Dr. Becker-Freyseng, who participated in some of the experiments,

declared that as a result of the freezing experiments conducted at

Dachau, they gave orders to flight surgeons that the warm bath method

was to be used in reviving aviators who had been chilled. And thus

another milestone was reached in science; namely, that warmth revived

and comforted these who had been chilled. (_T-470._)

On 22 September 1942, Himmler acknowledged Rascher’s report, but Himmler

who was carrion and obscenity incarnate, ordered that further subjects

be frozen, and that re-warming and revival be attempted by the use of

naked women. For this purpose Rascher obtained four gypsy women, and the

experiments began. The subjects were, in accordance with usual

procedure, forced into water in which ice cakes floated and were

retained in the freezing compound until unconscious. Then each frozen

victim was put to bed with two naked women, and the three were covered

with blankets. In still other experiments the unconscious subject was

placed in bed with only one woman. From all this revolting and macabre

performance, the scientific deduction was reached that the re-warming

process was better achieved by one woman than two because with one

single partner “personal inhibitions are removed and the woman nestles

up to the chilled victim more intimately.” This was the great scientific

revelation achieved from an obscene spectacle which could have seemed

more like the superstitious drum-beating rites of barbarians on some

forgotten savage, jungle-infested isle, than the work of educated

doctors in the year 1942. Nor was this type of experiment without its

fatalities. Of one subject, the report stated, “This person died with

symptoms suggesting cerebral hemorrhage as was confirmed by the

subsequent autopsy.” The Nazi scientists, after this experiment, did

however, achieve greatness in stating that this type of re-warming was

recommended only when women were available and other types of re-warming

facilities were not available, except in the “case of small children who

are best re-warmed by their mothers with the aid of hot-water bottles.”

(!)

In a final report to Himmler on the super-cooling experiments at Dachau,

the ghastly experimenters, after having killed scores of subjects, came

to the conclusion that they did not know whether rescued persons should

be re-warmed quickly or slowly—

“It was not clear, for example, whether those who had been

rescued should be warmed quickly or slowly. According to the

current instructions for treating frozen people, a slow

warming-up seemed to be indicated. Certain theoretical

considerations could be adduced for a slow warming. Well-founded

suggestions were missing for a promising medicinal therapy.”

The uncertainty is blamed on the “absence of well-founded suggestions

concerning the cause of death by cold in human beings.” (_T-433._)

And now, in order to clarify this question, they decided to go back to

animal experiments which would suggest that after all their

experimenting and killing of human beings, they are no closer to any

scientific discovery than when they started. (_T-433._)

However, they still continued the experiments with human beings in

another manner. This was the dry-cold process, an operation carried out

during the period January-March 1943. The _modus operandi_ of this

experiment was to place the subject outdoors at night in a nude state,

cover him with a linen sheet, and then pour cold water over him hourly.

After several operations of this character, Rascher complained that it

was a mistake to cover the subjects even with a linen sheet. He must be

utterly naked, otherwise “the air cannot get at the person.” And from

then on the subjects suffered their torture without covering of any

kind. Even if it could be assumed that the test could have the slightest

modicum of value, it is not understood why the subject had to be utterly

naked. As the purpose of the experiment, it is presumed, was to

ascertain the reaction of a soldier’s body to a frozen state, there is

no reason why the subject could not wear some clothes, if only the

merest undergarment, because it is scarcely conceivable that a soldier

or aviator would be without some clothing on his back. On this subject,

Neff testified—

“The next experiment was a mass experiment when the prisoners

were also put outside naked at night. The temperature of one of

them was measured with a galvanometer, the others with a

thermometer. Rascher was present during approximately eighteen

to twenty experiments of that type, but I can not remember

exactly how many deaths occurred and if deaths occurred in

connection with these experiments. I would like to say with

certain reservations that approximately three deaths occurred

during that period.” (_T-429._)

On the character of the subjects Neff stated—

“Of the experimental subjects subjected to air-cooling

experiments, none were people who were sentenced to death. They

were prisoners of various nationalities. There were also German

political prisoners and ‘green’ prisoners.

“Q. And these prisoners had not volunteered, had they?

“A. No.” (_T-429._)

V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

(a) Responsibility of Milch as to Count One of Indictment

Article II of Control Council Law No. 10, promulgated by the Allied

Control Council, representing the nations of the United States, Great

Britain, France, and Russia, proclaims the ill-treatment or deportation

to slave labor of civilian populations of occupied territories, or the

ill-treatment of prisoners of war, to be war crimes, punishable by

death, imprisonment, or other penalties.

It is sufficient for this Tribunal to cite Control Council Law No. 10 as

authority for its action in this case. Since, however, the Control

Council came into being after the ending of the war, and since the laws

which it published necessarily also followed the termination of

hostilities, it has been argued by defense counsel that it does not

comport with justice and reason that a defendant should be condemned for

an act which, prior to its commission, was not accepted in international

law as a crime. From the day of surrender Germany has been without a

government of its own, and as the Allied powers are exercising

quasi-sovereign jurisdiction in practically all phases of German

relations, both internal and external, the very circumstances of

Germany’s present political situation not only justifies but demands

that the Control Council establish government in its three fundamental

phases; namely, the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative.

Otherwise chaos would fling Germany into even a more precipitous abyss

than the one into which she has fallen, and the supreme and perhaps

irreparable disaster, arrested by Allied intervention, would be upon

her.

Yet it can be argued and it has been argued that despite the imperative

need of an occupational force with its almost unlimited jurisdiction,

such an occupying force simply represents the authority of victor over

vanquished. In the discharge of its duties under the law which created

it, this Tribunal is not called upon to answer the arguments just

indicated, but a respect for the opinion of mankind invites a listing of

the reasons which establish the justice of the procedure here invoked

and the reasons which must invest its judgment with the solemnity and

solidity of accepted international law.

In the first place, it is not Control Council Law No. 10 which makes

abuse of civilian populations an international crime, nor even the

decision of the International Military Tribunal, which in turn derived

its power from the London Charter which had as its antecedent the Moscow

Declaration of 1943. International law is not a body of codes and

statutes, but the gradual expression, case by case, of the moral

judgments of the civilized world, and no international law textbook of

the last century ever sanctioned the deportation of a civilian

population for labor. Although under Article 52 of the Hague

Regulations, the inhabitants of occupied countries may be used for the

needs of the occupying army, such civilians may be utilized only in

proportion to the resources of the country, and they may not under any

circumstances be required to take part in military operations against

their own country. L. Oppenheim’s Treatise on International Law (Vol.

II, Sixth Edition, page 345) states flatly that there is no right to

deport inhabitants to the country of the occupant for the purpose of

compelling them to work there.

It is submitted, however, that though this is the law and so recognized,

total warfare, as it raged in World War II, suspended, if it did not

outrightly abrogate, all these rules heretofore respected and esteemed

as binding on civilized nations. In this respect defense counsel argues

that “modern warfare, having as its aim total annihilation of the armed

production of the enemy, brought with it to a great extent warfare

against the civilian population,” and he cites total blockade as an

illustration of his thesis. It is true that total blockade affects the

entire blockaded population, as indeed air raids strike at the most

helpless and harmless of the enemy’s civilians. The writer of this

opinion was witness many times to the death and mutilation of

inhabitants, including women, children, and old men, in Luftwaffe air

raids aimed at legitimate war targets. German civilians also paid with

their lives for living in their own country. And thus, it would seem in

principle, that if civilians may legitimately be killed through military

action, though noncombatant, they may certainly be made to work. But it

does not follow that because military necessity unintentionally

victimizes a civilian population, political domination may strip them of

their civil rights and subject them to intentional torture and possible

death. With all its horror modern war still “is not a condition of

anarchy and lawlessness between the belligerents, but a contention in

many respects regulated, restricted, and modified by law.” (Oppenheim,

ibid., 421.)

Though the adversaries descend into the pit of bloody combat, there is

always open to them the means of re-ascending to the level of nonhostile

negotiations. The matter of temporary truces for recovering the dead and

succoring the wounded, the making of arrangements through international

relief organizations for the treatment of prisoners, the granting of

safe passage through the lines of persons mutually agreed upon by the

parties, all are instances which refute the logical development of

defense counsel’s argument that total warfare justifies the abandonment

of every restriction and authorizes the combatants to use all manners

and means to win the conflict.

And no one was in a better position to understand this than the

defendant. He had participated as a soldier in the First World War; he

had, following the war, entered distinguished private enterprise; he had

travelled extensively and was induced by none other than Hitler himself

to enter the Air Ministry long before the outbreak of World War II

because of his talents and abilities. It is idle for defense counsel to

say that Milch “was never a good National Socialist.” If joining a

political party, accepting its benefits and preferments, rising to

supreme heights in grade and distinction, offering never-flagging

loyalty to the Fuehrer, even in the face of a declared acknowledgment

that the Fuehrer was leading Germany to disaster, if this does not make

one a full-fledged National Socialist, then nothing does.

Milch did not simply passively ignore international law, he actively

expressed a knowledgeable contempt for it. We have seen how he declared

at one of the Central Planning Board meetings that “International law

cannot be observed here.”

Defense counsel made much of the point that the German people did not

want war, and the defendant himself described how when the first tanks

moved through the streets of Berlin, the inhabitants of that city were

silent and worried. But it is not clear how this observation advances

the innocence of the defendant. If anything it adds to his moral guilt

because the evidence reveals only too well that to the fullest extent of

his energies he prosecuted a war which he states was against the will

and interests of his people. The indictment has not charged him with

waging aggressive war, but in view of his participation in the 23 May

1939 conference when Hitler outlined quite clearly his aggressive

intentions, and in view of his (Milch’s) never tiring efforts in the

war’s various phases—at the front, in the air, in production, in

inspection—it cannot be said that to his trained mind the war had the

aspects of a defensive and not an aggressive conflict. Although Milch

has here repudiated belief in the master race theory, yet we know that

he went through a formal procedure to establish the absence of Jewish

blood in his veins. This procedure even took the embarrassing turn of

statements concerning his parentage. In doing this, Milch could not help

but know that the Jews were being persecuted by the political party to

which he voluntarily belonged. Nor will the Tribunal believe his

declaration that he knew of only two concentration camps in all of

occupied Europe. For the Tribunal to acknowledge this statement would be

to declare Milch weak-minded if not _non compos mentis_. Milch, was

constantly threatening workers with the concentration camp. These

threats he attributes to excessive anger as he does all his outbursts,

to which we have already called attention.

Milch would have the Tribunal believe that his violent language was

never intended to produce results. He explained that his declaration

that Italian prisoners of war attempting to escape should be shot does

not constitute cruelty because, in the words of his counsel, “all

countries have prisoners shot who attempt to escape.” This contradicts

another statement made in court wherein he lauded prisoners who sought

to regain their freedom. When confronted with inconsistencies of this

character, the defendant invariably sought refuge in the statement that

he was never taken seriously in his threats to shoot, hang, or whip. He

informs us that he never used a whip, that everybody knew he

exaggerated, that nobody took him seriously, and that he did not have

full control of himself. But Erhard Milch was not the village idiot. He

carried a field marshal’s baton, and the lifting of that baton compelled

obedience no matter how idiotic might be the demand. Further, Milch’s

imprecations were not simple interjections; they frequently carried the

appearance of orders already given or about to be issued. He may never

have actually penned a death warrant or called out the SD with its

murder squads, but is it so certain that underlings beyond his

cognizance did not carry into effect his sometimes very clear directions

on punishments to be inflicted?

Violent language is not as innocuous as Milch would have the present

world believe. Even if it should be true that his immediate circle

laughed at his fulminations, as was testified, there is no assurance

that others laughed. A field marshal’s fraternizations are necessarily

limited. There were not many who had the privilege to stand beside him,

as did General Vorwald, and philosophically muse; “Now his neck is

getting red again.” There were necessarily hundreds in the course of six

years of war who, attending his various meetings, were not informed that

his fire and brimstone were froth. Vorwald can laugh at a field marshal

and a field marshal can laugh at a Hitler, but the comedy ceases there.

Milch has ridiculed Hitler’s speeches and pointed out that certain

portions of the Fuehrer’s orations were known as the “Adam and Eve”

section. He indicated further that many of Hitler’s thunderings were

mere bluff, but who can say today that he was bluffing?

