TO DEFEND THE NORTHERN GATEWAY
CHARACTER OF THE RED-COATED INVADERS--“SHAMED THE MOST FEROCIOUS
BARBARIANS OF ANTIQUITY”--WORK OF THE YOUTHFUL YANKEE LIEUTENANT
MACDONOUGH TO STAY THE TIDE ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN--SHIP-BUILDING
AT OTTER CREEK--A BRITISH ATTEMPT AGAINST THE NEW VESSELS
REPULSED--THE BRITISH SHIP-BUILDERS AT ISLE-AUX-NOIX--A COMPARISON
OF FORCES BEFORE THE BATTLE--MACDONOUGH’S FORESIGHT IN CHOOSING THE
BATTLE-GROUND--MACDONOUGH AS A SEAMAN.
We return once more to the Adirondacks--to Lake Champlain--to the
Northern Gateway of the Nation as it was found in the war of 1812.
Let the reader travel the whole nation over--travel from Eastport to
San Diego and from Whatcom to Key West, he cannot find a region that
stirs the blood of the patriot more than does the Adirondacks. Three
times since the Americans first fought for liberty came the hosts of
the enemy with the north wind into the narrow gulch where lies Lake
Champlain--they came in whelming drifts to the Split Rock, to Saratoga,
and to Plattsburg. And then, like the snow on the sunny southern
slopes in May, they melted away. Remarkable--even astounding, as it
seems to the tourist of these days--was the ending of two of these
invasions. For though Champlain is but a narrow water, and in those
days the region round about was in great part an unexplored wilderness,
both invasions ended in naval battles between squadrons, and in the
later one there was a ship that rated with the _Constellation_ and the
_Macedonian_--a frigate fit to sail on any sea.
[Illustration: Near Skenesborough on Lake Champlain.
_From an old engraving in the collection of Mr. W. C. Crane._]
How the British under Carleton saw “the face of the enemy” near the
Split Rock, and Carleton abandoned forever his hope of glory, has
already been told, and it now remains to recall to the memory of the
reader how Macdonough met the British forces behind Cumberland Head
and, in spite of their superior force, destroyed their power.
Of great moment and far-reaching were the campaigns planned by the
British against the young American republic in the summer of 1814.
Napoleon had fallen. On March 31st the Duke of Wellington had marched
into Paris, and on May 11th Napoleon abdicated the throne of France and
was sent away to the island of Elba in the Mediterranean. The hosts of
veterans that had accomplished the defeat of the French emperor could
then be carried across the Western Ocean to fight the Yankees.
What the character of the veterans who were thus sent to the United
States was, has been accurately and in detail told both by the Duke of
Wellington himself and by Napier.
Says the Duke, who commanded but failed to restrain them, regarding
their deeds in a friendly country:
“It is impossible to describe to you the irregularities and outrages
committed by the troops. There is not an outrage of any description
that has not been committed on a people who have uniformly received
them as friends.”
And Napier describes as follows the sacking of Badajos by these
veterans:
“All the dreadful passions of human nature were displayed. Shameless
rapacity, brutal intemperance, savage lust, cruelty and murder,
shrieks and piteous lamentations, groans, shouts, imprecations, the
hissing of fires bursting from the houses, the crashing of doors and
windows, and reports of muskets used in violence resounded for two days
and nights in the streets of Badajos.”
These veterans, who “shamed the most ferocious barbarians of
antiquity,” (Napier), were sent across the Atlantic to subjugate a
people fighting for freedom from equally brutal press gangs. Some of
them were sent to the South that they might take New Orleans and so
add the whole watershed of the Mississippi to the British domains, and
the number sent on that invasion seemed overwhelming. Washington had
been taken meantime, and the public buildings, including the national
library, burned. The region of the Chesapeake was overrun. The whole
Atlantic coast was blockaded by the tremendous fleets that the British
were able to send at the end of the European war. And then came other
hosts of “Wellington’s Invincibles” to the Sorel River, bound, through
the northern gateway, to the head-waters of the Hudson, that they might
cut off New England from the middle and southern States.
As the reader will remember, the Americans had two small sloops
(one-masted vessels) on Lake Champlain during 1813--the _Growler_ and
the _Eagle_, each mounting eleven guns. These were sent by Lieutenant
Thomas Macdonough in chase of three British gun-boats, and so eager
were the Yankee crews that the sloops followed the British into the
outlet of the lake and so far toward the St. Lawrence as to arrive in
sight of Isle-aux-Noix, where the British had a fort and where three
more British gun-boats were lying. It was now the turn of the British
to force the fighting, and they gathered in great numbers on both
shores of the river, while the gun-boats, that had, as usual, a long
gun each, turned and opened fire at long range. The indiscreet zeal of
Lieutenant Sydney Smith, who commanded the American sloops, was fatal,
for both were captured.
