.
Both these agreements--the one dealing with the steerage and the one
dealing with the cabin business--were concluded, in 1895, for three
years in the first instance. In May, 1898, discussions were opened in
London, at which Ballin presided, with a view to extending the period of
their duration, and these proceedings, after a time, led to a successful
conclusion, but in June, Ballin again presiding, the desired
understanding was reached. A few weeks later an agreement concerning the
second cabin rates was also arrived at, and towards the close of the
year negotiations were started with a view to the extension of the
steerage agreement. In 1899 the pool was extended to run for a further
period of five years, under percentages:
_Westbound_ _Eastbound_
_traffic_ (_p.c._) _traffic_ (_p.c._)
North German Lloyd 44·14 41·53
Packetfahrt 30·71 26·47
Red Star Line 15·37 18·68
Holland American Line 9·78 13·32
To the Packetfahrt these new percentages meant a step forward, although
the omission of the tonnage clause was a decided hindrance to its
further progress.
The next important event in the development of the relations between the
transatlantic lines was the establishment of the so-called Morgan Trust
and the conclusion of a "community of interest" agreement between it and
the German lines.