Hitler’s most potent force for evil was language. With all that he has

to answer for at the bar of history, it can be doubted that there exists

proof that he with his own hands killed any man or even the proverbial

fly. Hitler’s armory was language. It was Hitler’s language which

mesmerized the German nation. Every one has said so. He had no other

abilities. He was no soldier. All the generals were agreed on that. He

could not ride a horse, he could not drive a car, he could not build a

fence. He could hang paper and he could talk, and the German people

regarded that talk as substance. And on the phosphorescent sea of his

wildly undulating phrases they launched the ship of their well-being

with the tragic result that fragments and splinters of that ship now

piteously stare at one from every nook and corner of this once

prosperous and happy land.

The greatest individual force of destruction in Germany for nearly 20

years was _Mein Kampf_. And yet _Mein Kampf_ was simply language. To the

knowledge of the writer of this opinion, _Mein Kampf_ was never used as

a missile or fired as a projectile, but is there a German sincerely

interested in the welfare of his country today who doubts that its words

were bullets, its phrases bombs, and its pages poison which, falling

into the wells of the nation, corroded the thinking of the innocent and

goaded into action the ambitions of the wicked?

As the record shows, Milch incessantly threatened the wildest excesses,

he orally directed them, and he reported to his chief on one occasion

that he had put certain ones into effect. In spite of his present

disavowal, there is nothing in the transcript to indicate that he

repudiated his threats at the time of utterance. The defense has

repeatedly attacked the accuracy of the minutes of the Central Planning

Board, the GL, and the Jaegerstab. All these documents were taken from

the official files of the Reich Air Ministry. Furthermore, the

defendant’s constant efforts on the stand to modify the far-reaching

implications of his speeches concede the general correctness of the

remarks attributed to him. Thus, making due allowance for stenographic

errors, the defendant stands out through the pages of these reports as a

resolute, persevering, determined worker, unyielding and loyal to his

cause, which was the cause of the Fuehrer.

It can be believed that Erhard Milch was not seeking personal enrichment

and a luxurious living, which was so obviously the nefarious and

principal goal of his chief, the super-pilferer Hermann Goering. Milch

was seeking victory for Germany, for which he held an understandable

affection, but his intelligence, training, and experience in the affairs

of the world told him inescapably that Germany was waging an aggressive

and culpable war. Milch gave of his talents and energies to the winning

of a war criminally begun and lawlessly prosecuted, which, had it ended

in victory for the aggressors would have resulted in the heartless

subjugation of countless millions of innocent and helpless people. The

defendant has recounted his worries and anguish and has explained that

this mental torment provoked many of his unbridled utterances, but what

was the cause of this bitterness and mortification? Not that Europe had

become a slaughterhouse, not that blood ran like water, not that the

four Horsemen of the Apocalypse were galloping over the continent

hurling famine, pestilence, and death into every city, village, and

hamlet. Milch’s torment and soul-sickness were not that the human race

and human dignity were being debased and degraded as they had never been

before since man knew shame. It was not for all this that Milch’s heart

was breaking. His consternation, his panic was that Germany was losing

the war!

He said, “I had to walk into defeat with open eyes.” (_T-1948._) Also,

“I could see what was coming and I could not help my people.” And in his

bitterness he increased the fury of his verbal lashes over the backs of

the foreign workers, he redoubled his efforts for more importations and

screamed for more production. He knew, as far back as November 1941,

that the war was lost; this knowledge was confirmed after Stalingrad,

and every vestige of doubt as to the eventual result was shattered by

the clouds of bombers over Germany every day. He knew that Hitler was

leading Germany over the brink to ruin, and yet he called for more and

more production to make the disaster all the more noteworthy. He was

having difficulties with Goering, Hitler did not want him any more, and

yet he stoked the fires of his wrath to an even higher degree of

vengeance against the workers because they would not turn out more

production for the war, every continuing day of which brought only

greater misery to his people. The argument does not ring true. Milch may

have believed Germany might lose the war but he certainly made every

effort to have it end victoriously. This in itself is honorable for a

soldier, but he allowed himself to use means and methods which the code

of a soldier does not authorize or countenance, and therein he fell.

He has related several accidents which may have affected his health. He

cracked-up two or three times with his plane and he suffered an

automobile mishap as well. It is suggested, although not vigorously

pressed, that all this may explain his towering wraths and lightning

fury. But the plea in this case is not “Not Guilty because of Insanity.”

Nowhere is it advanced that the defendant is not now, nor that at any

time throughout the war was not, in the fullest possession of his mental

faculties. If a temporary aberration is being suggested, it is

remarkable that these deviations from the norm occurred only when he was

urging the maximum and severest employment of forced labor and menacing

with the direst punishment those who did not fulfill to the extreme the

commitments of this illegal enterprise. If Milch was at any time

deprived of his reasoning faculties, his temporary unbalance had method

in it.

The Tribunal finds Erhard Milch guilty on count one of the indictment.

(b) Count Two

In considering Milch’s responsibility under count two, we will need to

enumerate and weigh each reference to him in the testimony in this

connection. The high-altitude experiments began in March and lasted

until June 1942. Cold-water experiments were conducted during the period

from the middle of August until October 1942. The dry-cold experiments

lasted from February through April 1943. During this time Milch was

Inspector General of the Air Forces, State Secretary in the Air

Ministry, and Generalluftzeugmeister. As Inspector General he was in

charge of the office which authorized research and medical experiments

conducted in behalf of the Air Forces. General Hippke, physician in

charge of the Luftwaffe Medical Department, was directly subordinate to

the defendant. As Generalluftzeugmeister, Milch was head of air

ordnance. Milch had charge of the development of technical experiments

for the Luftwaffe.

All medical institutes and Luftwaffe medical men were subordinate to the

Medical Inspectorate Chief, Dr. Hippke. The DVL[165] was subordinate to

Hippke’s office in technical matters. Dr. Rascher conducted his

experiments at Dachau. He was temporarily assigned to the SS, but

retained his status as a Luftwaffe physician, rising from a second

lieutenant to a captain in the Luftwaffe. During the period of the

experimentations, Rascher was under the command of the Luftwaffe.

On 20 May 1942, Milch wrote a letter to General Wolff, stating that his

medical inspector had reported to him that the high-altitude experiments

conducted by the SS and the Luftwaffe had been finished, and he did not

recommend that they should be continued. He did, however, authorize

experiments “of some other kind in regard to perils at high seas.” On 4

June 1942, Milch authorized Hippke the continued use of the low-pressure

chamber. On 20 July 1942, Rascher sent Brandt a report on the

high-altitude experiments and the accompanying letter stated that it is

Himmler’s desire that the report should be sent to Milch. On 25 August

1942, Himmler sent Milch a copy of the report and asked that he receive

Dr. Rascher and Dr. Romberg for a lecture and a showing of the film made

of the experiment.

On 31 August 1942, Milch wrote Himmler acknowledging the report and

promising to receive the two gentlemen for the lecture and showing of

the film. On 23 August 1942, Sievers wrote Brandt discussing a revival

of the high-altitude experiments and stating that a report was to have

been made to Milch, but that the report was not made. On 3 October 1942,

Rascher wrote Brandt that the report to Milch, planned for September,

could not be made because Milch was not present. On 27 November 1942,

Wolff wrote Milch a long letter pointing out the need and the great

value of the experiments with human beings, stating that Himmler “has

accepted the responsibility for supplying death-deserving, asocial

persons, and criminals from the concentration camps for these

experiments.” He asks Milch to assign Rascher to the SS so that he can

continue with the experiments directly under Himmler’s orders. “In any

case, these experiments must not be stopped. We owe that to our men.”

Dr. Romberg stated in an affidavit that Milch “was familiar with these

experiments.” Neff testified that “Milch’s name was mentioned in

connection with the high-altitude experiments.” Sievers, Director of the

Research and Teaching Association, stated that “Milch must have known

about the experiments of Dr. Rascher.” Dr. Ruff stated that to his

knowledge Milch was informed of these tests either by Hippke or by the

SS. Dr. Becker-Freyseng said that Dr. Kalk told him he had seen Rascher

in Milch’s office.

When the film was shown in Milch’s office on 11 September 1942, Milch

was not present. Wolfgang Lutz testified that Milch had negotiated

directly with Himmler regarding the execution of such experiments

without consulting the Medical Inspectorate. Rudolf Brandt stated that

Milch was fully informed about the low-pressure experiments. As late as

January 1943, Milch had not replied to the letter sent him by Wolff,

asking for the assignment of Rascher to the SS.

This, in brief, constitutes the case against Erhard Milch in connection

with the medical experiments. In order to find Milch guilty on this

count of the indictment, it must be established that—

1. Milch had knowledge of the experiments.

2. That, having knowledge, he knew they were criminal in scope and

execution.

3. That he had this knowledge in time to act to prevent the

experiments.

4. That he had the power to prevent them.

In pressing this count against the defendant, the prosecution has the

burden, as it has the burden in every count, to prove the guilt of the

defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. We begin our deliberations with the

cardinal rule that the defendant is presumed to be innocent. Glancing at

the evidence as a whole, it is a facile matter to say that the defendant

must have known of the experiments; that, with so much smoke, there must

be fire. But in addition to smoke, there must be light.

The proof against Milch on this count is entirely circumstantial, and

before we can find him guilty we must conclude that every hypothesis

resulting from the circumstances is consistent with guilt and

inconsistent with innocence. One can easily reach the hypothesis of

guilt from the documents and testimony but that hypothesis in many of

its phases is also consistent with innocence. Thus, applying the rule of

evidence just cited, the test of guilt fails.

So far as chronology is concerned, Milch does not come into the picture

of the experiments until 20 May 1942 with a letter in which he states

that his medical inspector informed him that the high-altitude

experiments had been completed. Obviously if they were completed there

was nothing he could do to prevent them. Nor did the medical inspector

or anyone else testify that Milch was informed of the precise nature of

the experiments. Further, there is no evidence that Milch ever received

any reports at all on the freezing experiments.

No one ever suggested that Milch attended the operations at Dachau or

that he ever gave an order that human beings were to be used to the

point of death.

If we can imagine the pieces of evidence on this count as irregularly

shaped blocks of wood floating on water, we find these blocks

occasionally coming together and dovetailing into a pattern of guilt,

but then we find them separating and just as often forming the pattern

of innocence. No man should be convicted on evidence that does not

remain fixed and immovable in granitic solidity. Guilt cannot be founded

on a set of facts from which arguments are equally convincing as to

guilt and as to innocence. Remarks such as “the defendant must have

known,” or “to the best of my knowledge he knew,” and other similar

inconclusive conjectures frequently used in this part of the case are

not the kind of links which are imperatively needed to make up a chain

strong enough to sustain the weight of a conviction.

The defendant is found not guilty on the second count of the indictment.

Though Milch is acquitted of complicity and participation in the medical

experiments, we have nonetheless commented on those experiments at

length. We have done this because otherwise the reference to Milch’s

acquittal standing alone might convey impression that the experiments

themselves were not criminal. The Tribunal holds that the _corpus

delicti_ was established and a crime was committed, even though Milch is

not guilty of it.

(c) Count Three

The third count of the indictment charges the defendant with crimes

against humanity (slave labor and fatal medical experiments) committed

on German nationals and nationals of other countries. As we have found

him not guilty on count two, we necessarily also find him not guilty of

the crime of fatal medical experiments in count three. We have, however,

adjudicated him guilty on count one, and since the evidence establishes

that nationals of other countries were also victims of slave labor under

his control, we thus find Erhard Milch guilty on that part of the third

count which covers the nationals of other countries. Sufficient proof

was not submitted as to slave labor offenses against German nationals to

justify an adjudication of guilt on that ground.

Thus, in recapitulation, we find the defendant guilty on count one, not

guilty on count two, not guilty on count three insofar as it appertains

to German nationals and guilty wherein it refers to “nationals of other

countries.” In reaching these conclusions, we inescapably ascertain that

Erhard Milch was a full-fledged member of the National Socialist Party

of Germany. Further, that he adhered to the doctrines of this Party

which, with the almost cataclysmic force of planetary violence, achieved

more destruction than has been known since man stood upright on the

shores of history. The conclusion is also unavoidable that it was

individuals like Milch that made the Hitler plan of war and subjugation

possible. Hitler was but one man and it was only because he had

brilliant and able coadjutors that he could develop a war machine which

achieved the incredible and fantastic record of smashing Poland in 18

days, striking France to her knees in 2 months, driving England from the

continent in 6 weeks, overrunning Holland and Belgium in a few days,

vanquishing Norway in several weeks, and Denmark overnight.