To repair the loss thus sustained Macdonough seized a merchant
sloop called the _Rising Sun_ (built at Essex, in 1810, for E. A.
Boynton), and converted her into a war-vessel by mounting seven long
nine-pounders on her deck. She was renamed the _Preble_. But he was
unable to secure a sufficient sea-power to prevent an invasion by a
British force that reached the Saranac River a little later, though
he undoubtedly hastened the retiring of that force and prevented any
further invasions during 1813.
Then as fall came on he repaired to the village of Vergennes, on the
Otter Creek (seven miles up from the lake) in Vermont. Vergennes had
a brisk community in those days. There were an iron foundry and a
rolling-mill and a wire factory there, besides saw-mills and a lot of
other industries, the whole dependent on the water-power found in the
falls of the creek. Macdonough found there just the workmen needed, and
to insure the control of this gateway to the American Union during the
next season, he laid, early in the spring, the keel of a full-rigged
ship--a corvette--to which he gave the significant name of _Saratoga_.
The forests furnished timber in abundance, the rolling-mills made the
bar iron for fastenings, and the foundry turned out no less than one
hundred and seventy-seven tons of shot for the great guns.
Then a vessel that had been built as a merchant steamer was taken for
the use of the Government, and because her machinery got out of order
at every trip it was removed and she was rigged as a schooner under the
name of _Ticonderoga_.
With the melting of the ice, came the news that the British intended
to come to the Otter and destroy the new ships. A fort that mounted
seven twelve-pounders on naval carriages had been erected to command
the mouth of Otter Creek, and Macdonough sent a party of seamen to
reinforce the militia that manned this battery. It was on May 14,
1814, that the British appeared. There were eight gun-boats, each
with a long gun (presumably eighteen and twenty-four pounders) and a
bomb-sloop with a big mortar on her deck. The battery on shore opened
fire as soon as the enemy came within range, and the enemy replied for
an hour, when they gave it up and retired.
A few days later Macdonough brought his new ship, the _Saratoga_, the
rebuilt steamer _Ticonderoga_, and the sloop _Preble_ out of the creek,
and with his gun-boats added was, for the time, master of the lake.
Meantime, however, the British Government had determined, as said, on
an invasion like that of the defeated Burgoyne, in the Revolutionary
war--an invasion that should cut the nation in two on the line of the
Hudson. To accomplish this it was necessary to gain complete control of
Lake Champlain. The country had been so far improved that an army could
find a roadway along the lake and away to the south, where Burgoyne
had been obliged to hew his way through a wilderness; but the control
of the lake was, nevertheless, essential. To hold the control they
supposed they had when they captured the sloops _Growler_ and _Eagle_,
they had built the brig _Linnet_, a vessel of the exact size of the
American schooner _Ticonderoga_. But when they found that Macdonough
had brought out a corvette (she measured about seven hundred and
thirty-four tons) they laid down the keel of a frigate, the exact size
of which is nowhere given, but it rated, later, in our navy with the
frigates of 1,400 tons. The lowest estimate of her size places it at
1,200 tons. She was built at Isle-aux-Noix in the Sorel--the outlet of
Lake Champlain--and was launched on August 25, 1814.
Hearing of the work upon her, Macdonough returned to Vergennes, on
the Otter Creek, and once more made the air resound with the slash
and rasp and click of broadaxe, saw, and maul. The keel of a brig was
laid on July 29th, and on August 16th she slid into the water--she had
been built in nineteen days! And yet she was about as large as the
_Lawrence_ and the _Niagara_, with which Perry won the victory of Lake
Erie--she measured well up toward five hundred tons. She was called the
_Surprise_, at first, but the name was changed to _Eagle_ later on.
[Illustration: Thomas Macdonough.
_From an engraving by Forrest of the portrait by Jarvis._]
The fleet which Macdonough now commanded was as follows: the
_Saratoga_, manned by a crew of two hundred and forty and carrying
eight long twenty-fours, six short forty-twos, and twelve short
thirty-twos; the brig _Eagle_, Captain Robert Henly, manned by a crew
of one hundred and fifty, and carrying eight long eighteens and twelve
short thirty-twos; the schooner _Ticonderoga_, Lieutenant Stephen
Cassin, manned by a crew of one hundred and twelve, and carrying
four long eighteens, eight long twelves, and five short thirty-twos;
the sloop _Preble_, with a crew of thirty and an armament of seven
long nines. In addition to these he had the gun-boats _Borer_,
_Centipede_, _Nettle_, _Allen_, _Viper_, and _Burrows_, mounting each
a long twenty-four and a short eighteen, with the _Wilmer_, _Ludlow_,
_Aylwin_, and _Ballard_, each carrying a long twelve. The larger
gun-boats had in all two hundred and forty-six men and the smaller
one hundred and four. On the whole, the squadron carried crews that
aggregated eight hundred and eighty-two men, and eighty-six guns that
threw at a broadside 1,194 pounds of shot, of which four hundred and
eighty pounds were from long guns and seven hundred and fourteen from
short.