In those days of spectacular triumph, Milch had no complaint against

Hitler. But it was precisely then that Hitler was working his greatest

harm to Germany because it was inevitable that the people he had

temporarily crushed would rise again and not rest until the evil power

responsible for their suffering was destroyed. If Milch had entertained

the loyalty to his people which he now professes, then was the time to

withdraw from a program which was wreaking a devastation so universal

that no country, including Germany, could escape.

The defendant stated from the witness stand he could not withdraw

because he owed fealty to Hitler and to the German people. His loyalty

to Hitler was loyalty to a man who he now states had marked him for

liquidation, and so far as allegiance to the German people is concerned,

they can feel no gratitude for an allegiance which increased their ruin,

magnified their misery, and pushed them only deeper into the pit of

despair. The Germans could do without a devotion of that kind.

The defendant apparently gained the impression in our questioning of him

that some heroic sacrifice was expected on his part. We never intended,

nor was it suggested, that he should take any action which could result

in the forfeiture of his life. But he did himself volunteer from the

witness stand that on two occasions he was ready to tell Hitler the

truth even if it should mean his execution. If he was prepared to

sacrifice his life on so futile a gesture, he could have taken some

action which involved less hazard. He could thus, at least to that

extent, have contributed to honesty and justice by refraining from

threatening with death and whipping those who did not give of their last

ounce of energy in the production of ordnance whose muzzles would

eventually be turned on Germany itself.

In his last statement in court Milch declared that he was indifferent to

his fate but he was interested in seeing Germany relieved of her

suffering and re-admitted to the community of nations as an equal

partner. We do not believe that any intelligent person can be

indifferent to his fate, although one can summon sufficient spiritual

fortitude to rise above an immediate regret. With regard to Milch’s wish

for the German people, he has definitely performed one service in

pulling aside the curtain to disclose to them the stupidities, the

vanities, and the arrogances of their leaders which brought about their

present state. The record of this case will particularly, of course,

expose Milch’s own errors and his transgressions against international

law, the laws and customs of war, the moral code of humanity and even

commandments 4 and 7 of the 10 commandments of the German soldier.

The purpose of these postwar trials obviously is not vengeance. The

object aimed at (as in the criminal jurisprudence of all civilized

nations) is the ascertainment of truth. When guilt is established, the

penalty imposed is to serve as a deterrent to all others who might be

similarly minded. Albert Speer, convicted in the first trial, stated

here in this courtroom that had trials such as these followed the First

World War, the Second World War might have been averted. Erhard Milch

may obtain some comfort from the realization that by the publication of

the evidence of this trial he is definitely contributing to the

education and well-being of Germany’s future, as indeed a precise

contribution is being made to the cause of world justice itself.

Over 155,000 Americans made the supreme sacrifice in Germany in this

war. These lads gave their lives for this ideal of world justice and

world peace. America sought no territorial aggrandizement or material

advantage. The American flag in this courtroom ensured to the defendant

all the guarantees of the United States Constitution as to a fair trial.

No person within the continental limits of the United States itself

could have wished for a fuller opportunity to demonstrate his innocence

of the charges brought against him.

America and her Allies bestowed upon Germany what no desire can achieve

and what no money can buy. The Allied nations gave the blood of their

youth to water the roots of the tree of liberty and tolerance which had

withered in the twelve-year drought of National Socialism. It is to

reveal who were responsible and what was responsible for the desiccation

of that tree and to proclaim to the world the inevitable consequences to

others who degrade the soil with the pollution and prussic acid of

oppression that these trials have been established. The present trial is

one chapter in the book which will forever condemn _Mein Kampf_ and

offer to the new German nation a volume of proved fact, whose every page

will tell of the sorrow awaiting any people which permit any man or men

to hoist deceit above truth, power above justice, oppression above

tolerance, war above peace and man above God.

[Signed] MICHAEL A. MUSMANNO

JUDGE MILITARY TRIBUNAL II

-----

[160] The reference “T” is to the page of the mimeographed transcript.

[161] “IMT” refers to Trial of the Major War Criminals before the

International Military Tribunal, Vol. I, Nuremberg, Germany, 1947.

[162] Original German document read 50,000 but, due to clerical error,

translation of document which was submitted in Court read 500,000.

Incorrectness is obvious by total figure of 220,000 in last sentence.

[163] Chef Ansbildungawesen (Chief of Training).

[164] A word is missing here in the German original.

[165] Deutsche Versuchsanstalt fuer Luftfahrt (German Institute for

Aviation Research). In this case, the reference is to the Medical

Section of the Institute.

C. Concurring Opinion by Judge Fitzroy D. Phillips

This Tribunal has been duly organized and is now existing under the

authority of Ordnance No. 7 pursuant to the powers of the Military

Governor of the United States Zone of Occupation within Germany

expressly conferred therein and further pursuant to the powers conferred

upon the zone commander by Control Council Law No. 10 and Articles 10

and 11 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal annexed to

the London agreement of 8 August 1945, and by authority of Executive

Order No. 9819 signed and issued by Harry S. Truman, President of the

United States of America, the pertinent parts of said order as follows:

“By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and

the statutes, and as President of the United States and

Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, it

is ordered as follows:

“1. I hereby designate Fitzroy Donald Phillips, Judge of a

Superior Court in the State of North Carolina; Robert Morrell

Toms, Judge of the Third Judicial Circuit Court, Detroit,

Michigan; and Captain Michael A. Musmanno (S), USNR, 086622, as

the members, and John Joshua Speight as the alternate member of

one of the several military tribunals established by the

Military Governor for the United States Zone of Occupation

within Germany pursuant to the quadripartite agreement of the

Control Council for Germany, enacted December 20, 1945, as

Control Council Law No. 10, and pursuant to Articles 10 and 11

of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which

Tribunal was established by the Government of the United States

of America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic,

the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Northern Ireland, and the Government of the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics, for the trial and punishment of major war

criminals of the European Axis. Such members and alternate

member may, at the direction of the Military Governor of the

United States Zone of Occupation, serve on any of the several

military tribunals above mentioned.”

and as such Tribunal, has jurisdiction to try and determine this case.

Subsequent to the organization of said Tribunal, Telford Taylor,

Brigadier General, United States Army, Chief of Counsel for War Crimes,

prepared and caused to be prepared a bill of indictment charging the

defendant, Erhard Milch, with certain war crimes and crimes against

humanity as will appear more specifically hereinafter in this judgment

and on 14 November 1946 caused said bill of indictment to be duly served

upon the defendant, Erhard Milch, by the Marshal for the United States

Military Tribunals according to the provisions of law.

Thereafter said bill of indictment was made returnable and said cause

set for trial before United States Military Tribunal No. II. Whereupon,

Dr. I. Friedrich Bergold of the Nuernberg, Germany, bar was duly

appointed as counsel for the defendant and accepted such appointment.

On 20 December 1946, at 9:30 a.m. in the Palace of Justice, Nuernberg,

Germany, the defendant, Erhard Milch, being present in court and

represented by his counsel, Dr. I. Friedrich Bergold, and the United

States of America being represented by Telford Taylor, Brigadier

General, United States Army, Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, and

Honorable Clark Denney of counsel, the Tribunal duly arraigned the

defendant upon the charges contained in the bill of indictment against

him, and the defendant when called upon to plead to the bill of

indictment entered a plea of Not Guilty. Whereupon the Tribunal set the

date of 2 January 1947, for the trial of said case and adjourned until

said time.

On 2 January 1947, United States Military Tribunal No. II met in the

Palace of Justice, Nuernberg, Germany, and commenced the trial of this

case.

The bill of indictment charging the defendant, Erhard Milch, with

certain and specific war crimes and crimes against humanity is

summarized as follows:

_Count One_: War crimes involving murder, slave labor, deportation of

civilian populations for slave labor, cruel and inhuman treatment of

foreign laborers, and the use of prisoners of war in war operations by

force and compulsion.

_Count Two_: War crimes involving murder, subjecting involuntary victims

to low-pressure and freezing experiments, resulting in torture and

death.

_Count Three_: Crimes against humanity, involving murder and the same

unlawful acts specified in counts one and two against German nationals

and nationals of other countries.

The trial was conducted in two languages in the main, English and

German, and in English, German, and French when French witnesses were

testifying.

The hearing of evidence and the arguments of counsel concluded on 25

March 1947.

The prosecution offered three witnesses who gave evidence orally and 161

written exhibits, several exhibits containing many documents. The

defense offered 27 witnesses who gave evidence orally and the defendant

also testified in his own behalf, and in addition to oral evidence the

defendant offered 51 written exhibits. The exhibits as offered by both

the prosecution and defense contained documents, photographs,

affidavits, interrogatories, letters, maps, charts, and other written

evidence.

A complete stenographic record of everything said and done in court has

been made as well as an electrical recording of all the proceedings.

Copies of all the documents and written evidence offered by the

prosecution have been supplied to the defense in the German language.

The applications made by the defendant for the production of witnesses

and documents were passed upon by the Tribunal and orders made in

pursuance thereof. The Tribunal, after examination, granted all of the

defense applications which in their opinion were relevant to the defense

of the defendant and denied a few that the Tribunal found not to be

relevant. Facilities were provided for obtaining those witnesses and

documents granted through the Office of the Secretary General of the

Tribunal.

Much of the evidence presented to the Tribunal on behalf of the

prosecution was documentary evidence captured by the Allied armies in

German army headquarters, government buildings, and elsewhere, and some

of said documents were captured in the private files of the defendant

himself. The case therefore against the defendant rests in a large

measure on the documents thus obtained. The documents offered against

the defendant on the part of the prosecution were in a large measure of

his own making or those that were made in the organizations of which he

was a member and largely under his control, and the authenticity of

which has not been challenged except in a few cases and in those he

challenged them mainly on the correctness of the transcript and not upon

the subject matter as a whole. The evidence, oral and written, together

with exhibits and documents contain approximately 3,000 pages which

constitutes the record in this case.

The trial was conducted generally along the lines as are usually

followed in trial courts of the United States except as to the rules of

evidence, and as to those the Tribunal was not bound by technical rules

of evidence and admitted any and all evidence which it deemed to have

probative value and in strict compliance with the provisions of Article

VII of Ordnance No. 7.

The Tribunal has kept in mind throughout the entire trial that this was

a Tribunal established for the purpose of trying major war criminals and

in this particular case a fallen military field marshal of a conquered

nation, and that he was entitled to the Anglo-Saxon and English common

law presumption that he was innocent until his guilt was established

beyond a reasonable doubt.

Article II of Control Council No. 10 is as follows:

“ARTICLE II

“1. Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime:

“(_a_) _Crimes against Peace._ Initiation of invasions of other

countries and wars of aggression in violation of international

laws and treaties, including but not limited to planning,

preparation, initiation or waging a war of aggression, or a war

in violation of international treaties, agreements or

assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for

the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.

“(_b_) _War Crimes._ Atrocities or offenses against persons or

property constituting violations of the laws or customs of war,

including but not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or

deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose, of civilian

population from occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of

prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages,

plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of

cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by

military necessity.

“(_c_) _Crimes against Humanity._ Atrocities and offenses,

including but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement,

deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts

committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on

political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in

violation of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated.

“(_d_) Membership in categories of a criminal group or

organization declared criminal by the International Military

Tribunal.

“2. Any person without regard to nationality or the capacity in

which he acted is deemed to have committed a crime as defined in

paragraph 1 of this Article, if he (_a_) was a principal or

(_b_) was an accessory to the commission of any such crime or

ordered or abetted the same or (_c_) took a consenting part

therein or (_d_) was connected with plans or enterprises

involving its commission or (_e_) was a member of any

organization or group connected with the commission of any such

crime or (_f_) with reference to paragraph 1 (_a_), if he held a

high political, civil or military (including General Staff)

position in Germany or in one of its Allies, co-belligerents or

satellites or held high position in the financial, industrial or

economic life of any such country.

“3. Any person found guilty of any of the crimes above-mentioned

may upon conviction be punished as shall be determined by the

Tribunal to be just. Such punishment may consist of one or more

of the following:

“(_a_) Death.

“(_b_) Imprisonment for life or a term of years, with or without

hard labor.

“(_c_) Fine, and imprisonment with or without hard labor, in

lieu thereof.

“(_d_) Forfeiture of property.

“(_e_) Restitution of property wrongfully acquired.

“(_f_) Deprivation of some or all civil rights.

“Any property declared to be forfeited or the restitution of

which is ordered by the Tribunal shall be delivered to the

Control Council for Germany, which shall decide on its disposal.

“4. (_a_) The official position of any person, whether as Head

of State or as a responsible official in a Government

Department, does not free him from responsibility for a crime or

entitle him to mitigation of punishment.

“(_b_) The fact that any person acted pursuant to the order of

his Government or of a superior does not free him from

responsibility for a crime, but may be considered in mitigation.

“5. In any trial or prosecution for a crime herein referred to,

the accused shall not be entitled to the benefits of any statute

of limitation in respect of the period from 30 January 1933 to 1

July 1945, nor shall any immunity, pardon, or amnesty granted

under the Nazi regime be admitted as a bar to trial or

punishment.”

The defendant stands indicted for the violation particularly of the

provisions of section _b_, which defines war crimes, and for the

violation of the provisions of section _c_, which defines crimes against

humanity, and for the violations of certain provisions of international

conventions, particularly of Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, 46, and 52 of the

Hague Regulations, 1907, and of Articles 2, 3, 4, 6, and 31 of the

Prisoner-of-War Convention, Geneva, 1929, the laws and customs of war,

the general provisions of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws

of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in

which such crimes were committed, and further as particularly defined in

Article II of the Control Council Law No. 10.

The first count in the bill of indictment has been designated by the

prosecution as “Slave Labor,” the second count as “Medical Experiments”

and the third count as “Slave Labor and Medical Experiments upon German

Nationals.” The pertinent rules of law that are applicable in this case

will now be considered, and we shall consider briefly some salient

precepts and prohibitions of international law up to and including the

provisions of Control Council Law No. 10.

The prosecution has offered evidence which tended to show that much of

the labor which supplied Germany with the tools of absolute and total

war was extracted from people who had been uprooted from their homes in

occupied territories and imported to Germany against their will and

often under the most trying and difficult circumstances. Displacement of

groups of persons from one country to another is the proper concern of

international law in as far as it affects the community of nations.

International law has enunciated certain conditions under which the fact

of deportation of civilians from one nation to another during times of

war becomes a crime. If the transfer is carried out without a legal

title, as in the case where people are deported from a country occupied

by an invader while the occupied enemy still has an army in the field

and is still resisting, the deportation is contrary to international

law. The rationale of this rule lies in the supposition that the

occupying power has temporarily prevented the rightful sovereign from

exercising its power over its citizens. Articles 43, 46, 49, 52, 55, and

56, Hague Regulations, which limit the rights of the belligerent

occupant, do not expressly specify as crime the deportation of civilians

from an occupied territory. Article 52 states the following provisions

and conditions under which services may be demanded from the inhabitants

of occupied countries:

1. They must be for the needs of the army of occupation.

2. They must be in proportion to the resources of the country.

3. They must be of such a nature as not to involve the

inhabitants in the obligation to take part in military

operations against their own country.

Insofar as this section limits the conscription of labor to that

required for the needs of the army of occupation, it is manifestly clear

that the use of labor from occupied territories outside of the area of

occupation is forbidden by the Hague Regulations.

The second condition under which deportation becomes a crime occurs when

the purpose of the displacement is illegal, such as deportation for the

purpose of compelling the deportees to manufacture weapons for use

against their homeland or to be assimilated in the working economy of

the occupying country. The defense as contained in this case is that

persons were deported from France into Germany legally and for a lawful

purpose by contending that such deportations were authorized by

agreements and contracts between Nazi and Vichy French authorities. The

Tribunal holds that this defense is both technically and substantially

deficient. The Tribunal takes judicial notice of the fact that after the

capitulation of France and the subsequent occupation of French territory

by the German army, a puppet government was established in France and

located at Vichy. This government was established at the instance of the

German Army and was controlled by its officials according to the

dictates and demands of the occupying army and a contract made by the

German Reich with such a government as was established in France

amounted to in truth and in fact a contract that on its face was null

and void. The Vichy Government, until the Allies regained control of the

French Republic, amounted to no more than a tool of the German Reich. It

will be borne in mind that at no time during the Vichy regime a peace

treaty had been signed between the French Republic and the German Reich

but merely a cessation of hostilities and an armistice prevailed, and

that French resistance had at no time ceased and that France at all

times still had an army in the field resisting the German Reich.

The third and final condition, under which deportation becomes illegal,

occurs whenever generally recognized standards of decency and humanity

are disregarded. This flows from the established principle of law that

an otherwise permissible act becomes a crime when carried out in a

criminal manner. A close study of the pertinent parts of Control Council

Law No. 10 strengthens the conclusions of the foregoing statements that

deportation of the population is criminal whenever there is no title in

the deporting authority or whenever the purpose of the displacement is

illegal or whenever the deportation is characterized by inhumane or

illegal methods.

Article II (1) (_c_) of Control Council Law No. 10 specifies certain

crimes against humanity. Among those is listed the deportation of any

civilian population. The general language of this sub-section as applied

to deportation indicates that Control Council Law No. 10 has

unconditionally contended as a crime against humanity every instance of

the deportation of civilians. Article II (1) (_b_) names deportation to

slave labor as a war crime. Article II (1) (_c_) states that the

enslavement of any civilian population is a crime against humanity. Thus

Law No. 10 treats as separate crimes and different types of crime

“deportation to slave labor” and “enslavement.” The Tribunal holds that

the deportation, the transportation, the retention, the unlawful use,

and the inhumane treatment of civilian populations by an occupying power

are crimes against humanity.

The Hague and Geneva Conventions codify the precepts of the law and

usages of all civilized nations. Article 31 of the Geneva Convention

provides that labor furnished by prisoners of war shall have no direct

relation to war operations. Thus the convention forbids (1) the use of

prisoners of war in manufacture or transportation of arms or ammunitions

of any kind; and (2) the use for transporting of matériel intended for

combat units. The Hague Regulations contain comparable provisions. The

essence of the crime is the misuse of prisoners of war derived from the

kind of work to which they are assigned, in other words, to work

directly connected with the war effort. The Tribunal holds as a matter

of law that it is illegal to use prisoners of war in armament factories

and factories engaged in the manufacture of airplanes for use in the war

effort.

Now, considering the basic charges and the law governing the charge

against the defendant in which it alleges his responsibility for and

participation in the medical experiment program, the fundamental crime

with which the defendant is charged in this connection is murder. Also

involved are various atrocities, tortures, offenses against the person,

and other inhumane acts. The provisions of Control Council Law No. 10,

which are applicable to this charge, to wit, Article II, are “_b._ War

crimes” and “_c._ Crimes against humanity.” The bill of indictment

charges:

“A. War crimes, namely violations of the laws and customs of war

as to medical experiments performed involuntarily upon persons,

some of whom were prisoners of war and citizens of countries who

were at war with the German Reich, and other deported citizens

from other countries who were at war with the German Reich

involving the commission of murders, tortures, and other

inhumane acts.

“B. Crimes against humanity, namely medical experiments

performed upon involuntary German nationals and nationals of

other countries in the course of which brutalities, murders, and

other inhumane acts were committed.”

The prosecution contends that the defendant Milch did not personally

participate in or personally direct, counsel, or initiate such medical

experiments but that the same was done by members of his command and

that he was personally responsible for their conduct by virtue of the

authority that he held over his subordinates.

In this connection in the recent case before the United States Supreme

Court in re Yamashita, the opinion of which was handed down by the

Supreme Court of the United States at the October term, 1945, of said

Court, some of the pertinent holdings in this case are as follows:

“It is evident that the conduct of military operations by troops

whose excesses are unrestrained by the orders or efforts of

their commander would almost certainly result in violations

which it is the purpose of the law of war to prevent. Its

purpose to protect civilian populations and prisoners of war

from brutality would largely be defeated if the commander of an

invading army could with impunity neglect to take reasonable

measures for their protection. Hence the law of war presupposes

that its violation is to be avoided through the control of the

operations of war by commanders who are to some extent

responsible for their subordinates.

“This is recognized by the annex to Fourth Hague Convention of

1907, respecting the laws and customs of war on land. Article I

lays down the condition which an armed force must fulfill in

order to be accorded the rights of lawful belligerents, that it

must be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.

“These provisions plainly imposed on petitioner, who at the time

specified, was Military Governor of the Philippines, as well as

commander of the Japanese forces, an affirmative duty to take

such measures as were within his power and appropriate in the

circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the civilian

population. This duty of a commanding officer has heretofore

been recognized, and its breach is penalized by our own military

tribunals.

“* * * It is plain that the charge on which petitioner was tried

charged him with a breach of his duty to control the operations

of the members of his command, by permitting them to commit the

specified atrocities. This was enough to require the commission

to hear evidence tending to establish the culpable failure of

the petitioner to perform the duty imposed on him by the law of

war and to pass upon its sufficiency to establish guilt.”

I am of the opinion and find as a fact from the evidence in this case

that the defendant Milch between the years 1939 and 1945 was State

Secretary in the Air Ministry, Inspector General of the Air Force,

Deputy to the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, a member of the Nazi

Party. The defendant Milch was also Field Marshal in the Luftwaffe, 1940

to 1945; Air Quartermaster General, 1941 to 1944; member of the Central

Planning Board, 1942 to 1945; and Chief of the Jaegerstab, 1944 to 1945.

After hearing the evidence of both the prosecution and defense, and

after having heard the arguments of counsel, and after having fully

considered all of the evidence, the following facts are concluded:

COUNT NO. I

_SLAVE LABOR_

That the defendant, Erhard Milch, was born in Germany on 30 March 1892,

that he was a member of the Air Force of the German Army in World War I

and was a contemporary in said air force with Goering, Udet, and others;

that after the termination of World War I he returned to Germany, had a

business and later was connected with the manufacture of civilian

airplanes.

Prior to the outbreak of World War II he became a member of the Nazi

Party and materially aided in the rebuilding of the air force of the

German Reich. Shortly prior to the outbreak of World War II he visited

various countries as a personal emissary of the Fuehrer, Hitler; to

France, England, Holland, Italy and other countries in an effort to

establish so-called permanent peace between the German Reich and these

nations. That on 23 May 1939, the defendant attended a conference for

the purpose of planning World War II with the following present: Hitler,

Goering, Col. Gen. von Brauchitsch, Col. Gen. Keitel, Gen. Halder, Gen.

Bodenschatz, Rear Admiral Schniewind, Col. (GSC.) Jeschonnek, Col.

Warlimont, Lieut. Col. Schmundt, Captain Engel, Lieut. Commander

Albrecht, and Captain v. Below. At the time of this meeting the

defendant held a high position in the German Army, to wit, the rank of

colonel general.[166]

At this meeting the Fuehrer, Hitler, gave his plan of aggressive war,

and in this plan was included the attack of Poland at the first suitable

opportunity; what the struggle would be like; the question of a short or

long war; England’s weakness; the consequences of such a war; the

unrestricted use of all resources available; the plan of attack; and the

working principles of an entire and complete program. Aggressive war was

planned and initiated at this meeting, and the defendant was one of the

high-ranking officers who counseled and approved of the plan.

After the outbreak of the war and the subsequent attack on Poland, the

defendant actively participated in the prosecution of aggressive war

until after the capitulation and fall of France. From that time on he

did not participate as a combat officer but was used in the general

economy for the prosecution of war in Germany, and particularly as to

the building and maintenance of the Luftwaffe. Later he was elevated to

the rank of field marshal in the Luftwaffe and was second in command

only to Goering.

The defendant was a member of the Central Planning Board which was

established and organized in April 1942, and said organization served as

a means of consolidating in a single agency all controls over German war

production. The Central Planning Board held regular meetings, and the

defendant presided over and was present at a majority of such meetings.

The Central Planning Board at each meeting kept full minutes, and a

great number of said minutes have been submitted to the Tribunal and

reflect the fact that the defendant had a dominant role in the meetings

of said board. The scope and authority of the Central Planning Board is

contained in the minutes of a meeting held on 27 April 1942, and the

duties and responsibilities of the board, according to said minutes,

were announced as follows:

“The Central Planning in the Four Year Plan (Decree of the Reich

Marshal of Greater Germany of 22 April 1942) is a task for

leaders. It encompasses only principles and executive matters.

It makes unequivocal decisions and supervises the execution of

its directives. The Central Planning does not rely on anonymous

institutions difficult to control but always on individuals and

fully responsible persons who are free in the selection of their

work methods and their collaboration as far as there are no

directives issued by the Central Planning.”