Because so small a weight of shot was thrown from long guns, and
because the American force has been so grossly misrepresented by the
British historians, it is proper here to remind the reader of the very
great superiority of long over short guns. The fact that short guns
(carronades) went out of use long ago is sufficient proof of this, but
it is just as well to keep in mind that the short thirty-twos such as
were used in the battle of Lake Champlain, could bear a charge of but
two and a half pounds of powder, at most, while a long twenty-four,
the shot of which was four-tenths of an inch less in diameter, used a
charge of not less than five pounds, and it could stand a pound and
even two pounds more. By the tables of ranges given by Sir Howard
Douglas in his famous work on gunnery, Macdonough’s short thirty-twos
could carry but two hundred yards with an elevation of one-half of a
degree (at point-blank the range was less than one hundred yards) while
the long twenty-fours of the British fleet, at an elevation of one-half
of a degree, carried five hundred yards. This is the range at which the
ball would strike smooth water when fired from a point five feet four
inches above the water. It would bound along much farther, of course,
but the figures are worth quoting, to show approximately the difference
in penetrating power of the long gun and the short gun.
To meet the American squadron came the British with a frigate, a large
brig, two sloops, and thirteen gun-boats. The frigate _Confiance_ was
manned by a crew of not less than three hundred and twenty-five men,
and she was armed with thirty-one long twenty-fours (one on a pivot
forward) and in addition carried six short guns that were probably
forty-twos, but may have been thirty-twos. She could fire sixteen long
twenty-fours in a broadside--her long-gun broadside was but ninety-six
pounds short of the long-gun broadside of the whole American fleet.
This weight was exactly made up by the British brig _Linnet_, that
was armed with sixteen long twelves--fired ninety-six pounds in a
broadside. At the range of this battle these two vessels alone should
have been equal to the entire American squadron, for not only was
their long gun metal equal to the Americans, but they had the very
great advantage of concentrating in these two ships the weight of long
metal that was scattered over fourteen vessels on the American side.
The advantage of concentration of power into few ships is so well
understood in these days of huge battleships that nothing more need be
said on that subject.
In addition to these powerfully armed vessels they had the two vessels
captured from the Americans the year before, which had been rebuilt
and now measured one hundred and twelve and one hundred and ten tons,
respectively, and were armed, the _Chubb_ with one long six-pounder and
ten short eighteens, the _Finch_ with four long sixes and seven short
eighteens. And then there were the gun-boats. The _Sir James Yeo_, the
_Sir George Prevost_, and the _Sir Sidney Beckwith_ carried a long
twenty-four and a short thirty-two each. The _Broke_ carried a long
eighteen and a short thirty-two. The _Murray_ carried a long eighteen
and a short eighteen. The _Wellington_, the _Tecumseh_, and another
whose name is not recorded carried a long eighteen each, while the
_Drummond_, the _Simcoe_, and three others whose names were omitted
in Macdonough’s report (from which this list of gun-boats is taken)
carried short thirty-twos. The British threw at least six hundred and
sixty pounds of metal from long guns where the Americans could throw
but four hundred and eighty. The American short guns threw seven
hundred and fourteen pounds of metal to five hundred and sixty-four at
least from the British.
When we come to a consideration of the crews it is worth noting
first of all that the Americans were commanded by Lieutenant Thomas
Macdonough, a man of twenty-eight years, who was called commodore
by courtesy because he commanded a squadron. The British were under
Captain George Downie, a man of mature years and wide experience. The
whole number of men on each fleet cannot now be ascertained beyond
dispute, but the Americans had, as already said, eight hundred and
eighty-two, as near as can be determined. The British historians place
their force at a smaller figure, and denounce as cowards the Canadians
who manned the British gun-boats. The highest number of men they allow
to their flagship is three hundred, although there were more than this
number of dead and prisoners taken out of her after the battle, and
not a few of the dead were thrown overboard from her during the battle
to get them out of the way. Moreover, there was no reason why any
vessel of their squadron should be undermanned, for they had a great
army on which to draw for men who could handle cannon and muskets. The
lowest American estimate in any printed table of the forces is given
by Roosevelt, who says they had nine hundred and thirty-seven men, and
then adds, in a footnote, “About; there were probably more rather than
less,” nevertheless the reader must keep in mind that this battle was
fought and won at long range, save for a small part at the tail of the
line, and neither the actual nor the relative number of men engaged is
of any material consequence. Each side had enough men to handle the
guns and the ships when the fight began, and that was all either side
could wish for. It was a battle of practical seamanship and accuracy in
aiming long-range guns. The men that could show the better seamanship
and the greater accuracy were to win, in spite of odds; and this is the
way they did it:
[Illustration: Major-General Alexander Macomb.