On 20 October 1942, the statutes of the Central Planning Board were

published and distributed, a portion of which are as follows:

“The Central Planning Board, created by the Fuehrer and the

Reich Marshal in order to unify armament and war economy, deals

only with the decision of basic questions. Professional

questions remain the task of the competent departments, which in

their field remain responsible within the framework of the

decisions made by the Central Planning Board.”

The Central Planning Board was superior to “the highest Reich authority,

the Reich protector, the Governor General, and the executive authorities

in the occupied countries.”

The International Military Tribunal found that the Central Planning

Board “had supreme authority for the scheduling of German production and

the allocation and development of raw materials.” The International

Tribunal found further in its opinion, in the case of United States vs.

Goering and others, “that the Central Planning Board requisitioned labor

from Sauckel with full knowledge that the demands could be supplied only

by foreign forced labor and that the board determined the basic

allocation of this labor within the German war economy.” The

International Military Tribunal found further in its opinion the

following:

“In the fall of 1943 Funk (who was then indicted before said

Tribunal in regard to deportation and the use of foreign forced

labor in the German Reich) was a member of the Central Planning

Board which determined the total number of laborers needed for

German industry, and required Sauckel to produce them, usually

by deportation from occupied territories * * * but Funk was

aware that the board of which he was a member was demanding the

importation of slave laborers, and allocating them to the

various industries under his control.”

The prosecution offered evidence which tended to show that Albert Speer

was the Plenipotentiary for Armament and was the nominal head of the

Central Planning Board and that the defendant was a member of said board

and was, by the order of Hitler, assigned to assist Speer as the head of

said board. During much of the time of the existence of said board Speer

was ill and unable to attend the meetings and look after the duties of

the board and during this time the defendant was the acting head of said

board and presided over its meetings as chairman.

Fritz Sauckel was Plenipotentiary for Labor and was directly responsible

for the procurement and allocation of labor to the various war

industries. However, the Tribunal finds as a fact that although Sauckel

had the primary duty of procuring and allocating labor, the Central

Planning Board on many occasions, as the minutes of the meetings of said

board show, called Milch into conference with the members of the Central

Planning Board and in such conferences labor was assigned and allocated

by the Central Planning Board and Sauckel. The minutes of the Central

Planning Board, as introduced by the prosecution, show that the members

of the Central Planning Board knew and discussed the fact that labor was

being deported from occupied countries against their will and were being

used in various factories manufacturing armaments, airplanes, and other

articles essential and necessary to the war effort, that such foreign

workers were being forcibly taken from their homes without knowledge of

their destination, and by force and against their will, crowded into box

cars without food or water or toilet facilities, transported great

distances, and forced to work in factories manufacturing war materials

and other necessary items for the prosecution of the war as slave

laborers.

I find as a fact that the defendant Milch had knowledge of the way and

manner in which such labor was procured and the work that they were

forced to do, and that he aided, abetted, counseled, advised, and

assisted in the deportation, allocation, and work of said slave

laborers.

The documents and reports of the meetings as offered by the prosecution

are too voluminous to incorporate herein, but said records clearly show

that the defendant was one of the authorized agents who dealt with the

procurement, deportation, and work of thousands and thousands of slave

laborers from occupied countries.

_JAEGERSTAB_

I find as a fact that it was the defendant who conceived and instigated

the formation of the Jaegerstab, and that the defendant directed its

activities and acted as its chairman. The Jaegerstab assumed control

over fighter production and exploited foreign forced labor in the

armament industry and directed the use of the same. The Jaegerstab was

assigned top priority for their projects, for the recruitment and

commitment of manpower in the air armament industry. From the meetings

of said board as offered in evidence by the prosecution, the question of

manpower was time and time again referred to by the defendant. When

other methods of obtaining its labor was not forthcoming, the Jaegerstab

recruited its own labor either directly or by engineering snatching

expeditions for the seizure of manpower arriving on transports from the

East.

At one of the meetings of the Jaegerstab, Prosecution Exhibit 54, page

28, the defendant made this statement to his subordinates, that

“international law cannot be observed here.” When the question of

Italian civilian labor was being discussed at a meeting of the

Jaegerstab, the defendant made the statement and advocated the shooting

of those who attempted to escape in transit.

I find as a fact that the Jaegerstab was not a mere discussion group but

was an agency with absolute authority over fighter production and acted

by orders and directives, fixed hours of labor and conditions of work,

and on one occasion fixed the established hours of work per week in the

aircraft industry at seventy-two hours.

Much of the labor employed by the Jaegerstab in aircraft production and

in the air armament industry was from concentration camp inmates and

foreign forced labor. The defendant was well acquainted with the

procurement and allocation of this labor.

I find as a fact, from the evidence offered in the case, that after the

arrival of forced slave labor from occupied countries they were poorly

fed, poorly clothed, were forced to work an excessive amount of hours

each week, and that their general condition and treatment as a result of

such forced labor resulted in the death of a great many and the

permanent disability of others, both in body and in mind.

_GENERALLUFTZEUGMEISTER_

I find as a fact from the evidence offered in the case, that the

defendant, as Generalluftzeugmeister, had complete control of aircraft

production and that he requisitioned labor for the aircraft industry

with knowledge of the brutal and inhuman techniques in recruiting these

laborers; and that he gave directives for the criminal treatment of the

same in the centers of production. Fritz Sauckel, Plenipotentiary for

Labor, stated that it was “Milch who produced manpower figures for

aviation.” Albert Speer testified as follows: “The requests of the air

armament industry for laborers were presented by Milch, and he did not

permit anyone to take this right away from him until March 1944.”

I find as a fact from the evidence offered on the part of the

prosecution, that prisoners of war were included in the manpower that

the defendant was requisitioning and distributing to the aircraft

industry with full knowledge that they were prisoners of war. As chief

of aircraft production, the defendant regulated the treatment of foreign

forced labor in the German aircraft industry, fixed hours of labor and

conditions of work, and by directives to his subordinates formulated the

basic policy for the handling of such labor within the industry.

The evidence presented by the prosecution tended to show that the

defendant advocated the most extreme measures in dealing with foreign

forced labor, inhuman measures which violated every recognized principle

of decency. When foreign forced laborers refused to work, the defendant

ordered that they be shot. When they attempted to revolt the defendant

directed that some of their numbers be killed, regardless of their

personal guilt or innocence. In the case of prisoners of war who

attempted to escape, the defendant ordered that these prisoners be shot

and later hanged in the factory for all to see. On one occasion the

defendant made the following statement, Prosecution Exhibit 145:

“The other day I talked to Himmler about it, and I told him that

his main task should be to see to the production of German

industry in case of internal uprisings of the foreign workers. I

said that consequently a well established method should exist,

and I have already given orders to the Chief A. W.[167] and to

the training stations to get military training in this field.

If, for instance, in the Locality X an uprising is started, then

a sergeant with a few men, or else a lieutenant with thirty men

has to turn up in the plant, and first of all shoot into the

crowd with a machine gun. What he should do after is to shoot

down as many people as possible in case of revolt. I have given

orders to that effect, and even if our own foreign workers are

involved—and then every tenth man is to be singled out and shot

while the others are lined up and see him.”

On another occasion, Prosecution Exhibit 148, when the defendant was

speaking of the treatment of foreign workers, he made the following

statement.

“In all these matters energetic interference must be made. I am

of the opinion that there should be only two types of punishment

in such cases; firstly, a concentration camp for foreigners, and

secondly, capital punishment.”

The prosecution offered a great number of documents containing

statements made by the defendant in regard to orders and threats of

violence, for mistreatment and punishment, tortures, killings, and

hangings of foreign workers. Space is too short to quote in this

judgment all of such pertinent documents.

Although the defendant denied making a number of these statements

appearing in the documents, he admitted the authenticity and utterances

of many, with the excuse that he was a man of very violent temper, who,

when worried from overwork, was not wholly responsible for many

utterances made by him. He protested further that he did not actually

mean nor intend for orders given in such fits of temper to be carried

out, but they were simply the result of uncontrolled anger, and

understood by his associates and subordinates to have been uttered in

such vein. In further extenuation he declared that head injuries

resulting from two serious accidents were largely responsible for such

uncontrollable temper.

I have given due consideration to the explanation given by the defendant

and am compelled to reject it. If but only a few of such remarks could

be attributed to the defendant, his protestations might be given some

credence; but when statements such as appear in the documents have been

persistently made over long periods of time, at many places and under

such varying conditions, the only logical conclusion that can be reached

is that they reflect the true and considered attitude of the defendant

toward the Nazi foreign labor policy and its victims and are not mere

aberrations brought on by fits of uncontrollable anger. I find as a

fact, therefore, that the true attitude of the defendant toward foreign

laborers and prisoners of war is that reflected in the documents of the

prosecution and was not the result of uncontrollable fits of temper. I

find, further, that the defendant ordered, advised, counselled, and

procured inhumane and illegal treatment of foreign workers resulting in

permanent injury and death to many.

COUNT NO. 2

_MEDICAL EXPERIMENTS_

The prosecution contends that in violation of the laws of war and of

crimes against humanity, high-altitude and freezing experiments were

carried out by the Luftwaffe physicians at Dachau, and that said

physicians who conducted such experiments were under the command of and

subordinate to the defendant Milch.

I am of the opinion from the evidence offered on the part of the

prosecution that illegal and inhuman medical experiments were conducted

at Dachau by Luftwaffe physicians who were under the command and

subordinate to the defendant Milch and from which a great number of

deaths ensued to concentration camp inmates and that great pain and

suffering and permanent disability resulted to many others. I find as a

fact from the evidence offered on the part of the prosecution that Dr.

Erich Hippke was the Medical Inspector of the Luftwaffe and was the

direct subordinate of the defendant Milch; that Hippke gave authority

and ordered Dr. Rascher, a Luftwaffe physician, in the early spring of

1941 to use concentration camp inmates and prisoners of war as

high-altitude experimental subjects for the benefit of the Luftwaffe. I

further find, as a fact, that the witness Hippke at no time communicated

this information to the defendant Milch, nor has the prosecution offered

any direct evidence to the effect that the defendant Milch knew that

such experiments had been conducted until after their completion. All of

the testimony and the evidence, both for the prosecution and the

defense, is to the effect that the defendant Milch did not have such

knowledge of the high-altitude or low-pressure experiments which were

carried out and completed by Luftwaffe physicians at Dachau until after

the completion of such experiments. The evidence offered as to the

knowledge or responsibility of the defendant Milch was not of such a

nature as to show guilty knowledge on his part of said experiments.

As to the cooling or freezing experiments performed at concentration

camp, Dachau, for which the defendant is charged with responsibility, I

find as a fact that the defendant ordered experiments to be conducted at

the camp for the benefit of the Luftwaffe. In a letter from Milch to

Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff of the SS, dated 20 May 1942, the following is

stated:

“In reference to your telegram of 12 May our medical inspector

reports to me that the altitude experiments carried out by the

SS and Luftwaffe at Dachau have been finished. Any continuation

of these experiments seems essentially unreasonable. However,

the carrying out of experiments of some other kind in regard to

perils at high sea would be important. These have been prepared

in immediate agreement with the proper offices. Oberstabsarzt

Weltz will be charged with the execution and Stabsarzt Rascher

will be made available until further order in addition to his

duties with the medical corps of the Luftwaffe. A change of

these measures does not appear necessary and an enlargement of

the task is not considered pressing at this time.”

Further evidence makes it manifestly plain that subsequent to the

receipt of the letter of Wolff, officers of the Luftwaffe, under the

command and subordinate to the defendant, conducted medical experiments

on concentration camp inmates at Dachau, against their will, by placing

such experimental subjects in tanks of water of freezing temperatures,

and requiring them to remain there for long periods of time while

certain medical data concerning such subjects was gathered; and that as

a result of such experiments, many of the human subjects died or were

gravely injured.

The defendant admits giving orders for the conduct of experiments within

the scope of the authority conferred by the letter, but contends that he

did not know of, or contemplate, that the experiments would be conducted

in an illegal manner or would result in the injury or death of any

person. The defendant further asserts that he did not know or have any

reason to believe that the experiments were conducted in such manner

until after they had been completed. He therefore insists that he was

and is not responsible for the unlawful manner in which the experiments

were actually conducted by the Luftwaffe officers, and that he is not

guilty of any crime as a result thereof.

The Tribunal, in its majority opinion, has fully considered the decision

of the United States Supreme Court in the judgment in re Yamashita, and

has found that said decision is not controlling in the case at bar. In

weighing the evidence, the Tribunal was mindful of the fact that the

defendant gave the order and directed his subordinates to carry on such

experiments, and that thereafter he failed and neglected to take such

measures as were reasonably within his power to protect such subjects

from inhumane treatment and deaths as a result of such experiments.

Notwithstanding these facts, the Tribunal is of the opinion that the

evidence fails to disclose beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

had any knowledge that the experiments would be conducted in an unlawful

manner and that permanent injury, inhumane treatment or deaths would

result therefrom.

Therefore, the Tribunal found that the defendant did not have such

knowledge as would amount to participation or responsibility on his part

and therefore found the defendant not guilty on charges contained in

count 2.

CONCLUSIONS

(1) I concur in the opinion of the Tribunal that war crimes and crimes

against humanity were committed by the defendant, including deportation,

enslavement, and mistreatment of millions of persons; and that as a

result thereof and in furtherance of such treatment, murders,

brutalities, cruelties, tortures, atrocities, and other inhumane acts

were committed in a large scale measure upon citizens of occupied

countries, prisoners of war, Jews, and other nationals. I agree further

that the defendant was a principal in, accessory to, ordered, abetted,

and took a consenting part therein. I also agree that for such acts and

conduct on the part of the defendant, he is guilty of charges contained

in count number one of the indictment.

The evidence produced during the trial upon the charges contained in

this count showed conclusively that countless millions of persons were

unlawfully deported, enslaved, and murdered. Especially were the Jews

mistreated, tortured and murdered merely because they were Jews and

their extermination desired. History discloses the fact that as early as

the year 1349 in the city of Nuernberg, and within sight of where this

opinion is being written, the citizens of Nuernberg drove the Jews from

their city, confiscated their property, and erected a market place on

the site of the Ghetto and the Liebfrauenkirche in place of the

Synagogue. The hatred of the Aryan German for the Jew seems to have been

constant during the many intervening years. History will record such

conduct as a blot upon the name of the present German generation for

many years to come.

(2) The Tribunal found the defendant not guilty of the charges contained

in count number two, and I concur in such finding.

Under the American concept of liberty, as brought to us by our

Anglo-Saxon heritage and the English Common Law, every person accused of

crime is presumed to be innocent until proof of his guilt is established

by the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt. This presumption follows

him throughout the trial and until he is found guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt. In applying this God-given principle of liberty, one

eminent American jurist uttered the following words:

“After considering and weighing all of the evidence you then

find that your minds are disturbed, your convictions

tempest-tossed, and your judgment, like the dove of the deluge,

finds no place to rest; the law says you must acquit.”

The defendant was given the full benefit of these great and lasting

rules of law and has received at the hands of the Tribunal a fair and

impartial trial in full accord with the American concepts of justice

under the law.

(3) Count three of the indictment charges the defendant with crimes

against “German nationals and nationals of other countries.” I am of the

opinion that sufficient evidence was not produced by the prosecution to

justify an adjudication by the Tribunal of guilt as to German nationals

alone. However, as to such crimes against nationals of other countries,

the Tribunal has heretofore considered such charges and has made an

adjudication concerning the same in count number one of the indictment.

The conclusion of the Tribunal is that the same unlawful acts of

violence which constituted war crimes under count one of the indictment

also constitute crimes against humanity as alleged in count three of the

indictment. Therefore, the Tribunal found the defendant guilty of crimes

against humanity under count three, with which finding I concur.

In weighing the evidence, the Tribunal simulated the ancient customs of

using the seed of the oriental carob tree to balance the scales of

justice. The defendant should not now complain.

Therefore, for the reasons stated, I am in full agreement with the

judgment of the Tribunal and concur therein.

Respectfully submitted this the 15th day of April, 1947

[Signed] FITZROY D. PHILLIPS

Fitzroy D. Phillips

Judge, Military Tribunal No. II

-----

[166] See Table of Comparative Ranks, p. 331.

[167] Chef Ausbildungswesen (Chief of Training).

VIII. PETITIONS

A. Extract from Petition for Clemency to Military

Governor of United States Zone of Occupation

Nuernberg, 2 May 1947

To the Military Governor

PETITION

of

Attorney-at-law Dr. Friedrich Bergold,

Nuernberg, Prinzregenten-Ufer 7/III,

Defense Counsel, Military Court II

Nuernberg

in Case II against the defendant

Erhard Milch, General Field Marshal,

at present in the Court Prison, Nuernberg,

to modify the sentence of the Military Court II

Nuernberg

on 16/17 April 1947.

* * * * *

A

The sentence passed on counts I and III contains actual inaccuracies,

which are inconsistent with the recorded evidence. Obviously, these

errors have had an influence on the sentence as far as the award of

punishment is concerned. A correction of these errors would necessarily

lead to a less severe sentence.

1. The statements on page 3 of the judgment that Milch since 19 November

1941 was the second highest commander of the Luftwaffe is not in

agreement with the evidence. The witnesses have testified that from

1938-1941 Milch held only one of the four highest commanding posts under

Goering, and since 1941 two of the four highest Luftwaffe commanding

posts. Only in regard to seniority he was the oldest officer of these

four highest commands. This is important because evidence has been given

for the fact that the general staff of the Luftwaffe had the

responsibility for the armament program of the Luftwaffe.

2. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that the Central Planning

Board had been created by a decree of the Fuehrer of 29 October 1943. It

has been proved by the statement of Speer that the decree of 29 October

1943 was a decree issued by Speer a long time after the creation of the

Central Planning Board and without authorization of the defendant Milch.

Since this decree was issued by Speer for his sphere of administration

only, no conclusion can be drawn therefrom against the defendant.

3. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that the Court finds that

the Central Planning Board handled the labor problem as such. Exhibit

151 of the prosecution proved the opposite. The witnesses who have been

heard have confirmed that the Central Planning Board handled the labor

problem only for information purposes for the distribution and

production of raw materials and in order to clarify the untrue

statements of Sauckel. This Exhibit 151 constitutes essential new

evidence which is of greatest importance in regard to the verdict of the

International Military Tribunal.

4. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that the defendant had

admitted having seen Russian prisoners of war at service at 8.8 and 10.5

cm. antiaircraft guns in aircraft factories in Luftgau 7. The witness

Vorwald made this statement on the basis of his own observation.

It has been proved that Milch had nothing to do with the allocation of

Russians to the antiaircraft artillery (flak), and that he declared

himself against it.

5. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that Milch said that

Russian prisoners of war had volunteered for work in war plants. What he

did state—and this was in agreement with the witnesses Vorwald and

Foerster—was that Russian prisoners of war had volunteered for service

at the antiaircraft artillery (flak), with the reservation that they

would not be used for combatting Russian airplanes. This condition was

fulfilled. Thus, there is no question of an inadmissible use of

prisoners of war for war service.

6. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that Sauckel, the

Plenipotentiary for the Allocation of Labor, participated in at least 15

sessions of the Central Planning Board. Only 15 minutes concerning the

sessions [minutes of 15 sessions] of the Central Planning Board have

been submitted. These minutes prove that Sauckel was not present at most

of these sessions.

7. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that the defendant was

informed about the methods employed and the cruelties on the occasion of

the recruiting and utilization of foreign workers. All witnesses who

have been heard have stated the opposite. It is therefore not

permissible to assume without the basis of exact proof that Milch was

informed about these matters. The Court concludes from the fact that

foreign workers and prisoners of war had been used that Milch must

necessarily have recognized that the methods must have been cruel. Speer

has stated explicitly that the cruel methods were not necessary and

that, therefore, they were an error. But if they were not necessary then

the conclusion drawn from them without any explicit proof was not

permissible.

8. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that 100,000 Polish

prisoners of war were deported to concentration camps. The opposite has

been proved, viz., that Polish prisoners of war, in accordance with the

agreement between Russia and Germany were released from captivity and

employed as civilians.

9. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that Romanian nationals

were subjected to deportation. Not one single piece of evidence for that

has been submitted. Romania was mentioned by the defense only in

connection with the armistice agreement between Russia and Romania.

10. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that Milch used

Hungarian Jews. It is proved by the evidence that this did not happen

before the summer of 1944 when Milch had resigned from his positions.

11. It is not consistent with recorded evidence that the Schmundt

minutes must be correct, for the reason that if any allusion to a war

had been omitted, Hitler would not have spoken at all. It has been

proven that Hitler spoke merely theoretically about the world situation

in case there should be a war at some time. He did not mention that he

wanted to foment aggressive wars.

B

The judgment states that the defendant recommended more drastic and more

cruel measures in regard to the recruiting and utilization of workers.

(Page 18 of the judgment.)

This is in discrepancy with the recorded evidence.

Here the defense does not argue about the separate reasons given by

Judge Michael A. Musmanno, since these reasons do not constitute the

official judgment. These reasons also contain factual errors and even

use material which has not been discussed during the trial.

These separate reasons, however, make it possible to draw a conclusion

in regard to the sentence of the judgment which states that the

defendant recommended more drastic and more cruel measures.

It has been proved through the evidence that utterances to that effect

were made by the defendant only in smaller circles and while he was in a

state of excitement. It has been proved that no action was ever taken in

conformity with these utterances. It has been proved that the defendant

never asked for action pursuant to such utterances. It has been proved

that he did not have any executive power in regard to any measures

whatsoever. It has finally been proved that the record concerning such

utterances must in part be incorrect.

Therefore, it has not been proved that the defendant approved such

cruelties or demanded them in earnest.

C

The objection must be raised that the Military Tribunal did not clarify

at all the legal questions which were raised by the defense in

connection with the fact that the Russian Government has explicitly

renounced the Hague Convention concerning Land Warfare and the previous

Geneva Conventions. Since the Decree Number 7 of the Military Government

for Germany provides, in Article XV, that reasons have to be given for

the sentence, the Tribunal would have had to state its position in

regard to these questions. This also constitutes a defectiveness of the

verdict and this defect may possibly have had an influence on the award

of the punishment.

D

The Military Tribunal has extensively referred on page 14 and 15 to the

verdict of the International Military Tribunal against Speer. The

Tribunal has therefore made the reasons of the International Military

Tribunal its own to a large extent.

But consequently the Military Tribunal would have had to examine the

problem of extenuating circumstances. The defense has already pointed

out that the fact that he organized protected factories constituted for

Speer an extenuating circumstance. During the trial it has been clearly

proved that Milch was the first who already in 1941 organized protected

factories, and that he was, therefore, the inventor of this kind of

employment.

The problem of extenuating circumstances involves further the

examination of the question, whether Milch had more to do with the

utilization of foreign workers and prisoners of war than Speer. This

examination was omitted. Exhibit Milch 55 and also all the evidence

proved that Speer’s participation in the utilization of foreign workers

and prisoners of war was considerably more extensive.

If the Tribunal had examined the extenuating circumstances, then the

result would undoubtedly have been that the defendant would have been

allowed extenuating circumstances on a large scale. Due to the fact that

the responsibility of Speer was greater than that of Milch, Milch should

not have received a more severe sentence than Speer.

Consideration should also have been given to the fact that it was proved

that Milch continually advocated restrictions in the employment of

foreign workers and of prisoners of war, and that he did indeed succeed

in achieving such restrictions.

Finally, consideration should also have been given to the fact that

Milch withdrew from his positions as early as spring and summer 1944,

and that he had nothing to do with the extraordinary aggravation of all

conditions which took place toward the end of the war.

This weighs more than what Speer did—the nonexecution of some insane

orders which Hitler issued at the end of the war in 1945.

This consideration too should have led the Tribunal to a much less

severe sentence. The fact that this was not taken into consideration is

therefore made a part of this petition.

(Signed) DR. BERGOLD

B. Petition to the Supreme Court of the United States

for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Erhard Milch,

Petitioner _vs._ United States of America

Nuernberg, 2 May 1947

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Application for Leave to File Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I, the undersigned Erhard Milch, have been charged in Case No. II before

the Military Court No. II Nuernberg of illegally, deliberately, and

intentionally having committed war crimes and crimes against humanity,

as defined in Control Council Law No. 10 Article II, viz. the following:

_Count One of the Indictment._ War crimes, including murder, slave

labor, deportation of the civilian population for slave labor, cruel and

inhuman treatment of foreign workers, and the employment of prisoners of

war by force and duress in actions connected with warfare.

_Count Two of the Indictment._ War crimes, including murder, whereby

involuntary victims were exposed to sub-pressure and cold, experiments

resulting in torture and death.

_Count Three of the Indictment._ Crimes against humanity, including

murder and the unlawful acts listed in counts one and two of the

indictment, committed against Germans and foreigners.