_From an engraving by Longacre of the portrait by Sully._]
To begin at the beginning of the preparations, Macdonough chose the
best place on the lake for receiving the enemy that was to come against
him. With the chart of the lake in mind--possibly with the story
of Arnold’s battle behind Valcour Island also in mind--Macdonough
carried his squadron to Plattsburg Bay. For Sir George Prevost,
Governor-General of Canada, with an army that, at the lowest
estimate, contained 11,000 men, chiefly “Wellington’s Invincibles,”
was coming to Plattsburg, where General Alexander Macomb could muster
at first only 1,500 effective men to meet him, although some thousands
of militia, including 2,500 hardy Green Mountain Boys, came to help
before the battle occurred. But the supporting of Macomb was only one
of the lesser reasons that led the able Yankee lieutenant to anchor his
squadron in Plattsburg Bay. As was said in describing Arnold’s battle,
the wind comes either from the north or the south when it blows in the
gorge of Lake Champlain. The British were coming from the north. Their
ships were of shoal draught. The water was very narrow. The current
runs toward the north. They could come only when the wind was from the
north. Now Plattsburg Bay opens toward the south. It is enclosed on
the east by a point of land that, at places, is two hundred feet high,
called Cumberland Head. The British squadron in coming from the north
with a fair wind would have to round Cumberland Head and then go up
into this bay against the wind that had brought them before they could
reach the Yankee ships. And reach the Yankee ships they must--they
could not go on to the south leaving a Yankee squadron behind them any
more than Carleton could go on leaving Arnold behind him.
So the position in Plattsburg Bay gave Macdonough the weather gage of
the enemy beyond peradventure. But that was not all of the advantage.
Macdonough anchored his vessels in a line, nearly north and south,
at a distance of about one hundred yards from each other, placing
the brig _Eagle_, that was at the north end of the line, so near to
Cumberland Head that the enemy could not easily pass around that end
of the line and double up on it. Indeed, since the enemy was sure to
have a head wind in the bay, it was practically impossible to double
around the north end of the line. Next to the _Eagle_ lay the corvette
_Saratoga_; astern of her was the _Ticonderoga_, and, last of all, was
the little sloop _Preble_. Observe that the head of the line was the
_Eagle_, the second best Yankee ship, and next to her lay the best of
the Yankee squadron. The head of the line concentrated the strength of
the squadron and the tail held the weakest ship. The tail was therefore
strengthened by the gun-boats; but more than that was provided for,
because in case the weak _Preble_ were attacked by the British flagship
the big _Saratoga_ or the _Eagle_ could go down-wind to help her.
Still another advantage is found in this position chosen by Macdonough.
The British were obliged to come in between his line and Cumberland
Head, and so could not take a position wholly beyond the range of the
Yankee short guns. As a matter of fact, the British commander anchored
as far away as he could, but he was obliged by the conformation of the
land to come in and take his chances with the carronades.
Having placed his ships in the best possible position for receiving
the enemy, Macdonough made one other provision for the battle, and it
was one that really saved the day. He hung anchors from the sterns as
well as from the bows of his ships. Just how he arranged the stern
anchors is not made clear to a landsman in Macdonough’s report or in
any documents relating to the fight. If the reader will keep in mind
the fact that a ship when at anchor always swings with her bow toward
the wind, the matter will appear clearer. As the Yankee ships swung
thus a hawser was carried from the stern of each ship either to the
anchor or to some point on its cable, and made fast. These were the
springs. So, then, the ship was held at each end to the anchor and
could be made to swing broadside to the wind. And that means that while
the wind was blowing out of the bay and the British ships had to come
into the bay against it, the Yankee ships lay with their broadsides
toward the enemy. But that was not all. Both cable and spring might
be shot away, although both were on the side of the ship away from the
enemy. So an extra anchor was planted broad off on each bow. By hauling
on hawsers leading to the various anchors the ship could be turned
one way or another. Further than that, an anchor was provided at the
stern. If this was dropped and the bow cable cut, the wind would swing
the ship around so that she would lie stern to it instead of bow to
it. And this is called “winding” a ship. In short, Macdonough, though
but twenty-eight years old, was a thorough seaman. He prepared and
could handle every device for working his ships in the battle that was
to come. He could, in perfect confidence, await the onslaught of the
enemy.