(page 2 of original)

I have been acquitted on count II of the indictment and found guilty by

the sentence passed by the Military Court II on 16/17 April 1947 in

respect of counts I and III of the indictment, and am condemned

therefore to lifelong imprisonment.

I hereby make application for the sentence of the Military Court II

passed on 16/17 April 1947 to be completely quashed, as being

inadmissible according to Articles 63 and 64 of the Geneva Convention of

1929.

_Substantiation_

Decree No. 7 of the Military Government of Germany concerning the

constitution and competency of certain military courts, constitutes a

violation of Article 63 of the Geneva Convention of 1929, insofar as

Decree No. 7 is applied to prisoners of war as well, and in its Article

II appoints special courts for passing sentences on prisoners of war.

Article 63 of the Geneva Convention of 1929 lays down, “Sentence against

a prisoner of war may only be passed by the same courts and according to

the same procedure as a sentence against persons belonging to the

fighting forces of the country where he is a prisoner”. A field marshal

is equal to a five-star general of the United States of America. The

present Court consisted of three judges, of which not one has the

military rank which I have. It therefore does not correspond to the

court which, according to the laws of the United States of America,

could pass sentence on a five-star general. The authority of the present

Court is, however, expressly recognized by me.

Furthermore, Decree No. 7 of the Military Government of Germany

constitutes a violation in Article XV of Article 64 of the Geneva

Convention of 1929, because Article XV declares the sentence of the

court in finding the defendant guilty, to be final and incontestable.

Article 64 of the Geneva Convention of 1929 stipulates that prisoners of

war must be allowed to employ the same legal means against a verdict as

are granted to members of the fighting forces

(page 3 of original)

of the country where they are detained.

The rules laid down by the Geneva Convention of 1929 represent

compulsory international law of a universal character and cannot be

altered either by a signatory power alone or by an agreement between

several signatory powers, but only by the consent of all signatory

powers. In no case may they be altered by a decree of Military

Government, not even by a decree of the Control Council. The rights of a

prisoner of war, which are based upon the regulations of the Geneva

Convention of 1929, can neither be waived nor cancelled.

The violation of the regulations of the Geneva Convention has now come

about with the passing of sentence and the now existing restrictions

placed in the way of contesting the verdict, not already by the trial as

such.

I am still a prisoner of war. I have not been released from captivity. I

am therefore still under the protection of the Geneva Convention, the

same as before.

The violation of the Geneva Convention is all the more serious, in that

I am still a prisoner of war of the British. True, the defense counsel

was told at the beginning of the trial in reply to an express question,

that my transfer to the jurisdiction of the United States of America was

already effected, but it was not proved until the conclusion of the

passing of sentence. That should have been absolutely necessary.

After the serving of the indictment and the beginning of the actual

trial, an attempt was made on 4 January 1947 to gain my veiled consent

to my release without saying anything, whereby I was asked to accept

release money. On the receipt, however, I expressly noted, “Without

recognizing my release”. I declared that release by American officers

was not

(page 4 of original)

permissible at that moment and moreover a German field marshal could not

be released in any case under existing German law.

After this explanation on my part, the American major conducting the

proceedings revealed to me that another separate release proceeding

would have to be carried out against me then.

Thereby it is clear that I am still a prisoner of war today. At any

rate, I was when the trial begun and therefore in accordance with

Article 60 of the Geneva Convention the protecting power for German

prisoners of war, viz., Switzerland, should have been informed of the

proceedings. This too constitutes a violation of the Geneva Convention

of 1929. If the public prosecution authorities, however, were to refer

to the fact that I was released after the trial had begun, then they

should be confronted with the assertion that such a release is invalid.

It would represent nothing but an evasion of the regulations of the

Geneva Convention of 1929. I was not set at large for a single day. But

that is demanded by a release from captivity as a prisoner of war. A

release from captivity as a prisoner of war while maintaining captivity

would be a release in fraudem legis.

Therefore the sentence constitutes a violation of international law. At

the same time this violation is also a violation of the Habeas Corpus

Act. None, under whatever pretext, may be deprived of the rights of

legal proceedings and of a legal judge.

I therefore request the Supreme Court in Washington to examine whether

the Decree No. 7 of the Military Government of Germany may be applied in

my case, and whether, with due regard to the regulations of Article

60-65 of the Geneva Convention, the present Military Court II

(page 5 of original)

Nuernberg was in a position to pass sentence on me.

Furthermore I enclose a copy of my petition to the Governor-General

[Military Governor of U. S. Zone of Occupation].

[Signed] ERHARD MILCH

[Note: Another petition with the same text was submitted to the

United States Supreme Court by Dr. Bergold, Defense Counsel.]

IX. AFFIRMATION OF SENTENCE BY THE

MILITARY GOVERNOR OF THE UNITED

STATES ZONE OF OCCUPATION

Military Tribunal II, Case No. 2

In the Case of

The United States of America

_vs._

Erhard Milch, Defendant

_Order with Respect to Sentence_

In the case of the United States of America against Erhard Milch, tried

by United States Military Tribunal II, Case 2, Nuernberg, Germany, the

defendant on 17 April 1947 was sentenced by the Tribunal to be

transported to the Rebdorf Prison and there confined for the remainder

of his natural life. A petition to modify the sentence, filed on behalf

of the defendant by Dr. Friedrich Bergold, his defense counsel, has been

referred to me pursuant to delegation by the Military Governor under the

provisions of Article XXIII of Military Government Ordinance No. 7 and

paragraph 6_b_ of Regulation No. 1 under said Ordinance. I have duly

considered the petition and the record of the trial, and in accordance

with Article XVII of said Ordinance and paragraph 6_b_ of said

Regulation it is hereby ordered that—

The sentence imposed by Military Tribunal II, upon Erhard Milch be, and

hereby is, in all respects affirmed.

[Signed] FRANK A. KEATING

FRANK A. KEATING

Major General USA

Deputy Military Governor

17 June 1947

X. ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME

COURT, 20 OCTOBER 1947, DENYING

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Present: Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Reed,

Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Murphy, Mr.

Justice Jackson, Mr. Justice Rutledge, and Mr. Justice Burton.

No. 50, Misc. Erhard Milch, petitioner, _vs._ The United States of

America. The motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus

is denied. Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Murphy,

and Mr. Justice Rutledge are of the opinion that the petition should be

set for hearing on the question of the jurisdiction of this Court. Mr.

Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this

application.

APPENDIX

List of Witnesses in Case 2

[NOTE.—With the exception of Constantin von Neurath, Erich

Raeder, and Albert Speer, all witnesses in this case appeared

before the Tribunal. Prosecution witnesses are designated by the

letter “P,” defense witnesses by the letter “D”, Tribunal

witness by the letter “T”. The name not preceded by any

designation represents the defendant testifying in his own

behalf. Extracts from testimony in this Case are listed in the

index of documents and testimonies.]

Name │ Date of Testimony │ Pages

│ │ (mimeographed

│ │ transcript)

D ALEXANDER, Dr. Leo │14 Feb 47 │1074-1092

D BECKER-FREYSENG, Hermann │14 Feb 47 │1061-1066

D BRANDT, Rudolf │24 Feb 47 │1330-1354

D BRAUCHITSCH, Berndt von │20 Feb 47 │1271-1289

D DORSCH, Xaver │24 Feb 47 │1361-1379

D ENGEL, Gerhard │24 Feb 47 │1355-1361

D ESCHENAUER, Artur │13 Feb 47 │980-996

D FELMY, Helmut │20 Feb 47 │1290-1296

P FERRIER, Roland │5, 6 Mar 47 │1481-1548

D FOERSTER, Helmut │12 Feb 47 │915-938

D HERTEL, Walter │12 Feb 47 │944-979

D HIPPKE, Erich │7, 11 Feb 47 │759-870

D KOENIG, Max │17 Feb 47 │1189-1204

D KOERNER, Paul │5 Feb 47 │652-710

P KRYSIAK, Joseph │21 Mar 47 │2362-2376

P LE FRIEC, Paul │6 Mar 47 │1550-1584

T LICHTENSTEIN, Walter │3 Mar 47 │1428-1432

MILCH, Erhard │11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18,│1696-2276

│ 19, 20 Mar 47 │

D NEFF, Walter │12 Feb 47 │939-943

D NEURATH, Constantin von │19 Feb 47 │1440-1443

D PENDELE, Max │18 Feb 47 │1205-1227

D RAEDER, Erich │4 Mar 47 │1434-1439

D REINECKE, Hermann │20 Mar 47 │2277-2287

D RICHTER, Karl Eitel │11 Feb 47 │871-900

D ROEDER, Manfred │3 Mar 47 │1381-1403

D ROMBERG, Hans Wolfgang │14 Feb 47 │1021A-1050

D RUFF, Siegfried │14, 17 Feb 47 │1092-1122

D SCHMELTER, Fritz │6, 7 Feb 47 │717-759

D SCHNIEWIND, Otto │24 Feb 47 │1307-1329

D SCHROEDER, Oskar │ │(withdrawn)

D SIEVERS, Wolfram │14 Feb 47 │1050-1057

D SPEER, Albert │17, 19 Feb 47 │1136-1186; 1445-1457

D VORWALD, Wolfgang │10, 11, 20, 21 Mar 47 │1586-1696; 2287-2340

D WARLIMONT, Walter │20 Feb 47 │1296-1299

D WELTZ, Georg August │14 Feb 47 │1066-1072

D WOLFF, Karl │18 Feb 47 │1228-1268

INDEX OF DOCUMENTS AND TESTIMONY

Document No. Exhibit No. Description Page

EC-68 Pros. Ex. 6 Letter from the Ministry of Finance 389

and Economics of Baden, 6 March

1941, containing directives

regarding the treatment of Polish

farm workers.

EC-194 Pros. Ex. 8 Memorandum of Keitel, 31 October 1941, 393

concerning the use of PW’s in the

armament industry.

F-824 Pros. Ex. 57 Order of Field Marshal von Kluge 542

regarding compulsory recruitment of

labor in the West, 25 July 1944.

L-61 Pros. Ex. 20 Letter from Sauckel to the presidents 413

of Labor Offices, 26 November 1942,

concerning deportation and

employment of Poles and Jews.

L-79 Pros. Ex. 3 Extract from minutes of Fuehrer 387

conference, 23 May 1939.

NI-1098 Pros. Ex. 63 Extracts from affidavit of Fritz 456

Sauckel, 22 September 1946,

regarding the jurisdiction of the

Central Planning Board.

NO-219 Pros. Ex. 83 Letter from Dr. Rudolf Brandt to Dr. 626

Rascher, 27 April 1942, concerning

medical experiment report for

Himmler and Milch.

NO-261 Pros. Ex. 89 Letter from Milch to Dr. Hippke, 4 626

June 1942, concerning availability

of low pressure air chamber for

experiments.

NO-262 Pros. Ex. 119 Letter from Dr. Hippke to SS 631

Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff, 6 March

1943, concerning Rascher’s transfer

to the Waffen SS.

NOKW-017 Pros. Ex. 54 Extracts from the minutes of the 527

conference with Air Force Engineers

and Chief Quartermasters under

chairmanship of Milch, 25 March

1944.

NOKW-041 Pros. Ex. 113 Sworn statement by Hermann Goering, 27 625

September 1946, concerning Milch’s

position as Inspector General of the

Luftwaffe.

NOKW-180 Pros. Ex. 155 Extracts from stenographic notes on 613

the conference at the Reich

Marshal’s on Thursday, 4 November

1943, 11 o’clock at the Junkers

Plant in Dessau.

NOKW-195 Pros. Ex. 143 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 608

conference with Goering, 28 October

1943.

NOKW-245 Pros. Ex. 157 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 606

conference with Goering, 22 February

1943, regarding plans for airplane

construction.

NOKW-247 Pros. Ex. 61 Appointment of Field Marshal Milch as 540

Goering’s plenipotentiary for the

intensification of air force

armament in June 1944.

NOKW-261 Pros. Ex. 70 Chart of the organization of the 535

Jaegerstab drawn by Saur with letter

of transmittal to prosecution staff,

14 November 1946.

NOKW-266 Pros. Ex. 76 Affidavit of Fritz Schmelter, 19 559

November 1946, concerning the

organization of the Jaegerstab.

NOKW-269 Pros. Ex. 59 A short curriculum vitae of Field 633

Marshal Erhard Milch.

NOKW-286 Pros. Ex. 144 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 605

GL-Conference, 1 September 1942.

NOKW-287 Pros. Ex. 49 Letter from Milch to Sauckel, 8 April 499

1943, concerning the protection of

industry.

NOKW-311 Pros. Ex. 62 Extract from interrogation of Hermann 597

Goering on 6 September 1946,

regarding Milch’s position as

Generalluftzeugmeister (GL).

NOKW-320 Pros. Ex. 73 Extract from interrogation of Karl 558

Otto Saur on 13 November 1946,

concerning the use of concentration

camp prisoners in Jaegerstab

construction.

NOKW-334 Pros. Ex. 75 Extract from transcript of 550

stenographic minutes of the

Jaegerstab Conference of 25 April

1944.

NOKW-334 Def. Ex. 16 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 564

the Jaegerstab Conference, 25 April

1944.

NOKW-336 Pros. Ex. 75 Extracts from transcript of 555

stenographic minutes of the

Jaegerstab Conference on 26 May

1944.

NOKW-336 Def. Ex. 23 Excerpts from the stenographic minutes 566

of the Jaegerstab Conference on

Friday, 26 May 1944, at 10:00

o’clock.

NOKW-337 Pros. Ex. 75 Extracts from transcript of 544

stenographic minutes of the

Jaegerstab Conference of 6 March

1944.

NOKW-337 Def. Ex. 12 Excerpts from the stenographic minutes 561

of the Jaegerstab Conference on 6

March 1944 in the Reich Air

Ministry.

NOKW-338 Pros. Ex. 75 Extracts from transcript of 545

stenographic minutes of the

Jaegerstab Conference on Friday, 17

March 1944.

NOKW-338 Def. Ex. 13 Excerpts from the stenographic minutes 562

of the Jaegerstab Conference

presided over by Field Marshal Milch

on Friday, 17 March 1944, 1100

hours, in the Reich Air Ministry.

NOKW-346 Pros. Ex. 75 Extracts from transcript of 546

stenographic minutes of the

Jaegerstab Conference under

chairmanship of Field Marshal Milch

on Monday, 20 March 1944.

NOKW-359 Pros. Ex. 75 Extracts from transcript of 557

stenographic minutes of the

Jaegerstab Conference on 27 June

1944.

NOKW-361 Pros. Ex. 75 Extract from transcript of 554

stenographic minutes of the

Jaegerstab Conference during the 6th

journey of the “Hubertus

Undertaking” from 8-10 May 1944.

NOKW-362 Pros. Ex. 75 Extracts from transcript of 552

stenographic minutes of Jaegerstab

Conference on the occasion of the

5th trip of the “Hubertus

Undertaking”, 2 and 3 May 1944.

NOKW-365 Def. Ex. 15 Extract from the stenographic minutes 563

of the Jaegerstab Conference, 12

April 1944.

NOKW-388 Pros. Ex. 75 Extracts from transcript of 547

stenographic minutes of the

Jaegerstab Conference of 28 March

1944.

NOKW-390 Pros. Ex. 75 Extract from transcript of 553

stenographic minutes of the

Jaegerstab Conference of 4 May 1944.

NOKW-406 Pros. Ex. 138 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 599

the GL-Conference, 7 July 1942.

NOKW-407 Pros. Ex. 137 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 599

GL-Conference, 27 May 1942.

NOKW-408 Pros. Ex. 139 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 600

GL-Conference, 28 July 1942.

NOKW-409 Pros. Ex. 140 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 601

GL-Conference, 4 August 1942.

NOKW-412 Pros. Ex. 141 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 602

GL-Conference, 18 August 1942.

NOKW-416 Pros. Ex. 142 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 602

GL-Conference, 26 August 1942.

NOKW-418 Pros. Ex. 136 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 598

GL-Conference, 5 May 1942.

NOKW-442 Pros. Ex. 75 Extract from transcript of 554

stenographic minutes of the

Jaegerstab Conference on 5 May 1944.

NOKW-442 Def. Ex. 21 Extract from the stenographic minutes 565

of the Jaegerstab Conference, 5 May

1944.

NOKW-449 Pros. Ex. 148 Extracts from stenographic minutes of 607

GL-Conference, 2 March 1943.

016-PS Pros. Ex. 13 Letter from Sauckel to Rosenberg, 24 405

April 1942, and extracts from report

on Sauckel’s labor mobilization

program, 20 April 1942.

084-PS Pros. Ex. 16-A Extracts from interdepartmental report 408

of the Ministry for Occupied Eastern

Territories, 30 September 1942,

concerning the status of Eastern

laborers.

204-PS Pros. Ex. 39 Extracts from memorandum of a 424

conference, 18 February 1944,

concerning the release of indigenous

labor for purposes of the Reich.

208-PS Pros. Ex. 55 Report by Sauckel, 7 July 1944, on the 428

accomplishments of labor

mobilization in the first half of

1944.

265-PS Pros. Ex. 35 Extracts from report by Leyser to 423

Rosenberg, 30 June 1943, on

conditions in the district Zhitomir.

294-PS Pros. Ex. 19-A Extracts from top secret memorandum, 411

signed by Braeutigam, 25 October

1942, concerning effects of slave

labor program.

407-II-PS Def. Ex. 3 Report from Sauckel to Hitler, 10 439

March 1943, concerning difficulties

originating from the draft of

manpower in former Soviet

territories.

407-V-PS Pros. Ex. 30 Extracts from letter from Sauckel to 418

Hitler, 14 April 1943, concerning

labor questions.

407-IX-PS Pros. Ex. 33 Letter from Sauckel to Hitler, 3 June 420

1943, concerning foreign labor

situation.

1063-D-PS Pros. Ex. 21 Extract from order of Mueller, 17 415

December 1942, concerning prisoners

qualified for work to be sent to

concentration camps.

1206-PS Pros. Ex. 9 Outlines of directives of Goering 395

regarding the employment of PW’s in

the armament industry, 7 November

1941.

1510-PS Pros. Ex. 58 Extracts from decree of 16 September 450

1943, defining the duties of the

Planning Office of the Central

Planning Board.

1526-PS Pros. Ex. 25 Extracts from letter from 416

German-appointed Ukrainian main

committee to Frank, February 1943.

1584-III-PS Pros. Ex. 71 Correspondence between Himmler and 537

Goering, 9 March 1944, concerning

the use of concentration camp

prisoners in the aircraft industry.

1607-A-PS Pros. Ex. 115 Letter from Himmler to Milch, 25 628

August 1942, concerning Dr.

Rascher’s report on high-altitude

experiments.

1607-B-PS Pros. Ex. 115 Letter from Dr. Rascher to Dr. Brandt, 627

20 July 1942, concerning report on

high-altitude experiments.

1617-PS Pros. Ex. 111 Letter from Himmler to Milch, 13 629

November 1942, concerning Rascher’s

transfer to the Waffen SS.

3000-PS Pros. Ex. 34 Extracts from report rendered to 422

Riecke, Ministerialdirektor in the

Ministry of Agriculture, 28 June

1943, on experiences in political

and economic problems in the East.

3005-PS Pros. Ex. 7 Extracts from letter from the Reich 392

Labor Ministry to presidents of

Regional Labor Offices, 26 August

1941, concerning the use of French

and Russian PW’s.

3040-PS Pros. Ex. 10 Extracts from secret order of Himmler, 399

20 February 1942, concerning the

commitment and treatment of manpower

from the East.

3721-PS Pros. Ex. 41-A Testimony of Fritz Sauckel, 22 452

September 1945, regarding the

jurisdiction of the Central Planning

Board.

3819-PS Pros. Ex. 56 Minutes of a conference on 11 July 430

1944 attended by Milch, concerning

the labor problem.

R-103 Pros. Ex. 40 Extracts from a letter from the 426

(German-appointed) Polish main

committee to the General Government

of Poland on the conditions of

Polish workers in Germany, 17 May

1944.

R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-B Stenographic record of the first 447

conference of the Central Planning

Board on 27 April 1942.

R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-A Extracts from report on the eleventh 457

conference of the Central Planning

Board, 22 July 1942.

R-124 Def. Ex. 5 Extract from the stenographic report 509

of the eleventh conference of the

Central Planning Board, 22 July

1942.

R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-A Extracts from report on the 459

seventeenth conference of the

Central Planning Board, 28 October

1942.

R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-A Extracts from stenographic minutes of 461

twenty-first conference of Central

Planning Board, 30 October 1942.

R-124 Def. Ex. 6 Extract from the stenographic minutes 510

of the twenty-second conference of

the Central Planning Board, 2

November 1942.

R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-B Extracts from stenographic minutes of 465

the twenty-third conference of the

Central Planning Board, 3 November

1942.

R-124 Def. Ex. 7 Extract from the stenographic minutes 510

of the thirty-second conference of

the Central Planning Board, 12

February 1943.

R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-A Extracts from stenographic minutes of 467

the thirty-third conference of the

Central Planning Board, 16 February

1943.

R-124 Def. Ex. 8 Extract from the stenographic minutes 511

of the thirty-third conference of

the Central Planning Board, 16

February 1943.

R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-A Extracts from stenographic minutes of 471

the thirty-sixth conference of the

Central Planning Board, 22 April

1943.

R-124 Def. Ex. 9 Extract from stenographic minutes of 516

the thirty-ninth conference of the

Central Planning Board, 23 April

1943.

R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-A Report of the forty-second conference 475

of the Central Planning Board, 23

June 1943.

R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-A Extracts from stenographic minutes of 478

the fifty-third conference of the

Central Planning Board, 16 February

1944.

R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-B Report on the fifty-third conference 479

of the Central Planning Board, 16

February 1944.

R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-A Extracts from the stenographic minutes 484

of the fifty-fourth conference of

the Central Planning Board, 1 March

1944.

R-124 Def. Ex. 31 Extracts from the stenographic minutes 517

of the fifty-fourth conference of

the Central Planning Board, 1 March

1944.

R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-D Extracts from the report on the 498

fifty-sixth conference of the

Central Planning Board, 4 April

1944.

R-124 Def. Ex. 1 Extract from report on Fuehrer 438

conference attended by Milch on 19

February 1942.

R-124 Def. Ex. 32 Extract from the Fuehrer conference 438

minutes, 21 and 22 April 1942.

R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-B Letter of 20 October 1942 transmitting 448

the statutes of the Central Planning

Board.

R-124 Def. Ex. 2 Extract from the Fuehrer conference 439

minutes of 3, 4, 5 January 1943.

R-124 Def. Ex. 33 Extract from report on Fuehrer 441

conference of 30 May 1943.

R-124 Pros. Ex. 124 Speer’s minutes of a conference with 501

Hitler on 8 July 1943.

R-124 Def. Ex. 4 Extract from report of Fuehrer 442

conference of 11-12 September 1943.

R-124 Def. Ex. 34 Extract from Fuehrer conference of 1-4 443

January 1944, concerning Speer’s

report on the French labor

situation.

R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-A Extract from the report by Saur of the 502

conference with the Fuehrer, 5 March

1944.

R-124 Pros. Ex. 48-E Extracts from the minutes of 539

discussions between Saur and the

Fuehrer, 6 and 7 April 1944.

Speer Ex. 34 Def. Ex. 17 Order of Hitler, 21 April 1944, 560

delegating to Dorsch authority for

Jaegerstab constructions.

TESTIMONIES

Excerpts from the testimony of defendant _Milch_ 635

Extracts of testimony of defense witness Fritz _Schmelter_ 567

Extracts of testimony of defense witness Xaver _Dorsch_ 583

Extracts from testimony of defense witness Max _Koenig_ 615

Excerpts from the testimony given by defense witness Albert _Speer_ 502

before Commission on 19 February 1947

TRANSCRIBER NOTES

Punctuation and spelling has been maintained except where obvious

printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for

periods. American spelling occurs throughout the document. Multiple

occurrences of the following spellings which differ and are found

throughout this volume are as follows:

border line borderline

front line front-line

Jewish Bolshevik Jewish-Bolshevik

Fraeulein Frau

Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb

tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the

tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations

between the German, English, Russian and French documents presented in

the trial(s). This volume had no German, Polish, Russian or other

eastern European diacritics, only French diacritics. As a result,

Goering and Fuehrer are spelled without umlauts throughout.

An attempt has been made to produce this ebook in a format as close as

possible to the original document's presentation and layout.

Some illustrations were moved to facilitate page layout.

[The end of _Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military

Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 (Oct 1946-Apr 1949) (Vol.

2)_, by Anonymous.]

Trials of war criminals before the Nuernberg military tribunals under control council law no. 10, volume II · 第 18 / 18 章